10517 World Development Report 1992 Development and the Environment WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS World Development Report 1992 Development and the Environment Published for the World Bank Oxford University Press Oxford University Press OXFORD NEW YORK TORONTO DELHI BOMBAY CALCUTFA MADRAS KARACHI KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE HONG KONG TOKYO NAIROBI DAR ES SALAAM CAPE TOWN MELBOURNE AUCKLAND and associated companies in BERLIN IBADAN © 1992 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / THE WORLD BANK 1818 H Street, N.W, Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016 Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Manufactured in the United States of America First printing May 1992 Second printing May 1993 The maps that accompany the text have been prepared solely for the convenience of the reader; the designations and presentation of material in them do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Bank, its affiliates, or its Board or member countries concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city, or area, or of the authorities thereof, or concerning the delimitation of its boundaries or its national affiliation. The composite satellite photograph on the front cover is reproduced with the permission of The GeoSphere Project, Tom Van Sant, Inc. 146 Entrada Drive, Santa Monica, Calif. 90402 U.S.A. ISBN 0-19-520877-3 clothbound ISBN 0-19-520876 -5 paperback ISSN 0163-5085 S Text printed on recycled paper that conforms to the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, Z39.48-1 984 Foreword World Development Report 1992, the fifteenth in this responsible manner, it is essential that tradeoffs be annual series, explores the links between eco- clarified in a rational manner and cost-effective nomic development and the environment. The policies designed. The Report demonstrates that 1990 report on poverty, last year's report on devel- much damage takes place with little or no benefit opment strategies, and this Report constitute a tril- in the form of increased income and that a careful ogy on the goals and means of development. assessment of benefits and costs will result in The main message of the Report is the need to much less environmental damage. integrate environmental considerations into devel- In emphasizing the essential consistency be- opment policymaking. The value of the environ- tween sound development and environmental ment has been underestimated for too long, result- policies, the Report follows in the tradition of ear- ing in damage to human health, reduced lier analyses, including the seminal work of the productivity, and the undermining of future devel- World Commission on Environment and Develop- opment prospects. The Report argues that contin- ment (Our Common Future, 1987). It also draws on ued, and even accelerated, economic and human research and experience in many parts of the development is sustainable and can be consistent World Bank and builds on the foundations laid by with improving environmental conditions, but that the Bank's Environment Department and regional this will require major policy, program, and insti- environment divisions, set up in 1987. The discus- tutional shifts. A twofold strategy is required. sion and research involved in the preparation of First, the positive ("win-win") links between effi- this Report have encouraged our economists, sec- cient income growth and the environment need to tor specialists, and environment staff to think be aggressively exploited. This calls, for example, more clearly and constructively about the links be- for the removal of distortionary policies (such as tween environment and development and about subsidies for energy, chemical inputs, water, and the design of policies and programs for develop- logging) that encourage the overuse of natural re- ment that is sustainable. The lasting result is that sources; for expanded emphasis on population environmental considerations will become more programs, female education, agricultural exten- deeply embedded in every aspect of the Bank's sion and research, and sanitation and clean water; work. for more local participation in the design and im- Like its predecessors, World Development Report plementation of development programs; and for 1992 includes the World Development Indicators, open trade and investment policies, which encour- which offer selected social and economic statistics age technological innovation and transfer. Second, on 125 countries. The Report is a study by the strong policies and institutions need to be put in Bank's staff, and the judgments made herein do place which cause decisionmakerscorporations, not necessarily reflect the views of the Board of households, farmers, and governmentsto adopt Directors or the governments they represent. less-damaging forms of behavior. Both types of policy are essential. Where tradeoffs exist between income growth and environmental quality, the Report argues for a careful assessment of the costs and benefits of al- Lewis T. Preston ternative policies, taking account of uncertainties President and irreversibiities that may be associated with The World Bank ecological processes. Some would prefer a more absolute approach to protection, but for policy- March 31, 1992 makers with scarce resources seeking to raise the well-being of their citizens in an environmentally in This Report has been prepared by a team led by Andrew Steer and comprising Dennis Anderson, Patricia Annez, John Briscoe, John A. Dixon, Gordon Hughes, Maritta Koch-Weser, William Magrath, Stephen Mink, Kenneth Piddington, Nemat Shafik, and Sudhir Shetty. Major papers and valuable advice were contributed by Jock Anderson, Wilfred Beckerman, Nancy Birdsall, Ravi Kanbur, The- odore Panayotou, David Pearce, Anwar Shah, and David Wheeler. The team was assisted by Lara Akinbami, Ifediora Amobi, Wendy Ayres, Sushenjit Bandyopadhyay, William Cavendish, Nathalie Johnson, Andrew Parker, and Salenna Wong-Prince. The work was carried out under the general direction of Lawrence H. Summers. Many others in and outside the Bank provided helpful comments and contributions (see the biblio- graphical note). Mohamed T. El-Ashry provided advice and coordinated inputs from the Bank's Environment Department. The International Economics Department prepared the data and projec- tions presented in Chapter 1 and the environmental data appendix. It is also responsible for the World Development Indicators. The production staff of the Report included Ann Beasley, Kathryn Kline Dahl, Stephanie Gerard, Jeffrey N. Lecksell, Nancy Levine, Hugh Nees, Carol Rosen, Kathy Rosen, Walton Rosenquist, and Brian J. Svikhart. The support staff was headed by Rhoda Blade-Charest and included Laitan Alli, Trinidad S. Angeles, Kathleen Freeman, Denise M. George, Jajuk Kadarmanto, and Lucy Kimani. Frances Cairncross was the principal editor. Contents Acronyms and initials x Definitions and data notes xi Overview 1 Focusing on the right problems 4 Development, the environment, and the long-term prospect 7 Policies for development and the environment 10 Removing impediments to action 14 Putting policies to work 15 The costs of a better environment 23 1 Development and the environment: a false dichotomy 25 The context: population, poverty, and economic growth 25 Sustaining development 33 The nature of the challenge 41 2 Environmental priorities for development 44 Water 45 Air pollution 50 Solid and hazardous wastes 53 Land and habitat 55 Atmospheric changes 61 Conclusion 63 3 Markets, governments, and the environment 64 Environmental damage: diverse problems, common causes 64 Adopting good development policies 65 Using targeted environmental policies 70 4 Making better decisions: information, institutions, and participation 83 The political economy of environmental degradation 83 Improving knowledge and understanding 85 Changing institutions: making the public sector more responsive 87 Involving local people 93 5 Sanitation and clean water 98 Water supply and sanitation as environmental priorities 98 Managing water resources better 100 Providing services that people want and are willing to pay for 103 Increasing investments in sanitation 106 Rethinking institutional arrangements 108 What might be accomplished 113 6 Energy and industry 114 Energy 115 Industry 126 Conclusions 132 V 7 Rural environmental policy 134 Resource management by individuals and enterprises 137 Resource management by communities 142 Resource management by governments 144 Conclusions 151 8 International environmental concerns 153 Some lessons from experience 154 Responding to the threat of greenhouse warming 158 Biological diversity: an approach to common concerns 166 9 The costs of a better environment 170 Finance and the local environment 170 Financing environmental expenditures 175 Development in the twenty-first century 178 Bibliographical note 179 Environmental data appendix 192 World Development Indicators 207 Boxes 1 Development and the environment: key messages of this Report 2 2 Sustainable development 8 3 Air pollution in developing countries: three scenarios 18 4 For national policymakers: seven suggestions to guide action 22 5 Complementary guidelines for the international community 23 1.1 The population-agriculture-environment nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa 27 1.2 Droughts, poverty, and the environment 31 1.3 Natural resource and environmental accounting 35 1.4 The dismal scienceeconomics and scarcity of natural resources 37 1.5 The Aral Sea: lessons from an ecological disaster 38 1.6 Delinking growth and pollution: lessons from industrial countries 40 2.1 Environmental damagewhy does it matter? 45 2.2 Setting pollution guidelines 50 2.3 Key species: big and small 59 2.4 What is the greenhouse effect? 61 3.1 Trade policy and the environment: a summary of the issues 67 3.2 Natural resources, open access, and property rights 70 3.3 Costing environmental damage 71 3.4 Controlling air pollution from transport: the case of Mexico City 74 3.5 The polluter-pays principle: what it can and cannot do 77 3.6 Valuing environmental resources: two examples 80 3.7 Integrating environmental considerations into World Bank lending 81 4.1 Chile's new fishery law 84 4.2 Independent commissions and improved environmental analysis 88 4.3 Setting priorities in Burkina Faso 89 4.4 The gap between policy and implementation 91 4.5 Japan: curbing pollution while growing rapidly 92 4.6 Indigenous values and knowledge of land and the environment 94 4.7 Reforming resettlement through participation: Mexico and Thailand 96 5.1 Specific investments that matter for health 99 5.2 Environmental improvement, management of water resources, and the private sector in Mexico 102 vi 5.3 Willingness to pay for water in rural areas 104 5.4 Breaking out of the "low-level equilibrium trap" in northeast Thailand 106 5.5 Innovative sewerage in northeast Brazil: the condominial system 107 5.6 Innovative sewerage in a Karachi squatter settlement: the Orangi pilot project 109 6.1 Innovations in emissions control and efficiency in power generation from fossil fuels 118 6.2 The future for improved stoves programs 127 6.3 Benign technological change: the manufacture of wood pulp 129 6.4 Controlling emissions from public enterprises: Brazil and Poland 131 6.5 Regulating hazardous wastes: an innovative approach in Thailand 132 7.1 How agricultural intensification can lessen pressure on forests 135 7.2 Increasing the knowledge base to meet growing demand for food 137 7.3 Long-term agricultural trials 138 7.4 Pesticides, agricultural trade, and poverty 140 7.5 Participatory land management in Burkina Faso 146 7.6 Land zoning in Rondônia 147 7.7 Conservation in Costa Rica: building effective institutions 151 7.8 Comparing the costs and benefits of conservation and development 152 8.1 Enforcing international obligations: how the international legal process works 154 8.2 Bargaining over acid rain in Europe 155 8.3 How knowledge of greenhouse gases and climate has evolved 159 8.4 Carbon taxes, energy prices, and tax reform 162 8.5 Afforestation: not a panacea for preventing climate change 163 8.6 Greenhouse policy alternatives in developing countries: the cases of Egypt and India 164 8.7 Protecting biological diversity: key complementarities with local development activities 166 8.8 Debt-for nature swaps: innovative but limited 169 9.1 Innovative approaches to environmental policy 171 9.2 Private finance and the environment 175 9.3 The Global Environment Facility: priorities for greenhouse warming projects 176 9.4 The Brazilian Tropical Rainforest Fund: international cooperation to protect the Amazon 177 9.5 Agenda 21 178 Text figures 1 Urban air pollution: average concentrations of suspended particulate matter, by country income group 5 2 Loss of tropical forests in developing regions, 1980-90 6 3 Water use and scarcity, by region 9 4 Environmental indicators at different country income levels 11 5 Effect of energy prices on air pollution in Poland, 1988-2000 12 6 Global carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel consumption and cement manufacturing, 1965 and 1989 24 1.1 World population projections under different fertility trends, 1985-2160 26 1.2 Rural and urban population in developing regions and high-income countries, 1960-2025 28 1.3 GDP and GDP per capita in developing regions and high-income countries, 1990 and 2030 33 1.4 Economic activity and the environment 39 1.5 Changes in urban sanitation and sulfur dioxide concentrations over time at different country income levels 41 2.1 Dissolved oxygen in rivers: levels and trends across country income groups 46 2.2 Access to safe water and adequate sanitation in developing countries, 1980 and 1990 47 2.3 Urban air pollution levels and trends: concentrations of suspended particulate matter across country income groups 51 2.4 Exposure of urban populations to air pollutants, 1980s 52 vi' 2.5 Urban air pollution levels and trends: concentrations of sulfur dioxide across country income groups 54 2.6 Change in crop yields in selected countries, 1970-90 56 2.7 Recorded extinctions of mammals and birds, 1700-1987 58 3.1 Benefits and costs of policies for environmental protection 66 3.2 Ratio of price to production cost, selected energy and agricultural inputs 69 3.3 Total estimated benefits and costs of reducing exposure to air pollutants in Tarnobrzeg, Poland 72 3.4 Policies for reducing sulfur dioxide emissions from electric power generation 79 4.1 Participants in the GEMS project for monitoring urban air quality 86 5.1 Life expectancy and improvements in water supply and sanitation in selected French cities, 1820-1900 99 5.2 Supplying water to urban areas: current cost and projected future cost 102 5.3 Conserving water as an alternative to expanding supply in Beijing 103 5.4 How reliability of supply affects willingness to pay for piped water: Punjab, Pakistan 105 5.5 How spreading connection costs over time affects willingness to pay for piped water: Kerala, India 105 5.6 Safe water and adequate sanitation: three scenarios, 1990-2030 112 6.1 Energy consumption, by country group: an "energy-efficient" scenario, 1970-2030 115 6.2 Sources and consumption of energy 116 6.3 Tariffs for electric power, 1988 117 6.4 Proven reserves of natural gas, selected years, 1965-90 120 6.5 Expansion of electric power in developing countries: pollution effects and investment requirement under three scenarios, 1990-2030 121 6.6 Land used to cultivate selected crops worldwide and hypothetical land requirements for production of solar energy, 1989 122 6.7 Electric power generation: cost and thermal efficiency in the United States, 1900-90 123 6.8 Cost of alternative means of generating electric power in high-insolation areas, 1970-2020 123 6.9 Vehicle emissions in urban areas in developing countries: three scenarios, 1990-2030 125 7.1 World production of cereals to feed a growing population: recent performance and the future challenge 136 7.2 Typical property-rights arrangements for rural resources in developing countries 136 7.3 Fertilizer input and cereal yields in developing regions and high-income countries, 1989 139 7.4 Timber stumpage fees as a share of replacement costs in selected countries, late 1980s 149 8.1 How increasing alternative energy sources affects carbon emissions, 1990-2050 162 8.2 Scenarios for allocating capacity to emit carbon dioxide if greenhouse gas warming effect is stabilized at 2xCO2 165 8.3 Priority areas for conservation: three approaches 168 Text tables 1 Principal health and productivity consequences of environmental mismanagement 4 1.1 Poverty in the developing world, 1985-2000 30 1.2 Growth of real per capita income in industrial and developing countries, 1960-2000 32 2.1 Availability of water by region 48 2.2 Effects of improved water and sanitation on sickness 49 2.3 Effects of water supply and sanitation improvements on morbidity from diarrhea 49 2.4 Indoor air pollution from biomass combustion in developing countries 53 2.5 Estimated number and scarcity of species worldwide 60 2.6 Reduction of wildlife habitat in two regions 60 3.1 Policies for changing behavior 73 3.2 Simulation studies of alternative policies for controlling air pollution 76 5.1 Sectoral water withdrawals, by country income group 100 vu' 6.1 Emissions standards for new gasoline-powered motor vehicles in Brazil, Mexico, and the United States 124 6.2 Costs of pollution abatement, United States, 1989 128 6.3 Potential for waste reduction through low-waste practices, Germany 129 7.1 Contribution of increases in areas and in yields to growth of cereals production in developing regions and in high-income countries, 1961-90 135 7.2 Effect of low-cost soil conservation practices on erosion and crop yields 138 8.1 Effects of eliminating subsidies on commercial energy in Eastern Europe and the former U.S.S.R. and in developing countries 161 8.2 Conservation spending in selected countries 167 9.1 Estimated costs and long-term benefits of selected environmental programs in developing countries 174 Statistical appendix tables A. 1 Population (midyear) and average annual growth 196 A.2 GNP, population, GNP per capita, and growth of GNP per capita 196 A.3 Water availability 197 A.4 Selected water quality indicators for various rivers 198 A.5 Selected ambient air quality indicators for various cities 199 A.6 Changes in land use 200 A.7 Agriculture: production and yields of selected crops, fertilizer consumption, and irrigation 202 A.8 Nationally protected areas 204 A.9 Global carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels and cement manufacture 204 A.10 Energy: consumption, production, and resources 205 ix Acronyms and initials BOD Biological oxygen demand IUCN International Union for the Conserva- CFC Chlorofluorocarbon tion of Nature and Natural Resources CGIAR Consultative Group on International (now World Conservation Union) Agricultural Research NGO Nongovernmental organization CITES Convention on International Trade in OECD Organization for Economic Coopera- Endangered Species of Fauna and tion and Development (Australia, Flora Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, EC European Community (Belgium, Den- Finland, France, Germany, Greece, mark, France, Germany, Greece, Ire- Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lux- land, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether- embourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, lands, Portugal, Spain, and United Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Kingdom) Switzerland, Turkey, United King- FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of dom, and United States) the United Nations R&D Research and development GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and SPM Suspended particulate matter Trade UNCED United Nations Conference on Envi- GDP Gross domestic product ronment and Development GEF Global Environment Facility UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the GEMS Global Environment Monitoring Sys- Law of the Sea tem UNDP United Nations Development Pro- GHG Greenhouse gas gramme GNP Gross national product UNEP United Nations Environment Pro- G-7 Group of Seven (Canada, France, Ger- gramme many, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, UNIDO United Nations Industrial Develop- and United States) ment Organization IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction UNSO United Nations Statistical Office and Development USAID U.S. Agency for International Devel- IDA International Development Association opment lEA International Energy Agency VOC Volatile organic compounds IFC International Finance Corporation WHO World Health Organization IMF International Monetary Fund IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change x Definitions and data notes Country groups term "countries" to refer to economies implies no judgment by the Bank about the legal or other sta- For operational and analytical purposes the World tus of a territory. Bank's main criterion for classifying economies is Other economies are Cuba, Democratic People's gross national product (GNP) per capita. Every Republic of Korea, and the former Union of Soviet economy is classified as low-income, middle- Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.). In the main tables income (subdivided into lower-middle and upper- of the World Development Indicators, only aggre- middle), or high-income. Other analytical groups, gates are shown for this group, but Box A.2 in the based on regions, exports, and levels of external technical notes to the WDI contains selected indi- debt, are also used. cators reported for each of these economies. In this edition of the World Development Report World comprises all economies, including and its statistical annex, the World Development economies with less than 1 million population, Indicators (WDI), the Europe, Middle East, and which are not shown separately in the main tables. North Africa group has been separated into two See the technical notes to the WDI for the aggrega- groups, (a) Europe and (b) Middle East and North tion methods used to retain the same country Africa. As in previous editions, this Report uses group across time. the latest GNP per capita estimates to classify countries. The country composition of each in- Analytical groups come group may therefore change from one edi- tion to the next. Once the classification is fixed for For analytical purposes, other overlapping classi- any edition, all the historical data presented are fications based predominantly on exports or exter- based on the same country grouping. The country nal debt are used in addition to geographic coun- groups used in this Report are defined as follows. try groups. Listed below are the economies in these groups that have populations of more than Low-income economies are those with a GNP per 1 million. Countries with less than 1 million popu- capita of $610 or less in 1990. Middle-income economies are those with a GNP lation, although not shown separately, are in- cluded in group aggregates. per capita of more than $610 but less than $7,620 in Fuel exporters are countries for which exports 1990. A further division, at GNP per capita of and reexports of petroleum and gas account for at $2,465 in 1990, is made between lower-middle- least 50 percent of exports in the period 1987-89. income and upper-middle-income economies. They are Algeria, Angola, Congo, Islamic Republic High-income economies are those with a GNP of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, per capita of $7,620 or more in 1990. Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates, and Low-income and middle-income economies are Venezuela. Although the former U.S.S.R. meets sometimes referred to as developing economies. the established criterion, it is excluded from this The use of the term is convenient; it is not in- group measure because of data limitations. tended to imply that all economies in the group are Severely indebted middle-income countries (abbre- experiencing similar development or that other viated to "Severely indebted" in the World Devel- economies have reached a preferred or final stage opment Indicators) are fifteen countries that are of development. Classification by income does not deemed to have encountered severe debt-servicing necessarily reflect development status. (In the difficulties. These are defined as countries in World Development Indicators, high-income econ- which, averaged over 1988-90, three of four key omies classified as developing by the United Na- ratios are above critical levels: debt to GNP (50 tions or regarded as developing by their authori- percent), debt to exports of goods and all services ties are identified by the symbol 1.) The use of the (275 percent), accrued debt service to exports (30 xi percent), and accrued interest to exports (20 per- Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, and Republic of cent). The fifteen countries are Algeria, Argentina, Yemen. Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Ec- Latin America and the Caribbean comprises all uador, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Peru, Poland, American and Caribbean economies south of the Syrian Arab Republic, and Venezuela. United States. In the World Development Indicators and the Environmental data appendix, OECD members, a Data notes subgroup of "High-income economies," com- Billion is 1,000 million. prises the members of the Organization for Eco- Trillion is 1,000 billion. nomic Cooperation and Development except for Tons are metric tons, equal to 1,000 kilograms, Greece, Portugal, and Turkey, which are included or 2,204.6 pounds. among the middle-income economies. In the main Dollars are current U.S. dollars unless other- text of the World Development Report, the term wise specified. "OECD countries" includes all OECD members Growth rates are based on constant price data unless otherwise stated. and, unless otherwise noted, have been computed with the use of the least-squares method. See the Geographic regions (low-income and middle- technical notes to the World Development Indica- income economies) tors for details of this method. Sub-Saharan Africa comprises all countries The symbol / in dates, as in "1988/89," means south of the Sahara except South Africa. that the period of time may be less than two years East Asia and the Pacific comprises all the low- but straddles two calendar years and refers to a and middle-income economies of East and South- crop year, a survey year, or a fiscal year. east Asia and the Pacific, east of and including The symbol .. in tables means not available. China and Thailand. The symbol - in tables means not applicable. South Asia comprises Bangladesh, Bhutan, In- The number 0 or 0.0 in tables and figures dia, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri means zero or a quantity less than half the unit Lanka. shown and not known more precisely. Europe comprises the middle-income Eu- The cutoff date for all data in the World Devel- ropean countries of Albania, Bulgaria, Czecho- opment Indicators is March 31, 1992. slovakia, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Ro- Historical data in this Report may differ from mania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. Some analyses in those in previous editions because of continuous the World Development Report use the categories updating as better data become available, because "Eastern Europe" (the countries listed above ex- of a change to a new base year for constant price cept for Greece, Portugal, and Turkey) or "Eastern data, and because of changes in country composi- Europe and former U.S.S.R." tion in income and analytical groups. Middle East and North Africa comprises the Economic and demographic terms are defined in the low- and middle-income economies of Af- technical notes to the World Development ghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Indicators. Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, xl' Overview The achievement of sustained and equitable devel- ploited. The most important of these relates to opment remains the greatest challenge facing the poverty reduction: not only is attacking poverty a human race. Despite good progress over the past moral imperative, but it is also essential for envi- generation, more than 1 billion people still live in ronmental stewardship. Moreover, policies that acute poverty and suffer grossly inadequate access are justified on economic grounds alone can de- to the resourceseducation, health services, infra- liver substantial environmental benefits. Eliminat- structure, land, and creditrequired to give them ing subsidies for the use of fossil fuels and water, a chance for a better life. The essential task of de- giving poor farmers property rights on the land velopment is to provide opportunities so that they farm, making heavily polluting state-owned these people, and the hundreds of millions not companies more competitive, and eliminating much better off, can reach their potential. rules that reward with property rights those who But although the desirability of development is clear forests are examples of policies that improve universally recognized, recent years have wit- both economic efficiency and the environment. nessed rising concern about whether environmen- Similarly, investing in better sanitation and water tal constraints will limit development and whether and in improved research and extension services development will cause serious environmental can both improve the environment and raise damagein turn impairing the quality of life of incomes. this and future generations. This concern is over- But these policies are not enough to ensure envi- due. A number of environmental problems are al- ronmental quality; strong public institutions and ready very serious and require urgent attention. policies for environmental protection are also es- Humanity's stake in environmental protection is sential. The world has learned over the past two enormous, and environmental values have been decades to rely more on markets and less on gov- neglected too often in the past. ernments to promote development. But environ- This Report explores the two-way relationship mental protection is one area in which government between development and the environment. It de- must maintain a central role. Private markets pro- scribes how environmental problems can and do vide little or no incentive for curbing pollution. undermine the goals of development. There are Whether it be air pollution in urban centers, the two ways in which this can happen. First, environ- dumping of unsanitary wastes in public waters, or mental qualitywater that is safe and plentiful the overuse of land whose ownership is unclear, and air that is healthyis itself part of the im- there is a compelling case for public action. Here provement in welfare that development attempts there may be tradeoffs between income growth to bring. If the benefits from rising incomes are and environmental protection, requiring a careful offset by the costs imposed on health and the qual- assessment of the benefits and costs of alternative ity of life by pollution, this cannot be called devel- policies as they affect both today's population and opment. Second, environmental damage can un- future generations. The evidence indicates that the dermine future productivity. Soils that are gains from protecting the environment are often degraded, aquifers that are depleted, and ecosys- high and that the costs in forgone income are mod- tems that are destroyed in the name of raising in- est if appropriate policies are adopted. Experience comes today can jeopardize the prospects for earn- suggests that policies are most effective when they ing income tomorrow. aim at underlying causes rather than symptoms, The Report also explores the impactfor good concentrate on addressing those problems for and badof economic growth on the environ- which the benefits of reform are greatest, use in- ment. It identifies the conditions under which p01- centives rather than regulations where possible, icies for efficient income growth can complement and recognize administrative constraints. those for environmental protection and identifies Strong environmental policies complement and tradeoffs. Its message is positive. There are strong reinforce development. It is often the poorest who "win-win" opportunities that remain unex- suffer most from the consequences of pollution 1 Box 1 Development and the environment: key messages of this Report The protection of the environment is an essential part and whose livelihoods depend on good environmental of development. Without adequate environmental pro- stewardship. tection, development is undermined; without develop- Addressing the environmental problems faced by these ment, resources will be inadequate for needed invest- people will require better progress in reducing poverty ments, and environmental protection will fail. and raising productivity. It is imperative that the cur- The coming generation presents unprecedented rent moment of opportunity be seized to bring about challenges and opportunities. Between 1990 and 2030, an acceleration of human and economic development as the world's population grows by 3.7 billion, food that is sustained and equitable. production will need to double, and industrial output and energy use will probably triple worldwide and in- crease fivefold in developing countries. This growth Policies for sustained development brings with it the risk of appalling environmental dam- age. Alternatively, it could bring with it better environ- Two types of policies are required: those that build on mental protection, cleaner air and water, and the vir- the positive links between development and the envi- tual elimination of acute poverty. Policy choices will ronment, and those that break the negative links. make the difference. Building on the positive links Priorities for action The scope for actions that promote income growth, poverty alleviation, and environmental improvement Inadequate attention has been given to the environ- is very large, especially in developing countries. Such mental problems that damage the health and produc- "win-win" policies include: tivity of the largest number of people, especially the Removing subsidies that encourage excessive use poor. Priority should be given to: of fossil fuels, irrigation water, and pesticides and ex- The one-third of the world's population that has cessive logging inadequate sanitation and the 1 billion without safe Clarifying rights to manage and own land, forests, water and fisheries The 1.3 billion people who are exposed to unsafe Accelerating provision of sanitation and clean wa- conditions caused by soot and smoke ter, education (especially for girls), family planning ser- The 300 million to 700 million women and children vices, and agricultural extension, credit, and research who suffer from severe indoor air pollution from cook- Taking measures to empower, educate, and in- ing fires volve farmers, local communities, indigenous people, The hundreds of millions of farmers, forest and women so that they can make decisions and in- dwellers, and indigenous people who rely on the land vestments in their own long-term interests. and environmental degradation. Unlike the rich, of thresholds beyond which unexpected or irrever- the poor cannot afford to protect themselves from sible change may occur. New evidence that the contaminated water; in cities they are more likely impact of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) on strato- to spend much of their time on the streets, breath- spheric ozone depletion is greater than earlier ing polluted air; in rural areas they are more likely thought is a timely reminder of how little we to cook on open fires of wood or dung, inhaling know. Such uncertainties call for much greater at- dangerous fumes; their lands are most likely to tention to research and to designing flexible pre- suffer from soil erosion. The poor may also draw a cautionary policies. large part of their livelihood from unmarketed en- Because this Report is about development and vironmental resources: common grazing lands, for the environment, it focuses primarily on the wel- example, or forests where food, fuel, and building fare of developing countries. The most immediate materials have traditionally been gathered. The environmental problems facing these countries loss of such resources may particularly harm the unsafe water, inadequate sanitation, soil deple- poorest. Sound environmental policies are thus tion, indoor smoke from cooking fires and outdoor likely to be powerfully redistributive. smoke from coal burningare different from and Making decisions about some environmental more immediately life-threatening than those as- problems is complicated by uncertainties about sociated with the affluence of rich countries, such physical and ecological processes, by the long- as carbon dioxide emissions, depletion of strato- term nature of their effects, and by the possibility spheric ozone, photochemical smogs, acid rain, 2 Targeted environmental policies ment rates in developing countries by 2-3 percent of GDP by the end of this decade. This would enable But these "win-win" policies will not be enough. Also stabilization of soil conditions, increased protection of essential are strong policies and institutions targeted at forests and natural habitats, improved air and water specific environmental problems. Lessons for effective quality, a doubling of family planning expenditures, policymaking include the following: sharply improved school enrollment rates for girls, and Tradeoffs between income and environmental universal access to sanitation and clean water by 2030. quality need to be carefully assessed, taking long-term, The costs of addressing global atmospheric issues uncertain, and irreversible impacts into account. Care- would be additional. fully balancing costs and benefits is especially impor- tant for developing countries, where resources are Partnership for solutions scarce and where basic needs still must be met. Standards and policies need to be realistic and Finding, implementing, and financing solutions will consistent with the monitoring and enforcement capac- require a partnership of effort among nations. ity and the administrative traditions of the country. Specifically: Blunter and more self-enforcing policies are likely Improved know-how, new technologies, and in- to be attractive in developing countries. Policies need creased investment are essential. Open trade and capi- to work with the grain of the market rather than tal markets, the restoration of creditworthiness against it, using incentives rather than regulations through policy reform and selective debt relief, and where possible. robust, environmentally responsible growth in the Governments need to build constituencies for world economy will all be needed. changeto curb the power of vested interests, to hold The close link between poverty and environmental institutions accountable, and to increase willingness to problems makes a compelling case for increasing assis- pay the costs of protection. Local participation in set- tance to reduce poverty and slow population growth ting and implementing environmental policies and in- and for addressing environmental damage that hurts vestments will yield high returns. the poor. High-income countries must play a major role in The costs of a better environment financing the protection of natural habitats in develop- The costs of protecting and improving the environment ing countries from which the whole world benefits. are high in absolute terms, but they are modest in com- They must also assume the primary responsibility for parison with their benefits and with the potential gains addressing worldwide problems of which they are the from economic growth. Improving the environment for primary cause (greenhouse warming and depletion of development may make it necessary to raise invest- stratospheric ozone). and hazardous wastes. Industrial countries need Fourth, the strong and growing evidence of to solve their own problems, but they also have a the links between poverty reduction and environ- crucial role to play in helping to improve the envi- mental goals makes a compelling case for greater ronments of developing countries. support for programs to reduce poverty and popu- First, developing countries need to have ac- lation growth. cess to less-polluting technologies and to learn Fifth, the capacity of developing countries to from the successes and failures of industrial coun- enjoy sustained income growth will depend on in- tries' environmental policies. dustrial countries' economic policies; improved ac- Second, some of the benefits from environ- cess to trade and capital markets, policies to in- mental policies in developing countriesthe pro- crease savings and lower world interest rates, and tection of tropical forests and of biodiversity, for policies that promote robust, environmentally re- exampleaccrue to rich countries, which ought sponsible growth in industrial countries, will all therefore to bear an equivalent part of the costs. help. Third, some of the potential problems facing Policy reforms and institutional changes are re- developing countriesglobal warming and ozone quired to bring about accelerated development depletion, in particularstem from high con- and better environmental management. The obsta- sumption levels in rich countries; thus, the burden cles are great. Nevertheless, the present time is of finding and implementing solutions should be unprecedented in its potential for change. The on the rich countries. growing recognition of the importance of environ- 3 mental concerns, the rapid introduction of eco- Report concludes that the current environmental nomic reform programs around the world, and the debate has paid too little attention to the problems trend toward democratization and participation in of sanitation and clean water, urban air pollution, the development process all point in the right di- indoor air pollution, and severe land degradation. rection. The United Nations Conference on Envi- Damage to the environment has three potential ronment and Development (UNCED)the "Earth costs to present and future human welfare. Hu- Summit"in June 1992 has provided an oppor- man health may be harmed. Economic produc- tunity for the world's nations to commit them- tivity may be reduced. And the pleasure or satis- selves to an agenda of reform. It is essential that faction obtained from an unspoiled environment, the energies that have been unleashed by UNCED often referred to as its "amenity" value, may be not be dissipated but rather be channeled toward lost. All are difficult to measure, but the third is addressing those environmental problems that especially so. "Amenity" includes values that most urgently threaten development. range from those associated with recreation to those associated with deeply held spiritual views Focusing on the right problems about the intrinsic worth of the natural world. The This Report makes no attempt to be comprehen- difficulty in measuring it argues for much more sive in its discussion of environmental problems. public involvement in setting priorities. Table 1 Rather, it seeks to identify the most serious chal- outlines the potential consequences for health and lenges and suggests strategies for addressing productivity of different forms of environmental them. Not every problem can be a priority for mismanagement. Since environmental problems every country. Taking the view that the highest vary across countries and with the stage of indus- environmental priorities are those that directly af- trialization, each country needs to assess its own fect the welfare of large numbers of people, the priorities carefully. Table 1 Principal health and productivity consequences of environmental mismanagement Environmental problem Effect on health Effect on productivity Water pollution and More than 2 million deaths and billions of Declining fisheries; rural household time and water scarcity illnesses a year attributable to pollution; poor municipal costs of providing safe water; aquifer household hygiene and added health risks depletion leading to irreversible compaction; caused by water scarcity constraint on economic activity because of water shortages Air pollution Many acute and chronic health impacts: Restrictions on vehicle and industrial activity excessive urban particulate matter levels are during critical episodes; effect of acid rain on responsible for 300,000-700,000 premature forests and water bodies deaths annually and for half of childhood chronic coughing; 400 million-700 million people, mainly women and children in poor rural areas, affected by smoky indoor air Solid and hazardous Diseases spread by rotting garbage and blocked Pollution of groundwater resources wastes drains. Risks from hazardous wastes typically local but often acute Soil degradation Reduced nutrition for poor farmers on depleted Field productivity losses in range of 0.5-1.5 soils; greater susceptibility to drought percent of gross national product (GNP) common on tropical soils; offsite siltation of reservoirs, river-transport channels, and other hydrologic investments Deforestation Localized flooding, leading to death and disease Loss of sustainable logging potential and of erosion prevention, watershed stability, and carbon sequestration provided by forests Loss of biodiversity Potential loss of new drugs Reduction of ecosystem adaptability and loss of genetic resources Atmospheric changes Possible shifts in vector-borne diseases; risks Sea-rise damage to coastal investments; regional from climatic natural disasters; diseases changes in agricultural productivity; disruption attributable to ozone depletion (perhaps 300,000 of marine food chain additional cases of skin cancer a year worldwide; 1.7 million cases of cataracts) 4 Clean water and sanitation Soot and smoke are worsening in poor countries, improving in middle- and high-income countries For the I billion people in developing countries who do not have access to clean water and the 1.7 billion who lack access to sanitation, these are the Figure 1 Urban air pollution: average most important environmental problems of all. concentrations of suspended particulate Their effects on health are shocking: they are ma- matter, by country income group jor contributors to the 900 million cases of diar- rheal diseases every year, which cause the deaths Micrograms per cubic meter of air of more than 3 million children; 2 million of these 350 deaths could be prevented if adequate sanitation and clean water were available. At any time 200 300 million are suffering from schistosomiasis or bil- harzia and 900 million from hookworm. Cholera, 250 typhoid, and paratyphoid also continue to wreak havoc with human welfare. Providing access to Unacceptable 200 sanitation and clean water would not eradicate all these diseases, but it would be the single most 150 effective means of alleviating human distress. The economic costs of inadequate provision are 100 also high. Many women in Africa spend more than two hours a day fetching water. In Jakarta an Marginal 50 amount equivalent to 1 percent of the city's gross domestic product (GDP) is spent each year on boil- Acceptable ing water, and in Bangkok, Mexico City, and Jakarta excessive pumping of groundwater has led 1970s- Mid- to early 1980s late 1980s to subsidence, structural damage, and flooding. Low-income countries Clean air Middle-income countries High-income countries Emissions from industry and transport and from domestic energy consumption impose serious costs for health and productivity. Three specific Note: Periods of time series differ by site. World Health Organization guidelines for air quality are used as the problems stand out for their effect on human criteria for acceptability. suffering. Source: Environmental data appendix table A.5. SUSPENDED PARTICULATE MATtER. In the second half of the 1980s about 1.3 billion people world- wide lived in urban areas that did not meet the IQ points by the age of seven because of elevated standards for particulate matter (airborne dust and exposure to lead, with enduring implications for smoke) set by the World Health Organization adult productivity. In adults the consequences in- (WHO). They thus faced the threat of serious res- clude risks of higher blood pressure and higher piratory disorders and cancers (see Figure 1). If risks of heart attacks, strokes, and death. In Mex- emissions could be reduced so that the WHO stan- ico City lead exposure may contribute to as much dards were met everywhere, an estimated 300,000 as 20 percent of the incidence of hypertension. to 700,000 lives could be saved each year, and many more people would be spared the suffering INDOOR AIR POLLUTION. For hundreds of millions caused by chronic respiratory difficulties. of the world's poorer citizens, smoke and fumes from indoor use of biomass fuel (such as wood, LEAD. High levels of lead, primarily from vehi- straw, and dung) pose much greater health risks cle emissions, have been identified as the greatest than any outdoor pollution. Women and children environmental danger in a number of large cities suffer most from this form of pollution, and its in the developing world. Estimates for Bangkok effects on health are often equivalent to those of suggest that the average child has lost four or more smoking several packs of cigarettes a day. 5 OTHER FORMS OF POLLUTION. An estimated 1 bil- Tropicalforests declined at an unprecedented lion people live in cities that exceed WHO stan- rate in the 1980s dards for sulfur dioxide. Nitrogen oxides and vol- atile organic compounds are a problem in a smaller but growing number of rapidly industrializing and Figure 2 Loss of tropical forests in developing heavily motorized cities. regions, 1980-90 Soil, water, and agricultural productivity Area deforested (millions of hectares; Rate of deforestation The loss of productive potential in rural areas is a annual average) (percent; annual average) more widespread and important problem, al- 10 2.0 though less dramatic, than that evoked by images of advancing deserts. Soil degradation, in particu- lar, is the cause of stagnating or declining yields in 1.5 parts of many countries, especially on fragile lands from which the poorest farmers attempt to wrest a living. Erosion is the most visible symptom of this degradation. Data on soil conditions are of low 1.0 quality, but crude estimates suggest that in some countries the losses in productive potential attribu- table to soil depletion may amount to 0.5-1.5 per- 0.5 cent of GDP annually. Erosion can also damage economic infrastructure, such as dams, down- stream. Even when erosion is insignificant, soils may suffer from nutrient, physical, and biological Latin America Asia Sub-Saharan depletion. and the Africa Waterlogging and salinization are serious prob- Caribbean lems in some irrigated areas and are often the re- sult of policies and infrastructure that inade- Area deforested quately recognize the growing scarcity of water. 0 Rate of deforestation The increasing conflicts over the use of water mean that in the future, additional growth in agri- Source: FAQ data. cultural productivity will have to make do with more efficient irrigation and, in some regions, less water overall. Agricultural intensification will continue as it be- comes harder to expand the area of cultivation. (1.2 percent) and Sub-Saharan Africa's lower (0.8 High levels of inputs and changes in land use will percent). The loss of forests has severe ecological cause problems for farm communities and other and economic costslost watershed protection, lo- parts of the economy. These problems, once con- cal climate change, lost coastal protection and fish- fined mainly to the highly intensive agricultural ing groundsand affects people's lives. African systems of Europe and North America, are now women have to walk farther for fuelwood, indige- increasing in such areas as the Punjab, Java, and nous forest dwellers in the Amazon have suc- parts of China. cumbed to settlers' diseases, and 5,000 villagers in the Philippines were recently killed by flooding Natural habitats and loss of biodiversity caused in part by the deforestation of hillsides. Extinction of species is occurring at rates that are Forests (especially moist tropical forests), coastal high by historical standards, and many more spe- and inland wetlands, coral reefs, and other ecosys- cies are threatened because their habitats are being tems are being converted or degraded at rates that lost. Models that link species extinction to habitat are high by historical standards. Tropical forests loss suggest that rapid rises in the rate of extinc- have declined by one-fifth in this century, and the tion to levels approaching those of prehistoric rate has accelerated. As Figure 2 shows, in the mass extinctions may be difficult to avoid in the 1980s tropical deforestation occurred at a rate of next century unless current rates of deforestation 0.9 percent a year, with Asia's rate slightly higher and other habitat loss are sharply reduced. 6 Greenhouse warming mental scarcity into decisionmaking (Box 2). With or without development, rapid population growth The buildup of carbon dioxide and other green- may make it more difficult to address many envi- house gases will raise average temperatures on ronmental problems. earth. The size of the effect remains unclear, but the best estimate of the International Panel on Cli- The importance of population and poverty programs mate Change (IPCC) is that average world tem- peratures may rise by 30 Celsius by the end of the The world's population is now growing by about next century under their "business as usual" sce- 1.7 percent a year. Although the rate is down from nario, with a range of uncertainty of from less than its peak of 2.1 percent in the late 1960s, absolute 2° Celsius to more than 5° Celsius. There is even growthalmost 100 million a yearhas never more uncertainty about the consequences than been higher. During the period 1990-2030 the about the extent of global warming. Although re- world's population is likely to grow by 3.7 billion cent research has reduced fears that icecaps might an increase much greater than in any previous melt or that the sea level might rise precipitously, generation and probably much greater than in any there are still grounds for concern. Low-lying na- succeeding one. Ninety percent of this increase tions are at risk, and forests and ecosystems may will occur in developing countries. Over the next not adapt easily to shifts in climatic zones. The four decades Sub-Saharan Africa's population is consequences will depend both on whether poli- expected to rise from 500 million to 1.5 billion, cies are adopted to reduce emissions and on how Asia's from 3.1 billion to 5.1 billion, and Latin effective economies are in adapting to rising tem- America's from 450 million to 750 million. peratures. The best estimates, still extremely crude Rapid population growth often contributes to and largely based on studies in industrial coun- environmental damage. Traditional land and re- tries, are that the economic costs are likely to be source management systems may be unable to modest in comparison with the welfare gains adapt fast enough to prevent overuse, and govern- brought about by higher incomes. But these costs ments may be unable to keep up with the infra- will not be evenly distributed: climate changes will structural and human needs of a growing popula- riot be uniform, countries will differ in their capac- tion. In addition, the sheer density of population ity to respond to change, and the importance of will pose challenges for environmental manage- agriculture, the most climate-sensitive part of the ment. Today, for example, apart from small islands economy, differs among countries. Research is be- and city states, only Bangladesh, the Republic of ginning on a modest scale into the potential effects Korea, the Netherlands, and the island of Java, on tropical agriculture; more needs to be done. Indonesia, have densities exceeding 400 per square kilometer. By the middle of the next cen- Development, the environment, and the long- tury, however, one-third of the world's population term prospect will probably live in countries with these popula- tion densities. Virtually all South Asia would have The environmental problems that countries face such densities (Bangladesh's would rise to 1,700 vary with their stage of development, the struc- per square kilometer), as would a substantial num- ture of their economies, and their environmental ber of African countries, the Philippines, and Viet policies. Some problems are associated with the Nam. lack of economic development; inadequate sanita- Rapid population growth can exacerbate the tion and clean water, indoor air pollution from bio- mutually reinforcing effects of poverty and envi- mass burning, and many types of land degrada- ronmental damage. The poor are both victims and tion in developing countries have poverty as their agents of environmental damage. Because they root cause. Here the challenge is to accelerate equi- lack resources and technology, land-hungry table income growth and promote access to the farmers resort to cultivating erosion-prone hill- necessary resources and technologies. But many sides and moving into tropical forest areas where other problems are exacerbated by the growth of crop yields on cleared fields usually drop sharply economic activity. Industrial and energy-related after just a few years. Poor families often have to pollution (local and global), deforestation caused meet urgent short-term needs, prompting them to by commercial logging, and overuse of water are 'mine" natural capital through, for example, ex- the result of economic expansion that fails to take cessive cutting of trees for firewood and failure to account of the value of the environment. Here the replace soil nutrients. challenge is to build the recognition of environ- Agricultural stagnation in Sub-Saharan Africa is 7 Box 2 Sustainable development The term' sustainable development" was brought into example, for running down their mineral reserves or common use by the World Commission on Environ- converting one form of land use to another. What mat- ment and Development (the Brundtland Commission) ters is that the overall productivity of the accumulated in its seminal 1987 report Our Common Future. The idea capitalincluding its impact on human health and aes- of sustaining the earth has proved a powerful meta- thetic pleasure, as well as on incomesmore than com- phor in raising public awareness and focusing on the pensates for any loss from depletion of natural capital. need for better environmental stewardship. In the past the benefits from human activity have often The Brundtland Commission's definition of the been exaggerated, and the costs of environmental loss term' 'meeting the needs of the present generation have been ignored. These costs must be built into deci- without compromising the needs of future genera- sionmaking, and all short- and long-term impacts must tions"is strongly endorsed by this Report. We also be carefully explored. This cannot be done without tak- believe, with the Brundtland Commission, that meet- ing account of the uncertainties and irreversibilities as- ing the needs of the poor in this generation is an essen- sociated with some environmental processes, recogniz- tial aspect of sustainably meeting the needs of subse- ing that some environmental benefits come in quent generations. There is no difference between the intangible forms and that some impacts occur far into goals of development policy and appropriate environ- the future. Not all environmental resources can or mental protection. Both must be designed to improve should be assigned monetary values, but tradeoffs welfare. should be made as explicit as possible. Making the concept of sustainability precise, how- It is sometimes argued that the benefits from human ever, has proved difficult. It is not plausible to argue investment are temporary, while the benefits of an un- that all natural resources should be preserved. Success- disturbed environment last forever. This has prompted ful development will inevitably involve some amount some to advocate using a lower discount rate in project of land clearing, oil drilling, river damming, and analysis. But this may lead to more damage (through swamp draining. Some have argued that natural capi- encouraging investment) rather than less. The answer tal should be preserved in some aggregate sense, with lies not in artificially lowered discount rates but in en- losses in one area replenished elsewhere. This ap- suring that the benefits from an expanding economy proach has helpfully focused attention on the need to are reinvested. estimate the value of environmental resources and on Basing developmental and environmental policies on the importance of protecting certain essential ecologi- a comparison of benefits and costs and on careful mac- cal systems. roeconomic analysis will strengthen environmental This Report supports efforts to assess values but protection and lead to rising and sustainable levels of goes further. Societies may choose to accumulate hu- welfare. When this Report uses "sustainable develop- man capital (through education and technological ad- ment" and "environmentally responsible develop- vance) or man-made physical capital in exchange, for ment," it refers to this narrower definition. a particularly clear example of the mutually rein- in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North forcing nexus of poverty, population growth, and Africa, and Central America are rural populations environmental damage. The slowly evolving in- expected to be still increasing through the next tensification that occurred in the first half of this generation. Urbanization will help reduce pres- century was disrupted by the sharp acceleration of sure on the rural environment, but it brings with it population growth in the past four decades. Low a different set of challenges associated with indus- agricultural productivity, caused mainly by poor trial growth, emissions, an'd wastes. incentives and poor provision of services, has de- The only lasting solution to the diverse prob- layed the demographic transition and encouraged lems caused by rapid population growth lies in land degradation and deforestation, which in turn policies that will improve human skills, increase lowered productivity. Africa's forest declined by 8 productivity, and so raise incomes. Improving ed- percent in the 1980s; 80 percent of Africa's pasture ucation for girls may be the most important long- and range areas show signs of damage; and in term environmental policy in Africa and in other such countries as Burundi, Kenya, Lesotho, Li- parts of the developing world. Education is a pow- beria, Mauritania, and Rwanda fallow periods are erful cause of reduced fertility; a recent cross- often insufficient to restore soil fertility. country study found that, on average, a secondary Ninety percent of the increase in the world's education reduces from seven to three the number population will occur in urban areas. Indeed, only of children a woman has. Access to family plan- 8 fling services also must be increased. The rate of Water is critically scarce in some areas contraceptive use in developing countries rose but plentiful overall from 40 percent in 1980 to 49 percent in 1990. The population projections given above assume that the rate will rise to 56 percent by 2000 and to 61 Figure 3 Water use and scarcity, by region percent by 2010. This will require expenditures on family planning programs to rise from $5 billion to Percent $8 billion during the 1990s. 0 20 40 60 80 Economic growth and the environment Sub-Saharan Africaa - What pressures will economic growth place on the East Asia and natural environment in the coming years? To assess the Pacific II this question, the Report explores a long-term pro- South Asiab jection of economic output. Under present produc- tivity trends, and given projected population in- creases, developing country output would rise by 4-5 percent a year between 1990 and 2030 and by Eastern Europe and former U.S.S.R. Other Europe I- II the end of the period would be about five times what it is today. Industrial country output would Middle East and rise more slowly but would stifi triple over the pe- North Africa riod. World output by 2030 would be 3.5 times what Latin America and it is today, or roughly $69 trillion (in 1990 prices). the Caribbean 1 environmental pollution and degradation I If Canada and were to rise in step with such a rise in output, the United Statesb result would be appalling environmental pollution World and damage. Tens of millions more people would become sick or die each year from environmental causes. Water shortages would be intolerable, and Annual withdrawals as a share of tropical forests and other natural habitats would total water resources for region decline to a fraction of their current size. For- Share of region's population living in countries tunately, such an outcome need not occur, nor will with annual per capita water resources of less it if sound policies and strong institutional ar- than 2,000 cubic meters rangements are put in place. The earth's "sources" are limited, and so is the absorptive capacity of its "sinks." Whether these Note: Regional groups include high-income economies. limitations will place bounds on the growth of hu- Data are from the 1970s and 1980s. Includes South Africa. man activity will depend on the scope for substitu- No countries have annual per capita water resources tion, technical progress, and structural change. of less than 2,000 cubic meters. Forcing decisionmakers to respect the scarcity and Sources: Environmental data appendix table A.3; limits of natural resources has a powerful effect on World Bank data. their actions. For example, whereas fears that the world would run out of metals and other minerals were fashionable even fifteen years ago, the poten- tial supply of these resources is now outstripping ing depleted, sometimes irreversibly, and the ex- demand. Prices of minerals have shown a fairly traction from rivers is often so great that their eco- consistent downward trend over the past hundred logical functions are impaired and further years. They fell sharply in the 1980s, leading to expansion of irrigation is becoming severely lim- gluts that threatened to impoverish countries de- ited. pendent on commodity exports. The reason some resourceswater, forests, and With some other natural resources, by contrast, clean airare under siege while othersmetals, demand often exceeds supply. This is true of the minerals, and energyare not is that the scarcity demand for water, not only in the arid areas of the of the latter is reflected in market prices and so the Middle East but also in northern China, east Java, forces of substitution, technical progress, and and parts of India (see Figure 3). Aquifers are be- structural change are strong. The first group is 9 characterized by open access, meaning that there Figure 4 does not imply an inevitable relation- are no incentives to use them sparingly. Policies ship between income levels and particular envi- and institutions are therefore necessary to force ronmental problems; countries can choose policies decisionmakerscorporations, farmers, house- that result in much better (or worse) environmen- holds, and governmentsto take account of the tal conditions than those in other countries at simi- social value of these resources in their actions. This lar income levels. Nor does it imply a static pic- is not easy. The evidence suggests, however, that ture; as a result of technological progress, some of when environmental policies are publicly sup- these curves have shifted downward over recent ported and firmly enforced, the positive forces of decades, providing an opportunity for countries to substitution, technical progress, and structural develop in a less damaging manner than was pos- change can be just as powerful as for marketed sible earlier. inputs such as metals and minerals. This explains why the environmental debate has rightly shifted Policies for development and the environment away from concern about physical limits to growth Two broad sets of policies are needed to attack the toward concern about incentives for human behav- underlying causes of environmental damage. Both ior and policies that can overcome market and policy are necessary. Neither will be sufficient on its own. failures. Policies that seek to harness the positive links Figure 4 illustrates how rising economic activity between development and the environment by can cause environmental problems but can also, correcting or preventing policy failures, improving with the right policies and institutions, help ad- access to resources and technology, and pro- dress them. Three patterns emerge: moting equitable income growth Some problems decline as income increases. Policies targeted at specific environmental This is because increasing income provides the re- problems: regulations and incentives that are re- sources for public services such as sanitation and quired to force the recognition of environmental rural electricity. When individuals no longer have values in decisionmaking. to worry about day-to-day survival, they can de- vote resources to profitable investments in conser- Building on the positive links vation. These positive synergies between eco- nomic growth and environmental quality must not Fortunately, many policies that are good for effi- be underestimated. ciency are also good for the environment. Policies Some problems initially worsen but then im- that encourage efficiency lead to less waste, less prove as incomes rise. Most forms of air and water consumption of raw materials, and more techno- pollution fit into this category, as do some types of logical innovation. deforestation and encroachment on natural habi- World Development Report 1991 described a set of tats. There is nothing automatic about this im- market-friendly" policies for development. provement; it occurs only when countries deliber- These included investing in people through educa- ately introduce policies to ensure that additional tion, health, nutrition, and family planning; creat- resources are devoted to dealing with environ- ing the right climate for enterprise by ensuring mental problems. competitive markets, removing market rigidities, Some indicators of environmental stress clarifying legal structures, and providing infra- worsen as incomes increase. Emissions of carbon structure; fostering integration with the global and of nitrogen oxides and municipal wastes are economy through promotion of open trade and current examples. In these cases abatement is rela- capital flows; and ensuring macroeconomic tively expensive and the costs associated with the stability. emissions and wastes are not yet perceived as All these policies can enable better environmental highoften because they are borne by someone management. For example, improved education is else. The key is, once again, policy. In most coun- essential for the widespread adoption of environ- tries individuals and firms have few incentives to mentally sound agricultural technologies, which cut back on wastes and emissions, and until such are more knowledge-intensive than conventional incentives are put into placethrough regulation, approaches. And freedom of international capital charges, or other meansdamage will continue to flows can facilitate the transfer of new and cleaner increase. The experience with the turnarounds technologies. Two elements of this package are es- achieved in other forms of pollution, however, pecially important: the removal of distortions that shows what may be possible once a policy commit- encourage too much resource use, and the clari- ment is made. fication of property rights. 10 Environmental problems may worsen or improve with income growth; some worsen, then improve Figure 4 Environmental indicators at different country income levels Urban population without Population without safe water adequate sanitation Percent Percent 100 70 60 80 60 40 40 20 20 0 0 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 Per capita income (dollars, log scale) Per capita income (dollars, log scale) Urban concentrations Urban concentrations of particulate matter of sulfur dioxide Micrograms per cubic meter of air Micrograms per cubic meter of air 1,800 50 40 1,200 30 600 20 10 0 0 100 1,000 10,000 100 000 100 1,000 10,000 100 000 Per capita income (dollars, log scale) Per capita income (dollars, log scale) Carbon dioxide Municipal wastes per capita emissions per capitaa Kilograms Tons 600 16 12 400 8 200 4 0 0 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 100 1,000 10,000 100000 Per capita income (dollars, log scale) Per capita income (dollars, log scale) Note: Estimates are based on cross-country regression analysis of data from the 1980s. a. Emissions are from fossil fuels. Sources: Shafik and Bandyopadhyay, background paper; World Bank data. REMOVING DISTORTIONS. Some government poli- ernments more than $230 billion a yearmore cies are downright harmful to the environment. than four times the total world volume of official Notable here are distorted prices in general and development assistance. The former U.S.S.R. and subsidized input prices in particular. Subsidies for Eastern Europe account for the bulk of this amount energy, for example, cost developing country gov- ($180 billion); estimates suggest that more than 11 Removing subsidies and taxing energy can in a sample of five African countries ranged from 1 sharpli reduce air pollution to 33 percent of the costs of replanting. Irrigation charges in most Asian countries covered less than 20 percent of the costs of supplying the water. And Figure 5 Effect of energy prices on air pesticide subsidies in a sample of seven countries pollution in Poland, 1988-2000 in Latin America, Africa, and Asia ranged from 19 to 83 percent of costs. Emissions of particulate matter Distorted incentives are often particularly evi- dent in the behavior of state-owned enterprises. Index (1988= 100) This is important because many sectors in which 140 state enterprises are prominentpower genera- 120 tion, cement, steel, and miningare heavy pollu- ters; the "commanding heights" are also the "pol- 100 luting heights." Thus, the environment can 80 benefit if the managers of state enterprises are 60 made more accountable and are exposed to the same competition as is the private sector. 40 20 CLARIFYING PROPERTY RIGHTS. When people have open access to forests, pastureland, or fishing 0 grounds, they tend to overuse them. Providing 1988 1995 2000 land titles to farmers in Thailand has helped to reduce damage to forests. The assignment of prop- Emissions of sulfur dioxide erty titles to slum dwellers in Bandung, Indonesia, Index (1988= 100) has tripled household investment in sanitation fa- 140 cilities. Providing security of tenure to hill farmers in Kenya has reduced soil erosion. Formalizing 120 community rights to land in Burkina Faso is 100 sharply improving land management. And allocat- ing transferable rights to fishery resources has 80 checked the tendency to overfish in New Zealand. 60 The most serious mistake that governments make in seeking to eliminate open access is to na- 40 tionalize resources in the name of conservation. 20 Nationalization has often reflected the failure of 0 policymakers and aid agencies to distinguish be- tween traditional common-property systems, 1988 1995 2000 which promote sound management of natural re- No change from 1988 energy prices sources, and open-access systems that result in ex- Energy prices adjusted to 1988 U.S. level cessive exploitation. When land and water have Energy prices adjusted to 1988 been nationalized and traditional management ar- European level rangements abandoned, the environmental conse- quences have often been severe, as they were in Source: World Bank estimates. the forests of Nepal. Targeted policies to change behavior half of their air pollution is attributable to these distortions (see Figure 5). The removal of all en- The policies described above are important, but ergy subsidiesincluding those on coal in indus- they are not enough. Eliminating fuel subsidies trial countrieswould not only produce large will not be sufficient to end air pollution in Beijing gains in efficiency and in fiscal balances but would or Mexico City. And it simply is not practical to sharply reduce local pollution and cut worldwide find property-rights solutions for most of those en- carbon emissions from energy use by 10 percent. vironmental problems that adversely affect a large Other distortionary incentives have also had se- number of people "offsite' 'air and water pollu- rious environmental consequences. Logging fees tion, watershed destruction, loss of biodiversity, 12 and the like. For these situations specific policies most effective instrument. Management of land are required to induce or require resource users to use in frontier areas is another example of situa- take account of the spillover effects that their ac- tions that may require direct controls. tions have on the rest of society. The appropriate choice among instruments will Policies designed to change behavior are of two depend on circumstances. Conserving scarce ad- broad types: those based on incentives ("market- ministrative capacity is an important considera- based" policies), which tax or charge polluters tion. For many developing countries blunt instru- according to the amount of damage they do, and ments that avoid the need for detailed monitoring those based on quantitative restrictions ("com- will be attractive. These may involve taxes or mand-and-control" policies), which provide no charges on polluting inputs rather than on the pol- such flexibility. lution itself. Also attractive will be policies that Market-based instruments are best in principle provide self-enforcing incentives, such as deposit- and often in practice. They encourage those pollu- refund and performance-bond schemes. ters with the lowest costs of control to take the Several lessons can be drawn from recent most remedial action, and they thus impose less of experience: a burden on the economy. A survey of six studies Standards should be realistic and enforceable. of air pollution control in the United States found Many developing countries have set unrealistically that least-cost policies could reduce the costs of tight standardsoften those of OECD countries control by 45-95 percent in comparison with the and have enforced them only selectively. This has actual policies implemented. Economic incentives wasted resources, facilitated corruption, and un- have been used for years in indirect, or blunt, dermined the credibility of all environmental poli- forms such as fuel and vehicle taxes (most OECD cies. Laws on the books and zoning charts on the countries), congestion charges (Singapore), and walls of government offices are often a genuine surcharges on potentially damaging inputs such as indication of concern, but unless policies are im- pesticides and plastics (Denmark and Sweden). plemented, they can give a false sense that serious More specific charges, such as the newly intro- problems are under control. Better to have fewer duced carbon taxes in some European countries, and more realistic standards that are truly tradable permits for air pollution (in the United implemented. States), deposit-refund schemes for bottles and Controls must be consistent with the overall policy batteries (in several European countries), haz- framework. Many well-intentioned policies have ardous waste charges and performance bonds, been thwarted by other policies that pull in the which are under consideration in Bangkok, and opposite direction. Both China and Poland have surcharges on stumpage fees to pay for replanting, had pollution taxes for years, but to no effect; as in Indonesia, are growing in importance. Indus- state-owned enterprises were not interested in trial countries have been slow to adopt market- profitability. Land-use planning in Sub-Saharan based strategies, in part because environmental- Africa has usually failed in the face of policies that ists contended that degrading the environment did not encourage intensification and off-farm em- was unacceptable at any price, but more impor- ployment. Brazil's concern about overfishing off tantly because corporations feared that they would the Bahia coast was undermined in the early 1980s have to adopt emissions standards and also pay by government subsidies for new nylon nets. charges on the remaining emissions. Most now A combination of policies will often be required. agree that market-based instruments have been Because environmental damage is frequently underutilized. They are particularly promising for caused by different actors and for different rea- developing countries, which cannot afford to incur sons, a single policy change may not be enough. the unnecessary extra costs of less-flexible instru- Reducing air pollution from vehicles in Mexico ments that have been borne by OECD countries. City, for example, will require mandated emis- Quantitative command-and-control instru- sions and engine standards, fuel improvements, ments, such as specific regulations on what abate- and gasoline taxes. ment technologies must be used in specific indus- tries, have acquired a bad name in recent years for Reviewing public expenditures their high costs and for stifling innovation. But in some situations they may be the best instruments Public expenditures can have a remarkable effect available. Where there are a few large polluters, as on the environmentfor bad or for good. It is now was the case in the industrial city of Cubatão in clear that numerous public investmentsoften Brazil, direct regulation may be the quickest and supported by development agencies, including 13 the World Bankhave caused damage by failing to interests, and lack of progress almost everywhere take environmental considerations into account or in introducing irrigation charges. Those who are to judge the magnitude of the impacts. Indonesia's hurt when the environment is degraded, and who transmigration program, Sri Lanka's Mahaweli stand to gain most from sound policies, are often scheme, and Brazil's Polonoreste projects are ex- the poor and the weak. They may be less potent amples of large programs that caused unantici- politically than the polluters whom governments pated damage in earlier years. But equally impor- must challenge. tant are design issues relating to individual project A second reason for disappointing performance componentsroad alignments, the design of wa- has to do with the inability of governments to reg- ter systems, and the provision of access to forests ulate themselves. The problem arises partly be- and wetlands. cause state bodies have conflicting social and eco- Beginning with analysis in the 1950s and 1960s nomic objectives, which allow them to use of hydroelectric projects in the United States, con- resources less efficiently, and partly because of the siderable progress has been made in applying cost- inherent contradictions of being both gamekeeper benefit techniques to environmental concerns. and poacher. In the United States, for example, Such analyses have tripled estimated returns for publicly owned municipal wastewater treatment some forestry projects and halved returns on some plants are the most persistent violators of effluent hydroelectric and road projects, making the latter discharge standards. unattractive. While private and public polluters may obstruct Most countries and aid agencies have recently policy, other influences may persuade govern- introduced environmental assessment procedures. ments to set the wrong priorities. International These are still early days for such arrangements; pressures may favor issues of interest to donors technical skills need to be developed, and lessons rather than to developing countries. And there is are being learned about the difficulties of incor- always a tendency to focus on dramatic problems porating assessment results, which are often non- rather than chronic ones; few pressure groups, for quantitative, into decisionmaking. Making the example, lobby for improved sanitation or for re- process transparent has been found to be an im- duced indoor air pollution. Moreover, govern- portant way of improving its quality and impact. ments may be pressed to address problems such as Listening to local views has also proved essential; air pollution that affect everybody, including the some lessons from World Bank experience are that rich, rather than problems such as fecal coliforms information must be shared with local people early in rivers from which the rich can insulate them- in the life of the project and that comments from selves. affected communities must be incorporated into Improving information project design. Ignorance is a serious impediment to finding solu- Removing impediments to action tions. Governments often make decisions in the Even when straightforward ways of tackling envi- absence of even rudimentary information. Interna- ronmental problems exist, governments have of- tional initiatives are urgently needed to overcome ten found it difficult to translate them into effective a grave lack of knowledge in some areas, including policy. The reasons for the gap between intentions soil depletion (especially in Africa), land produc- and performance include political pressures, an tivity in and around tropical forests, and global absence of data and knowledge, weak institutions, atmospheric issues. Countries can reap large re- and inadequate participation of local people in turns from investments in basic environmental finding solutions. data on exposure to emissions and unsanitary con- ditions, soil and water depletion, land capability, Counteracting political pressures and loss of forests and natural habitat. Stopping environmental damage often involves Understanding the causes and effects of envi- taking rights away from people who may be politi- ronmental damage and the costs and benefits of cally powerful. Industrialists, farmers, loggers, action is the next stage. Following a careful analy- and fishermen fiercely defend their rights to poi- sis, authorities in Bangkok found that attacking lute or to exploit resources. Examples of the results lead and particulate emissions deserved the high- include modification of proposed carbon taxes in est priority. The U.S. Environmental Protection Europe to assist energy-intensive industries, delay Agency estimated that, as a measure for avoiding in the introduction of transferable fishing rights in deaths, placing controls on unvented indoor Chile because of pressure from powerful fishing heaters was 1,000 times more cost-effective than 14 further tightening certain hazardous wastes stan- Involving local people dards. A study in southern Poland discovered that the benefits from reducing emissions of particu- Making choices between economic and social lates would greatly exceed costs but that this benefits and environmental costs often requires would not be true of controls on sulfur dioxide. subjective judgments and detailed local knowl- Independent commissions have proved a useful edge. Neither governments nor aid agencies are way for governments to draw on technical exper- equipped to make judgments about how local peo- tise; a growing number of developing countries, ple value their environment. A participatory pro- including Hungary, Nigeria, and Thailand, are cess is essential. Local participation also yields finding that ad hoc commissions can bring profes- high economic and environmental returns in im- sional objectivity to highly charged issues. In Af- plementing programs of afforestation, soil man- rica, national environmental action plans, which agement, park protection, water management, have already been completed for Lesotho, Mad- and sanitation, drainage, and flood control. agascar, and Mauritius and are under preparation Development projects that have not built on the for seventeen other countries, are bringing techni- strengths of existing practices have often failed. cal experts and citizens' groups into the process of Haiti's top-down reforestation program was un- setting priorities and policies. successful until small farmers and community groups were allowed to choose what kinds of trees Enhancing institutional arrangements should be planted, and where. Then, instead of Governments around the world are actively seek- the target of 3 million trees on 6,000 family farms, ing to strengthen their institutional capacity for en- 20 million trees were planted on 75,000 farms. A vironmental management. In addition to the clear large irrigation project in Bali, Indonesia, that needs for better technical skills, adequate finance, failed to recognize the advantages of traditional and a clarification of environmental regulations, approaches to pest management had disastrous re- experience suggests four priorities. sults. A follow-up project that built on indigenous Clarify objectives and ensure accountability. The strengths succeeded. public agencies that implement programs for the Involving people can be expensive and in some environmentforest and land departments, irriga- instances can paralyze decisionmaking, hold pub- tion and water supply authorities, public works lic investments hostage to unproductive NIMBY departments, and agricultural extension services ("not-in-my-backyard") activism, and reinforce need to be held accountable for the environmental local power structures. Experience suggests that impact of their activities. The same applies to do- success is greatest when tasks are devolved selec- nors and aid agencies. tively and on the basis of actual performance. In- Establish the capacity to set priorities and monitor creasing responsibilities for local governments is progress. No ideal blueprint exists for environmen- an important part of this process. Public agencies tal institutions, but a formal high-level agency for need training in participatory approaches and a setting policies and ensuring implementation clear indication from senior management of the across sectors has sharply improved environmen- importance of participation. tal management in Brazil, China, and Nigeria. Putting policies to work Ensure areawide coordination. Where intersec- toral decisions need to be madethe management How can these principles be applied in practice? of water within a river basin, the citywide manage- This Report organizes the discussion around four ment of pollution and wastes, the protection of a themes: water and sanitation, emissions from en- large populated forest areacoordination is re- ergy and industry, rural environmental chal- quired to ensure consistency and cost-effective- lenges, and environmental challenges that cross ness. Areawide organizations responsible for im- national borders. plementation of intersectoral plans have generally Water and sanitation failed. Mechanisms for coordination, however, are essential: the recently established regional pollu- Investments in providing clean water and sanita- tion units in Santiago and Mexico City are promis- tion have some of the highest economic, social, ing examples. and environmental returns anywhere. The 1980s Regulate at arm's length. Implementing agen- witnessed progress in coverage, but the costs of cies should be held accountable for the effects of inadequate provision remain enormous. In India their actions and should be kept separate from reg- no water supply system reliably provides water ulatory and monitoring bodies. twenty-four hours a day. In rural Pakistan only 10 15 percent of public handpumps were functioning have therefore used limited public funds to pro- ten years after their installation. In the first ten vide a poor service to restricted numbers of peo- weeks of the recent cholera epidemic in Peru, ple. A vicious cycle of low-level and low-reliability losses in agricultural exports and revenues from service and correspondingly low willingness to tourism were more than three times the amount pay ensues. The poor suffer the most from the that the country had invested in sanitation and very policies that were supposed to help them. water supply in the 1980s. There is growing recog- Excluded from the formal system, they typically nition that current approaches will not meet the pay water vendors ten times as much for a liter of needs of the coming years. Changes are needed in water as the full cost of the same amount of piped four areas: water. But it is possible to break this pattern. First, IMPROVING MANAGEMENT OF WATER RE- provide those willing to pay with a good commer- SOURCES. Domestic water use in developing coun- cial service. Second, explore ways of bringing ser- tries will need to rise sixfold over the coming four vices to those unable to pay (who are much less decades. The bulk of demand will come from ur- numerous than was once thought)by allowing ban areas, where populations will triple. This in- longer payoff periods for capital costs, setting care- crease will place severe strains on surface and fully targeted "social tariffs," or both. Third, offer groundwater supplies and will call for much more people with different incomes a broader menu of efficient allocation within river basins. options. Irrigation accounts for more than 90 percent of withdrawals in low-income countries and for 70 INCREASING INVESTMENTS IN SANITATION. percent in middle-income countries but for only 39 Aggregate investments in water and sanitation percent in high-income countries. Since domestic were inadequate in the 1980s (public investment use almost always has a much higher private and accounted for about 0.5 percent of GDP), but in- social value than does irrigation, it is from the lat- vestments in sanitation were especially low. Most ter that water will need to be redirected. Govern- investments have been for sewage collection, with ments around the world are grappling, often un- almost nothing for treatment. For example, today successfully, with the complex legal and cultural only 2 percent of sewage in Latin America is obstacles to reallocating water. Taking rights from treated. Evidence is accumulating in countries rural areas may be impossible for legal or political such as Brazil, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Pakistan reasons or undesirable for equity reasons. One so- that willingness to pay for household sanitation at lution is for urban areas to compensate farmers for all income levels is much higher than had been the loss of irrigation water. This need not be pro- thought and is roughly equivalent to what people hibitively expensive; the current inefficiencies in will pay for water and for electricity. This suggests use of irrigation water are so great that substantial a variety of ways of financing services if facilities reductions in use are often possible with only can be tailored to incomes. That task may be modest reductions in agricultural output. helped by important innovations now occurring in Urban water must also be used more efficiently. sanitation. Unaccounted-for water, much of it unused, consti- tutes 58 percent of piped water supply in Manila RETHINKING INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. A and about 40 percent in most Latin American recent review of forty years of World Bank experi- countries. The reclamation of wastewater is help- ence in the water and sanitation sector identified ing conserve water in a growing number of cities, institutional failure as the most frequent and per- including Mexico City and Singapore, and will sistent cause of poor performance. The number of continue to expand. employees per 1,000 water connections is two to three in Western Europe but ten to twenty in Latin RESPONDING TO CUSTOMER DEMANDS. The most America. Even so, in cities such as Caracas and effective means of encouraging the efficient use of Mexico City 30 percent of connections are not reg- water is to raise and enforce charges. On average, istered. Two conditions for better performance are households in developing countries pay only 35 essential: utilities need to be made more autono- percent of the cost of supplying water. The vast mous and more accountable for their performance, majority of urban residents want in-house sup- and they need to be placed on a sounder financial plies of water and are willing to pay the full cost. footing through better pricing policies. The private Most countries, however, have assumed that peo- sector must also play a greater role. Côte d'Ivoire pie cannot afford to pay the full costs, and they was a pioneer in privatizing water supply; the 16 Abidjan utility is one of the best run in Africa. and 50 percent of all coal consumption worldwide, When Guinea began franchising water supply, col- the gains from reduced pollution are substantial. lection rates rose from 15 to 70 percent in eighteen Shifting to natural gas and using clean coal tech- months. Santiago, which contracts out many com- nologies can reduce emissions of particulates and ponents of its water services to the private sector, carbon monoxide by 99.9 percent and emissions of has the highest staff productivity in the sector in sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides by more than 90 Latin America. What holds for water supply is percent. Curbing emissions of particulates should even more relevant to the management of solid be the first point of attack. It is cheapi to 2 per- wastes. cent of the total capital costs of electric power sup- Privatization is not a panacea. Regulation issues ply, on averageand, as noted earlier, it is impor- are complex, and in some countries no private tant for human health. All new power plants firms bid on contracts. Nonetheless, it is certain should have equipment for control of particulate that the trend toward privatization will accelerate matter. Most new ones do, but the equipment is in the 1990s. often not well maintained. The costs of reducing Emissions from energy and industry sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides are higher (un- less natural gas is available), at 5 to 10 percent of The costs of pollution from industry, energy, and capital costs. The effects on health of reducing transport are already high and will grow exponen- these emissions are usually much lower than for tially if these problems are neglected. Encouraging particulates, and the impacts on forests, agricul- energy conservation is a helpful first step in tack- ture, and buildings vary greatly by area. The case ling pollution. But it cannot solve the problem for setting tough standards will depend on circum- alone. The effects of rising populations and in- stances. comes will soon swamp any reductions in demand Box 3 shows how reducing pollution from elec- per person. It is thus absolutely essential to reduce tric power production requires both improvements emissions per unit of production. This requires in- in efficiency and investment in abatement. On av- vestment in new equipment and the development erage, prices today cover less than half of supply of new technologies. costs in developing countries, and losses in trans- REDUCING HOUSEHOLD ENERGY POLLUTION. mission are often three or four times those in in- Household energy use creates both indoor and out- dustrial countries. Improved management and door air pollution. Indoor pollution is very serious pricing will conserve resources and facilitate in- in Africa and South Asia, where biomass is burned vestments in abatement technologies. For exam- for cooking in unventilated rooms. Outdoor pollu- ple, cutting transmission losses by only one-tenth tion is a great problem where low-quality coal is in Asia would reduce the need for investment in burned, as in China, India, and Eastern Europe. generating capacity during the 1990s by about $8 Progress in dealing with indoor air pollution has billionalmost enough to pay for controls to re- been disappointing. Higher incomes and im- duce particulate emissions for every new power proved distribution systems for commercial fuels plant to be built in the entire developing world and electricity will bring about a switch away from during the 1990s. biomass, which now accounts for 35 percent of energy use in developing countries. In the mean- PROMOTING USE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY. time, improved biomass stoves, which increase ef- Nonfossil energy sources, especially renewable ficiency and reduce emissions, can make an impor- sources, offer great promise. Solar energy may tant contribution and merit greater donor support. have the best long-term prospects, especially if Reduction in outdoor air pollution from house- strong action is needed on carbon emissions (see hold use of coal will turn (as it did in the industrial below). Each year the earth receives about ten countries in the 1950s and 1960s) on two develop- times as much energy from the sun as is stored in ments: policies that favor the adoption of clean all fossil fuel and uranium reservesthe equiva- coals (such as anthracite) and a transition to oil, lent of 15,000 times the world's primary energy gas, electricity, and, sometimes, district heating as demand. The unit costs of production of photo- household energy sources. voltaics and solar-thermal systems have fallen 95 percent in twenty years. The market for photo- REDUCING POLLUTION FROM GENERATION OF ELEC- voltaics grew tenfold in the 1980s and, although TRIC POWER. Because electric power generation ac- still small, is growing at 20 percent a year. Applica- counts for 30 percent of all fossil fuel consumption tions include village electrification, irrigation 17 Box 3 Air pollution in developing countries: three scenarios This Report shows, for a number of environmental problems, three possible paths for future development. Box figure 3 Selected air pollutants in developing The first, the "unchanged practices" scenario, as- countries: three scenarios sumes that current policies and patterns of resource use remain the same as in 1990. The second shows Emissions of particulates from electric what would happen under policy and managerial re- power generation forms that would encourage more efficient use of re- sources. The third shows the effect of introducing both Index (1990= 100) efficiency reforms and cleaner technologies and 1,200 practices. These scenarios have been quantified for the cases of 1,000 pollution from energy and transport, for the use of renewable energy as a long-term means of addressing 800 the problem of global warming, and for sanitation and water supply (see Chapters 5, 6, and 8). As an exam- 600 ple, the top panel of Box figure 3 illustrates the case of 400 emissions of particulates from electric power plants. The amount of electric power generated from fossil 200 fuels doubles every five to ten years in developing countriesand so would pollution, in the absence of 0 controls (the top curve in the figure). Raising electricity 2010 2020 2030 1990 2000 prices gradually to cost-reflecting levels (the middle curve) would reduce unnecessary waste in consump- tion, lower the rate of growth of pollution, and put Lead emissions from vehicles utilities in a financially better position to invest in Index (1990=100) cleaner technologies. The bottom curve shows the ef- fect of efficiency reforms plus pollution controls. Con- 600 trols on particulate matter in coal-fired plants can re- 500 duce pollution per unit of output by 99.9 percent over the long term (see Chapter 6 for details). The invest- 400 ment costs for such controls are modest and are dwarfed by the efficiency gains from removing sub- 300 sidies by a factor of ten to one. Taxes on vehicle fuels are low in developing coun- 200 tries (and in the United States), and congestion pricing 100 is not much used. The economic reform scenario (mid- dle curve in the bottom panel) illustrates the potential 0 effects on emissions (with no change in fuels) of gradu- 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 ally adjusting taxes to European levels and introducing a "Singapore" model of congestion prices in large "Unchanged practices" scenario cities. This step would have large economic benefits (see Chapters 6 and 8) and would also help to reduce Scenario with efficiency reforms pollution. Even so, emissions from vehicles in develop- Scenario with efficiency reforms and ing countries would still quadruple by 2030. The intro- pollution abatement measures duction of cleaner fuels and technologies is thus essen- tial, as is illustrated for the case of lead in the bottom Source: Anderson and Cavendish, background paper. panel. Malaysia, Singapore, and now Mexico are phas- ing in lead-free fuel, using both market incentives (dif- ferential fuel and vehicle taxes) and regulations (man- datory catalytic converters and mandated emissions standards). Targeted policies of this kind would have a dramatic effect on pollution abatement (the bottom curve), and the costs would be a small fraction of the economic gains and health benefits. 18 pumping, and power for rural health clinics. Less individual firms about their enforcement has not dramatic, but still important, progress has been worked. It has led to inequities and in some cases, made in reducing the costs of and utilizing bio- as in Chile's copper-mining industry, is inducing mass and wind power technologies. Continued foreign-owned companies to argue for tight stan- rapid reductions in unit costs that can make these dards that are equitably applied. Incentive-based energy sources replicable on a very large scale will instruments must be more widely used. Effluent require help from industrial countries. Currently, charges will be especially important, and some only 6 percent of public research funds for energy countries, including Thailand, are considering in- is allocated to renewable sources (60 percent goes novative approaches such as the use of perfor- for nuclear energy and 15 percent for fossil fuels). mance bonds for the management of hazardous Priorities need to be reordered. wastes. Revenues from such charges can be used for treatment facilities and to defray the adminis- REDUCING POLLUTION FROM TRANSPORT. Vehicles trative costs associated with environmental audits account for one-half of oil consumption in most and enforcement. developing countries and sometimes account for Controlling emissions from smaller plants is 90 to 95 percent of lead and carbon monoxide more difficult and calls for indirect instruments. emissions. The problems are exacerbated because Taxation of inputsenergy, chemicals, and tech- vehicles are often in poor condition, vehicle use is nologiescan help, and deposit-refund schemes concentrated (in Mexico and Thailand half the fleet are potentially powerful. Leather tanning and operates in the capital city), and pedestrians spend small-scale gold mining pose particular problems much more time in the open air than in industrial because of their toxic emissions into rivers. countries. Lead is the main problem. It is being tackled effectively and relatively cheaply in some Rural environmental challenges countries; concentrations have gone down 85 per- cent in the United States and 50 percent in Europe Two important environmental and natural re- source challenges face rural people and over the past two decades. Box 3 describes how policymakers: lead emissions from vehicles in developing coun- tries could rise fivefold over the coming few de- Preventing the resource degradation that can cades or could fall to negligible levels. Policy result from rapidly growing demands for food, choices account for the difference. fuel, and fiber and from poor stewardship due to poverty, ignorance, and corruption REDUCING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION, In attacking Preserving valuable natural forests, wetlands, industrial pollution and wastes, it is necessary to coastal areas, and grasslands from being taken distinguish between large plants, which can be in- over for relatively low-value uses that are arti- dividually monitored and regulated, and the many ficially encouraged by bad policies, imperfect mar- thousands of small plants, which cannot. The for- kets, and flawed institutions. mer dominate the heavy, pollution-intensive in- dustries (chemicals, metallurgy, cement, mining, PROBLEMS ON AND AROUND FARMS. Ninety per- and paper and pulp). The worst problems include cent of the doubling in food production over the emissions of heavy metals from smelters and man- past quarter century came from higher yields and ufacturing plants (particularly in Eastern Europe) only 10 percent from cultivating more land. Inten- and toxic emissions from chemical and fertilizer sification, which will account for most future in- plants, especially in Latin America, Asia, and East- creases in production, will create environmental ern Europe. Water pollution that takes oxygen problems. The right policies are of two types: from rivers and kills river life is a problem those that enable farmers to do what is in their everywhere. Technologies for dealing with these own interests, such as managing soils better, and problems already exist and need not be expensive those that provide incentives to stop behavior except for the heaviest polluters. Capital spending which primarily hurts others. on controls cost 5 percent of total industrial invest- Protecting soils from erosion and nutrient deple- ment in Germany, Japan, and the United States in tionan urgent priority in many parts of the the 1980s. worldfalls mainly into the first category. Many A pragmatic approach to big polluters is re- options are available, including contour-based op- quired. The common practice of adopting indus- erations, intercropping, agroforestry, and changes trial country standards and then negotiating with in fertilizer application and animal husbandry. 19 These improvements can sharply reduce erosion ments and nongovernmental groups can help and raise yields and incomes. Why, then, are they overcome constraints in these areas. Interventions not universally undertaken? The reasons include that are too heavy-handed, however, such as the lack of access to credit markets and lack of knowl- group ranching schemes in Kenya, can erode so- edge of costs and benefits. Sometimes government cial cohesion and make individual ownership of failures may be the cause; artificially low farmgate property the only option. Nationalization of re- prices may undermine profitability, or fertilizers sources is almost never a good response. may be rationed because of subsidies or poor dis- tribution channels. In all such cases policies for RESOURCES MANAGED BY GOVERNMENTS. In many development and policies for environmental pro- countries governments own most of the land and tection are just different aspects of the same natural resources and need to make environmen- agenda. Reforming agricultural policies can be po- tally responsible decisions on allocating their use. litically difficult. Strengthening local research, ex- One demand for land comes from settlers. Much tension, and credit systems to enable farmers to of the 4.5 million hectares brought under cultiva- make appropriate investments requires a long- tion each year are vulnerable lands, and new set- term commitment and more support from donors. tlement for agriculture accounts for 60 percent of There is, however, no alternative if agriculture is to tropical deforestation. Too often, encroachers de- be put on a sustainable footing. plete resources in a manner that is neither eco- The overuse of pesticides is causing two prob- nomically nor environmentally viable. Promoting lems: declining effectiveness through the emer- alternative income opportunities, through both gence of resistance, and localized health problems off-farm employment and the intensification of ag- caused by runoff. Governments are responding in riculture, is the only long-run solution to these three ways. First, subsidies on pesticides are being pressuresa further argument for adopting sound removed and taxes are being imposed. Second, agricultural policies and human development pro- research efforts are yielding pesticides with grams. A study in Thailand found that providing shorter toxic lives and plants that are less suscept- educational opportunities was the single most ible to pests. Finally, integrated pest manage- powerful long-term policy for reducing menta technique that uses small, carefully timed deforestation. applicationsis being introduced in numerous In an effort to promote the right kind of settle- countries; it is financially attractive to farmers but ment, some governments have sponsored official requires careful training and follow-up. settlement programs, with mixed results. A recent World Bank review of its own experience con- COMMUNAL MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCES. Many cluded that such programs, which cost an average natural resources in the developing world are of $10,000 per family, were too often driven by managed communally. Often, this results in pru- targets and plans, tended to select settlers on the dent stewardship. But sometimes management wrong criteria, often failed to do adequate soil and systems collapse as a result of population pres- hydrologic surveys, and employed inappropriate sure, technical innovation, or commercialization. mechanized land-clearing equipment. Evidence Problems include the overgrazing of pastoral from Colombia and Indonesia indicates that, rangelands, depletion of village woodlands due to where property rights are clear, spontaneous set- fuelwood collection, deterioration of small-scale ir- tlers can be better resource managers than those rigation systems, and the overfishing of lakes and who are officially sponsored, because they con- near-shore waters. sider costs and risks. Nonetheless, settlement Where problems are serious, policymakers can needs to be guided and serviced. Viable settlement seek to strengthen either communal rights and areas need to be identified through better surveys management responsibilities or those of individuals than in the past, titles to land need to be provided within the group. Which is appropriate will de- to those settlers who demonstrate a capacity for pend on societal factors and on administrative and sound resource management, and research and legal systems. Strengthening existing institutions extension on sustainable agricultural techniques is should be the first line of action. Experience with required. Land-use zoning, which has usually pastoral associations in West Africa and elsewhere failed to achieve its objectives, must be supple- suggests that successful groups are those charac- mented by the provision of services, by titling, and terized by adequate legal protection, clear leader- by penalties for noncompliance. Innovative ap- ship, and the authority to raise funds. Govern- proaches to integrated land management that allo- 20 cate land to settlers, loggers, and extractive re- and technical assistance may be crucial to a suc- serves while ensuring the rights of indigenous cessful outcome. people are under way in the Amazon, West Africa, and Malaysia. GREENHOUSE WARMING. Enough is known to Areas that have particularly important ecologi- discern a threat of climate change from increasing cal or habitat functions need special protection. concentrations of greenhouse gases but not Traditional reliance on guards and patrols is now enough to predict how much will occur or how being supplemented by integrated conservation fast, the regional distribution of change, or the im- and development projects, which build on the plications for human societies. A threefold strat- principle that local communities must be involved egy is suggested here. in devising and implementing protection. Nepal First, measures should be taken that can be justi- and Zimbabwe have pioneered buffer zones fied mainly by their benefits for efficiency and around some conservation areas; these zones are their effects on local pollution. Removing energy intensively managed by local people to generate subsidies should be the starting point. Adjusting incomes and establish rules of access that limit fu- taxes on energy is the next step. Energy taxation in ture encroachment. industrial countries is often skewed in favor of the Although logging directly accounts for only 20 most carbon-intensive fuelsespecially coal. Car- percent of deforestation in developing countries, bon taxes have been introduced in Finland, the its impact is larger; it establishes access, encourag- Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. The nations ing farmers and ranchers to follow. Logging prac- of the European Community (EC) are considering tices have been notoriously damaging in the past, a proposal for a carbon-cum-energy tax. A number and a recent review by the International Tropical of other measures are also desirable, mainly be- Timber Organization found that less than 1 per- cause of their benefits in other areas. For example, cent of tropical forests subject to logging is sus- afforestation programs in watersheds and on tainably managed. Commercial logging must be farms (in the form of agroforestry) often have good limited to areas in which proper management is returns because of their role in protecting water- possible and demonstrated. Priority should be sheds and soils and, in developing countries, be- given to the preservation of intact tropical forests cause they are a source of fuelwood. The fact that and to reforestation of degraded areas. In most they sequester carbon makes them even more at- places, stumpage fees and concession rents need tractive. to be increased to reflect the opportunity costs of Second, research is urgently needed both on the cutting down trees. Felling leases or licenses and magnitude of the problem, especially as it may af- logging rights can be allocated by competitive bid- fect developing countries, and on potential solu- ding that is open to the private sector, local com- tions. Reducing uncertainty about potential costs munities, and nongovernmental organizations and benefits is essential for designing an effective (NGO5). policy response, but it will require a large effort. A International environmental challenges high priority should be given to research on en- ergy conservation and renewable energy sources. Institutional mechanisms for dealing with interna- Third, pilot programs and innovative ap- tional resource and environmental problems, proaches to finding lasting solutions in developing whether regional or global, are less developed countries need to be financed by industrial coun- than those available for national decisionmaking. tries. A coordinated international effort is desir- Nonetheless, experience is accumulating from past able to minimize duplication of effort and ensure negotiations, including those on the Law of the that initiatives are consistent with overall develop- Sea, various fishing agreements, international ment policies. The Global Environment Facility river agreements, conventions on transporting (GEF) has broken new ground by making finance hazardous wastes, and the Montreal Protocol on available for pilot projects to identify the scope for ozone depletion. Some lessons are that agree- widespread replication and cost reduction of tech- ments are most effective when they are based on nologies and practices that will lower net green- reciprocity and strong national interests; that in- house gas emissions. Its priorities include slowing ternational agreements often follow catalytic uni- deforestation and encouraging afforestation; de- lateral or regional action; that the lack of capacity veloping renewable sources such as biomass, solar to enforce agreements has been an important con- energy, and microhydropower; improving effi- straint on their effectiveness; and that financial ciency in end uses; and reducing methane emis- 21 Box 4 For national policymakers: seven suggestions to guide action Build the environment into policymaking and manpower. To keep down administrative costs, countries need to set realistic goals and then enforce Environmental considerations need to be intrinsic to them; to work where possible with the grain of the policymaking, not added on as afterthoughts. Environ- market, not against it; to give preference to "self- mental impact statements are already important in enforcing" instruments such as deposit-refund project analysis. They need to be extended to policy schemes; and to harness popular support through local reforms. Where economic policies bring environmental participation. benefits, those should add support to reform; where they carry possible adverse environmental costs, the Assess tradeoffsand minimize them adjustment program should include targeted environ- mental policies to offset them. Governments need to be able to assess the costs of environmental damage and the least costly ways of Make population a priority protecting the environment. Policies should be made For the sake of both development and the environ- on the basis of explicit comparisons of cost and bene- ment, population issues need more attention. Educat- fits. Citizens need to know what is being given up in ing girls, enabling women to earn cash incomes and to the name of economic growth and what is being given up in the name of environmental protection. participate fully in decisionmaking, and investing in better-equipped and better-financed family planning Research, inform, train programs all allow women to determine their own re- productive behavior. It takes time for the environmen- Research should concentrate on appropriate technolo- tal effects of these policies to be feltall the more rea- gies: low-cost chimneys to vent fumes from burning son to take action now. biomass, cheap sanitation systems to provide service to poor neighborhoods. Good information pays big divi- Act first on local damage dends by helping to set sensible policy priorities. Better Many people are killed or made ill in developing coun- skills can solve environmental problems such as inap- tries by dirty water, lack of sanitation, fumes from propriate use of pesticides and mishandling of toxic cooking with wood, and dust and lead in city air. Soils wastes. impoverished by erosion or poisoned with badly used Remember: prevention is cheaper than cure chemicals make it harder for developing countries to feed their people. Solving these environmental prob- Building pollution prevention into new investments is lems brings the biggest gains to health and wealth. cheaper than adding them on later. New technology is less polluting than old. Developing countries with Economize on administrative capacity open markets will be able to gain from importing clean Implementing environmental policy uses scarce money technologies already in use in industrial countries. sions from mining, gas transmission, and waste egy by host governments and donors. First, com- disposal. plementarities between the goals of development It is essential that the world community position and protection should be exploited. Policies that itself to take rapid, concerted action should the encourage sound agriculture, off-farm employ- balance of scientific evidence shift toward indicat- ment, and sustainable logging will also discourage ing that stronger concerted action is required. Cur- encroachment into natural habitats. Ecotourism, rent discussions concerning a convention on cli- sustainable fishing, and genetic prospecting will mate change can be important in facilitating such a be good for development and for biological diver- response. sity. Second, specific measures to protect habitats should be adopted, with financial support from PROTECTING BIODIVERSITY. Most of the world's industrial countries. Such funding should not be species reside in developing countries, but most regarded as aid and should not be diverted from spending on protection is in industrial countries. aid budgets. Because of the common international concern for As international funding expands, two concerns biological resources, there is a strong case for more will need to be addressed. First, improved coor- international efforts to provide funding and tech- dination among donors is required. The Brazilian nical assistance to developing countries. Tropical Rainforest Fund, a joint initiative by the Effective conservation requires a twofold strat- Brazilian government and the Group of Seven 22 (G-7) countries with first-phase financing of $250 physical infrastructure and protection will in- million, is an effort to ensure a coordinated ap- crease, and the private sector will spend more proach. Second, recurrent cost financing will be money on abatement. The Report makes broad es- required for continuous protection, where it does timates of costs for key sectors. The additional not pay for itself. That the pilot program launched costs of local environmental programsmany of under the GEF cannot easily handle costs of this which would add to employment and income nature highlights the need for a more durable growthcould amount to 2-3 percent of the GDP funding arrangement. of developing countries by the end of the 1990s. These expenditures would cover pollution control The costs of a better environment in energy, industry, and transport and expanded programs of sanitation and water supply, soil con- Policies and programs for accelerating environ- servation, agricultural extension and research, for- mentally responsible development will not hap- est protection, family planning, and female educa- pen by themselves. It is therefore important to tion. Although the sums required are high in an seize the current moment of opportunity to bring absolute sense, they are modest in relation to the about real change. The starting point should be benefits they will bring and to the resources pro- policy changes that will promote rising incomes vided by economic growth. and better environmental stewardship (see Box 4). Some of these changes have little or no financial Financing the program cost, but their political toll may be high. Subsidies and other interferences with markets are typically The bulk of these investments will be paid for by supported by powerful interests. The private ben- the customers of the private and public enterprises eficiaries of subsidies and other market inter- responsible for the damage and by the benefici- ferencesand those officials who enjoy the pa- aries of improved environmental conditions. Even tronage of handing them outwill fight to so, financing for investment will still be required. preserve them. Governments thus need to build In addition, governments will have to spend more constituencies of supportby, for instance, pub- on monitoring and enforcement, on research and licizing the positive economic and environmental development, on education, training, and exten- impacts of reforms. sion, and on protection of natural habitats. Financ- A second set of policies will involve financial ing for these expenditures will come primarily costs. Environmental institutions will need to be from increased domestic savingsbut interna- strengthened, public investments in social and tional finance will also have a crucial role (Box 5). Box 5 Complementary guidelines for the international community Adjust aid portfolios Ensure open trade and investment The composition and level of aid programs need Providing free access to industrial country mar- to reflect the costs to health and productivity of a kets is needed to help developing countries indus- damaged environment. Preventing pollution and trialize and grow (both of which are essential for preserving natural resources are proper goals of reducing pressure on natural resources) and to aid programs. The strong links between poverty, enable them to take advantage of less-polluting population, and environmental damage call for technologies. An immediate successful Uruguay higher overall allocations. Round agreement would increase foreign ex- change earnings of developing countries by more Invest in research and technological development than the costs of environmental protection. Gaps in fundamental knowledge must be filled. Pay for environmental services Among the priorities for international collabora- tion are the scale and causes of soil degradation When industrial countries want developing coun- (especially in Africa), the potential of tropical for- tries to provide environmental benefits (preserv- ests for sustainable production, the potential ef- ing biodiversity, restraining greenhouse gas emis- fect of climate change, and technologies for re- sions, and the like), they should be willing to pay newable energy. compensation. Such funding should be treated as equivalent to payments for imports, not as aid. 23 should not be viewed as separate from ongoing Industrial countries are responsible for most development needs; rather, it should be embed- greenhouse warming ded in official assistance programs. Development agencies and governments need to place more em- Figure 6 Global carbon dioxide emissions phasis on the close link between environmental from fossil fuel consumption and cement quality and the reduction of poverty. This war- manufacturing, 1965 and 1989 rants additional concessional assistance, particu- larly in extension, credit, and education programs and in the provision of sanitation services and wa- Per capita emissions Total emissions ter supplies to squatter settlements and rural (tons) (billions of tons) areas. Population programs must be given higher 3.5 3.0 priority; assistance should double in real terms during the 1990s. The close link between the eff i- 3.0 - 2.5 ciency of resource use and sound environmental policymaking warrants continued support to 2.5 countries that are undertaking adjustment - 2.0 programs. 2.0 - 1.5 FINANCING GLOBAL CHALLENGES. Industrial 1.5 countries must bear most of the costs of address- - 1.0 ing global problems, especially when the required 1.0 investments are not in the narrow interests of de- veloping countries. Industrial countries account 0.5 - 0.5 for most emissions of greenhouse gases and CFCs (see Figure 6) and wifi benefit, along with develop- 0 ing countries, from the protection of natural habi- 1965 1989 1965 1989 tats and biodiversity. It is clearly desirable to create Low-income countries arrangements that make it possible for rich coun- Middle-income countries tries to support poor ones in undertaking neces- 0 High-income countries sary changes. Such arrangements have the poten- tial to make all countries better off if the world's willingness to pay for policy changes exceeds the Source: Environmental data appendix table A.9. cost of the changes. It is imperative that payments under such arrangements not be treated as devel- opment assistance or be financed from funds that would otherwise be available for development as- INTERNATIONAL FINANCE FOR LOCAL PROB- sistance. They have much more the character of LEMS. Access to commercial financial markets importspayment for services renderedand are coupled with expanded foreign investmentwill quite different from aid transfers to developing be essential to facilitate the technology transfers countries. As a global response to a global chal- embodied in capital imports. The encouraging res- lenge, the allocation of such funds should be based toration of commercial flows to such countries as on effectiveness in raising global welfare, rather Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela over the past two than on meeting national needs. years must be extended to a much wider range of countries. This will require more consistent poli- The agenda for reform is a large one. Accepting cies on the part of borrowing countries, which the challenge to accelerate development in an en- should be supported by debt relief in a number of vironmentally responsible manner will involve countries. substantial shifts in policies and priorities and will Local environmental challenges deserve addi- be costly. Failing to accept it will be more costly tional development assistance. Such assistance still. 24 Development and the environment: a false dichotomy development and sound environmental management are complementary aspects of the same agenda. Without adequate environmental protection, development will be undermined; without development, environmental protection will fail. (Economic More than 1 billion people today live in abject poverty. The next generation will see the world's population rise by 3.7 billion, even if progress in reducing population growth accelerates. Most of these people will be born into poor families. Alleviating poverty is both morally imperative and essential for environmental sustainability. Economic growth is essential for sustained poverty reduction. But growth has often caused serious environmental damage. Fortunately, such adverse effects can be sharply reduced, and with effective policies and institutions, income growth will provide the resources for improved environmental management. The environmental mistakes of the past do not have to be repeated. Today, countries have more choices. They can choose policies and investments that encourage more efficient use of resources, substitution away from scarce resources, and the adoption of technologies and practices that do less environmental harm. Such changes will ensure that the improvements in human welfare which development brings are lasting. More people today live longer, healthier, and more risen to unprecedented levels as mortality de- productive lives than at any time in history. But clined and life expectancy increased. These gains the gains have been inadequate and uneven. More were the result of progress in living standards, than 1 billion people still live in abject poverty. To sanitary conditions, and public health practices, reduce poverty, sustained and equitable economic particularly the introduction of antibiotics, the in- growth is essential. But past economic growth has creased use of vaccinations, and antimalarial often been associated with severe degradation of spraying. World population growth peaked at 2.1 the natural world. On the surface, there appears to percent a year in 1965-70, the most rapid rate of be a tradeoff between meeting people's needs increase in history. Population growth has now the central goal of developmentand protecting slowed to 1.7 percent as more countries have be- the environment. This Report will argue that in gun a transition toward lower fertility. Even so, every realm of economic activity, development can world population now stands at 5.3 billion and is become more sustainable. The key is not to pro- increasing by 93 million a year. duce less, but to produce differently. This chapter To project future trends in fertilitythe largest explores the relationship between economic activ- factor in determining population growthjudg- ity and the environment, emphasizing the con- ments have to be made about two key questions: cerns of developing countries. when will a country begin its demographic transi- tion, and how fast will fertility decline once the The context: population, poverty, transition begins? Figure 1.1 illustrates three alter- and economic growth native paths for world population. Under the Population growth World Bank's base case projections, world popula- tion growth would decline slowly, from 1.7 per- The second half of the twentieth century has been cent a year in 1990 to about 1 percent a year by a demographic watershed. By midcentury the rate 2030. World population would more than double of population growth in developing countries had from current levels and would stabilize at about 25 World population will at least double and may might happen if fertility transitions are delayed in quadruple many countries. This tremendous range of possible long-term population trends depends largely on what hap- Figure 1.1 World population projections pens in Africa and in the Middle East. Together, under different fertility trends, 1985-2160 these regions account for 85 to 90 percent of the differences between the alternative scenarios and Billions of people the base case. Sub-Saharan Africa alone contrib- 25 utes more than two-thirds of the difference under the slow fertility decline scenario. Total fertility 20 rates (measured as births per woman) in Sub- Sb w decline in fertilityC Saharan Africa as a whole have remained un- 15 Ba se case a changed at about 6.5 for the past twenty-five yearsa level much higher than in other parts of 10 the world that have similar levels of income, life Rapd decline in fe rtilityb expectancy, and female education. 5 Recent statistics provide encouraging indica- 0 tions that a number of African countries are at or 1985 2010 2035 2060 2085 2110 2135 2160 near a critical turning point. Total fertility rates have already fallen in Botswana (6.9 in 1965 to 4.7 in 1990), Zimbabwe (8.0 in 1965 to 4.9 in 1990), and Countries with high and nondecining fertility levels Kenya (8.0 in 1965 to 6.5 in 1990) and are begin- begin the transition toward lower fertility by the year 2005 and undergo a substantial decline - by more than half in ning to decline in Ghana, Sudan, and Togo. The many cases - over the next forty years. All countries reach base case projections, which assume that these replacement fertility levels by 2060. Countries not yet in transition toward lower fertility begin positive trends will continue, imply that Sub- the transition immediately. For countries already in transition, Saharan Africa's population will rise from 500 mil- total fertility declines at twice the rate for the base case. Transition toward lower fertility (triggered when life lion at present to about 1.5 billion by 2030 and expectancy reaches 53 years) begins after 2020 in most almost 3 billion by 2100. Apart from its terrible low-income countries. For countries in transition, declines effects on health and welfare, the AIDS virus are half the rate for the base case. Source: World Bank data. could reduce African population growth rates by as much as 0.5-1.0 percentage points in the early decades of the next century. But because increased mortality from AIDS may delay fertility declines, the overall impact of the disease is ambiguous. 12.5 billion around the middle of the twenty-sec- ond century. Two-thirds of the increase would oc- POPULATION GROWTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT. cur by 2050, and 95 percent of population growth Population growth increases the demand for would take place in developing countries. goods and services, and, if practices remain un- Alternative paths are possible. The scenario of changed, implies increased environmental dam- rapid fertility decline illustrated in Figure 1.1 is age. Population growth also increases the need for comparable to the historical experience of, for ex- employment and livelihoods, whichespecially in ample, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Jamaica, Mexico, crowded rural areasexerts additional direct pres- and Thailand. The scenario of slow fertility decline sure on natural resources. More people also pro- is consistent with the experience of such countries duce more wastes, threatening local health condi- as Paraguay, Sri Lanka, Suriname, and Turkey. tions and implying additional stress on the earth's The stable population of 10.1 billion in the rapid assimilative capacity. fertility decline scenario is about 2.4 billion less Countries with higher population growth rates than that in the base case, but it is still almost have experienced faster conversion of land to agri- double the present size. In stark contrast, with a cultural uses, putting additional pressures on land slow decline of fertility, population increases more and natural habitat. An econometric study of than fourfold, to about 23 billion, and stabilizes twenty-three Latin American countries found that only toward the end of the twenty-second century. expansion of agricultural area continues to be pos- Few demographers expect world population to itively related to population growth, after control- reach 23 billion, but the projection shows what ling for such factors as agricultural trade, yield in- 26 Box 1.1 The population-agriculture-environment nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa Rapid population growth, agricultural stagnation, and problems are most severe in parts of the Sahel, in parts environmental degradation have been common to of mountainous East Africa, and in the dry belt stretch- most Sub-Saharan countries in recent decades. These ing from Namibia through Botswana, Lesotho, and three factors have been mutually reinforcing. The southern Mozambique. There is strong evidence that World Bank recently completed a study of this economic stagnation is delaying declines in fertility; 'nexus" with the purpose of better understanding family size may be higher (to provide additional labor) causal links and identifying remedies. Its preliminary where land damage is greatest and fuelwood supplies findings are summarized here. are depleted. An integrated approach to the problem is needed. The equilibrium upset Toward solutions Shifting cultivation and grazing have been appropriate traditional responses to abundant land, scarce capital, The traditional development approach, which empha- and limited technology. As population densities grew sized supplying services and technologies, must be slowly in the first half of this century, these extensive complemented by a strategy of promoting demand systems evolved into more intensive systems, as in for appropriate agricultural practices and inputs, for Rwanda, Burundi, the Kenyan highlands, and the fewer children, and for resource conservation. De- Kivu Plateau in Zaire. This slowly evolving system has, mand for these things can be promoted by: however, proved unable to adapt to sharply accelerated Removing subsidies that distort prices and incen- population growth over the past four decades. Tradi- tivesto promote more efficient use of resources tional uses of land and fuel have depleted soil and Improving land use planning_to promote inten- forests and contributed to agricultural stagnation. Stag- sification and protect valuable natural ecosystems nant incomes and the absence of improvements in hu- Clarifying resource ownership and land tenure, man welfare have impeded the demographic transi- giving legal recognition to traditional common-prop- tion. A combination of high population densities and erty management and private ownership, and reduc- low investment has caused arable land per person to ing state ownershipto encourage investment decline from 0.5 hectare in 1965 to 0.3 hectare in 1987. Expanding educational programs for girls and em- As a result, in many parts of Burundi, Kenya, Lesotho, ployment opportunities for women and improving in- Liberia, Mauritania, and Rwanda fallow periods are no formation on health and nutrition, in all cases through longer sufficient to restore fertility. the use of community groups, NGOs, and the private Population growth drives some people to cultivate sectorto promote demand for smaller families land not previously used for farming_in semiarid Expanding investment in and maintenance of areas and in tropical forests where soil and climatic rural infrastructure, especially roads, water supply, conditions are poorly suited for annual cropping or for and sanitationto improve production incentives, pro- the practices employed by the new migrants. These ductivity, and health. creases, and availability of land. A study of six The distribution of people between countryside Sub-Saharan African countries indicates that tech- and towns also has important implications for the nological innovations are not keeping up with the types of stress placed on the environment. In 1990 demands of rapidly rising rural populations. As a most people lived in rural areas. By 2030 the oppo- consequence, in many placesEthiopia, southern site will be true: urban populations will be twice Malawi, eastern Nigeria, and Sierra Leonefarm- the size of rural populations. Developing country ing is being intensified through shorter fallow pe- cities as a group will grow by 160 percent over this riods rather than through the use of better inputs period, whereas rural populations will grow by or techniques. Rapid population growth in these only 10 percent. By 2000 there will be twenty-one areas has led to the mining of soil resources and to cities in the world with more than 10 million in- stagnating or declining yields. In some circum- habitants, and seventeen of them will be in devel- stances, especially in rural Africa, population oping countries. growth has been so rapid that traditional land The pattern will vary substantially among re- management has been unable to adapt to prevent gions. Over the next thirty years urban population degradation. The result is overgrazing, deforesta- growth will average 1.6 percent a year in Latin tion, depletion of water resources, and loss of nat- America, 4.6 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 3 ural habitat (Box 1.1). percent in Asia. Rural populations are expected to 27 Urban populations will overtake rural populations for the first time in history Figure 1.2 Rural and urban population in developing regions and high-income countries, 1960-2025 Latin America and the Caribbean Millions 800 600 400 200 0 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 Asia and the Pacific Middle East and North Africa Millions Millions 4,500 600 J 400 1,500 200 0 0 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 Europe and former U.S.S.R. High-income countries Millions Millions 650 900 525 J 600 350 300 175 (1 0 196(1 1971) I 9$)) I 99)) 200)) 21)1)) 202)) 196 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 El Urban El Rural Note: Data after 1985 are projections. Sources: World Bank data; United Nations 1990. decline in absolute terms within a generation in all In high-income countries and in Eastern Europe regions except Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle and the former U.S.S.R. the numbers living in East and North Africa, and Central America (Fig- rural areas have been declining steadily, and in ure 1.2). Asia's rural population will continue to most South American countries, too, urbanization increase until the turn of the century but is ex- has brought about some decline in rural pected to fall back to current levels by about 2015. populations. 28 The pace of urbanization poses huge environ- points by 2000 and by yet another 5 percentage mental challenges for the cities. That is why much points by 2010. Unmet demand for contraceptives of this Report is devoted to the problems of sanita- is largeit ranges from about 15 percent of couples tion, clean water, and pollution from industry, en- in Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka to ergy, and transport. But urbanization will also af- more than 35 percent in Bolivia, Ghana, Kenya, fect the nature of rural environmental challenges. and Togo. Meeting this demand is essential for Successful urbanization and the associated income reaching even the base case projections and will growth should ease the pressures caused by en- require that total annual expenditure on family croachment on natural habitatslargely driven by planning increase from about $5 billion to about $8 the need for income and employmentbut will in- billion (in 1990 prices) by 2000. An additional $3 crease the pressures stemming from market de- billion would be required to achieve the rapid fer- mand for food, water, and timber. In much of Sub- tility decline scenario. Choices about family plan- Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, ning and education policies today will determine and Central America rural populations are likely to world population levels, and the consequent pres- increase by about 50 percent over the next genera- sures on the environment, in the next century. tion, and direct pressure on natural resources, par- ticularly by poor subsistence farmers, will The persistence of poverty intensify. The primary task of development is to eliminate POLICIES FOR REDUCING POPULATION GROWTH. poverty. Substantial progress has been achieved The declining fertility rates associated with the over the past twenty-five years. Average con- base case projections should not be taken for sumption per capita in developing countries has granted. They are rapid by historical standards increased by 70 percent in real terms; average life and will require solid progress on four fronts: in- expectancy has risen from 51 to 63 years; and pri- comes of poor households must rise, child mortal- mary school enrollment rates have reached 89 per- ity must decline, educational and employment op- cent. If these gains were evenly spread, much of portunities (especially for women) must expand, the world's poverty would be eliminated. Instead, and access to family planning services must be more than one-fifth of humanity still lives in acute increased. poverty. Investments in female education have some of New estimates prepared for this Report reveal a the highest returns for development and for the negligible reduction in the incidence of poverty in environment. Evidence from a cross-section of developing countries during the second half of the countries shows that where no women are en- 1980s (Table 1.1). The numbers of poor have in- rolled in secondary education, the average woman creased at almost the rate of population growth has seven children, but where 40 percent of all over the periodfrom slightly more than 1 billion women have had a secondary education, the aver- in 1985 to more than 1.1 billion by 1990. age drops to three children, even after controlling Asia, with its rapid income growth, continues to for factors such as income. Better-educated be the most successful at alleviating poverty. mothers also raise healthier families, have fewer China was an exception in the second half of the and better-educated children, and are more pro- 1980s; although its incidence of poverty remains, ductive at home and at work. Investments in for its income, very low, the new estimates reflect schools, teachers, and materials are essential. But some adverse changes for the poorest in that coun- so too are policies to encourage enrollment, such try as a result of a more uneven distribution of as scholarship programs. In Bangladesh a scholar- income. In most other East Asian countries pov- ship program has succeeded in almost doubling erty continued to decline. South Asia, including female secondary enrollment, as well as promot- India, has maintained a steady but undramatic de- ing higher labor force participation, later marriage, cline in poverty. The experience in other develop- and lower fertility rates. ing regions has been markedly different from that Efforts to expand family planning programs in Asia. All poverty measures worsened in Sub- have contributed to significant progress; the rate Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, of contraceptive use in developing countries rose and Latin America and the Caribbean. from 40 percent in 1980 to 49 percent in 1990. But What are the prospects for poverty alleviation to for the base case projections to be realized, the rate the end of this century? The estimates presented would need to increase by another 7 percentage in Table 1.1 are based on the projections of income 29 Table 1.1 Poverty in the developing world, 1985-2000 Percentage of population below the Number of poor poverty line (millions) Region 1985 1990 2000 1985 1990 2000 All developing countries 30.5 29.7 24.1 1,051 1,133 1,107 South Asia 51.8 49.0 36.9 532 562 511 East Asia 13.2 11.3 4.2 182 169 73 Sub-Saharan Africa 47.6 47.8 49.7 184 216 304 Middle East and North Africa 30.6 33.1 30.6 60 73 89 Eastern Europe' 7.1 7.1 5.8 5 5 4 Latin America and the Caribbean 22.4 25.5 24.9 87 108 126 Note: The poverty line used here$370 annual income per capita in 1985 purchasing power parity dollarsis based on estimates of poverty lines from a number of countries with low average incomes. In 1990 prices, the poverty line would be approximately $420 annual income per capita. The estimates for 1985 have been updated from those in World Development Report 1990 to incorporate new data and to ensure comparability across years. a. Does not include the former U.S.S.R. Source: Ravallion, Daft, and Chen 1992. growth presented below (see Table 1.2) and as- control. Land-hungry farmers resort to cultivating sume that the distribution of income within coun- unsuitable areassteeply sloped, erosion-prone tries remains constant. Under these assumptions, hillsides; semiarid land where soil degradation is the number of poor in Asia would continue to de- rapid; and tropical forests where crop yields on cline, and the adverse poverty trends in Latin cleared fields frequently drop sharply after just a America and Eastern Europe would be reversed few years. Poor people in crowded squatter settle- with economic recovery in those regions. Sub- ments frequently endure inadequate access to safe Saharan Africa is the only region in which the situ- water and sanitation, as well as flooding and land- ation is expected to deteriorate; with increases in slides, industrial accidents and emissions, and the proportion of the population in poverty, the transport-related air pollution. The poor are often number of poor would rise by about 9 million a exposed to the greatest environmental health year, on average. By the end of the decade about risks, and they tend to be the most vulnerable to one-half of the world's poor will live in Asia and those risks because of their poverty. The impact of one-quarter will live in Sub-Saharan Africa. environmental degradation on the poor will be de- It is sobering to compare these estimates with scribed in Chapter 2. those in World Development Report 1990. That report Poor families often lack the resources to avoid identified a path of poverty reduction that would degrading their environment. The very poor, reduce the absolute number of poor in the world struggling at the edge of subsistence, are preoc- by 300 million between 1985 and 2000. The path cupied with day-to-day survival. It is not that the was presented to illustrate what could be accom- poor have inherently short horizons; poor com- plished with sound policies in both developing munities often have a strong ethic of stewardship and industrial countries. Sadly, that target appears in managing their traditional lands. But their frag- no longer feasible, partly as a result of the severity ile and limited resources, their often poorly de- of the current recession and the disappointing fined property rights, and their limited access to progress in the 1985-90 period. Even under fairly credit and insurance markets prevent them from hopeful assumptions about economic recovery in investing as much as they should in environmen- the rest of the decade, the absolute number of poor tal protection (Box 1.2). When they do make in- in the world at the turn of the century will proba- vestments, they need quick results. Studies in In- bly be higher than in 1985. dia, for example, found implicit discount rates among poor farmers of 30-40 percent, meaning POVERTY AND THE ENVIRONMENT Alleviating pov- that they were willing to make an investment only erty is both a moral imperative and a prerequisite if it would treble its value in three years. Similarly, for environmental sustainabiity. The poor are efforts to introduce soil conservation and water- both victims and agents of environmental damage. harvesting techniques in Burkina Faso showed About half of the world's poor live in rural areas that the practices most likely to be adopted were that are environmentally fragile, and they rely on those that could deliver an increase in yields natural resources over which they have little legal within two or three years. In many countries ef- 30 Box 1.2 Droughts, poverty, and the environment Agriculture is a risky business everywhere, but per- communities. For example, a household may farm haps the most debilitating risk is that of drought in more than one separate parcel of land in order to ex- semiarid tropical areas. Households in the poor rural ploit local variations in conditions and thus reduce pro- societies that inhabit many of these regions have little duction risks. But because farmers have smaller land to fall back on. The combination of poverty and parcels at any one location, the environmental costs drought can also have serious environmental conse- (such as soil erosion and water runoff) associated with quences that threaten future agricultural productivity their farming practices are less likely to be felt on their and the conservation of natural resources. For exam- own farms and more likely to be borne by their neigh- ple, poor people are induced to scavenge more inten- bors. Individual farmers have little incentive to address sively during droughts, seeking out wood and other the problem. Even when they do, a solution may be organic fuels, wildlife, and edible plants, both to eat difficult because it can require organizing neighboring and to sell. But because the plants, trees, and wildlife farmers to undertake a joint investment (such as con- are already under stress from drought, such scaveng- touring or terracing). ing aggravates deforestation and damage to water- A similar problem can arise in common-property sheds and soil. Livestock farmers tend to concentrate pastoral farming if farmers carry extra cattle as insur- their animals near water holes during droughts, and ance against drought. Because farmers are likely to de- the consequent overgrazing may cause long-term dam- fer as long as possible selling their cattle, this simple age to the soil. form of insurance often leads to overgrazing in drought Many farming practices in semiarid areas have the years, increasing the likelihood of permanent damage potential to worsen the harm that droughts cause to to the pasture. natural resources. For example, arable cropping, by in- Markets are also inadequate for spreading risks in creasing soil exposure, makes the soil more vulnerable drought-prone regions because so many people are af- to wind and rain erosion and to loss of moisture and fected at once. Although credit markets can sustain nutrients. These effects can be pronounced even in consumption over the course of normal variations in normal years but are particularly severe in droughts. family incomes, they may not be able to provide the Since farmers cannot predict droughts, they typically huge amounts of credit required in drought years, clear and plant the land in preparation for a normal when large numbers of people need to borrow at the season. When the crops subsequently fail, the land is same time. Governments must therefore provide relief left exposed to the full rigors of sun, wind, and rain. employment and targeted food assistance in drought The ways in which farmers try to reduce risk, al- years, and effective drought insurance schemes may be though perfectly rational from their own point of view, needed. can sometimes impose environmental costs on local forts to encourage rural communities to plant shown effective leadership in managing natural woodlots have failed when people had to wait un- resources. til the trees reached maturity to realize a return but Substantial synergies exist between alleviating have succeeded when products such as building poverty and protecting the environment. Since the poles and fodder could be harvested more quickly. poor are less able than the rich to "buy out of" In many parts of the world women play a central environmental problems, they will often benefit part in resource management and yet enjoy much the most from environmental improvements. In less access to education, credit, extension services, addition, the economic activities stimulated by en- and technology than do men. In Sub-Saharan Af- vironmental policiessuch as the use of agrofores- rica women provide an estimated 50-80 percent of try and windbreaks to slow soil erosion and the all agricultural and agroprocessing labor. Despite construction of infrastructure for water supply and such high levels of economic activity, women in sanitationare often labor-intensive and thus can many countries have no or only limited rights of provide employment. Targeted social safety nets tenure to land and cultivated trees. This constrains make it less necessary for the poor to "mine" nat- their access to credit for investments in new tech- ural resources in times of crisis. Extension and nologies. Women are also frequently neglected by credit programs and the allocation of land rights to agricultural and forestry extension services. When squatters increase the ability of the poor to make women have been given equal opportunities (as in environmental investments and manage risks. In- combating soil erosion in Cameroon), they have vestments in water and sanitation and in pollution 31 abatement will also benefit the poor by improving projections presented in Table 1.2 assume that in- their health and productivity. But it is equitable dustrial countries will grow more slowly in the economic growth, coupled with education and 1990s than in the 1980s. This context provides all health services, that is most urgently needed. This the more reason to accelerate policy reform in de- will enable the poor to make environmental invest- veloping countries. Experience has shown that, on ments that are in their own long-term interest. It average, the effect of domestic policies on long-run will also be essential for accelerating the demo- growth is about twice as large as the effects attribu- graphic transition; better-off and better-educated table to changes in external conditions. couples have fewer children. With continued progress on economic reform in developing countries, GDP growth is projected to Economic growth-long-term trends and prospects increase to about 5 percent a year for the decade as a whole-significantly higher than the 3.4 percent Average per capita incomes in developing coun- achieved in the 1980s. Growth in Asia is expected tries rose 2.7 percent a year between 1950 and to slow from the high levels of the 1980s but will 1990-the highest sustained rate of increase in his- remain well above the average for developing tory. But the pace of economic growth has differed countries. Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the greatly among regions. Asian countries, which ac- Middle East and North Africa are all expected to count for 65 percent of the population of the devel- grow more rapidly during the remainder of the oping world, grew at an average rate of 5.2 percent 1990s. Sub-Saharan Africa's growth performance a year in the 1970s and 7.3 percent in the 1980s, will improve in comparison with the 1980s, but the while growth in the non-Asian developing coun- gains will be small. tries decelerated from 5.6 percent in the 1970s to 2.8 percent in the 1980s. Asia was the only devel- LONGER-TERM PROSPECTS. Because many envi- oping region to achieve sustained per capita in- ronmental issues evolve slowly, this Report takes a come growth during the 1980s. longer view than usual, giving special attention to the next four decades. About 3.7 billion people will RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS. The 1990s be added to the world's population during this started badly for developing countries. In both period-many more than in any previous genera- 1990 and 1991 per capita income in developing tion, and probably more than in any succeeding countries as a whole fell, after rising every year one. Economic projections over this length of time since 1965. The setback was caused largely by ex- are, of course, subject to great uncertainty. They traordinary events-the war in the Middle East, are presented in Figure 1.3 not as predictions but and economic contraction in Eastern Europe and as indicators of what historical experience suggests in the former U.S.S.R. Recession in several high- is likely to occur. income countries also contributed to the stagna- World GDP could rise from about $20 trillion in tion of export growth in developing countries. The 1990 to $69 trillion in 2030 in real terms. For the Table 1.2 Growth of real per capita income in industrial and developing countries, 1960-2000 (average annual percentage change) Country group 1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990 1991 1990-2OOO High-income countries 4.1 2.4 2.4 2.1 0.7 2.1 Developing countries 3.3 3.0 1.2 -0.2 -0.2 2.9 Sub-Saharan Africa 0.6 0.9 -0.9 -2.0 -1.0 0.3 Asia and the Pacific 2.5 3.1 5.1 3.9 4.2 4.8 East Asia 3.6 4.6 6.3 4.6 5.6 5.7 South Asia 1.4 1.1 3.1 2.6 1.5 3.1 Middle East and North Africa 6.0 3.1 -2.5 -1.9 -4.6 1.6 Latin America and the Caribbean 2.5 3.1 -0.5 -2.4 0.6 2.2 Europe 4.9 4.4 1.2 -3.8 -8.6 1.9 Eastern Europe 5.2 5.4 0.9 -8.3 -14.2 1.6 Memorandum: Developing countries weighted by population 3.9 3.7 2.2 1.7 2.2 3.6 Note: Totals do not include the former U.S.S.R. a. Estimates. Source: World Bank 1992. 32 Average per ca pita incomes in developing countries will triple by 2030 Figure 1.3 GDP and GDP per capita in developing regions and high-income countries, 1990 and 2030 GDP GDP per capita (trillions of 1990 dollars) (thousands of 1990 dollars) 50 40 15 10 5 0 0 5 10 15 40 50 Sub-Saharan Africa I Asia and the Pacific Latin America and the Caribbean Middle East and North Africa Europe and former U.S.S.R. High-income countries 0 1990 0 2030 Note: Data for 2030 are projections. Source: World Bank data. developing countries as a whole, average incomes Africa could exceed $5,000 and $4,000, respec- could more than triple in real terms, from an aver- tivelywell above the average for developing age of $750 today (the level of Côte d'Ivoire) to countries. Economic recovery in Eastern Europe about $2,500 in 2030, roughly the income per cap- would raise average per capita incomes to more ita of Mexico today. Substantial regional differ- than $9,000 by 2030, while those in the former ences would persist, although in the aggregate the U.S.S.R. could rise to more than $8,000. Projec- gap between income levels in developing and in- tions for Sub-Saharan Africa are the most sober- dustrial countries would narrow. By the middle of ing; under present productivity trends and popu- the next century developing countries' share of lation projections trends in total output would rise world income would have risen from less than fourfold, but per capita incomes would still reach one-quarter to almost one-half, and if trends con- only $400. tinued, it would rise to more than three-quarters by 2100. The most rapid growth rates are expected Sustaining development in Asia, particularly in East Asia, where per capita incomes would be more than $3,300 in 2030. Al- In terms of incomes and output, the world will be though growth rates in South Asia will be robust, a much richer place in the next century. But will the tripling of average incomes during the next the environment be much poorer? Will future gen- generation would still leave them at only about erations be worse off as a result of environmental $1,000 per capita. Average per capita incomes in degradation that results from economic decisions Latin America and in the Middle East and North made today? Will increases in the scale of eco- 33 nomic activity be sustainable in the face of increas- (Our Common Future, 1987)that current genera- ing pressure on natural resources? Prospective tions should "meet their needs without compro- changes of the size described above raise funda- mising the ability of future generations to meet mental questions about the kind of world we will their own needs"has become widely accepted bequeath to our children and about the nature and and is strongly supported in this Report. goals of development. Turning the concept of sustainability into policy raises fundamental questions about how to assess What is development? the well-being of present and future generations. What should we leave to our children and grand- Development is about improving the well-being of children to maximize the chances that they will be people. Raising living standards and improving no worse off than ourselves? The issue is the more education, health, and equality of opportunity are complicated because our children do not just in- all essential components of economic develop- herit our pollution and resource depletion but also ment. Ensuring political and civil rights is a enjoy the fruits of our labor in the form of educa- broader development goal. Economic growth is an tion, skills, and knowledge (human capital), as essential means for enabling development, but in well as physical capital. They may also benefit itself it is a highly imperfect proxy for progress. from investments in natural resourcesimprove- The first step in improving social choices is to ment in soil fertility and reforestation, for exam- measure progress correctly. It has long been recog- ple. Thus, in considering what we pass on to fu- nized that measures of, for example, educational ture generations, we must take account of the full opportunity, infant mortality, and nutritional sta- range of physical, human, and natural capital that tus are essential complements to GDP or GNP. will determine their welfare and their bequests to Some have even tried to merge these indices to their successors. capture progress in development. The human de- Intergenerational choices of this kind are re- velopment index constructed by the United Na- flected in the discount rate used to assess invest- tions Development Programme (UNDP) is such an ments. The discount rate is the mechanism effort. through which present and future costs and bene- The fact that environmental damage hurts peo- fits are compared. The lower the discount rate, the pleboth today and in the futureprovides addi- more it is worth investing today to make future tional grounds for rethinking our measurement of gains. It is sometimes claimed that a lower dis- progress. Indeed it raises special concerns, for un- count rateeven a zero discount rateshould be like education, health, nutrition, and life expec- used in order to give appropriate weight to the tancy, which tend to be improved by economic long-term consequences of environmental change. growth, the environment is sometimes damaged This argument is erroneous. Provided that the en- by that growth. Furthermore, the people suffering vironmental effects of projects are fully taken into from the damage may be different from those en- accountwhich they often are notit is always joying the benefits of growth. They may, for exam- best to choose the investments which generate the ple, be today's poor, or they may be future genera- highest net rate of return. Encouraging invest- tions who inherit a degraded environment. For ments that yield a lower net rate of return is waste- these reasons it is essential to assess the costs to ful; it implies a loss of welfare and of income that human welfare of environmental damagea cen- might have been devoted to environmental tral theme of this Reportand to take account of objectives. the distributional impacts of policies, particularly for the poor. Weighing costs and benefits What is sustainable? Addressing environmental problems requires not that discount rates be artificially lowered but Sustainable development is development that rather that the value of the environment be fac- lasts. A specific concern is that those who enjoy tored into decisionmaking. Values that are difficult the fruits of economic development today may be to measure are often implicit in decisionmaking, making future generations worse off by exces- but the tradeoffs are not well thought through. sively degrading the earth's resources and pollut- There is a clear need to make such costs and bene- ing the earth's environment. The general principle fits as explicit as possible so as to better inform of sustainable development adopted by the World policymakers and citizens. This does not imply Commission on Environment and Development that it is possible, or even desirable, to put mone- 34 Box 1.3 Natural resource and environmental accounting The limitations of conventional measures of economic ing economic policies, particularly in economies that activity, such as GNP and national income, as indica- are heavily dependent on natural resources. tors of social welfare have been well known for de- The various approaches to natural resource and envi- cades. Recently, the perception has grown that these ronmental accounting have divergent aims. Each re- indicators, which are based on the United Nations Sys- sponds to a different problem with the SNA frame- tem of National Accounts (SNA), do not accurately re- work. The simplest approaches attempt to measure flect environmental degradation and the consumption more accurately the responses to environmental degra- of natural resources. Several alternative approaches dation and protection that are already imperfectly mea- have been developed. Early work in this area was con- sured in the national income accounts. Examples in- ducted by some OECD countries, notably Norway and clude work in Germany, the Netherlands, and the France. Recent attempts to apply natural resource ac- United States on estimating pollution abatement ex- counting to developing countries have been made by penditures. A second approach responds to the incon- UNEP, the United Nations Statistical Office (UNSO), sistent treatment of natural capital in the SNA and at- the World Bank, and the World Resources Institute. tempts to account explicitly for the depletion of natural These methods differ in both comprehensiveness and resources; estimates of depletion are applied to con- objectives. ventionally measured income to derive a measure of Broadly, there are two criticisms of the SNA frame- net income. This approach has been applied in Indo- work. First, aggregates such as GNP may be inade- nesia for forests, petroleum, and soils, in Costa Rica for quate measures of economic activity when environ- fisheries and forests, and in China for minerals. Fi- mental damage occurs. The depreciation of some forms nally, the physical accounting method used by Norway of capital, such as machinery, is taken into account, but and the effort to integrate environmental and resource investments in human capital and depletion of envi- use with economic activity being developed by the ronmental capital, including nonrenewable natural re- UNSO both attempt to improve the information avail- sources, are not measured. able for environmental management. The Norwegian Second, it is argued, by neglecting the services pro- system focuses primarily on the country's main natural vided by natural resources, the SNA limits the infor- resourcespetroleum, timber, fisheries, and hydro- mation available to policymakers. Leaving Out these power. The more ambitious UNSO approach, currently services ignores the impact of economic activity on the being applied to Mexico and Papua New Guinea in environment in its role both as a "sink" for wastes and collaboration with their governments and the World a "source" of inputs. It is argued that ignoring these Bank, aims at developing a system of "satellite" na- services and their effects on economic activity makes tional accounts that explicitly incorporate the links be- the national income accounts misleading for formulat- tween economic activity and the use of natural and environmental resources. tary values on all types of environmental re- tivity should be taken into account in the same sources. But it is desirable to know how much en- way that other measures of welfare need to be con- vironmental quality is being given up in the name sidered. Second, it can help give a more realistic of development, and how much development is measure of the capacity of an economy to produce. being given up in the name of environmental pro- To this end, investment has to be adjusted to take tection. This Report argues that too much environ- account of depreciation of physical and natural mental quality is now being given up. There is, capital. But the accumulation of human capital and however, a danger that too much income growth the benefits of technical change must also be taken may be given up in the future because of failure to into account to provide an overall picture of an clarify and minimize tradeoffs and to take advan- economy's productive capacity. tage of policies that are good for both economic A number of approaches to measuring environ- development and the environment. mental costs have been tried in different countries To clarify these tradeoffs at the national level, (Box 1.3). A recent pilot study of Mexico's national efforts are under way in a number of countries to accounts indicates the potential magnitudes of the amend the national accounts. Such exercises can adjustments required. When an adjustment was be valuable for two reasons. First, they can help made for the depletion of oil, forests, and ground- indicate how growth of GDP may bring with it water, Mexico's net national product was almost 7 environmental costs for today's citizens. For exam- percent lower. A further adjustment for the costs ple, the costs of pollution to health and produc- of avoiding environmental degradation, particu- 35 larly air and water pollution and soil erosion, and economic activity increases. In some cases brought the national product down another 7 per- government policies that subsidize environmental cent. These estimates are preliminary and are only degradation can induce more damage than might intended to illustrate a methodology. Of more otherwise occur. In other cases the poor, with few value than these aggregate numbers are sectoral assets on which to draw, may have no choice but calculations. In the livestock sector, for example, to excessively degrade natural resources. adjustments for the costs of soil erosion sharply The most pressing environmental problems are reduced the sector's net value added. These calcu- associated with resources that are regenerative but lations in themselves give no indication to policy- are undervalued and are therefore in danger of makers as to whether Mexico's use of natural capi- exhaustion. Air and water are renewable re- tal has been in the country's best interest, but they sources, but they have a finite capacity to assimi- can be useful in reminding policymakers of poten- late emissions and wastes. If pollution exceeds this tial tradeoffs and can assist in setting sectoral capacity, ecosystems can deteriorate rapidly. priorities. When fisheries or forests are excessively depleted to meet human needs, critical thresholds may be Economic activity and the environment: key links passed, resulting in the loss of ecosystems and species. Shortages of nonrenewable resources, This Report will argue that the adverse impact of such as metals, minerals, and energy, the possible economic growth on environmental degradation exhaustion of which preoccupied early environ- can be greatly reduced. Poor management of natu- mental debate, are of less concern. The evidence ral resources is already constraining development suggests that when the true value of such non- in some areas, and the growing scale of economic renewable resources is reflected in the mar- activity will pose serious challenges for environ- ketplace, there is no sign of excessive scarcity (Box mental management. But rising incomes combined 1.4). with sound environmental policies and institu- Water provides an example of an undervalued tions can form the basis for tackling both environ- renewable resource that is showing signs of short- mental and development problems. The key to age. By the end of the 1990s six East African coun- growing sustainably is not to produce less but to tries and all the North African countries will have produce differently. In some situations, such as annual renewable water supplies below the level protection of forests or control of emissions, good at which societies generally experience water environmental policies may cause short-term shortage. In China fifty cities face acute water growth to fall, even as welfare may rise. In other shortages as groundwater levels drop 1 to 2 meters casesfor example, improved soil conservation a year. In Mexico City groundwater is being practices or investments in water supplythe ef- pumped at rates 40 percent faster than natural re- fect on output and incomes is likely to be positive. charge. These shortages emerge when water is lost In still other areas the impacts are unclear. What is or wasted because its true scarcity value is not rec- clear, however, is that failure to address environ- ognized. In such cities as Cairo, Jakarta, Lima, Ma- mental challenges will reduce the capacity for nila, and Mexico City more than half of urban wa- long-term development. ter supplies cannot be accounted for. In many countries scarce water is used for low-value agri- UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM. All economic ac- cultural crops, and farmers pay nothing for the tivity involves transforming the natural world. water they use. The misuse of water in the Aral Why does economic activity sometimes lead to ex- Sea in Central Asia is an extreme example of fail- cessive environmental degradation? One reason is ure to recognize the value of a natural resource that many natural resources are shared and the (Box 1.5). true value of many environmental goods and ser- Assessment of whether the regenerative capac- vices is not paid for by those who use them. Some ity of a natural resource has been exceeded is com- natural resources are shared because there is no plicated by uncertainty about the effect of eco- mechanism for enforcing property rights, as with nomic activity on the environment. In the cases of frontier land, and others are shared because, as soil erosion, atmospheric pollution, and loss of with the atmosphere, property rights are impossi- biodiversity, there is often substantial scientific un- ble to enforce. Unless an explicit agreement among certainty about the extent of environmental degra- users emerges, shared resources will be degraded dation. Controversy also surrounds the conse- over time, particularly as the scale of population quences of degradation. What are the health 36 Box 1.4 The dismal scienceeconomics and scarcity of natural resources The debate about whether the world is running out of table 1.4). Declining price trends also indicate that nonrenewable resources is as old as economics. The many nonrenewables have become more, rather than writings of Malthus and Ricardo, which predicted rap- less, abundant (Box figure 1.4). idly growing populations and increasing scarcity of re- The world is not running out of marketed nonrenew- sources, earned economics the name "the dismal sci- able energy and raw materials, but the unmarketed ence." For natural resources that are nonrenewable, side effects associated with their extraction and con- increases in consumption necessarily imply a reduction sumption have become serious concerns. In the case of in the available stock. The evidence, however, gives no fossil fuels, the real issue is not a potential shortage but support to the hypothesis that marketed nonrenewable the environmental effects associated with their use, resources such as metals, minerals, and energy are be- particularly local air pollution and carbon dioxide emis- coming scarcer in an economic sense. This is because sions. Similarly, the problems with minerals extraction potential or actual shortages are reflected in rising mar- are pollution and destruction of natural habitat. Be- ket prices, which in turn have induced new discov- cause 95 percent of the total material removed from the eries, improvements in efficiency, possibilities for sub- earth is waste that often contain heavy metals such as stitution, and technological innovations. copper, iron, tin, and mercury, these commonly find The rise in the prices of energy and metals in the their way into rivers, groundwater, and soils. 1970s encouraged efficiency gains and substitutions that ultimately reduced the growth of demand. Exam- ples of such technological changes include fiber optics, which replaced copper in telecommunications, the use of thinner coatings of tin, nickel, and zinc in a number Box figure 1.4 Long-run prices for nonferrous of industries, the development of synthetic substitutes, metals, 1900-91 and the recycling of aluminum and other materials. Similar efficiency gains were achieved in the energy sector. The use of metals and of energy per unit of output has declined steadily in industrial countries, al- Index (1977-79 100) though it is generally rising in developing countries. 250 Current consumption as a proportion of reserves has declined for several mineral and energy resources (Box Box table 1.4 Energy and mineral reserves and consumption, 1970 and 1988 Annual Index of consumption commercial as a percentage of reserves reserves, 1988 1:: (1970 = 100) 1970 1988 Energy resources Crude oil 163 2.7 2.2 Gas 265 2.1 1.5 1900 1915 1930 1945 1960 1975 1990 Mineral resources Bauxite 373 0.2 0.1 Copper 131 2.6 3.1 Iron ore 74 0.5 0.8 Note: The index is based on the real prices of aluminum, copper, Lead 75 4.7 8.1 lead, tin, and zinc, weighted by the value of developing country Nickel 72 0.8 1.7 exports in 1979-81. Tin 150 5.4 3.7 Source: World Bank data. Zinc 176 0.3 0.2 Source: World Bank data. effects of certain pollutants? What will climate come available and cost-effective? Uncertainty is change do to the ecosystem? Can tropical forests an inherent part of environmental problems. To be regenerated? The solutions are likewise often reduce it, decisionmakers need better information unclear. How quickly can the atmosphere restore about environmental processes and social itself? When will certain cleaner technologies be- preferences. 37 Box 1.5 The Aral Sea: lessons from an ecological disaster The Aral Sea is dying. Because of the huge diversions turned pastureland into bogs, water supplies have be- of water that have taken place during the past thirty come polluted by pesticide and fertilizer residues, and years, particularly for irrigation, the volume of the sea the deteriorating quality of drinking water and sanita- has been reduced by two-thirds. The sea's surface has tion is taking a heavy toll on human health. While it is been sharply diminished, the water in the sea and in easy to see how the problem of the Aral Sea might have surrounding aquifers has become increasingly saline, been avoided, solutions are difficult. A combination of and the water supplies and health of almost 50 million better technical management and appropriate incen- people in the Aral Sea basin are threatened. Vast areas tives is clearly essential: charging for water or allocat- of salty flatlands have been exposed as the sea has ing it to the most valuable uses could prompt shifts in receded, and salt from these areas is being blown cropping patterns and make more water available to across the plains onto neighboring cropland and pas- industry and households. tures, causing ecological damage. The frost-free period But the changes needed are vast, and there is little in the delta of the Amu Darya River, which feeds the room for maneuver. The Central Asian republics (ex- Aral Sea, has fallen to less than 180 daysbelow the cluding Kazakhstan) are poor: their incomes are 65 per- minimum required for growing cotton, the region's cent of the average in the former U.S.S.R. In the past, main cash crop. The changes in the sea have effectively transfers from the central government exceeded 20 per- killed a substantial fishing industry, and the variety of cent of national income in Kyrghyzstan and Tajikistan fauna in the region has declined drastically. If current and 12 percent in Uzbekistan. These transfers are no trends continued unchecked, the sea would eventually longer available. The regional population of 35 million shrink to a saline lake one-sixth of its 1960 size. is growing rapidly, at 2.7 percent a year, and infant This ecological disaster is the consequence of exces- mortality is high. The states have become dependent sive abstraction of water for irrigation purposes from on a specialized but unsustainable pattern of agricul- the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, which feed the ture. Irrigated production of cotton, grapes, fruit, and Aral Sea. Total river runoff into the sea fell from an vegetables accounts for the bulk of export earnings. average 55 cubic kilometers a year in the 1950s to zero Any rapid reduction in the use of irrigation water will in the early 1980s. The irrigation schemes have been a reduce living standards still further unless these econ- mixed blessing for the populations of the Central Asian omies receive assistance to help them diversify away republicsKazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan, Tajikistan, Turk- from irrigated agriculture. Meanwhile, salinization and menistan, and Uzbekistanwhich they serve. The di- dust storms erode the existing land under irrigation. version of water has provided livelihoods for the re- This is one of the starkest examples of the need to gion's farmers, but at considerable environmental cost. combine development with sound environmental Soils have been poisoned with salt, overwatering has policy. EFFICIENC TECHNOLOGY, AND SUBSTITUTION. The negative consequences of the overall growth in view that greater economic activity inevitably scale. Factors that can play a particularly impor- hurts the environment is based on static assump- tant role are: tions about technology, tastes, and environmental Structure: the goods and services produced in investments. According to this view, as popula- the economy tions and incomes rise, a growing economy will Efficiency: inputs used per unit of output in require more inputs (thus depleting the earth's the economy "sources") and will produce more emissions and Substitution: the ability to substitute away wastes (overburdening the earth's "sinks"). As from resources that are becoming scarce the scale of economic activity increases, the earth's Clean technologies and management practices: the "carrying capacity" will be exceeded. In reality, of ability to reduce environmental damage per unit of course, the relationships between inputs and out- input or output. puts and the overall effects of economic activity on the environment are continually changing. Figure Economic policies, environmental policies, and 1.4 illustrates that the scale of the economy is only environmental investments all have a role in en- one of the factors that will determine environmen- suring that individual behavior takes account of tal quality. The key question is whether the factors the true value of environmental resources. Eco- that tend to reduce environmental damage per nomic policies affect the scale, composition, and unit of activity can more than compensate for any efficiency of production, which can result in posi- 38 Scale, structure, efficiency, and intensity of damage determine environmental impact Figure 1.4 Economic activity and the environment Economic Environmental policies affect policies change Environmental productivity investments incentives for and the use of incur costs composition and generate environmental of output resources benefits Scale of the economy Environmental (income per Output Quality of the structure damage per unit capita x environment of input population) Demand for Cleaner better Greater efficiency technologies and environment practices reduce rises as reduces emissions, income per demand for resource inputs wastes, and capita grows degradation 0 Policies 0 Linkages 0 Environmental benefits j Source: World Bank staff. tive or negative effects on the environment. Effi- tives to use scarce resources sparingly, the pres- ciency gains from economic policies will often re- sure to reduce environmental damage will be duce the demand for natural resource inputs. weaker, and the adverse effects of economic Environmental policies can reinforce efficiency in growth are likely to dominate. But where the scar- resource use and provide incentives for adopting city of natural resources is accurately reflected in less-damaging technologies and practices. The in- decisions about their use, the positive forces of vestments that are induced by environmental poli- substitution, efficiency gains, innovation, and cies will change the way in which goods and ser- structural change will be powerful. In industrial vices are produced and may result in lower output countries these positive forces contributed signifi- but will also generate benefits that can increase cantly to improving environmental quality while human welfare. maintaining economic growth (Box 1.6). As incomes rise, the demand for improvements The environmental problems facing poor coun- in environmental quality will increase, as will the tries differ from those facing the better-off (see Fig- resources available for investment. Without incen- ure 4 in the Overview). In some cases environmen- 39 Box 1.6 Delinking growth and pollution: to the needs of developing countries. Cleaner technolo- lessons from industrial countries gies and practices can be acquired through trade and foreign direct investment, as well as through interna- Industrial countries have achieved substantial im- tional cooperation. Third, to the extent that environ- provements in environmental quality along with con- mental degradation in the OECD countries affects de- tinued economic growth. A recent report by the OECD veloping countries, as in the case of climate change and described some of the achievements since 1970. Access ozone depletion, polluters should pay and victims to clean water, adequate sanitation, and municipal should be compensated. waste disposal is now virtually universal. Air quality in OECD countries is vastly improved; particulate emis- sions have declined by 60 percent and sulfur oxides by 38 percent. Lead emissions have fallen by 85 percent in Box figure 1.6 Breaking the link between growth in North America and by 50 percent in most European GDP and pollution cities. Japan, which has spent substantial amounts on pollution abatement, has achieved the largest improve- The theory ment in air quality. Emissions of sulfur oxides, particu- lates, and nitrogen oxides as a share of GDP in Japan Quantity index are less than one-quarter of OECD averages. Persistent pollutants such as DDT, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and mercury compounds have also been re- duced in OECD countries, as has the frequency of large shipping accidents and oil spills. Forested areas and protected lands and habitats have increased in almost all countries. These improvements have been achieved as a result of annual expenditures on antipollution poli- cies equivalent to 0.8-1.5 percent of GDP since the 1970s. About half of these expenditures were incurred by the public sector and half by the private sector. These improvements in environmental quality are even more remarkable when it is recalled that the econ- omies of the OECD grew by about 80 percent over the same period. In many cases economic growth is being 44144 Time delinked" from pollution as environmentally non- Incentives Cleaner and more damaging practices are incorporated into the capital to protect the efficient stock (Box figure 1.6). environment technologies The OECD report, however, also identified a large introduced adopted in response "unfinished agenda" of environmental problems, as well as emerging issues, that remain to be addressed. Nitrogen oxides, which are emitted largely by trans- The practice GDP and emissions port sources, have increased by 12 percent since 1970 in in OECD countries the OECD countries (except Japan), reflecting the fail- ure of policies and technology to keep up with in- Index (1970=100) creases in transport. Municipal wastes grew by 26 per- 200 cent between 1975 and 1990 and carbon dioxide emissions by 15 percent over the past decade. Human exposure to toxic pollutants, such as cadmium, ben- GDP 150 zene, radon, and asbestos, remains a concern. Groundwater is increasingly polluted as a result of sali- Nitrogen oxides nization, fertilizer and pesticide runoff, and contam- 100 ination from urban and industrial areas. Soil degrada- Sulfur oxides tion persists irs some areas, and encroachment on coastal regions, wetlands, and other natural habitats is 50 still a concern. A number of plant and animal species Particulates are endangered; even larger numbers are threatened. Lead What does the OECD's experience imply for the en- 0 vironmental agendas of developing countries? First, there are many policy lessonssuch as the fact that it is 1970 1975 1980 1985 1988 often cheaper to prevent environmental degradation than to attempt to "cure" it later. The costly cleanup of Note: GDP, emissions of nitrogen oxides, and emissions of sulfur hazardous waste sites in several OECD countries gives oxides are OECD averages. Emissions of particulates are estimated from the average for Germany, Italy, Netherlands, United an indication of what environmental neglect might Kingdom, and United States. Lead emissions are for United States. mean for other countries in the future. Second, many Sources: OECD 1991; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1991. of the environmentally nondamaging technologies and practices developed in OECD countries can be adapted 40 Environmental quality often improves over time comes rise. Carbon dioxide emissions and munici- pal wastes are indicators of environmental stress that appear to keep rising with income. But this is Figure 1.5 Changes in urban sanitation because no incentives yet exist to change behavior. and sulfur dioxide concentrations over time The costs of abatement in these cases are relatively at different country income levels high, and the benefits of changing behavior are perceived to be lowpartly because (in the case of carbon dioxide) they would accrue mainly to other Urban population without adequate sanitation countries. When societies have decided to enforce a change in behaviorthrough regulations, Percent charges, or other meansenvironmental quality 100 has improved. Progress in reducing water pollu- tion and emissions of particulates, lead, and sulfur dioxide are examples of how higher-income coun- tries have been able to break the link between growth and environmental degradation. This is not easyit requires strong institutions and effec- tive policiesbut it can be done. It explains why so 2o980 many environmental indicators show an initial de- terioration followed by an improvement. As in- comes grow, the ability and the willingness to in- vest in a better environment rise. Past patterns of environmental degradation are 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 not inevitable. Individual countries can choose Income per capita (dollars, log scale) policies that lead to much better (or worse) envi- ronmental conditions than those in other countries Concentrations of sulfur dioxide at similar income levels. In addition, technological change, coupled with improved understanding of Micrograms per cubic meter of air the links between economic activity and environ- 5 mental damage, is enabling countries to grow more rapidly with less environmental impact than 45 was possible earlier. Figure 1.5 illustrates this for a cross-section of countries. At any given income 35 level, a higher proportion of people in any country 1976 is likely to have access to sanitation today than in 25 the past. The same can be true of progress in re- ducing air pollution. Concentrations of sulfur di- 15 oxide are lower today than in the past, so that someone living in a country with a per capita in- 1985 come level of $500 is more likely to breathe cleaner 5 air than in previous decades. The adoption of envi- 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 ronmental policies and the investment and techno- Income per capita (dollars, log scale) logical innovations induced by such policies imply that the environmental mistakes of the past do not Sources: Shafik and Bandyopadhyay, background paper; World Bank data. have to be repeated. The nature of the challenge tal quality improves as income rises. This is because increased income allows societies to pro- During the working lifetime of children born to- vide public goods such as sanitation services and day, the population of the world will almost because once individuals no longer have to worry double. By the middle of the next century almost about day-to-day survival, they can afford profita- one-third of the world's population will live in ble investments in conservation. countries with a population density of more than Some problems are observed to get worse as in- 400 per square kilometerequivalent to the den- 41 sity of the Netherlands or the Republic of Korea ist in most instances. Many possibilities also exist today. The next generation will also see the size of for dramatic improvements in pollution preven- the world economy triple. Under simple extrapola- tionswitching to cleaner-burning fuels or recyc- tion of current practices, this growth would lead to ling industrial wastewater, for example. Cleaner severe environmental degradation. Yet in virtually processes often yield productivity gains and cost every economic sector, environmentally less dam- reductions as well because they use materials more aging practices are available and are in use in a frugally. The scope for pollution abatement and number of countries. For almost every challenge prevention in industry and energy, and the poli- in water supply and sanitation, or energy and in- cies for inducing these new technologies, are dis- dustrial output, or food productionthere are pos- cussed in Chapter 6. sibilities for growing more sustainably. The challenge for agriculture will be to meet de- The challenge for water supply and sanitation veloping countries' expected demand for food. To- will be to respond to the backlog of demand while tal world consumption of cereals will have to al- meeting the needs of growing populations. Mak- most double by 2030. To protect fragile soils and ing clean water available to everyone in the next natural habitats, almost all of this increase will generation will require that service be extended to have to be achieved by raising yields on existing an additional 3.7 billion people living in urban cropland rather than by extending the area under areas and about 1.2 billion rural inhabitants. Since cultivation. There is little doubt that cultivated only about 1.5 billion urban residents currently soils have the capacity to meet future increases in have access to clean water, the magnitude of the world agricultural demand so long as they are well task is apparent. For sanitation the problem is managed. But intensification of production will in- even larger; the number of urban dwellers cur- volve the application of much higher levels of fer- rently served is little more than 1 billion. For a tilizers and pesticides, as well as significant im- country like Nigeria, providing access to clean wa- provements in the allocation of water for ter for the entire population by 2030 will imply agricultural use. Doubling food production in In- increasing the number of urban connections by dia by 2030 can be achieved by maintaining past four times and the number of rural connections by rates of crop yields but will require a fourfold in- almost nine times. To prevent the number of peo- crease in fertilizer application. By 2030 average ple without access to adequate sanitation from ris- yields in India would have to reach the level of ing, the population covered will have to increase those in China today. to 6.5 times the current number. Policies to meet Such gains in food production increase the risk these challenges are discussed in Chapter 5. of soil degradation, misuse of pesticides, spillovers The challenge for energy and industry will be to from chemical applications, and excessive draw- meet the projected growth in demand while con- down of water. Techniques such as integrated pest trolling pollution. Total manufacturing output in management, minimum tillage, agroforestry, inte- developing countries will increase to about six grated crop and livestock management, and soil- times current levels by 2030. Average emissions of enriching crop rotations will be needed to reduce air pollutants per unit of electric power generated land degradation and increase yields. This will of- would have to be reduced by 90 percent to avoid ten require better-educated farmers, and some- an increase in total emissions from this activity. times social changes as well. When governments Emissions from heavily polluting industries are committed to allocating resources to research chemicals, metallurgy, paper, and building mate- and extension services and to providing undis- rialswill also require large reductions in dis- torted incentives, many farmers are quick to adopt charges of air and water pollutants and in wastes these less-damaging practices. Policies for improv- produced if a worsening of industrial pollution is ing the management of natural resources, espe- to be prevented. In the Philippines, for example, cially of agricultural land, will be discussed in manufacturing output is likely to grow to nine or Chapter 7. ten times the current level, and demand for electric power will rise even more rapidly. This means that Policies and institutions many industries will have to reduce emissions per unit of output by between 90 and 95 percent to Without technologies and practices that can be ap- avoid worsening pollution. plied at reasonable cost, environmental improve- The technologies for achieving such reductions ment is difficult. But without the backing of appro- in pollution from energy and industry already ex- priate policies, even the most environmentally 42 helpful technologies and practices will not neces- growth that improves human welfare is urgently sarily be applied, unless (as is often the case in needed. Protecting the environment will be an im- industry) they are more productive than existing portant part of improving the well-being of people methods. The principles of sound environmental today, as well as the well-being of their children policy (described in Chapter 3) are well under- and grandchildren. This Report suggests a three- stood. But they are difficult for national govern- fold strategy for meeting the challenge of sustain- ments to introduce and are even more difficult to able development. translate into international agreements. National Build on the positive links. Policies for growth governments may be reluctant to challenge those promote efficient use of resources, technology who cause environmental damage; they are likely transfer, and better-working marketsall of which to be the rich and influential, while those who can help in finding solutions to environmental suffer most are often the poor and powerless. The challenges. Rising incomes can pay for invest- institutional obstacles to sustainable development ments in environmental improvement. Policies are discussed in Chapter 4. that are effective in reducing poverty will help re- If institutional obstacles to addressing national duce population growth and will provide the re- environmental problems are large, they are even sources and knowledge to enable the poor to take greater for international problems such as green- a longer-term view. house warming and the preservation of biodiver- Break the negative links. Rising incomes and sity. It may be difficult to reach agreement among technological advances make sustainable develop- many different countries, each of which may per- ment possible, but they do not guarantee it. Usu- ceive its national interest differently. If countries ally, additional incentives that capture the true do not think that the benefits of agreement are value of the environment will be required to in- worth more to them than the costs of refusing to duce less-damaging behavior. Effective environ- cooperate, they may be willing to join only if other mental policies and institutions are essential. countries are willing to compensate them for doing Clarify and manage the uncertain links. Many re- so. The complications of addressing global envi- lationships between human activity and the envi- ronmental problems are analyzed in Chapter 8 ronment remain poorly understood, and there will always be surprises. The response should be in- A strategy for sustaining development vestment in information and research and the adoption of precautionary measures, such as safe The challenges facing this generation are formida- minimum standards, where uncertainties are great ble. Many countries have not yet achieved accept- and there is a potential for irreversible damage or able living standards for their people. Economic high costs in the long run. 43 Environmental priorities for development * Setting environmental priorities inevitably involves choices. Developing countries should give priority to addressing the risks to health and economic productivity associated with dirty water, inadequate sanitation, air pollution, and land degradation, which cause illness and death on an enormous scale. In poor countries: Diarrheal diseases that result from contaminated water kill about 2 million children and cause about 900 million episodes of illness each year. Indoor air pollution from burning wood, charcoal, and dung endangers the health of 400 million to 700 million people. Dust and soot in city air cause between 300,000 and 700,000 premature deaths a year. Soil erosion can cause annual economic losses ranging from 0.5 to 1.5 percent of GNP. A quarter of all irrigated land suffers from salinization. Tropical foreststhe primary source of livelihood for about 140 million peopleare being lost at a rate of 0.9 percent annually. Concern over ozone depletion continues to grow. The consequences of loss of biodiversity and of greenhouse warming are less certain but are likely to extend far into the future and to be effectively irreversible. I Environmental degradation has three damaging unpolluted vista or satisfaction that a species is effects. It harms human health, reduces economic being protected from extinction, are being lost as productivity, and leads to the loss of "amenities," habitats are degraded or converted to other uses. a term that describes the many other ways in Because the interaction of various pollutants with which people benefit from the existence of an un- other human and natural factors may be hard to spoiled environment. Amenities are harder to predict, some environmental problems may entail measure than costs to health and productivity but losses in all three areas: health, productivity, and may be valued just as highly (see Box 2.1). The amenity. subject of this chapter is priorities for environmen- Policymakers need to set priorities for environ- tal policy: in which cases are the benefits for devel- mental policies. In both developing and industrial oping countries most likely to exceed the costs of countries governments rightly give greatest ur- action? Chapter 3 goes on to discuss ways to con- gency to environmental damage that harms hu- tain the costs of action by making sure that envi- man health or productive potential. The priorities ronmental policies are as cost-effective as possible, that developing countries set for their own envi- and later chapters look at such policies in greater ronments will not necessarily be those that people detail. in richer countries might want them to adopt. The health of hundreds of millions of people is Thus, although some cultures in poor countries threatened by contaminated drinking water, par- may value their natural heritage strongly, most de- ticulates in city air, and smoky indoor air caused veloping country governments are likely to give by use of such cooking fuels as dung and wood. lower priority to amenity damage as long as basic Productivity of natural resources is being lost in human needs remain unmet. many parts of the world because of the overuse National priorities will vary. In Sub-Saharan Af- and pollution of renewable resourcessoils, wa- rica, for example, contaminated drinking water ter, forests, and the like. Amenities provided by and poor sanitation contribute to infectious and the natural world, such as the enjoyment of an parasitic diseases that account for more than 62 44 percent of all deathstwice the level found in tems are installed. The problem is compounded in Latin America and twelve times the level in indus- some places by growing water scarcity, which trial countries. Higher-income countries have vir- makes it difficult to meet increasing demand ex- tually eliminated these waterborne health risks, cept at escalating cost. but they face other health threats because of emis- The most widespread contamination of water is sions from transport and industry. The importance from disease-bearing human wastes, usually de- that societies give to different environmental prob- tected by measuring fecal coliform levels. Human lems evolves, often rapidly, in response to gains in wastes pose great health risks for the many people standards of living and to other social changes. For who are compelled to drink and wash in untreated instance, as populations age in Latin America, the water from rivers and ponds. Data from UNEP's share in total mortality of adult chronic and degen- Global Environment Monitoring System (GEMS) erative diseases will more than double and the demonstrate the enormous problem of such con- share of infectious childhood diseases will dimin- tamination, with poor and deteriorating surface ish. Some of the increase in adult mortality will be water quality in many countries. Water pollution a delayed response to exposure to pollution today, from human wastes matters less in countries that and in many cases preventive action now will be can afford to treat all water supplies, and it can in cheaper than remedial measures in the future. principle be reversed with adequate investment in treatment systems. But water quality has contin- Water ued to deteriorate even in some high-income countries. Access to safe water remains an urgent human The capacity of rivers to support aquatic life is need in many countries. Part of the problem is decreased when the decomposition of pollutants contamination; tremendous human suffering is lowers the amount of oxygen dissolved in the wa- caused by diseases that are largely conquered ter. Unlike fecal contamination, oxygen loss does when adequate water supply and sewerage sys- not threaten health directly, but its effects on fish- Box 2.1 Environmental damagewhy does it matter? Values to people ging and salinization of the soil lowers crop yields. Some productivity declines result from damage to en- The costs of environmental damage to humanswhich vironmental assets that people use indirectly: if for- may be borne immediately or at some point in the fu- ested watersheds are heavily logged, economic losses tureare principally losses in health, productivity, and from increased downstream flooding may ensue. amenity. There are practical methods for evaluating Amenity. A clear vista or a clean and quiet neighbor- such costs, but not for evaluating the fundamentally hood adds to the quality of life. Environmental assets ethical issue of costs of human activity to other species. are often valued even by people who never enjoy them Health. Human welfare is reduced by ill health and directly but who cherish the thought that they exist premature mortality caused by degradation of air and and the prospect that future generations will enjoy water quality and by other environmental risks. Pollu- them too. Such values may increase when environ- tants can cause health problems through direct expo- mental resources are unique or endangered. sure or indirectly through changes in the physical envi- ronmentthe effects of which range from increased Intrinsic value solar radiation to lower nutrition. The links between pollutants and health have begun to be identified Many people believe that other living things in the nat- through epidemiological studies undertaken primarily ural world have "intrinsic" value separate from their in high-income countries; the effects are expected to be value to human beings. This belief is certainly not con- more pronounced in lower-income countries where fined to the rich; many indigenous groups strongly people are less healthy and less well nourished. hold such views. No measurement of intrinsic value is Productivity. Impaired health may lower human pro- possible; the best that can be done is to measure peo- ductivity, and environmental degradation reduces the ple's opinions regarding such values. Thus, intrinsic productivity of many resources used directly by peo- values can be captured only imperfectly and partially ple. Water pollution damages fisheries, and waterlog- under the notion of amenity values. 45 No improvement for aquatic life in dirtiest rivers in low- and middle-income countries Figure 2.1 Dissolved oxygen in rivers: levels and trends across country income groups Milligrams per liter of water 14 Rivers in Rivers in Rivers in low-income countries middle-income countries high-income countries 12 10 Acceptable 8 / cold water 6 4 warm water Unacceptable 2 0 Early Late Early Late Early Late 1980s 1980s 1980s 1980s 1980s 1980s All rivers, average Cleanest rivers, average Dirtiest rivers, average Note: Data are for twenty sites in low-income countries, thirty-one sites in middle-income countries, and seventeen sites in high-income countries. Cleanest rivers and dirtiest rivers are the first and last quartiles of sites when ranked by water quality. Periods of time series differ somewhat by site. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency water standards for supporting aquatic life are used as the criteria for acceptability. Source: Environmental data appendix table A.4. eries may be economically important. Human contaminated with toxic chemicals and with heavy sewage and agroindustrial effluent are the main metals such as lead and mercury. These pollutants causes of this problem; nutrient runoff in agri- are hard to remove from drinking water with stan- cultural areas with intensive fertilizer use is an- dard purification facilities. They may accumulate other contributor. Although inadequate levels of in shellfish and fish, which may be eaten by peo- dissolved oxygen tend to affect shorter lengths ple who do not realize that the food is contami- of rivers than does fecal contamination, a sample nated. In a sample of fish and shellfish caught in of GEMS monitoring sites in the mid-1980s found Jakarta Bay, Indonesia, 44 percent exceeded WHO that 12 percent had dissolved oxygen levels low guidelines for lead, 38 percent those for mercury, enough to endanger fish populations. The prob- and 76 percent those for cadmium. After Malaysia lem was worst where rivers passed through larger found that lead levels in twelve rivers frequently cities or industrial centers. In China, only five of exceeded the national standard for safe drinking fifteen river stretches sampled near large cities water, the country began monitoring rivers for were capable of supporting fish. High-income heavy metals. During the 1980s lead also wors- countries have seen some improvement over the ened or became a problem for the first time in past decade. Middle-income countries have, on some rivers in Brazil (Paralba and Guandu), Korea average, shown no change, and low-income ones (Han), and Turkey (Sakarya). show continued deterioration (see Figure 2.1). As surface water near towns and cities becomes Where industry, mining, and the use of agri- increasingly polluted and costly to purify, public cultural chemicals are expanding, rivers become water utilities and other urban water users have 46 turned to groundwater as a potential source of a More people have safe water, but urban sanitary cheaper and safer supply. Monitoring of ground- conditions worsen water for contamination has lagged behind mon- itoring of surface water, but that is beginning to change as in many places groundwater, too, is be- Figure 2.2 Access to safe water and adequate coining polluted. It is often more important to pre- sanitation in developing countries, vent contamination of groundwater than of sur- 1980 and 1990 face water. Aquifers do not have the self-cleansing capacity of rivers and, once polluted, are difficult Population (billions) and costly to clean. 0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 One of the principal origins of groundwater pol- lution is seepage from the improper use and dis- Water posal of heavy metals, synthetic chemicals, and other hazardous wastes. In Latin America, for in- 1980 stance, the quantity of such compounds reaching Urban 1990 groundwater from waste dumps appears to be doubling every fifteen years. Sometimes industrial 1980 effluents are discharged directly into groundwater. Rural In coastal areas overpumping causes salt water to 1990 infiltrate freshwater aquifers. In some towns con- tamination occurs because of lack of sewerage sys- Sanitation tems or poor maintenance of septic tanks. Where 1980 intensive agriculture relies on chemical inputs Urban combined with irrigation, the chemicals often 1990 leach into groundwater. 1980 Water quality has continued to deteriorate de- Rural spite substantial progress in bringing sanitation 1990 services to the world's population. Little has been done to extend the treatment of human sewage. o With access The replacement of septic tank systems with piped D Without access sewerage systems greatly reduces the risks of groundwater pollution but leads to increased poi- lution of surface water unless the sewage is Source: World Health Organization data. treated. Yet in Latin America as little as 2 percent of sewage receives any treatment. Moreover, de- spite the expansion of sanitation services, the ab- solute number of people in urban areas without gladeshi child washing household utensils in a access to these services is thought to have grown pool also used as a latrinewho bear the brunt of by more than 70 million in the 1980s, and more risks from contaminated water. The differences in than 1.7 billion people worldwide are without ac- access to safe water by income exist both within cess (Figure 2.2). and across countries. The gap in access between Access to uncontaminated water has barely kept lower- and higher-income countries has narrowed pace with population growth. Official WHO fig- only slightly, and within countries inequities con- ures suggest that between 1980 and 1990 more tinue to be striking. For example, a family in the than 1.6 billion additional people were provided top fifth income group in Peru, the Dominican Re- with access to water of reasonable quality. In fact, public, or Ghana is, respectively, three, six, and however, many of those who officially have access twelve times more likely to have a house connec- still drink polluted water. At least 170 million peo- tion than a family in the bottom fifth income group ple in urban areas still lack a source of potable in those countries. The rural poor are more likely water near their homes, and in rural areas, al- to rely directly on rivers, lakes, and unprotected though access has increased rapidly in the past shallow wells for their water needs and are least decade, more than 855 million are still without safe able to bear the cost of simple preventive measures water (see Figure 2.2). such as boiling water to make it safe for drinking. It is the poorthe woman in Niamey drawing In many cities in developing countries poor house- water from an open sewage channel or the Ban- holds in neighborhoods unserved by the munici- 47 Table 2.1 Availability of water by region Annual internal renewable water resources Percentage of population Total Per capita living in countries with scarce (thousands (thousands annual per capita resources of cubic of cubic Less than 1,000 1,000-2,000 Regions kilometers) meters) cubic meters cubic meters Sub-Saharan Africa 3.8 7.1 8 16 East Asia and the Pacific 9.3 5.3 <1 6 South Asia 4.9 4.2 0 0 Eastern Europe and former U.S.S.R. 4.7 11.4 3 19 Other Europe 2.0 4.6 6 15 Middle East and North Africa 0.3 1.0 53 18 Latin America and the Caribbean 10.6 23.9 <1 4 Canada and United States 5.4 19.4 0 0 World 40.9 7.7 4 8 a. Regional groups include high-income economies. Sub-Saharan Africa includes South Africa. Sources: World Resources Institute data; World Bank data. pal water system buy water from private vendors, flows for dilution rather than for other economic typically at prices several times greater than the uses. Often, the disparate agencies involved in charges for households with municipal hookups. water management cannot agree on tradeoffs be- tween quantity and quality. Water scarcity In many countries water scarcity is becoming an increasing constraint not just on household provi- Globally, fresh water is abundant. Each year an sion but on economic activity in general. Down- average of more than 7,000 cubic meters per capita stream cities can become so short of water as it is enters rivers and aquifers. It does not always ar- drawn off upstream that their industries are sea- rive where and when it is needed. Twenty-two sonally forced to curtail operations. That, indeed, countries already have renewable water resources has become routine during dry months in the In- of less than 1,000 cubic meters per capitaa level donesian regional capital of Surabaya. As indus- commonly taken to indicate that water scarcity is a try, irrigation, and population expand, so do the severe constraint. An additional eighteen coun- economic and environmental costs of investing in tries have less than 2,000 cubic meters per capita additional water supply. There is growing aware- on average, dangerously little in years of short ness of the need to integrate the management of rainfall. Most of the countries with limited renew- water demand from the different sectors of the able water resources are in the Middle East, North economy. Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa, the regions where populations are growing fastest (Table 2.1). Else- Health effects where, water scarcity is less of a problem at the national level, but it is nevertheless severe in cer- The use of polluted waters for drinking and tain watersheds of northern China, west and bathing is one of the principal pathways for infec- south India, and Mexico. tion by diseases that kill millions and sicken more Water scarcity is often a regional problem. More than a billion people each year. Diseases such as than 200 river systems, draining over half of the typhoid and cholera are carried in infected drink- planet's land area, are shared by two or more ing water; others are spread when people wash countries. Overpumping of groundwater aquifers themselves in contaminated water. Because of that stretch under political borders also injects in- their effect on human welfare and economic ternational politics into the management of water growth, deficient water supplies and sanitation scarcity. pose the most serious environmental problems When water is scarce, countries may sometimes that face developing countries today. Consider have to make awkward choices between quantity first the consequences for health. and quality. As river flows decline, effluents are The direct impact of waterborne diseases is less diluted. In countries with inadequate effluent huge, especially for children and the poor (who treatment, water quality can often be improved are most at risk). Unsafe water is implicated in only if supplies from dams are used to maintain many cases of diarrheal diseases, which, as a 48 group, kill more than 3 million people, mostly chil- Taking these studies as a guideline, it is possible dren, and cause about 900 million episodes of ill- to make a rough estimate of the effects of provid- ness each year. At any one time more than 900 ing access to safe water and adequate sanitation to million people are afflicted with roundworm infec- all who currently lack it. If the health risks of these tion and 200 million with schistosomiasis. Many of people were reduced by the levels shown in Table these conditions have large indirect health ef- 2.2, then there would be: fectsfrequent diarrhea, for instance, can leave a 2 million fewer deaths from diarrhea each child vulnerable to illness and death from other year among children under five years of age (as an causes. indication of magnitudes, about 10 million infants A key question is what the reduction in this bur- die each year in developing countries from all den of disease and death would be if water and causes) sanitation were improved. This is not a simple 200 million fewer episodes of diarrheal illness question to answer, or one on which all epidemi- annually ologists agree. Too little is known about how risks 300 million fewer people with roundworm and diseases are distributed and interact with each infection other, and uncertainty remains over the extent to 150 million fewer people with schistosomiasis which modest changes in infrastructure account 2 million fewer people infected with guinea for long-run health improvements. But some im- worm. pression can be gained from a recent comprehen- sive review by the U.S. Agency for International Other effects Development (USAID), which summarized the findings from about 100 studies of the health im- The costs of water pollution include the damage it pact of improvements in water supplies and sani- does to fisheries, which provide the main source of tation (Table 2.2). Most of the interventions stud- protein in many countries, and to the livelihoods ied were improvements in the quality or availabil- of many rural people. For instance, pollution of ity of water or in the disposal of excreta. The re- coastal waters in northern China is implicated, view showed that the effects of these improve- along with overfishing, in a sharp drop in prawn ments are large, with median reductions ranging and shellfish harvests. Heavy silt loads aggravated by land development and logging are reducing Table 2.2 Effects of improved water coastal coral and the fish populations that feed and and sanitation on sickness breed in it, as in Bacuit Bay in Palawan, the Philip- Median reduction pines. Fish are often contaminated by sewage and attributable to Millions of people improvement toxic substances that make them unfit for human Disease affected by illness (percent) consumption. Sewage contamination of seafood is Diarrhea 900a 22 thought responsible for a serious outbreak of hep- Roundworm 900 28 atitis A in Shanghai and for the recent spread of Guinea worm 4 76 cholera in Peru. Schistosomiasis 200 73 Excessive water withdrawal contributes to other a. Refers to number of cases per year. Source: Esrey and others 1990. environmental problems. In addition to displacing people and flooding farmland, damming rivers for reservoirs alters the mix of fresh and salt water in from 22 percent for diarrhea to 76 percent for guinea worm. It also showed that environmental improvements have a greater impact on mortality than on illness, with median reductions of 60 per- Table 2.3 Effects of water supply cent in deaths from diarrheal diseases. A compan- and sanitation improvements on morbidity ion WHO analysis of the largest group of health from diarrhea impact studiesthose on the effect of water and Median reduction Type of in morbidity sanitation on diarrheal diseasessuggests that the improvement (percent) effects of making several kinds of improvements at Quality of water 16 the same time (say, in the quality and availability Availability of water 25 of water) are roughly additive (Table 2.3). Project Quality and availability of water 37 experience shows that the gains are reinforced by Disposal of excreta 22 educating mothers and improving hygiene. Source: Esrey, Feachem, and Hughes 1985. 49 estuaries, influences coastal stability by affecting exposed to the somewhat less health-threatening sedimentation, and transforms fisheries by chang- effects of sulfur dioxide. ing spawning grounds and river hydrology. When Air pollution has three principal man-made groundwater is drawn off at a rate faster than the sourcesenergy use, vehicular emissions, and in- rate of natural recharge, the water table falls. In dustrial productionall of which tend to expand China's northern provinces, where ten large cities with economic growth unless adequate pollution rely on groundwater for their basic water supply, abatement measures are put in place. The rates of water tables have been droppingby as much as a urbanization and of energy consumption per cap- meter a year in wells serving Beijing, Xian, and ita are rising rapidly in developing regions. With- Tianjin. In the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu out aggressive abatement policies, air pollution a decade of heavy pumping has brought about a will intensify in the coming years. If the projected drop of more than 25 meters in the water table. growth in demand for vehicular transport and The costs are often substantial and go beyond the electricity were to be met with the technologies additional costs of pumping from greater depths currently in use, emissions of the main pollutants and replacing shallow wells with deep tubewells. deriving from these sources would increase five- Coastal aquifers can become saline, and land sub- fold and elevenfold, respectively, by about 2030. sidence can compact underground aquifers and As discussed in Chapter 6, most of this potential permanently reduce their capacity to recharge increase could be eliminated through improve- themselves. Sewers and roads may also be ments in efficiency and investment in abatement harmed, as has happened in Mexico City and technologies. Bangkok. In those developing countries now in the throes of industrialization, city air pollution is far worse Air pollution than in today's industrial countries. In the early 1980s cities such as Bangkok, Beijing, Calcutta, Although consistent monitoring of ambient air New Delhi, and Tehran exceeded on more than pollution in the world's cities has been going on 200 days a year the SPM concentrations that WHO for only slightly more than a decade, it has already guidelines indicate should not be exceeded more shown that several pollutants frequently exceed than seven days a year (Box 2.2). Where adequate the levels considered safe for health. The most se- data exist, it appears that cities in low-income rious health risks arise from exposure to sus- countries have SPM levels much higher than those pended particulate matter (SPM), indoor air pollu- in more developed countries. Indeed, pollution tion, and lead. Large numbers of people are also levels for even the worst quartile of high-income Box 2.2 Setting pollution guidelines Ideally, environmental guidelines should be based on a proach than establishing guidelines according to the comparison of the costs and the benefits of mitigating level at which the health benefits gained from reducing damage from pollution. Guidelines for air quality environmental health risks exceed the costs. The WHO should ensure that the benefits of reducing exposure to guidelines are unlikely to be met in the near future for air pollution at least equal the costs of pollution con- many countries unless stringent restrictions are placed trol. But with few exceptions (for example, U.S. regula- on emissions, and some countries have left the guide- tions on lead in gasoline) countries have rarely based lines as long-range objectives while defining intermedi- their standards on such explicit analyses, usually be- ate targets. cause of the difficulties of estimating benefits accu- Pollution guidelines, particularly for air pollution, of- rately. Instead, many developing countries have estab- ten recognize the differing impacts of high but short- lished national standards by adapting OECD or WHO duration pollution (peak guidelines) and persistent guidelines. lower levels (annual guidelines). The former type of The WHO exposure guidelines used in this Report pollution particularly affects people whose health is al- are determined by the pollution levels at which the ready delicate, including asthmatics, the elderly, and probability of adverse effects (for example, health risks) children. The latter leads to degeneration of health for starts to increase from low levels. This is a stricter ap- the broader population. 50 In poor countries even the best city air is bad, but the problem abates as income grows Figure 2.3 Urban air pollution levels and trends: concentrations of suspended particulate matter across country income groups Micrograms per cubic meter of air 600 Cities in Cities in Cities in low-income countries middle-income countries high-income countries 500 400 Unacceptable 300 200 100 Marginal Acceptable 0 1970s- Mid- to 1970s- Mid- to 1970s- Mid- to early 1980s late 1980s early 1980s late 1980s early 1980s late 1980s All cities, average Dirtiest cities, average Cleanest cities, average Note: Data are for twenty urban sites in low-income countries, fifteen urban sites in middle-income countries, and thirty urban sites in high-income countries. Cleanest cities" and "dirtiest cities" are the first and last quartiles of sites when ranked by air quality. Periods of time series differ somewhat by site. World Health Organization guidelines for air quality are used as the criteria for acceptability. Source: Environmental data appendix table A.5. cities are better than for the best quartile of low- that the sickness and death linked to SPM are the income cities. The gap widened marginally over most important health consequences of city air the past decade; high-income countries took mea- pollution. Estimates of environmental health risks sures to manage emissions, while pollution levels in developing countries still rely on cautious ex- deteriorated in low-income countries (Figure 2.3). trapolation from dose-response evidence in indus- Combining indicators of ambient air pollution trial countries. Poor health and nutrition in devel- with the numbers of people exposed to such levels oping countries are likely to make their shows the severity of unhealthy urban air. An ex- populations more susceptible to the effects of pol- trapolation from GEMS data on airborne particu- lution. Even the lower levels of SPM typically ex- lates for a sample of about fifty cities indicates that perienced in richer countries cause respiratory in the mid-1980s about 1.3 billion peoplemostly problems. Studies also show a pattern of increased in developing countrieslived in towns or cities mortality at higher particulate concentrations, par- (of more than 250,000 population) which did not ticularly among old people with chronic obstruc- meet WHO standards for SPM (see Figure 2.4). tive pulmonary diseases, pneumonia, and heart What are the health consequences for the one- diseases, because such pollution is particularly filth of humanity exposed to unsafe levels of urban stressful for individuals whose health is already air pollution? The evidence increasingly indicates poor. 51 More than a billion urban dwellers breathe above the WHO guideline at least 0.6 and perhaps unhealthy air 2.1 working days a year are lost to respiratory ill- ness for every adult in the labor force. In many developing countries indoor air pollu- Figure 2.4 Exposure of urban populations tion ranks not far behind poor urban air quality as to air pollutants, 1980s a cause of respiratory ill health. Somewhat fewer people, mostly women and children, are exposed Suspended particulate Sulfur dioxide, to indoor than to outdoor air risks-400 million to matter, mid-1980s late 1980s 700 million people according to rough estimates by WHObut exposure levels are often many times higher. In high-income countries the main indoor air risks are emissions from synthetic materials and resins and from radon gas. In developing 44 percent countries the problem arises when households (1,047 million) cook with or heat their homes with biomass (wood, straw, or dung). For poor households, mostly in rural areas, these are often the only fuels available or affordable. Studies that have measured biomass smoke in 25 percent household kitchens in poor rural areas have found (595 million) SPM levels that routinely exceed by several orders of magnitude the safe levels of WHO guidelines 8 percent (Table 2.4). Meal preparation can expose those do- (163 million) ing the cooking to such levels for several hours a day. Some other components of kitchen smoke to 26 percent 31 percent which women and children are exposed are (530 million) (737 million) broadly the same as for outdoor air pollution. Ex- posure to indoor pollution is thus important to take into account in determining overall health risks from air pollutants. Biomass burning is also U Unacceptable often linked to deforestation, which is a separate U Marginal source of environmental damage. U Acceptable The health impact of exposure to indoor air pol- lution from biomass burning began to receive Note: World Health Organization guidelines for air quality some attention only in the past decade, but scat- are used as the criteria for acceptability. tered studies indicate its gravity. The smoke con- Source: Environmental data appendix table A.5. tributes to acute respiratory infections that cause an estimated 4 million deaths annually among in- fants and children. Recurrent episodes of such in- Rough estimates indicate that if unhealthy levels fections lead to permanent lung damage that of SPM were brought down to the annual average shows up in adults as chronic bronchitis and em- level that WHO considers safe, between 300,000 physema, eventually contributing to heart failure. and 700,000 premature deaths a year could be Studies in Nepal and India of nonsmoking women averted in developing countries. This is equivalent who are exposed to biomass smoke have found to 2-5 percent of all the deaths in urban areas that abnormally high levels of chronic respiratory dis- have excessive levels of particulates. Many of ease, with mortality from this condition occurring these averted deaths would be in China and India. at far earlier ages than in other populations and at In addition to reduced mortality, chronic coughing rates comparable to those of male heavy smokers. in urban children under the age of fourteen could Emissions of carbon monoxide can cause ambient be reduced by half (or about 50 million cases annu- levels that interfere with normal respiratory ab- ally), reducing the chance that these children will sorption of oxygen. face permanent respiratory damage. Excessive Lead stands out among heavy metals that pose particulate pollution also results in lost produc- localized health risks because of its prevalence at tivity: in urban areas with average SPM levels harmful levels. Unlike some other pollutants, lead 52 Table 2.4 Indoor air pollution from biomass combustion in developing countries Concentrations of suspended particulate matter as multiple of WHO Location and year of study Measurement period peak guideline China, 1987 Cooking 11 Gambia, The, 1988 Average over full day 4-11 India, 1987-88 Cooking 16-91 Kenya 1987 Average over full day 5-8 1972 Overnight (space heating) 12-34 Nepal, 1986 Cooking 9-38 Papua New Guinea, 1975 Overnight (space heating) 1-39 Note: The studies are not completely comparable because of different measurement methods. a. The WHO peak (98th percentile) guideline recommends that a concentration of 230 micrograms per cubic meter not be surpassed more than 2 percent (seven days) of a year. Source: Smith 1988. can affect health through several pathways, in- levels have also been recorded in the neighbor- cluding ingestion and inhalation. One of the most hoods of antiquated smelters in several Eastern important sources is vehicular emissions in coun- European countries. tries where lead is still used as a fuel additive. The Sulfur dioxide concentrations are also serious in problem is particularly acute in towns and cities countries that rely on high-sulfur fuels. In the late where the number of motor vehicles is growing 1970s concentrations in lower-income countries rapidly. Most OECD countries are successfully ad- were, on average, below those in richer countries. dressing this problem by setting increasingly strict Over the past decade concentrations have risen in standards that limit lead in gas (an approach re- poor countries but have declined in many middle- cently copied in Malaysia, Mexico, and Thailand), and high-income countries (Figure 2.5). As a re- but many developing countries have yet to come sult, sulfur dioxide pollution is now worst in low- to grips with this issue. and middle-income countries, with more than 1 Blood lead levels have fallen dramatically in billion people exposed to unhealthy levels (see Fig- countries that have reduced the lead content of ure 2.4). Nonetheless, there are encouraging ex- fuels. In the United States and Japan average ceptions, suggesting that a country's income level blood lead concentrations are now only a third of need not be a constraint in tackling air pollution. A the levels of the mid-1970s. In developing coun- number of cities in low- and middle-income coun- tries, as direct monitoring of blood lead becomes triesBeijing and Caracas, for examplehave re- more common, evidence from scattered samples versed worsening trends in sulfur dioxide concen- clearly reveals levels that are likely to jeopardize trations within the past decade, at much earlier health. High levels in children are linked with hin- stages of economic development than cities in de- dered neurological development, including lower veloped countries managed to do. IQ and agility. Rough estimates for Bangkok sug- gest that children lose an average of four or more Solid and hazardous wastes IQ points by the age of seven because of elevated exposure to lead, with enduring implications for Many cities generate more solid wastes than they their productivity as adults. In the Mexico City can collect or dispose of. The volume increases Metropolitan Area, where 95 percent of automo- with income. In low- and middle-income countries tive gasoline is still leaded, 29 percent of all chil- municipal waste services often swallow between a dren have unhealthy blood lead levels. In adults filth and a half of city budgets, yet much solid the consequences include risks of higher blood waste is not removed. About 30 percent of solid pressure, particularly in men, and higher risks wastes generated in Jakarta, four-fifths of refuse in of heart attacks, strokes, and death. In Mexico Dar es Salaam, and more than two-thirds of solid City exposure to lead may contribute to as much wastes in Karachi go uncollected. Much better ser- as 20 percent of the incidence of hypertension, vice is achieved in various cities in South America; while in Bangkok excessive exposure causes collection averages between 91 and 99 percent in 200,000-500,000 cases of hypertension, resulting Caracas, Santiago, Buenos Aires, São Paulo, and in up to 400 deaths a year. Elevated blood lead Rio de Janeiro. Poor neighborhoods generate 53 Sulfur dioxide pollution is increasing in poor countries, falling in higher-income countries Figure 2.5 Urban air pollution levels and trends: concentrations of sulfur dioxide across country income groups Micrograms per cubic meter of air 200 Cities in Cities in Cities in low-income countries middle-income countries high-income countries 150 Unacceptable 100 50 Marginal Ii Acceptable 0 1970s- Mid-to 1970s- Mid-to 1970s- Mid-to early 1980s late 1980s early 1980s late 1980s early 1980s late 1980s All cities, average Dirtiest cities, average Cleanest cities, average Note: Data are for seventeen urban sites in low-income countries, nineteen urban sites in middle-income countries, and forty-two urban sites in high-income countries. 'Cleanest cities" and "dirtiest cities" are the first and last quartiles of sites when ranked by air quality. Periods of time series differ somewhat by site. World Health Organization guidelines for air quality are used as the criteria for acceptability. Source: Environmental data appendix table A.5. lower amounts of solid wastes per capita but typ- wastes, which may then seep into water supplies. ically receive the least service, often because roads More localized problemsair pollution from burn- are so congested that conventional collection ing, gaseous emissions, and even explosions methods are nearly impossible. occur around improperly managed disposal sites. Even when municipal budgets are adequate for Generation of hazardous materials and wastes is collection, safe disposal of collected wastes often increasing, but the amounts vary enormously remains a problem. Open dumping and uncon- among countries. Industrial economies typically trolled landfilling remain the main disposal produce about 5,000 tons for every billion dollars methods in many developing countries; sanitary of GDP, while for many developing countries the landfills are becoming the norm in only a handful total amount may be only a few hundred tons. of cities. Singapore and Hong Kong combined generate Inadequate collection and unmanaged disposal more toxic heavy metals as a by-product of indus- present a number of problems for human health try than all of Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding and productivity. Uncollected refuse dumped in South Africa). Although toxic wastes are not yet a public areas or into waterways contributes to the widespread problem, industrial growth can in- spread of disease. In low-income neighborhoods crease the volume produced. Thailand, for exam- that lack sanitation facilities, trash heaps become ple, had only about 500 factories in 1969, and mixed with human excreta. Municipal solid waste roughly half of them produced hazardous wastes. sites often receive industrial and hazardous Now more than 26,000 factories produce haz- 54 ardous wastes, and their number could almost tri- verse as the land pressures in rural areas. The ex- ple in a decade. On present trends, the volume of panding populations of poor, land-hungry farmers toxic heavy metals generated in countries as di- eking out a bare living on the highland slopes of verse as China, India, Korea, and Turkey will Ecuador, Nepal, and Indonesia are hard pressed to reach levels comparable with those of present-day keep their crops from washing away with the hill- France and the United Kingdom within fifteen sides. In the Sahel expansion of cropping, with years. ever-shorter fallow periods, into areas with margi- But the risks of exposure to hazardous materials nal rainfall exposes the soil to wind erosion. Three cannot easily be extrapolated from the quantities aspects of soil degradationdesertification, ero- produced. Their potential for causing harm differs sion, and salinization or waterloggingreceive the tremendously across countries and depends most attention, although desertification does not mainly on how they are handled. Although man- have as large and pervasive an effect on produc- agement of hazardous wastes is improving in tivity as do the others. Ways of reducing these some countries, in many others wastes are problems are addressed in Chapter 7. dumped into water or on land sites with minimal Desertification in the form of advancing fron- safeguards. Severe exposure to hazardous mate- tiers of sand that engulf pastures and agricultural rials can be caused by industrial accidents and by land, as often shown in the media, is not the most surreptitious trade in and dumping of wastes, serious problem in dryland areas, although it oc- sometimes across national boundaries. People in curs locally. Definitions of desertification, how- some occupationsfor example, scavengers in ever, are usually broader and include losses of veg- dump sites in many poor citiesare particularly etative cover and plant diversity that are vulnerable. attributable in some part to human activity, as well Although exposure to pollution from toxic as the element of irreversibility. Desertification in wastes may be serious locally, it is rarely as wide- this sense is difficult to measure. It is clearly affect- spread as exposure to the other water and air p01- ing some dryland regions, but truly irreversible lutants discussed above, except where contamina- damage is probably less widespread than is com- tion of surface water or groundwater is involved. monly believed. Satellite imagery of the Sahel re- Nevertheless, it is usually cheaper to minimize the gion of Sub-Saharan Africa shows that vegetation generation of hazardous wastes and restrict dan- advanced and retreated by up to 200 kilometers gerous dumping practices than it is to clean up between wet and dry years during the 1980s but dumps. does not show any underlying trend. The health effects of contamination of the air, More widespread than desertification, if less water, and soil with hazardous wastes are in some dramatic, is the gradual deterioration of agri- instances known to be serious, and new com- cultural soils, particularly in dryland areas. Results pounds, perhaps with untested potential effects of a global assessment of soil degradation spon- on environmental health, are constantly being de- sord by UNEP (see Oldeman, Hakkeling, and veloped. Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish the Sombroek 1990) show that 1.2 billion hectares carcinogenic consequences of hazardous wastes, almost 11 percent of the earth's vegetated sur- at the low doses that are most common, from face--have undergone moderate or worse soil deg- those of naturally occurring carcinogens, particu- radation over the past forty-five years because of larly when the consequences are likely to become human activity. Responding to the productivity evident only after many years. Indeed, other consequences of this degradation is difficult for threats to health may be more important. In the most farmers and herders. As a result of this dete- United States epidemiological evidence on the 2-3 rioration, yields and total harvests of important percent of all cancers associated with environmen- food crops are declining in a number of countries, tal pollution suggests that exposure to hazardous particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, counter to the wastes is a less important risk than exposure to global trend of increasing yields (Figure 2.6). Ero- indoor radon and to pesticide residues on sion is one of the key components of soil degrada- foodstuffs. tion. Its irreversibility and its potential offsite ef- fects distinguish it from the other critical elements Land and habitat of soil deteriorationloss of plant nutrients, or- Soils ganic matter, and microorganisms. Estimates of land damaged or lost for agricultural Th.e few comprehensive analyses of soil erosion use through soil degradation range from moderate that have been done in temperate areas indicate to apocalyptic. The types of degradation are as di- that the consequences are not large for aggregate 55 Yields are deteriorating along with soils in some countries but not worldwide Figure 2.6 Change in crop yields in selected countries, 1970-90 Average annual growth (percent) 14 12 6 () A + $ V -6 World Developing Angola Bolivia Colombia Côte d'Ivoire Rwanda Tanzania Uganda countries Maize Cassava 0 Millet a Note: Arrows show change between 1970-80 and 1980-90. a. Millet is not a significant crop in Bolivia or Colombia. Source: World Bank data. agricultural productivity, although they are a con- mates, would capture the offsite effects of erosion. cern locally for susceptible soils. Several studies Although such an accounting is seldom available, have concluded that erosion in the United States the existing partial estimates may be a broadly ac- may cause cereal yields to be 3-10 percent less at curate reflection of the full economic costs, since the end of the next century than what would some of the spillover effects offset each other. otherwise be achieved. The problem is substan- First, soil erosion may harm productivity by de- tially greater in tropical developing countries, positing silt in dams, irrigation systems, and river where soils, rainfall, and agricultural practices are transport channels and by damaging fisheries. more conducive to erosion and where many re- Partial costings done for Java and Costa Rica show ports have found rates of soil loss well above the these offsite impacts to be significant but consid- natural rate of soil formation. Several country erably less important economically than the on- studies that extrapolate from test-plot measure- farm productivity losses. Second, standard mea- ments of gross soil loss to effects on agricultural surements of gross soil erosion from test plots productivity indicate substantial national eco- typically overestimate the consequences for pro- nomic losses. These are estimated at about 0.5-1.5 ductivity, since the eroded soil can remain for de- percent of GDP annually for countries such as cades elsewhere in the farming landscape before it Costa Rica, Malawi, Mali, and Mexico, and they is delivered to the oceans. Thus, a portion of on- offset a significant part of economic growth as con- site erosion represents a transfer of assets rather ventionally measured. than a complete loss from the standpoint of agri- A full account of erosion costs, unlike these esti- cultural productivity. But geographic shifts in pro- 56 ductivity do have potentially important distribu- many other countries, sometimes by directly af- tional consequences; it is no solace to Nepal that fecting health or economic productivity, but often Bangladesh gains agricultural land and soil fertility through loss of amenitythe value that many peo- from deposition of Himalayan sediment in its river ple derive from knowing that a particular environ- deltas. mental resource exists. Deforestation straddles Agronomic research and project experience are both categories. It causes productivity loss (often revealing that erosion is best prevented through grossly underestimated) in individual countries, balanced management of soil moisture, nutrients, and it leads to loss of biodiversity and ecosystems and organic matter. Low-cost techniques for soil that local people and foreigners may value in their conservation, designed to improve soil moisture own right. levels, can increase yields sufficiently within the The forests that occupy more than a quarter of first several years to make the interventions prof- the world's land area are of three broad types itable in their own right, regardless of the long-run tropical moist and dry forests, temperate forests, benefits from soil conservation. Compared with and degraded forest land. The main concern is traditional cropping methods, practices such as with tropical moist forests, which are disappearing mulching, manuring, low tillage, contour cultiva- at a rate that threatens the economic and ecological tion, and agroforestry can frequently reduce sur- functions they provide. These forests, which still face runoff of water, sediment loss, and erosion by cover more than 1.5 billion hectares, are the richest 50 percent and more. These techniques are not yet ecosystems, in biomass and biodiversity, on land. widely used. They will contribute to the control of About two-thirds are located in Latin America, pri- soil degradation only if practical constraints such marily in the Amazon basin, with the remainder as shortages of cash and labor and the use of dung split between Africa and Asia. Tropical dry forests and mulching materials as household fuel are first also total some 1.5 billion hectares, with three- alleviated. quarters located in Africa. These forests consist Hard on the heels of rapid expansion of irriga- mainly of open woodlands and the secondary tion over the past forty years have come growing growth that grows up following shifting cultiva- problems with salinization and waterlogging that tion. Temperate forests total about 1.6 billion hec- are eating away at the productivity of irrigation tares, with about three-fourths found in industrial investments. Irrigated land is deteriorating in countries. parts of many countries, including China, Egypt, Forests are not just a source of timber; they per- India, Mexico, Pakistan, the Central Asian repub- form a wide range of social and ecological func- lics, and the western United States. tions. They provide a livelihood and cultural integ- Salinization of irrigated land is part of a much rity for forest dwellers and a habitat for a wealth of larger problem of managing the productivity of plants and animals. They protect and enrich soils, soils affected by salts. Globally, perhaps about 950 provide natural regulation of the hydrologic cycle, million hectares, or nearly one-third of arable land, affect local and regional climate through evapora- are affected by elevated salt concentrations. Most tion, influence watershed flows of surface and of this salinization occurs naturally. But about 60 groundwater, and help to stabilize the global cli- million hectares, or some 24 percent of all irrigated mate by sequestering carbon as they grow. Many land, suffer from salinization caused by bad irriga- forests have a deeper spiritual importance, for tion practices. Severe declines in productivity af- those who live in them and for those who may fect, according to some estimates, about 24 million never visit them but still cherish the thought of hectares, or about one-tenth of irrigated land. De- their existence. When trees are indiscriminately spite awareness of the problems, and despite sev- cut, most or all of these services are lost. In tempe- eral decades of reclamation efforts, new areas are rate forests strict management practices that in- being degraded faster than other soils are being clude highly selective cutting or replanting make it rehabilitated. Prevention and reclamation may possible to pursue commercial logging without continue to be hampered by the cost and mana- sacrificing all these forest services. But in tropical gerial complexity involved. moist forests comparable techniques are rarely practiced, and sustainable timber production, let Forests alone maintenance of ecological services, is not be- ing achieved. Even when reforestation or selective Pollution and soil degradation harm mainly those logging is attempted in tropical moist forests, who live in the regions where they arise. Other many services provided by forests are still at risk. kinds of environmental damage touch people in All types of forest serve to varying degrees as 57 carbon sinks and play a role in local hydrology, but Extinctions are occurring much faster than the they differ in their contribution to other services. natural rate and are increasing Tropical moist forests are particularly rich in spe- cies. Although they cover only 7 percent of the earth's land mass, they provide habitat for about Figure 2.7 Recorded extinctions of mammals half of all known species. They are also the pri- and birds, 1700-1987 mary source of livelihood for about 140 million people who live within them or on their margins, Number of species lost over period and they supply about 15 percent of the world's 80 commercial timber. But the land underneath them often cannot support alternative land uses. Tropi- cal dry forests are not as species-rich as tropical moist forests, but they provide important protec- tion against soil erosion. Their main economic uses 60 are for livestock grazing and fuelwood collection by rural people. Temperate forests are the least biodiverse of the three, although they shelter many unique species. They are the main source of 40 industrial wood, and they are also used exten- sively for recreation. The rapid deforestation currently occurring in developing countries recalls an earlier epoch in in- dustrial countries, when one-third of the world's 20 temperate forests were cleared for agriculture, construction materials, and fuelwood. Net de- forestation has stabilized in most industrial coun- tries, and for temperate areas as a whole, forest area is increasing. Deforestation in developing countries is more recent, with tropical forests de- 1700-99 1800-99 1900-87 clining by nearly one-fifth so far in this century. The first authoritative estimate of global losses of Natural ratea tropical forests to conversion, extrapolated from Mammals Birds partial data, concluded that 11.4 million hectares were disappearing each year in the early 1980s. Subsequent country studies and the increasing Note: Extinctions were counted at the level of species only. use of satellite imagery backed by site checks have Extinct subspecies were grouped and counted as one species extinction at the latest date recorded. pushed up estimates for the late 1980s to 17 mil- a. The natural rate is an estimate of the rate of extinction that lion-20 million hectares a year. The latest statistics would occur in the absence of human influence. Sources: Nilsson 1990; Reid and Miller 1989; World on deforestation suggest that for tropical forests Conservation Monitoring Centre data; Ziswiler 1967. the overall rate in the 1980s was 0.9 percent a year. This is also the rate in Latin America, with Asia's rate somewhat higher (1.2) and Africa's lower (0.8). Tropical moist forests are mostly being lost to agri- Deforestation is caused by farmers, ranchers, cultural settlement (roughly 60 percent of an- logging and mining companies, and fuelwood col- nual clearing), with the remainder divided about lectors, each pursuing private interests that are fre- equally among logging and other uses. Small-scale quently distorted by perverse government poli- farmers in land-scarce countries of Central Amer- cies. Rarely is only one source of disturbance ica, Central and East Africa, and South Asia are responsible. Indeed, the first intruders may do often involved in such conversion. But in much of relatively little damage, but they make it easier for the Amazon region most forest destruction can be others to follow. Tree felling for firewood accounts traced to livestock ranchers, who typically burn for the largest share of wood use in developing the tree cover. In East Asia tropical moist forest has countries, but it is concentrated in tropical dry for- mainly been exploited for its timber by logging ests and nonforest wooded areas around dense companies. human settlements in Africa and South Asia. Incentives to cut trees will remain strong. 58 Growth of population and income leads to a rising constrained by the current paucity of knowledge. demand for fuelwood. Falling demand for labor in These risks, however, could increase and become settled agricultural areaswhether the result of more evident. Although we live in perhaps the mechanization, consolidation of landownership, richest geologic era in terms of biological diversity, or economic stagnationhas in some countries re- this wealth risks being squandered through irre- leased a flood of migrants who seek new liveli- versible losses of species and destruction of eco- hoods on forest frontiers. These frontiers have be- systems, with consequences that are among the come increasingly attractive and accessible in least predictable of environmental changes. countries such as Brazil, Ecuador, and Indonesia, When species become extinct, an irreversible thanks to mining, oil exploration, the building of loss occurs. Extinction is an importantalbeit im- roads and railways, and control of diseases. Often, perfectmeasure of the severe and growing pres- such settlement has been actively encouraged by sure on the survival of wildlife in its natural habi- governments (with backing from the World Bank tat. Recorded extinctions continue to increase and other donors) through cheap credit, land and steadily (Figure 2.7). But decreases in populations resettlement grants, provision of infrastructure, and local disappearances are also important. At- and low stumpage fees. Some governments are tempts to project extinction of both known and starting to reverse such policies. estimated species on the basis of habitat loss indi- cate that if recent rates of habitat conversion were Biodiversity to continue through the next century, extinction Biological diversitya composite of genetic infor- levels comparable in magnitude to earlier episodes mation, species, and ecosystemsprovides mate- of mass extinction would occur. Such projections rial wealth in the form of food, fiber, medicine, remain an inexact science, and the uncertainties and inputs into industrial processes. It supplies are great. In any event, avoidance of mass extinc- the raw material that may assist human commu- tion is not the only concern. The complex web of nities to adapt to future and unforeseen environ- interactions that maintains the vitality of ecosys- mental stresses. Furthermore, many people value tems can unravel even if only a small number of sharing the earth with numerous other forms of key species disappear. It is increasingly under- life and want to bequeath this heritage to future stood that the elimination of single species of generations. These aesthetic rewards are already carnivores, pollinating birds and insects, large threatened by the loss of biological diversity. By herbivores, and important food plants can funda- comparison, demonstration of immediate risks of mentally and unpredictably alter the balance of harm to health or productivity is difficult and is particular ecosystems (Box 2.3). Box 2.3 Key species: big and small swamps. In addition, the limestone caves in which the "Key" species have a more profound impact on their bats roosted were being blasted by a local cement fac- ecosystems than other species. They are organisms tory. Conservation efforts to protect the limestone hills that, in many interconnected ways, are essential for the and the caves led to the closing of the cement factory. existence of other species. If they disappear, the depen- The bats and the durian industry then recovered. dent species may also vanish. Often, the importance of In the Hluhluwe Game Reserve in South Africa, key species is not appreciated or understood until an- since the removal of the elephant population a century other part of the ecological system breaks down. ago, three species of antelope have become locally ex- Key species can be as small as a bat or as big as an tinct, and the numbers of open-country grazers such as elephant. In Malaysia in the 1970s supplies of a popular wildebeest and waterbuck have declined. Large brows- fruit, the durian, mysteriously began to decline, threat- ing and grazing mammals such as elephants have a ening a $100 million a year fruit industry. The durian considerable effect on the vegetative landscape of their trees were intact and apparently healthy, but they were habitat. By trampling and browsing saplings, they pre- bearing less fruit. The mystery was solved when it was vent open forest glades from forming canopies, shrub- discovered by chance that the flower of the durian tree land from becoming forested, and grassland mosaics was pollinated by a single species of bat whose popula- from becoming tall grassland. This maintains habitats tion was in severe decline. Although the bats polli- in which smaller herbivores can thrive. The removal of nated the duriari trees, their primary source of food large herbivores can cause vegetation cover to close up, was flowering trees in mangrove swamps, and devel- thus restricting or eliminating the habitat of smaller opment of shrimp farming was converting the herbivores. 59 Table 2.5 Estimated number and scarcity of species worldwide Number of scarce Number species as Number of Lstimated identified as Number of percentage of species total percentage of scarce species Group identified species estimated total species' identified" Mammals, reptiles, and amphibians 14,484 15,210 95 728 5 Birds 9,040 9,225 98 683 8 Fish 19,056 21,000 90 472 3 Plants 322,311 480,000b 67 Insects 751,000 30,000,000 3 895 <1 Other invertebrates and microorganisms 276,594 3,000,000b 9 530 <1 Total 1,392,485 33,525,435 4 Scarce species are those classified by the IUCN as endangered, vulnerable, or rare, or as indeterminate among these categories. In some taxa few species have been evaluated. Figures are taken from World Resources Institute 1989, p. 93. Because these figures are sensitive to the estimated number of insect species, about which there is much debate and uncertainty, they should be considered only rough estimates. Sources; Wilson and Peter 1988; Wolf 1987; IUCN 1990. Table 2.6 Reduction of wildlife habitat in two regions Original area (thousands of Percentage Percentage square remaining, in protected Type of vegetation kilometers) 1986 areas Indomalayan realm' Dry forests 3,414 28 11 Moist forests 3,362 37 8 Savannah/grassland 46 36 21 Scrub/desert 816 15 21 Wetland/marsh 414 39 10 Mangroves 95 42 8 Afrotropical realm5 Dry forests 8,217 42 15 Moist forests 4,700 40 7 Savannah/grassland 6,955 41 11 Wetland/marsh 177 98 10 Mangroves 88 45 3 South and Southeast Asia, Taiwan (China), and southern China. Sub-Saharan Africa. Source: World Resources Institute 1990. Monitoring of identified species illuminates but ity. Loss and fragmentation of habitat because of a part of the threat to biodiversity, since in many human use is the main threat, although the link is ecosystems only some species have been cata- not simple, and overexploitation, species introduc- loged. It is difficult to be precise about species loss tion, and pollution play important secondary because for some categories of organisms there is roles. The greatest attention has been paid to the only a vague notion of the total in existence. Cata- loss of tropical forests, since they have the most loging is the most complete for vertebratesprob- intense concentrations of species and have shrunk ably about 90-98 percent of mammals, reptiles, at unprecedented rates. But other habitatscoastal fishes, birds, and amphibians are known, and of and freshwater wetlands and coral reefsare also these about 4 percent are scarce (see Table 2.5). suffering serious degradation and loss. The work About ten times more plants than vertebrates have of establishing the basis for global estimates of eco- been identified, but the known species may still system loss has begun only recently, using vegeta- represent only two-thirds of all plant species in tion mapping, land-use data, and newer tools of existence. Least is known about insects, of which satellite imagery. Studies conducted in the perhaps only 3 percent have been identified. Most mid-1980s by the International Union for the Con- of the unrecorded species are in tropical moist servation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) forests. and UNEP indicated that 65 percent of original Unlike any previous species extinction, the wildlife habitat in tropical Africa and 68 percent in present bout is caused principally by human activ- tropical South and East Asian countries have been 60 converted to other uses (see Table 2.6). The lack of how much to devote to addressing known threats comparable estimates for other regions leaves a to present populations and how much to uncertain large gap in our knowledge, since habitat conver- and irreversible hazards to future generations. sion is known to be important in these areas as Two examples are greenhouse warming and ozone well. depletion. Species extinction is occurring even though in- Greenhouse warming creasingly large habitat areas are nominally pro- tected. Worldwide, the area under national protec- The atmospheric concentrations of the gases that tion systems tripled between 1972 and 1990, from cause greenhouse warmingthe greenhouse 1.6 to 4.8 percent of total land area. But because gases (GHG5)are rising. Carbon dioxide, the funds for management are inadequate, incentives principal GHG, has increased by more than 12 for encroachment are strong, and preservation percent in the past thirty years. The change in laws are ineffectively enforced, these areas have GHG concentrations is mainly the result of human rarely been adequately protected. Chapter 7 dis- activities. Emissions of carbon dioxide from these cusses the prospects for improving the manage- activities have more than doubled over the period ment of natural habitat. (Box 2.4). Future trends in GHG concentrations depend Atmospheric changes on a number of factorseconomic growth, the en- Whereas many of the consequences of pollution ergy intensity of production, and the chemistry of and loss of biodiversity are evident today, some the atmosphere, biosphere, and oceannot all of environmental threats will have their main effects which are fully understood. Nonetheless, as the in the future. That creates special problems for p01- recent scientific assessment by the Intergovern- icymakers with limited resources who must decide mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) empha- Box 2.4 What is the greenhouse effect? The earth's climate is driven by solar radiation. In the (the largest contributor to the greenhouse effect), car- long term the energy absorbed from the sun must be bon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and ozone. There balanced by outgoing radiation from the earth and the are also purely man-made greenhouse gases, including atmosphere. Part of this outgoing energy is absorbed many ozone-depleting substances such as CFCs, which and re-emitted by radiative atmospheric gases ("green- are controlled under the Montreal Protocol. The main house gases"), thereby reducing net emission of en- greenhouse gases shown in Box table 2.4 differ in the ergy to space. To maintain the global energy balances, intensity of their heat trapping (or "radiative forcing") both the atmosphere and the surface will warm until and atmospheric lifetimes and thus in their ability to the outgoing energy equals the incoming energy. This affect the radiative balance of the earth. CFCs and ni- is the greenhouse effect. trous oxide are many times more potent than the same The main natural greenhouse gases are water vapor quantity of carbon dioxide or methane. The additional carbon dioxide that human activities Box table 2.4 Key greenhouse gases affected put into the atmosphere between 1980 and 1989 came by human activity principally from fossil fuels. Additions from changes in (percent) land use, such as deforestation, are estimated to have Carbon Cit lorofluoro- Nitrous been one-fifth to one-half as large. All these net addi- Effect dioxide Methane carbons" oxides tions from human activity are dwarfed by the natural Increase in atmospheric concentrations exchanges of carbon between the earth and the Preindustrial to 1990 26 115 8 atmosphere. 1990 to 2025k 23 51 10 The largest sources of methane in the atmosphere Contribution to the change in heat trapping are natural wetlands, rice paddies, and livestock. Natu- Preindustrial to 1990 61 23 12 4 ral gas production (drilling, venting, and transmis- 1990 to 2025 68 17 10 5 sion), biomass burning, termites, landfills, and coal * No preindustrial presence in the atmosphere. mining also release methane. Nitrous oxide is released Note: Ozone is not included because precise data are lacking. by the oceans and soil, but human activities such as Includes hydrochiorofluorocarbons. Projections are based on IPCC "business as usual" biomass burning and the use of fertilizers play a role assumptions. that is not yet fully understood or quantified. Much The 1990-2025 increase is 73 percent for CFC-11 and 86 percent for CFC-12; the total is not available. uncertainty surrounds the total size of the sources of Source: Houghton and others 1990. both methane and nitrous oxide. 61 sized, the direction is clear. Sometime in the next equilibrium. How much more time is still un- century, heat trapping (or "radiative forcing") known but is the subject of intensive research. from increases in greenhouse gases is likely to Where? Climate changes will vary across the reach a level equivalent to a doubling of carbon globe. For individual countries and regions, this dioxide concentrations over their preindustrial geographic distribution is of more interest than level. Chapter 8 discusses possible responses to mean global temperature. These predictions the threats of greenhouse warming. stretch modeling capacity even more than does The direct effects on heat trapping of the ex- modeling global temperature change. Both the di- pected increases in the atmospheric concentrations rections and the magnitudes of predicted climate of greenhouse gases are known with reasonable changes for regions vary considerably across certaintywithin a range of about 20 percent. The models, and the models have great difficulty in direct temperature effects of doubling atmospheric replicating the historical paths of regional climate. carbon dioxide are estimated to be an increase of How much will it matter? There is considerable about 1.2° Celsius. But the ultimate effects on certainty that warming will occur, even if it is diff i- warming of changes in GHG concentrations de- cult to predict its speed and extent. It is much pend on the secondary effects of those changes on harder to know the extent and rate of warming the earth and oceanseffects that feed back in that would cause serious effects for human soci- ways that will reinforce or counteract temperature eties. Potentially significant effects are more likely change. Relatively little is known about these feed- to result from related changes in soil moisture, backs, but the best understood is that of water storms, and sea level than from temperature as vapor, which probably adds another 0.7° Celsius such, and these changes are more difficult to pre- to the direct warming effect. Other important dict. There is some agreement that climate change feedbacks, some of which would moderate warm- induced by greenhouse warming may cause drier ing, include the effects of clouds, ice, and snow. In soils in midcontinental areas and lead to a substan- addition, the ocean plays a large role in determin- tial rise in sea levels. The plausible argument that ing the timing and geographic location of warm- tropical storms will become more frequent and in- ing. Climate models that attempt to capture these tense remains to be convincingly demonstrated. It feedbacks vary considerably in their predictions of is still not possible either to rule out costly climatic equilibrium temperature change following a dou- effects of greenhouse gas accumulations or to bling of carbon dioxide concentrationsfrom demonstrate compellingly that they are likely to about 1.5° to 4.5° Celsius. Over the past century occur. Indeed, because it is so hard to narrow the average global temperatures have increased be- range of possible answers to these questions, very tween 0.3° and 0.6° Celsius, which is consistent different policy inferences can be drawn from the with a wide range of long-term temperature re- evidence. sponses to increased GHG concentrations. Ozone depletion The complex dynamic models being developed to examine those direct and indirect interactions In 1985 the appearance of a dramatic spring ozone stretch the capacity of even the most sophisticated reduction over Antarctica was confirmed. Ozone computers to their limits. As stylized representa- depletion is mainly the result of increasing atmo- tions of global climate, they involve simplifica- spheric concentrations of chlorine originating from tions, reflecting both the gaps in our understand- CFCs. In the Montreal Protocol (see Chapter 8) ing of important physical processes affecting countries agreed to phase out production of climate and the need to keep the calculations man- CFCsa decision supported by subsequent rapid ageable. All models indicate that GHG accumula- improvements in scientific understanding. The de- tions will have large implications for climate; im- crease in the protective ozone layer has occurred portant questions remain about the magnitude, more quickly than anticipated and will continue patterns, and timing of change, as well as its ulti- for at least a decade before it can be reversed. The mate effects. long-term consequences will be harmful for health How fast? Most climate models examine only and for the productivity of marine and terrestrial the equilibrium response to a one-time change in systems. GHG concentrations. Increasing attention is now Atmospheric levels of CFCs are expected to peak being given the pace at which climate would move around 2000. In the meantime the rate, geographic toward equilibrium as GHG concentrations rise. scale, and seasonal peaks of the ozone layer's ero- Lags in adjustment mean that climate change sion continue to expand. The largest ozone impact could take decades, possibly centuries, to reach is over Antarctica, where the maximum deple- 62 tionabout 50 percent compared with earlier in atmospheric ozone and in UV radiation of the levelswas as deep and as extensive in area in earth's surface have occurred before, and many 1991 as at any time since measurement began. The organisms have evolved protective coping mecha- most recent evidence compiled by the UNEP Sci- nisms. Studies of agricultural crops have demon- entific Assessment Panel also confirms smaller strated some inhibition of growth and photo- ozone decreases of 5-10 percent during the past synthesis when plants are exposed to increased decade in the upper atmosphere over much of the UV radiation. But some plants, including cultivars middle and high latitudes in both hemispheres; so of rice, show considerable capacity for adaption far there is no evidence that tropical latitudes are and repair. What is of concern is whether the pace affected. Losses over the next decade may be of of recent and expected change is so rapid and large the same magnitude, although the possible im- as to overwhelm natural defenses. There will be pacts of clouds, chemical particles, and ground- some scope for dealing with increased UV radia- level pollutants remain poorly understood. Recov- tion through plant breeding. Damage to marine ery of the protective ozone layer is expected to systems caused by reduced productivity of vegeta- occur slowly after 2000, with atmospheric chlorine tive plankton is a more immediate concern, par- concentrations projected to return to the levels of ticularly because of the important place of these the late 1970s about midcentury. organisms in aquatic food chains that begin in the An important consequence of ozone depletion is highly productive waters of Antarctica. Recent an increase in solar ultraviolet (UV) radiation re- studies show that increased UV radiation in Ant- ceived at the earth's surface. Biologically damag- arctica during the peak of the ozone hole is suffi- ing UV has more than doubled during episodes of cient to cause some seasonal decline (6-12 percent) ozone depletion in Antarctica. The threat from in the production of vegetative plankton. The penetration of UV radiation to ground level is cer- larger impact on marine productivity and ecosys- tain to worsen, although various factors, including tems is not yet understood. increased ozone pollution of the lower atmo- sphere, have made it difficult to detect longer-term Conclusion changes associated with ozone depletion in the upper atmosphere. The effects of increases in UV This chapter has tried to demonstrate why devel- are likely to appear first in the Southern oping countries, just as much as industrial coun- Hemisphere. tries, should care about environmental degrada- In the absence of changes in human behavior to tion. Indeed, the imperative is even greater in poor protect against exposure to the sun's rays, a sus- countries. Filthy air and polluted water now harm tained ozone decrease of 10 percent, as is now an- or kill far more people in developing countries ticipated for the middle latitudes, would mean an than were affected when today's industrial coun- increase in nonmelanoma skin cancerswhich pri- tries passed through their own period of Victorian marily affect fair-skinned individualsof about 25 grime. Moreover, some types of environmental percent (300,000 additional cases a year) within damage are growing worse and will continue, un- several decades and an increase in eye damage der present policies, to worsen as populations ex- from cataracts of about 7 percent (1.7 million cases pand and economies become more industrialized. a year). The health risks could be reduced if people Because natural systems work in complicated and would avoid unnecessary exposure by making interrelated ways that are still poorly understood, small changes in their behavior. In countries with some of the effects of today's environmental ne- good health care, the severity of health conse- glect may turn out to have more serious conse- quences from these diseases has declined steadily quences for health, productivity, and the quality of with dramatic improvements in treatment. A life than is yet apparent. greater worry is raised by preliminary evidence But environmental degradation can be checked. that exposure to increased levels of UV radiation There are policies that will allow developing coun- can suppress the immune system in people of all tries to improve the efficiency with which their skin colors; that would have much wider detri- economies work while at the same time addressing mental health effects. many of the types of environmental damage de- Concern about the impact of increased UV radia- scribed in this chapter. Developing countries need tion on plant productivity has spurred research, to give priority to the kinds of damage that most but the results are not yet sufficient to predict the immediately threaten the quality of their citizens' consequences for agriculture, forestry, and natural lives. The following chapters describe which poli- ecosystems. Fluctuations over long periods of time cies are likely to be most effective. 63 3 Markets, governments, and the environment Improved environmental management requires that businesses, households, farmers, and governments change the way they behave. Two sets of policies are required. First, policies should build on the positive links between development and environment. Policies that are bad for both growth and the environment should be eliminated: subsidies to energy, pesticides, water, and logging should be removed; rights to manage and own land, forests, and fisheries should be clarified; and pubu enterprises should be held accountable. Other development policies, such as promoting macroeconomic stability, improving the access of the poor to education and family planning services, and liberalizing trade and investment, will facilitate environmental protection. Second, targeted policies are needed to ensure that environmental values are properly reflected in economic activity by both the private and public sectors. The interventions that work best are those that combine incentive and regulatory policies, recognize administrative constraints, and are tailored to specific problems. The purpose of development policies, and of envi- rope, occurs when those who make decisions ronmental policies, is to improve welfare. Chapter about using these resources ignore or underesti- 1 argued that the increased welfare from rising in- mate the costs of environmental damage to soci- comes need not sacrifice environmental improve- ety. The reasons for this divergence in interests fall ment. But as Chapter 2 pointed out, human activ- into two main categories. ity has often caused environmental damage and imposed considerable costs. Failure to take ac- Market failure count of these costs can lead to bad decisions, and as a consequence, the welfare gains from income Markets frequently do not accurately reflect the growth may be outweighed by the losses from en- social value of the environment, for several vironmental damage. Furthermore, the benefici- reasons: aries of higher incomes are often different from No market exists because it is difficult to de- those who suffer the costs of environmental degra- marcate or enforce the rights to own or use .the dation. This chapter discusses the policies neces- environmentas with air quality. Thus, prices do sary to ensure that decisions better reflect the not reflect the adverse effects of pollutants, and value of the environment. The next chapter looks the result is too much air pollution. at why such policies are politically so difficult to Some uses for a resource are marketed but adopt. others are notas with tropical rainforests, where timber is marketed but watershed protection is Environmental damage: diverse problems, not. The nonmarketed benefits are frequently ig- common causes nored, while other uses of the resource are overexploited. Environmental degradation, whether tropical de- Open access to resources allows them to be forestation in Africa or air pollution in Eastern Eu- exploited by allas with rainforests in the Amazon 64 and sardines off the coast of Costa Rica. In these conservationat the margin. When this balance is instances, environmental effects are not recog- not struck, either environmental damage or con- nized by users (and so become externalities). The servation can be excessive. results are deforestation and overfishing. Individuals and societies lack information Adopting good development policies about environmental impacts or about low-cost ways to avoid damageas with the link between Poverty, uncertainty, and ignorance are the allies CFCs and ozone depletion, which is only now of environmental degradation. Addressing them is fully appreciated. Private firms may not provide therefore the first requirement of effective environ- better information because they find it difficult to mental policies. World Development Report 1991 capture the benefits. identified four elements of a market-friendly ap- proach to development: an improved climate for Policy failure enterprise; integration into the global economy; investments in people; and maintenance of macro- Sometimes government actions encourage ineffi- economic stability. These policies will also make ciencies that in turn cause environmental damage. environmental protection easier. With prudent Examples include subsidies for agricultural and macroeconomic policies that provide price stability energy inputs and for logging and cattle ranching, and external balance, market signals are communi- nonaccountability of public sector polluters, provi- cated more clearly, uncertainty is reduced, and it is sion of services such as electricity, water, and sani- easier to attract foreign investment. The environ- tation at subsidized prices, and ineffective man- mental policies described below will then be more agement of public lands and forests. effective. Expanding the access of poor people to These failures of government policy may aggra- health and family planning will help reduce popu- vate the environmental damage caused by market lation growth. And better-educated people can failures, as happened in the Brazilian Amazon. more readily adopt environmentally sound but Land clearance for ranching since 1970 in Mato complicated techniques, such as integrated pest Grosso and Para has reflected a combination of management. open access and tax incentives for ranching. Broadly, there are two sets of development poli- cies that help protect the environment. One set, Contributing factors illustrated by the blue area in Figure 3.1, includes measures that require investment, such as improv- The damage due to these primary causes is fre- ing the education of women and the supply of quently exacerbated by poverty and by economic water. But not only do these measures yield eco- instability. Poor people may care more about ex- nomic dividends (represented by the blue curve in tracting what they can today from environmental the figure); they are even more beneficial when resources than about conserving them for tomor- environmental benefits are considered. row: the result is often the very opposite of sus- Other development policies that are good for the tainability, with excessive exploitation of forests environmentsometimes termed "win-win" poli- and soils. Economic (or political) uncertainty also ciesare illustrated by the light red area in the encourages short-term behavior. figure. These improve economic efficiency and re- Environmental damage may also be worsened duce environmental damage at no net financial by population growth and migration. The immedi- cost to governments. Examples include ending ate causes of deforestation in the Philippine up- subsidies for resource use by the private and pub- lands are open access to public forests and low lic sectors and clarifying property rights, all dis- concession fees. But rapid population growth has- cussed below. Finally, the green area in the figure tens deforestation by adding to the demands for shows policies that supplement those develop- agricultural land and for wood for fuel and build- ment policies. These additional measures, dis- ing materials. cussed in the next section, are targeted specifically Even if environmental policies address all the at resolving environmental problems. As the fig- main causes of damage, some degradation will still ure shows, they are justified only because their occur. It is too costly for societies to eliminate air environmental benefits outweigh their costs. pollution completely or to preserve all forests. The Sometimes, though, the requirements of sound right mix of uses for the environment balances the economic policy may appear to jeopardize envi- costs and benefits of alternative usesincluding ronmental goals. An example is liberalized policies 65 Policies and investments to protect the environment have widely varying benefits and costs Figure 3.1 Benefits and costs of policies for environmental protection Incremental costs and benefits Total benefits Costs Nonenvironmental benefits Environmental quality Policies that have no net Public and private investments Policies and investments financial costs for governments that have positive net economic that address market failures and that contribute to both benefits even when and that have positive net economic efficiency and environmental benefits are economic benefits when environmental protection excluded environmental effects are included Elimination of subsidies for energy inputs, pesticides, Investments in water supply Taxes on emissions and wastes fertilizers, and irrigation water and sanitation Investments in soil Regulations on disposal of Elimination of subsidies for conservation hazardous wastes logging and ranching Fees for timber extraction Clarification of farmers' rights Improvements in the to land education of women Taxes on urban road congestion Note: This figure is not drawn to scale. The relative size of the shaded areas is not intended to show the importance of each set of policies and investments. for trade and investment, which often bring envi- Open trade and investment policies ronmental improvement through greater eco- nomic efficiency but can sometimes lead to envi- Trade policy crystallizes the scope for potential ronmentally harmful changes in the structure of clashes between economic and environmental economic activity. In the latter case, it is usually goals. By promoting specialization and competi- more appropriate to introduce better policies for tion and encouraging technological progress, open environmental protection than to sacrifice eco- trade and investment policies raise productivity nomic gains by restricting trade. and improve efficiencyincluding efficient use of 66 Box 3.1 Trade policy and the by lowering their environmental standards (see Dean, environment: a summary of the issues background paper, and GATT 1992). The main reason is that environmental costs are a small share of output The links between trade and the environment raise valueabout 0.5 percent, on average, for all U.S. in- three main questions. dustries in 1988 and only 3 percent for the most-pollut- What are the environmental effects of trade liberaliza- ing industry (for details see Low forthcoming). So for- tion? The fear that these effects are generally negative eign investment flows do not shift dramatically toward has led to calls for amending trade policies to take ex- locations with lax environmental standards (so-called plicit account of environmental goals. Recent contro- pollution havens). Rather, anecdotal data from Chile versies have concerned the negative effects of the pro- and elsewhere suggest the opposite: because it is posed North American Free Trade Agreement on air cheaper for multinational corporations to use the same and water quality in Mexico and the southwestern technologies as they do in industrial countries, these United States, of liberalized cassava exports to the EC firms can be potent sources of environmental on soil erosion in Thailand, and of exchange rate de- improvement. preciation on deforestation in Ghana. But using trade Should trade policies be used to enforce or implement restrictions to address environmental problems is inef- international environmental agreements? An example of ficient and usually ineffective. Liberalized trade fosters their use as an enforcement mechanism would be greater efficiency and higher productivity and may ac- threats of trade sanctions against countries that do not tually reduce pollution by encouraging the growth of honor prior commitments under agreements on bio- less-polluting industries and the adoption and diffu- diversity protection or greenhouse gas emissions. But sion of cleaner technologies. if those countries are willing signatories to the agree- In these and other examples, the primary cause of ment, the threat of trade sanctions will rarely need to environmental problems is not liberalized trade but the be used. failure of markets and governments to price the envi- Trade measures to implement environmental agree- ronment appropriately. Trade policies are a blunt and ments include the Montreal Protocol, which phases out uncertain tool for environmental management because ozone-depleting chemicals; the Basel Convention they influence the use of environmental resources only (which entered into force in May 1992) for controlling indirectly. Indeed, modifying trade policies to deal the transboundary movement and the disposal of haz- with environmental problems may worsen degrada- ardous wastes; and the Convention on International tion. Thus, restricting the export of logs, as in Indo- Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), which supports nesia, raises returns to the domestic wood-processing the embargo on ivory trade. The use of trade instru- industry and may contribute to inefficient and high- ments could be justified in some of these cases. For cost production that could worsen deforestation. Usu- instance, restricting trade in hazardous and toxic ally, more direct instruments than trade policies are wastes, as under the Basel Convention, is appropriate available for combating deforestation, soil erosion, or if the capacities of many countries to monitor and dis- industrial pollution. Trade liberalization should be ac- pose of these wastes are in doubt. But in most coun- companied by better use of these targeted policies. tries the scale of such trade is small in comparison with Should trade policies be used to influence environmental the volume of hazardous wastes being generated do- standards in other countries? It has been proposed, for mestically. Therefore, the concern should be to mini- example, that the General Agreement on Tariffs and mize the production of these wastes and to devise Trade (GATT) be amended to allow countries to neu- ways of ensuring their safe disposal. A total ban on all tralize international differences in pollution control ex- trade in hazardous and toxic wastes would be counter- penditures and environmental standards by imposing productive because it would prevent the development countervailing duties. The arguments noted above ap- of collective arrangements for treatment and disposal ply here as well and are strengthened by another con- even where individual countries, as in Western Eu- sideration: some variation in environmental standards rope, can specialize in safe and low-cost disposal. across regions and countries is justified by differences The ban on trade in ivory to protect the African ele- in priorities and in capacities to assimilate pollutants or phant also involves difficult tradeoffs. Available evi- cope with resource degradation. When countries (typ- dence shows that ivory prices have fallen and poaching ically, the bigger and richer ones) use trade policy to has declined since the ban became effective. But coun- impose their environmental standards, the effect is to tries such as Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe protect domestic producers from foreign competition. have argued that the ivory ban, by raising prices in the Applying the same standards to domestic production long run, will simply make poaching more lucrative. and imports may be justified when, as with cars or (Work by the London Environmental Economics Cen- pesticides, consumption leads to environmental dam- ter supports this assertion.) These countries also claim age. But even there, environmental concerns do not that the ban discriminates against their efforts to man- warrant uniformity across countries. age their elephant herds sustainably by using revenue Evidence shows that developing countries do not from hunting and tourism to enrich local people and compete for foreign investment in "dirty" industries finance law enforcement. 67 environmental resources. The pattern of adoption by more than 30 percent between 1989 and 1995. In of thermomechanical pulping processes in the pa- Indonesia pesticide subsidies were more than 80 per and pulp industry illustrates this point (see percent of the retail price in 1985 but had been Box 6.3). That technology was developed in the eliminated entirely by late 1988. This step reduced 1970s and was used initially in the United States excessive pesticide use (in favor of a successful in- and Western Europe in response to environmental tegrated pest management program) and gener- regulation. Thermomechanical pulping was not ated budgetary savings of more than $120 million only less polluting than the earlier chemical-based annually. In Brazil discontinuing the fiscal and technology but also cut average manufacturing credit incentives extended to ranching has saved costs in half. Its initial adoption and later diffusion about $300 million annually while easing (al- have been significantly quicker in developing though not eliminating) pressures for defor- countries with fewer trade restrictions. As late as estation. 1989, not a single pulp producer in Eastern Europe Subsidies to public industrial firms in many had adopted this technology. countriesthrough preferential access to the pub- But because greater openness also makes export lic treasury, as in Eastern Europe, or through pro- production more profitable, it can exacerbate envi- tection from domestic and foreign competition ronmental pressures. Where there is open access, must be eliminated. The inefficiencies that these liberalizing trade may encourage more intensive subsidies encourage have worsened pollution in exploitation. For instance, in Malaysia liberalizing countries where public ownership has been con- trade in logs and timber products would worsen centrated in capital-intensive and highly polluting deforestation if stumpage fees are too low and con- industries. cession agreements too short to encourage sus- Public enterprises must be given greater auton- tainable logging. Similarly, by making it more omy and be exposed to competition. If managers profitable to clear land to grow cocoa in Ghana or of public utilities are made accountable for their cotton in Nigeria, exchange rate depreciations performance, they are more likely to set charges at have intensified pressures for deforestation where levels that improve cost recovery and to compare ownership of forests is not well defined. But these the costs and benefits of investments system- examples usually argue not for trade restrictions atically. Private investment should also be encour- but rather for other measures to address the envi- aged, particularly where private benefits are ronmental problems that may be exacerbated (see highin irrigation and water supply, in particu- Box 3.1). In some cases, as with hazardous wastes, larbut also for collection of solid wastes and trade restrictions are appropriate because more treatment of industrial wastewater. In many Latin targeted measures are infeasible. American cities, including Caracas, Santiago, and São Paulo, private solid waste collection services Elimination of subsidies for resource use are already successful. As Figure 3.2 shows, subsidies that cause environ- Clarification and enforcement of property rights mental damage by encouraging resource use are common. Both economic and environmental bene- Clarifying rights of ownership and use would im- fits will be achieved by removing subsidies that prove environmental outcomes, especially where encourage the use of coal, electricity, pesticides, those who invest in environmental protection and irrigation water and promote expansion of would also benefit the most. In Thailand the recent grazing and timber extraction on public lands. assignment of ownership titles and tenurial rights These reforms will require considerable political to land in recent years has made it more profitable will because the subsidies typically benefit the po- for farmers to invest in soil conservation and land litically influential or are intended to serve such improvement, thus reducing soil erosion. goals as food self-sufficiency and rapid indus- Strengthening individual and communal rights trialization. would also help in many cases where govern- Recognizing the environmental cost of such sub- ments have responded to concerns about overuse sidies will provide a powerful additional reason for of natural resources by taking over responsibility removing them. Frequently, the same goals can be for resource management. In the 1950s Nepal insti- met in cheaper ways. It was estimated that in Po- tuted state ownership of forests in place of com- land removing energy subsidies would by itself munity-based arrangements that had regulated reduce emissions of particulates and sulfur oxides use effectively. But as deforestation there and 68 Subsidies that encourage the use of energy and agricultural inputs are widespread Figure 3.2 Ratio of price to production cost, selected energy and agricultural inputs Ratio 1.4 S Turkey t Philippines 0 1.2 h 1.0 Republic of Korea A Republic of Korea Bangladesh United Kingdom Indonesia India 0.8 China 5 Turkey ' Indonesia Bangladesh India Sri Lanka 06 5 Sri Lanka Egypt " Mexico India Brazil South Africa 04 Republic of Korea China Poland Mexico /Czechoslovakia Poland 0.2 /Chifla 5Philippines /Mexico Former U.S.S.R. S-Indonesia /India o $.-Bangladesh Electric power a Coal b Nitrogen fertilizerc Irrigation water d Average electricity tariff as a proportion of the incremental cost of system expansion (1987; Egypt, 1991). Domestic price as a proportion of border price or long-run marginal cost (various years, 1987-91, except South Africa, 1982). Farmgate price of urea as a proportion of the average production cost of urea (average of various years, 1980-88). Direct water charge as a proportion of operating and maintenance costs plus midrange estimate of annualized capital cost (various years, 1985-88). Sources: World Bank data; FAQ various years; Shah and Larsen, background paper (b). overgrazing on public lands in many other parts of are clearly defined, the self-interested decisions of the world show, public ownership and manage- private owners will produce more desirable envi- ment have often led to overexploitation. ronmental outcomes than will open access. Private Even for natural resources other than land loggers on plantation forests, for instance, will minerals, trees, and fishif private property rights weigh the returns from cutting trees today (includ- 69 Box 3.2 Natural resources, open access, and property rights When property rights to natural resources are non- the Himalayas, and the Andes, fisheries in Turkey, and existent or unenforcedwhen there is open accessno irrigation water in southern India. In each case users individual bears the full cost of environmental degra- have developed mechanisms for restricting access by dation, and there is no mechanism for regulating the outsiders, allocating use rights among those in the use of the resources. The result is overexploitation- group, and monitoring and enforcing these allocations. what Garrett Hardin termed the "tragedy of the com- Private property and common property can and do mons." Overfishing, overgrazing, excessive extraction coexist. In Japan forests, meadows, and irrigation of groundwater, and overuse of the "global commons" works were held as communal property while agri- are examples. cultural land was held privately. In the Swiss Alps Two policy options are to create private property private property governs agriculture, but forests and rights or to assert state control over the resource. Pri- summer meadows are under common-property man- vate property conveys rights, which are transferable agement. Property regimes can also change between and are enforced by the state, to exclude others from seasons or over time. Communal land rights in Ghana, exploiting the resource. When a resource is state prop- Kenya, and Rwanda have generally moved toward erty, as with public forests, governments make deci- greater individualization in response to population sions on its use. Political pressures then often lead to pressure, the growth of commercial agriculture, and overexploitation and misuse. A third option is for a technological change. resource to be held and exploited by a group, in the Hostile government policies can lead to the deterio- form of common or communal property. The group ration of common-property regimes. For instance, excludes outsiders from using the resource and regu- long-standing cooperative fishing agreements in south- lates use by its members. Examples of common-prop- ern Bahia, Brazil, were undermined when subsidies erty management of natural resources abound. Some from the government fisheries agency encouraged out- have argued that even the medieval English commons siders and some fishermen within the group to use (which Hardin used to make his case) was actually sub- nylon nets instead of traditional equipment. In addi- ject to communal management, with access restricted tion, because Brazilian law does not recognize exclu- to certain members of the village and limits on the sive rights to coastal fishing areas, any registered Bra- number of animals that could be grazed. In fact, this zilian fishing vessel could legally enter the local fishing commons system lasted for hundreds of yearshardly grounds, making it impossible for the cooperatives to a tragedy! Similar communal management systems are exclude outsiders. used for forests in Japan, pastures in the Swiss Alps, ing the accrued interest from investing these reve- useare capable of regulating the use of range- nues) against future revenues, looking at price lands, forests, irrigation systems, and fisheries. trends and the expected growth of timber yields. Because such community-based arrangements are Extending the length and increasing the security of difficult to restore once they break down, govern- concessions in Southeast Asian forests encourages ments should not undermine them by enacting more sustainable logging practices. laws that make encroachment by outsiders easier, But as the controversies about excessive logging as happened with the coastal fisheries in north- even in privately owned forests in the United eastern Brazil (Box 3.2). States and elsewhere illustrate, such measures are no panacea. Clear property rights may induce pri- Using targeted environmental policies vate users to adopt the "correct" pattern of timber extraction, taking into consideration the current Removing policy distortions will frequently en- and future benefits from logging, but give no in- hance both environmental quality and economic centive to take into account the costs of deforesta- growth (even as conventionally measured). Some tion to those living outside the forestsfor exam- environmental resources, however, will remain ple, increased soil erosion and lost biodiversity. In susceptible to overexploitation. Because markets such cases additional environmental controls are fail to reflect environmental costs accurately in a often needed. variety of cases, governments must consider going Common-property systemswhereby commu- beyond removing policy distortions. Well-chosen nities establish rules for controlling access and public policies and investments that respond to 70 Box 3.3 Costing environmental damage An essential step in determining what should be done luted, factories can invest in a private tubewell, and about environmental damage is to value it and com- households can buy water from vendors. Losses of soil pare it with the costs of preventing the damage. Mea- fertility caused by erosion can be approximated by the surement is essential, since tradeoffs are inescapable. cost of using purchased fertilizers to replace nutrients. There are many practical problems in deriving credible estimates of economic value. But four broad ap- Surrogate markets proaches can be used in setting priorities for policy. Environmental degradation can sometimes be valued Market prices through its effect on other marketsespecially on property values and wages. For example, clean air is Market prices are used in valuation when environmen- implicitly traded in property markets, since buyers will tal damage leads to losses in productivity or to adverse consider environmental attributes as characteristics of health effects. Common applications include valuation property. Similarly, environmental risks associated of damages due to soil erosion, deforestation, and air with different jobs are traded in labor markets, and and water pollution. In applying this approach, the wage levels for higher-risk jobs will include larger risk physical or ecological relationship between environ- premiums. This technique is difficult to apply when mental damage and its impacts on output or health property owners or workers are unaware of environ- the dose-response functionis estimated and com- mental problems or are constrained in responding to bined with prices to derive monetary values. For them. environmentally related health risks, income forgone because of illness or premature death is sometimes Surveys used to measure welfare losses. Such estimates are par- tial and controversial because they rely solely on in- Direct questioning can determine what value people come losses and use causal links that are difficult to place on environmental change. This approach is par- quantify or to extrapolate from studies in high-income ticularly relevant where markets are nonexistent or countries. where people value art environmental resource that they do not use. Such surveys have become more so- Costs of replacement phisticated to minimize the biases that may enter into responses to hypothetical questions. They are increas- People and firms can respond to environmental degra- ingly employed to determine the amenity value of spe- dation by making expenditures to avert damage or cies or landmarks. In developing countries their use is compensate for possible consequences. Although some rare but increasing; examples include surveys to deter- effects of degradation are not accounted for, these ex- mine willingness to pay for better access to clean water penditures can provide an estimate of environmental in Brazil and for improved sanitation in Ghana, and to damage. For example, when water supplies are pol- assess tourists' valuation of elephants in Kenya. market failures can often raise welfare. This sec- prove, environmental valuation is being extended tion looks at how these policies should be into new areas of policymaking. Its use, however, designed. remains controversial because environmental benefits are often difficult to measure (Box 3.3). The role of valuation Especially when damage is irreversible or would occur far into the future, assessing tradeoffs may Environmental damage imposes costs on societies appear meaningless. But even here, some valua- that are often not reflected by markets. Comparing tioneven if imperfect, such as assessments of these benefits of environmental protection with risks and thresholdsis better than none. the costs of remedial action helps policymakers make better-informed decisions. In making CHOOSING PRIORITIES. Deciding which environ- choices about environmental priorities, standards, mental problems to address inevitably requires a and policies, governments implicitly place values comparison of the costs of damage with the costs on different kinds of damage. It is better that these of preventing it. Such techniques are being used to choices be guided by comparisons of the costs and a greater extent in policy analysis, as illustrated by benefits of environmental improvements. As ana- a recent study of air pollution in the southeastern lytical tools, data, and scientific knowledge im- Polish town of Tarnobrzeg. The economic benefits 71 Reducing particulates yields net benefits; reducing sulfur dioxide does not Figure 3.3 Total estimated benefits and costs of reducing exposure to air pollutants in Tarnobrzeg, Poland Sulfur dioxide Particulate matter Billions of 1987 zloty Millions of 1987 zloty 3.0 14 2.5 12 10 2.0 1.5 Costs 1.0 0.5 Benefits 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Reduction in highest exposure level Reduction in highest exposure level (percent) (percent) Source: Cofala, Lis, and Balandynowicz 1991. to the local population of reducing air pollution provements in children and adults, as well as the decreased mortality and morbidity and less mate- savings from reduced misfueling, lower mainte- rial damage and soilingwere compared with the nance, and greater fuel economy. These benefits costs of achieving reduced exposure to suspended were compared with the costs to refineries of using particulate matter and to sulfur dioxide. The re- more expensive alternatives to lead in raising oc- sults were surprising: whereas the benefits of re- tane levels. The results showed that the benefits ducing sulfur dioxide were in all cases lower than from lowering lead concentrations were substan- the costs, the benefits of reducing particulates by tially greater than the costs, and the more strin- up to 70 percent exceeded the costs, with net bene- gent standards were adopted in 1985. fits greatest for a reduction of about 40 percent But despite the appeal of these methods, they (Figure 3.3). Thus, from a local perspective, mea- are not always applicable because some benefits sures that would reduce particulates are of higher are difficult to value. Targets will therefore usually priority in this region of Poland than are those that be set in response to tangible signs of damage. In would control sulfur dioxide. these cases, it is still worth choosing cost-effective policiesthose that meet specific environmental SETTING STANDARDS. Ideally, countries should goals at lowest cost. In practice, some environ- set environmental goals by comparing the benefits mental policies impose large costs for small bene- from environmental improvements with the costs fits while other measures that have more substan- of achieving them. The U.S. Environmental Pro- tial payoffs are ignored. In the United States, for tection Agency used this approach in setting stan- example, a cost-effectiveness analysis of various dards for the use of lead in gasoline. The benefits health and safety regulations that took account of of reducing lead content from 1.1 to 0.1 grams per implementation costs, mortality risks, and esti- gallon were estimated by valuing the health im- mates of the number of deaths avoided found that 72 the cost per premature death averted by the regu- policies) or by pricing additional pollution or addi- lations varied from about $100,000 to more than tional resource use (incentive-based or market- $100 million. based policies). Although the regulatory approach has been dominant in most countries, interest in Regulation and economic incentives incentive-based measures has revived. Notable ex- amples of such measures include effluent charges In choosing policies, regulators have to make three on water pollution in the Netherlands and Ger- main related decisions, as displayed in Table 3.1. Is many; emissions charges on sulfur dioxide in Ja- regulation likely to be more effective than relying pan; charges on fuels, automobiles, pesticides, on economic incentives? Should policies address and fertilizers and deposit-refund systems for bev- the quantity or the price of pollution or resource erage containers and car batteries in Northern Eu- use, or should they specify technologies? And rope; and emissions trading for air pollutants in should policies target the damaging activities di- the United States. rectly or indirectly? Since policies differ substantially in cost and ef- WHERE REGULATION IS APPROPRIATE. Regulatory fectiveness, and since developing countries can ill policies, which are used extensively in both indus- afford to waste resources, the measures they trial and developing countries, are best suited to choose should be guided principally by the cost of situations that involve a few public enterprises and effective implementation. The cost-effective policy noncompetitive private firms. This is particularly mix depends, in general, on the characteristics of true when the technologies for controlling pollu- the environmental problem at hand as well as the tion or resource use are relatively uniform and can capabilities of regulatory institutions. In most cir- easily be specified by regulators. Cubatão, Brazil, cumstances, a combination of policiesregulatory provides a good illustration (see Box 6.4). To ad- and market-basedis most cost-effective. Box 3.4 dress serious pollution from particulates and sul- illustrates this for the control of air pollution from fur dioxide, CETESB (the state regulatory agency) transport in Mexico City. forced the larger polluterspublic sector and mul- The behavior of polluters and resource users can tinational firmsto install precipitators and switch be influenced in two main ways: by stipulating to low-sulfur oil. The result has been a dramatic standards and regulations (command-and-control improvement in air quality. This experience also Table 3.1 Policies for changing behavior Variable affected Type of policy Price Quantity Technology Incentive Direct Effluent charges (Netherlands, Tradable emissions permits Technology taxes based on China) (emissions trading program, presumed emissions Stumpage fees (Canada, United States) (water pollution control, United States) Tradable fishing permits Germany, France) Deposit-refund schemes (New Zealand) (beverage containers, northern Europe) Indirect Fuel taxes (Sweden, Tradable input or production Subsidies for R&D and fuel Netherlands) permits (lead trading efficiency (catalytic Performance bonds (hazardous program, United States) converters, United States, wastes, Thailand) Japan, Western Europe) Regulation Direct Emissions standards Mandated technical standards (United States, China) (catalytic converters, Logging quotas and bans United States, Japan, (Thailand) Western Europe) Indirect Land zoning (Rondônia, Brazil) Efficiency standards for inputs Bans and quotas on products or processes (fuel efficiency and inputs (high-sulfur fuel, standards, United States) São Paulo, Brazil) Source: Eskeland and Jimenez 1991. 73 Box 3.4 Controlling air pollution from transport: the case of Mexico City Transport is a significant source of air pollution in Mex- (cars and taxis) account for a disproportionately high ico City, contributing about 97 percent of carbon mon- share of emissions. Emissions per passenger kilometer oxide, 66 percent of nitrogen oxides, 54 percent of vol- from private vehicles are more than double those from atile organic compounds, and 48 percent of total micro- and minibuses and are even higher compared emissions on a toxicity-weighted basis. Private vehicles with larger buses. Box figure 3.4 Control of air pollution from transport in Mexico City Incremental cost of reducing emissions (thousands of dollars per ton) 2,600 Fuel 2,100 improvements Emission standards Passenger 1,600 1,100 / Gasoline Taxis (replacements) cars Minibuses trucks 600 Strengthened Vapor recovery inspection 4. - Inspection of passenger cars 100 Inspection of high-use vehiclesa 0 Natural gas retrofits -400 I I 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 12 1.4 Reduction in toxicity-weighted emissions (millions of tons) Incremental cost with or without tax - Emissions reduction target - Incremental cost with tax El Cost savings with a gasoline tax - Incremental cost without tax a. Including taxis, light-duty trucks, and minibuses. Source: Eskeland 1992. illustrates how important it is for regulators to ap- land or to preserve ecologically sensitive habitats. ply environmental standards impartially to all en- Urban zoning seeks to separate land uses so as to terprises, public and private. reduce adverse effects from, for example, indus- Another area in which regulation may be appro- trial air pollution. priate is land use. Governments may use zoning regulations to attempt to create a land-use pattern ECONOMIC INCENTIVES. If effectively imple- that differs from the one that market allocations mented, policies that use economic incentives would produce. The aim of zoning laws in rural such as charges will frequently be less costly in areas is typically to slow conversion of agricultural meeting environmental goals than regulatory al- 74 districts according to license plates, encourage evasion and are costly because they force all drivers to give up the same proportion of trips, Because continuous monitoring of individual emis- irrespective of the widely differing benefits they sions from transport is obviously impossible, there is derive. With policies that rely on economic incen- no emissions tax that can be applied easily and effi- tives, each user decides either to use fewer re- ciently. Therefore indirect policies, which target sources or to pay for using more. Regulations, by proxies for emissions, have to be used. These measures contrast, leave these decisions to regulators, who reduce emissions by decreasing the overall demand for are rarely well informed about the relative costs travel, by shifting travel demand toward less-polluting and benefits faced by users. or less fuel-intensive modes of transport, or by reduc- Incentive-based policies that price environmen- ing emissions per kilometer driven. The United States has focused almost exclusively on the third option, pri- tal damage affect all polluters, in contrast to regu- marily by imposing emissions standards on all new lations, which affect only those who fail to comply. vehicles and requiring vehicle inspections. This means that incentive-based policies give the A combination of policies that targets all three op- right long-term signals to resource users. The poi- tions has advantages, however, as a recent study on luter or resource user has an incentive to use Mexico City by Mexican regulatory authorities and the whichever technologies most cost-effectively re- World Bank illustrates. Box figure 3.4 shows the incre- mental costs of reducing emissions from transport duce environmental damage. Regulations that sources in Mexico City. The upper curve shows the mandate standards give polluters no reason to go costs of reducing total emissions by various amounts further than the standard demands. Indeed, regu- when only measures to reduce emissions per kilometer lations that specify control technologiesthat is, driven are used. The lower curve shows how the incre- technology-forcing policies, which are common in mental control costs fall when the same measures are the United States and Western Europelock in ex- combined with a gasoline tax, which reduces demand isting standards and give businesses less incentive and stimulates a shift toward less fuel-intensive modes to switch to cleaner production methods or more of transport. By using measures designed to decrease emissions effective controls. per kilometer, Mexico City could reduce current emis- The potential savings from using economic in- sions from transport by 1.2 million tons (more than 50 centives are illustrated in Table 3.2, which summa- percent) at a cost of $560 million. Adding a gasoline tax rizes evidence from simulation studies of air pollu- would achieve the same reduction with a cost saving of tion control in the United States and the United about 20 percent (the light red area in the figure). The Kingdom. The studies contrast regulatory policies tax would also generate about $300 million in public revenue within the metropolitan area alone, which (such as those currently in place) with least-cost could be used to reduce other, more distortionary policies for the same level of pollution control. Al- taxes. though incentive-based measures would not, in Mexico City has already begun to implement several practice, exactly mimic the least-cost outcomes, of the measures shown in the figure, including gas the figures show how expensive regulatory poli- retrofits for high-use vehicles, emissions standards and cies can be. inspection programs for all vehicles, and replacement Policies that use economic incentives will be ef- of older taxis by newer catalyst-equipped models. In addition, unleaded gasoline has been introduced, and fective only to the extent that polluters and re- prices of leaded and unleaded gasoline have been in- source users respond to them. Responsiveness de- creased by about 50 percent. pends on three factors: ownership, competition, and differences among users. As the experiences of Poland and China with pollution charges illus- trate, state-owned enterprises are particularly in- sensitive to policies that use economic incentives ternatives. With market-based policies, all pollu- because they generally do not care much about ters or resource users are faced with the same price costs. Lack of domestic and foreign competition and must choose their degree of control. For in- dampens the pressures even on private businesses stance, a gasoline tax such as that proposed in to minimize costs. Thus, countries such as India, Mexico City (Box 3.4) would encourage all drivers Mexico, and Thailand that have state-owned pe- to limit vehicle use to the point at which the value troleum refineries would gain little by using of benefits forgone is the same for each driver. By charges or tradable permits to phase out leaded contrast, the current regulations in Athens and gasoline. By contrast, a scheme that allowed Mexico City, which restrict driving in central urban highly competitive private refineries in the United 75 Table 3.2 Simulation studies of alternative policies for controlling air pollution Ratio of costs of regulatory policies to those of least-cost policy Pollutant Geographic area (percent) Study and year Sulfates Los Angeles, Calif. 110 Hahn and Noll (1982) Nitrogen dioxide Baltimore, Md. 600 Krupnick (1983) Particulate matter Baltimore, Md. 420 McGartland (1984) Sulfur dioxide Lower Delaware Valley, 180 Particulate matter United States 2,200 Spofford (1984) Hydrocarbons All U.S. Dupont plants 420 Maloney and Yandle (1984) Sulfur dioxide Five regions of the United States 190 Gollop and Roberts (1985) Sulfur dioxide United Kingdom 140-250 Welsch (1988) Source: Adapted from Tietenberg 1988. States to trade rights to use lead is estimated to in Santiago, industry is highly differentiated and have saved about $250 million in phasing out largely uncontrolled. leaded gasoline in the mid-1980s. These policies also work best when users re- QUANTITY OR PRICE? Environmental degradation spond to changes in prices in differing ways, as is can be controlled either by altering the prices of characteristic of private firms and households. The environmental resourcesusing charges or taxes, experience with charges in controlling water pollu- for exampleor by restricting use, as with logging tion in the Netherlands illustrates their effective- permits, emissions standards, and land zoning. ness as a way of influencing private firms. Charges Policies that specify quantities of pollution or re- were introduced in 1970 for all organic pollutants source use fix the level of environmental damage, from industrial sources and were raised about 83 whereas those that alter prices fix the cost of con- percent in real terms over the following decade. As trolling environmental damage. Quantity-based a result, and despite a 27 percent increase in indus- policies often take the form of regulation. But even trial output between 1970 and 1983, organic pollu- if the overall quantity of pollution or resource use tion fell almost 70 percent. Similarly, Malaysia is fixed, the market can still be allowed to allocate uses variable license fees to charge palm oil pro- the quantity through the use of tradable permits. cessors for their emissions into streams and rivers. Such schemes ensure that resources are used by These fees were effective in reducing the pro- those who value them the most. cessors' discharges of biological oxygen demand Quantity-based policies are also appropriate (BOD) by almost 90 percent between 1982 and when it is extremely important that certain thresh- 1987. The environmental fund for treating haz- olds not be exceeded, as with emissions of radioac- ardous wastes from private firms that is being con- tive and toxic wastes. In these cases the costs of sidered in Thailand will encourage businesses to greater environmental damage are rightly judged minimize waste generation by charging firms and to be of graver concern than the possibility that providing them rebates if less waste is generated pollution control might be more expensive than than presumed (see Box 6.5). These advantages expected. By contrast, the social costs of other extend to commercial agriculture, where charges types of environmental damagefrom, say, partic- on pesticides and fertilizers, as in Austria and ulates or mineral extractiondo not rise dramati- Sweden, may help address overuse more cost-ef- cally if standards are exceeded by small margins. fectively than regulation of their use. In these cases it is more important to avoid spend- If individuals and businesses are unable to ing too much on controlling degradation than to change their behavior muchbecause, for exam- risk a bit more environmental damage. ple, resource use is already tightly controlledsav- So, quantity-based policies are most appropriate ings from using economic incentives will be small. for pollution problems that involve threshold As Table 3.2 shows, in Los Angeles regulatory pol- health impacts (for example, hazardous wastes icies are not much more costly than the least-cost and heavy metals) and for natural resources such option because most industrial polluters already as unique habitats. Similarly, enforceable zoning face stringent standards. By contrast, the gains laws may be more reliable than differential prop- from incentive-based policies would be much erty taxes in preserving unique habitats such as larger in most developing country cities, where, as wetlands, sensitive shorelines, and coral reefs. 76 Costa Rica is one of many Latin American coun- environmental protection funds to finance invest- tries to use a shoreland restriction program to con- ments. Subsidizing environmental cleanup or re- trol commercial development. source use has an obvious problem: it sends the Among incentive-based policies, the choice be- wrong signals to resource users and conflicts with tween charges and tradable permits depends the common interpretation of the polluter-pays partly on the capabilities of regulators. Although principle (Box 3.5). Subsidies may thus encourage tradable permits have been used for control of air a long-term increase in environmental damage, and water pollution in the United States and for and their use should be well targeted, explicitly fisheries in New Zealand and have been suggested time-bound, and carefully monitoredas, for in- for restricting emissions of greenhouse gases, they stance, when they are provided only for the initial tend to be more administratively demanding than installation of pollution control equipment. charges because the latter can typically be imple- Unlike regulations, incentive-based policies mented through the existing fiscal system. such as taxes raise revenues. These measures may be advantageous for governments when they re- DISTRIBUTIONAL ISSUES. One obstacle to using place more distortionary sources of revenue com- market-based environmental policies is that busi- mon in developing countries, such as trade tariffs nesses and individuals may be unable to invest in and corporate taxes. Revenue generation and envi- new technologies or pay for cleaner products. Ex- ronmental protection are then complementary. In amples include declining heavy industries in East- practice, although the potential yield from incen- ern Europe and poor people who use kerosene as tive-based policies is considerableabout the same their principal cooking fuel. Sometimes govern- as control costs for industrial pollutionrevenues ments have subsidized the changes, by directly fi- today are minuscule even in OECD countries. nancing pollution control equipment or by using But the corollary of those revenues is the impo- Box 3.5 The polluter-pays principle: what it can and cannot do The polluter-pays principle (PPP), adopted by the reduce pollution from automobiles and small-scale OECD in 1972, states that "the polluter should bear the firms. A similar problem in identifying polluters arises cost of measures to reduce pollution decided upon by in cleaning up past pollution. The United States tried public authorities to ensure that the environment is in to apply the polluter-pays principle through the Super- an acceptable state." The main objective is to harmo- fund program. Superfund aims to restore hazardous nize policies among OECD members so that differen- waste sites with taxes on crude oil and petrochemical tial environmental regulations do not distort compara- feedstocks and is to be replenished by recovering tive advantage and trade flows. The principle has been cleanup costs from past polluters. This attempt has widely accepted as a guide for environmental poli- been a failure; much has been spent on litigation, little cymaking by governments and aid agencies. The on cleanup. polluter-pays principle is a useful starting point, but it Finally, where environmental effects spill over na- provides little help in judging the cost-effectiveness of tional borders and jurisdictions, it may be necessary to alternative policies. One problem is that the principle pay polluting or resource-using countries to cooperate can be interpreted in two different ways: as requiring in implementing cost-effective solutions. (Examples are polluters to pay only the costs of pollution control and biodiversity losses due to tropical deforestation and cleanup (standard PPP) or, in addition, to compensate sulfur dioxide emissions that contribute to acid rain citizens for the damages they suffer from pollution (ex- outside the originating country.) These inducements or tended PPP)an interpretation which gives citizens an side payments convert the polluter-pays principle into entitlement to a clean environment. Neither reading the victim-pays principle, but without them there may necessarily implies the use of economic incentives be little or no incentive to cooperate in improving envi- charges or auctioned permitsalthough these are cost- ronmental quality. effective in many instances. Thus, the polluter-pays principle should not be Nor is the principle much help in choosing cost-ef- viewed as a guide to designing cost-effective policies. fective policies when polluters or resource users are Rather, it is a specific way of distributing the costs of difficult to identify and monitor. For example, it is less environmental protection among polluters or resource costly and more effective to use blunter policies such as users and those who benefit from the improvements. input or output taxes rather than emission charges to 77 sition of costs. Emissions standards provide poliu- resource users by means of direct policiesfor in- ters with the right to pollute up to the specified stance, by taxing or regulating emissions. But limits; imposing charges forces them to pay for all these measures involve a heavy administrative their emissions. Similarly, if regulations on air burden because they target individual polluters or emissions are replaced by tradable permit resource users. Blunt policies, such as taxes on schemes, the overall cost of controlling air pollu- polluting inputs and area-based forestry charges, tion falls, but businesses may still have to pay the are less demanding because they can be imple- government for the permits. That may cost busi- mented through the tax system. In the United nesses several times as much as meeting regula- States, which primarily uses direct policies, the tory standards. Using economic incentiveswhich share of staff resources within the Environmental is often more cost-effective than regulatingmay Protection Agency devoted to enforcing these benefit society as a whole, but not individual pol- measures rose continuously through the 1980s and luters. Moreover, whereas the costs imposed by by 1991 accounted for more than a quarter of the switching to economic incentives fall on relatively totaleven though self-monitoring by large pollu- few polluterswho will see clearly that they are ters is the main tool for enforcing compliance. So, worse off and protest noisilythe gains are dis- in many cases it will be appropriate that develop- persed across large numbers of people, who may ing countries use blunt policies, which require less not even realize that they are better off. Not sur- stringent monitoring. prisingly, it is often easier politically to use The difficulties involved in monitoring the ac- regulation. tions of individual users, and thus the application Can cost-effective policies be modified to build of direct policies, depend on four factors. First, political support for them? Yes: revenues can be and most obviously, the more numerous and dis- earmarked for environmental funds, or tradable persed the sources of environmental damage, as in permits can be given mainly to existing users transport, the more costly are policies that require ("grandfathering"). Revenues from pollution continuous monitoring. Second, it is almost im- charges have been widely used to pay for cleaning possible to monitor the actions of users who can- up water pollution in Western Europe. Such not be located, such as fuelwood gatherers in rural schemes do not win support only because charges Africa and small-scale gold miners in the Amazon. impose lower economic costs than regulation; they Third, the ease of monitoring depends on the na- also win favor with those who benefit from the ture of the technological solutions available. After way the money is spent. leaded fuel was phased out (as in the United States Grandfathering can be effective in reducing op- and Japan) or taxed (as in Western Europe), use of position to the introduction of cost-effective poli- catalytic converters to control automobile emis- cies. It helped build support among businesses for sions became easier because their operation could incentive-based policies to eliminate leaded gas- simply be checked during regular vehicle inspec- oline and reduce sulfur dioxide in the United tions. Last, for environmental problems that ex- States and to limit fishing catches in New Zealand. tend beyond national boundariessuch as acid But policies that favor existing producers, such as rain in Europe and Asia or biodiversity in tropical subsidies from earmarked funds and grandfather- forests that is valued in other countriesit may be ing, are not costless. Because the U.S. Clean Air more cost-effective for countries to coordinate the Act imposed more stringent standards on new pol- enforcement of their policy responses than to lution sources (a type of grandfathering), firms adopt policies unilaterally. tended to postpone replacement of older, less-effi- Therefore, the conditions in which direct poli- cient technologies. cies (whether or not incentive-based) are most jus- tified are best approximated for environmental DIRECT OR INDIRECT POLICIES. In addition to de- problems that involve large, highly visible enter- ciding whether or not to use incentives, regulators prisesnotably, particulate and sulfur dioxide must also choose between direct policies, which emissions from electric utilities, pollution from in- target proxies for environmental damage, such as dustrial and mining operations of public enter- industrial emissions or timber extraction, and prises, and timber extraction by logging com- blunter measures, which influence actions only in- panies. The cleanup since 1985 in Cubatäo (cited directly related to environmental damage, such as above) was accomplished mostly by enforcing the use of leaded gasoline or of land. Ideally, regu- emissions and technology standards and suc- lators would attempt to change the behavior of ceeded because the main polluters were large pub- 78 Direct policies target emissions; indirect policies address outputs, inputs, or the production process Figure 3.4 Policies for reducing sulfur dioxide emissions from electric power generation Direct policies Indirect policies Emissions tax Mandatory installation Tax on high-sulfur S Tax on generation of controls coal of electric power Emissions standards Subsidies for development Tax on consumption Tradable emissions or installation of abatement of electric power permits technologies or cleaner" production techniques 1 I I Inputs of different I Total emissions Emissions per unit of fossil fuel input x fossil fuels per unit of electric power generated x Electric power output Source: Levinson and Shetty, background paper. lic or private sector firms. Similarly, the trading of structure of demandmany alternatives are avail- sulfur dioxide emissions that will now be allowed able for addressing specific environmental prob- under the U.S. Clean Air Acta direct policy with lems (Figure 3.4). But because these policies often economic incentivesapplies initially only to elec- target distant proxies for emissions or extraction, a tric utilities, which, by virtue of their size, are eas- single indirect policy may not be cost-effective ier to monitor. and, indeed, may encourage resource users to be- Indirect policies are particularly useful when the have in ways that worsen environmental damage. monitoring and enforcement capabilities of regula- Setting area-based license fees for forest conces- tory authorities are weak. Air pollution from auto- sions rather than differentiating these finely by the mobiles and household energy use, excessive de- volume and species logged may protect a larger forestation by small logging companies, pesticide forested area but may lead to intensified logging of and fertilizer runoff from agriculture, hazardous higher-value species. The costs of using many wastes from small enterprises, and solid wastes such measures have to be weighed against the ad- from households are all problems well suited to ministrative savings they make possible. the use of blunt policies. For instance, selective zoning to create buffers around reserveswhich is Improving public investments being discussed in Brazilis a less direct policy for protecting reserve areas than a comprehensive Changing the behavior of individuals and busi- land-use planning scheme. By limiting zoning to nesses must be accompanied by steps to improve smaller areas, access to reserves can be controlled the investment decisions of government agencies at significantly lower cost. More ambitious zoning and departments. in the Brazilian Amazon is unlikely to succeed be- cause it cannot be enforced adequately, given the TAKING ACCOUNT OF ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS. pressures for clearing land. Failure to consider environmental costs and bene- Because blunt policies for environmental protec- fits leads governments to undertake projects with tion can be applied at many different levelsthe adverse impacts or to neglect investments that waste generation or resource extraction process, might bring environmental gains. Understanding the pattern of resource use or conversion, or the the environmental impacts of such public projects 79 will require better analysis of environmental costs When it is difficult to value environmental bene- and benefits, using the methods described in Box fits, environmental impact assessments (EIA5- 3.3. The Polonoroeste rural development and also called environmental assessments, or EAs) highway projects in Brazil, funded in part with a can be useful. Although they are qualitative, they loan from the World Bank, and the Mahaweli irri- force recognition of the environmental risks of gation project in Sri Lanka provide vivid illustra- public projects. The need for these assessments is tions of the environmental damage from ill-con- now well recognized, and their use is mandatory ceived and badly implemented development in many countries and by large donors. (Box 3.7 projects. Better project design and appraisal could discusses the World Bank's approach.) But EIAs have predicted at least some of these impacts. In are often conducted too late to influence project the case of Polonoroeste, it should have been an- design and approval. ticipated that building roads and other infrastruc- Further reforms are required in the processes ture would attract many more migrants into the that governments and donors (including the project area, making already underfunded public World Bank) use to identify and appraise invest- agencies even less capable of controlling large- ment projects. Such reforms will be helped if the scale deforestation. Similarly, the appraisers of the agency that implements a project also bears the Mahaweli scheme assumed that it would not accel- cost of any environmental damage that results. erate deforestation, even though it occupied large They can be accomplished either by establishing areas of land in four wildlife sanctuaries. geographically based development authorities Furthermore, valuing environmental benefits (river-basin or watershed authorities) or by using will make some investments more attractive. An mechanisms that make the managing agency re- example is a forestry project funded by the World sponsible for the project's financial consequences. Bank in northern Nigeria. For calculating the eco- User charges should also be employed more of- nomic rate of return, the benefits of expanded tim- tenin irrigation projects, for exampleto reduce ber production included reduced soil erosion, excess profits to some beneficiaries and thus the higher crop yields, and more fodder and forest political pressures for public investments that have products. These benefits (using current and esti- little economic justification. In Morocco the finan- mated future market prices) increased the project's cial autonomy of the regional agricultural develop- rate of return almost threefold and made it more ment office (ORMVAD), achieved through full cost worthwhile. Two other public investment deci- recovery, was an important reason for the success sions that valued environmental impacts are sum- of the Doukkala irrigation projects. marized in Box 3.6. Project appraisal should be supplemented with Box 3.6 Valuing environmental resources: two examples The examples here are of two cases in which estimating soil erosion and floodinggave the project a rate of environmental benefits helped improve decision- return of about 9 percent. making. Investing in water supply Improving forest management When prices are not available, consumer choices can be used to value the benefits from improvements in water Market prices were used to estimate the gains from a and sanitation and in other infrastructure. In Ukundu, forest development project in Nepal. The project was Kenya, residents had three sources of watervendors, designed to reduce deforestation by planting trees and kiosks, and wellseach with different costs in money bushes suitable for fuelwood and fodder and so im- and time. Water from door-to-door vendors cost the prove scrubland and timberland. Prices for milk and most but required the least collection time. A study fertilizertwo of the increased outputswere avail- found that the villagers were willing to pay a substan- able, and the value of the fuelwood was estimated on tial share of their incomesabout 8 percentin ex- the basis of the price of a substitute, cattle dung. The change for greater convenience and time saved. This increased land-use values aloneeven without count- finding, and similar ones in other developing coun- ing the less easily quantifiable benefits from control of tries, have been used to make the case for extending reliable public water supply even to poor communities. 80 Box 3.7 Integrating environmental considerations into World Bank lending The World Bank's Operational Directive on Environ- For instance, all projects that could cause serious mental Assessment (approved in 1989 and substan- environmental damage, such as development of hy- tially expanded in 1991) is the principal vehicle for tak- dropower and thermal energy, large-scale irrigation ing account of the environmental effects of the Bank's and flood control, and forestry production, are classi- project lending. Fiscal 1991 was the first year in which fied in category A and require full and detailed EAs. A all approved Bank projects were subject to these pro- review of category A projects approved recently shows cedures. As noted in the Bank's latest annual report on that several have been modified following EAs. For the environment, almost half of all projects required example, for the Lower Guayas flood control project in environmental assessments. Environmental assess- Ecuador, a channel was rerouted to avoid disruption to ments (EAs) are required for all projects that could a lagoon. have significant adverse effects on the environment. To improve understanding and implementation of By requiring such assessments early in project prepara- these procedures, an Environmental Assessment Source- tion, the directive helps reduce the risk of cost over- book was published in 1991. It provides details on the runs and delays in implementation as a result of unan- operational directive, including a section on how the ticipated environmental disruptions. The Bank's four views of affected groups and NGOs are to be taken regional environmental divisions are responsible for into account in preparing EAs and during project de- coordinating the process, but the ultimate responsibil- sign and implementation. ity for the EA remains with the borrower. All prospec- It is anticipated that the current version of the direc- tive Bank projects are now screened for potential envi- tive will be reviewed and will be adapted, as it was in ronmental effects and are placed in one of three 1991, to the experience of the Bank and its borrowers. categories according to the effort required to mitigate adverse impacts. assessments by independent evaluators who are With other services, such as solid waste collection insulated from the implementing agency. For in- and wastewater treatment, the social benefits sig- stance, the Indira Sarovar irrigation project in In- nificantly exceed the benefits to users. Then it will dia was redesigned in the late 1980s after its initial rarely be appropriate to charge their full cost, and design was reviewed and criticized by several investments will have to be paid for partly through agencies, including the departments of environ- subsidies (see Chapter 5). ment and wildlife. Finally, as is discussed in Chap- ter 4, more attention must be given to improving Directions for policy reform knowledge about environmental impacts. Most countries, developing and industrial, have IMPROVING SERVICE PROVISION. Sometimes fail- used direct regulations to address environmental ure to value environmental benefits may lead not problems. The United States is typical: its Clean to overinvestment by the public sector but to un- Air Act mainly prescribes emissions standards or derinvestment. This is particularly true for ser- control technologies; the Clean Water Act man- vices such as water supply, sanitation, wastewater dates control technologies; the Resource Conser- treatment, and irrigation. These services are likely vation and Recovery Act regulates the transport to be undersupplied by markets, either because and disposal of hazardous wastes; and more than excluding users who do not pay is costly (storm- 28 percent of land is publicly owned and managed water drainage) or because the service is a natural by various government agencies. Direct regula- monopoly and an unregulated private supplier tions are not always cost-effective. Environmental would restrict the service in order to raise prices improvementsin air and water quality in indus- (water supply and wastewater treatment). trial countries, for examplehave probably been Governments frequently provide these services achieved at higher cost than if economic incentives but artificially hold down the price charged to had been used to a greater extent. users. When private benefits are high, as for water In developing countries this widespread prefer- supply and wastewater collection, more invest- ence for directly regulating polluters and resource ment can be financed by charging realistic prices. users has also stretched administrative capa- 81 bilities, particularly for monitoring and enforce- public revenues. Such incentive-based policies will ment. Few policies have been enforced con- not be applicable to all environmental problems, sistently. For instance, despite ambitious goals and particularly where only a few large firms, pro- regulations, air pollution remains a problem in tected from competition or state owned, are in- most cities in developing countries. The inability volved. But most countries, including industrial to enforce regulations has been an important rea- ones, have made too little use of economic incen- son for the ineffectiveness of the often stringent tives in addressing environmental problems. environmental laws. Third, indirect policies such as charges on in- Policy reform, because of its redistributional im- puts and products that pollute, self-enforcing de- plications, will require considerable political will. posit-refund schemes, and performance bonds But the gains to developing countries from well- should be used more frequently. Because most en- designed policies are enormous. Reform should vironmental problems in developing countries proceed in four directions. stem from the actions of numerous and dispersed First, a sequence of policies will generally be re- resource users, it is costly and often prohibitive to quired. The initial step is to remove policy distor- enforce direct regulations. Blunt policies would tions that damage the environment and slow simplify administration and so make enforcement growth. These measures must often be supple- more likely. Greater use of indirect policies will mented by others aimed at inducing government also typically mean that several must be used to- agencies and the private sector to recognize envi- gether. As in Mexico City (see Box 3.4), fuel taxes ronmental impacts. Even here, a combination of alone will not encourage vehicle owners to replace policies will usually be required because environ- polluting engines or meet emission standards. mental problems have several causesdeforesta- Taxes need to be combined with regulatory tion, for example, results from the actions of gov- measures. ernment departments, logging companies, Fourth, early action can reduce the costs of im- farmers, and fuelwood gatherers. Not every plementing effective environmental policies. As source of damage needs to be targeted, but a com- with air pollution from transport or hazardous bination of policies, including removal of distor- solid wastes from the chemicals industry, the tions, regulations (such as standards and land zon- emergence of many environmental problems can ing), and economic incentives, will be needed to be foreseen. It is usually possible to take steps control even the most important sources. such as setting up regulatory institutions, initiat- Second, policies to change behavior should rely ing charges, and encouraging adoption of cleaner more on economic incentives such as charges, technologies that can reduce the eventual magni- taxes, and deposit-refund schemes. Pricing envi- tude of the problem. Countries that delay acting ronmental damage would help reduce implemen- until problems become crises will eventually need tation costs, encourage the faster adoption of envi- to take extreme and costly responses, such as clos- ronmentally benign technologies, and supplement ing industrial plants and restricting vehicle use. 82 Making better decisions: information, institutions, and participation The principles of sound environmental poiiey do not conflict with development objectives. Why, then, are wise policies frequently the exception? A principal reason is that such policies often mean the withdrawal of entrenched "rights"to pollute or to use resourcesthat tend to benefit the wealthy and influential, often at the expense of the poor. Effective governmental action is also hampered by incomplete information, uncertainty, and weak regulatory powers. In implementing change, governments must make the best use of their scarce administrative capacity. To do so requires, first, improved information and analysis to inform priority-setting and policy design; second, responsive and effective institutions suited to the administrative traditions of the particular country; and, third, greater local participation in policymaking, monitoring, and enforcement. The benefits of public participation frequently outweigh its costs. This chapter asks why governments find it so hard the most dramatic rather than the most important to develop and implement wise environmental issues, and governments even find it difficult to policies. The guidelines for environmental man- curb their own damaging behavior. Building con- agement discussed in Chapter 3 are easier to de- stituencies is an important part of the solution to scribe than to put into practice, so that, in both these pressures. industrial and developing countries, there is a gap Redistributing environmental rights between policy and performance. For example, many middle- and low-income countries set envi- People benefit from being able to use environmen- ronmental standards that are unrealistically high tal resources without paying for them, and remov- and then fail to enforce them. In some countries ing these benefits has direct distributional conse- serious environmental problems are apparently ig- quences. Often, those who have been enjoying the nored, while in others decisions are often based on benefits are the wealthiest and most politically the lobbying clout of industry or of environmental powerful members of the society. Taking away activists rather than on balanced analysis. Some- their rights to pollute or to exploit resources can be times public investments proceed with little or no politically painful and will often require compro- attention to environmental impacts, while others mises. Second-best policies are not desirable, but if are thwarted by NIMBY ("not-in-my-backyard") well implemented, they are often preferable to Un- campaigns that hamper dispassionate analysis of enforced "perfect" policies. Chile's new fishing the benefits and costs of alternative measures. law (Box 4.1) is an example. Whereas the rich are often good at protecting The political economy of environmental their positions, the poorwhether they be slum degradation dwellers in Manila, Lagos, or Rio de Janeiro, pas- Governments face many pressures in making en- toralists in East Africa, or artisanal fishermen in vironmental policy. Conflicting interest groups Peru and Indonesiatend to play little part in the lobby noisily, public opinion demands action on environmental debate. Yet they usually bear the 83 Box 4.1 Chile's new fishery law Chile has one of the five largest fishing industries in scheme that is to be phased in gradually after the third the world. In 1990 exports of fish and fish products year and is based on a percentage of the total catch. totaled more than $900 million, making the sector sec- The new law is an improvement over the previous ond only to mining as a foreign exchange earner. Man- situation of completely open access without restrictions aging the open-access fisheries has become more diffi- on the catch. It was not possible, however, to imple- cult as additional investment in the fishing sector has ment a strict ITQ systemthe preferred approach from led to overfishing. The Chilean government has re- the standpoint of both sustainable management and sponded with a new law (Ley de Pesca) designed to the economic viability of the fishermen. Fishing com- prevent overexploitation and the collapse of any one panies in the north opposed the inclusion of ITQ5 in fishery by regulating access to the different species be- the law. They preferred open access within overall ing fished. Since any management scheme would im- quotas, which would allow them to switch their boats ply some restrictions on the fish catch, the law became from a declining fishery to another area. Many fisher- the subject of public debate. The evolution of the law men saw any catch restriction as a zero-sum game in illustrates some of the constraints on making environ- which they stood to lose. mental policy. The new fishery law is an important step that dem- Three main regulatory systems were considered in onstrates that a compromise solution is frequently bet- designing the new management scheme: global ter than none, Its implementation will have to be mon- quotas, individual transferable quotas (ITQs), and itored carefully. Chile is receiving assistance from the limits on individual boats and their gear. The final ver- Nordic countries and the World Bank in strengthening sion of the law combines open access (within an overall its capacity to monitor and analyze the fishing quota), selected controls on boats, and a licensing industry. brunt of environmental degradation. They may be popular support and donations is common. Many the ones to suffer most when forests that once pro- environmental activists have found these to be vided free fuel are logged or when factories pollute powerful metaphors for broader environmental rivers. Unlike the better-off, they lack the means to concerns. The danger remains, however, that pri- defend themselvesby switching to other fuels, orities can be distorted. Governments must make say, or by boiling polluted water. Thus, the poor sober determinations of the relative importance of generally have the most to gain from effective en- different environmental problems and set priori- vironmental policies. Governments must repre- ties in an informed, cost-effective manner. sent the interests of those without a voice, includ- ing the urban poor and ethnic minorities. Difficulties in self-regulation Crisis-driven policymaking In many countries the public sector owns the most-polluting industries and controls important Even when environmental cause and effect are natural resources. Instead of performing better on well understood by scientists, individuals may environmental criteria than private enterprises, make perverse judgments about relative risks state-owned enterprises tend to be less efficient, to when setting priorities. People are more con- use more resources, and to produce more wastes. cerned about cancer and nuclear accidents than The public sector is also notoriously bad at policing about many known health problems. Overreaction itself. The environmental problems of Eastern Eu- to environmental disasters is also common. Dra- rope and the former U.S.S.R. clearly demonstrate matic images of oil spills or leaking toxic wastes this. Being both poacher and gamekeeper does not have captured public attention and played a pow- work, especially when public agencies are respon- erful role in initiating policy change. Less attention sible for such essential but massive tasks as waste- has been paid to the insidious, chronic problems of water treatment or solid waste disposal. exposure to high levels of particulates or to unsat- Creating a greater separation between the regu- isfactory drinking waterenvironmental problems lator and the regulated is one option. The estab- that may put many more lives at risk. lishment of semiautonomous regulatory bodies, or The use of the dramatic or photogenic to garner the use of independent commissions to regulate 84 such natural-resource matters as interprovincial in anticipation of UNCED, forcefully advances the water allocation, the fish catch, or logging policies, idea that good environmental management is also helps depoliticize decisions and creates greater re- good business. sponsibility for self-regulation. Privatization with Given the multitude of environmental problems appropriate regulation can also help; in the United and political pressures, governments must con- Kingdom when water companies were privatized, serve their scarce administrative capacity. To de- they came under tighter government scrutiny. velop good environmental policies, they need in- formed analysis based on accurate information. Building constituencies They also need to improve the way bureaucracies make and enforce decisions. To implement poli- If governments are to challenge established pollu- cies, they need to build popular support and en- ters or reallocate existing rights to resources, they courage local participation. These are the themes need to build on and promote wider support for of the next sections. good environmental policies. Much evidence sug- gests that the basis for such support already exists, Improving knowledge and understanding having been stimulated sometimes by particular environmental issues, sometimes by a powerful Ignorance is an important cause of environmental book (such as Rachel Carson's Silent Spring) or an damage and a serious impediment to finding solu- expert report. As voters, protesters, and con- tions. This principle holds for international nego- sumers, people in many countries show a similar tiators and poor households alike, as is illustrated interest in environmental causes. by the global damage done to the ozone layer by "Green" political parties have appeared in a CFCs and the serious implications of indoor air number of countries, and increased activism by pollution for family health. It is necessary, first, to nongovernmental organizations has made govern- know the facts; second, to determine values and ments and public institutions more accountable for analyze the benefits and costs of alternative mea- their actions. Environmental causes frequently sures; and, third, to ensure that information is cross established political divides. Indeed, even in available to inform public and private choices. countries where conventional political participa- tion is discouraged, the environment may be one Establishing the facts area in which governments are willing to allow and respond to popular protest. It is no accident Frequently, especially in developing countries, de- that the move toward more democratic forms of cisions are made in the absence of environmental government has coincided with the worldwide in- information. Collecting basic data can be expen- crease in popular environmental awareness. sive, but the rewards are usually high. Although The behavior of consumers and producers is different countries have different needs, there are also changing. In many countries people are will- some general guidelines. For example, the discus- ing to recycle, to think about using energy and sion in Chapter 2 suggests some priorities for mon- materials more efficiently, and to alter their con- itoring pollution and waste problems: sumption patterns. Companies often respond by Quality and availability of drinking water and using the environment as a selling point. "Green sanitation facilities labeling," increased use of recyclable and biode- Exposure to ambient air pollutants, especially gradable packaging, and more energy-efficient particulate matter and lead, in urban areas technology are most common in industrial coun- Fecal coliform and heavy metals in rivers and tries, but the same trends are appearing in some lakes developing countries. Businesses sometimes argue Indoor air pollution from the burning of that environmental measures will diminish com- biomass petitiveness or lead to loss of jobs, but they are Hazardous wastes and pesticides in selected usually wrong. (As Chapter 3 noted, many envi- "hot spots." ronmental measures have little effect on compet- Essential management information on land use itiveness.) Business is increasingly realizing that it and natural resources needed for improved man- can take actions which yield both environmental agement of these resources (see Chapter 7) and economic benefits. For example, Changing includes: Course (Schmidheiny 1992), a report prepared by Data on soils, from surveys and experiments the Business Council for Sustainable Development in each agricultural zone 85 A worldwide network monitors air pollution Figure 4.1 Participants in the GEMS project for monitoring urban air quality r Participating countries Cities with monitoring sites Source: Monitoring and Assessment Research Centre data. Rate of depletion and quality of groundwater collection points to the numbers that can be accu- in threatened aquifers rately monitored. In the late 1980s Poland was re- Changes in forest area and data on harvesting ported to be regularly monitoring river pollution at and replanting more than 1,000 sites. Even if all the samples col- Data on fish harvest and wildlife depletion in lected were properly analyzed, the gain in know!- vulnerable areas edge about river quality over that attainable with a Damage to coastal and wetland resources. system of 100-200 monitoring points would not Efforts are being made to help countries with justify such an extensive system. environmental monitoring and to compile interna- tionally comparable data. The Global Environmen- Valuing resources and analyzing benefits and costs tal Monitoring System (GEMS), managed by UNEF has activities related to air and water qual- Ending well-entrenched but environmentally ity in 142 countries. Monitoring of urban air qual- damaging practices is difficult enough for govern- ity began in 1974. Most of the cities shown in Fig- ments when the damage is readily quantifiable. ure 4.1 report on concentrations of sulfur dioxide When environmental damage threatens health or and suspended particulate matter, both important jeopardizes economic output, it is relatively easy air pollutants. Unfortunately, the amount of finan- to point to the benefits of changes in policy. But as cial help has so far been inadequate, and thus the previous chapters have stated, some environmen- coverage and quality of data are weaker than is tal valuesimportant to poor and rich people desirable. alikeare not only unmarketed but also intan- Given limited resources, it is better to concen- gible. The more difficult it is to quantify the bene- trate on the most significant pollutants and to limit fits of preserving these values, the harder it will be 86 for policymakers to weigh the gains from conser- sions can also audit public agencies and so make vation against the quick profits from resource deg- them more accountable. radation or pollution. As described in Chapter 3, The most important effect of improved informa- however, more sophisticated methodologies are tion and environmental education is to change be- now making it possible to estimate the value of havior. Well-informed citizens are in a better posi- less-tangible environmental benefits. tion to put pressure on governments and on In many cases local analysis of costs and benefits polluters and are more likely to accept the costs can build on international experience. Researchers and inconveniences of environmental policies. The in Bangkok, in analyzing the health impacts of pol- results can be dramatic. In Curitiba, Brazil, a com- lution, tested local data against what had been bination of an energetic mayor, a committed mu- learned in other countries about the links between nicipal government, and an informed and in- exposure to pollutants and health. They found volved public have led to many environmental that the greatest threats to health were particulate innovations and an improved quality of urban life matter, lead, and microbiological diseases. Other in this city of 2 million. Public transport is used by environmental problems that traditionally receive most of the population, green spaces have been a great deal of attentioncontamination of expanded, recycling is widely practiced, and in- groundwater and surface water; air pollutants dustrial location and product mix are carefully cho- such as sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and sen to minimize pollution. ozone; and disposal of hazardous wasteswere much less dangerous. (In fact, the gravest threats Changing institutions: making the public sector were at least 100 times more serious than the low- more responsive est risks.) This information was used to develop cost-effective pollution control policies. Given that the scarcest government resource is fre- quently not money but administrative capacity Improving information and education and that political pressures make environmental policymaking particularly difficult, governments Environmental education based on careful analysis must think carefully about what they do and how can add rationality to the environmental debate. they do it. The "what" of environmental manage- Publication of annual reports on the environment ment consists of setting priorities, coordinating ac- is increasingly common. When the public has a tivities and resolving conflicts, and creating re- well-informed grasp of environmental issues, sponsible regulatory and enforcement institutions. there is a better prospect of developing positive The institutional response to these tasksthe rather than purely defensive policies. Without "how" of the equationincludes developing leg- such knowledge, people tend to focus on causes of islation and administrative structures, providing death (for example, technological hazards and nu- needed skills, ensuring funding and donor coor- clear accidents) that are sensational and are caused dination, and implementing decentralization and by somebody else and to worry less about the devolution. probability of death from causes that are less dra- matic and often under an individual's own con- Essential government functions trol, such as cigarette smoking and wood fires. The work of independent research institutessuch as SETTING PRIORITIES AND FORMULATING POLICIES. the Thailand Development Research Institutecan Since all countries face multiple environmental help to modify people's views. problems, governments must set priorities on the Communities are increasingly bombarded with basis of informed analysis so that they can make a variety of environmental information and need the most efficient use of scarce administrative and sources of information that they can trust. Inde- financial resources. Frequently, better environmen- pendent commissions can help to depoliticize deci- tal policy is more important than more environ- sionmaking by analyzing thorny environmental is- mental policy. In many developing countries top sues and producing recommendations for policy priority must be given to environmental impacts action. Box 4.2 illustrates how some of these on health and productivity (see Chapter 2). Actual bodies have contributed to the development of the priorities will depend on whether a country is consensus required for policy decisions on such largely rural or urban and on the average level complex topics as global warming, pollution con- (and distribution) of income. In highly urbanized trol, and urban planning. Independent commis- countries such as Argentina, Korea, and Poland, 87 Box 4.2 Independent commissions and improved environmental analysis Governments have often used independent panels of Academy of Sciences to review available evidence on experts (sometimes constituted as special commis- global warming and evaluate policy options. The re- sions) to investigate contentious policy issues. In re- port, issued in 1991, recommended that even though cent years environmental issues have increasingly been the effect of global warming on the United States was referred to such bodies. The procedure has a number of uncertain, selected low-cost actions to reduce green- advantages. house gas emissions should be initiated. On national priorities. Industrial countries have occa- It relieves, at least temporarily, the pressure for an early decision. sionally used expert panels to help prepare national It facilitates open debate, sometimes through pub- environmental strategies. The United Kingdom has had a Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution lic submissions or hearings, without committing the since 1970. Members serve as individuals, not as repre- government to adopt any of the recommendations that sentatives of organizations or professions, and are ap- may emerge. Scientific disagreement can be clarified pointed for at least three years. The commission is em- and the public educated. It allows a number of scientific disciplines and in- powered to request documents and even to visit premises. Over the years it has produced fifteen re- terest groups to be brought together. A consensus is ports, most of which have influenced policy. For exam- more likely to emerge if the commission is chaired by ple, following the 1983 report on lead, the lead content an independent person rather than by a government representative. of gasoline was reduced and unleaded fuel was introduced. There have been several interesting examples of the On specific environmental issues. Governments increas- use of this approach. ingly finance independent "think tanks," such as the On global issues. In 1990 the Enquete Commission on Thailand Development Research Institute, which an- Preventative Measures to Protect the Earth's Atmo- alyzes a wide range of issues, including environmental sphere presented a comprehensive report to the Ger- topics. Sometimes governments use interagency task man Bundestag. The commission, which was made up forces to examine discrete issues. In Hungary a group of scientists and representatives of the country's main evaluated a proposed hydropower dam on the political parties, made specific recommendations not Danube; in Mexico a task force will analyze the use of only on national energy policy but also on international economic instruments to control pollution and manage measures. natural resources. In the United States, Congress asked the National air and water pollution in cities will be priorities. COORDINATING AND PLANNING. Once priorities In more rural economies, as in many Sub-Saharan have been determined and appropriate policies de- African countries, parts of Central America, and signed, implementation of policies and the resolu- India and Bangladesh, land, forest, and water tion of conflict become important. Environmental management may well have top priority. policy often cuts across the normal bounds of bu- The distribution of impacts is important. reaucratic responsibility. Whether it is watershed Wealthier city dwellers, who can protect them- management to protect a new dam, allocation of a selves against unsafe water, may lobby govern- region's water resources among competing users, ments to assign higher priority to air pollution, or the complex problem of managing a city's air which affects rich and poor alike, than to ensuring quality, many different actors must be brought to- a safe water supply. Yet water investments may gether. Agencies need to collaborate, and some have a much larger immediate health benefit. machinery for resolving conflict is needed. Al- National environmental action plans are proving though there is a natural bureaucratic tendency for useful tools for setting priorities. Plans are being governments to respond to intersectoral conflicts drawn up for a number of African countries and by setting up regional bodies, these organizations have already been completed for Lesotho, Mad- have rarely been successful in the past because agascar, and Mauritius. The experience of Burkina they are inevitably at odds with strongly estab- Faso with such a plan (Box 4.3) demonstrates the lished, sectorally organized government bureau- importance of building consensus and the will to cracies. act. A common problem with environmental issues 88 that cross normal bureaucratic demarcation lines is relatively successful implementation of a program the absence of an effective mechanism for coor- to protect the metropolitan area's ecologically sen- dinating the work. In São Paulo, Brazil, the metro- sitive watershed by shifting growth away from the politan area has a planning agency, while the state south, where the watershed is located, and toward has agencies with responsibilities for environmen- the east and west of the city. tal protection, water, and sanitation. A conse- quence of divided responsibility is that programs REGULATING AND ENFORCING. Agencies, chron- for controlling industrial pollution have not been ically short of money and manpower, need to de- integrated with investments in wastewater treat- vise cost-effective ways of implementing policy. ment, and the sanitation master plan has not been One way is to give citizens more power to chal- sensibly implemented. (For example, treatment lenge polluters, whether public or private. For ex- plants have been constructed, but not the needed ample, public environmental agencies may give lo- interceptor and trunk line sewers.) cal communities or voluntary organizations If regional environmental planning is to be suc- substantial responsibility for implementing or cessful, countries need flexible management monitoring programs. This approach can be for- frameworks that encourage the actors to "think malized through the legal system. In the Clean Air globally, act sectorally." In rural areas resource Act of 1970 the U.S. Congress authorized private analysis and planning should be done at the level citizens to seek injunctions (and in some cases fi- of the individual watershed or irrigation scheme, nancial penalties) against companies that violated even if line ministries take responsibility for imple- the terms of their operating permits, thus making mentation. In cities the management of air and environmental enforcement no longer the exclu- water pollution requires a strong mechanism for sive responsibility of the government. intersectoral planning and coordination. For exam- Enforcement may be bolstered by making more ple, Santiago and Mexico City recently established use of the private sector or of nongovernmental special organizations for planning pollution reduc- groups. Many governments now hire private com- tion strategies to be implemented by line agencies panies and technical consultants to perform envi- for the wider metropolitan areas; in Mexico City ronmental assessments, collect and analyze data, the commission will include part of the state of undertake monitoring and inspection, and pro- Mexico as well as the federal capital. In Jakarta the vide specialized advice. Mexico City, for example, work of several intersectoral groups has led to the is implementing air pollution control measures Box 4.3 Setting priorities in Burkina Faso Improved environmental management requires a com- With the aid of funding from a number of bilateral mitment from both the government and the wider pub- and multilateral organizations, including the World lic. The recent experience of Burkina Faso in develop- Bank, the entire process took about three years and ing a national environment action plan illustrates how cost about $450,000. A national seminar was held to the process itself can be an essential component in cre- debate the draft plan and to set priorities in preparation ating awareness and building the political will needed for approval by the Cabinet in September 1991. A for action. meeting is planned for mid-1992 at which donors will When Burkina Faso began to develop its plan, the be asked to pledge support for specific projects that process was based on a series of previous national make up the action plan. meetings synthesized by local consultants in commis- The main lesson from Burkina Faso is that by work- sioned reports. These resulted in the identification of ing with the government and local participants, it was several key program areas: developing environmental possible to develop a plan that incorporates the work of management capability at all levels, improving living those who will have to implement it. Although it might conditions in rural and urban environments, focusing have been quicker and cheaper to produce the plan on environmental management at the village using international consultants, the plan would not ("micro") level, addressing key national ("macro") re- have been a Burkinabé product and would probably source issues, and, in support of all these, managing have joined other "external" products on a bookshelf information on the environment. instead of resulting in action. 89 through private vehicle-inspection stations and is policy implementation: a clear legislative frame- considering using private laboratories to analyze work, an appropriate administrative structure, air and water samples. technical skills, adequate money, and decentral- Community groups can play an important role ized responsibility. in enforcement. In India an "environmental au- dit" procedure has been developed for the 500- ENACTING LEGISLATION. Laying the legal foun- megawatt Dahanu Thermal Power project, cur- dations for environmental management frequently rently under construction. The authorities in necessitates the repeal of outdated laws and the charge of pollution control plan to distribute to codification of new concepts. If the laws are to be local communities and NGOs summaries in non- effective, detailed regulations, without which technical language of the results of environmental most laws are only general principles, also have to monitoring. Community groups can then check be developed. New environmental provisions emissions against legal standards and seek redress need to be integrated into existing government in the courts if necessary. procedures or into traditional local law. In Chile The success of such approaches will depend one of the first steps taken by the new National partly on how freely information about polluting Environment Commission (CONAMA) was to re- activities is available. Sometimes simply obliging view existing legislation and prepare a compre- large polluters to publish information about spe- hensive environmental law. This law and a com- cific emissions will have some effect on behavior. panion law implementing requirements for Legislation in the United States now requires some environmental assessments, both now under con- 20,000 plants to make public information on their sideration, will provide a rational framework for annual emissions of 320 potential carcinogens. environmental management. Public disclosure can also help focus the attention of senior management on emissions and the op- BUILDING ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE. Institution portunities for reducing them and can supplement building is a long-term business. It depends on official monitoring with public and community local conditions, political factors, and the availabil- oversight. ity of manpower and money. Frequently, it is eas- iest to build on existing institutions. In practice, The institutional response the structure of environmental administration matters much less than the ability to get the job Policymaking has frequently outpaced administra- done. As outlined above, governments need the tive capacity to analyze and implement policies. capacity to set priorities, coordinate and resolve Laws are multiplying, and often the result is a conflicts, and regulate and enforce. Countries will large number of contradictory regulations that are allocate these roles differently; for instance, coor- beyond the capacity of governments to enforce. dination and conflict resolution might be under- This situation, in addition to doing little for the taken by an independent executive agency, by an environment, breeds skepticism about laws in interdepartmental committee, or by a small, politi- general and government commitment to the envi- cally and technically astute group in the office of ronment in particular and may encourage corrup- the president. The key is clear statutory powers tion. It is essential to close the gap between mak- combined with the authority to resolve intra- ing and implementing policy. That means governmental disputes and the ability to provide reforming the way the machinery of government continuity when administrations change. handles environmental issues. Institutional arrangements that have been found When the World Bank expanded its lending for to be helpful include: environmental purposes in the 1980s, it was clear A formal high-level agency that can provide that the public sector was often unable to deliver advice on policy and monitor implementation. Ex- the expected results. The World Bank and member amples are IBAMA in Brazil, the Federal Environ- governments therefore began drawing up compre- mental Protection Agency (FEPA) in Nigeria, and hensive country environmental action plans. the State Environmental Protection Commission in These plans take into consideration both the legal China. and the administrative frameworks in countries as Environmental units in the principal line min- diverse as Brazil, Poland, and the Philippines (Box istries that can provide the central unit with tech- 4.4). Experience with the plans has shown that nical expertise and monitor those environmental there are five main requirements for successful policies that the ministries are responsible for im- 90 Box 4.4 The gap between policy and implementation In a growing number of borrower countries World in Eastern Europe. The Poland Environmental Man- Bank assistance for national environment plans in- agement Project, approved in April 1990, was the third cludes help with institution building. Here are some World Bank loan to Poland and the first for environ- examples of attempts to reduce the gap between poli- mental activities. The purposes of the $18 million loan cies on paper and results on the ground. include strengthening environmental management, in- The Brazil National Environment Project, a $117 mil- troducing consistent standards and enforcement, im- lion loan signed in mid-1990, is designed to strengthen proving monitoring, and regionalizing environmental the institutional and regulatory framework and pro- management. The government has identified the most- mote better management of biological resources. In polluted areas and has told the eighty worst industrial support of the first three-year phase of Brazil's Na- polluters to improve their environmental performance tional Environmental Program, the project finances the at once. At the same time, government task forces are strengthening of national conservation units; im- revising the regulatory system and designing a na- proved environmental management of threatened eco- tional environmental monitoring strategy. systems in the Pantanal, the Atlantic Forest, and the In the Philippines a loan and credit package totaling Brazilian coast; and reinforcement of IBAMA (Brazil's $224 million, approved in 1991, will promote policy national environmental agency, the executing agency reform and strengthen institutions. The loan contains for the project) and state environmental agencies. The provisions to help protect biodiversity in the country. loan provides support for staff training, equipment, Since the largest threats to biodiversity are encroach- better technical information, and legal and technical ment by land-hungry farmers and illegal commercial assistance; improvement of regulations and technical logging, the project supports more sustainable patterns guidelines for environmental management; and envi- of resource use by small farmers in exchange for secure ronmental education. Implementation of the project tenure rights and improves the enforcement of logging has been delayed by fiscal and management problems. regulations, partly by strengthening the regional and The slow start highlights the need to strengthen the local offices of the Department of Environment and management capability of executing agencies before Natural Resources. The loan also supports the design they can effectively undertake project implementation. of a network of protected areas and provides resources Building environmental institutions is a key concern to manage ten priority protected areas. plementing. Oversight, from a public health per- and institutes financed by nongovernmental spective, of general environmental quality (espe- sources sometimes undertake both policy analysis cially air and water) is frequently carried out by the and resource management. ministry of health, and the management and con- Another common problem is an imbalance of servation of natural resources may be spread professional skills. In some countries agencies are among government units responsible for agricul- dominated by engineers and contain few natural ture, forestry, fisheries, and parks and wildlife. or social scientists; in other countries the reverse is Regional and local environmental units that true. But environmental management requires a allow local implementation and monitoring and mix: natural or biological scientists to manage re- feed information back to the national government newable resources, social scientistseconomists, (see below). sociologists, and anthropologiststo identify problems and formulate policies, and engineers to CLosING THE SKILLS GAP. The public sector in design solutions. many developing countries is short of qualified Economic analysis is particularly important to staff at all levels. The necessary skills may exist but (and frequently absent from) the dialogue between may not be attracted into the public sector because those responsible for environmental management salaries are well below the market rate. Environ- and those in charge of the budget, planning, and mental agencies are therefore condemned to being economic policy. An environmental economics outstaffed by the private firms they are charged unit in the ministry or agency responsible for eco- with regulating or may be forced to rely for exper- nomic planning and public finance can fill this role tise on expensive temporary consultants. Some by assessing budgetary allocations, ensuring that countries have found ways to mitigate this prob- economic incentives are consistent with environ- lem. In Iatin America, for example, foundations mental objectives, and helping to strike an appro- 91 priate balance between environmental and eco- polluters, charges for permits to use forests and nomic goals in determining development fisheries, entrance fees for parks and protected priorities. areas, and so oncan help to pay for enforcement and administration. OBTAINING FUNDING. Environmental agencies Donors, including development banks and mul- have not yet firmly established their place in the tilateral agencies, are often reluctant to finance competition for scarce government funds. Given what is needed mostimproved operation and the secondary importance usually attached to en- maintenance of fledgling national environmental vironmental management, budgetary allocations administrations. Rather, they seek to make specific are sometimes insufficient and highly variable. investments that tie up scarce local staff. Some- When money runs out, the effect may be dispro- times contributions come in the form of technical portionately damaging. For instance, if a shortage assistance and other tied aid, which does not nec- of cash means that enforcement of water pollution essarily strengthen local capabilities, and some- regulations has to be suspended, the consequent times the donor community floods local officials damage to groundwater and surface water can be with well-meant but unorchestrated offers of assis- substantial. If a national park goes unprotected tance. Finally, most donor-funded projects are during a dry season because of lack of funds, relatively short term and small scale. What is poachers may quickly undo what has taken years needed most is longer-term reliable funding, espe- to achieve. cially for institution building and research. Environmental administration can often be im- proved even within a tight budget. But an environ- DECENTRALIZING AND DELEGATING. Once na- mental agency needs a core of skilled technical tional priorities and policies have been set, it is staff, as well as laboratories and other monitoring often cost-effective to solve problems at the local devices, to do its job properly. In some countries level. Many governments therefore pass day-to- more money is becoming available as environmen- day responsibility to local bodies. This approach tal management is accepted as an important na- was used successfully in Japan (Box 4.5) and is tional objective. Economic instrumentsfines for being increasingly applied in other countries. In Box 4.5 Japan: curbing pollution while growing rapidly Japan's postwar reconstruction brought about both Establish a national policy framework. The initial legal rapid economic growth and major environmental prob- framework, established by the Diet, included the Basic lems. In the 1960s, when it was still a middle-income Law for Environmental Pollution Control (1967), the country, Japan began to invest heavily in control tech- Air Pollution Control Laws (1967 and 1970), and the nology to combat severe air and water pollution, Water Pollution Control Law (1970). These laws define largely from industrial sources. Expenditures for pollu- responsibilities and divide them among government at tion control by large firms peaked at more than 900 various levels, private firms, and individuals, thereby billion yen in the mid-1970s before declining to 400 encouraging the decentralization of environmental billion yen or less by 1980. Japan is now enjoying the management. benefits of its investments: between 1970 and the late Negotiate agreements at the local level. The open ne- 1980s emissions of sulfur oxides decreased by 83 per- gotiation of agreements between polluting industries, cent, emissions of nitrogen oxides by 29 percent, and local authorities, and citizens' groups often led to emis- concentrations of carbon monoxide by 60 percent. Sim- sions considerably lower than the minimum required ilar advances were made in improving water quality. bylaw. These results were obtained through stringent govern- Allow flexibility in setting emissions levels and promote mental regulations and negotiations between industry self-regulation. Since industries were often located in and communities to define solutions that could be fine- the middle of residential areas, firms were very sensi- tuned to varying local requirements. An estimated tive to local environmental concerns. The negotiating 28,000 such agreements are now in force. process allowed emissions levels to be tailored to local Three lessons from the Japanese experience may of- conditions and also encouraged self-regulation by in- fer useful guidance to today's middle-income dustry, thus fostering the idea of good corporate countries: citizenship. 92 China, for example, the actual work of environ- tion, wildlife conservation, park management, im- mental protection takes place mainly at lower provements in sanitation systems and drainage, levels of government. The provinces are responsi- and flood control. Local people can provide the ble for carrying out national policy set by the State manpower and knowledge for dealing with the af- Environmental Protection Commission. All prov- termath of environmental disasters, and local inces and municipalities and most counties now knowledge of genetic diversity has led to break- have environmental protection bureaus (EPB5) throughs in crop production. that answer to local environmental policy commis- Participatory approaches offer three main ad- sions headed by a vice governor or vice magistrate. vantages: (a) they give planners a better under- China's network of environmental protection standing of local values, knowledge, and experi- agencies thus consists of the central units and ence; (b) they win community backing for project about 2,400 EPBs, which together employ more objectives and community help with local imple- than 16,500 people. mentation; and (c) they can help resolve conflicts In Nigeria, a federal state, most policy is imple- over resource use. mented at the state level. Over the years the states have monitored their environmental problems Drawing on local values, knowledge, and experience through their administrative systems, which in- clude representation from local governments. Lo- People's views of their environment strongly in- cal capacity, however, has been weak. The 1988 fluence how they manage it. Even when attitudes decree establishing Nigeria's FEPA encourages the toward the natural world do not achieve the so- establishment of local environmental protection phistication described in Box 4.6, few cultures bodies, but most have only limited capacity to view natural resources as worth nothing more carry out their responsibilities for environmental than their cash value in the marketplace. Only if management. If decentralization is to work, it environmental programs reflect local beliefs, must be accompanied by a transfer of finance. values, and ideology will the community support Otherwise, a policy vacuum is created the center them. sheds responsibilities, but local agencies are ill The belief that traditional knowledge of the en- equipped to take them up. vironment is simple and static is changing rapidly. Some countries have made specific allocations to More and more development projects are taking local administrations for environmental invest- advantage of local knowledge about how to man- ments. China and Colombia, for example, have age the environment. For example, people in the passed national laws that permanently assign a tropical rainforests of the Amazon and Southeast percentage of the income from hydropower sales Asia have accumulated a valuable understanding to local governments for watershed protection, en- of local ecosystems, and African pastoralists, such vironmental education, soil protection, and envi- as the Maasai and Samburu of Kenya, are able to ronmental training programs for municipal off i- exploit apparently marginal savannahs (see Box cials. In others emissions fees serve as local 4.6). Building on these strengths requires great sources of finance. The Municipal Environmental care, expertise, and patience. But development Protection Bureau of Tianjin, China, has created projects that do not take existing practices into ac- an industrial pollution control fund financed by count often fail. emissions fees mandated under national legisla- A particularly costly instance of neglecting local tion. Revenues are used to finance investments in practices occurred in Bali, Indonesia. For centuries control and treatment at individual enterprises. In- the traditional Balinese irrigation calendar had vestments in decentralized treatment of industrial provided a highly efficient way of making the most wastewater increased the treatment rate from 35 to of water resources and soil fertility and of control- 46 percent between 1985 and 1990. ling pests. When a large internationally financed agricultural project tried to replace traditional rice Involving local people varieties with high-input imported varieties, the result was a sudden increase in insect pests, fol- Many environmental problems cannot be solved lowed by declining crop yields. A subsequent proj- without the active participation of local people. ect that built on the indigenous production system Few governments can afford the costs of enforcing has been much more successful. management programs that local people do not Sometimes local knowledge can be applied in accept. Participation can also help with afforesta- other parts of the world. Vetiver grass has been 93 Box 4.6 Indigenous values and knowledge of land and the environment Many of the world's remaining indigenous people because the methods that they use to alter the course of forest estimated to number over 250 million living in more succession are technologically simple (consisting of axe and than seventy countriestake a view of nature that dif- machete and a vast array of knowledge), and also because the fers strikingly from conventional attitudes. A study forest that regrows is diverse and complex and hard to distin- (Davis, background paper) commissioned for this Re- guish from undisturbed mature rainforest. The lowland port analyzes the attitudes of three groups of indige- Quichua achieve this effect by altering the mix of species that nous peoples: the Quichua-speaking Amerindians in regrow in their agricultural clearings. . . . [The result is] a the rainforests of eastern Ecuador, the Maasai and patchwork of habitats of different ages in different stages of Samburu nomadic pastoralists of Kenya, and the indig- succession and with a varying blend of useful resources. enous swidden (slash-and-burn) farmers in the upland (p. 12) areas of the Philippines. The study concluded that many indigenous people view land not as a commodity In most countries legal recognition and practical pro- to be bought and sold in impersonal markets but as a tection of the customary land and territorial rights of substance endowed with sacred meanings, embedded indigenous people are limited or nonexistent. Pastoral- in social relations, and fundamental to the understand- ists in Africa face particular problems in maintaining ing of the groups' existence and identity. access to their traditional pastures. An example is the Tribal Filipinos see land as a symbol of their historical case of the Maasai and Samburu of Kenya. At one time identity: an ancestral heritage to be defended and pre- the Kenyan government hoped to set up group ranches served for all future generations. According to the as a way of increasing beef exports while retaining col- Episcopal Commission on Tribal Filipinos, lective management. Recently, the government has promoted the privatization of these ranches, asserting They believe that wherever they are born, there too shall they that corporate land tenure impedes rational land man- die and be buried, and their own graves are proof of their agement. The Bank study notes that Maasai elders re- rightful ownership of the land. It symbolizes their tribal iden- gard private landownership as an "alien concept" and tity because it stands for their unity, and if the land is lost, express fears that "subdivision may lead to a disas- the tribe, too, shall be lost. trous change of lifestyle of the Maasai people." Ownership of the land is seen as vested upon the commu- nity as a whole. The right to ownership is acquired through The only source of income for the Maasai people is livestock. ancestral occupation and active production. To them, it is not Their culture provides them with a system in which they can right for anybody to sell the land because it does not belong to preserve the arid and semiarid areas . .in such a way that . only one generation, but should be preserved for all future certain areas are put aside in periods of drought in order to generations. (p. 68) keep grazing areas in good condition. Although lately it has become more difficult to do, it still works within and among Like many indigenous people, the surviving tribes of group ranchers, especially where upgraded cattle breeds are the rainforests of South America draw on traditional introduced. However, in the fragile (semi-)arid areas it might knowledge and practices to make a living in fragile even become impossible to keep livestock on an individual environments. The study observes, basis on small plots; it will also irrevocably lead to soil ero- sion, overuse of water resources, and desertification. (pp. Quichua forest management is often overlooked and unap- 37-38) preciated by outsiders who are unfamiliar with it, in part used for centuries in the hilly areas of Tamil Nadu ticesembedded as they are in specific cultures and other parts of India as cattle fodder and as a are not always so transferable. hedge plant to conserve soil and moisture. Experi- ence from the Kabbalama Watershed Development Improving project design and implementation Project in 1987 prompted the World Bank to sup- port the use of vetiver in countries as diverse as Projects are more successful if they are participa- China, Madagascar, Nepal, Nigeria, the Philip- tory in design and implementation. A review of pines, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe. The costs of vet- thirty completed World Bank projects from the iver are one-fifteenth those of soil conservation 1970s found an average rate of return of 18 percent systems that rely more heavily on engineering (see for projects that were judged culturally appropri- Chapter 7). However, local management prac- ate but only 9 percent for projects that did not 94 include mechanisms for social and cultural adapta- collection ratehigh by developing country tion. A more detailed study of fifty-two USAID standards. projects similarly found a strong correlation be- tween participation and project success, especially Resolving local conflicts when participation took place through organiza- tions created and managed by the beneficiaries Properly planned participation eases resolution of themselves. the conflicts inherent in environmental decision- The contrasts between environmentally benefi- making. When mechanisms for resolving conflicts cial projects designed on participatory principles exist, people may be less likely to overuse natural and those that fail to include participatory designs resources out of fear of losing their access to them. can be striking. Haiti's top-down afforestation pro- All too often, top-down rules that govern access to gram, plagued by high sapling mortality rates on natural resources appear arbitrary and unfair. forest department lots and by conflicts with vil- Many governments are changing resource alloca- lagers, consistently fell short of tree-planting tar- tion rules to reduce conflicts between authorities gets. Starting in 1981, an alternative approach was and local communities and to set up procedures tried. NGOs helped to provide trees that were Se- for resolving disputes among competing claimants lected by farm households. The result was dra- to resources. matic: instead of the 3 million trees on 6,000 family When large infrastructural investmentsdams, farms originally planned, 20 million seedlings irrigation facilities, roads, and portsare planned, were planted on the farms of 75,000 families who listening to public opinion and local NGOs at an voluntarily joined the program. early stage is a good way to avoid trouble later on. Ideally, both local communities and the respon- If this is not done, community opposition can sible agencies gain from participation, as the expe- gather momentum and delay or stop the project. A rience of the National Irrigation Authority (NIA) in good environmental assessment should clarify po- the Philippines illustrates. Early involvement of tential environmental and social impacts, propose community groups in planning construction and mitigative measures, and present the costs and in finding ways to avoid the silting of channels and benefits of alternatives. drains has brought about better maintenance of A particularly difficult challenge for conflict res- irrigation works and higher agricultural yields. olution is posed by projects such as dams, high- Users have also been more willing to pay for the ways, and some types of wildlife reservations that NIA's services. change land use and lead to involuntary displace- Growing numbers of countries are devising ment and resettlement. Rarely have local views partnerships with local people to provide munici- been consulted to any extent in making such in- pal environmental services. In Accra sanitation vestment decisions or, until recently, in planning services in low-income areas have improved resettlement programs. This omission has led to greatly since NGOs and local entrepreneurs have inefficiency, as well as injustice; traditional reset- been allowed to operate improved community pit tlement has turned out to be needlessly slow and latrines. Desludging and disposal are carried out expensive. Governments and donors now broadly by the city's central waste management depart- agree on several principles: (a) project designers ment. This division of responsibility has proved should explore ways of minimizing resettlement; more effective than attempting to operate a com- (b) resettlers' living standards should be as good pletely centralized sewerage system that had fallen as or better than before resettlement; (c) compen- into disrepair. In Jakarta neighborhoods organize sation for lost assets should be paid at replacement the collection of solid wastes by collecting monthly costs; and (d) communities should be encouraged dues that are used to buy a cart and hire a local to participate in all stages of resettlement planning garbage collector. At least once a month, one vol- and implementation. Examples from Mexico and unteer from each household assists in collecting Thailand illustrate this new approach (Box 4.7). garbage and cleaning the neighborhood drainage system. The wastes are taken to a transfer station. The limitations and costs of participation There they are picked up by municipal authori- tiesa task that is gradually being contracted out Public participation has its drawbacks. Extensive to private companies. This combination of com- participation, especially when information is inad- munity collection and centralized disposal has equate, can delay decisionmaking. Communities allowed Jakarta to achieve an 80 percent waste with political influence sometimes reject proposals 95 Box 4.7 Reforming resettlement through participation: Mexico and Thailand Resettlement of people displaced by large hydroelectric lications to inform resettlers of their rights and entitle- dams has typically been the extreme case of nonpar- ments, and providing farmers with good-quality re- ticipatory planning. But experience with two recent placement farmland are important steps in improving projects in Mexico and Thailand illustrates how partici- the resettlement program. pation can help with issues as difficult as involuntary To implement the resettlement policy for Mexico's displacement and resettlement. Zimapan project, the parent company set up a unit that The 200-meter dam at Zimapan, central Mexico, and reported directly to the company's president. The unit the 17-meter Pak Mun dam on the Mun River in Thai- included anthropologists, technicians, economists, ar- land are at the core of two World Bank-assisted proj- chitects, and social workers, all of whom were to live in ects designed to provide urgently needed clean energy. the affected villages, help identify local concerns and But the national benefits of the dams meant little to the resettlement preferences, and provide a channel of nearly 25,000 people who would be displaced. Nor was communication between the villagers and the com- previous experience in either country encouraging; pany. As villagers in Zimapan organized, they repudi- new housing and compensation for lost assets had ated the local administration and elected their own proved no substitute for submerged farmland and up- much tougher council to manage the negotiations on rooted communities. It was not surprising that resettle- compensation and resettlement. Farmers have been ac- ment proposals were greeted with skepticism and tive in selecting and supervising designs for replace- opposition. ment housing, and the company has purchased and In both countries the impact of resettlement was transferred to the resettlers functioning, productive taken into account when the dams were designed. In farms that will improve their incomes and living the case of Pak Mun a review of technical options standards. showed that locating the dam slightly upstream and In neither case has participation in resettlement plan- lowering its height would reduce the number of people ning led to the disappearance of oppositionthat was to be resettled from approximately 20,000 to fewer than not the purpose. Indeed, opposition remains strong, 2,000. Detailed resettlement plans that followed the and confrontational encounters between the company World Bank's guidelines were prepared to help the af- and antidam organizations still occur. Nevertheless, in fected farmers recover their lost livelihoods. Under re- both projects pressure for more active participation by peated prodding by NGOs and community groups, the local people has led to significant improvements in energy company began working with the affected com- what will always be a difficult process. Participation munities on improving its approach to resettlement. has allowed the people most adversely affected by the Although problems remain, sharing information about projects to be actively involved in directing the course resettlement alternatives, preparing meetings and pub- that resettlement will take. to construct facilities such as waste disposal cen- hectare. The outcome was a better irrigation sys- ters on the most suitable sites because of the im- tem with higher utilization and higher revenues. pact on local property values, aesthetics, or safety. Increased participation was clearly cost-effective. Making compensatory payments for local use and A potential disadvantage of participation is that giving communities control over how the project is decentralization of decisionmaking can easily rein- sited and designed can help defuse opposition. force the power of local elites. In these cases strong Participatory approaches tend to be expensive. supervision is needed to overcome local conflicts. Consultation requires plenty of staff and time, and When projects involve voluntary provision of la- government agencies, already short of funds, may bor, participatory approaches can widen income cut corners. If they do, the most remote and margi- differentials. This often happened with commu- naland often the neediestcommunities will be nity woodlot programs in India in the 1970s and the ones to suffer. early 1980s. In many of these projects, despite an The extra net expense of seeking participation approach ostensibly built on village participation, need not be large, however. In the Philippine ex- poor villagers commonly found that their time and ample described above, the additional cost for the labor were welcome but that the benefits went dis- community organization program was about $25 a proportionately to wealthier villagers who made a hectare, but savings in construction costslargely smaller contribution. More thought is needed on as a result of information provided by farmers ways to ensure that participatory approaches are brought the net increase down to less than $2.50 a able to balance the claims of different groups. 96 How participation can be improved involved need to be well informed. Some ways to achieve that are (a) to share information with local How can the large benefits of participation be real- communities at the early stage of identifying a ized while minimizing the costs? Community or- project, (b) to discuss local worries with the af- ganizations often require strengthening through fected communities, (c) to allow public comments technical assistance, management training, and on background studies, (d) to encourage public gradually increased levels of responsibility. Sev- comments on the draft environmental assessment, eral measures can enhance participation. and (e) to include hearings and comments in the final document. The World Bank expects its bor- USE OF INDIGENOUS INSTITUTIONS. Indigenous rowers to arrange public discussion of environ- institutions (such as the subak, or traditional mental assessments prepared for the projects it groups of water users, in Bali) that are already in- finances. volved in managing natural resources can be use- ful, particularly when decisions on land use have INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS. The attitudes of bu- to be made. Where such institutions do not exist, it reaucracies often thwart the benefits of local par- is often necessary to create them. All too often, ticipation. Forestry departments, for example, however, user groups have been legislated into generally see as their mission protecting trees from existence rather than built on existing social foun- people. Wildlife conservation agencies (sometimes dations. User groups can be effective only when justifiably) fail to distinguish local communities they enjoy broadly based local support. from game poachers. Often, the institutional units that have the best relations with local communities USE OF LOCAL VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS. are themselves on the margins of their own agen- Among the strengths of community groups and cies. Most technical agencies lack the skills to fos- NGOs are their ability to reach the rural poor in ter participation. High priority should therefore be remote areas and to promote local participation; given to increasing the organizational weight of their effective use of low-cost technologies; and units that specialize in participation, to hiring pro- their innovativeness. They work best when they fessional staff trained in the social sciences, and to complement the public sector but may also have providing institutional incentives for participation. an important "watchdog" function, thereby influ- encing public policy. The disadvantages of NGOs The following chapters describe particular areas of include a generally weak financial base and admin- environmental concern. In each area, policies are istrative structure and limited technical capa- available for mitigating the worst effects of pollu- bilities. Many NGOs are small and by themselves tion and degradation without sacrificing develop- cannot be expected to cover large populations. The ment. Although such policies may appear simple challenge is to retain the NGOs' expertise and en- and logical, no one should underestimate the po- ergy while simultaneously enlarging their financial litical difficulties entailed in implementing them. and administrative bases. As this chapter has argued, governments can re- duce those difficulties by introducing well-de- INCREASED ACCESS TO INFORMATION. Many coun- signed administrative structures for making and tries now support local involvement in environ- implementing environmental policy and by care- mental impact assessments. But if such consulta- fully building constituencies of support. tions are to be effective, the people who are 97 5 Sanitation and clean water For many people in developing countries water supply, sanitation, and solid wastes are the most important of all environmental problems. More than 2 million deaths from diarrhea alone could be avoided each year if all people had reasonable water and sanitation services. And large economic and environmental costs are incurred in trying to compensate for poor-quality services. This chapterargues that large gainsin environmental quality, health, equity, and direct economic returns can be realized by adopting an approach that comprises four key elements: Managing water resources better, taking account of economic efficiency and environmental sustainability Providing, at full cost, those 'private" services that people want and are willing to pay for (including water supply and the collection of human excreta, wastewater, and solid wastes) Using scarce public funds only for those services (specifically, treatment and disposal of human excreta, wastewater, and solid wastes) that provide wider communal benefits Developing flexible and responsive institutional mechanisms for providing these services, with a larger role for community organizations and the private sector. Although the provision of clean water and sani- waste collection and disposal mean that large tation is often omitted from the list of priority quantities of waste enter both groundwater and environmental challenges, in many parts of the surface water. Groundwater contamination is less developing world it ranks at the top. Two environ- visible but often more serious because it can take mental issues are involved: the costs to human decades for polluted aquifers to cleanse them- health and productivity of polluted water and in- selves and because large numbers of people drink adequate sanitation and the stresses placed on wa- untreated groundwater. ter resources by rapidly growing human demands More environmental damage occurs when peo- for water. This chapter argues that to address the ple try to compensate for inadequate provision. first problem, the second must be tackled as well. The lack or unreliability of piped water causes This will require better management and more effi- households to sink their own wells, which often cient use of water. It may mean that agriculture leads to overpumping and depletion. In cities such will have to do more with less water (as discussed as Jakarta, where almost two-thirds of the popula- in Chapter 7), and it will certainly demand a shift tion relies on groundwater, the water table has de- in how sanitation and water supply services are clined dramatically since the 1970s. In coastal areas providedthe main theme of this chapter. this can cause saline intrusion, sometimes render- ing the water permanently unfit for consumption. Water supply and sanitation as environmental In, for example, Bangkok excessive pumping has priorities also led to subsidence, cracked pavements, broken water and sewerage pipes, intrusion of seawater, Inadequate sanitation is a major cause of the deg- and flooding. radation of the quality of groundwater and surface Inadequate water supply also prompts people to water described in Chapter 2. Economic growth boil water, thus using energy. The practice is espe- leads to larger discharges of wastewater and solid cially common in Asia. In Jakarta more than $50 wastes per capita. Inadequate investments in million is spent each year by households for this 98 purposean amount equal to 1 percent of the Health gains follow investments in water city's GDP. Investments in water supply can there- and sewerage fore reduce fuelwood consumption and air pollution. Figure 5.1 Life expectancy and improvements Effects on health in water supply and sanitation in selected French cities, 1820-1900 The health benefits from better water and sanita- tion, as noted in Chapter 2, are large. When ser- vices were improved in the industrial countries in Improvements made the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the impact Life Lyon Paris Marseilles expectancy at on health was revolutionary. Life expectancy in French cities, for example, increased from about 32 birth (years) 4, 4,4,4,4,4,4,4, 50 years in 1850 to about 45 years in 1900, with the timing of changes corresponding closely to im- provements in water supply and wastewater dis- 45 posal (Figure 5.1). Today, adequate water and sani- tation services are just as vital: diarrheal death rates are typically about 60 percent lower among 40 children in households with adequate facilities than among those in households without such fa- 35 cilities. Box 5.1 describes the improvements that are critical for better health. 30 Effects on productivity 25 Improved environmental sanitation has economic 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 benefits. Consider the case of sewage collection in Santiago, Chile. The principal justification for in- Source: Briscoe 1987. vestments was the need to reduce the extraordi- Box 5.1 Specific investments that matter for health The potential health benefits from improved water and 50 liters per capita per day and generally depends on sanitation services are huge. What improvements must getting the water delivered to the yard or house. be made to secure these benefits? Excreta disposal. It is necessary to distinguish among the effects on the household and on the neigh- Water quality. Contrary to common belief, contam- borhood. For the household, the health impacts of im- ination of water in the home is relatively unimportant. proved sanitation facilities depend only on getting the What matters is whether the water coming out of the excreta out of the house and are thus similar whether tap or pump is contaminated. In most developing family members use an improved pit latrine, a cesspool countries the imperative is to get from 'bad" quality overflowing into a street drain, or a conventional sew- (say, more than 1,000 fecal coliforms per 100 milliliters) erage system. For the neighborhood, the key is the to "moderate" quality (less than 10 fecal coliforms per removal of excreta, a task done well by a wide range of 100 milliliters), not necessarily to meet the stringent technologies but badly by many commonly used sys- quality standards of industrial countries. tems (such as nightsoil collection and unemptied septic Water availability. As long as families have to go out tanks). Because all the fecal-oral transmission routes of the yard to collect water, the quantities used will are much more important when people live in close remain low (typically between 15 liters and 30 liters per proximity to each other, the ill effects of poor environ- capita per day). The use of water for personal hygiene mental sanitation are greatest in high-density urban usually increases only when availability rises to about settlements. 99 narily high incidence of typhoid fever in the city. A the number of deep wells providing water to the secondary motive was to maintain access to the city. And the costs of compensating for poor water markets of industrial countries for Chile's increas- quality are great, too. In Bangladesh boiling drink- ingly important exports of fruit and vegetables. To ing water would take 11 percent of the income of a ensure the sanitary quality of these exports, it was family in the lowest quartile. With the outbreak of essential to stop using raw wastewater in their cholera in Peru the Ministry of Health has urged production. In the light of the current cholera epi- all residents to boil drinking water for ten minutes. demic in Latin America, this reasoning was pre- The cost of doing so would amount to 29 percent scient. In just the first ten weeks of the cholera of the average household income in a squatter epidemic in Peru, losses from reduced agricultural settlement. exports and tourism were estimated at $1 billion more than three times the amount that the country What needs to be done? had invested in water supply and sanitation ser- vices during the 1980s. Investments in sanitation and water offer high eco- Improved access to water and sanitation also nomic, social, and environmental returns. Univer- yields direct economic benefits. For many rural sal provision of these services should and could people, obtaining water is time-consuming and become a reality in the coming generation. But the heavy work, taking up to 15 percent of women's next four decades will see urban populations in time. Improvement projects have reduced the time developing countries rise threefold and domestic substantially. In a village on the Mueda Plateau in demand for water increase fivefold. Current ap- Mozambique, for instance, the average time that proaches will not meet these demands, and there women spent collecting water was reduced from is a real possibility that the numbers unserved 120 to 25 minutes a day. Family well-being was could rise substantially, even while aquifers are thus improved, as the time saved could be used to depleted and rivers degraded. The remainder of cultivate crops, tend a home garden, trade in the this chapter discusses four key policy changes that market, keep small livestock, care for children, or need to be made. even rest. Because users clearly perceive these time savings, they are willing to pay substantial Managing water resources better amounts (as discussed below) for easier access. In the absence of formal services, people have to When there was little competition for water, it was provide their own services, often at high cost. In (correctly) used in large quantities for activities in Jakarta, for instance, about 800,000 households which the value of a unit of water was relatively have installed septic tanks, each costing several low. In many countries irrigated agriculture be- hundred dollars (not counting the cost of the came the dominant "high-volume, low-value" land). And in many cities and towns large num- user. Today about 73 percent of all water with- bers of people buy water from vendors. A review drawals (and higher proportions of consumptive of vending in sixteen cities shows that the unit cost use) are for irrigation. This share is even higher in of vended water is always much higher than that low-income countries, as shown in Table 5.1. In of water from a piped city supplyfrom 4 to 100 most countries this water is provided at heavily times higher, with a median of about 12. The situa- subsidized prices, with users seldom paying more tion in Lima is typical; although a poor family uses than 10 percent of operating costs. only one-sixth as much water as a middle-class As demand by households, industries, and family, its monthly water bill is three times as farmers increases, governments find it hard to large. Consequently, in the slums around many cities water costs the poor a large part of house- hold income-18 percent in Onitsha, Nigeria, and Table 5.1 Sectoral water withdrawals, 20 percent in Port-au-Prince, for example. by country income group The economic costs of compensating for unreli- Annual able servicesby building in-house storage facili- withdrawals per capita Withdrawals, by sector (percent) ties, sinking wells, or installing booster pumps Income group (cubic meters) Domestic Industry Agriculture (which can draw contaminated groundwater into Low-income 386 4 5 91 the water distribution system)are substantial. In Middle-income 453 13 18 69 Tegucigalpa, for example, the sum of such invest- High-income 1,167 14 47 39 ments is so large that it would be enough to double Source: World Resources Institute 1990. 100 change existing arrangements. The allocation of in reducing the overpumping of its aquifers by reg- water in all countries is a complex issue and is istering groundwater users (especially commercial governed by legal and cultural traditions. Users and industrial establishments) and by introducing typically have well-established rights. Reallocation a groundwater levy. is a contentious and ponderous process that gener- The striking features of these "market-based" ally responds to changes in demand only with reallocation methods are that they are voluntary, long lags. Even though agricultural use of water they yield economic benefits for both buyers and has the lowest value per cubic meter, there is sellers, they reduce the environmental problems strong political opposition to diverting water from caused by profligate use of water in irrigation, and agriculture to other sectors. The result is that in they lessen the need for more dams. many countries, industrial and developing alike, Without effective management of water re- large volumes of water are used in irrigated agri- sources, the cost of supplying water to cities will culture, adding little economic value, while cities continue to rise. The most dramatic examples will and industries, which would gladly pay more, be in large and growing urban areas. In Mexico cannot get enough. City, where much water is used for irrigation, the This mismatch is most striking in the areas city has to contemplate pumping water over an around large cities. In the western United States, elevation exceeding 1,000 meters into the Valley of for example, farmers in Arizona pay less than 1 Mexico; in Lima upstream pollution has increased cent for a cubic meter of water, while residents of treatment costs by about 30 percent; in Shanghai the city of Phoenix pay about 25 cents. In the in- water intakes have already been moved upstream dustrial heartland of China around Beijing and more than 40 kilometers at a cost of about $300 Tianjin 65 percent of water is used relatively ineffi- million; and in Amman the most recent works in- ciently for low-value irrigation, while huge expen- volve pumping water up 1,200 meters from a site ditures are contemplated to bring water from other about 40 kilometers from the city. A recent analysis river basins to the cities. of the costs of raw water for urban areas in World Paradoxically, there is good news in these dis- Bank-financed projects (Figure 5.2) shows that the tortions. Their very size indicates that urban short- unit cost of water would more than doubleand in ages could be met with only modest reallocation. some cases more than tripleunder a new water In Arizona, for instance, the purchase of the water development project. rights from just one farm is sufficient to provide Industries and households also need to be given water for tens of thousands of urban dwellers. Be- incentives to use water efficiently. Cities, like cause of the low value of water in irrigated agricul- farmers, have tended to take demand as given and ture, the loss of this marginal water has little over- to see as their task increasing supplies to meet it. all effect on farm output. To help transfers, new As was the case with energy twenty years ago, market-driven methods for reallocation have been little attention is paid to conservation and demand developed. When a recent drought dangerously management in the water sector. This is both eco- reduced available water, the state of California set nomically and environmentally unsound. Con- up a voluntary "water bank" that purchased wa- sider the case of Washington, D.C. In the 1960s the ter from farmers and sold it to urban areas. The U.S. government concluded that sixteen dams and farmers made a profit by selling the water for more more than $400 million were required to meet the than it was worth to them, while the cities got water needs of the metropolitan area. Because of water at a cost well below that of other sources of resistance from environmentalists to the construc- supply. tion of the dams, the plan had to be reconsidered. In developing countries, too, a start is being Eventually the number of dams was reduced to made in applying innovative methods for manag- one and the total cost of the scheme to $30 million. ing water resources. China's State Science and The key changes were a revised plan for managing Technology Commission found that the economic demand during droughts and more efficient oper- rate of return to a cubic meter of water used for ating rules. This illustrates once again that better agriculture was less than 10 percent of the return economics and a better environment are to municipal and industrial users. Once agri- compatible. cultural and urban users accepted that they had to Experience in industrial and developing coun- look at water as an economic commodity with a tries alike shows the potential for using water price, progressincluding reallocationwas pos- more cost-effectively in industry. In the United sible. And Jakarta has been reasonably successful States withdrawals of fresh water by manufactur- 101 Costs are high and are rising rapidly A particularly important conservation alterna- tive is reclamation of wastewater. Reclamation of water for urban, industrial, and agricultural use is attractive both for improving the environment and Figure 5.2 Supplying water to urban for reducing the costs of water supply. Reclaimed areas: current cost and projected future cost wastewater has been used for many years for (1988 dollars per cubic meter of water) flushing toilets in residential and commercial buildings in Japan and Singapore. A recent recla- Future cost mation scheme in the Vallejo area of Mexico City 1.4 (Box 5.2) illustrates the great potential, both eco- nomic and environmental, of wastewater reuse 1.2 and, to anticipate a theme developed below, the scope for the private sector. At present, in most countries management of 1.0 water resources is fragmented (industrial users, for example, do not have to take account of the 0.8 costs that their use and pollution of water imposes 0.6 0.4 Box 5.2 Environmental improvement, management of water resources, 0.2 and the private sector in Mexico In 1989, faced with rising water prices and poten- 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 tial water shortages, a group of companies in the Current cost Vallejo area of Mexico City sought an alternative to water supplied by the public agency. At about Future cost is three times current cost the same time, the Mexican government decided to involve the private sector in water supply and Future cost is twice current cost wastewater treatment. The industrialists realized that if sewage flows Future cost equals current cost could be adequately treated, this could provide a cost-effective and reliable source of industrial wa- ter (and, incidentally, could improve the environ- ment by treating wastes and reducing the need for Note: Cost excludes treatment and distribution. Current new water supplies). Twenty-six Vallejo com- cost refers to cost at the time data were gathered. Future panies organized a new for-profit firm, Aguas In- cost is a projection of cost under a new water development dustriales de Vallejo (AIV), to rehabilitate an old project. municipal wastewater treatment plant. Each Source: World Bank data. shareholder company contributed equity on the basis of its water requirements, with total equity amounting to $900,000. AIV operates the plant under a ten-year conces- ing industries are expected to be 62 percent less in sion from the government. The plant now pro- 2000 than in 1977, primarily because of the in- vides 60 liters per second to shareholders and 30 liters per second to the government as payment creased costs industries have to pay for disposing for the concession. The concession agreement of industrial wastewater. In São Paulo, Brazil, the gives AIV the right to withdraw up to 200 liters imposition of effluent charges induced three in- per second of wastewater from the municipal dustrial plants to reduce their water demand by trunk sewer. AIV plans to double the plant's ca- between 42 and 62 percent. Figure 5.3 shows how pacity within five years at an estimated cost of in Beijing a variety of conservation measures in $1.5 million. The firm provides treated water to industries and households could release large shareholder companies at a price equivalent to 75 percent of the water tariff charged by the govern- quantities of water at a substantially lower unit ment (currently, $0.95 per cubic meter). cost than the cost under the next supply augmen- tation project. 102 Conservation can be cheaper than new supplies Figure 5.3 Conserving water as an alternative to expanding supply in Beijing (discounted cost in dollars per cubic meter) Domestic uses Industry (total savings: 15 percent of (total savings: 33 percent of current domestic consumption) current industrial consumption) 0.12 0.10 Cost of next water development project 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.00 0 50 100 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 Quantity conserved (millions of cubic meters per year) o Improved efficiency in public facilities 0 Increased recycling of cooling water o Leakage reduction program in manufacturing O Recycling of cooling water used in 0 Recycling of cooling water from air conditioning power plants Installation of water-efficient flush toilets 0 Wastewater recycling Source: Hufschmidt and others 1987. on domestic users downstream) and is done by times higher than is normal in industrial countries. "command and control" (most allocations are set In Lima 70 percent of the water distribution dis- by administrative fiat). The challenge is to replace tricts provide inadequate water pressure. In Mex- this system with one that recognizes the unitary ico 20 percent of the water supply systems have nature of the resource and its economic value and unreliable chlorination facilities. that relies heavily on prices and other incentives to encourage efficient use of water. What has been done Providing services that people want and are Developing countries cannot afford to provide all willing to pay for people with in-house piped water and sewerage connections. The policy has usually been to con- During the United Nations Drinking Water and centrate primarily on the (subsidized) provision of Sanitation Decade of the 1980s, coverage increased water, often through house connections for the (see Chapter 2). But about 1 billion people still lack better-off and standpipes or handpumps for the an adequate water supply, and about 1.7 billion poor. people do not have adequate sanitation facilities. Consumers in most industrial countries pay all The quality of service often remains poor. In Latin of the recurrent costs (operations, maintenance, America, for example, levels of leakage and pipe and debt service) of both water and sewerage ser- breakage are, respectively, four times and twenty vices. They also pay most of the capital costs of 103 water supply and a large (typically over half) and A new approach rising portion of the capital costs of sewerage. In developing countries, by contrast, consumers pay In urban areas there is abundant evidence that far less. A recent review of World Bank-financed most people want on-plot water supplies of rea- projects showed that the effective price charged sonable reliability and are willing to pay the full for water is only about 35 percent of the average cost of these services. In some areas this standard cost of supplying it. The proportion of total project solution will have to be adjusted and special ef- financing generated by utilities points in the same forts made to accommodate poor people. In Latin direction: internal cash generation accounts for America and, more recently, in Morocco utilities only 8 percent of project costs in Asia, 9 percent in have helped poor families to install a connection Sub-Saharan Africa, 21 percent in Latin America and in-house plumbing by giving them the option and the Caribbean, and 35 percent in the Middle of paying over several years. Another option is a East and North Africa. "social tariff" whereby the better-off cross-subsi- Box 5.3 Willingness to pay for water in rural areas The World Bank, in conjunction with other agencies, option for many households. Those who wish to have recently completed a study of rural water demand in house connections should be able to do so but must Brazil, Haiti, India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tanzania, and have metered connections and must pay the full cost. Zimbabwe. The study suggests that where water de- Many of the better-off communities in Sub-Saharan Af- mand is concerned, there are four broad categories of rica and poorer communities in Asia and Latin America rural community. probably fall into this category. Type I: willingness to pay for private connections is high Type Ills households' willingness to pay for improved ser- and willingness to pay for public water points is low. Com- vice is high but not high enough to pay the full costs of an munities in this group offer exciting possibilities be- improved service. This group typically includes poor cause people want and are willing to pay the full costs communities in arid areas in South Asia and Sub- of reliable water service delivered by way of private Saharan Africa. As in Type II villages, people are will- metered connections into the house or yard. The avail- ing to pay a relatively large share of their income for ability of free public taps (for the poor) will not appre- improved water service. The distinction is that the ciably affect the demand for private connections. The costs of supply are so high, as a result of a combination appropriate strategy is to offer private connections and of aridity and low population densities, that improved even encourage them (specifically, by amortizing con- systems will not be built and operated without sub- nection costs in monthly water bills); to recover all sidies. Given the high priority that people give to im- costs through the tariff; and to deliver a reliable ser- proved water supply, if transfers were available from vice. A striking finding from the World Bank study is central government or from foreign donors, house- that this category is larger than is commonly assumed; holds would typically choose to spend the funds on an it probably includes many communities in Southeast improved water supply. The primary service offered in Asia, South Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East such communities would be public taps, wells, or bore- and North Africa. holes, although in piped systems metered yard taps Type II: only a minority of households are willing to pay should be allowed, with tariffs set to recover full costs. the full costs of private connections, but most households are Type IV: willingness to pay for any kind of improved ser- willing to pay the full costs of public water points. Although vice is low. This group typically includes poor commu- overall willingness to pay for improved water service is nities in which (a) traditional water supplies are consid- considerable in Type II communities, users vary greatly ered more or less satisfactory by the population or (b) in their willingness to pay for different levels of service. water supply is seen as the financial responsibility of In these villages the provision of free public water the government. In such communities self-financed points (such as standpipes, wells, or boreholes) would improved water supplies are not feasible. Given the significantly reduce the demand for private connec- low priority accorded improved water supply, available tions. When there is heavy reliance on public water subsidies could be better used in providing other, more points, some charge must be levied on water from highly valued infrastructural services. For the time be- these sources in order to finance the system. Here the ing, the appropriate rural water supply policy in such greatest challenge is to devise revenue collection sys- cases is simply to do nothing. For the second category, tems that are sensitive to peoples' preferences about once government paternalism ceases, communities when they want to buy water and how they want to may express a willingness to pay and will become Type pay for it. Kiosks appear to be an attractive and flexible II communities. 104 Users want reliable supplies Credit for connections is vital Figure 5.4 How reliability of supply affects Figure 5.5 How spreading connection costs willingness to pay for piped water: over time affects willingness to pay for piped Punjab, Pakistan water: Kerala, India Connection rate Connection rate (percentage of households) (percentage of households) 100 100 75 50 50 25 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 5 10 15 20 Tariff paid by customer Tariff paid by customer (rupees per month) (rupees per month) Revenue collected by supplier Revenue collected by supplier (rupees per 100 households (rupees per 100 households per month) per month) 1,000 500 100 0 5 10 15 20 0 20 40 60 80 Tariff paid by customer Tariff paid by customer (rupees per month) (rupees per month) Improved reliability Connection cost amortized Existing reliability Connection cost as lump sum Source: World Bank Water Demand Research Team Source: World Bank Water Demand Research Team forthcoming. forthcoming. dize the poor. Properly executed, such policies are try study by the World Bank of rural water de- both sensible (since the poor use relatively little mand (Box 5.3) found that most rural people want water) and compassionate. But there are dangers. and are willing to pay for a relatively high level of Social tariffs can lead to a general spread of sub- service (yard taps). As shown in Figure 5.4, they sidies. And the assignment of noncommercial ob- will pay substantially more if that service is reli- jectives to a public enterprise generally has an in- able. And, as Figure 5.5 illustrates, more people sidious effect on the achievement of all its will make use of improved water supplies if inno- objectives, commercial and noncommercial alike. vative financing mechanisms are employed. It is widely assumed that the demand situation Twenty years of experience with the provision of in rural areas is quite different, that there people water in rural Thailand (Box 5.4) shows how it is have only a "basic need" which can be met with a possible to break out of a "low-level equilibrium public tap or handpump. But a recent multicoun- trap" (in which a low level of services is provided, 105 Box 5.4 Breaking out of the "low-level equilibrium trap" in northeast Thailand A well-documented case in northeast Thailand, cover- did not want handpumps, which were not considered ing a twenty-year period, demonstrates the importance an improvement over the traditional rope-and-bucket of discovering what users of rural water services want system. And standpipes, being no closer than their tra- rather than making assumptions about the answers. ditional sources, offered no obvious benefits. Only Since the people in the area were poor, the initial piped water to yardtaps could meet people's project was intended to provide protected water at the aspirations. lowest possible cost. Because groundwater is abundant In the next project yardtaps were allowed, with the in the region, the technology chosen was handpumps. users paying the full costs of connection. Five years After five years most of the handpumps were not later the verdict was in: 90 percent of the systems were working, and water use habits were largely un- functioning reliably, 80 percent of the people were changed. In a follow-up phase motor pumps provided served by yardtaps, meters had been installed, and lo- piped water at community standpipes. Again, the proj- cally adapted charging systems had been developed. ect failed. Five years after implementation 50 percent of Not only were the systems well maintained, but be- the systems were not working at all, and another 25 cause the service was so popular, many systems had percent operated intermittently. extended distribution lines to previously unserved As was consistent with conventional assumptions, areas. the failures were attributed to technologies that were In other words, in terms of the typology discussed in too complex to maintain and to the inability of the vil- Box 5.3, when these (poor) people were treated as lagers to pay for improved supplies. Gradually, how- "Type IV" cases, the result was the familiar low-level ever, it became apparent that the main problem was equilibrium trap. When they were treated as "Type I" not the capabilities of the villagers but the fact that the communities, the cycle was broken, and a high-level service being offered was not what they wanted. They equilibrium was established. willingness to pay and thus revenues are low, and hoods. People want privacy, convenience, and sta- the operation consequently deteriorates) to a tus; polluted water smells unpleasant and fosters "high-level equilibrium" in which users get a high mosquitos; and the installation of sewers typically level of service, pay for it, and maintain the de- increases property prices. As with water supply, sired system. so with sanitation: where public provision is ab- sent, people pay significant amounts for privately Increasing investments in sanitation provided services. Even in poor cities the amounts paid are considerable. In Kumasi, Ghana, for ex- Public investment in water supply and sanitation ample, the use of public latrines and bucket la- accounts for 10 percent of total public investment trines accounts for large recurrent expenditures in developing countries, or about 0.6 percent of about 2.5 and 1 percent, respectively, of family in- GDP. Spending on sewerage and sanitation ac- come. In Kumasi and in Ouagadougou families are counts for substantially less than one-filth of lend- willing to pay about 2 percent of household in- ing in World Bank-financed projects. Most of this come for an improved sanitation system. This is has been for sewage collection, with little spent on roughly the amount paid for water and for electric- treatment. An indication of the huge underinvest- ity. The examples of northeast Brazil and of Or- ment in treatment is that only 2 percent of sewage angi, Pakistan, discussed in Boxes 5.5 and 5.6 in Latin America is treated. Similarly, only a small show the willingness of households to pay for hav- proportion (typically 5 percent in developing ing wastewater carried out of the neighborhood countries, compared with 25 percent in industrial (by means of a low-cost sewer). countries) of all spending on solid wastes is di- rected to their safe disposal. Expanding the menu of supply options Taking account of demand A vital element of a demand-driven sanitation strategy is to expand the menu of services from There is abundant evidence that urban families are which users can choose. willing to pay substantial amounts for the removal In city centers there is no alternative to costly of excreta and wastewater from their neighbor- waterborne systems. But even in relatively poor 106 Box 5.5 Innovative sewerage in northeast Brazil: the condominial system The condominial system is the brainchild of José Carlos the neighbor's portion of the sewer. The consequence de Melo, a socially committed engineer from Recife. is rapid, direct, and informed feedback to the misuser. The name "condominial" was chosen for two reasons. This virtually eliminates the need to "educate" the First, a block of houses was treated like a horizontal users of the system about dos and don'ts and results in apartment buildingor condominiais, in Portuguese. fewer blockages than in conventional systems. And Second, "Condominial" was the title of a popular Bra- third, because of the greatly reduced responsibility of zilian soap opera and so was associated with the best in the utility, operating costs are much lower. urban life! As is evident in Box figure 5.5, the result is a The condominial system is now providing service to layout radically different from the conventional sys- hundreds of thousands of urban people in northeast tem, with a shorter grid of smaller and shallower Brazil. The danger is that the clever engineering may "feeder" sewers running through backyards and with be seen as "the system." Where the community and the effects of shallower connections to the mains rip- organizational aspects have been missing, the technol- pling through the system. These innovations cut con- ogy has worked poorly (as in Joinville, Santa Catarina) struction costs to between 20 and 30 percent of those of or not at all (as in the Baixada Fluminense in Rio de a conventional system. Janeiro). The more fundamental and radical innovation, how- ever, is the active involvement of the population in choosing the level of service and in operating and maintaining the "feeder" infrastructure. Families can Box figure 5.5 Conventional and condominial choose to continue with their current sanitation sys- sewage collection systems tem, to connect to a conventional waterborne system (which usually means a holding tank discharging into Conventional system Condominial system an open street drain), or to connect to a "condominial" system. If a family chooses to connect to a condominial sys- tem, it has to pay a connection charge (financed by the a U U water company) of, say, X cruzados, and a monthly U U tariff of Y cruzados. If it wants a conventional connec- tion, it has to pay an initial cost of about 3X cruzados and a monthly tariff of 3Y cruzados, reflecting the . U U U higher capital and operating costs of the conventional U U U system. Families are free to continue with their current sys- U . U tem. In most cases, however, those families that ini- tially choose not to connect eventually change their . U U minds. Either they succumb to heavy pressure from U U . U their neighbors, or they find the buildup of wastewater in and around their houses intolerable once the (con- U iU U U nected) neighbors fill in the rest of the open drain. Individual households are responsible for maintain- Main sewer ing the feeder sewers, with the formal agency tending Street sewer only to the trunk mains. This has several related posi- House sewer tive results. First, it increases the communities' sense Backyard toilet of responsibility for the system. Second, the misuse of o Plot any portion of the feeder system (by, say, putting solid wastes down the toilet) soon shows up as a blockage in cities the difficulties are not insoluble. In For- pass them on to those who purchase units in the taleza, a poor city in northeast Brazil, developers buildings. of all high-rise buildings are required to, and do, Beyond the urban core, however, conventional install package sewage collection and treatment sewerage systems (with average household costs systems. The point here is not that this is a good anywhere from $300 to $1,000) are too expensive technical solution but that even in a relatively poor for most developing countries. In recent decades city, developers can easily absorb such costs and efforts have been made to develop technological 107 alternatives. Most of this work has concerned the $1,000 per household that was standard in Karachi onsite disposal of excreta. Pour-flush latrines and to less than $50 per household (excluding the cost ventilated improved pit (VIP) latrines are often the of the trunk sewers). The achievement is extraordi- technologies of choicethey provide good service naryabout 600,000 people in Orangi are now (privacy and few odors) at reasonable cost (typ- served with self-financed sewers. ically about $100 to $200 per unit), and their instal- lation and functioning does not depend on the Investing in waste disposal municipality or other organization. At even lower cost, there are yet simpler improvements, such as There is an important difference between "private the latrine slab program that proved successful in goods" (including water supply and even waste- Mozambique. water and solid waste collection), in which the pri- For a variety of reasonshigh housing densities, mary benefits accrue to individual households, impermeable soils, and the need to dispose of con- and waste treatment and disposal, in which the siderable quantities of domestic wastewateron- benefits accrue to the community at large. In the site solutions do not function well in many urban first case willingness to pay is an appropriate areas. Sewage and wastewater collect in the streets guide to the level of service to be provided, and and in low-lying areas, creating serious aesthetic the main source of finance should be direct charges to the users. In the case of waste disposal, and health problems. And in many settings people aspire to "the real thing"waterborne sewerage. however, public financing is essential. Govern- Current sanitation choices include a Rolls-Royce ments that subsidize "private" water supply and (conventional sewerage), a motorcycle (an im- wastewater collection services are left with less proved latrine), and a bicycle (an unimproved la- money to finance treatment and disposal services. trine). What is missing is the Volkswagensome- No developing country, however, will have the thing that provides much the same service as the luxury of collecting and treating wastewater from Rolls Royce but that many more people can afford. all households. Because the costs of meeting such Several such technologies are being developed: goals are extremely high, even in industrial coun- Effluent sewerage is a hybrid between a septic tries the full population is not served by wastewa- tank and a conventional sewerage system. Its dis- ter treatment facilities; coverage is only 66 percent tinctive feature is a tank, located between the in Canada and 52 percent in France. In making the house sewer and the street sewer, that retains the inevitable choices, the best ratio of benefits to costs solids, thereby allowing smaller sewers to be laid will usually be achieved by concentrating most at flatter gradients and with fewer manholes. Such public funds on waste treatment in large cities, systems have been widely used in small towns in especially those that lie upstream from large the United States and Australia and in Argentina, populations. Brazil, Colombia, India, Mozambique, and Zam- In recent decades some important advances bia. The (limited) cost data suggest that solids-free have been made in innovative sewage treatment sewerage costs about 20 percent less than conven- processes. At the lower end of the spectrum is the tional sewerage. stabilization pond, a technology that has proved Simplified sewerage, developed in São Paulo, robust, easy to operate, and (where land is not allows smaller, shallower, flatter sewers with costly) relatively inexpensive. A promising inter- fewer manholes. This simplified design works as mediate (in both cost and operational complexity) well as conventional sewerage but costs about 30 is the upflow anaerobic sludge blanket, which has percent less. It is now routinely used in Brazil. performed well in Brazil and Colombia. The point The condominial system described in Box 5.5 is the importance of developing technical solutions has been developed and applied in northeast Bra- that are adapted to the climatic, economic, and managerial realities of developing countries. zil. It comprises shallow, small-diameter backyard sewers laid at flat gradients and costs about 70 Rethinking institutional arrangements percent less than a conventional system. The Orangi Pilot Project in Karachi (described A recent comprehensive review of forty years of in Box 5.6) adapted the principles of effluent sew- World Bank experience in water and sanitation erage and simplified sewerage to the realities of a pinpoints "institutional failure" as the most fre- hilly squatter settlement in Karachi. The result quent and persistent cause of poor performance by not just the result of clever engineeringwas a public utilities. This section deals with the key drastic reduction in the cost of sewers, from the areas for institutional reform. 108 Box 5.6 Innovative sewerage in a Karachi squatter settlement: the Orangi Pilot Project In the early 1980s Akhter Hameed Khan, a world- the lanes and streets) were less than $50 per renowned community organizer, began working in the household. slums of Karachi. He asked what problem he could The related organizational achievements are equally help resolve and was told that "the streets were filled impressive. OPP staff members have played a catalytic with excreta and wastewater, making movement diffi- role: they explain the benefits of sanitation and the cult and creating enormous health hazards." What did technical possibilities to residents, conduct research, the people want, and how did they intend to get it? and provide technical assistance. The OPP staff never he asked. What they wanted was clear' 'people as- handle the community's money. (The total costs of the pired to a traditional sewerage system. . it would be . OPP's operations amounted, even in the project's early difficult to get them to finance anything else." And years, to less than 15 percent of the amount invested by how they would get it, too, was clearthey would the community.) The households' responsibilities in- have Dr. Khan persuade the Karachi Development Au- clude financing their share of the costs, participating in thority (KDA) to provide it free, as it did (or so the poor construction, and electing a "lane manager" who typ- perceived) to the richer areas of the city. ically represents about fifteen households. Lane com- Dr. Khan spent months going with representatives of mittees, in turn, elect members of neighborhood com- the community to petition the KDA to provide the ser- mittees (typically representing about 600 houses), vice. When it was clear that this would never happen, which manage the secondary sewers. Dr. Khan was ready to work with the community to The early successes achieved by the project created a find alternatives. (He would later describe this first "snowball" effect, in part because of the increased step as the most important thing he did in Orangi- value of properties with sewerage systems. As the liberating, as he put it, the people from the immobiliz- power of the OPP-related organizations increased, ing myths of government promises.) they were able to put pressure on the municipality to With a small amount of core external funding, the provide funds for the construction of trunk sewers. Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) was started. It was clear The Orangi Pilot Project has led to the provision of what services the people wanted; the task was to re- sewerage services to more than 600,000 poor people in duce the costs to affordable levels and to develop or- Karachi and to recent initiatives by several munici- ganizations that could provide and operate the sys- palities in Pakistan to follow the OPP method and, tems. On the technical side, the achievements of the according to OPP leader Arif Hasan, "have govern- OPP architects and engineers were remarkable and in- ment behave like an NGO." Even in Karachi the mayor novative. Thanks partly to the elimination of corrup- now formally accepts the principle of "internal" devel- tion and the provision of labor by community mem- opment by the residents and "external" development bers, the costs (for an in-house sanitary latrine and (including trunk sewers and treatment) by the house sewer on the plot and underground sewers in municipality. Improving the performance of public utilities between $1 billion and $1.5 billion in revenue for- gone every year. A World Bank review of more than 120 sector proj- The number of employees per 1,000 water ects over twenty-three years concludes that only in connections is between two and three in Western four countriesBotswana, Korea, Singapore, and Europe and about four in a well-run developing Tunisiahave public water and sewerage utilities country utility (Santiago) but between ten and reached acceptable levels of performance. A few twenty in most Latin American utilities. examples illustrate how serious the situation is: Financial performance is equally poor. A recent review of Bank projects found that borrowers of- In Accra only 130 connections were made to a ten broke their financial performance covenants. A sewerage system designed to serve 2,000 corollary is that the shortfalls have to be met connections. through large injections of public money. In Brazil, In Caracas and Mexico City an estimated 30 from the mid-1970s to mid-1980s about $1 billion a percent of connections are not registered. year of public monies was invested in the water Unaccounted-for water, which amounts to 8 sector. The annual federal subsidy to Mexico City percent in Singapore, is 58 percent in Manila and for water and sewerage services amounts to more about 40 percent in most Latin American cities. For than $1 billion a year, or 0.6 percent of national Latin America as a whole, such water losses cost GDP. 109 Public utilities play a dominant role in the provi- water and wastewater services and as environ- sion of water and sanitation services throughout mental regulatorit is both gamekeeper and the world. There are many examples of such util- poacher. The results of this conflict of interest are ities working effectively in industrial countries similar throughout the world. In England and and, as described above, a few cases in developing Wales prosecutions of those responsible for sew- countries. An essential requirement for effective age treatment were rare when the river basin au- performance is that both the utility and the regula- thorities were responsible for water resource man- tory body (essential for such natural monopolies) agement, environmental protection, and services. be free from undue political interference. In the In 1989 private companies were given responsibil- case of the utility the vital issue is managerial au- ity for the delivery of water and sewerage services tonomy, particularly as regards personnel policies; (with public agencies retaining regulatory author- in the case of the regulatory body, it is the setting ity). Since then, fines have been increased sub- of reasonable tariffs. Although this recipe is simple stantially and violators have been prosecuted. The and has been well tested in many industrial coun- other side of the separation of powers is that ser- tries, it has been extraordinarily difficult to imple- vice delivery agencies are, in the process, liberated ment in developing countries other than those from serving multiple tasks and can pursue well- with high levels of governance. Sometimes util- defined and specific objectives. ities and regulators are nominally autonomous, Expanding the role of the private sector but usually key policies (on investments, person- nel policies, and tariffs, for instance) are effectively Increased private sector involvement is warranted made by government and heavily influenced by in two areas. One is in services to public utilities. short-term political considerations. In industrial countries the engineering of public Many projects financed by external agencies works is dominated by private firms, which de- have addressed the problems of public water util- pend for their survival on their reputation for per- ities through sizable action plans, technical assis- formance and which assume legal liability for the tance components, and conditionality. Some of consequences of any professional negligence. these efforts, such as that undertaken recently by These factors provide powerful incentives for sup- Sri Lanka's National Water Supply and Drainage plying cost-effective, high-quality services and Board, have led to significant improvements in concurrently furnish a stringent environment for performance. As with public enterprises in other the supervised apprenticeship training that is a re- sectors, however, most of these efforts failed be- quired part of professional certification in these causein the words of a recent Bank review countries. By contrast, in many developing coun- "public enterprises . . . are key elements of pa- tries (particularly in Asia and Africa) the engineer- tronage systems, . . . overstaffing is often rife, and ing of public works is dominated by large public appointments to senior management positions are sector bureaucracies. Employment security is total, frequently made on the basis of political connec- promotion is by seniority alone, good work goes tions rather than merit." And things have been unrecognized, poor work is not subject to sanc- getting worse rather than better. Achievement of tions, and an atmosphere of lethargy prevails. The institutional objectives in World Bank-financed direct consequence is the construction of high- water and sanitation projects fell from about two cost, low-quality facilities; the indirect effects in- in three projects in the late 1970s to less than one clude a weak professional labor force. The obvious in two projects ten years later. answers are, first, to decrease the direct involve- Improving the performance of public utilities ment of the government in public works and, sec- nevertheless remains an important goal, for two ond, to nurture a competitive engineering consul- reasons. First, in the medium term public utilities tancy sector. will continue to provide services to many. Second, More private involvement in the operation of improvement in the performance of public utilities water, sewerage, and solid waste companies is is often a precondition if private operators are to be also warranted. Many industrial countries have induced to participate. found it difficult to reform public enterprises, ex- cept as part of a move to privatize them. Indeed, Separating provision and regulation privatization is increasingly seen as a way not only Experience in industrial countries shows that a to effect performance improvements but also to central problem in improving environmental qual- lock in the gains. ity is that the public sector acts both as supplier of In developing countries there has been some ex- 110 perience with private sector operation of water The case for private sector involvement is stron- and sanitation utilities. Côte d'Ivoire has been a ger still in the solid waste collection business. pioneerSODECI, in Abidjan, is considered one Whereas foreign control of water supply is often of the best-run utilities in Africa. After Macao's perceived to involve losing sovereignty over a stra- water utility was privatized in 1985, performance tegic sector, no one cares if foreigners pick up the improved dramatically; the percentage of unac- garbage. In addition, for populations of more than counted-for water fell by 50 percent over six years. about 50,000 there are no economies of scale and Guinea, which recently let a lease contract for sup- thus no natural monopoly. Experience in many plying water to its principal cities, experienced countriesincluding Argentina, Brazil, Canada, dramatic improvements in the financial condition Chile, Colombia, Japan, Switzerland, and the of the utility in just the first eighteen months as a United Stateshas shown that the private sector result of raising the efficiency of bill collection from almost invariably collects solid wastes more effi- 15 to 70 percent. ciently than municipalities. Unit costs for public Other countries have taken more incremental systems are 50 to 200 percent higher, with the pri- approaches. EMOS, the utility serving Santiago, vate sector efficiency gains apparently greatest in has used private contracts for functions such as the developing countries listed. meter reading, pipe maintenance, billing, and ve- hicle leasing. As a result, it has a high staff produc- Increasing community involvement tivity ratethree to six times higher than that for other companies in the region. Many other coun- Community groups and other NGOs also have an tries, faced with persistently poor performance by important role to play in the supply of water and their public utilities, are seriously considering sanitation services and the collection of wastes. As greater private sector involvement, following, in the condominial (Box 5.5) and Orangi (Box 5.6) general, variations of the French model. For exam- examples show, in the urban fringe the most pro- ple, in Latin America, concession contracts are cur- ductive relationship between community groups rently being let for the supply of water and sew- and the formal sector is that of partnership, with erage services in Buenos Aires and Caracas. the formal sector responsible for the "external" or Private involvement in the sector is not a pan- "trunk" infrastructure and the community paying acea and is never simple. In the United Kingdom for, providing, and managing the "internal" or water privatization is generally considered the "feeder" infrastructure. most complex of all privatizations undertaken. In Because many water and sanitation services are developing countries there are formidable prob- monopolies, consumers cannot force suppliers to lems. For the private operator the risk involved is be accountable by giving their business to a com- typically high. In addition to the obvious political petitor. To give consumers a voice in the political and macroeconomic risks, knowledge about the process, consumers' associations and ratepayers' condition of the assets is usually only rudimen- boards are vital. Paradoxically, because there is tary, and there is uncertainty about the govern- such an obvious need for oversight of the activities ment's compliance with the terms of the contract. of a private operator of a natural monopoly, Groups such as existing agencies and labor unions greater private sector involvement stimulates that stand to lose from greater private sector in- greater consumer involvement. In the United volvement often strongly oppose privatization. Kingdom, for example, water users have had a For the government, too, there are problems. much greater say in running the industry since Because of economies of scale, it is virtually impos- privatization. sible to have direct competition among suppliers In recent years external agencies and govern- in a specific area. Countries have tried a variety of ments alike have become aware that in rural areas solutions: in France, there is periodic competition involvement of the users is essential if water sup- for markets, and in England and Wales, economic plies are to be sustained. Generally it has been as- regulators reward efficiency by comparing the rel- sumed that support to rural communitiesin the ative performance of different companies (a prac- form of information, motivation, and technical as- tice that is unlikely to be applicable elsewhere). In sistancewill come from the government. The diffi- addition, in many developing countries it is often culty is that governments, especially in rural areas, difficult to attract private sector interest. Only a are often weak, and their officials rarely have an handful of firms compete internationally for such incentive to provide support. Here the private sec- contracts. tor (including NGOs) may be able to help. 111 Good policies can make a big difference in quality of life Figure 5.6 Safe water and adequate sanitation: three scenarios, 1990-2030 Population without safe water Population without adequate sanitation Billions Billions 3.0 3.5 2.5 3.0 2.0 2.5 1.5 2.0 1.0 1.5 0.5 0 1.0 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 "Business as usual" scenario Scenario with accelerated investment in water supply and sanitation services a Scenario with accelerated investment and efficiency reformsb Note: Assumptions are as follows: growth of per capita income and population as in Chapter 1; per capita income elasticity, 0.3; price elasticity, -0.25; initial prices 60 percent of marginal costs, gradually rising to efficiency levels over a twenty-five-year period; initial supply costs 50 percent higher than with good practices (due to managerial inefficiencies), gradually being reduced in step with price efficiency reforms; and marginal costs rising at 3 percent per year. Investment in water supply increases 30 percent, and investment in sanitation services increases 50 percent over the period. To realize this scenario in low-income countries, efficiency reforms - and the resulting increase in investment shares - would need to be greater than average. Source: World Bank estimates, based on Anderson and Cavendish, background paper. Several promising examples of the involvement provision of spare parts. Later on, the community of small-scale private operators in developing will be able to maintain the pump and will pur- countries have emerged: chase the necessary spare parts from local traders. Because the private sector agent has clear incen- In rural Pakistan about 3 million families have wells fitted with pumps, many of which are mo- tives for providing services effectively, this ar- rangement may work better than government sup- torized. The water supplies are paid for in full by port to the communities. the families, and all the equipment is provided and serviced by a vibrant local private sector industry. Finally, women have a central role to play in In Lesotho the government trained brick- these reforms. In most countries the collection of layers to build improved pit latrines. Government water has been considered "women's work" (ex- banks also provided (unsubsidized) credit to fi- cept where the water is sold!). Only recently, how- nance the latrines. The program has been a singu- ever, have systematic efforts been made to involve lar success, thanks mainly to the aggressive role of women in project identification, development, the bricklayers in expanding their markets (and maintenance, and upkeep. The results have gener- providing services as well). ally been encouraging. In an urban slum in Zambia In West Africa a private handpump manufac- a women's organization improved drainage turer has developed a "Sears Roebuck"-type around public taps. Women have been trained as scheme whereby purchase of a pump comes with caretakers for handpumps in Bangladesh, India, five years of support, including training and the Kenya, Lesotho, and Sudan. In Mozambique 112 women engineers and pump mechanics perform markets can come into existence, rewriting con- alongside, and as effectively as, their male coun- tract laws so that the private sector can participate terparts. In Sri Lanka women's cooperatives have with confidence, building a capacity for environ- been set up to assemble and maintain a locally mental and, where appropriate, economic regula- manufactured handpump. Women's cooperatives tion, developing financial mandates for utilities manage communal standpipes and collect money that encourage conservation, and setting and en- to pay for metered supplies in Honduras, Kenya, forcing quality standards for equipment. The gov- and the Philippines. Women who are trained to ernment must also create conditions under which manage and maintain community water systems othersthe private sector, NGOs, communities, often perform better than men because they are and consumerscan play their parts. less likely to migrate, more accustomed to volun- tary work, and better trusted to administer funds What might be accomplished honestly. More than 1 billion people are still without access Creating an enabling environment to safe water and 1.7 billion people are without access to adequate sanitation facilities. Elementary This chapter has argued that massive improve- calculations show that an "unchanged practices" ments can be made in health, economic efficiency, or "business-as-usual" scenario would lead to a and equity through better provision of sanitation rise in the number of people without service in the and water. The key is firmly in the hands of gov- coming decades (the top curves in Figure 5.6). This ernments, for the single most important factor is a result of rising unit costs, as well as unprece- needed is political will. Where there are long-es- dented increases in population. If the shares of tablished and deeply entrenched traditions of total investment allocated to sanitation (currently sound governance (as in Botswana, Korea, and 0.6 percent of gross investment) and to water sup- Singapore), it is evident that autonomous, ac- ply (currently 1.7 percent) were raised by, say, 50 countable public sector agencies can provide effi- and 30 percent, respectively, the numbers un- cient and equitable service. For many countries, served might still rise, although not as much (the however, such levels of governance are not attain- middle curves in the figure). Far more important able in the short run, so that greater involvement (as shown by the bottom curves) is the combina- of the private sector and NGOs will be crucial to tion of policy reforms and accelerated investment. the provision of accountable and efficient services. By attracting financial, managerial, and skilled la- To allow helpful change to occur, the govern- bor into the sector and by freeing enterprises to ment must concentrate on the things that it, and invest more and improve maintenance, this new only it, can do. Its job is to define and enforce an approach, which is already being adopted in some appropriate legal, regulatory, and administrative countries, could bring about dramatic increases in framework. This includes tasks as fundamental access to sanitation and clean water within the and diverse as rewriting legislation so that water next generation. 113 Energy and industry Without altered policies, pollution from fossil fuel generation of electric power will rise tenfold in the next forty years, from vehicles more than fivefold, and from industrial emissions and wastes also more than fivefold as demand for industrial goods multiplies. Low-waste and "clean" technologies and practices are capable of reducing local pollution levels appreciably as output expands. Options are also emerging for reducing carbon dioxide emissions in the long term through the use of renewable energy sources and through greater efficiency in energy production and use. To encourage the adoption of such technologies, governments need to pursue policies that improve the efficiency with which energy is used. These policies include the elimination of subsidies for power generation and, in many countries, for vehicle fuels and coal. Efficiency reforms help reduce pollution while raising a country's economic output. Policies designed to curb pollution directly, using economic incentives, laws, and regulations, are also necessary. s developing economies grow, they will begin to pled between 1970 and 1990 and now accounts for catch up with the levels of energy consumption 27 percent of the world total. Even if developing and industrial production of high-income coun- countries' demand for primary energy were to tries. In today's industrial countries the main pe- grow at a rate 1 to 2 percentage points lower than riod of industrialization saw rapidly increasing the trend growth rate, demand is likely to exceed pollution. How far can the developing countries 100 million barrels a day of oil equivalent (mbdoe) avoid repeating that experience and benefit from by 2010 and perhaps 200 mbdoe by 2030. Yet per the ways in which the richer countries have capita consumption in these countries would re- learned to reduce pollution from energy use and main much lower than in industrial countries. industrial production even as output expands? The production and consumption of industrial At present, the omens are poor. Chapter 2 con- goods have also increased rapidly in developing cluded that current levels of air pollution, water countries. In many, the historical and current pace pollution, and hazardous wastes in developing of industrial growth has outstripped that of indus- countries pose serious threats to human health, trial countries and will continue to do so as per productivity, and welfare. These types of pollution capita incomes rise. As incomes rise, the structure arise mainly from the use of energy and from in- of consumption will also change. Manufactures dustrial production. If growth continues at present have a high income elasticity of demand, and the rates or higheras it must if poverty is to dimin- structural shifts brought about by development are ishthen, on present trends, increased energy use likely to put heavy pressure on the environment. and industrial production will add enormously to The growth of manufacturing in developing coun- pollution. tries averaged 8.0 percent in 1965-80 and 6.0 per- The consumption of commercial energy in de- cent in 1980-90, compared with 3.1 and 3.3 percent veloping countries is rising rapidly and will soon in the industrial countries for those periods (see dominate energy markets worldwide (Figure 6.1). World Development Indicators, Table 2). Manufac- Despite oil price shocks and financial crises, it tn- turing output will probably rise threefold in the 114 Developing countries will soon become the largest generates most of these pollutants, as well as efflu- narket for comni'rial energy ents and wastes, which are becoming more nu- merous, toxic, and exotic as industrialization pro- ceeds. Like industrial countries, developing Figure 6.1 Energy consumption, by country countries also need policies for dealing with group: an "energy-efficient" scenario, "global pollutants" such as CFCs and greenhouse 1970-2030 gases. In trying to skip the most polluting stages of Total consumption industrialization, developing countries have some Millions of barrels of oil equivalent per day special advantages. They are able to draw on ad- 400 vances in technology and management practices already made in industrial countries, under the pressure of increasingly strict pollution controls. And because they are expanding rapidly, they are generally building new generating and industrial plants rather than refitting existing ones. They should therefore be able, with investment, to go straight to low-polluting practices. Developing countries are more likely to gain from such advan- 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 tages if they encourage international trade and in- vestment and if they adopt environmental taxes, laws, and regulations that make cleaner practices Per capita consumption profitable and polluting ones unprofitable, thus Barrels of oil equivalent per year creating a commercial interest in a clean 50 environment. Energy Figure 6.2 shows the main sources and uses of world energy. For developing countries, biomass, used mainly by households, is the largest source of energy, and efficiency in its use will be important in controlling air pollution. Coal, oil, and gas are 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 the next largest sources. Hydroelectric power pro- vides 6 percent of the energy needs of developing o OECD countries countries, while nuclear power provides less than 0 Eastern Europe and former U.S.S.R. 1 percent. Developing countries As Chapter 1 pointed out, fears that the world may be running out of fossil fuels are unfounded. Note: The scenario assumes growth in total consumption The world's proven reserves of oil and gas in 1950 of one to two percentage points below the trend rate. stood at 30 billion tons of oil equivalent (btoe); Source: Anderson 1991a. today they exceed 250 btoe, notwithstanding a to- tal world consumption of 100 btoe over the forty- year period. Proven reserves of coal rose from 450 to 570 btoe in the same period. Reserves of natural next twenty years and fivefold in the next thirty. gas have expanded more than fivefold since 1965 In relation to energy use, the most serious prob- (despite a threefold increase in production during lems faced by developing countries are the local the period). They now amount to more than 100 effects of emissions of particulate matter (dust and btoe, almost as much as the world's proven oil smoke), the use of leaded fuels, and the indoor air reserves; supplies in developing countries are pollution arising from the use of biomass fuels. In strong and improving. Estimates of "ultimately re- a growing number of places sulfur dioxide, nitro- coverable" fossil fuel reserves worldwide are more gen oxides, unburned hydrocarbons, and carbon than 600 times the present annual rate of extrac- monoxide also need attention. Industrial activity tion. All told, fossil fuel resources are probably 115 economic instruments and institutional reforms to With development, commercial energy replaces encourage the more efficient use of energy. The traditional biomass fuels second is either to develop technologies that re- duce the polluting effects of conventional fuels or Figure 6.2 Sources and consumption to use less-polluting substitutes. In discussing en- of energy ergy use for electric power generation and for (pe'rccut) transportthe two most rapidly growing catego- riesthis chapter examines three scenarios: an Sources of all energy, 1987 "unchanged practices" scenario, with no environ- Developing countries mental policies in place; a scenario that employs economic and institutional reforms to improve the efficiency with which fossil fuels are used; and a scenario that progressively adopts environmen- Industrial countries tally beneficial technologies. A combination of the 6 second and third not only reduces local pollution appreciably but also improves economic efficiency. 37 But using cleaner fossil fuels and technologies and improving efficiency will not by themselves 23 L Oil solve the long-term problem of stabilizing carbon D Coal dioxide accumulations in the atmosphere (see U Natural gas Chapter 8). That will require a much greater use of U Nuclear energy nuclear or of renewable energy. This chapter U Hydropower (which concentrates mainly on local pollution) will U Biomass show that solar energy, biomass, and other renew- ables are developing rapidly as environmentally Consumption of commercial energy, 1988 and commercially viable energy sources. Eight developing countriesa Electric power generation from fossil fuels More than half the world's consumption of coal Industrial countries and 30 percent of fossil fuel consumption go to 14 generate electricity. Fossil-fired power stations, in turn, account for two-thirds of the world's electric power-generating capacity, currently 2.6 million 34 megawatts. In the 1980s electric power generation U Households and rose by 60 percent in industrial countries and by services 22 more than 110 percent in developing countries U Transport (where demand is expanding at 8 percent a year U Industry 19 and requires roughly 50,000 megawatts of added U Electricity capacity each year). Under an "unchanged prac- tices" scenario, in which pollution abatement a. Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, technologies are not widely deployed, emissions Philippines, and Thailand. These countries account for more of pollutants will increase more than fourfold in than 50 percent of total energy and 35 percent of oil the next twenty years and tenfold in the next forty. consumed in developing countries. (Detailed data are not available for all developing countries.) Good policies would make this grimy prospect Sources: For energy sources, Hall, background paper. For avoidable. consumption, OECD 1990; Imran and Barnes 1990. ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM. A sec- ond scenario considered in this section looks at the possible effects of price increases and institutional sufficient to meet world energy demands for the reforms. At present, underpricing of electricity is next century, perhaps longer. the rule, not the exception, in most developing Policies to mitigate the effect on the environ- countries. Prices, on average, are barely more than ment of energy production and consumption take one-third of supply costs and are half those in in- two complementary approaches. The first uses dustrial countries (Figure 6.3). Whereas average 116 tariffs in the OECD countries rose by 1.4 percent a Many developing countries sell electricity year in real terms between 1979 and 1988, they fell at well below cost by 3.5 percent a year in developing countries. Such low prices do not reflect improvements in the efficiency with which electric utilities supply Figure 6.3 Tariffs for electric power, 1988 their customers. On the contrary, losses during transmission and distribution, partly through Dollars per kilowatt hour theft, run at high levels: 31 percent of generation 0.10 in Bangladesh, 28 percent in Pakistan, and 22 per- cent in Thailand and the Philippines. (In the United States only 8 percent of electricity is lost 0.08 during transmission, in Japan, 7 percent.) These losses, the equivalent of about 75,000 megawatts of capacity and 300 terawatt hours (300 billion kilo- watt hours) a year, represent a loss to developing 0.06 countries of approximately $30 billion a year through increased supply costs. Worse, by the end of the century, on present trends, aggregate losses would double. 0.04 The reasons for persistent underpricing are largely institutional. The points made in Chapter 5 about the management of water utilities apply with equal force to electric utilities. Governments 0.02 frequently intervene in the day-to-day operations of utilities, and they worry that price increases will exacerbate inflation. Utility managers and their boards may have little say in pricing or investment 0 decisions. Lack of accountability and transparency leads to poor management, either of the utilities OECD Deve oping Brazil India Mexico countries countriesa themselves or of the state fuel companies that fre- quently supply them. Subsidizing the price of electricity has both eco- a. Weighted average of tariffs in sixty-three countries. nomic costs and environmental effects. Low prices Marginal supply costs are generally $0.10 or more per kilowatt hour. give rise to excessive demands and, by undermin- Source: World Bank forthcoming. ing the revenue base, reduce the ability of utilities to provide and maintain supplies; developing countries use about 20 percent more electricity than they would if consumers paid the true margi- for industry to use waste heatfor example, nal cost of supply. Underpricing electricity also through cogeneration, which combines power discourages investment in new, cleaner tech- generation with the use of residual thermal energy nologies. for other purposesand to improve efficiency in Because of the need to service the borrowing heating, motive power, refrigeration, and lighting. incurred to build new generating capacity, some A paradox of the energy market is that end users developing countries are now starting to raise elec- of electricity often appear to require much higher tricity tariffs. Some are considering or (in a few rates of return on the installation of more energy- cases) implementing privatization programs, usu- efficient equipment than those that electric power ally in the hope of tapping capital markets to build producers require on new plant. This has led some new capacity. Price increases may be easier in countries to introduce subsidies for new types of countries in which parts of the energy industry are energy-saving investments by electricity cus- privatized, and management is also likely to be tomers, paid either by the government or (as in improved. several U.S. states) by the electric utilities them- selves. Better information in the form of labeling or CONSERVATION. Sensible energy prices affect advisory services to help customers make more not just the generation of energy but also its use by informed decisions is also required. In developing industry and households. They create incentives countries industrial advisory services have some- 117 times identified ways of reducing energy con- sumption per unit of output and other costs. Such initiatives are important for improving energy eff i- Box 6.1 Innovations in emissions control and ciency, but their success, too, will depend greatly efficiency in power generation from fossil fuels on prices that reflect the full economic and envi- Smokestack pollution from power stations can be ronmental costs of energy. These will, in them- greatly reduced by clean coal- and oil-burning technol- selves, help to make energy-efficient technologies ogies or by using natural gas. Box table 6.1 shows typi- financially more attractive to industry and cal emissions characteristics. For coal several technolo- individuals. gies are available or emerging. The first three are in commercial use, and the others are in advanced stages of development. TECHNOLOGIES. By providing strong incentives to generate and use electricity in more efficient Coal-cleaning technologies to reduce nonburning mineral matter (ash). These methods can also remove ways, price and institutional reforms have the ad- the 10-30 percent of the sulfur content that is chem- vantage of encouraging reductions in all polluting ically bound in the inorganic form (notably, pyrites). emissions (including carbon dioxide) per unit of The cleaned coal has a higher heat value and puts a output. However, low-polluting methods of gen- lower ash load on the boiler. eration are also required to reduce pollution signif- Mechanical and electrical devices for removing icantly. The third scenario developed below there- particulates. These devices, introduced in industrial fore combines the efficiency reforms discussed countries over the past forty years, can remove more than 99 percent of particulate matter. Improvements in above with the gradual adoption of environmen- combustion technologies and thermal efficiencies have tally improved technologies and practices. also eliminated carbon monoxide emissions, which are Technological advance has put developing coun- now rarely classified as a significant pollutant from tries in a better position to reduce all forms of p01- power stations in the industrial market economies. lution from electric power generation than the in- Flue gas desulfurization technologies ("scrub- dustrial countries were in as recently as twenty bers"). These methods, also in commercial use, are capable of removing more than 90 percent of sulfurous years ago. In industrial countries the capital stock emissions, albeit at some cost. Methods are also being takes about thirty years to turn over, and retrofit- developed for reducing emissions of nitrogen oxides by ting is costly. Because developing countries are using catalysts and lowering combustion temperatures making new investments, they have the oppor- and avoiding excess air supply to the boilers. tunity to install less-polluting plant right away. Fluidized bed combustion, in which crushed coal There are, broadly, four technological options is fluidized with sand, its own ash, or limestone by for reducing harmful emissions: (a) changing the supporting the particles on a strong rising current of fuel by switching to low-sulfur coals, oil, and gas; air. The contact of the sulfur compounds with the lime- stone enables the sulfur to be removed from the fur- (b) cleaning the coal before combustion; (c) con- nace directly. Flue gas desulfurization is not needed, trolling emissions; and (d) using existing fuels and sulfur dioxide abatement efficiencies are as high as more efficiently, mainly by adopting advanced, 90 percent. Better control of furnace temperatures also high-efficiency, low-emissions technologies. Box enables nitrogen oxides to be reduced significantly, 6.1 summarizes recent assessments and costs of while the turbulence of the fluidized bed leads to more these options. When coal is used, it is not unusual efficient combustion. to find two or three approaches used in combina- Integrated coal gasification combined-cycle tech- nologies with fluidized bed combustion. These either tionfor instance, to address the rather different problems posed by particulates, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxides. COAL. Coal-fired stations are currently the main pollutants from coal (other than carbon dioxide) to source of emissions from power stations because low levels per unit of output. The costs of the op- they make up more than half of total thermal gen- tions vary, as the last column of Box table 6.1 erating capacity and because of the high sulfur shows, but are not so great as to compromise the content of coal in many regions. Combustion effi- ability of developing countries to meet their grow- ciencies are often poor, and modern emissions ing demands if they pursue rational abatement control technologies are not widely deployed; this policies. gives rise to high emission rates of particulates and sulfur dioxide. The technological developments GAS. Switching to natural gas, where it is eco- described in Box 6.1 mean that options are now nomically available, carries many environmental available or emerging for reducing all significant advantages. Its use offers reductions in particu- 118 gasify the coal before burning it to drive gas turbines or ciable improvements in thermal efficiency have been use the hot gases from a pressurized version of a flu- obtained in pilot schemes, with further reductions of idized bed combustion chamber. In both cases appre- sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions. Box table 6.1 Controlling pollution through improved technology for electric power generation Percentage abatement in Added costs as relation to base case Thermal percentage of Particulate efficiency generation Fuel and plant type Emissions control matter SO2 NO, (percent) costs' Base Coal, conventional boiler None 0 0 0 34.0 With improvements and controls Coal Conventional boiler Mechanical cleaning 90 0 0 34.0 <1 (cyclone) Conventional boiler Fabric ("baghouse") >99 0 0 34.0 2-4 filters Conventional boiler Electrostatic >99 0 0 34.0 2-4 precipitators (ESP) Conventional boiler ESP/coal cleaning >99 10-30 0 34.0 4-6 Conventional boiler ESP/S02 controls >99 90 0 34.0 12-15 Conventional boiler ESP/ SO2 and NO, >99 90 90 33.1 17-20 controls Fluidized bed combustion ESP >99 90 56 33.8 Pressurized fluidized bed ESP >99 93 50 38.9 combustion/combined <0-2 cycle5 Integrated coal gasification) None >99 99 50 38.0 combined cycle5 Residual fuel oil Conventional boiler None 97 30 12 35.2 Conventional boiler ESPISO2 controls >99.9 93 12 35.2 1012° Combined cycle5 ESP/S02 and NO, >99.9 93 90 34.4 13I5 controls Natural gas Conventional boiler None >99.9 >99.9 37 35.2 Conventional boiler NO, controls >99.9 >99.9 45 35.2 <0 Combined cycle5 None >99.9 >99.9 62 44.7 Note: SO2, sulfur dioxide; NO,, nitrogen oxides. Figures for coal and residual fuel oil are based on 3 percent sulfur content. In relation to base case. The percentages are based on generation costs of 5 cents per kilowatt hour, excluding transmission and distribution. A combined cycle plant uses both gas and steam turbines to drive the generators. The gas turbines are powered by the hot gases emerging directly from the combustion chamber. Steam is also raised in the combustion chamber and by utilizing the still-hot exhaust gases from the gas turbines. The improvements in efficiency arise from the thermodynamic advantages of higher inlet temperatures to the heat engine (turbine). Varies with relative costs of oil and coal. In relation to conventional oil boiler without controls. Sources: Based on OECD 1987a and 1989; Asian Development Bank 1991; Bates and Moore, background paper; Anderson 1991a. lates and sulfur dioxide of more than 99.9 percent times are also short (roughly four years). For many in relation to conventional coal-fired boilers with countries gas offers the prospect of both cheaper poor or no emissions control technologies. The use electric power generation and less local pollution. of combined-cycle gas-fired stations also brings These developments in the efficient use of natu- some reductions in emissions of nitrogen oxide per ral gas for electric power generation have coin- unit of energy produced. Current efficiencies (the cided with a remarkable increase in proven re- proportion of energy converted into electricity serves over the past twenty-five years (Figure 6.4). from the fuel) of combined-cycle gas units are In addition to proven reserves, there are several about 45 percent and could rise to more than 50 "unconventional" sources of methane that are percentalmost twice those of conventional coal- thought to be vastly greater than conventional re- fired stations thirty-five years ago. Construction serves in some countriesfor example, coal-bed 119 Discoveries of natural gas have risen appreciably FUEL OIL. Polluting emissions from the use of fuel oil for electric power generation can similarly be reduced to very low levels. Emissions of partic- Figure 6.4 Proven reserves of natural gas, ulate matter are intrinsically much lower for oil selected years, 1965-90 than for coal and can be virtually eliminated by using the technologies described in Box 6.1. The Billions of tons of oil equivalent use of low-sulfur fuel oil or flue gas desulfuriza- 50 tion can reduce emissions of sulfur dioxide by more than 90 percent. Catalytic methods are also available for significantly reducing nitrogen oxides in exhaust gases. The costs of controlling emis- sions from oil-fired plant are lower than those for coal. REGULATION. To encourage electric utilities to employ pollution-reducing technologies, govern- ments generally use regulation. This has been ef- fective (although not always cost-effective) in in- dustrial countries because there the pollution 1965 1980 1990 comes from a relatively small number of easily monitored point sources. In addition, the utilities El Western Europe Latin America are monopolies, are already regulated, and are El Eastern Europe and former U.S.S.R. perhaps more responsive to regulation than to El Asia, Australia, and New Zealand U Africa taxes. This situation may change with the growth El Middle East U North America of private ownership of power plants; pollution taxes (on, for example, sulfur emissions) would help to encourage plants to adopt more cost-effec- Source: British Petroleum Company 1991. tive means of abatement. Regulation has typically involved setting abate- ment standards. It is fortunate that the technology for addressing one of the most serious pollution methane; "tight gas" formations in which the gas problems of electric power productionemissions is held in rocks of low permeability and rock-frac- of particulate matteris relatively simple and inex- turing techniques are required to bring about use- pensive. Increased use of gas-fired power stations ful production; and some as yet uneconomical re- will be important in this respect. Where coal is the serves such as shale gas deposits. The costs of preferred fuel, constructing tall chimneys, siting exploiting natural gas reserves vary according to power stations away from large population cen- circumstances but have generally declined. Margi- ters, and using the emissions control devices dis- nal costs in developing countries range from one- cussed in Box 6.1 all help to reduce disamenity and quarter to three-quarters of the cost of steam coal, hazards to health from its combustion. They add the cheapest imported alternative energy source. less than 2 percent to total supply costs and may A major barrier to development has been the be associated with reductions in costs. China, for high fixed costs of exploration and production and example, has numerous small coal-fired power of establishing a basic pipeline network. For those plants that emit three to eight times more particu- countries that have a natural gas resource but have lates per kilowatt hour generated than do large yet to exploit it, the development of gas-fired plants yet have 30 percent higher capital costs, 60 power station projects can provide the commer- percent higher operating costs, and lower efficien- cially justified starting point for the development cies than large plants. Given the costs to life and of a widespread gas industry. Trade in natural gas health of particulate matter emissions (Chapter 2) will also be important from both commercial and and the modest costs of reducing the emissions to environmental perspectives; there is enormous low levels, the case for working toward high stan- scope both for the shipment of liquefied natural dards of abatement is unambiguous. gas to the main demand centers and for pipeline Unless natural gas is economically available, set- exports of gas from the former U.S.S.R., Europe, ting emissions standards for nitrogen oxides and the Middle East, and North Africa. sulfur dioxide will require a more critical examina- 120 Demand for electric power will grow, but pollution can be curbed and costs reduced Figure 6.5 Expansion of electric power in developing countries: pollution effects and investment requirement under three scenarios, 1990-2030 Emissions of pollutantsa Annual investment requirement Index (1990=100) Billions of dollars 1,200 1,200 1,000 A 1,000 800 800 pr 600 600 00 400 PM NO 200 200 - sox 0 0 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 - 'Unchanged practices' scenario Scenario with efficiency reforms b Scenario with efficiency reforms and pollution abatement measures C Note: NOR, nitrogen oxides; PM, particulate matter; SO sulfur oxides. Assumptions are as follows: growth of per capita income and population as in Chapter 1; per capita income elasticity, 1.5; price elasticity, -0.5; pollution abatement technologies and costs as in Box 6.1; initial average electricity prices as in Figure 6.3; and initial managerial and institutional inefficiencies that imply costs 50 percent higher than with good practices. The upper two curves are indexes for all pollutants, which increase together. Marginal cost pricing is phased in over twenty-five years, and losses in transmissions distribution and unused capacity are reduced to "best-practice" levels. Abatement technologies are phased in over twenty years. Source:Anderson and Cavendish, background paper. tion of tradeoffs (as was done, for example, in Po- ronmental policies are not in place, and rising de- land; see Figure 3.3). Extensive studies in Europe mands for electric power are met at the cost of an and North America have found that the damage exponential rise in pollution. from these pollutants varies greatly with region. In the second scenario, reforms to rectify the Much can be accomplished by using coal-cleaning price inefficiencies and problems of accountability technologies and low-sulfur fuels. Costs can also noted above are phased in gradually over twenty- be reduced by a proper phasing of investments. In five years. Pollution still rises (although more industrial countries the costs of flue gas desulfur- slowly), but there is less waste of capital, fuel, and ization are declining with experience; alter- operating resources in supply and less waste of natively, it may be more cost-effective to postpone energy in consumptiona clear case of good eco- decisions until advanced coal combustion technol- nomic policies being good for the environment. ogies or new gas deposits are fully commercial- The investment costs of expansion are lower (the ized. second panel of Figure 6.5) and could even decline for a period as output expands, as a result of im- The three scenarios proved capacity utilization and reductions in losses. The net benefits of electricity supply are Figure 6.5 illustrates the three scenarios discussed also higher. Efficiency in energy production and in this section. use thus reduces pollution while raising incomes In the "unchanged practices" scenario, envi- and welfare. 121 In the third scenario, in addition to energy the whole of the world's fossil fuel and uranium efficiency, environmentally improved technologies reserves. This energythe equivalent of 15,000 and practices are gradually incorporated into the times the world's primary energy demandcan be capital stock. Pollution rises initially on account of captured in solar-thermal systems, which produce lags and difficulties in introducing new policies heat for electric power generation and for domestic and practices but eventually declines as output ex- and commercial uses, or with photovoltaic sys- pands. The savings in investment arising from im- tems, which produce electric power directly from provements in prices and institutional arrange- sunlight. Both types of scheme have been consid- ments far outweigh any extra costs of pollution ered for the production of hydrogen, which could abatement. be used as a transport, domestic, or industrial fuel. Solar energy can also be stored by growing plants Renewable and nuclear energy and, in the form of biomass, may be used as a feedstock for the production of commercial fuels Fossil fuels will continue to be the predominant and electric power. energy source for the next several decades, and In the past there have always been two commer- the main task ahead will be to use them in eco- cial drawbacks to solar schemes: the amount of nomically and environmentally satisfactory ways. land they require and their costs. Both are declin- But if the threat of greenhouse warming made it necessary to restrict the use of fossil fuels, could the world's demands for commercial energy still Producing solar power would occupy relatively little be met? More efficient use of fossil fuels and a land area switch from coal to fuels lower in carbon could substantially reduce emissions of carbon dioxide per unit of output. Beyond that, the options would Figure 6.6 Land used to cultivate selected be nuclear energy or renewable energy (primarily crops worldwide and hypothetical land solar energy, biomass, geothermal energy, hydro- requirements for production of solar energy, power, and wind). 1989 As Figure 6.2 showed, nuclear power provides less than 1 percent of the energy used in develop- Millions of hectares ing countries. That share seems unlikely to rise 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 significantly. Quite apart from the abundance of fossil fuel reserves, which will act to depress de- Grapes mand for all alternatives, nuclear power has two Coffee handicaps: its costs and its environmental risks. Sugar cane Discoveries of fossil fuel reserves and progress in Potatoes production and conversion technologies have Groundnuts helped to hold down the prices of fossil fuels. At the same time, the costs of nuclear stations have Solar farms a risen for a variety of reasons: long lead times and Seed cotton delays in seeking approval, meeting environmen- Soybeans tal safeguards, and constructing the plants; the Rice costs and risks of disposing of radioactive wastes; Wheat and the prospective costs of decommissioning Coarse plants. Recent estimates (OECD 1989) show that grainsb fossil fuels still have lower costs than nuclear power, except perhaps at low discount rates. The bar shows the area that would be required in theory While the costs of nuclear power have in- to meet world demand for commercial energy using only creased, developments in renewable energy in the solar energy. It assumes that solar farms would be in areas with insolations of 2,000 kilowatt hours per square meter per 1970s and 1980sin solar, wind, and biomass en- year, the net conversion efficiency is 10 percent, primary ergy, in particularhave led to remarkable cost re- energy demand is 8 billion tons of oil equivalent, 50 percent of primary energy goes to electricity, and conversion factors ductions in these technologies. There is now a are 12,000 and 4,000 kilowatt hours per ton of oil equivalent growing awareness that renewable energy is an for nonelectric and electric energy, respectively. abundant resource that can be harnessed. Barley, maize, millet, oats, rye, and sorghum. Source: FAQ 1990b. Each year the earth's surface receives from the sun about ten times as much energy as is stored in 122 ing. In developing countries solar insolation is Technological advances will make renewable energy roughly 6,500 times the annual consumption of competitive commercial energy. At current conversion efficien- cies of 15 percent, less than 0.1 percent of these countries' land area would be required to meet, in Figure 6.8 Cost of alternative means of theory, the whole of their primary energy require- generating electric power in high-insolation ments. In industrial countries the fraction of land areas, 1970-2020 area is 0.5 percent. These areas are less than those currently occupied by hydroelectric reservoirs Dollars per kilowatt hour (log scale) worldwide and are very small in relation to the 10.00 area under crops (see Figure 6.6). In fact, the land intensities of solar schemes average only one- Photovoltaic a twentieth those of hydroelectric schemes and sometimes considerably lessthey are less than one-hundredth that of the Aswan High Dam, for 1.00 example. Moreover, the ideal locations will often Natural gas be sparsely populated arid areas, and the technol- (peak load) ogy is modular and allows flexibility in the choice 0.20 of sites. Thus, solar schemes suffer minimally or not at all from three problems that sometimes be- 0.10 set hydroelectric schemesthe inundation of ar- 0.05 able or forested lands, ecological side effects, and FOSsilC Nuclear the displacement of people. (base load) (base load) The costs of all commercial forms of renewable energy have declined remarkably over the past 0.01 two decades (as they did in the earlier part of this 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 century for electric power generation from fossil Notes: Data after 1990 are predicted. Future costs of fossil-fuel fuels; see Figure 6.7). The costs of solar energy and nuclear generation are uncertain; they are affected by such factors as demand shifts, technological change, environmental concerns, and political conditions, which may act in opposite directions. Increased efficiency has reduced costs greatly Excluding storage costs. in this century Including storage costs (on the basis of hybrid natural gas! solar schemes through 1990 and heat storage thereafter). Natural gas and coal. Sources: For solar sources, U.S. Department of Energy 1990; Figure 6.7 Electric power generation: cost for others, Scientific American 1990. and thermal efficiency in the United States, 1900-90 Cost may well fall further. In high-solar-insolation areas (1990 dollars per Thermal efficiency kilowatt hour) (percent) the costs of electric power from solar energy seem 40 likely to become competitive with those of nuclear 1.40 power within the next ten years or so (even ig- 1.20 noring their advantages in reducing environmen- Cost 30 - tal costs) and probably with those of fossil fuels 1.00 over the long term. Figure 6.8 summarizes one set 0.80 Thermal efficiency - 20 of representative but fairly conservative cost 0.60 estimates. The commercial development of renewables 0.40 - 10 may thus be justified on nonenvironmental 0.20 grounds. But if greenhouse warming makes it nec- 0 0 essary to restrict the use of fossil fuels, several 1900 1915 1930 1945 1960 1975 1990 things could be done to promote the wider use of renewables. First, financial incentives could be put Source: Based on U.S. Department of Energy 1983. in place to encourage applications and market de- velopment. Environmental taxes (such as carbon 123 taxes) on fossil fuels would favor renewables and control devices, and in the types of fuel used. encourage private research and development Many of these developments have not yet been (R&D). Second, industrial countries, in particular, fully incorporated into the vehicle fleets, but the could allocate a greater share of their national en- upshot has been a significant decrease in lead ergy R&D portfolios to renewables. Up to now, emissions and containment of other pollutants. R&D has been heavily skewed in favor of nuclear Urban lead concentrations have decreased in power. The member countries of the International North America, on average, by 85 percent and in Energy Agency (lEA) allocate 60 percent of their large European cities by about 50 percent. Emis- R&D budgets (which totaled $7.3 billion in 1989) to sions of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and nuclear power, 15 percent to coal, oil, and gas, and nitrogen oxides, however, have generally in- 19 percent to electric power transmission and creased, compared with the early 1970s, because other areas but only 6 percent to renewables. Inter- motor vehicle fleets and kilometers traveled have national collaboration on research in renewable increased much faster than the implementation of energy also merits support. Several developing emissions controls. In developing countries leaded countriesincluding Brazil, China, India, and fuels are still widely used, and emissions stan- Thailandalready have the nucleus of good re- dards are either nonexistent or are much slacker search programs. Third, applications in develop- than in the OECD countries, as can be seen for the ing countries could be encouraged by expanding cases of Brazil and Mexico (Table 6.1). the Global Environment Facility and concessional finance (see Chapter 9). Table 6.1 Emissions standards Vehicle fuels for new gasoline-powered motor vehicles in Brazil, Mexico, and the United States (grams per kilometer) Pollution caused by fuels used in transport is ris- Volatile ing rapidly in developing countries as passenger Carbon organic Nitrogen and freight traffic increases. Transport fuels ac- Country and year monoxide compounds oxides count for more than 55 percent of developing Brazil, 1989 24 2.1 2.0 countries' total oil consumption, which has grown Mexico, 1990 24 2.9 3.2 by 50 percent since 1980, as against 10 percent in United States Before controls 54 5.4 2.5 the OECD economies. 1968 32 3.7 3.1 In the cities of developing countries vehicles are 1983 2.1 0.3 0.6 a significant source of airborne toxic pollutants, Source: Faiz and others 1990. accounting for up to 95 percent of lead. Three fac- tors make pollution from vehicles more serious than in industrial countries. First, many vehicles Three mutually reinforcing policies might be are in poor condition, and lower-quality fuels are used to try to reduce vehicular pollution: improve used. Second, motor vehicles are concentrated in a the efficiency of fuel pricing, reduce urban conges- few large cities. In Mexico and Thailand about half tion, and promote clean fuel and engine technolo- the vehicle fleet operates in the capital city, and in gies. This section applies the three scenarios to Brazil a quarter of the fleet operates in São Paulo. policy options for transport (Figure 6.9). In the Third, a far larger percentage of the population "unchanged practices" scenario the possibilities moves and lives in the open air and is thus more for improving efficiency and abating pollution are exposed to automotive pollutants. The poor are ignored, and all forms of pollution rise exponen- usually the most affected. They and their children tially (as they would be bound to do) with the are more likely to walk than to ride, and they are growth of fuel consumption. The second scenario thus exposed to noxious fumes and to lead, which illustrates the effect on emissions of two much- is known to affect mental development and the discussed possibilities for improving economic ef- neurological system. Lead and other pollutants ficiency while reducing pollution: (a) lessening also contaminate food in open-air restaurants, price inefficiencies by eliminating subsidies and in- which are frequented by the poor. creasing taxes on vehicle fuels and (b) reducing The OECD countries have had some success in urban congestion. In the third scenario (these are controlling the main pollutants from motor vehi- the biggest effects) the additional effects of gradu- cles. Increasingly stringent regulations have led to ally introducing cleaner fuel and improved engine changes in the design of engines, in emissions technologies are considered. 124 EFFICIENT VEHICLE FUEL PRICES AND TAXES. In Eu- Good policies and abatement measures can rope and Japan gasoline prices range from $3.00 to dramatically reduce pollution $4.00 per U.S. gallon. In the United States and in developing countries prices are less than one-third to one-half of that range; they average about $1.25 Figure 6.9 Vehicle emissions in urban areas per gallon and vary from $0.40 per gallon (in Ven- in developing countries: three scenarios, ezuela) to $2.60 per gallon (in India). Such interna- 1990-2030 tional differences arise from differences in gasoline taxes. Smalleralthough still largedifferences Index (1990 = 100) are also found in diesel fuel taxes. Some countries 600 have chosen high fuel taxes for several reasons: to defray the costs of road construction and mainte- 500 nance, to raise revenues (because fuel taxes may have lower economic, or "deadweight," losses 400 than some other specific taxes), and because they are relatively simple to administer. 300 REDUCING CONGESTION. Urban congestion is si- 200 multaneously a source of pollution, of economic inefficiency (it reduces the net economic output of 100 urban areas), and of losses in human welfare and amenity more broadly defined. One policy ap- 0 proach is traffic management through such mea- sures as segregation of motorized and non- 1990 2001) 2010 2020 2030 motorized traffic, encouragement of the wider use 'Unchanged practices" scenario of bicycles and development of special facilities for Scenario with efficiency reformsa them, creation of vehicle-free precincts for pedes- Scenario with efficiency reforms and trians, incentives for greater investment in and use pollution abatement measuresb of public transport, incentives for higher vehicle occupancy rates, and parking controls. Schemes of this kind may reduce vehicle fuel consumption in Note: The calculations are illustrative and are based on the metropolitan areas by more than 30 percent, in following assumptions. Growth rates for per capita income addition to lowering the number of accidents in- and population are as in Chapter 1. Per capita income elasticity of demand for vehicle fuels equals 1.2, and fuel volving pedestrians and cyclistsa major problem price and congestion price elasticities equal -0.5 and -0.6 in developing countries. Cities in China, Ghana, respectively. The average life of vehicles is fifteen years. Gasoline and diesel fuels each account for about half of total Indonesia, Japan, and the Netherlands are all con- consumption. sidering such schemes, with a greater emphasis on Efficiency reforms include congestion charges (based on nonmotorized traffic and pedestrian facilities. Traf- data from the Singapore Area Licensing Scheme) and higher fuel taxes (assumed to rise over a twenty-five-year period to fic can also be restricted through quantity-based levels now found in Europe). measures, such as the area traffic bans based on Pollution abatement measures include emission controls and the gradual introduction of cleaner fuels over a twenty- license plate numbers introduced in Athens, Mex- year period. Under this scenario, lead emissions gradually ico City, and Santiago. These, howeveL are only drop to the bottom of the yellow band; emission levels of particulate matter, hydrocarbons, and sulfuric oxides fall stopgap measuresand can sometimes make the within the band, and nitrogen oxides are at the lop. situation worse, since the better-off simply pur- Sources:For emission coefficients for vehicles, OECD 1987a chase a second vehicle, and a market for fake li- and 1988; Faiz and Carbajo 1991. For detailed methodology, see Anderson and Cavendish, background paper. cense plates develops. A third possibility is some form of congestion pricing, such as area licensing, access fees to city centers, higher fees and taxes on parking during business hours, and electronic CLEANER FUELS AND IMPROVED TECHNOLOGIES. road pricing. Despite the very successful example Differential taxation can be used to promote the of the Singapore Area Licensing Scheme and the use of cleaner fuels. Fuel tax revenues, in turn, benefits and practical promise of such policies, may be used to finance the costs of inspecting ve- they have been more discussed than hicles and monitoring pollution. Examples are dif- implemented. ferential taxation of leaded and unleaded gasoline, 125 fuel price surcharges based on the sulfur content One promising strategy is to devise less-pollut- of diesel fuel, and lower taxes on "clean" fuels ing ways of burning biomass. Several countries such as compressed natural gas. Some empirical have developed and disseminated improved bio- evidence from the United States and the recent mass stoves over the past two decades, although experience of the United Kingdom with tax ex- with mixed success. Much has been learned, how- emptions on unleaded fuels shows that the choice ever, and continued support for these efforts will of fuel is highly sensitive to price. The same would be important (Box 6.2). The installation of chim- probably be true of tax incentives for the adoption neys has increased the popularity of the stoves of emissions control devicesfor example, cataly- for example, in China, where 100 million im- tic converters on gasoline engines and the particu- proved stoves have been introduced. late "traps" being developed for diesels. Experi- When the transition is from biomass to coal or ence suggests, however, that for a policy to be lignite, as in China and Turkey, it introduces out- effective, any tax incentives would need to be com- door pollution on a scale just as serious as that plemented by regulations regarding standards and encountered, for example, by Sheffield, Pitts- emissions testing (see Box 3.4). burgh, the Ruhr, and many other industrial areas fifty years ago. The histories of these places show Household energy that the reduction of outdoor pollution from household fuels depends on two developments. About half of the world's people cook all or some The first is a shift toward oil, gas, electricity, and of their meals with biomass fuels. Until the twen- district heating; for many cities this will take sev- tieth century such fuelsmainly firewoodpro- eral decades. The second is the use of cleaner vided most of the world's energy. Today biomass coals, such as anthracite, for which particulate in all its forms (wood, agricultural and forestry emissions are roughly one-twentieth those of raw residues, and dung) meets about 14 percent of the bituminous coal. China, where residential and world's energy demands. More than 80 percent is commercial consumption of coal totals more than consumed in developing countries (see Figure 200 million tons a year and nearly doubled in the 6.2), where it still accounts for 35 percent of energy 1980s, is weighing this option. Cleaner coal-burn- suppliesmore than is met by coal, oil, gas, or ing technologies in district heating plants and hydropower. Biomass is used not only for cooking small-scale commercial enterprises will also be re- but also in small-scale service industries, agri- quired and may help to reduce costs by improving cultural processing, and the manufacture of bricks, efficiency. tiles, cement, and fertilizers. Such uses can be sub- Reducing indoor and outdoor pollution from stantial, especially in and around towns and cities. household use of biomass fuels and coal in devel- The use of biomass fuels for cooking gives rise to oping countries presents one of the more difficult high levels of indoor air pollution (Chapter 2). It is problems of development and will take two or also a source of ecological damage: the use of dung three decades to addresspossibly longer. As with and crop residues depletes soil productivity, and pollution from other forms of energy use, it cannot deforestation often causes soil erosion. Finally, the be solved by efficiency alone, important though poor thermal efficiency of biomass helps to explain this will be. It will depend above all on the growth the relatively high energy intensities of many low- of per capita incomes and on the successful devel- income developing countries and their high car- opment of commercial energy. bon dioxide and particulate emissions in relation to energy use. Industry Making the transition from reliance on biomass to commercial fuels will be slow and difficult, and Three factors intensify the environmental prob- there is no obvious way of hastening the process. lems associated with rapid industrial develop- Some countries subsidize kerosene; this leads to ment. First, as emissions from existing activities some extra substitution, but people also buy ex- increase, they pass the point at which they can be cess amounts and retail it as a (very polluting) sub- readily assimilated by the environment. Second, stitute for diesel fuels. Haiti, in contrast, taxes ker- as industrial towns expand, more people are ex- osene, which has discouraged its use. Substitution posed to pollution. Third, within industry the is further handicapped by poor infrastructure, dis- structure shifts away from activities that are mod- persed populations, and poor delivery services in erately polluting, such as textiles, wood products, many regions, notably in Africa. and food processing, and toward others with 126 Box 6.2 The future for improved stoves programs Current worldwide trade in wood fuel is about $7 bil- They have concentrated on the users most likely to lion, and about 2 million people are employed full time benefit. The people who first adopt improved biomass in producing and marketing it. Although people will stoves are usually not the poorest but those who have eventually switch to cooking with modern fuels, many limited income and are spending much of it on cooking hundreds of millions will be using biomass for de- fuel. cades. What has been learned from efforts to promote The designers and producers of the stoves discuss better biomass stoves? them with each other and with the users. The potential benefits of stoves programs are consid- The program relies on mass-produced stoves and erable. In addition to the large direct benefits of fuel stove parts, which seem to be more successful than savings, recent research has found that the economic custom-built stoves. value of the environmental and health benefits of im- Subsidies go for the development of stoves rather proved stoves amount to $25-$100 a year per stove, than to consumers for purchase of the stoves. leading to a payback period to society of only a few All these features can be found in a successful stoves months. program in Rwanda. Potential users, producers, and Improved biomass stoves are a stepping-stone be- retailers participated at every stage, and several tween traditional stoves and modern fuels. Most of the models were tested by households. High charcoal large investments in stoves programs have come from prices and unregulated prices for the stoves themselves individual countries; the participation of donors has ensured profitability for the producers and a short pay- been modest. The two largest programs in the world back period for the consumers. Government agencies are in India and China, where practically all the invest- were involved only in technical support. Promotion of ments have been generated internally. the stoves was carried out by women who had used Successful stoves programs have shared the follow- them. ing characteristics: much greater potential for causing environmental Technological means for improving the environ- harm, such as metals, chemicals, and paper. mental performance of many industrial activities The derelict or highly polluted industrial areas already exist, having often developed in response and rivers to be found in all high-income countries to stricter environmental controls in high-income represent both a warning and a challenge for the countries. To take a few examples: air pollution in developing world. The challenge is to avoid pass- several industries, such as cement and mining, is ing through the "dark satanic mills" phase of in- largely caused by emissions of dust and can be dustrial growth. The policy response will need to checked by installing appropriate dust control sys- address the rather different pollution problems tems; water effluents from large chemical and posed by large plants and mines and by large pulp plants can be treated once the biodegradable numbers of small industries. and nonbiodegradable emissions have been sepa- A few industries dominated by large plants are rated; and pollution caused by the use of coal for responsible for a significant share of industrial p01- steel production and as a boiler fuel for process lution. In addition to energy supply, these include heat (once major sources of energy-related pollu- ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, industrial tion in industrial countries) can be reduced by chemicals, paper and pulp, cement, and mining. switching to natural gas, by electrifying the pro- Unchecked, the pollutants discharged by these in- cess, or by using one of the various precombus- dustries damage the health of local people, reduce tion, combustion, and postcombustion technolo- output from local agriculture and industry, and gies described in Box 6.1. damage infrastructure and buildings. Small and But the existence of better technologies does not medium-scale industries, which provide much guarantee that they will be adopted, especially by employment and productivity growth in develop- small firms, for which the costs of control in rela- ing countries, cause many of the same kinds of tion to output may be large. Enforcement, as noted pollution as larger enterprises and are especially in Chapter 4, is notoriously difficult. Because they important sources of organic wastes in water efflu- are so numerous and diverse, smaller firms are ents and of inadequately handled hazardous particularly hard to regulate or taxwhether for wastes. environmental or for other purposesand indeed, 127 Table 6.2 Costs of pollution abatement, United States, 1989 Total investment in new plant and equipment Annual cost of pollution abatement Share for Type of As share of Type of pollution abatement total value abatement Millions abatement (percent) Millions of out put (percent) Sector of dollars (percent) Air Water of dollars (percent) Air Water Food and beverages 8,330 3 20 70 1,056 0.3 13 63 Textiles 2,280 1 33 56 136 0.3 14 59 Paper 10,070 8 49 32 1,449 1.1 27 47 Chemicals 13,480 9 32 50 3,509 1.3 23 46 Petroleum 3,330 13 35 55 2,170 1.5 58 27 Rubber 4,570 2 64 20 403 0.4 21 25 Stone, clay, and glass 2,870 3 75 18 592 0.9 56 14 Primary metals 5,660 7 53 34 1,931 1.3 46 27 Fabricated metals 4,610 3 33 47 896 0.6 14 43 Machinery 8,050 2 59 32 572 0.2 14 30 Electrical equipment 8,660 2 35 50 729 0.4 14 42 Transport equipment 9,970 3 54 29 1,000 0.3 21 32 All manufacturing 97,190 4 42 42 15,626 0.5 30 37 Source: U.S.Bureau of the Census 1990 and 1991. most are not even recorded in establishment common use in industrial countries. There, emis- surveys. sions from large industrial plants fell even before the main surge of investment in pollution controls Costs and the scope for cost reductions that followed the passage of key legislation in the late 1960s and early 1970sa good example of in- The technologies thus often exist, but the costs are novations leading, rather than following, laws and sometimes still high, especially for small com- regulations. panies. For industry as a whole, capital invest- Industries in developing countries have the ad- ment in pollution abatement accounted for about 5 vantage of making new investments rather than percent of total industrial investment in Germany, replacing old equipment. In industrial countries Japan, and the United States in the late 1970s and basic changes in production processes often can- early 1980s (although it had risen to 17 percent in not easily be accommodated in existing plant. As a Japan in the early 1970s). Table 6.2 shows that in result, industrial countries have tended to control absolute terms the heaviest cost burden in the emissions mainly by adding on technologies. Less United States fell on the chemicals, petroleum, pri- than a quarter of capital expenditures on pollution mary metals, and paper industries. (Note that ex- control for German manufacturing firms during penditures are quite small in relation to the total 1975-84 was devoted to changes in production value of outputin the range of 0.3-1.5 percent.) processes as distinct from the installation of end- These figures overstate the likely burden of of-pipe controls. When a new plant is being built, abatement expenditures on industries in develop- however, it is usually more cost-effective to adopt ing countries, at least for large plants. The earliest production processes that recycle residuals or gen- steps in pollution control tend to be the least ex- erate less wastethe so-called "low-waste" pro- pensive. Up to 60-80 percent of pollution can be cesses. These, combined with improved operating eliminated with only small increases in costs. procedures that reduce leaks and spills, can Thereafter, the additional ("marginal") cost rises achieve substantial reductions in industrial emis- sharply as the degree of abatement is increased; in sions. Table 6.3, based on a study of German in- contrast, the benefits of each new step in abate- dustry, illustrates the potential for reducing haz- ment are large at first and then taper off. Emis- ardous wastes by means of such changes. Box 6.3 sions standards in some industrial countries have gives an example of how technological changes reached the point at which the costs of additional have brought about greater efficiency and lower abatement rise sharply while the benefits increase emissions in the pulp and paper industry. Recent only slowly. Developing countries are at an earlier surveys by the United Nations Industrial Develop- stage. ment Organization (UNIDO 1991) and others have Emissions often can be sharply reduced at no shown that possibilities for reducing both wastes extra cost by installing technologies already in and costs simultaneously are widespread. 128 Table 6.3 Potential for waste reduction from large industrial plants (as output expands) at through low-waste practices, Germany a lower cost than is being incurred by industrial Amount of Potential waste countries. waste, 1983 reduction Type of waste (millions of tons) (percent) Policy Sulfurous (acids, gypsum) 2.2 80 Emulsion 0.5 40-50 Dyes and paint residues 0.3 60-70 At the earliest stages of policy development the Solvents 0.3 60-70 crucial considerations must be, first, to ensure that Galvanic sludges 0.2 60-70 the initial measures are unambiguous and easily Salt slags 0.2 100 enforced and, second, to concentrate on those Other wastes 1.2 Low 4.9 emissions and wastes that cause the most damage, Total 50-60 particularly to health. Source: OECD 1991, p. 197. DIFFICULTIES OF ENFORCEMENT. The standards imposed by industrial countries may set reason- In developing countries end-of-pipe controls able long-term goals, but developing countries should be less important because their industrial rarely have the means or the need to adopt them sectors are expanding rapidly. Each new invest- immediately. Instead, each country must deter- ment offers an opportunity to incorporate cost-ef- mine its own priorities. Emissions standards need fective pollution control. In ten years' time new to be set in the light of a balance between the mar- plants will account for more than half of the indus- ginal costs of the damage caused by the main pol- trial output of developing countries and in twenty lutants and the marginal costs of reducing such years for practically all of it. Thus policies that lead emissions. to the adoption of a proper combination of low- A common practice has been to adopt emissions waste processes and end-of-pipe controls should standards promulgated in industrial countries and permit developing countries to reduce emissions then to negotiate with firms about enforcement. Box 6.3 Benign technological change: the manufacture of wood pulp Until the mid-1970s most (67 percent) of the world's tal controls and high prices for wood and chemicals. wood pulpthe principal raw material for paper man- Manufacturers then turned to pulp produced by ther- ufacturewas produced by chemical means. Mechani- momechanical methods, which have yields and energy cal processes accounted for 25 percent and combina- requirements similar to those of mechanical processes tions of the two (semichemical processes) for the but produce a stronger fiber that does not have to be remainder. Each method has technical and environ- bleached with chlorine. The volume of BOD generated mental advantages and disadvantages. Mechanical is moderate. By using thermomechanical pulp in their processes produce a high yield of low-strength fiber. mix, newsprint manufacturers were able to reduce They require relatively large inputs of energy but their raw material costs by 5 percent or more. otherwise have little impact on the environment. This cost advantage, and the need for new invest- Chemical processes have lower energy requirements ment to meet a shortage of pulp capacity, combined to but also lower yields. The fibers are strong and high in bring about a rapid increase in thermomechanical pulp- quality; they are, however, dark and are usually ing plants. In 1974 there were only four thermome- bleached with chlorine, which then presents a disposal chanical mills in the world. By the end of 1977 there problem. Chemical methods also generate large vol- were fifty, with another thirty under construction or on umes of biological oxygen demand (BOD) and sulfur order. Chemical processes still dominate the industry, emissions unless appropriate environmental controls but almost half of the pulping capacity added in OECD are installed. countries during the 1980s consisted of thermome- The largest paper market is that for newsprint, chanical plants. Thermomechanical pulping offers clear which used to be made from a combination of 15-25 advantages to developing countrieslower capital percent chemical pulp and 75-85 percent mechanical costs, less technological complexity, and less environ- pulp. The jump in energy prices in the mid-1970s mental impact than with chemical processes, and pushed up the cost of mechanical pulp, and the price of stronger and better-quality fiber than that produced by chemical pulp also rose because of stricter environmen- mechanical plants. 129 This places enormous stresses on the honesty of pulp and paper output. In India, Mexico, and Ven- officials. Enterprises will be uncertain about the ezuela all oil refining and distribution and a large environmental standards that they are expected to share of basic metals production are in state meet and unhappy about perceived differences in hands; about 94 percent of mining production in treatment between themselves and their competi- India is in the public sector. In Turkey 95 percent of tors. Indeed, uneven enforcement may turn for- mining output, about 60 percent of chemicals pro- eign investors into supporters of tough and effec- duction, and 70 percent of basic metals production tive environmental standards. For example, fear of come from public enterprises. State-owned firms public censure has made foreign investors in make up an important part of the mining, petro- Chile's copper mining industry more willing than leum, basic metals, and chemicals sectors in Ar- local enterprises to invest in sophisticated environ- gentina and Brazil. These firms, like private sector mental controls. monopolies, are often also sheltered from import Whatever instruments are chosen, they must be competition and consequently do not face the compatible with the administrative capacities of same pressures to minimize costs as do competi- the regulatory agencies. Unenforced standards or tive private firms. Incentive-based pollution con- uncollected fines are worse than useless: they un- trol policies are less likely than mandated controls dermine confidence in environmental controls and to be effective in inducing these firms to reduce encourage enterprises to look for ways of avoiding emissions. The ineffectiveness of economic incen- penalties rather than reducing pollution. Experi- tives in inducing public enterprises with soft bud- ence shows that five conditions (all institutionally get constraints to reduce emissions is well illus- demanding) are essential if policies are to have the trated by the case of Poland, and the effectiveness intended effect: a local framework for negotiation of controls by the case of Cubatão in Brazil (Box between polluting and polluted parties; a clear 6.4). and publicly available statement of the standards Community participation can help augment offi- set and agreements reached; a means of monitor- cial enforcement. A recent survey of enterprises in ing and spot-checking pollution; a means of pe- Bangladesh, for example, found that riverside vil- nalizing defaulters; and fair and equal application lages have proved surprisingly willing and able to of the laws and regulations to all parties. negotiate agreements with upstream polluters on Scarce administrative resources should be di- monetary compensation and first-stage effluent rected first to the control of emissions from large treatment. With better information and legal sup- industrial plants and minesthe most concen- port, such local arrangements could provide cost- trated sources of pollution. Policies will be effec- effective means of both supporting central regula- tive only with the (perhaps reluctant) cooperation tors and holding them to account. of the enterprises responsible for these plants. Even the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, MARKET-BASED INCENTIVES. As environmental which oversees the most sophisticated environ- policies evolve, there is a good case for making mental monitoring system in the world, is forced more use of market-based incentives, as discussed to rely on self-reported data on emissions for the in Chapter 3. These policies reduce the costs of vast majority of sources and pollutants. Develop- compliance, are often administratively simpler ing countries might thus benefit by concentrating than regulatory policies, and provide a financial their monitoring resources on spot checks to vali- incentive for innovation in developing pollution date such self-reported data and on a baseline sys- controls and low-waste technologies and practices. tem designed to collect data in the most heavily They can also be refined (without great cost) in polluted areas. Enforcement actions must be seen practical and important ways. For example, under as one element in a dialogue between regulators a system of nonlinear fees and fines recently intro- and enterprises, the objective of which is to im- duced in Eastern Europe, the charge is increased prove the environmental performance of the in Poland by ten timesif discharges exceed some plants under scrutiny. specified level. Such a dialogue is particularly difficult when Experience in industrial countries shows that both parties are government agencies. Public en- discharges of industrial wastewater into public terprises account for a substantial part of produc- sewers are quite sensitive to charges for the vol- tion in the most-polluting industries. They account ume of emissions and effluent concentration. In for all Tanzania's fertilizer, cement, and iron and the Netherlands, for example, water pollution steel production and for almost 83 percent of its charges succeeded in reducing emissions once the 130 Box 6.4 Controlling emissions from public enterprises: Brazil and Poland In Cubatão, Brazil, and Katowice, Poland, state-owned and television coverage of the environmental fiasco in enterprises were implicated in severe and persistent air Cubatão has given the whole country an environmen- pollution that caused extreme levels of exposure to par- tal education. ticulates. In Cubatão the main sources were steel, fertil- Throughout the 1980s the provincial government in izer, petrochemical, and cement plants. In Katowice Katowice attempted to improve the city's air quality by steel mills, nonferrous metal smelters, chemical plants, levying fees for emissions that exceeded permissible power stations, and a wide range of other industrial levels. Although the rates were double those set by the plants were the principal polluters. national government for the rest of Poland, they were In September 1984 an atmospheric inversion and revised infrequently during the 1980s and fell sharply mounting levels of particulates spurred the governor of in real terms as prices rose. Furthermore, because in- São Paulo state to decree an unprecedented state of dustrial plants claimed that they lacked the resources emergency in Cubatão. The state environmental to invest in better environmental controls, emissions agency promptly shut down nine industries in the dis- permits were typically set much too high to achieve trict of Vila Parisi and ordered an evacuation. Police reasonable ambient air quality, and enterprises were from São Paulo city were sent to assist in the evacua- often exempted from paying fees and fines. Techni- tion and to prevent looting. The mayor of Cubatao cally, provincial governments could close down plants made the soccer stadium available for displaced resi- for persistently violating emissions standards, but this dents and provided food and blankets. When atmo- power seems to have been exercised only oncein the spheric conditions improved, the state of emergency case of an aluminum plant in Krakow that was due to was downgraded to a state of alert (the eighth that be closed anyway. year), and people were allowed to return to their The situation in Katowice has changed radically homes. since 1990. Air quality has improved significantly, and A few months later a pipe at a fertilizer plant rup- enterprises are considering or actually investing in en- tured, releasing massive amounts of ammonia gas. Six vironmental controls. There are three reasons for this thousand residents were evacuated and more than change: (a) some of the worst polluters have closed sixty people hospitalized. The fertilizer plant was down permanently; (b) the level of fees and fines has fined, but the state governor protested that the penalty been raised more than ten times in real terms, and was too small. payment is enforced under a real threat of closure; and Conditions in Cubatão have improved since then (c) the prospect of privatization means that enterprises (though crises still occur periodically); plants are no longer face "soft" budget constraints and provincial installing pollution control equipment and are switch- authorities no longer strive to maintain industrial pro- ing to less-polluting fuel, and thousands of residents duction at the expense of other objectives. are being helped to move to more suitable areas. The The moral to be drawn from these two cases is that environmental agency has become more aggressive in unless public enterprises are subject to "hard" budget using fines and temporary plant closures to deal with constraints and are accountable to the public, economic recalcitrant polluters, and the government has initiated incentives for pollution control are likely to be ineffec- public civil actions seeking restoration of damaged wet- tive, and direct regulation may be required. lands, waterways, and hillsides. Extensive newspaper charge was high enough to represent a significant REGULATORY MECHANISMS AND TOXIC WASTES. element in total operating costs for the enterprises Even with pollution charges, some regulatory affected. Charging systems need not be complex mechanisms are bound to be retained. This is es- so long as they encourage enterprises to make pro- pecially true for toxic wastes, where the main pri- cess innovations that reduce the total volume of ority is to define safe standards and safeguards. effluent and discourage the discharge of highly Pollution charges may be evaded by illegal dump- concentrated effluent to public sewers. In general, ing, which causes even worse problems than legal a policy of taxing pollution (or the offending input) but ill-supervised hazardous waste management. has the advantage of influencing large numbers of The crucial issue is one of monitoring and manage- activities and has administrativeas well as envi- ment. Careful records must be maintained and ronmental and economicappeal. dumping sites monitored regularly to ensure that 131 Box 6.5 Regulating hazardous wastes: an innovative approach in Thailand To control hazardous wastes from industrial sources, central treatment and disposal facilities for hazardous the Thailand Development Research Institute has pro- wastes collected from factories. Factories would de- posed the creation of an autonomous Industrial Envi- posit with the fund their waste charges for the entire ronment Fund. In line with the "polluter-pays" princi- year. Plants that attained lower waste per unit of out- ple, the fund would be financed from waste charges put, as verified by accredited private environmental that would first be estimated for each industry and auditing firms, would then be eligible for rebates. The later verified by environmental auditing. The charge operation of the treatment and disposal facilities would would be set at a level that covers the cost of transport, be contracted out to private waste management firms treatment, and disposal of hazardous wastes and pro- through competitive bidding. vides a margin for running the program. A charge of The main message of this initiative is that pollution 1,000 baht per ton on the 600,000 tons of industrial control costs can be minimized if the incentives are hazardous wastes projected for 1991 would raise 600 right. The more efficient an industry's production pro- million baht. This is only 0.3 percent of the GDP origi- cess, the less waste it generates and the less it pays for nating in the 17,000 industrial plants in Thailand that waste treatment and disposal. The scheme would thus generate hazardous wastes, or 1.5 percent of net give industry an incentive to reduce wastes and would profits. encourage the development of business opportunities The proceeds would be used to establish and operate in hazardous waste management. groundwater supplies are not being infiltrated by services for industries. For example, the Pollution toxic materials leaching from the sites. This implies Control Cell of the National Productivity Council an administrative cost that may sometimes be be- in India's Ministry of Labor works on solutions yond the capacity of environmental control agen- that both reduce pollution and improve profits. cies. In such cases an alternative is to combine reg- Effective ways have been found to reduce emis- ulation with market-based incentives. The latter sions and water use in electroplating, food pro- can draw on indirect policies such as taxes on pol- cessing, bleaching and dyeing, mini-cement luting inputs, product charges, deposit-refund plants, pulp and paper, drugs, and tanneries. Co- schemes, and performance bonds. The role of the operative approaches can sometimes be helpful. regulatory authority is to compile information For example, in Hyderabad a group of forty small about sources of emissions for the pollutants being companies set up a common wastewater treatment controlled and to design the mix of policies that plant that they operate jointly on a nonprofit basis. can reduce emissions from these sources cost-ef- In Gujarat 400 small companies did the same. fectively. A scheme that applies to hazardous Such arrangements are cheaper than individual wastes some of the characteristics of a deposit-re- treatment facilities at each plant, and it is easier to fund arrangement has been proposed for Thailand operate, maintain, and monitor one large facility (Box 6.5). than numerous scattered small ones. Industrial zoning is another example of regula- tion that cannot easily be replaced by pricing Conclusions mechanisms. The key argument for zoning is that there are economies in dealing with environmental In considering how to reconcile the expansion of problems when plants are concentrated in one energy and industrial activities in developing place. Furthermore, it is difficult to ensure that countries with the goals of reducing pollution to spatial differences in pollution charges are suffi- acceptably low levels, this chapter has made four cient to achieve an efficient concentration or dis- points. persion of plants. Although zoning is a blunt in- Options are available for reducing energy and strument, it may be the best way of handling industrial pollution per unit of output by factors of spatial differences in the environmental damage ten, hundreds, and sometimes more, depending caused by particular forms of pollution. on the case. The investment and operating costs are not so ADVISORY SERVICES. One effective way to influ- large as to compromise economic growth in devel- ence small firms is through extension and advisory oping countries. For priority areas such as particu- 132 lates, lead, and industrial effluents and wastes, Response times can be long, however, even investment costs are low. Indeed, pollution abate- when policies are agreed on and implemented. ment has often been accompanied by reductions in The rapid rate of investment may, paradoxically, costs. Pollution control costs can be further re- reduce response times (and costs) in developing duced by setting standards appropriately and by countries, since less-polluting practices can more choosing the instruments of policy wisely. Offset- readily be incorporated into new investment. ting these costs are the many benefits of pollution Greater efficiency, whether in the production abatement, including a healthier population and a and use of energy or in the production and use of better quality of life in cities, which will help to manufactured goods, can make significant contri- improve economic prospects. butions to pollution abatement. 133 7 Rural environmental policy As the world's population grows by two-thirds over the next forty years, demands for food, fuel, and fiber will rise enormously. Meeting these demands will require more intensive and extensive exploitation of many natural resources, especially agricultural land, forests, water, and fisheries. The more that yields can be increased by careful and sustainable management of those resources that are already in use, the easier it will be to resist 11 pressure to draw down new resourcesto drain wetlands, clear forests, and encroach on natural habitats. Three obstacles stand in the way of sensible resource management: failure to recognize scarcity in the natural world, failure to ensure that the institutions managing natural resources are accountable, and failure to mobilize knowledge for managing environmental problems. To overcome these obstacles, individuals must have access to knowledge and resources, (so that they can make the right investments) and incentives, (to ensure that their activities do not impose costs on others). Comm unally managed resources require a clear legal framework and supporting services. Governments must devolve the responsibility for managing some resources to individuals, communities, and fiscally accountable utilities. They need to make more use of pricing to allocate resources, to protect property rights, and to support research and the dissemination of knowledge of sound environmental practices. As the world's population expands to 9 billion some extent, these are tradeoffs. If more food can over the next forty years, consumption of food will be grown on the same land, that will ease the pres- nearly double worldwide and will more than sure to cultivate new land and will permit the pres- double in developing countries. To match this in- ervation of intact natural areas (Box 7.1). Indeed, crease, world grain output will have to grow by over the past quarter century increases in yields about 1.6 percent a yeara difficult target, but less have accounted for 92 percent of additional food than the 2.0 percent a year increase achieved over production, and area expansion for only 8 percent the past three decades. This demand for grain (Table 7.1). But intensification can also produce (which accounts for more than four-fifths of food problems. Raising yields by increasing the use of crops consumed in developing countries) and the chemicals, diverting more water for irrigation, and demand for other foods, fuel, and fiber will add changing land use can create problems elsewhere. enormously to pressure on natural resourcesnot Runoff of fertilizer and animal wastes can cause only on agricultural land but also on stocks of wa- algal blooms and the eutrophication of lakes, ter, fish, and timber. coastal estuaries, and enclosed seas. Although Natural resources will have to be managed with these externalities are more common in Western great care. They will need protection from the in- Europe and North America, pollution from agri- adequate stewardship that is a consequence of cultural sources is becoming significant in Eastern poverty, population pressure, ignorance, and cor- Europe and other parts of the developing world; ruption. Natural forests, wetlands, coastal areas, in the Punjab in India and Pakistan and in Java, and grasslandsall of high ecological valuewill Indonesia, the use of chemical inputs is almost as have to be protected from overuse and great as in industrial countries. degradation. The alternative to intensification, however, is Farmers and other managers of rural resources equally problematic. Already an estimated 60 per- have two options: to intensify production on area cent of the deforestation in developing countries is already in use or to expand into new areas. To the result of agricultural expansion, with the great- 134 Box 7.1 How agricultural intensification can lessen pressure on forests The expansion of agriculture is one of the main reasons suitable, fields can be tilled mechanically once most of for deforestation in the humid tropics. Researchers in the felled vegetation has decomposed. Forty crops Brazil, Indonesia, and Peru are exploring possibilities grown continuously over seventeen years at for maintaining productivity on deforested land and so Yurimaguas demonstrate that productivity can be reducing pressures for additional forest conversion. maintained. But the system will be economically attrac- Some promising results are emerging. Farm trials con- tive only if roads, credit, and market infrastructure are ducted in Yurimaguas, Peru, show that for every addi- sufficiently developed. tional hectare with sustainable and high productivity, an estimated 5 hectares to 10 hectares a year of tropical Legume-based pastures rainforests could be saved from the ax of the shifting The low-input system can be the first step toward es- cultivator. tablishing improved acid-tolerant pastures for produc- The transition from shifting to continuous cultivation tion of beef and milk. The transition from income-gen- in these trials begins by taking secondary forest fallows erating food crops to pasture is achieved by planting left by slash-and-burn agriculture and applying low- pasture species under a rice canopy and applying fertil- input methodsacid-tolerant crops, capture of nutri- izers annually or every two years. Several combina- ents in the ash, maximum nutrient recycling, no tillage tions and rotations of selected grasses and legumes (only a planting stick is used), and managed fallow to have sustained high weight gains in cattle over eight control weeds. The profit from this initial phase aver- years of trials. Degraded pastures have been regener- ages $1,100 per hectare a year, or a 120 percent return ated with the use of similar techniques. over total costs (largely labor) for small farmers. op- tions for subsequent phases include intensive Contin- Agroforestry uous cropping, legume-based pasture, or agroforestry. Low-input cropping is a good way of providing cash Continuous crop rotation income and ground cover during the establishment phase of acid-tolerant tree crops, whether the trees are Following several years of the low-input system, a grown for industrial purposes (rubber, oil palm, and transition can sometimes be made to intensive, fertil- guarana), food production (peach palm), or alley izer-based, continuous Cropping. Where slopes are cropping. Table 7.1 Contribution of increases in areas and in yields to growth of cereals production in developing regions and in high-income countries, 1961-90 Current production Increase since 1961-63 (percent) Current (1988-90 Attributable yield average, Attributable to (1988-90, millions of to increased tons per Country group tons) Total increased area average yields hectare) Developing countries 1,315 118 8 92 2.3 Sub-Saharan Africa 57 73 47 52 1.0 East Asia 499 189 6 94 3.7 South Asia 261 114 14 86 1.9 Latin America 105 111 30 71 2.1 Middle East and North Africa 41 68 23 77 1.4 Europe and former U.S.S.R. 336 76 13 113 2.2 High-income countries 543 67 2 98 4.0 World 1,858 100 8 92 2.6 Note: South Africa is included in figures for developing countries as a group but not in regional figures. Source: FAO data. est intrusions in Latin America and Africa. This if lands are fragile. The great challenge for the fu- expansion may be led by poor subsistence farmers ture is to balance intensive and extensive growth seeking a livelihood or be driven by growing mar- of agriculture so as to avoid the environmental ket demand. While it may meet immediate needs damage and constraints on productivity that each for food and income, it is not a long-term solution can cause (Figure 7.1). 135 Better knowledge of the extent, quality, and Future combinations of cereal yield and area growth potential of the resource base. At present, emerg- to feed increasing populations are uncertain ing constraints that confront resource manage- ment are often poorly understood; research is Figure 7.1 World production of cereals to hampered by inadequate funding. In addition to feed a growing population: recent developing new knowledge and techniques, there performance and the future challenge is a need to accelerate the diffusion of existing technology that can expand output in environ- Average yield (tons per hectare) mentally sound ways (Box 7.2). 8 This chapter examines ways of improving the management of natural resources. Some natural resources, as Chapter 3 noted, have no clear 6 owner, and it is these open-access resources that 2030 are most vulnerable to overexploitation. Other re- (production possibilities sources are managed in three main ways: as pri- to supply 3.6 billion tons) vate property, in common, or by the state (Figure 4 7.2). The pattern varies from one country (and cul- ture) to another and is rarely clear-cut, even within 1990 (1.9 billion tons produced) a single country. For example, in most countries 2 public authorities control surface water until it is 1965 (1.0 billion tons produced) delivered to individual farms or to canals managed by local communities. Policies for improving the 0 management of a resource depend to a large extent 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 on the category into which it falls. Area cultivated (billions of hectares) Note: World population was 3.3 billion in 1965 and 5.3 billion in 1990; it is projected to be 9.0 billion in 2030 ( see "base Property arrangements for natural resources differ case" assumptions in Figure 1.1). Source: World Bank data. tremendously in rural areas Figure 7.2 Typical property-rights arrangements for rural resources in Policies for resource management will have to developing countries include three essential components: State A recognition of the true value of natural re- sources. Failure to accept that natural resources are ultimately in finite supply, and divergences in the private and social costs of resource exploita- tion, are root causes of many environmental prob- lems: erosion of deforested hill slopes, releases of carbon dioxide by land-clearing fires, and losses of biological diversity as a result of poorly controlled logging. Institutions that match responsibility for Pastoral resource management with accountability for re- lands sults. The public sector will inevitably retain Forest plantations responsibility for allocating some of the most sen- sitive natural resources; it will often own them and Wildlife ranching will sometimes manage them. Governments need Communal Private to make sure that those who use natural resources bear the full costs of doing so. But when public institutions are themselves directly involved in production, that rarely happens. 136 Box 7.2 Increasing the knowledge base to meet growing demand for food Meeting the doubled food demand that is anticipated Experience over the past decades has demonstrated by 2030 will be feasible but will require substantial pro- that the generation of new knowledge is the most po- ductivity gains, according to a study prepared for this tent and least costly avenue to improving productivity. Report. Fundamental to meeting the challenge of in- The expansion of knowledge through research and de- creasing productivity will be better application of exist- velopment will need to encompass human capital, in- ing (but underused) knowledge about resource man- stitutional innovation, and new technology. New and agement and development of new agricultural higher-yielding cultivars of plants will be needed, technologies. along with farming systems research that focuses on Among the incentives that would encourage farmers integrating livestock and crop activities and on modify- to adopt existing improved technologies and methods, ing the physical environment in which plants grow none is more important than the allocation and protec- through, for example, measures that conserve soil tion of property rights. In addition, as technologies be- moisture and that permit continuous cultivation on the come more sophisticated, farmer education and infertile, acidic soils common in many tropical areas. strengthening of extension systems are essential. The Deliberate investment in agricultural research and spread of practices such as conservation tillage and inte- development has never been more important. Yet ex- grated pest management demonstrates that environ- penditures for agricultural research are stagnating. Re- mentally friendly and economically attractive technolo- search must address the increasing constraints posed gies offer practical alternatives to regulation and by the environmental consequences of agricultural de- subsidies in controlling the environmental costs of agri- velopment. The Consultative Group on International culture. But even if existing knowledge is fully exploited, Agricultural Research (CGIAR) is placing more em- the availability and quality of land and irrigation water phasis on agricultural resource systems and on rela- will be insufficient to meet demand. (Plant genetic re- tively neglected areas such as forestry, pest manage- sources and climate change are less immediate con- ment, soil conservation, and irrigation, to complement straints on increasing global output.) Further expansion the more traditional focus on commodity programs. of cropland by perhaps 25 percent and of irrigated land These changes need to be reinforced and matched by by 50 percent may be possible but will have environmen- commitments to strengthen national research systems tal costs. New knowledge will be necessary. in these directions. Resource management by individuals also be too expensive for farmers, and access to and enterprises credit is often inadequate. Poverty makes farmers understandably averse to new and unfamiliar Privately managed farms and woodlands produce risks. most of the food, fiber, and fuel that people use. It Even if these constraints are overcome, private is on these lands that the central issue of natural ownership may not deliver ideal results from soci- resource management will be decided: can output ety's point of view. As some of the instances in be increased to match demand without unaccept- this section make clear, private owners do not nec- able environmental damage? essarily know whether the side effects of their ac- When land is privately owned and managed, tivities impose costs on others. Even if they do, some environmental problems are less severe. individual farmers may not cooperate to find solu- Land is less likely to be overused if its owners have tions unless the result is increased profits on their a clear legal title. People who have secure rights to own fields. It is on privately managed farms and the land they cultivate are more likely to take the woodlands and the areas around them that recog- long view in managing the soil. One of the few nition of scarcity and side effectsthe first require- detailed studies of the connection between greater ment of good resource managementis most im- security and improved land management, con- portant. And it is on these lands that sound ducted in Thailand, shows a clear positive link be- agricultural policy is, most clearly, sound environ- tween more secure tenure, access to formal credit, mental policy. and investment in the land. But technologies such as integrated pest man- Protecting soil fertility agement that are better for the environment are often information-intensive and require training Farmers are usually aware of the consequences of for the farmers if they are to be effective. They may soil degradation and erosion for their crop yields 137 Box 7.3 Long-term agricultural trials Appallingly little information exists about the long- trained generations of agricultural scientists. Although term productivity of agriculture in developing coun- many of the results of trials in temperate areas are tries. Only a handful of studies have systematically transferable, the different soils, cropping practices, and monitored the effect of agricultural practices on soil pest and disease problems in most developing coun- fertility, crop production, soil loss, and hydrologic pro- tries limit the usefulness of the conclusions. Studies cesses. Only studies that extend over decades and even initiated during the colonial period in many African centuries can reveal small but critical changes in the and Asian countries have been stopped, and data from dynamics of agricultural systems. them go unanalyzed. The few agricultural experiments that have been Relatively recent work of shorter duration is begin- maintained for more than 100 years are all in temperate ning to hint at the potential value of long-term trials in developed countries. These studiesincluding trials at tropical agriculture. The International Rice Research In- the Rothamstead Experiment Station in the United stitute in the Philippines began in 1964 to monitor Kingdom (initiated in 1843) and the Morrow Plots trends on continuously cultivated paddy fields. These (1876), the Sanborn Field (1888), and the Magruder studies have started to reveal slow yield declines, Plots (1892) in the United Statesprovided answers caused by increased pest pressure, depletion of soil regarding, for example, the effects of manuring and micronutrients, and buildup of harmful chemicals from crop rotation on sustainable yields. They confirmed low-quality irrigation water. Only long-term observa- that agricultural performance can be sustained on the tion will make possible understanding and manage- prairie soils of the American Midwest, laid the founda- ment of these problems. tions for the modern science of plant nutrition, and and wish to prevent the damage. But many proj- cost-effective, irrespective of land use, is contour- ects to help them have failed because they pro- based cultivation. In India contour ditches have moted only a single method of soil conservation. helped to quadruple the survival chances of tree The greatest success is realized when farmers can seedlings and quintuple their early growth in select from a menu of techniques adapted to local height. Ground covergrasses, leaf litter, and circumstances; the profitability of a method for other growthprotects soil from erosion and farmers can vary significantly, depending on the maintains its capacity to absorb rainfall. characteristics of the land, the crop mix, and the Successful intensification will need to combine availability of labor. Experience shows that even such soil management with greater use of inputs, where erosion imposes costs on otherssedimen- particularly inorganic fertilizers, which provide tation and siltation of dams, for exampleit is im- about 40 percent of nutrients for the world's crops. portant to try first to persuade farmers to do what In Sub-Saharan Africa grain yields average about a is in their own interest. This will usually be less third those of East Asia. Differences in land quality complex than getting farmers to be accountable for are part of the reason, but so too is Sub-Saharan the costs borne by others and will in any case con- Africa's low fertilizer useless than one-fifth of tribute toward reducing these costs. East Asia's average (Figure 7.3). In the developing Managing soils to maintain fertility requires world low use rates and the consequent mining of achieving a balance between loss of nutrients soil nutrients are far greater problems than exces- (through crops and animal products) and replace- sive and poorly managed fertilizer applications. ment of nutrients through the use of manure, inor- ganic fertilizers, and other sources. In addition, Table 7.2 Effect of low-cost soil conservation the capability of soils to deliver nutrients and store practices on erosion and crop yields moisturefunctions of soil structuremust be Decrease in erosion Increase in yield maintained. Basic concerns such as the long-term Method (percent) (percent) viability of continuous land use in some tropical Mulching 73-98 7-188 areas are poorly understood (Box 7.3). A review of Contour cultivation 50-86 6-66 Grass contour hedges 40-70 38-73 more than 200 studies shows the potential effec- Note: The figures are ranges derived from a review of more than 200 tiveness of low-cost technologies in reducing ero- studies. sion and increasing yields (Table 7.2). The most Source: Doolette and Smyle 1990. 138 Fertilizer is a key part of conserving soils as output intensifies Figure 7.3 Fertilizer input and cereal yields in developing regions and high-income countries, 1989 Average yield (tons per hectare) 8 Sub-Saharan Africa I East Asia 6 High-income countries SI'. 5$ . South Asia ,.'- S. Europe and former U.S.S.R. Europe and former U.S.S.R. 4 - Latin America and the Caribbean . Latin America South Asia and the Caribbean Sub-Saharan Africa East Asia 2 Middle East and North Africa 0 1 Middle East and High-income countries North Africa 0 o Group average 0.5 1 10 100 1,000 Average fertilizer use (kilograms per hectare, log scale) Source: FAO data. To preserve soil fertility, better use also needs to off dramatically, reduces erosion, and increases be made of agricultural techniques such as the moisture available for crop growth. Over the agroforestry and integrated crop and livestock past six years a quiet revolution has been taking management. Agroforestry can add nutrients to place, and today 90 percent of soil conservation the soil, reduce water runoff and evaporation from efforts in India are based on such biological the soil's surface, supply green manure and systems. mulch, and reduce soil erosion. It thus raises crop In the Sahel simple technologies involving yields and, because the soil retains more moisture construction of rock bunds along contour lines for and nutrients, helps to prevent yields from declin- soil and moisture conservation have succeeded ing in dry years. It provides fodder and shade for where sophisticated measures once failed. cattle and is a good source of fruit, fuelwood, and OXFAM has promoted techniques among farmers other by-products. Integrating animals into farm- to improve water harvesting in Burkina Faso. ing, in addition to providing food and income, Bunded fields yield an average of 10 percent more makes use of manure to recycle nutrients, includ- than traditional fields in a normal year and, in the ing those from otherwise low-value crop residues, drier years, almost 50 percent more. grasses, and fodder trees. Smallholders will be In the Central Visayas Regional Development more interested in raising livestock if markets for Project in the Philippines a highly successful dairy and meat products are encouraged by gov- scheme for distributing young animals has been ernment support services. paired with the promotion of contour grass strips Farmer-controlled soil conservation methods for erosion control. A farmer who establishes a can be developed and implemented at reasonable 100-meter strip of napier grass is entitled to borrow cost: a pregnant cow from the project. The farmer cares A centuries-old practice in India is being re- for the cow and its calf until the calf is weaned and discovered, adapted, and promoted. Deeply the cow reimpregnated. The cow then goes to an- rooted, hedge-forming vetiver grass, planted in other farmer. Demand became so great that a lot- contour strips across hill slopes, slows water run- tery was needed to manage it. 139 mously in the past twenty years. Pesticide use in Sub-Saharan Africa remains low, but the Asia- Box 7.4 Pesticides, agricultural trade, Pacific pesticide market had grown to $2.5 billion and poverty by the mid-1980s. Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philip- In 1987 the Board of Agriculture of the U.S. Na- pines, and Sri Lanka all witnessed increases of tiorial Academy of Sciences indicated that low res- more than 10 percent a year between 1980 and idue levels of twenty-eight pesticides used on 1985. food may be one of the main environmental If used judiciously and responsibly, chemical causes of cancer. The steps that were conse- quently taken to protect the health of consumers pesticides provide farmers with an important tool. in several industrial countries may hinder agri- But improperly used pesticides can endanger the cultural diversification by many developing coun- health of users, other rural people, and con- tries and affect poorer farmers in particular. sumers. They can disrupt ecosystems by polluting In Central America donors are encouraging a soil and water, accumulating in the food chain. rapid growth of nontraditional food exports. And they can indiscriminately kill nontarget spe- Large farmers receive assistance to ensure that cies, including natural enemies of pests, and has- their products will not violate limits on pesticide residues; small independent producers do not. As ten the development of resistance by pests. Many a result, many small producers have found that pesticides that are banned in industrial countries their harvests are unacceptable for export to the because of these effects remain available in the de- United States or that exporters refuse to work veloping world. Policies for managing pesticide with them. use will be encouraged by restrictions in importing A study in Guatemala found that 95 percent of countries on pesticide residues on food products large growers received technical assistance on (Box 7.4). pesticide use but that only 51 percent of the smaller growers and no small independent In most low-income agriculture, pesticide use is growers received any help. Small growers applied minimal. But its growth in intensive agriculture three times as much pesticide as did larger and for malaria control has had measurable and growers, mainly because they sprayed routinely sometimes alarming impacts in developing coun- rather than when pests were bad. Few small tries. Breast milk samples from women in cotton- growers knew about the need to leave an ade- growing regions of Guatemala and Nicaragua quate interval between spraying and harvesting. have some of the highest levels of DDT ever re- Almost 75 percent of all farmers were increasing their use of pesticides, and only 7 percent knew corded in humans, and the illness and mortality about other options such as biological defenses or rates from pesticide poisoning in these areas ap- integrated pest management. proach those for major diseases. Small independent producers will need special Because the pesticide that one farmer uses con- help if all farmers are to benefit from export tributes little to increased resistance by pests, no growth. It would be ironic if concern about health individual farmer has an incentive to use less. But in industrial countries impoverished the poorest increasing use of pesticides has contributed to the farmers in developing countries. growth in resistant pest populations that has taken place since early in this century. From low levels, the number of resistant species has grown rapidly, giving rise to such severe outbreaks as those of the brown planthopper in Indonesia in the 1980s. After a costly and unsuccessful attempt to re- Since the effects of overusing pesticides have duce soil erosion on the uplands of Java, largely begun to be widely understood, several policies through construction of physical structures, Indo- have been followed. Pesticides are now formu- nesia shifted to a more decentralized, farmer- lated, as far as possible, to target particular pests. oriented approach. The use of a broad range of Their toxic life is shorter, to reduce accumulation simple agronomic and vegetative measures that in the environment. Some governments are elim- farmers can control has led to a higher rate of inating subsidies for pesticides or are even taxing adoption. them, thus signaling to farmers that pesticide use has environmental as well as financial costs. Pesticides, safety, and pesticide resistance Two technological developmentsintegrated pest management and bioengineering of crop vari- With encouragement from governments, the de- etiesoffer alternatives to chemicals. Integrated mand for chemical pesticides has grown enor- pest management calls for carefully timed, selec- 140 tive spraying of pesticides, backed up by the en- Intensifying the use of private forests couragement of natural predators and more use of resistant varieties and crop rotation. Chemical Shortages of wood for domestic usesfirewood pesticides are still used, but less often and in and building polescontinue to be a serious prob- smaller amounts. To work, the technique requires lem in many developing countries. The rural poor onsite research and testing, adaptation to particu- are particularly affected, and especially women, lar pests, and sensitivity to socioeconomic condi- who have to spend time gathering and fetching tions. Farmers need to be well trained and to re- heavy bundles of wood. The record of tree-plant- ceive plenty of expert support. ing efforts led by governments has been mixed. One form of integrated pest management, clas- Successful cases indicate an important lesson: sical biological control, uses natural predators to trees can be a highly profitable commercial crop manage damage. The development costs can be but farmers must be given the right to own, cut, substantial, but the results can be dramatic, as Af- and sell them, at fair market prices. rica's cassava mealybug program illustrates. The When prices and costs reflect shortages of wood mealybug, inadvertently introduced from South and the services that trees supply, farmers plant America in the early 1970s, had cut cassava yields trees. In Nepal air photographs taken in 1964 and by two-thirds by 1983. Biologists eventually found ground surveys done in 1988 revealed that the natural enemies that would control the spread of density of tree cover on rainfed agricultural land in the pest. With the help of mass-rearing and distri- two remote rural districts had increased from 65 to bution techniques developed at the International 298 trees a hectarenot by chance but because Institute of Tropical Agriculture in Nigeria and the farmers had responded to incentives by planting International Center for Tropical Agriculture, the trees. The population in the two districts had dou- natural predators are now at large in 90 percent of bled during the preceding thirty years, communal the cassava-growing region of Africa, bringing and government forests had become less access- losses under control. This effort, which involved ible, and the costs of obtaining wood and forest no chemicals and few risks to the environment, fodder had risen. saved a crop that provides a quarter of the food Smallholder tree farming in Kenya shows the energy consumed in Sub-Saharan Africa, at an es- same responsiveness to emerging markets for timated benefit-cost ratio of nearly 150 to 1. wood and forest products. The afforestation ef- Pest-resistant varieties developed through con- forts of the government, aid agencies, and local ventional plant breeding have already substan- NGOs often assumed that farmers would be reluc- tially reduced crop losses in developing countries. tant to plant trees on their land. But in the densely One of the most dramatic examples has been the populated Muranga District, where wood was be- genetic resistance of improved rice varieties to the coming scarce, farmers independently maintained brown planthopper. Although insects can over- nearly 14 percent of the area under indigenous tree come inbred resistance, the continuous develop- cover and planted or cultivated trees on another 9 ment of new varieties, together with other tech- percent of the land. niques such as staggered planting of crop varieties High-yielding industrial plantationsmainly with different resistance characteristics, can pro- private but sometimes maintained with technical vide more lasting protection than chemical assistance or subsidies from the governmenttake pesticides alone. pressure off natural forests and provide produc- Governments have to enforce regulations that tive ways of using land. More than thirty years ban or limit the use of pesticides which pose large ago, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia began to de- risks to human health and the environment. Al- velop plantation forestry as an alternative to ex- most all countries have the rudiments of such a ploitation of the natural forest. In Kenya in the regulatory system, but coverage is often incom- 1950s about 90 percent of the country's industrial plete and enforcement lax. The manufacture and wood requirements were met by selectively log- import of pesticides is easily monitored and is thus ging natural forest areas. By the early 1970s fast- well suited to a command-and-control approach. growing pine and cypress plantations made it pos- That approach is particularly appropriate where sible to meet 80 percent of industrial requirements low levels of literacy and scientific understanding through sustained yields from plantations occupy- on the part of pesticide users and nonstandard ing 180,000 hectaresless than 10 percent of the repackaging by retailers create dangers of unsafe natural forest area. This strategy slowed encroach- use. ment on the natural forest from traditional logging 141 and allowed large parts of the natural forest to be will not be easy. To work, common-property man- gazetted as national parks and catchment areas. agement requires local responsibility, effective More recent problems with reforestation, recovery ways of resolving disputes, and national political of costs, and control of damage caused by cypress support. A key to success appears to be "political aphids in monocultural plantations confront the entrepreneurship." The political entrepreneur Forest Department in its efforts to sustain these motivates others, engenders trust, and demon- gains. strates the tangible benefits of collective action. In Chile the government has encouraged private This essential ingredient is also probably the investment in plantation forestry through direct scarcest, the hardest to define, and the least substi- subsidies, increased security of tenure on forested tutable in rural development. Even when it is land, and a stable macroeconomic and regulatory available, deciding on whether more or less gov- climate. Industrial roundwood production from ernment involvement and action is appropriate re- plantations doubled between 1960 and 1977 and mains a difficult choice. Fragile community man- again between 1977 and 1984, making Chile one of agement of land, fisheries, or woodlots can the most successful developing countries in the sometimes be rescued by stopping detrimental in- international forest products market. trusions and providing supporting services. Resource management by communities OVERGRAZING. Millions of people in Africa and Asia raise animals on pastures and rangelands that Many natural resourcesvillage commons, pas- have low carrying capacity because of poor quality tures, water resources, and near-shore fisheries or unreliable rainfall. Pastoralists and their range- are managed communally. This has often resulted lands are threatened by overgrazing, by land ap- in sound stewardship over many centuries. But propriations by governments and farmers, and by when communal management has broken down, the development of water sources for competing these areas have suffered some of the worst over- uses. exploitation. Often the forces leading to the col- Pastoral associations in West Africa have lapse of common-property management are insur- sought, with mixed success, to improve the pro- mountable, and then either private or state ductivity of commonly held livestock pastures and ownership and control are the only answers. water sources. In addition to managing water and A compelling reason for supporting community grazing, they procure inputs and services and sell resource management is its importance for the products. Successful associations have clear lead- poor. In many parts of the world, rights to com- ership, adequate legal protection, and mecha- mon-property resources are all that separates the nisms for raising capital. Legislation has been nec- landless and land-poor from destitution. In India, essary to confirm the status of the associations, the for instance, research by the International Crops legal allocation of grazing and water points, and Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics the enforcement duties of local authorities. Pas- showed that common-property resources ac- toral associations that have gained legal status still counted for between 14 and 23 percent of the in- often have poor access to formal credit, even for come of poor households in seven states and that short-term working capital. In Mauritania funds grazing on communally owned lands accounted are currently raised by annual contributions from for as much as 84 percent of poor people's live- members; in Mali well construction is financed stock fodder. In contrast, wealthy households de- with payments collected from members when they rived no more than 3 percent of their income and water their livestock. less than 38 percent of their animal grazing from Government agencies and NGOs can also pro- common-property lands. vide political entrepreneurship. The Aga Khan Rural Support Program in Pakistan has been suc- Pressures on community management cessful in improving management of common grazing lands. The program has used credit and Population growth, technological change, diffi- technical assistance to build village infrastructure. culties in raising capital, and government inter- ference can all make community resource manage- OVERFISHING. Common-property regimes rely ment harder to sustain. The solution in these on continuing self-imposed restraints enforced by situations may lie in developing and rehabilitating group members, which can easily be eroded. Suc- collective management and decisionmaking. That cessful self-management of a fishing village in Sri 142 Lanka was finally unable to cope with population In Niger, under the French colonial regime, for- growth and higher prices, and long-standing co- ests were taken over by the state because they operative agreements among fishermen in south- were being eroded by the demand for firewood. ern Bahia, Brazil, were undermined when nylon Wood harvesting was prohibited except for con- nets were introduced under a government pro- trolled exploitation under cutting licenses, and vi- gram (see Box 3.2). olators were fined. The outcome was the elimina- Elsewhere, common-property management has tion of private and community incentives for proved more durable. In the inshore fishery at Al- management and replanting. Forest guards and anya, Turkey, local fishermen came together in the police found that they could extract bribes from 1970s to overcome problems caused by increased harvesters in lieu of official fines. fishing. They developed a rotational system of spacing and assigning choice fishing spots, with Prospects for community management mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement. The system controlled overfishing and reduced costly Many development agencies and researchers place conflicts. great hope in common-property systems as a way New technologies and political entrepreneur- of managing natural resources. Although, as the ship on the part of development agencies have examples given here show, success is possible, sometimes brought coastal communities together failure and collapse into open access are more to improve resource management. To counter dy- common. It is too early to say whether the benefits namite fishing, which has depleted fish stocks and of common-property management outweigh the destroyed coral reefs in the Philippines, the Cen- costs of rehabilitating failed community manage- tral Visayas Regional Project established fish sanc- ment or instituting it in new areas. tuaries by building artificial reefs from local mate- Governments need to recognize that smaller or- rials and also provided alternative employment ganizational units, such as villages or pastoral as- opportunities, road construction, and village wa- sociations, are better equipped to manage their ter supplies. own resources than are large authorities and may be a more effective basis for rural development DEPLETING VILLAGE WOODLANDS. Rural commu- and rational resource management than institu- nities in many countries have lost their traditional tions imposed from outside. Group action is management responsibilities over village wood- deeply rooted in many societiesfor managing lands, and the result has often been neglect and land, for cooperative marketing and input supply, overexploitation. Nationalization of forest re- for running community savings and loan arrange- sources is frequently at fault. In the 1950s Nepal ments, and for pooling labor for urgent tasks. To nationalized forests to "protect, manage, and con- succeed, cooperatives have to be voluntary and serve the forest for the benefit of the entire coun- managed by group members. They can be based try." Analysts have documented the disruption on customary social structures. Governments can if not destructionof the previous system of com- give advice on accounting, legal rights, and tech- munal management. Because the government nology and provide a legal framework for the cre- lacked the resources to regulate use, common ation, recognition, and dissolution of coopera- property was turned, in reality, into open-access tives. What is most needed is popular land in the name of conservation through state participation at the village level, which may control. In the late 1970s Nepal reversed its policy usefully be fostered by NGOs and grass-roots or- and began to return woodlands and degraded for- ganizations (see Chapter 4). ests to communities and villages. At first forests It is important that governments guarantee se- were formally turned over to panchayatslarge ad- curity of land tenure. Farmers with a clear title to ministrative units with little previous involvement land are more likely to have access to formal credit in forestry. These bodies gave the villages the most and to invest more in their land. Security is not degraded lands, which required high investments synonymous with individual possession of a for- for restoration and offered only delayed benefits. mal title. In Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, The World Bank is now supporting efforts to en- greater security could be achieved by strengthen- courage management by smaller groups more ing indigenous and customary land rights. The closely associated with particular forest tracts and benefits extend well beyond soil conservation by to give them responsibility for forests in good con- individual farmers. Legal definition and enforce- dition, as well as for degraded land. ment of group rights have proved important for 143 improving the management of such common variably publicly owned, and the infrastructure of property as grazing land. water resources is often developed and owned by Land tenure in much of Sub-Saharan Africa is the public sector. The rationale for public manage- evolving and is often a cross between private own- ment of resources is that the government is best ership and common access. Because of the com- placed to pursue multiple objectiveseconomic plexity, apparent efficiency, and continuing evolu- growth, regional development, environmental tion of indigenous land tenure systems, protection, and support of indigenous people and policymakers should be cautious about interven- the cultural heritage. But government ownership ing. Unless indigenous tenure systems are weak- and management in the pursuit of such public ob- ened (by, for example, civil war or resettlement), jectives need to be effective if they replace incen- formal land titling is unlikely to improve resource tives for private gain. In practice, government management and may lead to unnecessary land- stewardship of resources has shown a mixed rec- lessness. Policies for strengthening indigenous ord of successes and failures. tenure systems by, for example, giving legal status Part of the reason lies with the bureaucracies to group ownership and voluntarily recording con- that manage public resources. Often, they are inef- tractual arrangements related to land can be bene- ficient and overstaffed. Lack of rewards, job inse- ficial. But care must be taken to avoid introducing curity, and staff turnover may blunt the incentive barriers that limit the evolution of land rights and to adopt new management techniques. Under- markets. priced natural resources put additional pressure Landownership in Sub-Saharan Africa tradi- on resource management agencies in both indus- tionally resides with the community, but farmers trial and developing countries. By creating enor- are assigned rights to use specific parcels. These mous opportunities for corruption and gain, un- rights give sufficient security for growing crops derpricing makes the agencies vulnerable to and, where they can be bequeathed to children, influence from the politically powerful. Forestry foster a long-term interest in land management. agencies come under pressure to provide low-cost Farmers may have limited rights to transfer land materials to industry, and water authorities to they use to others without permission from family build irrigation infrastructure that will serve politi- or village elders, and other people may have sup- cally important areas. Meanwhile, essential tasks plementary use rights over the same landto with little political appeal, such as maintenance graze the land during the dry season or to collect and regeneration, are overlooked. wood or fruit. Such restrictions, however, do not In many cases reform will require devolving re- appear as yet to have had significant effects on sponsibility for investment and implementation investments in land improvements or on land pro- from central authorities to individuals, commu- ductivity. Moreover, as population growth and nities, and fiscally autonomous agencies. Govern- commercialization make land scarce and increas- ments need to concentrate on generating new ingly valuable, land is increasingly privatized. The knowledge through research, protecting property indigenous systems of communal tenure appear rights, and resolving conflicts fairly. flexible enough to evolve with the increasing scar- Legal frameworks and economic incentives have city of land and the commensurate need for often proliferated but remain confused and coun- greater security of land rights. At the same time, terproductive. Laws and regulations need to be the retention of some community control over reviewed to ensure consistency, avoid deterring landownership helps to prevent the emergence of responsible private investment, and preserve the landlessness. rights of local people and forest dwellers. Eco- nomic incentives that foster environmentally de- Resource management by governments structive practices need to be removed. Stable poli- Governments play two main roles in the manage- cies are essential because uncertainties encourage ment of natural resources. They often own them, exploitation to obtain short-term benefits. and they influence their allocation by setting the Deciding allocations legal framework and through policies that affect incentives to which other resource users respond. In theory, price is the ideal mechanism for allocat- In many countries, particularly developing ing resources. In practice, it is never easy to design countries, economically and environmentally sig- appropriate pricing mechanisms for natural re- nificant natural resources are in the hands of the sources, each of which presents different diffi- government. Tropical moist forests are almost in- culties. But although price is not a panacea for 144 problems of resource allocation, it is underused by systems that characterize most irrigation systems. many countries. The consequences, as learned Closed-pipe conveyance systems are best for from the Aral Sea, can be ecological and economic charging by water volume, but unless there is disaster (see Box 1.5). A number of developing good communication between farmers and the de- countries are devising and using market-based livery agency, they are vulnerable to tampering mechanisms to allocate resources, with good re- and damage to volumetric gauges. sults. When pricing is not relied on, there must be A number of countries are finding that progress some other mechanism for bringing scarcity to is possible. In China financially semiautonomous bear on decisionmaking. Zoning is one such water supply agencies sell water wholesale to wa- mechanism. ter users who are grouped by village or township, partly on the basis of volume. These user groups WATER ALLOCATION AND USE. Competition be- in turn collect fees from their members, typically tween farmers and cities for water supplies is al- on the basis of the area irrigated or, less frequently, ready constraining many countries' development the volume of water used. Although the charges strategies. The problem will grow as populations are generally set well below real costs, the link to increase and economies expand. The large fixed quantities used encourages savings. Moreover, the costs associated with water distribution, uncer- system reinforces financial responsibility at each tainties about the physical availability of water level because the fees collected remain in the irri- from year to year, and widely held cultural and gation budgets. Tighter overall budgets in other religious proscriptions against treating water as a countries have prompted increases in water fees commodity are likely to compel governments to from the subsidized rates. continue to allocate water administratively. Additional public investment in surface irriga- The largest single demand for water comes from tion must take account of increasing infrastructural irrigation. Inefficient use of irrigation water puts costs, low commodity prices, and environmental pressure on other users and imposes environmen- costs. Some developments will be ruled out by the tal costs. Eighty-five percent of irrigated land relies environmental consequences of reservoir inunda- on traditional surface systems based on canals and tion, water diversion, increased water pollution gravity flow. Their design is often too inflexible to from nonpoint agricultural sources, and alteration provide water with the timeliness and predict- of hydrologic systems. ability that farmers desire as they adopt improved New techniques such as drip and sprinkler sys- crop varieties and turn to intensified and diver- tems can use water more efficiently and deliver sified cropping systems. Instead, water is deliv- water when farmers need it. Although they are ered on arbitrary schedules and for limited periods unlikely to supplant the large surface irrigation of time, with incentives for use further distorted systems for grain crops, these techniques will be- by subsidized prices. Farmers respond by taking come more important for future expansion of irri- as much water as possible while they can. The gation, partly because they can be employed with results are often wasted water, waterlogging, high-value crops grown on unleveled land and leaching of soil nutrients, and excessive runoff of permeable soils where traditional surface irrigation agricultural chemicals with drainage water. is impossible. They are already spreading in devel- It is often better to improve existing systems oping countries, especially in North Africa and the than to build new ones. Lining canals reduces wa- Middle East, China, and Brazil. ter losses, and installing drainage helps combat The spreading of these irrigation techniques will salinization and waterlogging. But modernizing require a change in the traditional role of govern- installed designs is generally more expensive than ments in irrigation. The new techniques work on a achieving comparable gains through improved far smaller scale than traditional surface irrigation, management. and the source of water is usually a privately Better pricing of water (and of electricity used to owned tubewell rather than a publicly managed pump groundwater) to reflect its scarcity and the dam. Manufacturers can be relied on to promote environmental costs of overuse is fundamental to the systems because more marketable equipment better management. Governments often worry is involved than in surface canal systems. Any that reducing subsidies will hurt poor farmers and price distortions that affect investment decisions will be unacceptable if water delivery is unpredict- by farmers must be corrected, since the farmers, able. Implementing improved pricing is difficult. rather than direct public investment, will be the Water flows are hard to measure in the open canal main agents of expansion. Governments must also 145 Box 7.5 Participatory land management in Burkina Faso Land-hungry farmers in Africa are pushing into new tamable output, protection of key natural resources, areas. Conflicts between agricultural and pastoral com- and generation of income for the community. munities are common, and resource breakdown is an The terroir management plan is agreed on by the increasing threat. In Burkina Faso an innovative ap- committee and the government. The agreement stipu- proach to the management of natural resources is using lates the activities and expenditures needed to imple- indigenous institutions and sustained local participa- ment the plan. The community, for instance, may tion to resolve problems of resource allocation and en- agree to measures and targets for improving pasture, vironmental deterioration. planting trees, and adopting improved practices for Community terroirs (management areas) are the basis soil conservation. In return, the government assists the for the approach, which is decentralized (to take into community to obtain basic infrastructure and services, account each terroir's specific features), intersectoral cofinances some investments, and provides protection (embracing agriculture, forestry, and livestock), partici- from encroachment on land improvements. The agree- pative (respecting the goals and resources of the com- ment also conveys official recognition of the commu- munity), and iterative (responsive to monitored re- nity's rights to the land and to any improvements. sults). Several critical steps are needed to put these Monitoring is a key element of implementation, principles into practice. and along with changes in community goals, in envi- ronmental status, and in the effectiveness of chosen The community designates a natural resource technologies, may lead to adjustments to the plan. management committee that includes representatives of the principal social groups of the village and of user As Burkina Faso's experience shows, participation groups such as herders, men and women farmers, and can lead to better resource management, but the par- fishermen. The committee is responsible for allocating ties involved must also change the basis on which re- resources and dealing with neighboring communities source management decisions are made. Local institu- and the government on natural resource issues. tions can form a building block for the management A resource use management plan is then drawn contract, but they need to be modified and adapted to up with the assistance of technical advisers. The plan cope with the new challenges created by immigration includes a statement of community objectives, an inter- and resource breakdown. This management strategy is sectoral environmental assessment of the terroir, and currently being extended to other Sahelian countries, the choice of technologies most likely to achieve sus- including Mali and Niger. monitor aggregate use of groundwater and regu- centives are the principal influence on individual late tubewell pumping to prevent excessive draw- behavior, land zoning alone is a weak tool for de- down of aquifers. termining land use. But it can be influential if it If the potential efficiency gains from these tech- has political support and the incentives driving in- nologies are to be realized, the new methods must dividual behavior are weak. Experience with zon- be integrated into a broader approach to the inter- ing in developing countries, whether to protect actions among water, plants, soils, nutrients, and forests or to locate agricultural activities, has not other farm inputs. Farmers will need research and been successful. Many countries have spent large extension support to acquire new management sums on mapping and land use planning but have skills, credit to enable them to afford mechanical failed to integrate these activities into effective equipment, and secure legal rights to water to en- land management programs. courage them to invest in new technology. Agricultural zoning in Africa has traditionally had the primary purpose of separating crop and CHANGING LAND usE. Zoning is used in rural animal agriculture or confining the agricultural ac- areas for the same reason as in urban areas: indi- tivity of particular groups to specific regions. In vidual decisions about land use do not necessarily several countries, colonial laws that partitioned produce the best results for society as a whole. land into European and African reserves were Because zoning imposes constraints on land use among the first targets for change after indepen- that are contrary to the underlying incentives driv- dence. In Kenya this was followed by the registra- ing individual behavior, its effectiveness depends tion of blocks of land with fixed boundaries for on whether it is enforced and to what extent those pastoralists to manage as group ranches; in several incentives can be weakened. Where economic in- cases the lands were next to game parks. To pro- 146 mote the ranches, pastoralist groups were prom- areas with high environmental value need to be set ised compensation for wildlife damage, participa- aside and protected. Similarly, areas that provide tion in tourism revenue from the adjacent parks, watershed protection need meaningful, enforce- upgrading of livestock, and access to credit. Re- able boundaries. In Uganda, beginning in the suits have been mixed, and the pastoraiists' range- 1950s, increasing population pressure led to settle- land remains under pressure from competing ment in zoned forest reserves, but the reserves uses. Some groups found that tourism receipts were managed fairly effectively for forestry went elsewhere, that promised infrastructure for through the early 1970s. Later, the breakdown of delivering water was ineffective, and that pro- civil order and continued population pressure tected wildlife degraded ranch pastures. Lessons brought about massive migration into the re- learned from such experiences have led to new serves. The government now faces a long and dif- approaches to defining resource use. Burkina Faso ficult process of evicting squatters from forest is relying on community-based development of re- areas. Kenya and Nigeria have had similar source management plans (Box 7.5). Botswana has experiences. also depended on participatory planning within In several countries agroecological zoning is be- districts to identify and support zoning for pri- ing used to prevent further encroachment into for- vate and communal ranches, cropping, wildlife ests. Simply demarcating zones, however, is management, protected areas, and urban devel- clearly not enough to prevent illegal encroach- opment. ment. Zoning must be backed up by economic and Zoning of forests attempts to set forest bound- financial incentives that discourage invasion. In- aries and identify areas for various uses. Until vestments must be made to intensify land use in management techniques are devised for tropical suitable areas, develop extractive production in forests that enable uses which are compatible with areas that should remain under forest cover, and preserving biodiversity and the natural ecosystem, protect the borders of conservation zones. (Box 7.6 Box 7.6 Land zoning in Rondônia Growing socioeconomic problems caused by accelerat- areas that are most suitable for population and where ing migration to the northwest frontier of Rondônia led forest cover is already mostly cleared. the Brazilian government in 1980 to launch an invest- Forest clearing will no longer be a criterion for ob- ment program. The Integrated Development Program taining land title. Inconsistent land regulations and for Northwest Brazil (Polonoroeste) was designed to laws are being regularized, and institutions for estab- promote migration and its orderly absorption. This was lishing property rights are being strengthened. done by building a highway and feeder roads, but in- Fiscal incentives for cattle ranching and deforesta- creasing deforestation accompanied the program. tion have already been suspended, and credit pro- Now, agroecological zoning has distinguished areas grams are being restricted to activities that are con- capable of development from those with special ecolog- sistent with the zoning. ical or social significance or without long-term agri- Most of the lands reserved for Amerindians-20 cultural potential. The government hopes to discour- percent of the state's areahave been identified and age new migration, concentrate existing populations in demarcated, and policies and programs for improved areas with potential for permanent agriculture, and re- protection are being put in place. duce encroachment into areas that should remain un- A media campaign is under way to explain the der forest cover. Active intervention is needed to con- zoning restrictions on use of land and discourage mi- trol the spread of itinerant agriculture. Rondônia's new gration to Rondônia. constitution and the complementary laws adopt Local NGOs are participating in consultative gov- agroecological zoning as one of the basic criteria for ernment bodies to represent their communities in dis- determining legal land occupation. Zoning is ineffec- cussions of policies and annual public investment tive if it stands alone; in Rondônia it is being supported proposals. by the following reforms: Agroecological zoning, strengthened government Public investments will be reviewed for con- commitment, and closer community involvement are sistency with the agroecological zones. New roads and greatly improving the prospects for sustainable agri- support services will no longer be put where agricul- cultural and extractive development, as well as envi- ture is not sustainable but will be concentrated in the ronmental protection. 147 describes the experience in Rondônia, Brazil.) nomic viability of settlementreduces the costs to Zoning must be complemented by measures to government and the hazards of plans and targets. strengthen enforcement, such as training staff and Spontaneous settlement can be guided by policies paying them properly, investing in equipment, that provide infrastructure and social services, ex- and reinforcing the capacity of government to pur- tension programs on viable agricultural strategies, sue legal action against illegal loggers and en- and legal status for land occupation. In addition to croachers. Training for prosecutors, auditors, and creating such magnets to steer settlers toward ac- judges in the handling of forestry and land use ceptable areas, governments will still need to re- cases could be an important measure in many strict settlement in areas where the environmental countries. impact would be unacceptable. The settlement of new lands, which are often publicly owned, has been an important and in- Managing natural resources: indust rial forestry creasingly controversial dimension of develop- ment. Settlement takes place because individuals Many of the natural resources on which develop- want better lives and governments want to ease ing countries rely are and will remain public. Gov- population pressures, raise agricultural output, ernments should attempt to manage resources un- generate employment, reinforce political control, der public ownership in ways that maximize their and relocate people displaced by natural disasters value to society. Such policies will yield two bene- and development projects. The 4.5 million hect- fits: the resources will contribute to development, ares brought under cultivation each year is small in and consumers will have incentives to economize relation to the nearly 1.3 billion hectares of poten- on their use, develop substitutes, and invest in tial cropland in developing countries. But land set- sustained-yield management of privately owned tlement can transform the countries where it oc- resources. curs. Land settlement projects have sometimes Ownership of forests often remains in public been promoted in areas that better preparation hands in an attempt to ensure that multiple objec- would have revealed to be unsuitable. Settlement tives can be achieved. In addition to wood produc- projects are expensive$10,000 per family in a tion, these objectives include soil conservation, sample of World Bank-supported projectswhich flood control, and protection of biodiversity. Log- has made for costly mistakes when the projects ging often dominates because it generates money, were poorly sited. and until recently relatively little attention was Several countries have promoted settlement by given to managing the nonwood services of for- instituting fiscal incentives for investment in unde- ests. But that situation is changing as developing veloped areas. These incentives have encouraged countries realize that past forest management has uneconomic and environmentally destructive rarely achieved sustainability in timber harvests, practices, such as livestock ranching in the Bra- let alone maintained other forest services. zilian Amazon. From 1966 until recently, the Bra- In determining the future of forests, logging pol- zilian tax system allowed investors in approved icy is particularly important. Although logging ac- agricultural projects in the Amazon to claim tax counts for only about one-fifth of total deforesta- credits of up to 50 percent of their federal income tion in developing countries, managing it properly tax liability. Investors responded enthusiastically can help control the agriculture and ranching that and by the late 1980s had established cattle often follow. And commercial logging may be the ranches on more than 8.4 million hectares. Subsi- forestry subsector most amenable to policy reform. dized agricultural credit, which was even more Government efforts to rationalize industrial for- widely available than the tax credits, reinforced estry in many countries are another instance of the the incentive for deforestation. The elimination of advisability of using market-based approaches and such measuresin part because of environmental the difficulties of doing so in practice. The rates concerns but more for fiscal reasonsillustrates (stumpage fees) charged loggers for standing tim- that reforms of environmental and economic poli- ber seldom come close to the costs of replacing the cies can be complementary. volume removed with wood grown in plantations In many countries, including Colombia, Indo- (Figure 7.4). nesia, and Senegal, willing settlers, migrating at their own initiative and expense, already play a SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES. A recent significant role in land settlement. Their assump- review of tropical forest management by the Inter- tion of costs and riskone test of the likely eco- national Tropical Timber Organization found that 148 less than 1 percent of the tropical forest is currently Logging fees are often less than costs of reforestation under truly sustainable management. Several coun- tries are trying to raise that total through improved harvest technologies and low-impact design of Figure 7.4 Timber stumpage fees as a share roads. In Peru the forest is harvested in long narrow of replacement costs in selected countries, strips designed to mimic the gaps created when a late 1980s tree falls from natural causes. The strips to be har- vested are carefully selected, and animal traction is Percent used to avoid soil compaction. Harvesting can thus 25 be done without serious environmental damage, and the regeneration that takes place is rapid, abun- dant, and diverse. This experiment is being con- ducted in collaboration with the Yanesha Forestry Cooperative, a group of indigenous people who own the land communally. Much more effort is needed to find scientifically sound techniques for plantations and to learn how natural forests work. Advances in farm forestry and commercial logging have been slow, partly because of inadequate research. In Asia (excluding China) at least 5,000 scientists are working on rice research but fewer than 1,000 on forestry. In India expenditure on forestry research amounts to less than 0.01 percent of the value of forest products consumed each year. Natural tropical forests, especially tropical moist forests, are difficult to manage even for the rela- tively straightforward objective of timber produc- o tion. Their ecosystems are highly sensitive to inter- vention, often in unexpected ways. Many important tree species, for example, can mature Source: World Bank data. only when the forest canopy is opened by the death or removal of older trees. At other stages in their life cycles, however, many of these same spe- cies may be dependent on light-intolerant soil mi- maps. They are thus unable to discover the value croorganisms. Even selective logging alters the of the resource they are supposed to protect. Log- species and size composition of the forest and can gers, however, have incentives to be well aware of set off a chain of changes that makes unlikely the that value and to obstruct or corrupt efforts to re- regeneration of the original species mix. Timber strict their operations. In many countries forestry extraction must be sophisticated if it is to avoid officials who attempted to enforce restrictions damage to the integrity of the forest as an have been assaulted and even killed. Faced with ecosystem. these risks, and typically underpaid, officials often ignore transgressions or accept bribes from loggers CONTROLLING PRIVATE LOGGERS. Logging in to look the other way. tropical forests is typically carried out by private One way to lessen the difficulties of enforce- firms, nominally under terms established by the ment is to build into timber concessions adequate government. These terms may stipulate the log- incentives to ensure regeneration. Too often, the ging practices to be used, the fees to be paid, the concession arrangements are too short to make duration of harvesting rights, and the loggers' concessionaire silvicultural activities after the first obligation to provide for postharvest treatment of harvest profitable, and no provision is made for the forest. Unfortunately, these agreements are of- publicly financed regeneration. In Sabah, Malay- ten flouted, and forestry agencies have con- sia, for example, half of all concessions are for sistently been unwilling or unable to enforce them. twenty-one years, most of the remainder are for Forestry agencies often lack transport and good ten years, and 5 percent are for one year. Full tim- 149 ber rotation, by contrast, exceeds seventy years. Integrated conservation and development proj- Concessionaires may harvest gradually over the ects build on the principle that local communities twenty-one-year period of the contract, but they must be involved in devising ways to protect will have little reason to undertake reforestation. parks. When an existing park's neighbors are de- Longer-term contracts or contracts with provisions riving economic benefits from encroaching on it, for performance-based extensions, as in Canada, better alternatives must be made available; pro- can force concessionaires to bear the costs that tecting parks from the local population, in addition their initial harvests impose on future resource re- to being ethically unjustifiable, can be prohib- turns. They also permit concessionaires to reap the itively expensive. Several new schemes establish a future rewards that are the necessary incentives core conservation area surrounded by multiuse for good harvest and regeneration practices. buffer zones that are managed intensively by local Another way to reduce the difficulty of enforce- communities to provide income and products. ment is to mobilize local communities to report Agreed-on rules of access form the basis for limit- illegal activities. In Indonesia private national and ing future encroachment. international firms are being recruited to monitor One country that is reorienting its conservation compliance with logging concessions. If the mon- strategy from the traditional pattern to this newer itoring and enforcement capability of developing approach is Nepal. The Royal Chitwan Park in the countries can be improved, efforts to redesign in- fertile Terai plains is an important tourist destina- centives to loggers can begin to be effective. tion, but it was generating few benefits for local communities. With control of malaria and rapid Managing natural resources: habitats population growth on the plains, the park came The most precious natural habitats are likely to be under strong pressure from encroachment that best served by remaining under some form of pub- was only partly kept under control by the army, at lic ownership. But that does not necessarily mean the cost of generating hostility. In contrast, in that they should also be managed by the central Nepal's Annapurna Conservation Area, estab- government. Some successful schemes for protect- lished in 1986 as a multiple-use area rather than a ing sensitive ecosystems rely on a marriage of pub- national park, government collaboration with local lic ownership with communal management. community groups brought about the establish- Some fragile and particularly vulnerable ecosys- ment and enforcement of a land-use system that tems will always need to be protected against en- increased the local benefits from tourism and pro- croachment and degradation. The coverage of vided local people with training in conservation protected areas should be consistent with conser- and forest management. The project has suc- vation goals. Sri Lanka is one of the few countries cessfully induced a skeptical local population to to devote more than 10 percent of its land area to participate in management of the area, and the wildlife protection, yet about 90 percent of this conflicts that beset Chitwan have been avoided. protected land is outside the wet zone, the coun- Only a few developing countries have managed try's most biologically diverse habitat, and many to establish priorities, reformulate policies, and of the protected areas are probably too small for operate protected areas effectively. Even those that effective preservation. The costs of conservation have succeeded in strengthening their conserva- programs, both financial and economic, can esca- tion institutions have found it hard to coordinate late if protected areas are not selected with care. policy, fix the division of labor between local and Park consolidation and identification of under- central authorities, collaborate with NGOs, and protected habitats are thus important first steps in devise incentives for efficient management (Box reorienting conservation programs. 7.7). Although 5 percent of the world's natural habi- In Africa expanding settlements in marginal tats is formally protected from development, much areas are reducing agricultural productivity and of this area is threatened with encroachment by displacing wildlife. Conservationists and develop- farming, logging, and other activities. Not only ment planners are exploring ways to use wildlife does the level of protection in officially protected resources to generate food and income. This possi- areas need to be strengthened; natural values need bility has been most seriously explored in the to be, and can be, protected in areas outside parks semiarid rangelands and particularly in southern and reserves. Several techniques are being tested Africa, where commercial use of wildlife is replac- in developing countries. It is clear that involve- ing livestock husbandry in many places. Zim- ment of and benefits to local people are the key to babwe's experience is that wildlife has significant the viability of any scheme. advantages in this ecosystem: it yields greater 150 Box 7.7 Conservation in Costa Rica: building effective institutions Costa Rica has struggled to become a leader in conser- and grants from international foundations and NGOs vation. In the 1960s and 1970s almost half its land was were converted into local funds controlled by the Na- put under some degree of protection. But a lack of tional Parks Foundation (NPF), a private organization funds, exacerbated by the country's economic crisis, founded by the government to help channel financial meant that by the mid-1980s the country's parks and support to the parks. The NPF functions as a financial reserves were seriously threatened. The pressure of intermediary, receives the proceeds of debt-for-nature poverty increased encroachment in search of timber, swaps, and has responsibility for financial accounting fuel, and agricultural land. There was no coordination and management. among the different agencies responsible for park pro- There have been some problems. In an effort to de- tection, forestry, and wildlife management, and en- velop long-term commitment, the NPF has encouraged forcement was sparse. international donors to support particular megaparks. In 1986 a new administration, with international fi- So far, that has led to unequal financing across regions. nancial support, decided to restructure institutions to Competition among regions for donor funding risks maintain the protected areas and gain acceptance for compromising national control over conservation. conservation. Numerous agencies were consolidated What happens if one of the megaparks cannot find into the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy, and funds? Why should money go to the areas with the Mines to improve coordination and enhance the na- best public relations instead of being allocated on the tional stature of conservation. To reduce encroach- basis of need? Does it matter that external funds and ment, the government decentralized park manage- donations, rather than central government budgetary ment. A national system of conservation areas divided allocations, are supporting the system? the country into nine regions, or "niegaparks." In or- Implementing a conservation system that decentral- der to gain local support, regions with parks received izes decisionmaking and financial control is clearly a economic benefits. The director of each megapark is challenge, even with Costa Rica's advantages of a well- responsible for oversight of all the protected areas and educated population, strong national scientific capac- for working with local communities. ity, and good physical infrastructure. Mobilizing finan- Innovative financing arrangements funded these cial support is just one of the building blocks of an changes and paid for land appropriations. Donations effective conservation system. earnings and does less damage to soils and vegeta- approaches to protection, which, by restricting ac- tion. The scope for community-based wildlife cess to traditionally used resources, disrupt local management programs, however, depends on the cultures and economies. economic value of the wildlife asset compared In 1985 a rubber tappers' union in Brazil joined with alternative land uses. with the government to establish a new way of Throughout the semiarid rangelands of Africa keeping tracts of Amazonian forest under low-im- wildlife use could be greatly increased if a number pact use. The creation of extractive reserves of distortions could be removed. The most impor- granted legal protection to forestland traditionally tant constraint is that wildlife, albeit technically used by rubber tappers, Brazil-nut gatherers, and state property, is effectively art open-access re- other local people. Although separate deeds were source. Access needs to be controlled, and man- not issued, individual families retain their rights to aged culling implemented. Other distortions arise traditional collecting territories within the reserve. from direct and indirect subsidies to the livestock The land cannot be sold or converted to nonforest sector; quarantine and veterinary policies that re- uses, but subsistence crops are permitted on small strict wildlife production; local sale and export of plots. Twenty reserves have been proposed; the wild meat; and lack of accounting for environmen- first six were established in Acre, one of the Bra- tal degradation (Box 7.8). zilian states most threatened by deforestation. The establishment of extractive reserves for the Conclusions harvest of nontimber forest products has emerged as a promising strategy for reconciling economic A common theme in many aspects of natural re- development and environmental conservation. source use is the need for better research. That Harvest of many nontimber forest products can need will increase: as development and growth take place without destroying the forest cover. The proceed, new problems will emerge. We still know extractive reserve approach differs from traditional little about how to protect the resource base suffi- 151 Box 7.8 Comparing the costs and benefits of conservation and development The example of Korup National Park in Cameroon conservation area for Cameroon were less than the shows how valuation of environmental damage and costs. conservation costs can help inform choices about how But not all benefits were measurable. People in Cam- to use the environment. The park contains Africa's old- eroon and in the rest of the world derive other benefits est rairiforest, which is home to numerous unique and from conservation. These include "option values" endangered species of plants and animals. Increasing (protection against loss of future benefitssay, from pressures to convert the forest to agriculture led the medicines developed from indigenous plants) and government to design a conservation plan for about "existence values" that arise because people value the 126,000 hectares of the park. Economic valuation tech- preservation of species even when they do not expect niques were used to estimate the damage that would to derive any other benefits, now or ever, from them. occur if these areas of rainforest were developedas a Since most of these nonuse values reflect benefits to measure of the benefits of conserving themand com- people outside Cameroon, the difference between the pare the benefits with the costs of the conservation benefits and costs of the conservation area for Cam- program. eroonroughly $6 billionrepresents the international Conserving the areas would provide local, national, transfers needed to justify conservation on economic and international benefits, but not all of these could be grounds. The per hectare transfer would be lower than estimated. The measurable benefits from use of the the values attributed to tropical forest conservation conservation area that accrued to Cameroon included areas in, for example, Costa Rica. Given the diversity direct yields from, for example, sales of forest products of species in Korup Park, making such transfers would (32 percent of measurable benefits) and indirect bene- be to the advantage of the international community. fits such as protection of fisheries and soils (68 per- The issue then becomes whether the rest of the world cent). These were set against the costs of management is willing to pay Cameroon for the costs it would incur (88 percent) and of forgone revenues from commercial to protect an environmental asset that is valuable for forest products (12 percent). The exercise found that (at the world as a whole. an 8 percent discount) the measurable benefits of the ciently to feed the burgeoning world population. problems require international research. The We know little about improving simple technolo- CG1AR is already placing more emphasis on for- gies: the design of surface irrigation and drainage estry, pest management, soil conservation, and ir- systems has not changed in years, in spite of grow- rigation. Countries often say they believe in the ing demands from farmers for better control of wa- need for more agricultural research. Yet even ter. As countries become richer, their demands on though, as measured by rates of return, agri- their natural resources change but do not dimin- cultural research is among the best public invest- ish: rising incomes in industrial countries have led ments available, support for research is declining. to new demandsfor open space, wilderness pre- If that trend continues, the prospects for environ- servation, and other amenitiesthat could not mentally sound agricultural intensification are have been foreseen fifty years ago. poor indeed, and the implications for the protec- Research on the conservation and use of natural tion of natural habitat from encroachment are resources ought to be mainly national. But some dismal. 152 International environmental concerns International environmental problems are more complicated to solve than national ones, for two reasons. First, no single authority can lay down and enforce appropriate policies. Second, solutions must accommodate large variations in the balance of benefits and costs to different countries. Some countries may have more pressing local problems and less money for solving them. To secure action, rich countries may sometimes need to pay poor ones. Given the large uncertainties surrounding the likely effects of greenhouse warming, a wise policy would include measures that both reduce emissions and improve economic performance (for example, the elimination of subsidies for fossil fuel consumption and deforestation); investments in more information to avoid the risks of costly over- or underreaction; precautionary measures to reduce emissions now at modest costs and bring down the costs of future reductions; and financial transfers to help developing countries broaden their technological options. More pragmatic international action is needed to protect biological diversity. Individual countries can do more to manage these resources in their own interests, but additional transfers will be needed to ensure as much conservation as the rest of the world would like. U When the effects of environmental degradation ing problems. In addition, if the poor are to meet cross national boundaries, an additional layer of the environmental concerns of rich countries, they complexity is added to the problem of devising may reasonably expect to be paid for doing so. The and implementing policies. It is not possible to right balance can be achieved, but only if the rely, as in an individual country, on a common world's leaders are prepared to act responsibly legal framework, regulatory controls, economic in- and pragmatically. centives, and, if necessary, the coercive powers of Three broad classes of issues require interna- a national government. Solutions to international tional solutions. First, there are regional problems environmental problems must be based on com- that arise when neighboring countries share a mon principles and rules of collaboration among common resource and one country's actions there- sovereign states, backed up by persuasion and ne- fore affect others. Into this category fall most prob- gotiation. Setting priorities for international envi- lems of transboundary pollution, including acid ronmental policy is also particularly complex. The rain and the management of international rivers or costs of doing nothing may be borne by other na- regional seas. tions; the gains from policies may not accrue to Second, the world shares certain global environ- those that take the biggest steps. Above all, the mental resources such as the atmosphere and the issue of how to give proper weight to the interests deep oceans. Any action by one country that af- of the poor and politically weak lays an especially fects such 'global commons" has an effect, al- heavy burden on the world's more powerful though perhaps a rather small one, on all other countries. countries. Into this category fall the buildup of Earlier chapters of this Report have documented greenhouse gases and the thinning of the ozone the seriousness of several local environmental is- layer caused by the emission of CFCs. (The term sues in the world's poorer countries. The common "global commons" as used here reflects its mean- good will not be served if international issues that ing in standard writings on the environment, not are mainly of concern to rich countries are allowed necessarily its sense in international law.) to divert attention and resources from these press- Third, there are resources that clearly belong to 153 Box 8.1 Enforcing international obligations: how the international legal process works The international legal system differs from national le- The international legal process provides various gal systems in several respects. National systems have monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Among a central authority that establishes the law, and institu- them are the bodies established within the framework tions that detect breaches and punish violators. In in- of the United Nations Charter, notably the Security ternational law there is no central "lawmaker," no cen- Council; fact-finding and diplomatic missions; auditing tral monitoring body, and no courts with compulsory and reporting systems (for example, those set up by jurisdiction. the International Labour Organisation and human Yet international law successfully regulates many rights conventions); and mechanisms created by inter- economic, technical, and social activities. Most states national treaties (for example, inspection of nuclear comply voluntarily, accepting some limitation on their sites by the International Atomic Energy Agency). In- sovereignty in return for similar concessions from ternational law relies heavily on the willingness of other states. That explains, for instance, why states states to subject their performance to international establish international regulations on, say, interna- scrutiny. tional telecommunications or gathering data on epi- What can be done once a breach of an international demicsareas in which national law is inadequate. rule is detected? The International Court of Justice can- The rules of international law are either "custom- not adjudicate unless the parties to a dispute have ary" (based on state practice) or explicitly agreed in agreed to submit to its jurisdiction. Other methods for treaties. When states perceive cooperation to be in their resolving disputes include arbitration, conciliation, me- interest, they negotiate a codification of their areas of diation, and negotiation. International law can use agreement. States may then decide to sign legal instru- sanctions, in particular those agreed on in bodies such ments expressing their approval of the goals. But only as the United Nations. As the recent Security Council through ratification do states take on an obligation to resolutions against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait indi- abide by the agreement and incorporate its provisions cate, some sanctions may include the use of force to into national law. Once incorporated, international law ensure compliance. Most sanctions, however, apply benefits from the law enforcement mechanisms used economic and political pressure. within each state. Treaties may also provide machinery for international enforcement. one country but have values for the international International law: its role and limitations community which are not reflected in the market. They include tropical rainforests, other special eco- Nations adhere to international agreements cover- logical habitats, and individual species. ing the environment because they judge such agreements to be in their own interest. The gains Some lessons from experience from cooperation can be large, but as Box 8.1 ex- plains, the enforcement and monitoring of interna- Growing awareness of environmental issues has tional agreements present several difficulties. prompted institutional innovation at the interna- Building an international consensus is often tional, as well as the national, level. Intergovern- slow and costly. The United Nations Convention mental organizations such as the EC, the OECD, on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) took more than the Organization of African Unity, and the Organi- ten years to negotiate and, a decade after the end zation of American States have extended their of negotiations, still has not come into force. The areas of cooperation to include the environment. A time was not entirely wasted. The negotiations whole range of specialized bodies, official and over the UNCLOS led to a codification of decisions nongovernmental, concern themselves with par- to create exclusive economic zones extending 200 ticular international environmental problems such miles out to sea. Most countries have recognized as pollution at sea, the management of nuclear and the economic and environmental benefits of "na- toxic wastes, the protection of endangered species, tionalizing" what were once international waters and the conservation of ancient monuments. The and have therefore adopted these specific mea- UNEP plays a special coordinating role and has sures. There was no such consensus on the notion been the focal point for establishing legal regimes of creating a supranational authority with powers for international environmental issues. to ensure the equitable distribution and manage- 154 ment of the mineral and other resources in the Prospects for fisheries have dramatically improved deep oceans. in such countries as Australia, Iceland, and New Governments have, however, reached a number Zealand. of more limited agreements on marine pollution. Even when countries wish to take environmen- International conventions prohibit the dumping of tal action, they often lack the technical and admin- radioactive and other wastes in the oceans, and istrative capacity to do so. Experience with "soft there are internationally agreed procedures for law' 'nonbinding international guidelines devel- handling many other wastes. Guidelines govern- oped by recognized expertsshows a substantial ing the maritime transport of dangerous goods demand for technical advice on environmental is- have been adopted by many countries. Since the sues. Already, some international agreements in- guidelines are broadly recognized as best practice, clude provisions for financial and technical assis- operators have strong incentives to abide by them. tance with implementationthe Montreal Protocol is an instanceand the Global Environment Facil- Drawing on and building national capacity ity (GEF) offers help with implementing the Con- The actual implementation of measures to address vention for the Prevention of Pollution from international environmental problems must rely Ships (MARPOL). Such initiatives need to be on national governments, which ultimately have strengthened. the capacity to make and enforce policies. The pos- Paying for international environmental action itive lesson from the establishment of 200-mile eco- nomic zones has been that when it is possible to The potential partners to an international environ- delegate responsibility for managing resources to mental agreement rarely stand to gain or lose nations, they may do the job more effectively than equally from it. If an agreement is to work, either it international bodies. Countries now have the in- must lead to efficiency gains sufficiently large that centive and the legal capacity to manage their fish- all parties can expect to be better off (which rarely eries to maximize their value. Although some happens) or countries must be willing to negotiate countries have overexploited their coastal fish- transfers to assist those who will lose. Box 8.2 illus- eries, others have used the opportunity wisely. trates some of these points for the acid rain prob- Box 8.2 Bargaining over acid rain in Europe Acid rain in Europe is linked to the acidification of There is disagreement about whether the total bene- lakes in Scandinavia, the death of forests in Central fits of controlling sulfur emissions exceed the costs be- Europe, and damage to property in many countries. cause benefits are difficult to measure. Another study, One of the primary causes of acid rain is emissions of which inferred these benefits from government behav- sulfur dioxide from power stations and other large ior, concluded that a reduction of 39 percent in total combustion plants. Approximately half of all deposi- European emissions of sulfur would be justified but tions of sulfur within Europe have come across na- that there would be large cross-country variations in tional boundaries, so that international agreement is abatement targets. The aggregate net benefit from re- necessary to limit acid rain. In 1985 twenty-one coun- ducing sulfur emissions would be large. However, tries signed the Helsinki Protocol to reduce their emis- three countriesItaly, Spain, and the United King- sions of sulfur dioxide to not more than 70 percent of domwould be significant net losers. Without some their 1980 levels by 1993. Another thirteen countries, form of recompense for their additional costs, they including Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom, did would be unwilling to cooperate to reduce emissions. not sign the protocol. Nonetheless, the net gainers would have a strong in- Uniform targets of this kind are very inefficient be- centive to pay the net losers in order to reach an agree- cause both the costs and the benefits of reducing sulfur ment, since total net losses amount to less than 10 per- emissions differ widely across countries. One study cent of total net gains. The one obvious difficulty is that computed that the most cost-effective way to share a because of the prevailing wind direction, the primary reduction of 30 percent in total sulfur emissions would net gainers are countries in Central and Eastern Europe be for five countries, including Hungary, the United that are much poorer than the net losers. But even if Kingdom, and Yugoslavia, to make cuts of more than emissions reductions and payments to net losers were 60 percent and for ten countries, including Spain, restricted to EC countries, all parties could be net Sweden, and the former U.S.S.R., to make reductions gainers. of less than 10 percent. 155 lem in Europe. Arranging for such transfers will permanent losses for all, before they will compro- not be simple. The many potential parties to an mise. A second obstacle is the lack of clear interna- agreement may not share a common view of the tional law on the subject. No global convention urgency of the problem or of the possible solu- sets out agreed law on international water- tions. It is extremely difficult to ensure that coun- coursesindeed, there is not even a generally ac- tries are paid for neither more nor less than the cepted definition of an international watercourse. extra costs of meeting their international obli- But work by various international bodies and ju- gations. Every country has incentives to distort the rists has established two generally recognized ba- costs or benefits of taking action. sic principles: each state has a duty not to cause Although intergovernmental transfers can be an appreciable harm to others that share the same efficient way to make international agreements watercourse; and water rights should be appor- work, this does not imply that individual polluters tioned equitably among the parties involved. in recipient countries should be subsidized. At the One of the most successful agreements on an national level there are more efficient ways to dis- international watercourse concerns the sharing of courage pollution (see Chapter 3). Individual the Indus basin between India and Pakistan. After countries should be allowed to choose the policies partition in 1947, Pakistan was dependent on India that best fit their circumstances. Agreements for much of its irrigation water. After thirteen should set national targets, not national policies years of disagreement had brought them to the for meeting them. To avoid biasing national policy brink of war, both countries agreed in 1960 to a decisions, any transfers should take the form of division of the rivers of the Indus system. Several lump-sum payments rather than finance for spe- factorssome of them difficult to replicatef a- cific investments. vored success. First, India and Pakistan had strong incentives to compromise: both needed adequate An example of a regional problem: international river water for irrigation, the technical information was basins readily available, and neither wanted an armed conflict. Second, the agreement was reached with For centuries countries have disagreed and negoti- the help of a third party, the World Bank. Third, ated over the management of international rivers. external donors and the World Bank provided a More than 200 treaties have been signed between total of about $720 million, in addition to India's countries on water issues, but mostly by European contribution of $174 million, to assist Pakistan in and North American countries; many rivers that undertaking works to replace the flows from the pass through developing countries are still not river waters allocated to India. Finally, because the covered. Over time, the need for international co- agreement involved allocating to each country the ordination has grown. An expanding population flows of separate rivers in the basin, the need for and rising living standards have increased de- coordination was minimized. mand for water; technological ability to exploit wa- There are other examples of cooperation: with ter resources has advanced; the number of nation the Zambezi, for instance, an agreement has been states has grown; and people have become more reached covering not only water flows but also concerned about the environment. A good deal is other environmental aspects of river management. at stake. More than 200 river basins, which ac- Another innovative case is the Lesotho Highlands count for over half of the world's land area, are Water Project, where payments between countries shared by more than one country. More than 40 facilitated cooperation. Lesotho has undertaken to percent of the world's population lives in river ba- construct large works on the Senqu River to sup- sins that straddle national frontiers. ply South Africa with water. In return, South Af- The optimal solution for managing an interna- rica is underwriting and servicing the debt in- tional river is most likely to be found when all the curred for the project. Lesotho benefits from the countries that share the river basin cooperate. That water royalties that South Africa pays, while rarely happens. First, river basin management has South Africa reduced the costs of ensuring its wa- a distributional dimensionit involves the sharing ter flow because Lesotho was a better place to put of a scarce productive resourcewhich can make the dam. negotiations contentious or preclude them alto- In many other cases it has been difficult to reach gether. The countries upstream may see little gain practicable solutions. One example is the Nile. The in increasing the flow to those downstream. Fre- river flows for more than 6,800 kilometers through quently, countries need a strong incentive, such as three climate zones and nine nations. Although the threat of armed conflict or the likelihood of coordinated management of water storage, irriga- 156 tion systems, and soil erosion control for the to help developing countries adopt replacements whole river basin has the potential to benefit all for CFCs if they cost more than what is being re- countries involved, no single agreement covers the placed, and clauses on technological transfer that entire Nile basin. Inability to negotiate a compro- urge the parties to ensure the transfer of the best mise has hindered the realization of the benefits of technology "under fair and most favorable condi- cooperation, although the recent establishment of tions." The fund was established on a pilot basis a coordination group of riparian countries is a for three years. During that time the extra burden promising development. of phasing out CFC use for all countries expected To encourage cooperation, the World Bank has to qualify for assistance was estimated at $240 drawn up guidelines to be used in projects it f i- million. nances on international rivers. These require that other countries along the river be notified. The aim ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE. The Montreal Protocol, is to ensure that the project does not appreciably together with the funding and technical assistance harm the interests of the other countries and is not arrangements, is a pilot program. When the pro- likely to be harmed by plans they may have. gram comes up for review, some of the key issues will be the following: An example of a global problem: the ozone layer and the Ensuring that the program is not biased against Montreal Protocol efficient policies to phase out the use of controlled sub- stances. Countries have a number of policy op- The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete tions. One is for the government to try to identify the Ozone Layer, signed in 1987, is a pathbreaking and invest in alternative technologies. This ap- international agreement dealing with an environ- mental "global bad." The protocol aims to control proach involves governments in a task to which they are generally ill suited: picking good invest- consumption, and hence emissions, of CFCs and related substances that deplete ozone (see Chapter ments. But financing specific investments has the advantage of making the use of funds more trans- 2). By the mid-1980s world consumption of CFCs parent to donors and local industries. An alterna- was about 1 million tons a year, 80 percent of it in industrial countries. tive is the use of market-oriented mechanismsfor example, the allocation of some import quotas by tender in Singapore. Such policies provide incen- How AGREEMENT WAS REACHED. The first evi- dence that CFCs might not be benign emerged in tives to the private sector to adopt least-cost the early 1970s. In 1977 the U.S. Congress banned methods of substitution while encouraging con- CFCs in aerosols. The ban stimulated develop- sumers to switch to less CFC-intensive products, ment of alternative technologies at lower costs but it may be harder to calculate the additional costs entailed. than predicted, allaying fears that a phaseout of Total costs. The Interim Fund provides funding CFCs would be impossible or prohibitively costly. Evidence of ozone depletion continued to accumu- only for the first three years of the program. The late, and, although uncertainties remained, during ultimate costs may be much larger, and an expan- sion of the fund may be necessary. the late 1980s progressively more ambitious agree- ments were reached, culminating in 1990 with a The grace period. Developing countries have binding agreement to phase out consumption of been given longer than industrial countries to CFCs and related chemicals in industrial countries phase out CFCs. If this grace period were only by 2000. used to delay action, however, it would not Under the Montreal Protocol and subsequent re- achieve its purpose, which is to minimize the bur- visions, developing country consumption of CFCs den on developing countries. Current arrange- may rise to specified ceilings and will be frozen in ments offer no incentives for a more rapid 1996, after which it must be phased out by 2010. A phaseout than that prescribed under the agree- ban was agreed on trade between parties and non- ment, although the benefits of greater speed are now commonly agreed to exceed the costs. In spite parties to the protocol in the substances controlled of this, some developing countries are planning to by the protocol, products made with them, and phase out CFC use more rapidly than required, products containing them. Even so, chlorine con- and private industry in many countries is pressing centrations in the atmosphere are unlikely to re- forward in the search for substitutes. turn to their pre-CFC level until the end of the next century. The agreement also includes two impor- The Montreal Protocol is often viewed as an ex- tant new provisions: an Interim Multilateral Fund ample of what can be achieved through interna- 157 tional cooperation. Actually, the Montreal Protocol as modest declines in rainfall cause substantial may prove more a special case than a model for losses. Even when the pattern of climate change is action on more complex and costly global issues, similar, it may affect countries differently because such as greenhouse warming and biological diver- of differences in ecology, economic activity, or the sity. A number of factors made it easier. For values placed on natural habitats and other envi- example: ronmental resources. Action was easier once ozone depletion was Countries are responsible for different observed rather than merely postulated by amounts of greenhouse gas emissions. The richer scientists. countries have been emitting large amounts for A small group of products was involved, for many years and have thus contributed a dispro- which substitutes appear to be technically possi- portionate share of accumulated gases in the atmo- ble, although more expensive. sphere (about 60 percent of carbon dioxide from The fact that there are only a few producers fossil fuels). On the other hand, emissions from worldwide and that the main CFC manufacturers low-income countries, starting from a lower base, also make the main substitutes makes effective im- are growing more rapidly and will become more plementation more likely. important in the future. Most of the parties to the Montreal Protocol Measures to reduce emissions are one re- therefore perceived that the gains from cooperat- sponse to the threat of climate changethey seek ing would exceed the costs of not doing so. The to prevent the problem. Another response is to negotiations carry a number of other important seek to adapt, by investing in assets that will miti- lessons: gate the impact of any climate change on economic Even for a problem that is relatively inexpen- and social activities. The relative costs and benefits sive to address, negotiations can be quite of these two approaches will differ across involved. countries. Incorporating payments to defray the costs of Some countries are heavily dependent on ex- phasing out CFCs explicitly in the formal agree- ports of fossil fuels and are likely to suffer from ment helped to bring on board some of the key policies that would reduce world demand. They parties. might respond by reducing prices to stimulate Making payments to countries eligible for as- demand. sistance has proved cumbersome. As of late 1991 Despite these difficulties, there are various mea- payments into the fund were behind schedule sures that can be adopted at a national or an inter- (less than half of what was due had been paid), national level to reduce current emissions of and there was not yet a smoothly functioning greenhouse gases and to leave the world better mechanism for disbursing the funds. placed to address the problem. In important re- spects, such measures overlap with policies to pro- Responding to the threat of greenhouse warming mote the efficient production and use of energy and the development of clean energy technologies The greenhouse effect is a global issue because all that have been identified in Chapter 6. emissions of greenhouse gases, regardless of their origin, affect climate. However, the costs and Uncertainty and the range of policy alternatives benefits of measures to mitigate the greenhouse effect may be spread very unevenly across coun- Setting aside the problems of reaching agreement tries. As a result, the negotiations leading up to on a global strategy, there are two fundamental any international agreement on greenhouse warm- reasons why it is extraordinarily difficult to formu- ing will be difficult and lengthy. late an appropriate response to greenhouse Among the factors that must be taken into ac- warming. count are the following: First, the lags between action and effect will in- Climate change will differ across countries. evitably be long. Even adopting stringent mea- Regional climate predictions are highly uncertain. sures to reduce output of long-lived greenhouse The evidence suggests that climate changes will be gases immediately will not stop their atmospheric smaller but more rapid in equatorial areas than in concentration from rising until late into the next the temperate zones. century. This means that some climate change will The damage will differ across countries. Some certainly occur and will probably require invest- countries may find their climate improving and ments to mitigate its impact, whatever policies are may gain, while others may find that such effects followed. 158 Box 8.3 How knowledge of greenhouse gases and climate has evolved For decades scientists have studied the climatic effects What has been learned of greenhouse gases (GHGs). In 1827 Fourier con- Perhaps the main lesson of recent scientific re- ceived the theory of the greenhouse effect. Arrheriius search on global warming is the importance of tran- published in 1896 an analysis of possible climate sient change (the path of change over time, given the change caused by industrial emissions of radiatively lags in the climate system), as opposed to equilibrium active gases. Early in the twentieth century there was a change (the change that would occur once all the lags lively scientific debate on whether atmospheric carbon had worked through the system, which may take de- dioxide would increase and lead to warming, or decline cades or centuries). Unfortunately, transient climate and lead to cooling. Major advances in measurement of change can be only crudely simulated. greenhouse gas concentrations and physical calcula- More sophisticated analyses of the historical tem- tions of the greenhouse effect were made in the 1950s perature record suggest that the temperature sensi- and 1960s. Carbon dioxide accumulations were first tivity to greenhouse gases may be in the lower range of raised as a national concern in the United States in a climate model predictions. 1965 report of the President's Science Advisory In the early 1980s a rise of several meters in the sea Committee. level was considered a possibility. By 1990 the esti- In the 1970s attention switched from greenhouse mated range was 0.2 meters to 0.7 meters by the year warming to the possibility of global cooling, motivated 2070 (Houghton, Jenkins, and Ephraums 1990). in part by a cooling trend that began about 1940. By the early 1980s fears of global warming had revived, again What might be learned partly because temperatures indicated an end to the Improvements in computing capabilities will allow cooling trend. By the middle of the 1980s a number of more refined simulations of the path of climate change national and international scientific panels had issued and better understanding of key climate processes such reports suggesting that mean global temperature as cloud and ocean feedback. Improvements in the col- would rise between 1.5° and 4.5° Celsius (and possibly lection and analysis of temperature data would enable higher) by some time in the twenty-first century (Car- scientists to verify the results from climate models. Fi- bon Dioxide Assessment Committee 1983; Bolin and nally, more detailed analysis of impacts, coupled with others 1986). better estimates of the timing and regional distribution of change, could help in assessing the costs and bene- fits of alternative policies. Second, there is great uncertainty about the ture should it become necessary. The more weight links between atmospheric concentrations of the is put on the worst possible consequences of cli- gases and climate change and about the economic mate change, even if they have a very low chance and social consequences of greenhouse warming of occurring, the more costs should be incurred for (see Chapter 2). Much has been learned from re- such precautionary actions. search over the past thirty years (Box 8.3) but criti- Take immediate action to stabilize or reduce total cal relationships are still poorly understood, and output of greenhouse gases. the range of possible outcomes is still very broad. The choice among these options depends on an Some scientists worry about the possibility of irre- assessment of the relative costs and benefits of versible change in ecosystems or of thresholds mitigating greenhouse warming. In all three cases above which climate change accelerates rapidly. it is desirable to adopt any policy, such as eliminat- Some suggest that such uncertainty highlights the ing energy subsidies, that simultaneously im- need for immediate, stringent action, while others proves economic performance and reduces output conclude that such a response is unwarranted of greenhouse gases. without better evidence. The range of possible policy responses can be THE BENEFITS OF MITIGATING GREENHOUSE WARM- divided into three broad categories: ING. The climate change that might arise from the Do nothing. Finance additional research but in- increases in greenhouse gas concentrations pre- cur no other costs until the extent and implications dicted for the next century could have widespread of warming become clearer. effects. Take out an insurance policy. Adopt precaution- Agriculture and livestock would be affected, ary measures that entail modest costs now but will although it is uncertain whether global agricultural reduce the costs of a stronger response in the fu- potential would increase or decrease. The effects 159 may be severe in some regions, especially those THE COSTS OF PREVENTING CLIMATE CHANGE. The that are marginal today. The evidence is not com- costs of preventing climate change rise with the plete enough to suggest a systematic pattern of extent and the speed of the reduction in the output gains or losses for developing countries. of greenhouse gases. For carbon dioxide, modest Forests and other natural ecosystems could be reductions could be achieved at zero or minimal threatened. Some species or ecosystems may be cost by eliminating subsidies for energy use and lost as a result; others may flourish as areas hospi- deforestation and by disseminating information table to them increase. about efficient energy-saving technologies. A sec- Human settlements, especially in areas that ond set of measures would involve low costs be- are already vulnerable to flooding, droughts, land- cause they draw on the synergy between reducing slides, and severe windstorms, could be severely greenhouse gas emissions and achieving other lo- affected. A rise in the sea level could flood agri- cal objectives, environmental and economic. For cultural land in heavily populated coastal low- example, policies to reduce the use of coal might lands. Vector-borne and viral diseases could shift be justified partly because they reduce local air to higher latitudes, putting new populations at pollution from particulates. Thereafter, the margi- risk. However, climatic conditions for human set- nal cost of reducing emissions rises rapidly as tlements could also improve in some areas. higher taxes or other controls affect the efficiency Any complex and poorly understood system can of resource allocation, output, and future growth. spring surprises. This applies to the climate and its These costs may be lowered by phasing in emis- impact on human societies and natural ecosys- sions reductions and encouraging the develop- tems. A rise in global temperatures might cause ment of alternative technologies. The costs of re- some radical changes, although their magnitude ducing methane emissions have received less and their probability cannot yet be analyzed. It is attention. The largest sources of methane associ- not yet possible to rule them inor outand it is ated with human activity are agriculture and ani- impossible to estimate the associated damage mal husbandry. On current knowledge, it would without a clearer idea of how such changes might be necessary to reduce output of some agricultural arise and what they would imply. products to reduce methane emissions substan- Detailed estimates of the damage that climate tially. This would imply extra costs for producing change may cause have so far been attempted only alternative foodstuffs. for the industrial countries, mainly the United Numerous studies have estimated the costs of States. The very partial evidence so far available reducing the output of greenhouse gases. The suggests that the damage is likely to be relatively range is wide, reflecting different assumptions modest. One study (IPCC 1990) estimates the costs about growth, capital mobility, the costs of substi- of protection against inundation from a rise of 1 tute technologies, and the underlying rate of de- meter in the sea level at 0.04 percent of world GDP. cline in energy per unit of output. Several studies For some countries, however, such as the small suggest that stabilizing emissions of greenhouse island states, the costs would be much larger. gases at present levels appears to mean a reduc- Studies for the United States have estimated the tion of global GDP of between 3 and 7 percent by total costs of adapting to climate change induced the end of the next century (Hoeller, Dean, and by the equivalent of doubling carbon dioxide con- Nicolaisen 1990). For developing countries the centrations at about 1 percent of GDP (Cline 1991; costs may well be higher. Two global studies which Nordhaus 1990, 1991, 1992; and National Acad- include one or more developing countries suggest emy of Sciences forthcoming). For longer-term that they may face costs in relation to GDP which warming over the next 250 years, the costs might are almost twice as high as the world average amount to 6 percent of GDP in the United States (Manne and Richels forthcoming; Whalley and (Cline 1991). As emphasized above, there is a high Wigle 1991). The high costs for these countries re- degree of uncertainty associated with these esti- flect a number of factors that make adjustment mates. Some costs may not be quantifiable and are more difficultlimited ability to use less energy in not included in the analyses, particularly damage industry, low capital mobility, shortage of funds to natural ecosystems, including species loss. for investment, and heavy reliance on low-cost but Also, some of the gains from climate change in high-carbon energy supplies. certain areas may have been missed. Changes in the structure of the world economy over the next Choosing among the policy options century will also affect these cost estimates Bringing together the various estimates of eco- considerably. nomic costs and benefits leads to a simple conclu- 160 siori: the balance of the evidence does not support in that world energy prices are assumed to remain a case for doing nothing, but neither does it sup- constant; the projected reductions in demand port stringent measures to reduce emissions could lead to lower world prices, which would nowthe costs are too high in relation to the pro- tend to increase energy consumption above the spective benefits. This conclusion applies particu- predicted levels. larly to the developing countries, which face high Energy taxes can play an important role in a costs of reducing greenhouse gas output. Indeed, precautionary strategy. In many European coun- the evidence implies that investments with real tries, coal, the fuel with the highest carbon con- rates of return as low as 5 percent could do more tent, is the least taxed. Simply on the grounds of for future generations than investments in large raising tax revenue in the least distortionary man- reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. The ef- ner and improving local air quality, this bias in fects of climate change, however, could fall heavily favor of coal should be removed. Well-designed on the poor and on particularly vulnerable coun- carbon taxes would give market signals for effi- tries. In that event, these countries should receive cient energy use and provide incentives for devel- financial assistance to cover their losses. The in- oping new technologies (Box 8.4). The EC is con- come growth made possible by the additional gen- sidering a carbon tax, but it may allow exemptions eral investment would be more than sufficient to for heavy industry, which would blunt the incen- cover such help. tive for reducing carbon dioxide emissions and The wisest course is to make modest immediate make energy taxation more rather than less reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases and distortionary. investments designed to lower the cost of achiev- ing larger reductions should this become neces- DEVELOPING RENEWABLE ENERGY. Any long-term sary in the future. Such an insurance policy, which strategy to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of would go further than economic efficiency alone greenhouse gases must uncouple economic would dictate, is justified by uncertainty about the growth from growth in carbon dioxide emissions. physical and economic effects of climate change Reducing the amount of energy used per unit of and by the lags between action and response. GDP will be one element in such a strategy, but a shift away from fossil fuels will also be essential. A precautionary policy INFORMATION AND RESEARCH. The case for choosing the insurance option is based on current knowledge of greenhouse warming combined Table 8.1 Effects of eliminating subsidies with estimates of the costs and benefits of reduc- on commercial energy in Eastern Europe ing emissions. As noted above, the returns to re- and the former U.S.S.R. and in developing ducing the substantial uncertainty about the eco- countries nomic, social, and environmental effects of climate Eastern change will be high. So a crucial part of any insur- Eu rope and former Developing ance strategy will be to collect additional informa- Effect U.S.S.R. countries tion and fund scientific research. Financing will be Reduction in emissions, 1995 needed for work related to the developing coun- Amount (millions of tons of tries (see Chapter 9). Governments should also carbon) 446 234 prepare to act if evidence emerges that (a) more As share of projected regional stringent reductions in greenhouse emissions will emissions (percent) 29 11 As share of projected global be required or (b) their citizens and economies emissions (percent) 7 4 need protection from the effects of climate change. Cumulative reduction, 1991-2000 Amount (millions of tons of ENERGY SUBSIDIES AND TAXES. As Chapter 6 carbon) 3,796 2,318 noted, many developing countries subsidize con- As share of projected cumulative sumption of commercial energy. Eliminating such regional emissions (percent) 24 11 subsidies would reduce carbon dioxide emissions As share of projected cumulative while yielding substantial economic gains. Table global emissions (percent) 6 4 Note: The base case is derived from World Bank projections of 8.1 provides rough estimates of the effect that re- energy demand. In this scenario, worldwide carbon dioxide ducing subsidies would have on carbon dioxide emissions increase by about 20 percent between 1990 and 2000. Sources: World Bank staff estimates using Bates and Moore, emissions (conventionally expressed as tons of car- background paper; Imran and Barnes 1990; Marland and others bon). These estimates represent an upper bound 1989; Hughes 1991. 161 Box 8.4 Carbon taxes, energy prices, and tax reform Energy is relatively easy to tax, and many countries bon tax might be justified on local environmental rely on energy taxes as a source of revenue. Even so, grounds alone. The health benefits associated with the the structure of energy prices is often not what would reduction of nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide as a be desirable on economic or environmental grounds. result of imposing a $10 a ton carbon tax would be large Because energy use has a variety of environmental ef- in countries with low energy taxes, such as Indonesia fects, a tax on any one pollutant will not necessarily and the United States. meet all the objectives of energy taxation equally well. Revenue generation The key issues are the overall level of energy taxation and the extent of differentiation between fuels. At the Eliminating subsidies for energy consumption would very least, no fuel should be subsidized. Taxes on the raise more than $230 billion worldwide (Shah and carbon content of fuels are targeted specifically at emis- Larsen, background paper [b]). Beyond that, introduc- sions of carbon dioxide. By altering the relative prices ing even a modest carbon tax of $10 a ton could raise of different energy sources, they will induce substitu- about $55 billion. In countries whose 1987 GDP per tion away from carbon-rich fuels. Use of coal emits the capita was less than $900, such a tax would yield reve- most carbon and is also the most serious source of en- nues worth an average of more than 1 percent of GDP ergy-related local pollution. A carbon tax may therefore and 5.7 percent of government revenue. improve welfare indirectly by reducing emissions of Welfare costs particulates. Petroleum is the second most carbon-in- tensive of the primary sources of energy. Taxing gas- A carbon tax may be less distortionary than other sig- oline and diesel fuel is a substitute for more direct mea- nificant sources of tax revenue. Shifting the tax burden sures for dealing with traffic pollution and urban from inefficient taxes to a carbon tax may improve wel- congestion, so that a carbon tax may have secondary fare. But since broadly based taxes such as sales, value benefits through its effect on vehicle use. added, and income taxes incur lower welfare costs per A study commissioned for this Report (Shah and unit of revenue raised than do fuel taxes (see Hughes Larsen, background paper [aj) found that in the ab- forthcoming), fuel taxes should be regarded primarily sence of efficient taxes on local pollution, a higher car- as instruments for achieving environmental objectives. Stabilizing carbon emissions requires a switch to renewables Figure 8.1 How increasing alternative energy sources affects carbon emissions, 1990-2050 Alternative energy scenario: Annual carbon emissions sources of primary energy under two scenarios Percent Index (1990= 100) 100 350 80 Fossil fuels 300 enario/# 250 60 200 40 150 Renewables 100 Alternative energy scenario 20 50 0 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Note: Carbon emissions in 1990 are about 6 billion tons. All data after 1990 are projections. a. The share of renewables in primary energy sources remains at its 1990 level in this scenario. Sources: World Bank staff estimates; Anderson and Bird 1992. 162 Figure 8.1 illustrates two scenarios for the evolu- function of the stock of greenhouse gases, not of tion of total carbon dioxide emissions based on the annual emissions. Countries should therefore be projections for world energy demand presented in allowed to choose the speed at which they reduce Chapter 6. Continued reliance on fossil fuels leads their emissions if the cumulative addition of green- to a tripling of emissions by 2050, whereas with a house gases does not exceed a safe level. Fixing shift toward renewable energy sources the in- annual percentage targets would add an unneces- crease would be only 25 percent. The renewable sary constraint. So would fixing separate emission energy scenario demonstrates the magnitude of targets for each gas rather than allowing tradeoffs the shift from fossil to renewable sources that among gases on the basis of their climatic effect. would be required to stabilize carbon dioxide emis- The examples of Egypt and India illustrate this sions. Even if the share of renewable sources were point (Box 8.6). Substantial burdens can be re- to rise from less than 10 percent of total primary duced to more manageable levels with few or no energy demand in 2000 to 60 percent in 2050an differential climatic effects if efficient adjustment unprecedentedly rapid shifta significant increase targets are set. Making backstop technologies in carbon dioxide emissions would still occur. available eventually reduces the costs even more. The shift toward renewable energy can be pro- But allowing flexibility in phasing emissions re- moted by appropriate government policies. The ductions poses an important problem. The optimal key is energy prices, as discussed above, since path might be to delay most reductions for a con- these provide the incentive for the development and installation of new technologies. In addition, renewable energy should receive larger shares of national expenditures on energy research and de- velopment. New technologies should also be sup- Box 8.5 Afforestation: not a panacea ported by financing the dissemination of informa- for preventing climate change tion and the establishment of pilot projects in As trees decay or are burned, carbon dioxide is developing countries (see Chapter 9). released. As trees grow, they capture carbon diox- ide. But afforestation reduces net emissions only OTHER MEASURES. Many afforestation projects as long as forests are growing. Once a forest is are justified on economic and local environmental mature, the emissions from decay just offset the carbon fixing from new growth. If a forest is cut grounds. Growing extra trees can slow the in- down and the wood used, its carbon will eventu- crease in net emissions by fixing carbon. But be- ally be returned to the atmosphere. Offsetting cause afforesting large areas solely to fix carbon emissions from fossil fuels would require contin- would be extremely costly, afforestation cannot be ual additions to the forest stock. relied on to "solve" the problem of carbon dioxide Temperate forests sequester about 2.7 tons of emissions (Box 8.5). carbon per hectare a year for the first eighty years of their lives. In temperate areas about 400 million hectares of growing forests would be required to Long-term considerations sequester I billion of the 3 billion-4 billion tons of carbon that accumulate in the atmosphere each As knowledge of climate change improves, the ev- yearmore than the current forested area of the idence may warrant stronger action to reduce United States, which is about 300 million hectares. emissions. The costs could be substantial. It will In the tropics, where less carbon is sequestered therefore be essential to adopt policies that involve per hectare (Houghton 1990), locking up 1 billion the least loss of welfare and to consider their im- tons of carbon a year would require about 600 million hectares of growing forest, the equivalent pact on equity. of about 75 percent of the area of the Amazon basin. Intensive forest management that reduced SETTING EFFICIENT TARGETS. Considerable gains the rotation period could increase the sequestra- can be made by reducing emissions in efficient tion rate per hectare, but only at substantial addi- ways. Uniform targets impose greater adjustment tional cost. costs on some countries than on others. Giving These calculations show that afforestation is no individual countries different targets could lower panacea for greenhouse warming. Nonetheless, afforestation projects that are justified on other the aggregate cost of meeting a global target. environmental and economic grounds can also Adopting targets for annual reductions, rather help to reduce net carbon emissions. than setting cumulative targets, will also impose significant extra costs. The scale of warming is a 163 Box 8.6 Greenhouse policy alternatives in developing countries: the cases of Egypt and India If, eventually, targets for substantial reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions are adopted, develop- Box figure 8.6b General and specific targets for ing countries could face the prospect of curbing the greenhouse gas emissions in India growth of their emissions. Background papers by Blitzer and others commissioned for this Report ex- plored how the design of emission targets would affect Index of policy inefficiency a the welfare costs of these adjustments for two coun- 0.7 tries. Scenarios for Egypt and India were examined 0.6 using dynamic optimization models for the period to 0.5 2030. The models take account of features that will be important to individual countries, such as industrial structure and consumption of different sources of energy. Egypt: flexibility in timing Controlling concentrations of greenhouse gases in- volves managing cumulative net emissions. A simple approach is to stipulate annual reductions. But there 20 percent 30 percent 40 percent are alternatives that allow for flexibility tailored to the Reduction targets possibilities and preferences of individual countries while reducing cumulative emissions by the same General target for addition to warming effect amount. The high cost of the simple approach is shown in Box figure 8.6a. If a cumulative target is phased in at Specific targets for annual emissions of an optimal pace rather than reached through a fixed carbon dioxide and of methane annual reduction, the welfare costs decline substan- tially. These gains, however, are achieved only by ac- a. Ratio of percentage decline in welfare to percentage reduction cepting that emissions reductions eventually have to be in warming effect, both relative to a base case with no limits on emissions. Welfare is measured as the utility of discounted consumption over the time period of the model. Source: Blitzer and others, background paper (b). Box figure 8.6a Limiting carbon dioxide emissions in Egypt: cumulative and annual targets made. The shock is cushioned by planning in advance, Reduction in welfare (percent) not just putting off a decision. 15 India: taking into account more than one greenhouse gas Annual 10 targets Carbon dioxide accounts for a large sharemore than become 50 percentof the warming effect attributable to hu- infeasible man activities. But other gases play a role. Of these, 5 methane is probably the most important for developing countries. Since irrigated rice production and animal 0 husbandry give rise to these emissions, controlling 20 percent 30 percent 40 percent them would affect critical sectors in developing econ- omies. The case of India is illustrative because of the Reduction in emissions importance of its agricultural sector. The technological options for reducing methane Cumulative emissions target emissions in agriculture are more limited than for car- Annual emissions targets bon dioxide, and the burden of methane reductions is correspondingly greater. Adding the same annual con- straints on methane as on carbon dioxide roughly qua- druples total welfare losses. The possibilities for reduc- Note: Welfare is measured as the utility of discounted consumption over the time period of the model. Reductions in ing methane emissions while maintaining agricultural welfare and emissions are relative to a base case with no limits on output are limited. The economy must therefore con- emissions. tract much more to meet a separate methane constraint Source: Blitzer and others, background paper (a). than if the country can choose between gases to achieve the same climatic effect (see Box figure 8.6b). 164 siderable period. Eventually, countries would Trades between rich and poor countries would have to live up to commitments made long ago, facilitate allocating rights by population rather than and it could be difficult to make them stick. Some income safeguards will be needed to ensure that countries actually adhere to a long-term strategy. Figure 8.2 Scenarios for allocating capacity DISTRIBUTIONAL ISSUES. The way that targets for to emit carbon dioxide if greenhouse gas emissions reductions are set has important impli- warming effect is stabilized at 2xCO2 cations for equity. Steps to limit emissions allocate (warming effect of emissions in watts a global common resource: atmospheric carrying per square meter) capacity. An agreement to a uniform percentage reduction in emissions would implicitly allocate If allocated If allocated those rights according to current emissions, favor- by population by income ing the world's richer populations, whose per cap- .83 1.83 ita emissions are high. For example, the per capita carbon dioxide emissions of the United States are Capacity almost ten times those of China. If the approach to emit as that every human has an equal right to the atmo- of 1950 0.50 spheric resource were taken, rights to future use 1.02 0.45 could be allocated according to population. An- other option is to allocate rights according to some measure of output, such as GDP. That would pro- mote energy efficiency but not equity. Any alloca- tion of future emission rights ought to take some Cumulative account of cumulative past emissions, since green- effects of house gases emitted decades ago continue to con- actual emissions, tribute to warming. 1950-88 0.22 What might the alternatives for allocating atmo- spheric carrying capacity look like? Figure 8.2 as- sumes, for purely illustrative purposes, that the If allocated If allocated by population by income warming effect of greenhouse gases is stabilized at 1.08 1.08 the equivalent of doubling the preindustrial level of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. It then shows 0.95,) _, how rights to use this fixed amount of atmospheric Remaining capacity carrying capacity might be shared. to emit 0.29 Allocating rights according to population in 1988 0.23 leaves developing countries with substantial ca- pacity to continue emitting gases, while the high- income countries would have a net deficit equiva- o Low-income countries Middle-income countries lent to about the amount that they emitted in 0 High-income countries Total 1980-88. Thus, on this formula the cumulative past emissions of the richer countries exceed their fu- ture share of the atmospheric carrying capacity; Note: For illustrative purposes, it is assumed that the greenhouse gas warming effect is stabilized at the equivalent of double they have exhausted their right to emit. preindustrial carbon dioxide concentrations (2xCO2 ). Actual emissions exclude deforestation due to lack of reliable data. 1950 Allocating rights according to income, which is used as the starting point because the data series on emissions leaves all country groups with the potential to emit from fossil fuels and cement manufacturing begins in that year. Numbers may not sum to totals because of rounding. more greenhouse gases in the future, looks more Source: World Bank staff estimates. feasible. The richest countries, however, take the lion's share of this potentially valuable resource. TRADING EMISSION RIGHTS. These schemes show pacity, although the practical difficulties of making how rights to emit might be allocated, but the al- such a market work are substantial. For instance, if location need not translate directly into emissions rights were allocated on the basis of population, targets. Countries could profitably trade their the industrial world would purchase rights from rights to use a share of atmospheric carrying ca- the world's poorer countries. The outcome of such 165 a hypothetical trade is difficult to predict, but the biological diversity, since people do not have to magnitudes could be large. If rights to emit were pay to derive these benefits. As a consequence, sold at $25 per ton of carbon, the industrial world countries acting on their own will tend to protect would have to pay developing countries about $70 their biological diversity less than if they took its billion to afford one year's emissions at 1988 global value into account. levels. Such a sum roughly matches total official Two questions need to be addressed: development finance in 1989. How can developing countries manage their resources in their own best interests? Biological diversity: an approach to common How should the world at large contribute to concerns the protection of resources that people value but do not own? Humans have a lot of company on the earth. Mil- lions of species of plants, animals, and other or- Efficient management of natural resources is es- ganisms enrich our environment. Awareness of sential from both perspectives, and Chapter 7 de- the importance of this biological diversity has scribes a broad range of measures needed to grown in recent years along with concern that achieve it. In preserving biological diversity, the more effective action is needed to preserve it. starting pointas in other areas of environmental There is a particular sense of urgency because de- protectionshould be policies that both promote struction of ecosystems and species extinctions en- development and relieve excessive pressure on tail irreversible losses. natural resources (Box 8.7). In the absence of strong efforts to exploit these "win-win" oppor- Priorities for international action Biological diversity is a matter of international con- cern, but it is not global common property. The habitats supporting biological diversity, other than those in international waters, belong to individual Box 8.7 Protecting biological countries that have an interest in managing a valu- diversity: key complementarities with able national resource well. At the same time, pro- local development activities tecting biological diversity is of international con- Programs that raise economic output in other sec- cern because its benefits accrue not only to the tors and, as a by-product, reduce pressures on local population but alsosometimes in rather dif- wildlife and natural habitats include: ferent waysto people all over the world. Some of Measures that raise yields in agriculture and those benefits have to do with personal values or reduce the need for area expansionefficiency in preferences and consequently are difficult to de- agricultural pricing and marketing policies; re- fine objectively and to quantify. moval of subsidies for land clearance and mecha- nization; good soil management practices; The tangible economic and health benefits are agroforestry programs; and human resource de- reflected directly in the use of plants, animals, and velopment in rural areas services from natural ecosystems (see Chapters 2 Policies that increase nonfarm employment and 7). Benefits of this kind can to some extent be opportunities, such as efficient development poli- captured by the use of appropriate charging mech- cies for trade, agriculture, and industry anisms. In addition, because of their individual Sustainable forestry practices that remove preferences or moral views, many people attach subsidies for logging and other activities that cause deforestation and encourage sustainable af- value to the existence of species and habitats that forestation projects in ecologically less sensitive they may never see or use. They may wish to save areas. natural ecosystems intact for future generations. Programs designed to capture the value of bio- Or they may simply feel an ethical responsibility to logical diversity for the local population include: avoid destruction of the variety of life forms that have evolved on earth. Growing voluntary contri- Development of options for sustainable use of resources in areas of rich biological diversity butions to conservation organizations bear witness Programs to add value to biological resources to these values, as does the criticism in industrial (for example, genetic prospecting) countries of developing countries' conservation Development of ecotourism. policies. But the market will not reflect the spiri- tual and emotional pleasure that people draw from 166 tunities, policies for direct protection are likely to A number of options are under consideration; fail. there is no consensus on which is best. All agree The more developing countries can profit from that developing countries should have a high pri- the true value of their resources, the smaller will ority, largely because tropical ecosystems are so be the divergence between national and interna- rich but also because industrial countries now re- tional concerns. Beyond that, if the international tain so little of their own habitats in pristine state. community wants to ensure a higher level of pro- The geographic distribution of various priority tection than would be chosen by nations acting on areas is shown in Figure 8.3. their own, policymakers in the world's richer These priority areas rarely lie in the countries countries must translate the concerns of their citi- that can afford to spend the most on conservation. zens into financial flows to developing countries. Satisfactory figures are difficult to obtain, since They must be prepared to pay the full costs of the spending on conservation appears under a wide additional conservation. That implies a transfer of range of categories. Many countries raise some additional resources, not merely a restructuring of revenues from their national parks, so net outlays existing aid. may be less. One can, however, estimate a rough Many developing countries are uncomfortable order of magnitude of spending on biological di- about accepting funding to manage their resources versity using information on budgetary allocations because of the implied loss of autonomy. Contrib- for national parks management. Table 8.2 shows uting countries may also worry that they are pay- ing for programs that recipient countries should undertake anyway. To address these problems, Table 8.2 Conservation spending in selected countries developing countries should make sure that their As share of Total resource use is consistent with their own develop- government As share of spending ment objectives when accepting international sup- spending GDP (millions of Country and year (percent) (percent) dollars) port. Even so, the problem of moral hazard will be hard to avoid altogether. Botswana, 1984 0.32 0.11 1.3 The full economic costs of preserving biological Denmark, 1989 0.11 0.04 45.0 Indonesia, 1988 0.04 0.01 6.0 diversity will typically be much larger than the di- Malaysia, 1988 0.05 0.01 5.0 rect expenditures on protection. If certain uses of Sri Lanka, 1988 0.03 0.01 0.6 natural habitats are prohibited or reduced, the for- Tanzania, 1983 0.17 0.05 2.9 gone revenue is part of the cost and should be United States, 1988 0.15 0.04 1,702.3 covered by the assistance provided to encourage Sources: For conservation spending in Botswana and Tanzania, national data; for Denmark and Finland, UNEP 1990; for the United preservation. These opportunity costs will change States, U.S. Department of the Interior 1991; for Indonesia, over time, since they are closely linked to the value Malaysia, and Sri Lanka, World Bank data. For GDP, World Bank data; for exchange rates and government expenditures, IMF data. of land in alternative uses. Thus, increasing pres- sure on land resources will raise the opportunity costs of keeping out of production segments of these estimates for a few countries. The figures natural habitat suitable for agricultural use. Finan- suggest that spending on conservation-related ac- cial arrangements to support countries that protect tivities may amount to between 0.01 and 0.05 per- species and habitats will break down if they fail to cent of GDP in developing countries and about take account of such changes. 0.04 percent in industrial countries, implying a to- Some domestic policies, in addition to being tal of about $6 billion-$8 billion a year. Estimates of economically inefficient, may encourage the de- international transfers for conservation activities, struction of natural habitats and species. In such equally hard to come by, are roughly $200 million a cases, the international community may reasona- year, or about 3 percent of world spending on con- bly choose not to support conservation programs, servation activities (excluding lending from multi- on the grounds that effectiveness would be under- lateral development banks, which is growing rap- mined by the overall policy framework. idly). Most of the spending is in the richer In the longer term there needs to be some agree- countries. Modest increases in the amount of ment on priorities so as to ensure the best use of funds transferred by the international community limited funds. Work is under way to analyze this could allow a significant increase in spending on question more systematically; it will be important conservation in developing countries. Chapter 9 for the future. In the meantime, scientists have discusses further the costs and financing of a pro- attempted to establish criteria to guide action now. gram to protect biological diversity. 167 Priority areas for conservation are mostly in the developing world Figure 8.3 Priority areas for conservation: three approaches Hawaii (US), same wale as main map. Megadiversity countries (Mittermeier and Werner)a Conservation priority areas (National Academy of Sciences)b Hot spots (Myers)c Twelve countries that together are estimated to account for at least 60-70 percent of the world's biodiversity. Tropical areas identified as demanding special conservation attention on the basis of high biodiversity, high endemism, and rapid conversion of forests to other uses. Tropical forest areas and Mediterranean-type areas identified as priorities for conservation because of their high biodiversity, high endemism, and rapid rates of habitat conversion. Together, these areas cover only about 0.5 percent of the earth's land surface but are estimated to have at least 20 percent of its species. Sources:Mittermeier 1988; Mittermeier and Werner 1990; National Academy of Sciences 1980; Myers 1988 and 1990. Mobilizing resources account their own priorities and what is feasible for them. The international community should transfer addi- Second, better coordination is needed to cap- tional funds to developing countries to achieve a italize on the growing interest of private and pub- level of spending that reflects its desire to protect lic donors in supporting developing countries' ef- species and habitats there. Innovative financing forts. International donors recognize that there is mechanisms such as debt-for-nature swaps may growing competition for good projects. Receiving play a useful role. But debt-for-nature swaps can- countries spend much time and effort working not substitute for a concerted effort by the interna- separately with a number of donors. Recipient tional community to make the necessary transfers countries and donors would benefit from a process (Box 8.8). There are three key elements in any akin to the aid group mechanism that matches strategy for making international transfers more country program requirements with a variety of effective. donor capacities and interests. The Brazilian Tropi- First, if increased spending is to be used effi- cal Rainforest Fund is a promising example of this ciently to improve protection, it is important to approach (see Box 9.4). develop programs rather than fund discrete proj- Third, finance for conservation efforts needs ects. The receiving countries themselves should to be sustained. Unlike traditional investment take the initiative in designing programs for inter- projects, most conservation activities will never national financing to ensure that these take into become self-financing. Even new mechanisms 168 Box 8.8 Debt-for-nature swaps: innovative but limited Debt-for-nature swaps were developed to transform years. Second, many severely indebted countries have commercial debt of developing countries into finance serious budgetary problems that may preclude con- for the environment. The transactions have appeal in verting a foreign debt into a domestic obligation. principle because they can meet two objectives: financ- A recurring issue is the amount of local-currency ing worthwhile environmental activities with substan- bonds the government issues in exchange for the exter- tial leverage for donor funds, while helping to manage nal debt. If the new bonds are close to the face value of developing country debt. In practice, the transactions old debt, the financial leverage of the donor is maxi- are complex, and the instances in which both objec- mized, but so too is the financial obligation of the local tives can best be served with a single instrument are government. In three-quarters of the swaps the new few. "conservation bonds" have a value of about 90 percent Since the first debt-for-nature swap was completed or more of the original debts. (for Bolivia, in 1987), a further sixteen swaps in eight Debt-for-nature swaps financed by NGOs are likely countries have retired nearly $100 million in external to be small in relation to both the overall needs of envi- debt, using original donations of $16 million. Although ronmental funding and to foreign debts. National aid this represents only a small fraction of the commercial agencies in a number of countries, notably the Nether- debt of these countries, it paid for significant conserva- lands, Sweden, and the United States, have made tion efforts, in some cases vastly expanding existing grants available to buy some outstanding debt. These expenditures. debt-for-nature swaps have been valuable for some For NGOs, swaps demanded a new financial exper- countries, but their effect has been more to reallocate tise. NGOs have also had to build up relationships aid than to generate additional resources. Some official with local NGOs and government agencies. For the debts are now eligible for swaps. Part of eligible Paris recipient government, the conversion of external to lo- Club debts can now be exchanged for local-currency cal-currency obligations has several implications for funding of agreed environmental activities. The U.S. economic and debt management. First, debt-for-nature Enterprise for the Americas Initiative provides for lo- swaps imply greater domestic spending by the debtor cal-currency payments on reduced official debt, to be government. To avoid stimulating inflation, most such used to fund eligible environmental projects in Latin swaps have been not for cash but for government America and the Caribbean. bonds, with payments spread out over a number of such as the GEF do not provide long-term financ- high cost. Recipient countries should have assur- ing. If recurrent costs are to be financed over the ance that funding will be provided to maintain the long term, it is essential to find the right balance programs or at least to wind them down in an between the need to provide incentives for pro- orderly fashion should that become necessary. gram development and the donors' requirements Most donors, however, find it difficult to make for accountability. If developing countries devote binding financial commitments for long periods scarce managerial and institutional capacity to con- because of their budget cycles and because they servation programs for the benefit of the world at need assurances that programs will be managed large, adjusting to wavering levels of commitment well as long as finance is provided. from the international community could come at 169 9 The costs of a better environment The costs of protecting and improving the environment appear at first sight to be large. Yet such investments must and can be afforded. With good policies, the costs are modest in comparison with the potential gains from improved efficiency and economic growth. Most investments will pay for themselves. But increased international support will be essential. Local environmental concerns need to be better embedded in official assistance programs, and the close link between environmental quality and poverty reduction warrants additional aid. Concessional funding for global problems is required, but this should not be taken from aid budgets. Access to trade and capital markets in industrial countries will be essential for a sustainable future. I This final chapter examines the costs of the policies The costs of environmental policies can also be and programs discussed in earlier chapters. It con- reduced, as the preceding chapters have shown, cludes that the costs of addressing the main envi- by (a) choosing standards appropriately and con- ronmental priorities are affordablesome because centrating on those options with the highest net of the improvements in economic efficiency they benefits; (b) choosing instruments that encourage bring, others because of their environmental bene- producers and consumers to respond flexibly and fits. Yet even those that appear costless in eco- cost-effectively; (c) preventing damage from the nomic terms may carry a political price. Most pol- outset and avoiding heavy cleanup costs later; and lution and resource degradation occurs because (d) building pollution prevention into new equip- people have enjoyed something for nothing. ment rather than adding it on later. Individual de- When that entitlement is threatened, polluters will veloping countries are already working out solu- resist. In considering the aggregate financial cost tions to their own environmental problems (Box of environmental investments, such political costs 9.1). also need to be borne in mind. Investment requirements: an estimate Finance and the local environment Fortunately, many investments will begin to pay Can countries afford to protect the quality of their for themselves within a few yearseither through environments? For many countries, the proper improved productivity, as with soil conservation, question is the opposite one: can they afford not or through improved health and welfare, as with to? Environmental damage has real and sometimes investments in sanitation and water supply and in crippling costs. A recurring theme of this Report several forms of industrial pollution control. has been that good environmental policies often Others, such as protecting forests and addressing bring good economic returns. They are thus no carbon emissions, will have uncertain but poten- more or less affordable than other desirable invest- tially high returns to future generations. Nev- ments in industry, agriculture, public services, or ertheless, substantial spending will be needed. human resources. Even low-cost investments need careful mainte- 170 nance by skilled workers and involve recurrent growth will allow investment to double in real spending. terms, to $30 billiori-$40 billion a year. Yet without In preparing this Report, rough estimates of the changes in prices and institutional arrangements, costs of environmentally responsible growth in de- the goal of universal provision will still recede. The veloping countries have been made (in 1990 prices) scenarios discussed in Chapter 5 postulated that for selected sectors. Of course, costs will depend investment would gradually rise to 3 percent of on the standards chosen, the time path for reach- gross investment, or from 0.6 to 0.8 percent of ing them, and the policy instruments used. GDP. The shares will probably have to be higher in Clearly, not all countries should invest in the low-income countries if universal provision is to be cleanest technologies immediately. The following achieved in the next forty years, even allowing for figures, which should be treated as orders of mag- the effects of price and institutional reforms. nitude only, assume that new technologies and management practices are phased in over a gener- ELECTRIC POWER. Under the worst scenario, ation. It is assumed, for example, that by 2030 emissions of pollutants will rise tenfold by 2030 emissions controls embodied in the capital stock in from their already unacceptable levels. The alter- developing countries should be roughly equiva- natives described in Chapter 6 show how unneces- lent to the best practices emerging in OECD coun- sary this is. The projections assume that reason- tries today. able improvements in efficiency and pricing policies are achieved over the next twenty-five WATER AND SANITATION. Achieving universal years, while the best control technologies in cur- coverage means not just supplying the 1 billion rent use are applied to all new investments. With people currently without safe water supplies and such reforms, the investments required to meet the 1.7 billion without sanitation but matching the growth of demand, which are already more population growth as well. Annual investment is than $120 billion a year (roughly 15 percent of currently in the range of $15 billion-$20 billion a gross domestic investment, or 4 percent of GDP), yearabout 2.3 percent of gross investment in de- will rise to an average of more than $200 billion a veloping countries. If that share remains constant year in the 1990s. Controlling emissions of particu- over the next fifteen to twenty years, economic lates will raise investment costs by about 1 per- Box 9.1 Innovative approaches to environmental policy Many developing countries have begun in recent years waste generation, and its proceeds would be used to to develop policies and institutions for addressing en- establish and operate central treatment and disposal vironmental problems. Because they often start from facilities. scratch, and because their problems are so pressing, Protecting natural habitats in Costa Rica. In response they have sometimes considered solutions that are un- to increased pressure on protected areas and weak tried or little used in the industrial world. Several ex- management of parks and reserves, a new national sys- amples of such innovative approaches appear in this tem of conservation areas was created in 1986 (Box 7.7). Report. Regional "megaparks," with greater decisionmaking authority and financial autonomy, were created, and Controlling pollution in Mexico City. To control pollu- each is being supported by a different set of interna- tion from transport in Mexico City, regulators have tional donors. chosen to use a combination of regulation and incen- Improving sanitation in Ghana. In low-income areas tives (Box 3.4). These measures are less costly than in Accra voluntary organizations and local entrepre- regulation alone because they discourage driving, neurs operate community latrines, and the municipal whereas most industrial countries merely encourage authority is responsible for desludging and disposing the use of cleaner engines and fuels. In Mexico City of wastes (Chapter 4). measures such as gasoline taxes are being used to re- Setting priorities in Poland. Benefit-cost analysis duce demand and shift travel toward less-polluting provides a basis for setting and implementing environ- modes of transport. mental standards. As described in Chapter 3, a study Treating hazardous wastes in Thailand. An Industrial of air pollution in southeastern Poland found the net Environment Fund has been proposed to finance the benefits to be highest if stricter controls on emissions of treatment of hazardous wastes from industrial sources suspended particulate matter, rather than on emissions (Box 6.5). The fund would be financed from charges on of both particulates and sulfur dioxide, were enforced. 171 cent, or by 0.04 percent of GDP. In regions where measures. The latter often cannot be estimated, as acid deposition is serious enough for controls on they are embodied in the overall plant design or sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides to be justified, a process and cannot easily be distinguished from further 5-15 percent of capital costs (amounting to expenditures on general investment. Some low- about 0.5 percent of the regions' GDPs) would be waste, in-plant measures now being adopted actu- incurred if low-sulfur coals or natural gas were not ally reduce costs and improve profits. available. For this investment, developing coun- The cost of end-of-pipe and in-plant controls to tries would be able in 2030 to produce ten times as reduce industrial emissions and effluents varies much electric power as they do today, with lower among sectors and with the standards set. In the emissions of particulates and of pollutants that 1970s identifiable expenditures on reducing pollu- cause acid rain. tion in industrial countries typically amounted to 2.0-2.5 percent of investment costs. As standards ROAD TRANSPORT. The "unchanged practices" have been tightened, these expenditures have scenario described in Chapter 6 envisages that the risen to 5 percent in Germany and Japan and 4 demand for vehicle fuels in developing countries percent in the United States. Better policies would will grow from 425 million tons of oil equivalent a enable developing countries to spend a smaller year today to 2.3 billion tons by 2030. Phasing in amount than this. If spending on pollution control fuel taxes at levels found in Western Europe today by manufacturers were to approach 2-3 percent of and introducing congestion management schemes investment, developing countries could apprecia- would reduce this consumption to 1.5 billion tons. bly reduce industrial pollution and avoid the costs Investments in cleaner and more-efficient fuels of cleanup later. The extra costs would amount to and engine technologies would bring the main about $10 bihion-$15 billion a year by the end of emissions from urban vehicle traffic to much lower the decade, or 0.2-0.3 percent of GDP. levels than today. Such investments would be tiny in comparison AGRICULTURE. It is not possible to estimate the with other costs of motoring. The extra costs of costs of making agriculture sustainable. Even the introducing unleaded gasoline range from 2 cents land area under stress is not reliably known. But to 10 cents a gallon in OECD countries and average the costs of preventing soil erosion and degrada- about 4 cents a gallon. They would add approxi- tion are comparatively small, while the costs of mately $2 billion a year to developing country ex- rehabilitating degraded areas can be large. The penditures on gasoline; this is equivalent to 0.06 capital costs of prevention vary with the farming percent of today's GDP and less than 1 percent of system, the methods used, and topography: ex- expenditures on vehicles and fuels. Reducing ni- penditures of $50-$150 per hectare (sometimes trogen oxides, unburned hydrocarbons, and car- less) for such measures as farm forestry and con- bon monoxide by using catalytic converters may touring with vetiver grass or other vegetative bar- raise costs by an additional 15 cents a gallon. (This riers are typical; $200-$500 may be required per estimate corresponds broadly to the annualized hectare for "structural" measures (terracing, land capital costs of the controls divided by average fuel leveling, earth banks, and the like) on undegraded consumption.) For diesel vehicles, recently devel- lands. Rehabilitation, in contrast, may cost from oped devices for removing particulates (the largest $500 to several thousand dollars per hectare, de- pollutant), nitrogen oxides, and sulfur have simi- pending on the severity of the problem. The main lar costs. Much can also be accomplished (and at priority must therefore be prevention. Thanks to low cost) by improving the quality of diesel fuels the favorable effects of these practices on farm out- and, especially, vehicle maintenance. Assuming put, payback periods can be short (five to ten years that the cleaner fuels and emissions control prac- or less), providedand this is an important quali- tices are phased in over twenty years, the costs of ficationthat the programs achieve high levels of moving toward the low-polluting scenario dis- participation. Public expenditure will be needed cussed in Chapter 6 would rise to $10 billion a for research, extension, training, education (in- year, or 0.2 percent of GDP, by 2000 and to $35 cluding the costs of encouraging community par- billion a year, or 0.5 percent of GDP, by 2010. ticipation in the programs), and support for infra- structure and afforestation. By far the greatest INDUSTRIAL EMISSIONS AND WASTES. In this area commitment of time and resources, however, will the two elements in costs are explicit investments have to come from the farmers themselves. in end-of-pipe controls and incremental expendi- Not all agricultural lands will need additional tures on "cleanliness-in-the-process" or in-plant investment in preventive measures. But enough is 172 known about the situation in many regions, and stabilization at 12.5 billion population discussed in about measures for preventing soil erosion and Chapter 1 would mean increasing spending to $8 degradation, for a significant program to be billion by 2000. To arrive at the lower-fertility pro- mounted immediately. For example, investments jections, an extra $3 billion a year would be re- of $10 billion-$15 billion a year (0.2-0.3 percent of quired, giving a total of $11 billion a year by 2000, GDP) in the 1990s, including the costs borne by or 0.2 percent of developing country GDP. (It will, the farmers themselves, would probably be suffi- of course, also require better progress on reducing cient to extend the coverage of improved soil man- poverty and increasing access to education.) agement practices by up to 100 million hectares each year. (Currently, 1.1 billion hectares are un- FEMALE EDUCATION. Improving education for der crops in developing countries, and 2.5 billion girls may be the most important long-term envi- hectares are under permanent pasture.) Allowing ronmental policy in the developing world. Edu- for the need to complement agricultural programs cated women have smaller families, and their chil- with reforestation projects in some watersheds dren tend to be healthier and better educated. may raise investment costs by a further $2 billion- Furthermore, women are often the principal man- $3 billion a year (unit costs vary between $500 and agers of natural resources; they gather wood and $1,500 a hectare). The main limits would be the water and undertake much agricultural labor. Bet- capacity of the institutions to implement the pro- ter education will help them to use natural re- grams and the circumstancessuch as tenurial ar- sources more productively and to depend less on rangements, crop prices, and educationthat af- natural resources for income. Educated women fect farmers' responses. will have more opportunities for productive off- There is an urgent need to improve knowledge farm employmenta vital source of income as the of the links between agriculture and environmen- average sizes of farms shrink. Raising the primary tal damage and to survey environmental condi- school enrollment rate for girls to equal that for tions in rural areas. Given the increasing complex- boys in low-income countries would mean educat- ity of rural environmental problems and the need ing an additional 25 million girls each year, at a to raise agricultural yields, more money is needed total annual cost of approximately $950 million. for agricultural research, particularly on the effects Raising the secondary school enrollment of girls to of crop practices on soil loss and fertility (see Boxes equal the rate for boys would mean educating an 7.2 and 7.3). Current national R&D expenditures additional 21 million girls at a total cost of $1.4 by developing countries are approaching $5 billion billion a year. Eliminating educational discrimina- a year, and international expenditures are about tion in low-income countries would thus cost a $350 million. For the reasons discussed in Chapter total of $2.4 billion a year, or about 0.25 percent of 7, both need to be expanded by 30-50 percent in these countries' GDP. relation to projected levels. In addition, a com- mensurate increase in finance is required for train- Putting costs in perspective: the case for reform ing and for disseminating the findings of R&D. Expenditures on extension are presently about The additional costs of the investments listed $4.5 billion a year in developing countries, or $1.5 above would add $75 billion a year by the end of for every hectare under crops and permanent pas- the decade, or about 1.4 percent of the combined ture. To help put agricultural practices on a sus- GDPs of developing countries (Table 9.1). Costs tainable footing, the extension message will need will be higher if an allowance is made for items not to be broadened from the present emphasis on costed above, such as forest protection, the reha- production technologies to include soil conserva- bilitation of environmentally degraded areas, and tion, integrated pest management, the manage- cleanup. And costs may rise over time, even as a ment of pastures, and, more generally, issues of share of GDP, as standards are tightened. Overall resource custody. incremental costs in the range of 2-3 percent of GDP by 2000 would appear appropriate and suff i- POPULATION. Total spending on family planning cient. The estimates are, of course, approximate in developing countries amounts to $4.7 billion a and are not all-embracing; even less are they a year, of which 80 percent is borne by developing financial plan, since such plans can only be devel- countries and 20 percent comes from external as- oped through careful assessments of each coun- sistance. Family planning programs have never re- try's priorities and circumstances. They are indica- ceived more than 2 percent of official development tive and are intended solely to place costs in assistance. To achieve the base case projections of context. 173 Table 9.1 Estimated costs and long-term benefits of selected environmental programs in developing countries Additional investment in 2000 As a percentage Billions of As a percentage of GDP growth, Program dollars a year of GDP1n 2000' 1990-2 000' Long-term benefits Increased investment in water 10.0 0.2 0.5 Over 2 billion more people provided and sanitation with service. Major labor savings and health and productivity benefits. Child mortality reduced by more than 3 million a year. Controlling particulate matter 2.0 0.04 0.1 PM emissions virtually eliminated. (PM) emissions from coal-fired Large reductions in respiratory power stations illnesses and acid deposition, and Reducing acid deposition from 5.0 0.1 0.25 J improvements in amenity. new coal-fired stationsb Changing to unleaded fuels; 10.0 0.2 0.5 Elimination of pollution from lead; controls on the main more than 90 percent reductions in pollutants from vehicles" other pollutants, with improvements in health and amenity. Reducing emissions, effluents, 10.0-15.0 0.2-0.3 0.5-0.7 Appreciable reductions in levels of and wastes from industry ambient pollution, and improvements in health and amenity, despite rapid industrial growth. Low-waste processes often a source of cost savings for industry. Soil conservation and 15.0-20.0 0.3-0.4 0.7-1.0 afforestation, including Improvements in yields and extension and training productivity of agriculture and forests, which increase the economic Additional resources for agri- 5.0 0.1 0.2 returns to investment. Lower cultural and forestry research, pressures on natural forests. All in relation to projected levels, areas eventually brought under and for resource surveys sustainable forms of cultivation and pasture. Family planning (incremental 7.0 0.1 0.3 Long-term world population costs of an expanded stabilizes at 10 billion instead of 12.5 program)' billion. Increasing primary and 2.5 0.05 0.1 Primary education for girls extended secondary education for girls' to 25 million more girls, and second- ary education to 21 million more. Discrimination in education sub- stantially reduced. The GDP of developing countries in 1990 was $3.4 trillion, and it is projected to rise to $5.4 trillion by 2000 (in 1990 prices). The projected GDP growth rate is 4.7 percent a year. Costs may eventually be lowered by the use of new combustion technologies and other measures discussed in Chapter 6. Recurrent expenditures on these items are counted as investments in human resources. These costs, although high in absolute terms, projected growth rate for the 1990s. Over a fifteen- are small in relation to the additional incomes gen- year period, the total real income of countries with erated by good economic management. For exam- good policies should rise by 125 percentmore ple, World Development Report 1991 found that than twice the amount in other countriesand by countries with good economic policies had average twenty to twenty-five times the costs of a full- growth rates fully 2.5 percentage points higher blown environmental program. Because their in- than those with middling and poor policies and comes will be higher, these countries will also be nearly 1 percentage point higher than the average able to afford more environmental protection. 174 Financing environmental expenditures A substantial share of the investment and mainte- Box 9.2 Private finance and the nance expenditures related to the environment environment will be incurred by enterprises and will therefore The International Finance Corporation (IFC) re- be paid for by consumers. These extra costs will be cently undertook nine country studies to deter- reflected in the prices of the final product or ser- mine market potential and opportunities for pri- viceas they should be under the "polluter-pays" vate investment in environmental goods and services. The studieswhich looked at Chile, principle. Thus, environmentally damaging prac- Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, tices and products will be less profitable to pro- Poland, Thailand, and Turkeyconsidered oppor- ducers and less attractive to consumers, while en- tunities in waste management, technology for vironmentally desirable ones will be more control of industrial pollution, and related ser- profitable and attractive, so that there is a conver- vices. In developing countries the market for envi- gence of private and social interests. In this way, ronmental goods and services is still small but is private investment (and the technical and mana- likely to expand rapidly during the next decade. Market growth is driven by several factors, in- gerial skills it brings with it) will be attracted to the cluding the severity of environmental problems, resolution of environmental problems. increasing public awareness of environmental is- With financial and regulatory incentives for pri- sues, growing political support, and international vate action in place, public expenditure can be fo- pressure on developing countries to harmonize cused on such areas as: and enforce environmental laws and regulations. Environmental monitoring and research and As governments respond with environmental leg- the administration of policy islation, strengthened environmental protection Technological research, development, and institutions, and increased enforcement, oppor- tunities are being generated for private invest- demonstration ments in environmental goods and services. The Education and training constraints on public resources in providing tradi- Agricultural research and extension tional public services such as wastewater treat- Provision of supporting public services, such ment and management of solid wastes are also as afforestation; the protection of forests, wildlife, creating opportunities for the private sector to and natural habitats; and the establishment and provide such services. The studies identified more than 200 potential opportunities of this kind. maintenance of national parks. International finance for national environmental policies The financing of environmental investments will more than $80 billion in annual foreign exchange require an increase in export earnings and an ex- earnings by developing countries. pansion of private and official capital flows to de- veloping countries in the coming decades. RESTORING ACCESS TO CAPITAL MARKETS. Access to commercial finance, coupled with expanded for- THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE. eign investment, will make it easier to import Some environmental investments will require im- clean technologies embodied in capital imports. ported capital equipment. By far the most impor- There is no reason why additional spending on tant source of foreign exchange will be export pollution control should not be financed through earnings. Developing countries are currently ham- commercial markets and, indeed, be profitable for pered by import restrictions, which in some indus- the companies that undertake it (Box 9.2). The en- trial countries have become tighter in recent years. couraging restoration of commercial flows to such A successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round of countries as Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela over trade negotiations that reduced by one-half the tar- the past two years must be extended to a much iff and nontariff barriers in the main industrial wider range of countries. This will require more countries would generate additional annual export consistent policies on the part of borrowing coun- earnings in developing countries of $65 billion by tries and would be facilitated by policies to raise the end of the decadean amount only slightly savings ratesespecially in the public sector. Debt lower than the entire incremental investment pro- relief will be required in a number of countries. gram described above. Robust, environmentally responsible growth in industrial countries can also OFFICIAL ASSISTANCE. It is essential that new in- help. An increase in OECD growth by 1 percent- ternational financing for global environmental age point over a four-year period would generate problems (discussed below) not detract from the 175 Box 9.3 The Global Environment Facility: priorities for greenhouse warming projects The GEF has established principles and priorities to II. Reduction in the emissions intensity of energy guide project design. production Renewables such as photovoltaics, solar-ther- Principles mal, and wind power More technologies are needed to offer options for Biomass gasifiers/gas turbines reducing emissions at least cost. Sustainable biomass production to replace fos- GEF funding should encourage promising but un- sil fuels proven technologies when the technology, economics, Advanced, efficient gas turbine cycles or market conditions are not yet "right." Microhydropower Successful technologies will be those that show Fuel switching to natural gas potential for widespread use and could eventually at- III. Non-carbon-dioxide emissions reductions tract investment from conventional sources. Urban and rural waste treatment Priorities for support Reduction of flaring and venting of natural gas Reduction of releases associated with coal I. End-use efficiency mining Reducing energy intensity of basic materials IV. Generic areas processing More efficient production, transmission, and Efficient motors and drives distribution of energy Irrigation pumpsets Slowing deforestation Lighting and water heating Sequestering carbon dioxide (for example, Vehicle fuel use afforestation) urgent needs of developing countries for develop- implementation of international agreements. ment assistance in general. The elimination of pov- These transfers should not be thought of as devel- erty and the achievement of economic stability and opment assistance, since they should be allocated growth remain the main priorities for develop- in ways that offset the unequal distribution of ment and, as discussed in this Report, will be fun- gains and costs across countries. damental if environmental problems are to be suc- cessfully addressed. At the same time, additional GREENHOUSE WARMING. Finance is required development assistance will be needed to tackle now to assist developing countries in meeting the local environmental problems. Such assistance immediate costs involved in implementing the should not be viewed as separate from develop- precautionary policy discussed in Chapter 8. ment needs but, rather, should be embedded in Increased knowledge is an immediate need. official programs. Three distinct changes are Studies of the vulnerabiities of individual coun- needed. First, development agencies need to as- tries to climate change would be in the interest of sess thoroughly the environmental impact of all the world at large, and so developing countries their lending, especially for irtfrastructural proj- should be helped to undertake them. ects. That will require the further development of Although developing countries should adopt environmental impact assessment techniques. those measures that best promote economic effi- Second, a shift is needed in the balance of aid port- ciency and improve their local environment, it is folios. Development agencies and governments unrealistic to expect them to do more without fur- need to consider how their traditional programs ther incentives. Additional measures in the inter- might deliver environmental improvements. ests of the world at large will require further assis- Third, assistance will be needed for new kinds of tance, such as that already available in pilot form projects that offer environmental rather than under the GEF. For now, the objectives of such purely economic gains. funding should be to broaden the scope for low- Finance and the global environment cost reductions in emissions through technological innovation. That means supporting those projects Funds will be required to enable developing coun- that hold out the most hope for future cost de- tries to meet the additional costs of addressing clines, for future reductions in greenhouse gas global environmental problems and to facilitate the emissions, and for learning by doing. Under the 176 GEF, work is under way to identify promising have an important effect in some areas, as could areas for investment. Box 9.3 lists some of them. many of the "win-win" options discussed in Many of the most promising areas for support Chapters 7 and 8. are in electric power generation and related end- It is not possible to estimate precisely how much use technologies. In particular investments in the is needed to conserve the world's biodiversity, but application of renewable energy would sharply re- estimates for high-priority programs can be made. duce the costs of an accelerated response to green- Much biodiversity can be conserved in protected house warming, if this were to prove necessary. A areas, which form the mainstay of almost every shift in the emphasis of research and develop- conservation strategy. The costs would not be pro- ment, now heavily concentrated on nuclear energy hibitive. At present 4.8 million square kilometers and fossil fuels, should be coupled with more in- of terrestrial and marine areas are under protection ternational collaboration. A long-term government in developing countries, but neither the level of commitment to the development and application protection nor the areas already gazetted are suffi- of renewable energy would encourage manufac- cient. It is estimated that to make the protection of turers to expand their own development from its the areas already gazetted effective and to increase current small base. Expenditures building up to $3 the total area of protected areas by 50 percent over billion-$4 billion a year by the end of the century the next decade would require some $2.5 billion a a commitment much less than industrial country year. By comparison, the United States spends $2 R&D budgets for nuclear powerwould make it billion a year on national parks. possible to mount a major program of research, From the perspective of the developing coun- development, and demonstration projects. tries, however, official assistance for protecting biodiversity is affordable only if it is not at the BI0DIvERsITY. Estimates of the likely direct costs expense of other concessional aid. Considering of achieving a satisfactory level of protection for that disbursements by the International Develop- biological diversity range from millions to billions ment Association (IDA), which cover a wide range of dollars a year over the next decade. The wide of development activities, have been about $4 bil- variation is not surprising. The work of setting na- lion a year over the past few years, diverting even tional priorities and analyzing what is needed is a fraction of the funding for conservation from only beginning. Novel approaches to conservation concessional aid flows would be highly undesir- may lower direct financial outlays considerably. able. The Brazilian Tropical Rainforest Fund (Box Reducing subsidies for habitat destruction could 9.4) illustrates what can be achieved when donor Box 9.4 The Brazilian Tropical Rainforest Fund: international cooperation to protect the Amazon The Brazilian Amazon has long been recognized as a versity and indigenous areas, (b) consolidating policy unique repository of natural resources of value to the changes and strengthening implementing institutions, world at large. Many groups in the industrial world and (c) developing scientific knowledge and applied fear that these resources are threatened, and econo- technologies for environmentally benign development mists have argued that there is an international willing- in the Amazon and building support for their ness to pay to avert their loss. An agreement, reached adoption. in December 1991, to provide $250 million to finance This innovative program results from two important the first phase of a pilot program to conserve the rain- developments. First, over the past few years the Bra- forest in Brazil promises to translate these concerns zilian government has embarked on extensive policy into action. A number of industrial countries led by the and institutional changes to improve environmental Group of Seven have pledged to contribute. management. For the Amazon, this involves trying to The pilot program is to be the start of a comprehen- improve the standard of living of local people while sive effort to maximize the environmental benefits of protecting the resources in the rainforest. Second, in Brazil's rainforests that is consistent with Brazil's de- July 1990 heads of state of the Group of Seven re- velopment goals. The formulation of this plan brought quested the World Bank and the EC Commission to together several federal agencies, the nine state gov- cooperate with the Brazilian government in drawing ernments of the Amazon region, and numerous local up a pilot program and to coordinate funding. This was and national NGOs. The specific objectives of the proj- a quick and effective way to mobilize help for ects in the pilot phase are (a) conserving biological di- conservation. 177 and recipient countries cooperate to tackle the Good environmental policies are good economic most urgent problems of preserving biodiversity. policies and vice versa. Efficient growth need not be an enemy of the environment, and the best pol- Development in the twenty-first century icies for environmental protection will help, not hurt, economic development. The United Nations This Report has highlighted the growing con- Conference on Environment and Development sensus that policies for economic efficiency and for provides an opportunity for the world's leaders to environmental management are complementary. commit themselves to these principles (Box 9.5). With international political tensions reduced and with near unanimity on the central impor- tance of markets and human resource investments for successful development, the coming decades Box 9.5 Agenda 21 offer great prospects for progress. Within the next The United Nations Conference on Environment generation, widespread poverty could be elimi- and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in nated. Clean water and adequate sanitation could June 1992 has provided leaders with an oppor- be made available to virtually everybody on earth. tunity to agree on a strategy for environmentally This will be possible only with rising incomes, in- responsible development in the next century. vestment, education, and employment. Agri- Most environmental problems will be addressed at the local and national levels, of course, but cultural productivity could continue to grow at there are a number of areas in which an interna- present rates or better, thus doubling food produc- tional commitment to change is needed. These are tion in developing countries by 2030 in a manner set out in Agenda 21an agenda for the next cen- that minimizes pressure on natural habitats. But turythe primary document discussed at the con- this will require a commitment to research and ex- ference. They include: tension and to undistorted policies. Industrial out- Allocating international aid to programs with put in developing countries could rise to six times high returns for poverty alleviation and environ- present levels, with lower total emissions and mental health, such as providing sanitation and wastes. This will require rapid investment, stron- clean water, reducing indoor air pollution, and ger environmental institutions, and technology meeting basic needs Investing in research and extension to reduce transfer, supported by open trade and capital soil erosion and degradation and put agricultural flows. Such development could be powered by practices on a sustainable footing clean fossil fuel technologies and, increasingly, by Allocating more resources to family planning renewable energy. Commitment on the part of and to primary and secondary education, espe- both the public and private sectors to accelerate cially for girls the development and use of these technologies Supporting governments in their attempts to and resources would be required. Valuable natural remove distortions and macroeconomic imbal- ances that damage the environment habitats could be much better protected than at Providing finance to protect natural habitat present. The international community would need and biodiversity to accept this as a joint obligation with national Investing in research and development of governments. noncarbon energy alternatives to respond to cli- This is not a small agenda. But it is an affordable mate change one, and there is already considerable knowledge Resisting protectionist pressures and ensur- and experience on which to base a successful pro- ing that international markets for goods and ser- vices, including finance and technology, remain gram. Were it to be incorporated into national and open. international policy, the world would be wealthier, and its environment would be preserved for future generations to enjoy. 178 Bibliographical note This Report has drawn on a wide range of World with the Report office, a conference in Kuala Lumpur Bank sourcesincluding country economic, sector, in July 1991 at which participants from Southeast and project work and research papersand on nu- Asian countries discussed the themes of the Report. merous outside sources. The principal sources are Chapter 1 noted below and are also listed in two groups: back- ground papers commissioned for this Report and a This chapter draws extensively on the academic liter- selected bibliography. Most of the background papers ature and the work of various international organiza- are already available on request through the Report tions. Population projections and scenarios were pro- office. The views they express are not necessarily vided by the Population and Human Resources those of the World Bank or of this Report. Department of the World Bank. The evidence on fer- In addition to the sources listed below, many per- tility transitions and unmet demand for contraception sons, both inside and outside the World Bank, helped draws on Bulatao 1992. The discussion on the role of with the Report. In particular, the core team wishes to women in resource management and the link be- thank Anil Agarwal, Jean Baneth, Carl R. Bartone, tween women's education and fertility draws on sug- David Bloom, Rodolfo Bulatao, Leif E. Christoffersen, gestions from Barbara Herz and Elizabeth Morris- Anthony Churchill, Herman Daly, Partha Dasgupta, Hughes and from cross-country evidence supplied by Mohamed T. El-Ashry, Gunnar Eskeland, Robert Kalanidhi Subbarao. Box 1.1 is based on Cleaver and Goodland, Johan Holmberg, Ian Johnson, Josef Leit- Schreiber 1991. The new estimates of poverty in the mann, Mohan Munasinghe, Robert Repetto, Ibrahim developing world were prepared by Ravallion, Datt, F. I. Shihata, Vinod Thomas, T. H. Tietenberg, David and Chen 1992. The sections on the relationships Turnham, and Jeremy Warford. Others who provided among population, poverty, and the environment notes or detailed comments include Shankar N. draw heavily on Stephen Mink's background paper. Acharya, David Bock, José Carbajo, Armeane M. Box 1.2 was prepared by Peter Hazell. The data on Choksi, John Clark, Gloria Davis, Shanta Devarajan, economic growth and future projections are based on Salah El Serafy, S. Shahid Husain, Frida Johansen, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries, Harinder Kohli, Alan Krupnick, Johannes Linn, Karl prepared by the World Bank International Economics Maler, Norman Myers, Daniel Ritchie, Robert Schnei- Department. The section on longer-term prospects to der, Ediberto L. Segura, Marcelo Selowsky, Anand 2030 benefited from the judgment of Paul Armington Seth, Piritta Sorsa, William Tyler, and Walter and Robert Lynn. Box 1.3 is based on the work of Vergara. Important contributions were also made by Ernst Lutz, Salah El Serafy, Robert Repetto, and the the team's summer interns: Peter Brixsen, Linda Bui, United Nations Statistical Office. The example of na- Rafaello Cervighi, Heinz Jansen, Michaela Weber, tional income accounting in Mexico is based on Van and Mm Zhu. Valuable inputs and comments were Tongeren and others forthcoming. The section on received from the Secretariat of the United Nations links between economic activity and the environment Conference on Environment and Development, the draws on the work of Dasgupta 1982 and Maler 1974. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel- Box 1.4 draws on the background papers by Margaret opment, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Slade. Box 1.5 is based on input from Gordon the Business Council for Sustainable Development, Hughes and Rory O'Sullivan. The evolution of envi- the World Wide Fund for Nature, and the Interna- ronmental indicators with respect to changes in per tional Institute for Environment and Development. capita income is based on the Shafik and Ban- The Report benefited from comments from the dyopadhyay background paper. The discussion of meetings in Senegal and New Delhi of the NGO- technological options in various sectors is informed World Bank Committee, from seminars in a number by Anderson and Cavendish, background paper. Box of cities, and from more than forty seminars held in 1.6 draws from OECD 1991. The analysis of sustain- Washington, D.C. The Economic Development Insti- able development is based on input from Ravi Kan- tute of the World Bank (EDT) sponsored in December bur and from Dixon and Fallon 1989. 1991 a seminar course at which policymakers, aca- Chapter 2 demics, and representatives of NGOs discussed the main findings of the Report. The Institute of Strategic This chapter draws on technical documents from the and International Studies in Malaysia cosponsored, World Health Organization, the United Nations Envi- 179 ronment Programme, and the World Bank and from stitutional issues. Josef Leitmann contributed to the the scientific literature. Joseph Leitmann provided in- section on decentralization and coordination for im- put on urban pollution, Carl Bartone on solid wastes, proved urban management, and Glenn Morgan pro- the World Bank's Energy Strategy/Management As- vided materials on remote sensing and geographic sessment Program (ESMAP) on indoor air pollution, information systems. Box 4.1 is based on press re- and David Wheeler on hazardous wastes. The sec- ports and Chilean publications. Box 4.5 draws on ma- tions on air and water pollution rely on the back- terial provided by Kazuhiko Takemoto and Japan En- ground paper by Beckerman. Material on soils draws vironment Agency 1988. Box 4.6 was adapted by on the background paper by Crosson and Anderson Shelton Davis from his background paper. Box 4.7 and on Nelson 1990. The forestry discussion is based was written by Scott Guggenheim. Among those on World Bank 1991d. Box 2.3 is based on personal who provided helpful comments were Carl Bartone, discussion with Peter Ashton and on Lewin 1987. The Jeremy Berkoff, Alice Hill, David O'Connor, William section on greenhouse warming, including Box 2.4, Partridge, and Michael Stevens. owes much to Houghton, Jenkins, and Ephraums Chapter 5 1990. The ozone depletion discussion is drawn from UNEP 1991 and World Meteorological Organization This chapter draws heavily on the cumulative experi- and others forthcoming. The chapter also benefited ence of World Bank water sector staff. In particular, from constructive comments from David Grey, Agnes published and unpublished Bank studies by Joszef Kiss, Gerald D. Mahlman, and Norman Myers. Ad- Buky, Michael Garn, Dale Whittington and vice on environmental indicators and data quality Guilermo Yepes were extensively used. The section came from Allen Hammond, Eric Rodenberg, and on environmental priorities draws from Bhatia and Dan Tunstall of the World Resources Institute. Falkenmark 1992. The section on health relies on the Chapter 3 work of Briscoe 1985 and 1987, Esrey and others 1991, Feachem and others 1983, VanDerslice and Briscoe The section on trade policy and the environment (in- forthcoming, WHO 1984b, and Moe and others 1991. cluding Box 3.1) is based on material from the back- The discussion on productivity impacts draws on ground papers by Dean and by Lucas, Wheeler, and Bhatia and Falkenmark 1992, Briscoe and de Ferranti Hettige and from Wheeler and Martin forthcoming, 1988, Cairncross and Cliff 1986, Gilman and Grossman and Krueger 1991, and Low and Safadi Skillicorn 1985, Whittington and others 1991, Whit- forthcoming. Evidence on the impact of removing tington and others 1988, and the background paper subsidies is from the background paper by Hughes by Webb. The section on managing water resources and from World Bank reports. The discussion of com- relies on Bhatia and Falkenmark 1992, Falkenmark, mon-property rights is based on the background pa- Garn, and Cestti 1990, Hufschmidt and others 1987, per by Kanbur, as is Box 3.2. The material on valua- IFC forthcoming, Kennedy 1990, McGarry 1990, Mi- tion of environmental benefits (including Box 3.3) is glino 1984, Ramnarong 1991, Repetto 1986, Rogers based on the background paper by Pearce. Box 3.4 is 1984 and 1986, Smith and Vaughan 1989, and World based on Eskeland 1992. The section on regulation Resources Institute 1990. The section on financing and economic incentives draws on Bernstein 1991, and willingness to pay draws on Altaf, Haroon, and Eskeland and Jimenez 1991, Wheeler 1992, and the Whittington 1992, Briscoe and others 1990, Christmas background paper by Levinson and Shetty. The sec- and de Rooy 1991, Churchill 1987, OECD 198Th, tion on improving public investment is based on the Singh and others forthcoming, Whittington and background paper by Ascher and on material from others 1992, World Bank 1990b and 1991a, and World Anderson 1987. The examples in Box 3.5 are from Bank Water Demand Research Team forthcoming. Dixon and others 1988 and Mu, Whittington, and The section on sanitation relies on Altaf and Hughes Briscoe 1991. Box 3.6 draws on Fargeix 1992. Exten- 1991, Wright and Bakalian 1990, Bartone, Bernstein, sive comments were provided by William Ascher, and Wright 1990, de Melo 1985, Hasan 1986 and 1990, Gunnar Eskeland, Antonio Estache, Emmanuel Jim- and Okun 1988. The discussion of institutional re- enez, Ravi Kanbur, Alan Krupnick, Arik Levinson, forms relies on Bartone and others 1991, Borcherd- Patrick Low, Ashoka Mody, Vinod Thomas, Tom Tie- ing, Pommerrehne, and Schneider 1982, Kinnersley tenberg, David Wheeler, and Mm Zhu. 1991, Lovei and Whittington 1991, Paul 1991, Triche Chapter 4 1990, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1989, World Bank 1991e, and Yepes 1990 and 1991. Box 5.1 This chapter draws on academic and NGO sources. relies on Moe and others 1991, Feachem and others Individual staff members in the World Bank's Envi- 1983, VanDerslice and Briscoe forthcoming, and ronment Department made significant contributions. WHO 1984b. Box 5.2 is taken from International Fi- Of particular note is the paper 'Participation for Sus- nance Corporation forthcoming, Box 5.3 from World tainable Development" by Guggenheim and Koch- Bank Water Demand Research Team forthcoming, Weser, which formed the basis for the section on par- and Box 5.4 from Dworkin and Pillsbury 1980. Box 5.5 ticipation. Barbara Lausche provided material on in- is drawn from de Melo 1985, and Box 5.6 from Hasan 180 1986 and 1990. The chapter also benefited from de- by Crosson and Anderson. Box 7.3 was prepared by tailed and constructive comments from Bank staff Donald Plucknett and Kern Wright Platais. The sec- members Janis Bernstein, Ramesh Bhatia, John Blax- tion on private management draws on Carter and all, Pauline Boerma, Arthur Bruestle, Joszef Buky, Gilmour 1989, Dewees 1989, Doolette and Magrath Sergio Contreras, Christopher Couzens, Antonio Es- 1990, Georghiou 1986, Kiss and Meerman 1991, Nor- tache, David Grey, Ian Johnson, Peter Koenig, Ayse gaard 1988, Pimental 1991, and Wright and Kudat, Andrew Macoun, Geoffrey Matthews, Mohan Bonkoungou 1986. Box 7.4 was written by Montague Munasinghe, Letitia Oliveira, Walter Stottman, Alain Yudelman and is based on Murray and Hoppin forth- Thys, Anthony van Vugt, and Albert Wright and coming and on Hoppin 1991. The discussion of com- from external commentators, including Anjum Altaf, munity management relies on Cernea 1991, Jodha Charles Griffin, Stein Hansen, Arif Hasan, Richard 1991, Migot-Adholla and others 1991, and National Helmer, Daniel Okun, Peter Rogers, Sheila Webb, Academy of Sciences 1986. The example of Burkina Dale Whittington, and James Winpenny. Faso in Box 7.5 was provided by World Bank and Chapter 6 others 1990. The section on public management is based on Hyde, Newman, and Sedjo 1991, Kiss 1990, The chapter draws on background papers by Bates Repetto and Gillis 1988, Spears forthcoming, Wells, and Moore, Anderson and Cavendish, Hall, Homer, Brandon, and Hannah 1992, and World Bank 1991e and Panayotou and on Anderson 1991a. The section and 1992b. Material for Box 7.7 was prepared by Ka- on energy relies on Asian Development Bank 1991, trina Brandon. Box 7.8 is drawn from the background Balzheiser and Yeager 1987, Davis 1990, Faiz and Car- paper by Pearce. Valuable comments were received bajo 1991, Gamba, Caplin, and Mulckhuyse 1986, from Jock Anderson, Pierre Crosson, John Dixon, Harrison 1988, Imran and Barnes 1990, Johansson, John Doolette, John English, Richard Grimshaw, Pe- Bodlund, and Williams 1989, OECD 1986-91, Shell ter Hazell, Heinz Jansen, Norman Myers, John Briefing Service 1991, U.S. Department of Energy O'Connor, David Pimentel, Donald Plucknett, James 1990, Wirtschafter and Shih 1990, and World Bank Smyle, John Spears, Laura Tuck, and Montague 1991c and forthcoming. Box 6.1 is taken from Asian Yudelman. Development Bank 1991, OECD 1989, and Bates and Chapter 8 Moore background paper. Box 6.2 is based on World Bank 1991c, which includes research by Douglas The section on international law draws from back- Barnes, who also provided much valuable material on ground papers by Mensah, Ricker, and Tschofen with woodfuels. Eric Larsen, Joan Ogden, Robert guidance from Paatii Ofosu-Amaah. Ralph Oster- Socolow, and Robert Williams of Princeton Univer- woldt and Franziska Tschofen contributed Box 8.1. sity's Center for Energy Studies provided valuable Box 8.2 draws on Maler 1989 and 1990 and Newbery guidance on renewable energy technologies; Jo- 1990. Michael Prest contributed material on interna- hansson and others forthcoming provided a technical tional rivers, drawing on Kolars and Mitchell 1991, review. The section on industry draws on Bartone, Rogers 1991, Smith and Al-Rawahy 1990, Viachos Bernstein, and Wright 1990, Bernstein 1991 and forth- 1990, and information from Raj Krishna. Michael coming, Eckenfelder 1989, GATT 1971, Hirschhorn Prest also provided material on the ozone layer and and Oldenburg 1991, Kneese and Bower 1968, Krup- on the Montreal Protocol, drawing on Benedick 1991, nick 1983, OECD 1991, Tedder and Pohland 1990, Munasinghe and King 1991, and Rowland 1990 and UNIDO 1991, and Wheeler and Martin forthcoming. 1991. Andrew Solow of the Woods Hole Ocean- Bernard Baratz and Kathleen Stephenson supplied ographic Institution supplied scientific advice for the extensive comments and material on industrial pollu- section on greenhouse warming. Gerald Mahlman of tion, as did Roger Heath, John Homer, Afsaneh the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin- Mashayekhi, and Robert Saunders on energy and in- istration and Robert Watson of the U.S. National dustry. Box 6.3 is taken from Wheeler and Martin Aeronautics and Space Administration reviewed the forthcoming. The discussion on Cubatão in Box 6.4 is greenhouse warming section. The discussion of sci- based on Findley 1988. Box 6.5 is drawn from the entific issues and the effects of climate change draws Panayotou background paper. The discussion on especially on Arrhenius and Waltz 1990, Ausubel transport relies on Faiz and Carbajo 1991, Hau 1990, 1983, Houghton, Jenkins, and Ephraums 1990, IPCC Heggie 1991, Jones 1989, and OECD 1986 and 1988. 1990, National Academy of Sciences 1991 and forth- Michael Walsh provided helpful comments. coming, Parry 1990, Rosenberg and others 1989, and Chapter 7 Tegart, Sheldon, and Griffiths 1990. For Figure 8.3 a carbon cycle model (Harvey and Schneider 1985) was The chapter benefited from background papers by applied to data on carbon emissions from Marland Barbier and Burgess, Crosson and Anderson, and and others 1989. Radiative forcing as a function of Manwan and from Murray and Hoppin forthcoming. atmospheric concentration is from Houghton, Sanchez, Palm, and Smyth 1990 is the main source Jenkins, and Ephraums 1990. Only carbon dioxide for Box 7.1. Box 7.2 is based on the background paper emissions from 1950 onward are included in alloca- 181 tions, but the effects of earlier emissions are taken Bilsborrow, Richard. "Rural Poverty, Migration, and the En- into account in aggregate. The share of other green- vironment in Developing Countries: Three Case Studies." house gases in the total warming effect is held con- Blitzer, Charles, R. S. Eckaus, Supriya Lahiri, and Alex- stant at its current level in the 2 x CO2 scenario. The ander Meeraus. (a) "Growth and Welfare Losses from section on biological diversity draws on Barbier and Carbon Emissions Restrictions: A General Equilibrium others 1990, Dixon and Sherman 1990, McNeeley and Analysis for Egypt." others 1990, Pearce 1991, Reid and Miller 1989, So- (b) "The Effects of Restrictions of Carbon Dioxide low, Polasky, and Broadus forthcoming, Swanson and Methane Emissions on the Indian Economy." 1991, and Weitzman 1992a and b. Box 8.8 was pre- Butcher, David. "Deregulation, Corporatization, Privatiza- tion, and the Environment." pared by Jeffrey Katz. The estimate of international Crosson, Pierre R., and Jock Anderson. "Global FoodRe- transfers for conservation draws on Abramovitz 1989 sources and Prospects for the Major Cereals." and UNEP 1990. Robert J. Anderson, Nancy Birdsall, Davis, Shelton H. "Indigenous Views of Land and the Charles Blitzer, Jessica Finhorn, Agnes Kiss, Barbara Environment." Lausche, Paatii Ofosu-Amaah, Ralph Osterwoldt, Dean, Judith M. "Trade and the Environment: A Survey of Susan Shen, and Ibrahim Shihata commented in de- the Literature." tail. Richard S. Eckaus provided ideas and advice on Guerami, Behrouz. "Prospects for Coal and Clean Coal Technology." many parts of the chapter. Claudia Alderman, Erik Gutman, Pablo. "Environment and Development: Perspec- Arrhenius, Charles Feinstein, Mudassar Imran, tives from Latin America." Robert Kaplan, Kenneth King, John Lethbridge, Edu- Hall, David 0. "Biomass." ardo Loayza, Patrick Low, Carl Gustaf Lundin, Do- Hammond, Allen, Eric Rodenburg, and Dan Tunstall. "En- nald Plucknett, Michael Wells, and Anders Zeijlon vironmental Indicators." Hamrin, Robert. "Business' Critical Role in Meeting Devel- provided information on specific topics. Bita Hadj- oping and Environmental Challenge." imichael provided research assistance. Homer, John B. "Natural Gas in Developing Countries: Chapter 9 Evaluating the Benefits to the Environment." Hughes, Gordon. "Are the Costs of Cleaning Up Eastern The cost estimates for electricity, transport, and water Europe Exaggerated? Economic Reform and the and sanitation are from the background paper by An- Environment." Kanbur, Ravi. "Heterogeneity, Distribution and Coopera- derson and Cavendish; for soil conservation and af- tion in Common Property Resource Management." forestation from Doolette and Magrath 1990; and for Levinson, Arik, and Sudhir Shetty. "Efficient Environment agricultural research and extension from Zijp 1992 Regulation: Case Studies of Urban Air Pollution." and Evenson 1991. Those for family planning were Lucas, Robert, David Wheeler, and Hemamala Hettige. based on Bulatao 1992 and on discussions with the "Economic Development, Environmental Regulation, World Bank's Population and Human Resources De- and the International Migration of Toxic Industrial Pollu- tion: 1960-1988." partment. Costs of achieving equal education for girls Manwan, Ibrahim. "Soil Conservation and Upland Farming are reported in Summers 1991. Unit costs of conser- Systems in Indonesia." vation in protected areas are from McNeeley and Mensah, Thomas. "Existing and Emerging State of Interna- others 1990. Figures in this Report benefited from tional Environmental Law." discussions with Jan Post and Mario Ramos. All esti- Mink, Stephen. "Poverty, Population, and the mates benefited from detailed reviews by the World Environment." Bank's operational and research staff, and helpful Mody, Ashoka, and Robert Evenson. "Innovation and Dif- fusion of Environmentally Responsive Technologies." discussions were held with UNCED. NGOWorld Bank Committee. "Economics, Human De- velopment, and Sustainability." Background papers Panayotou, Theodore. "Policy Options for Controlling Ur- ban and Industrial Pollution." Anderson, Dennis. (a) "Economic Growth and the Environ- Pearce, David. "Economic Valuation and the Natural ment." World." (b) "Energy and the Environment." Repetto, Robert. "Key Elements of Sustainable (c) "Global Warming and Economic Growth." Development." Anderson, Dennis, and William Cavendish. "Efficiency and Ricker, Margaret. "Effectiveness of International Environ- Substitution in Pollution Abatement: Simulation Studies mental Law." in Three Sectors." Shafik, Nemat, and Sushenjit Bandyopadhyay. "Economic Ascher, William. "Coping with the Disappointing Rates of Growth and Environmental Quality: Time Series and Return of Development Projects with Environmental Cross-Country Evidence." Aspects." Shah, Anwar, and Bjorn Larsen. (a) "Carbon Taxes, the Barbier, Edward B., and Joanne C. Burgess. "Agricultural Greenhouse Effect, and Developing Countries." Pricing and Environmental Degradation." (b) "World Energy Subsidies and Global Carbon Bates, Robin W., and Edwin A. Moore. "Commercial En- Emissions." ergy Efficiency and the Environment." Sinha, Chandra Shekhar. "Renewable Energy Programmes Beckerman, Wilfred. "Economic Development and the En- in Brazil, China, India, Philippines, and Thailand." vironment: Conflict or Complementarity?" Slade, Margaret E. (a) "Environmental Costs of Natural- Resource Commodities: Magnitude and Incidence." (b) "Do Markets Underprice Natural-Resource Commodities?" 182 Sorsa, Piritta. "Environment-A New Challenge to GATT?" Barbier, Edward B., Joanne C. 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York: Springer-Verlag. 191 Environmental data appendix Tables A.1 and A.2 present summary date on drawal as a share of water resources refers to total population and GNP; the remaining eight tables in water withdrawal as a percentage of internal re- this Appendix provide environmental and policy- newable water resources. Withdrawals include related data as a supplement to the main text and those from nonrenewable aquifers and desalting to the data presented in the World Development plants but do not include evaporative losses. Indicators. Readers should refer to the "Defini- Per ca pita figures are calculated using 1990 popu- tions and data notes" for an explanation of the lation estimates. Withdrawals can exceed 100 per- country groups used in these tables. In Tables A.6 cent of renewable supplies when extractions from and A.7 economies are listed in the same order as nonrenewable aquifers or desalting plants are con- in the World Development Indicators. siderable or if there is significant water reuse. The data reported here are drawn from the most Sectoral withdrawal is divided into three catego- authoritative sources available; however, they ries: agriculture (irrigation and livestock), domestic should be used with caution. Although the data (drinking water, private homes, commercial estab- present the major differences in resources and lishments, public services, and municipal use or uses among countries, true compatibility of data is provision), and industry (including water for cool- limited because of variation in data collection, sta- ing thermoelectric plants). The sectoral propor- tistical methods, definitions, and government tions are based on national reports and models resources. that use estimates from other data and thus should Table A.3 Water availability be interpreted with care. Numbers may not sum to 100 percent because of rounding. The Département Hydrogeologie in Orleans, Generally, countries with an annual water avail- France, compiles water resource and withdrawal ability of less than 1,000 cubic meters per capita data from published documents, including na- face chronic water scarcity, while those with less tional, United Nations, and professional literature. than 2,000 cubic meters face water stress and ma- The Institute of Geography at the National Acad- jor problems in drought years. emy of Sciences in Moscow also compiles global Table A.4 Selected water quality indicators for water data on the basis of published work and, various rivers where necessary, estimates water resources and consumption from models that use other data, The global water quality monitoring project such as area under irrigation, livestock popula- (GEMS/Water) was established in 1976 as part of tions, and precipitation. These and other sources the Global Environment Monitoring System have been combined by the World Resources Insti- (GEMS). In 1990 there were a total of 488 reporting tute to generate the data for this table. Data for stations in 64 countries. Water quality data are small countries and countries in arid and semiarid available from 1979 to the present. Data shown in zones are less reliable than are those for larger this table comprise two of the fifty indicators of countries and those with higher rainfall. water quality that are reported within the GEMS Annual internal renewable water resources refer to system and have been made available by the Can- the average annual flow of rivers and of aquifers ada Centre for Inland Waters, which acts as the generated from rainfall within the country. The re- global data center. Not all stations collect all data, gional and income group totals presented here are and the frequency and physical accuracy of mea- compiled from data that are not strictly additive, surement vary among stations. Four-year periods since they are based on differing sources and are used in the table to minimize seasonal and dates. In addition, annual country data may con- year-to-year variability and to emphasize general ceal large seasonal, year-to-year, and long-term trends, if any. variations. Dissolved oxygen is a critical factor in the health of For each region or income group, annual with- aquatic organisms. In general, for life, growth, and 192 reproduction, values must exceed 5.5 milligrams Nations (FAO) by national governments in re- per liter for warm-water habitats and 6.5 milli- sponse to annual questionnaires. The FAO also grams per liter for cold-water habitats. Lower compiles data from national agricultural censuses. values of dissolved oxygen endanger stocks of fish When official information is lacking, the FAO pre- and other oxygen-dependent organisms. pares its own estimates or relies on unofficial data. Fecal coliforms are most commonly associated Several countries use definitions of total area and with animal and human feces. This measure is land use that differ from those used in this table. used as a sentinel indicator for the presence or (See the current edition of the FAO Production Year- potential presence of many other pathogenic or- book for details.) The FAO often adjusts its defini- ganisms that are more difficult to observe and tions of land use categories and sometimes sub- measure. Water for human consumption should stantially revises earlier data. Because these usually contain zero fecal coliforms per 100-millili- changes reflect data-reporting procedures as well ter sample, and bathing water and water used for as actual changes in land use, apparent trends irrigation should contain less than 1,000 per 100- should be interpreted with caution. milliliter sample. Land area refers to total area, excluding the area under inland water bodies (mainly, rivers and Table A.5 Selected ambient air quality indicators lakes). Agricultural land includes both arable and for various cities permanent crop land. Arable land refers to land under temporary crops (double-cropped areas are Since 1974 standardized data on concentrations of counted only once), temporary meadows for sulfur dioxide and suspended particulate matter mowing or pasture, market and kitchen gardens (SPM) from selected cities worldwide have been (including cultivation under glass), and land tem- submitted to the World Health Organization porarily fallow or lying idle. Permanent crop land (WHO) as part of the WHO/UNEP-GEMS Urban is occupied by crops such as cocoa, coffee, and Air Quality Monitoring Project (GEMS/Air). The rubber that are in place for long periods and that project currently extends to nearly eighty cities in need not be replanted after each harvest; the cate- more than fifty countries. Most cities report data gory includes land under shrubs, fruit trees, nut from three sites, which are classified as city center trees, and vines but excludes land under trees or suburban and as commercial, industrial, or resi- grown for wood or timber. Permanent pasture refers dential. Data are maintained at the GEMS/Air data to land used permanently (five years or more) for center at the United States Environmental Protec- herbaceous forage crops, either cultivated or grow- tion Agency's Atmospheric Research Exposure ing wild. Forest and woodland refers to land under Assessment Laboratory in North Carolina and are natural or planted stands of trees, whether subject made available through the Monitoring and As- to harvesting or not, and includes land from which sessment Research Centre, London. forests have been cleared but that will be re- WHO has separate guidelines for peak (daily av- forested in the foreseeable future. Other land in- erage) and average (annual mean) exposure of cludes unused but potentially productive land, populations to air pollutants. For sulfur dioxide built-on areas, wasteland, parks, ornamental gar- the daily average guideline of 100-150 micrograms dens, roads, lanes, barren land, and any other per cubic meter should not be exceeded for more land not specifically listed in the foregoing than seven days in one year; the annual mean categories. guideline is 40-60 micrograms per cubic meter. For gravimetrically determined 5PM the respective Table A.7 Agriculture: production and yields guidelines are 150-230 micrograms per cubic meter of selected crops, fertilizer consumption, and and 60-90 micrograms per cubic meter. It should irrigation be noted that these guidelines are generally con- sidered to be targets; for each country the costs Most of the data in this table are supplied by na- and benefits of achieving the targets have to be tional agriculture ministries in response to annual carefully assessed. FAO questionnaires or are derived from agri- cultural censuses. The FAO compiles data from Table A.6 Changes in land use more than 200 country reports and from many other sources. Gaps in the data are filled by the Data on land area and use are provided to the FAO on the basis of its own estimates. As better Food and Agriculture Organization of the United information becomes available, the FAO corrects 193 its estimates and recalculates the entire time-series Partially protected areas (IUCN categories IV-V) when necessary. include: Cereal crops include wheat, rice paddy, barley, Managed natural reserves and wildlife sanctu- maize, rye, oats, millet, and sorghum. Area and aries that are protected for specific purposes, such production data relate to crops harvested for dry as the conservation of a significant plant or animal grain only. Cereal crops harvested for hay, har- species. Some areas require management. vested green for food, feed, or silage, or used for Protected landscapes and seascapes, which grazing are excluded. Area data relate to harvested may be entirely natural or may include cultural area. Roots and tubers include potatoes, sweet po- landscapes (for example, scenically attractive agri- tatoes, cassava, yams, and taro. Yields are calcu- cultural areas). Examples would include coast- lated by dividing total production by the area lines, lakeshores, and hilly or mountainous terrain harvested. along scenic highways. Fertilizer consumption is calculated by dividing the total consumption of nitrogenous, phosphatic The figures presented do not include locally or and potash fertilizers by the area of agricultural provincially protected sites, privately owned land given in table A .6. areas, or areas managed primarily for extraction of Data on irrigation refer to areas purposely pro- natural resources. vided with water (including land flooded by river water) for crop production or pasture improve- Table A.9 Global carbon dioxide emissions ment, whether these areas are irrigated several from fossil fuels and cement manufacture times or only once during the year stated. For some African countries data on irrigation have The Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center been revised recently on the basis of new studies. (CDIAC) in the United States calculates world emissions from data on the net apparent consump- Table A.8 Nationally protected areas tion of fossil fuels and on world cement manufac- ture. Emissions are calculated from global average fuel chemistry and use. Data for this table have been provided by the Estimates of world emissions are probably World Conservation Monitoring Centre in the within 10 percent of actual emissions. Individual United Kingdom, which maintains data on na- country estimates may depart more widely from tional parks and protected areas. reality. The CDIAC points out that the time trends Information on protected areas combines five of from a consistent and uniform time-series "should the management categories originally developed be more accurate than the individual values." by the International Union for the Conservation of Total emissions consist of the sum of the carbon Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) in 1972. To- in carbon dioxide released in the consumption of tally protected areas (IUCN categories 1-111) include: solid, liquid, and gas fuels (primarily but not ex- Scientific reserves and strict nature reserves clusively coals, petroleum products, and natural that possess outstanding, representative ecosys- gas), in gas flaring (the burning off of gas released tems. Public access is prohibited or severely re- in the process of petroleum extractiona practice stricted. The reserve should be large enough to that is declining), and in the production of cement ensure the integrity of the area, meet the scientific (in which calcium carbonate is calcined to produce management objectives, and provide for the pro- calcium oxide, with 0.136 metric tons of carbon tection of the reserve. In many reserves natural released as carbon dioxide for each ton of cement perturbations (for example, insect infestations and produced). forest fires) are allowed to run their course without Combustion of different fossil fuels releases car- any direct human interference. bon dioxide at different rates for the same energy National parks and provincial parks that con- production. Oil releases about 1.5 times the stitute relatively large areas of national or interna- amount of carbon dioxide released from natural tional significance not materially altered by human gas; coal releases about twice the carbon dioxide of beings. Visitors may use them for recreation and natural gas. study. It is assumed that approximately 1 percent of the Natural monuments and natural landmarks coal used by industry and power plants is not that contain unique geologic formations, special burned and that an additional few percent are con- animals or plants, or unusual habitats. verted to nonoxidizing uses. Other oxidative reac- 194 tions of coal are assumed to be of negligible impor- production. Wood for charcoal, "put kilns," and tance in carbon budget modeling. Carbon portable ovens is included, using a conversion fac- emissions from gas flaring and cement production tor (6 tons of charcoal = 1 cubic meter of fuelwood) are also included. These two sources account for to convert from weight to solid volume units. A about 3 percent of the carbon emitted by fossil fuel further conversion factor (1 cubic meter of fuel- combustion. Fossil fuel emissions include those re- wood = 0.222 tons of oil equivalent) has been used leased from bunker fuels in international transport to obtain a rough estimate of the energy equivalent and are not ascribed to particular countries. of fuelwood to show the importance of this form of energy, especially in developing countries. Data Table A.1O Energy: consumption, production, come from the FAO Forest Products Yearbook. and resources World reserves are generally taken to be those quantities that geologic and engineering iriforma- Energy data are compiled by the United Nations tion indicate with reasonable certainty can be re- Statistical Office (UNSO) and are published in the covered from known reservoirs under existing eco- United Nations Energy Statistics Yearbook. The World nomic and operating conditions. Caution should Bank makes some modifications to these data, as be exercised when using reserve data, since esti- explained below. mates can vary widely from source to source. In Since the difference between world consump- considering reserve data, it should be borne in tion and production for liquid and solid fuels and mind that revisions of estimates account for the for gas is small, data are only presented on the greater part of the reported additions to reserves changing pattern of consumption. However, since and that past increases or decreases in reserves do consumption data on electricity are less reliable, not necessarily mean that the volumes or eco- production data are presented. nomic values of reserves will continue to increase Under world consumption, liquid fuels comprise or decrease over time. Reserve data for liquid fuels petroleum products, including feedstocks, natural (crude oil only) and gas have been compiled from gasoline, condensate, refinery gas, and the input the Oil and Gas Journal, and data for solid fuels (an- of crude petroleum to thermal power plants; solid thracite, bituminous, subbituminous, and lignite) fuels include primary forms of solid fuels, net im- from various editions of the World Energy Confer- ports, and changes in stocks of secondary fuels; ence publication Survey of Energy Resources. and gas includes the consumption of natural gas, The reserves/production ratio is calculated by di- net imports, and changes in gas stocks of coke- viding the reserves remaining at the end of any ovens and gasworks. year by the production in that year. The result is World production of primary electricity comprises the number of years that those reserves would last electricity generated by hydroelectric, nuclear, and if production were to continue at the same level. geothermal sources. The role of electricity is se- The world price for liquid fuels is the average Or- verely underestimated when a kilowatt-hour is ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries counted at its thermal end-use equivalent of 860 (OPEC) petroleum price, which is calculated by kiocalories, as is often the case with UN energy weighting OPEC government sales by OPEC ex- data. Primary electricity substitutes for at least ports. The price of solid fuels is for thermal coal of 2,500 kilocalories of other fuels, and the World 12,000 British thermal units per pound, less than 1 Bank has revised UN estimates to account for this. percent sulfur, 12 percent ash, f.o.b. piers, Hamp- Fuelwood is defined as wood in the rough (from ton Roads, United States. No world prices are trunks and branches of trees) that is used as fuel given for gas, electricity, or fuelwood because they for purposes such as cooking, heating, and power are not widely traded on the international market. 195 Table A.1 Population (midyear) and average annual growth Population (millions) - Average annual growth (percent) Count ry group 1965 1973 1980 1990 1991 2000a 2030a 1965-73 1973-80 1980-90 1990_2000a 2000_2030a Low- and middle-income 2,403 2,923 3,383 4,146 4,226 4,981 7,441 2.5 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.4 Low-income 1,776 2,168 2,501 3,058 3,117 3,670 5,430 2.5 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.3 Middle-income 627 755 883 1,088 1,109 1,311 2,011 2.3 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.4 Severely indebted 258 314 370 455 464 546 794 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.8 1.3 Sub-Saharan Africa 245 302 366 495 510 668 1,346 2.7 2.8 3.1 3.0 2.4 East Asia and the Pacific 972 1,195 1,347 1,577 1,602 1,818 2,378 2.6 1.7 1.6 1.4 0.9 South Asia 645 781 919 1,148 1,170 1,377 1,978 2.4 2.4 2.2 1.8 1.1 Europe 154 167 182 200 195 217 258 1.1 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 Middle East and North Africa 125 154 189 256 264 341 674 2.7 3.0 3.1 2.9 2.3 Latin America and the Caribbean 243 299 352 433 441 516 731 2.6 2.4 2.1 1.8 1.2 Other economies 252 275 294 321 323 345 . . 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.7 High-income 671 726 766 816 821 859 919 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.2 OECD members 649 698 733 777 781 814 863 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.2 World 3,326 3,924 4,443 5,284 5,370 6,185 8,869 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.2 a. Projections. For the assumptions used in the projections, see the technical notes for Table 26 in the World Development Indicators. Table A.2 GNP, population, GNP per capita, and growth of GNP per capita 1990 GNP 1990 1990 GNP (billions of population per capita Average annual growth of GNP per Ca pita (percent) Country group dollars) (millions) (dollars) 1965-73 1973-80 1980-90 1989 1990 1991 Low- and middle-income 3,479 4,146 840 4.3 2.6 1.5 0.9 0.3 Low-income 1,070 3,058 350 2.4 2.7 4.0 2.3 2.4 1.3 Middle-income 2,409 1,088 2,220 5.3 2.4 0.4 0.4 -0.6 Severely indebted 972 455 2,140 5.2 2.6 -0.3 -1.6 -3.5 -1.2 Sub-Saharan Africa 166 495 340 1.6 0.6 -1.1 0.1 -1.6 East Asia and the Pacific 939 1,577 600 5.1 4.8 6.3 4.0 5.3 South Asia 383 1,148 330 1.2 1.8 2.9 2.7 2.6 1.4 Europe 480 200 2,400 . . . . 1.0 2.0 -3.7 . Middle East and North Africa 458 256 1,790 6.8 1.0 -1.5 -1.2 -1.9 . Latin America and the Caribbean 946 433 2,180 4.6 2.3 0.5 -1.1 -1.8 0.7 Other economies 321 High-income 15,998 816 19,590 3.7 2.1 2.4 2.7 1.5 OECD members 15,672 777 21,170 3.7 2.1 2.5 2.7 1.6 World 22,173 5,284 4,200 2.8 1.3 1.4 1.6 0.5 a. Preliminary data. 196 Table A.3 Water availability Total annual Per capita Per capita internal Total Annual annual in- annual renewable annual withdrawal ternal renew- water with- water water with- as a share of able water drawal, resources drawal total wafer resources, year of data Sectoral withdrawal as a share of total (cubic kilo- (cubic kilo- resources 1990 (cubic (cubic water resources (percent) Country group meters) meters) (percent) meters) meters) Agriculture Domestic Industry Low-income 14,272 1,257 9 4,649 498 91 4 5 China and India 4,650 840 18 2,345 520 90 5 6 Other low-income 9,622 417 4 8,855 460 95 3 2 Middle-income 13,730 492 4 12,597 532 69 13 18 Lower-middle-income 6,483 290 4 10,259 550 71 11 18 Upper-middle-income 7,247 202 3 15,824 508 66 16 18 Low- and middle-income 28,002 1,749 6 6,732 507 85 7 8 Sub-Saharan Africa 3,713 55 1 7,488 140 88 8 3 East Asia and the Pacific 7,915 631 8 5,009 453 86 6 8 South Asia 4,895 569 12 4,236 652 94 2 3 Europe 574 110 19 2,865 589 45 14 42 Middle East and North Africa 276 202 73 1,071 1,003 89 6 5 Latin America and the Caribbean 10,579 173 2 24,390 460 72 16 11 Other economies 4,486 375 8 13,976 1,324 66 6 28 High-income 8,368 893 11 10,528 1,217 39 14 47 OECD members 8,365 889 11 10,781 1,230 39 14 47 Other 4 4 119 186 372 67 22 12 World 40,856 3,017 7 7,744 676 69 9 22 197 Table A.4 Selected water quality indicators for various rivers Dissolved oxygen Fecal coliform Average Ann ual mean concentration Average Annual mean concentration annual (number per annual (milligrams per liter) growth rate 100-milliliter sample) growth rate for series for series Country River, city 1979-82 1983-86 1987-90 (percent) 1979-82 1983-86 1987-90 (percent) Low-income Bangladesh Karnaphuli 5.7 6.1 -1.1 (5) (3) Bangladesh Meghna 6.5 7.0 2.6 (5) 3,133 700 -35.1 (5) China Pearl, Hong Kong 7.6 7.8 7.8 0.4 (11) 519 563 174 -14.4 (10) China Yangtze, Shanghai 8.3 8.3 8.2 -0.1 (11) 316 464 731 10.6 (11) China Yellow, Beijing 9.8 9.7 9.8 -0.1 (11) 711 1,337 1,539 9.8 (11) India Cauveri, d/s from KRS 7.2 7.6 7.3 0.8 (9) 51 681 445 63.8 (9) Reservoir India Cauveri, Satyagalam 7.0 7.3 7.5 1.1 (9) 10 684 920 121.8 (9) India Godavari, Dhalegaon 6.5 6.6 6.7 0.3 (9) (0) India Godavari, Mancherial 8.0 8.0 7.3 -1.1 (9) 5 5 8 19.7 (7) India Godavari, Polavaram 7.2 7.2 6.9 0.0 (8) 4 2 4 -3.8 (7) India Sabarmati, Dharoi 9.4 9.1 8.9 0.0 (9) 248 222 220 -15.4 (8) India Subarnarekha, Jamshedpur 8.0 7.9 7.5 -0.2 (9) 659 4,513 2,800 89.0 (9) India Subarnarekha, Ranchi 6.7 4.0 5.3 -6.2 (9) 1,239 7,988 3,100 70.5 (9) India Tapti, Burhanpur 7.5 6.9 6.1 -2.3 (9) 110 130 -23.2 (4) India Tapti, Nepanagar 7.2 7.0 7.0 -0.6 (9) 19 163 76.0 (4) Pakistan Chenab, Gujra Branch 6.2 6.8 7.1 1.8 (10) 436 463 446 -1.7 (10) Pakistan Indus, Kotri 7.6 7.2 2.6 -13.6 (ii) 105 121 78 -3.4 (11) Pakistan Ravi, d/s from Lahore 6.8 5.7 6.3 -1.4 (12) 378 746 555 -2.4 (10) Pakistan Ravi, u/s from Lahore 7.2 6.7 7.0 -0.8 (12) 275 392 249 -6.6 (10) Sudan Blue Nile 7.3 8.2 3.3 (7) (0) Middle-income Argentina de Ia Plata, Buenos Aires 7.6 7.5 0.0 (8) 828 230 -23.1 (8) Argentina Paraná Corrientes 8.1 8.0 0.1 (10) 185 146 111 -6.6 (10) Brazil Guandu, Tomada d'Agua 8.1 7.8 7.7 -0.7 (11) 1,202 2,452 6 -47.0 (8) Brazil Paraiba, Aparecida 6.0 6.1 6.0 -0.4 (7) 13,950 9,800 6,075 -11.5 (7) Brazil Paraiba, Barra Mansa 7.4 7.6 7.8 0.4 (11) 8,003 8,100 8 -33.4 (7) Chile Maipo, el Manzano 12.9 13.2 10.8 -1.4 (10) 871 705 775 5.3 (8) Chile Mapocho, Los Almendros 11.8 12.1 10.0 -1.7 (10) 2 2 5 8.0 (8) Colombia Cauca Juanchito 5.2 4.8 1.0 (5) 10,000 10,000 0.0 (4) Ecuador San Pedro 7.7 7.8 -0.1 (5) 80,000 30,603 -31.5 (4) Fiji Waimanu 7.6 7.8 0.5 (9) 600 1,605 8.1 (7) Hungary Danube 9.4 10.4 9.9 1.7 (10) 3,419 3,075 3,750 1.2 (10) Korea Han 10.5 10.4 -0.2 (8) 8 12 14.4 (8) Malaysia Kinta 7.5 8.3 2.9 (7) (0) Malaysia Klang 3.0 3.3 2.8 -1.1 (9) (1) Malaysia Linggi 3.4 3.6 3.7 0.9 (10) (0) Malaysia Muda 7.3 7.2 6.3 -1.3 (8) (0) Mexico Atoyac 3.5 1.7 0.3 -47.5 (9) 157,500 105,000 916,667 23.9 (7) Mexico Balsas 7.6 6.3 6.8 -1.9 (10) 1,558 26,333 130,000 95.4 (8) Mexico Blarico 5.0 3.4 4.1 -3.7 (9) 21,717 39,500 12,150 1.8 (8) Mexico Colorado 7.9 8.7 8.2 1.4 (9) 277 58 37 -28.7 (7) Mexico Lerma 0.3 0.4 0.5 -18.6 (10) 192,250 165,000 67 5.7 (7) Mexico Panuco 7.7 8.1 8.3 0.7 (11) 110 201 -27.8 (6) Panama Aguas Claras 7.9 8.2 0.4 (7) 219 143 -14.4 (6) Panama San Felix 8.2 8.0 -1.0 (7) 850 753 -6.2 (6) Philippines Cagayan 7.8 7.9 0.3 (11) (3) Portugal Tejo, Santarem 8.9 8.6 8.4 -0.7 (9) 2,252 4,163 4,225 24.6 (9) Thailand Chao Phrya, dls from Nakhon 6.3 6.3 0.2 (8) 1,093 1,745 47.7 (7) Sawan Thailand Prasak, Kaeng Khoi 6.6 7.7 8.0 (5) 596 2,724 9.9 (8) Turkey Porsuk, Agackoy 9.0 9.1 9.2 0.7 (9) (1) Turkey Sekarya, Adetepe 9.2 8.7 8.9 -0.3 (8) (1) Uruguay de Ia Plata, Colonia 7.1 (3) 453 93 54.6 (4) Uruguay Uruguay Bella Union -1.4 (4) 200 1,100 66.9 (4) High-income Australia Murray 10.0 9.4 9.1 1.0 (6) (0) Australia Murray, Mannum 7.1 8.2 8.6 2.4 (8) 33 10 80 15.8 (8) Belgium Escaut, Bleharies 5.7 6.2 5.9 1.1 (11) 76 579 867 40.8 (11) Belgium Meuse, Heer/Agimont 10.5 10.8 11.3 0.8 (11) 30 1,391 1,700 69.7 (11) Belgium Meuse, Lanaye Ternaaien 9.2 8.4 8.9 -0.7 (11) 147 5,233 7,100 78.2 (11) Japan Kiso, Asahi 10.0 10.6 11.7 1.7 (11) 300 400 216 -4.1 (11) japan Kiso, Inuyama 10.8 10.5 10.8 -0.2 (10) 610 491 600 -2.0 (10) Japan Kiso, Shimo-Ochiai 11.2 11.1 11.4 0.3 (10) 546 443 353 -6.0 (10) Japan Shinano, Zuiun Bridge 10.1 10.3 10.3 0.2 (10) 290 346 193 -3.0 (10) Japan Tone, Tone-Ozeki 10.0 9.9 10.4 0.5 (10) 521 593 618 3.7 (10) Japan Yodo, Hirakata Bridge 8.7 8.4 8.4 -0.4 (11) 72,000 70,333 9.3 (7) Netherlands ljssel, (arm of Rhine) 8.7 7.9 -3.3 (6) 9,833 2,050 . -43.0 (5) Netherlands Rhine, German frontier 8.5 8.0 -2.6 (6) 17,633 10,500 . -11.8 (5) United Kingdom Thames 9.9 10.3 0.2 (8) (0) United States Delaware, Trenton, N.J. 11.1 10.6 -2.5 (7) 74 1 -4.0 (7) United States Hudson, Green Island, N.Y. 9.8 12.1 4.2 (7) 941 792 . -7.4 (7) United States Mississippi, Vicksburg, Miss. 8.4 8.3 -0.2 (7) 435 1,473 40.2 (7) Note: dis, downstream; u/s, upstream. a. Numbers in parentheses denote the number of years of observations. Data have been presented only when they are available for four or more years. 198 Table A.5 Selected ambient air quality indicators for various cities Sulfur dioxide Suspended particulate matter Average Average Annual mean concentration annual Annual mean concentration annual (micrograms per cubic meter) growth rate (micrograms per cubic meter) growth rate Type of for series for series Country group Cit site 1979-82 1983-86 1987-90 (percent) 1979-82 1983-86 1987-90 (percent) Low-income China Beijing CCC 77 119 107 3.5 (8) 475 500 413 -2.7 (8) China Beijing CCR 132 141 115 -1.3 (8) 412 380 370 -1.6 (8) China Guangzhou CCC 100 78 54 -9.0 (9) 248 198 163 -6.1 (9) China Guangzhou CCR 59 107 95 7.7 (9) 146 209 234 7.4 (9) China Shanghai CCC 66 59 69 2,5 (9) 224 214 253 2.5 (9) China Shanghai CCR 57 84 104 9.2 (9) 240 230 290 3.8 (9) China Shenyang CCC 105 100 118 2.5 (8) 409 475 435 0.3 (8) China Shenyang CCR 80 127 88 1.8 (9) 471 481 465 0.4 (9) China Xian CCC 138 107 95 -4.7 (9) 399 515 555 5.7 (9) China Xian CCR 116 1111 100 -1.4 (9) 401 485 580 6.7 (9) Egypt, Arab Rep. Cairo CCC 5 101 18 -11.0 (8) . . . . . . . . (0) Egypt, Arab Rep. Cairo SR . . 157 28 -1.2 (7) . . . . . . . . (0) Ghana Accra St . . . . . . . . (1) 119 109 144 2.4 (9) Ghana Accra SR . . . . . . (1) 108 107 137 3.5 (8) India Bombay CCC 23 23 1.8 (4) 154 140 . . -1.1 (6) India Calcutta CCC 71 54 4.6 (7) 410 393 . . 1.0 (13) India Calcutta SR 36 36 8.9 (7) 468 310 . . 0.5 (12) India Delhi CCC 42 86 12.0 (6) 460 460 . . -0.3 (7) India Delhi CCR 16 33 23.9 (6) 312 301 . . -1.3 (7) Indonesia Jakarta CCR . . . . . . (2) 254 271 . . 2.2 (6) Indonesia Jakarta SI . . . . . . (2) 159 204 185 3.5 (7) Pakistan Lahore SR . . . . . . . . (1) 745 . . 496 -5.1 (6) Middle-income Brazil Sao Paulo . . 78 46 41 -7.5 (12) 134 98 -9.1 (6) Chile Santiago CCC 69 85 2.5 (10) . . . . (0) Chile Santiago CCR 43 46 -1.5 (9) . . . . . . (0) Greece Athens CCC 57 34 . . -4.8 (9) 224 178 -6.0 (9) Greece Athens SI 48 27 . . -9.7 (9) 190 182 . . -4.5 (9) Iran, Islamic Rep. Tehran CCC 130 115 165 6.9 (14) 226 248 261 -2.4 (14) Iran. Islamic Rep. Tehran SR 114 61 64 -2.7 (14) 215 251 238 -1.3 (14) Malaysia Kuala Lumpur SC . , . . . . (2) 172 135 119 3.9 (7) Malaysia Kuala Lumpur SI 12 24 -12,4 (6) 155 139 144 1.5 (10) Philippines Davao SI . . . . . . . . (3) 163 205 -2.4 (5) Philippines Manila SI 73 34 . . -12.0 (9) 90 . . 0.8 (8) Poland Warsaw CCC 42 35 23 -6.4 (13) . . . . . . (0) Poland Warsaw CCR 31 31 18 -5.5 (13) . . . . . . (0) Poland Wroclaw CCC 41 53 53 2,6 (13) . . . . . . . . (0) Poland Wroclaw CCR 31 42 42 4.5 (13) . . . . . . . . (0) Portugal Lisbon CCR 32 21 27 -3.0 (10) 99 97 99 0.4 (9) Portugal Lisbon SR 19 14 20 2.7 (8) 100 95 86 -2.6 (8) Thailand Bangkok SI . . . . . . . . (1) 213 247 244 0.8 (13) Thailand Bangkok SR 15 15 14 -1.7 (10) 136 163 105 -2.4 (12) Venezuela Caracas CCC 32 27 21 -0.5 (13) . . . . . . . . (0) Yugoslavia Zagreb CCC 79 107 92 -4.3 (19) 114 127 135 -1.7 (19) Yugoslavia Zagreb SR 33 66 47 -0.9 (19) 129 117 91 -2.6 (19) High-income Australia Melbourne CCC 7 6 . -14.3 (10) 71 58 -4.5 (9) Australia Sydney CCC 51 28 -10.9 (11) 100 114 2.2 (11) Australia Sydney SI 31 15 . , -7.3(11) 76 58 -8.5 (11) Belgium Brussels CCC 74 42 . , -11.5 (11) 24 22 -3.3 (11) Belgium Brussels SR 60 37 , , -9.1 (15) . . . . . . . . (2) Canada Hamilton CCC . . . . . . (3) 102 89 89 -2.8 (13) Canada Hamilton SR 32 36 -4.4 (9) 102 99 . . -1.9 (9) Canada Montreal CCC 41 23 -11.0 (10) 67 55 61 -1.8 (12) Canada Montreal SR 27 20 . . 0.7 (11) 58 39 35 -8.3 (13) Canada Toronto CCC . . 11 14 4.0 (5) 60 60 61 -0.5 (8) Canada Toronto SR 18 . . -16.1 (7) 70 60 57 -2.2 (13) Canada Vancouver CCC 21 -7.0 (5) 70 50 42 -4.5 (14) Canada Vancouver CCR 18 . . -2.7 (11) 55 39 . . -5.2 (15) Denmark Copenhagen CCC 28 30 . . -0.5 (7) 34 . . . . 3.4 (6) Denmark Copenhagen SI 33 27 . , 5.7 (7) 53 55 . . 3.0 (9) Finland Helsinki CCC 24 . . , . -2.8 (5) 72 79 81 2.0 (11) Finland Helsinki 51 27 28 20 -3.8 (12) 64 68 62 0.2 (11) Germany Frankfurt CCC 71 56 36 -7.2 (17) 24 39 42 0.5 (17) Hong Kong Hong Kong . . . . 25 64 47.3 (4) . . 99 132 14.9 (4) Ireland Dublin CCI 411 34 32 -3.2 (12) . . . . (0) Ireland Dublin CCR 57 44 41 -2.9 (12) . . . . . . (0) Israel Tel Aviv CCC 16 30 . , -7.1 (11) . . . . . . . . (0) Italy Milan CCC 160 90 . , -14.5 (7) . . . . . . (0) Italy Milan CCR 259 114 . . -11.4 (7) . . . . . . . . (0) Japan Osaka CCC 37 28 28 8.4 (14) 51 41 42 -6.3 (13) )apan Osaka SR 34 26 24 -8.0 (14) 61 49 54 -4.1 (13) japan Tokyo CCC 42 23 20 -8.9 (17) 61 50 . . -4.9 (13) Japan Tokyo SR 42 30 20 -5.7 (17) 54 51 . . -4.5 (14) Netherlands Amsterdam CCC 33 24 -6.7 (15) . . . . . . (0) Netherlands Amsterdam SR 34 29 -1.8 (13) . . (0) New Zealand Auckland CCC 10 3 -17.6 (9) . . . . (0) New Zealand Auckland CCR 8 3 -37.2 (6) . . . . (0) New Zealand Christchurch 51 37 43 . . 6.9 (9) . . . . . (0) New Zealand Christchurch SR 20 18 19 -3.5 (12) . . . (0) Spain Madrid CCC 105 54 36 -9.8 (17) . . (0) Spain Madrid SR 45 28 19 -8.4 (18) . . (0) United Kingdom Glasgow CCC 73 52 -8.8 (8) . . . . (0) United Kingdom Glasgow CCI 62 41 -9.8 (9) . . (0) United Kingdom London CCC 66 44 . . -11.4 (13) . . . . (0) United Kingdom London 51 56 34 -11.3 (13) . . . . . . (0) United States Birmingham CCC . . . . . . (3) 83 75 . . -3.0 (11) United States Chicago CCI . . . . . . (2) 121 99 . . -6.2 (10) United States Fairfield SI . . . . (3) 71 53 . . -5.6 (11) United States Harris Co. SR . . . . . 68 . . (3) 54 . -4.8 (11) United States Houston CCC . . . . . . . 82 . . .(3) 7.3 (10) 62 United States Houston SR 18 8 -32.0 (8) 93 . . -6.3 (11) 64 United States New York City CCR 79 60 -5.8 (9) 63 -2.2(11) 61 United States New York City SR 38 31 -5.9 (9) 49 46 -2.7 (11) Note: for type of site: CCC, city center commercial; CCI, city center industrial; CCR. city center residential; St. suburban industrial; SR. suburban residential; SC, suburban commercial. Numbers in parentheses denote the number of years of observations. Data have been presented only when they are available for four or more years. There are two methods for calculating concentrations of suspended particulate matter: gravimetric measurement and the smoke stain method. These methods are not comparable. Because most air momtonng stations use the for- mer method. only data derived from this method are presented. To masiinuze the number of cities for which data are presented. informatii,n is given on only two site types, though more data than these may be available. Growth rates are calculated using the entire time-series available, although only part of that series may appear in the concentration data presented. Table A.6 Changes in land use Land area, 1989 Share of total land area, 1989 (percent) Average annual growth rate, 1965-89 (percent) (thousands of square Permanent Forest and Permanent Forest and Count r1j group kilometers) Agricultural pasture woodland Other Agricultural pasture woodland Other Low-income 36,396 13 27 25 36 0.2 0.0 -0.4 0.3 China and India 12,264 22 27 16 36 0.0 0.0 -0.4 0.2 Other low-income 24,132 9 27 29 35 0.5 0.0 -0.4 0.3 Mozambique 784 4 56 18 22 0.5 0.0 -0.8 0.7 Tanzania 886 6 40 46 8 0.9 0.0 -0.3 1.3 Ethiopia 1,101 13 41 25 22 0.4 -0.1 -0.4 0.4 Somalia 627 2 69 14 15 0.5 0.0 -0.1 0.1 Nepal 137 19 15 18 48 1.6 0.9 0.0 -0.7 Chad 1,259 3 36 10 52 0.5 0.0 -0.6 0.1 Bhutan 47 3 6 55 36 1.3 0.3 0.4 -0.6 Lao PDR 231 4 3 55 37 0.4 0.0 -0.7 1.3 Malawi 94 26 20 40 15 0.8 0.0 -1.1 4.0 Bangladesh 130 71 5 15 9 0.1 0.0 -0.4 0.2 Burundi 26 52 36 3 10 1.1 1.9 1.3 -5.7 Zaire 2,268 3 7 77 13 0.5 0.0 -0.2 1.1 Uganda 200 34 9 28 29 1.6 0.0 -0.5 -0.9 Madagascar 582 5 58 27 9 1.6 0.0 -0.9 2.8 Sierra Leone 72 25 31 29 15 1.1 0.0 -0.2 -1.2 Mali 1,220 2 25 6 68 1.1 0.0 -0.4 0.0 Nigeria 911 34 44 13 8 0.3 0.0 -1.9 4.6 Niger 1,267 3 7 2 88 2.3 -0.7 -2.2 0.1 Rwanda 25 47 19 23 12 2.7 -2.8 -0.5 -0.8 BurkinaFaso 274 13 37 24 26 2.1 0.0 -0.8 0.1 India 2,973 57 4 22 17 0.2 -0.8 0.3 -0.7 Benin 111 17 4 32 47 1.0 0.0 -1.4 0.9 China 9,291 10 34 13 42 -0.3 0.0 -0.8 0.4 Haiti 28 33 18 1 48 0.8 -1.2 -2.3 0.1 Kenya 570 4 67 4 25 1.0 0.0 -0.8 0.0 Pakistan 771 27 6 5 62 0.4 0.0 1.9 -0.3 Ghana 230 12 22 35 31 -0.3 0.0 -0.8 1.2 Central African Republic 623 3 5 57 34 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 logo 54 27 33 30 11 0.6 0.0 -0.6 0.6 Zambia 743 7 40 39 14 0.3 0.0 -0.2 0.6 Guinea 246 3 25 60 [2 0.4 0.0 -0.4 2.5 Sri Lanka 65 29 7 27 37 0.0 0.8 -0.3 0.1 Mauritania 1,025 0 38 5 57 -1.6 0.0 0.3 0.0 Lesotho 30 11 66 . . 24 -1.0 -0.4 1.8 Indonesia 1,812 12 7 63 19 0.9 1.3 Honduras 112 16 23 30 31 0.9 0.9 -1.9 1.7 Egypt, Arab Rep. 995 3 . . 0 97 -0.6 0.0 0.0 Afghanistan 652 12 46 3 39 0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.0 Cambodia 177 17 3 76 4 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 Liberia 96 4 59 18 19 0.1 0.0 -1.2 1.7 Myanmar 658 15 1 49 35 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 Sudan 2,376 5 41 19 34 0.5 0.0 -0.6 0.3 Viet Nam 325 20 1 30 49 0.5 0.8 -2.3 1.6 Middle-income 40,684 10 29 33 29 0.7 0.1 -0.4 0.2 Lower-middle-income 22,141 10 31 28 31 0.6 -0.1 -0.5 0.4 Bolivia 1,084 3 25 51 21 3.1 -0.2 -0.3 0.6 Zimbabwe 387 7 13 50 30 1.1 0.0 -0.4 0.5 Senegal 193 27 30 31 12 0.7 0.0 -0.6 0.2 COte d'Ivoire 318 12 41 24 24 1.4 0.0 -2.4 4.4 Philippines 298 27 4 35 34 0.7 2.0 2.1 3.1 Dominican Republic 48 30 43 13 14 1.5 0.0 -0.3 2.1 Papua New Guinea 453 1 0 84 15 0.8 0.5 -0.1 0.3 Guatemala 108 17 13 35 35 1.0 0.8 -1.3 1.1 Morocco 446 21 47 18 15 0.9 0.9 0.2 -2.8 Cameroon 465 15 18 53 14 1.0 -0.3 -0.4 1.3 Ecuador 277 10 18 40 32 0.1 4.5 -1.8 1.4 Syrian Arab Rep. 184 30 43 4 23 -0.5 0.4 0.7 -0.3 Congo 342 0 29 62 8 1.0 0.0 -0.1 0.8 El Salvador 21 35 29 5 30 0.8 0.0 -2.9 -0.3 Paraguay 397 6 52 36 6 5.0 1.6 -1.4 -2.9 Peru 1,280 3 21 54 22 1.7 0.0 -0.4 0.8 Jordan 89 4 9 1 86 0.9 0.0 1.2 -0.1 Colombia 1,039 5 39 49 7 0.3 0.7 -0.6 0.2 Thailand 511 43 2 28 27 2.4 3.5 -2.6 0.6 Tunisia 155 30 19 4 47 0.3 0.9 1.5 -0.6 Jamaica 11 25 18 17 40 0.2 -1.1 -0.5 0.5 Turkey 770 36 11 26 26 0.2 -1.2 0.0 0.4 Romania 230 45 19 28 8 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4 Poland 304 48 13 29 10 -0.2 -0.3 0.3 0.9 200 Land area, 1989 Share of total land area, 1989 (percent) Average annual growth rate, 1965-89 (percent) (thousands of square Permanent Forest and Permanent Forest and Country group kilometers) Agricultural pasture woodland Other Agricultural pasture woodland Other Panama 76 8 20 44 28 0.2 1.6 -1.3 1.8 Costa Rica 51 10 45 32 12 0.4 3.5 -2.8 0.1 Chile 749 6 18 12 64 0.5 1.2 0.1 -0.4 Botswana 567 2 58 19 20 1.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 Algeria 2,382 3 13 2 82 0.5 -1.0 1.5 0.1 Mauritius 2 57 4 31 8 0.4 0.0 -0.2 -1.5 Bulgaria 111 38 18 35 9 -0.5 2.4 0.3 -2.1 Malaysia 329 15 0 58 27 0.7 0.4 -1.1 3.6 Iran, Islamic Rep. 1,636 9 27 11 53 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 Argentina 2,737 13 52 22 13 0.7 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 Albania 27 26 15 38 21 1.3 -2.7 -1.0 4.4 Angola 1,247 3 23 42 31 0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.2 Lebanon 10 29 1 8 62 -0.3 0.0 -0.9 0.3 Mongolia 1,567 1 79 9 11 3.0 -0.7 -0.2 18.6 Namibia 823 1 46 22 31 0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.1 Nicaragua 119 11 45 29 15 0.3 1.1 -2.3 5.9 Yemen, Rep. 195 7 36 8 49 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 Upper-middle-income 18,543 9 26 38 27 1.0 0.4 -0.4 -0.1 Mexico 1,909 13 39 23 25 0.3 0.0 -1.2 1.2 South Africa 1,221 11 67 4 19 0.0 -0.1 0.5 0.4 Venezuela 882 4 20 35 41 0.5 0.4 -0.9 0.6 Uruguay 175 7 77 4 11 -0.4 -0.1 0.5 0.4 Brazil 8,457 9 20 65 5 2.1 1.1 0.4 1.9 Hungary 92 57 13 18 12 -0.3 -0.2 0.7 1.0 Yugoslavia 255 30 25 37 8 -0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 Gabon 258 2 18 78 2 3.4 -0.3 0.0 0.7 Czechoslovakia 125 41 13 37 9 -0.2 -0.4 0.2 0.9 Trinidad and Tobago 5 23 2 43 31 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.1 Portugal 92 41 8 32 18 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.8 Korea, Rep. 99 22 1 66 12 -0.4 6.9 -0.1 1.1 Greece 131 30 40 20 10 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.6 Saudi Arabia 2,150 1 40 1 59 1.9 0.0 -1.9 0.0 Iraq 437 12 9 4 74 0.5 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 Libya 1,760 1 8 0 91 0.3 1.3 1.4 -0.1 Oman 212 0 5 95 2.6 0.0 0.0 Low- and middle-income 77,079 11 28 29 32 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.2 Sub-Saharan Africa 22,416 7 33 30 31 0.7 0.0 -0.4 0.3 East Asia and the Pacific 15,175 11 30 25 34 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.8 South Asia 4,781 45 4 23 28 0.2 -0.4 0.3 -0.4 Europe 2,139 39 16 29 16 -0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.3 Middle East and North Africa 11,305 6 22 3 69 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 Latin America and Caribbean 20,043 9 28 48 15 1.3 0.5 -0.5 0.1 Other economies 22,502 10 17 43 30 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 High-income 30,412 12 25 30 33 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 OECD members 29,870 12 26 30 32 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 Other 541 3 1 5 90 0.1 0.2 -1.0 0.1 Ireland 69 14 68 5 13 -1.9 0.5 2.2 0.7 Israel 20 21 7 5 66 (1.2 1.3 0.2 0.2 Spain 499 41 20 31 7 -0.1 -0.8 0.7 -0.2 Singapore 1 2 . . 5 93 -7.1 . . -0.7 1.0 Hong Kong 1 7 1 12 80 -3.0 . . 0.7 0.0 New Zealand 268 2 51 27 20 0.1 0.5 0.0 -1.1 Belgium" 33 25 21 21 33 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 0.3 United Kingdom 242 28 46 10 16 -0.3 0.4 1.2 1.4 Italy 294 41 17 23 20 -1.0 -0.2 0.4 3.0 Australia 7,618 6 55 14 25 0.9 -0.2 -1.5 1.4 Netherlands 34 28 32 9 32 0.0 -0.9 0.1 1.4 Austria 83 19 24 39 18 -0.5 -0.6 0.0 1.6 France 550 35 21 27 17 -0.1 -0.7 0.5 0.6 United Arab Emirates 84 0 2 0 97 7.2 0.0 5.4 0.0 Canada 9,221 5 4 39 53 0.6 2.1 0.5 -0.5 United States 9,167 21 26 32 21 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.5 Denmark 42 60 5 12 23 -0.2 -1.9 0.3 1.0 Germany 244 31 18 30 21 -0.1 -0.9 0.1 1.1 Norway 307 3 0 27 70 0.2 1.9 0.5 -0.2 Sweden 412 7 1 68 24 -0.3 -0.8 0.1 0.0 Japan 377 12 2 67 19 -1.0 6.0 0.0 0.5 Finland 305 8 0 76 15 -0.5 -0.2 0.3 -0.9 Switzerland 40 10 40 26 23 0.3 -0.5 0.3 0.4 Kuwait 18 0 8 0 92 6.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 World 130,099 11 25 31 32 0.3 0.0 -0.2 0.1 a. Includes Luxembourg. 201 Table A.7 Agriculture: production and yields of selected crops, fertilizer consumption, and irrigation Production - Yields Cereals Roots and tubers Cereals Roofs and tubers Fertilizer consumption Irrigation Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Share of Growth 1989 rate, 1989 rate, 1989 rate, 1989 rate, 1989 rate, agricultural rate, (thousands 1965-89 (thousands 1965-89 (tons per 1965-89 (tons per 1965-89 (font per 1965-89 land, 1989 1965-89 Count ry group of tons) (percent) of tons) (percent) hectare) (percent) hectare) (percent) hectare) (percent) (percent) (percent) Low-income 779,426 3.4 297,738 1.7 2.5 3.0 11.3 1.3 94 10.3 8.9 1.7 China and India 565,269 3.5 161,841 1.2 2.9 3.4 15.1 1.9 138 10.8 14.8 1.7 Other low-income 214,156 2.9 135,897 2.5 1.9 2.1 8.8 1.1 39 9.2 4.8 1.8 Mozambique 607 -1.1 3,725 2.2 0.5 -3.0 6.3 0.7 1 -1.4 0.2 8.8 Tanzania 4,750 6.9 6,790 3.6 1.5 3.6 7.3 2.7 9 6.6 0.4 8.4 Ethiopia 6,013 1.7 1,684 2.7 1.2 2.0 3.3 -0.2 7 15.9 0.3 0.3 Somalia 654 4.3 49 3.5 0.8 2.1 10.4 0.2 3 . . 0.3 0.9 Nepal 5,673 1.8 784 3.0 1.9 -0.3 6.8 0.0 26 13.8 20.3 12.2 Chad 568 -0.8 643 4.5 0.5 -0.5 5.5 1.3 2 25.1 0.0 3.6 Bhutan 94 0.8 50 2.7 1.0 -0.8 9.6 1.1 1 0.1 8.5 4.6 LaoPDR 1,448 2.5 310 9.5 2.3 3.6 7.7 0.8 0 -0.7 7.1 12.0 Malawi 1,588 1.2 485 5.0 1.2 0.6 3.1 -1.8 23 9.7 0.5 10.9 Bangladesh 28,796 2.3 1,633 1.8 2.6 1.7 10.0 0.3 99 11.2 27.7 5.1 Burundi 265 2.9 1,523 1.0 1.2 0.8 8.1 0.0 4 13.8 3.2 6.9 Zaire 1,272 3.9 18,162 2.6 0.8 0.6 7.5 0.4 1 3.2 0.0 10.9 Uganda 1,468 -0.6 5,068 3.7 1.5 1.6 6.3 2.0 0 -14.9 0.1 4.8 Madagascar 2,542 1.2 3,128 3.3 2.0 0.2 6.4 -0.1 4 -0.8 2.4 5.3 SierraLeone 538 0.7 158 1.5 1.4 0.2 3.3 -1.0 0 -1.5 0.9 11.7 Mali 2,157 2.7 136 3.8 0.9 1.0 8.5 0.4 5 10.2 0.6 5.6 Nigeria 13,643 2.2 47,901 2.7 1.2 3.2 12.4 1.2 12 22.2 1.2 0.3 Niger 1,849 2.5 246 1.7 0.4 -0.8 7.1 0.2 1 13.4 0.3 3.5 Rwanda 274 2.6 1,716 5.5 1.1 0.4 7.8 0.7 1 9.3 0.3 0.0 BurkinaFaso 1,952 2.7 112 2.1 0.7 1.6 6.0 4.3 6 23.9 0.1 8.0 India 199,816 3.2 20,961 3.8 2.0 2.8 15.7 2.2 69 10.1 23.8 2.3 Benin 563 2.9 2,026 2.2 0.9 1.8 9.3 1.2 2 3.7 0.3 5.8 China 365,453 3.7 140,880 1.0 4.0 3.9 15.0 1.9 262 11.4 10.8 1.2 Haiti 398 -0.9 902 2.2 0.9 -0.6 4.1 -0.3 4 14.3 5.4 1.9 Kenya 3,446 0.9 1,480 2.2 1.7 1.0 8.6 0.3 48 4.9 0.1 3.9 Pakistan 21,018 4.0 649 6.2 1.8 2.8 10.1 0.1 89 12.1 63.0 1.3 Ghana 1,177 2.1 5,172 1.7 1.0 -0.3 6.2 -0.7 3 11.6 0.1 4.5 Central African Rep. 124 1.7 734 -0.7 1.0 0.9 3.5 0.7 0 -3.8 . Togo 570 2.3 830 0.3 0.9 1.6 8.3 -2.7 8 22.9 0.2 4.2 Zambia 1,967 1.6 278 2.2 1.7 4.6 3.7 0.5 17 7.8 0.1 9.8 Guinea 740 1.7 624 0.2 0.9 -0.4 5.5 -0.6 1 -10.1 0.4 7.3 Sri Lanka 2,102 4.1 590 2.4 2.9 2.2 9.1 3.7 102 3.6 23.9 1.8 Mauritania 184 1.3 6 -0.3 1.0 4.2 1.8 0.0 12 . . 0.0 2.2 Lesotho 147 -1.5 7 3.2 0.8 0.3 14.0 0.4 14 13.6 . Indonesia 50,921 5.0 20,054 0.8 3.8 3.9 11.6 2.3 117 13.6 22.8 2.6 Honduras 644 1.9 28 -1.5 2.1 1.6 7.6 1.6 18 2.6 2.1 1.4 Egypt, Arab Rep. 11,113 1.6 1,838 7.0 5.4 1.3 23.1 1.5 404 6.5 100.0 -0.6 Afghanistan 3,410 -0.4 300 4.3 1.3 0.8 15.0 2.3 7 12.6 7.0 0.8 Cambodia 2,550 -1.3 203 7.3 1.4 -0.5 8.1 -1.1 0 . . 2.5 -0.3 Liberia 280 3.3 404 1.4 1.2 1.3 7.2 1.0 11 3.3 0.0 0.0 Myanmar 14,261 3.5 208 8.6 2.8 3.5 8.4 4.4 9 11.2 9.8 1.4 Sudan 1,971 2.6 134 -2.4 0.4 -2.4 2.2 -1.4 4 1.5 1.7 0.9 VietNam 19,839 3.1 4,797 5.3 3.1 1.9 7.5 1.3 84 5.9 26.4 3.5 Middle-income 332,878 2.5 145,806 0.6 2.2 2.0 12.0 0.3 69 4.7 2.9 2.3 Lower-middle-income 183,637 2.4 104,465 1.5 1.9 1.9 11.8 0.6 60 4.8 3.2 2.3 Bolivia 811 3.0 1,221 1.6 1.3 1.0 6.0 0.8 2 2.1 0.6 4.0 Zimbabwe 2,460 2.1 119 2.7 1.5 0.7 4.8 0.9 60 1.9 2.9 9.2 Senegal 1,067 1.8 75 -6.8 0.8 1.7 4.3 0.5 6 1.7 1.7 3.1 Philippines 13,981 3.9 2,711 4.2 1.9 2.7 6.8 1.3 67 5.0 17.6 3.6 Côte d'Ivoire 1,193 3.4 4,404 3.6 0.9 0.3 6.1 2.3 11 3.7 0.4 8.4 Dominican Rep. 608 5.1 331 -2.1 3.6 2.7 6.8 0.1 50 3.6 6.4 3.1 Papua New Guinea 3 1.0 1,283 1.9 1.7 -0.7 7.1 0.2 40 13.8 . . Guatemala 1,480 3.2 60 4.5 1.8 3.0 4.4 0.9 73 6.5 2.4 2.3 Morocco 7,429 1.9 916 6.5 1.3 1.4 16.7 3.1 34 6.6 4.2 1.8 Cameroon 991 1.1 2,048 1.3 1.3 2.0 2.6 0.8 4 6.0 0.2 8.5 Ecuador 1,450 3.2 498 -2.2 1.7 3.1 6.6 -1.1 34 5.0 7.1 0.9 Syrian Arab Rep. 1,404 3.8 371 11.0 0.3 1.0 16.4 2.1 45 13.1 5.0 1.1 Congo 22 2.4 755 1.9 0.7 -2.0 6.4 2.1 3 . . 0.0 8.7 El Salvador 802 2.7 37 3.7 1.9 1.6 15.2 2.7 106 1.0 8.9 10.4 Paraguay 1,605 9.1 4,087 4.4 2.0 1.8 16.5 0.5 9 3.8 0.3 2.7 Peru 2,439 2.5 2,440 0.0 2.5 2.2 8.5 1.0 41 1.2 4.1 0.7 Jordan 77 -5.1 40 11.9 0.5 -0.8 22.3 5.2 77 8.8 4.9 2.4 Colombia 3,790 3.3 4,318 3.7 2.5 2.7 11.9 2.1 90 5.5 1.1 3.8 Thailand 25,241 3.0 24,486 11.7 2.1 0.6 15.2 0.5 37 8.6 18.5 4.1 Tunisia 635 0.2 179 5.0 0.6 0.6 11.2 2.2 23 6.6 3.6 5.9 Jamaica 3 0.5 198 3.1 1.3 1.6 12.2 1.1 116 -0.2 7.6 1.7 Turkey 23,499 2.8 4,060 4.1 1.7 2.6 21.7 2.9 64 9.6 6.1 1.6 Romania 18,379 2.0 4,420 3.1 3.0 2.4 12.6 3.0 133 6.6 23.4 10.6 Poland 26,958 1.8 34,390 -1.5 3.2 1.9 18.5 0.2 205 3.0 0.5 5.1 Panama 328 1.6 86 2.5 1.9 2.6 9.2 0.8 54 4.5 1.5 2.7 Costa Rica 246 3.4 91 5.3 2.6 2.5 8.2 0.5 203 4.5 4.1 8.2 202 Production Yields Cereals Roots and tubers Cereals Roots and tubers Fertilizer consumption Irrigation Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Shore of Growth 1989 rate, 1989 rate, 1989 rate, 1989 rate, 1989 rate, agricultural rate, (thousands 1965-89 (thousands 1965-89 (tons per 1965-89 (tons per 1965-89 (tons per 1965-89 land, 1989 1965-89 Country group of tons) (percent) of tons) (percent) hectare) (percent) hectare) (percent) hectare) (percent) (percent) (percent) Chile 3,148 1.7 889 1.0 4.0 2.9 14.0 2.0 80 3.8 7.0 0.5 Botswana 76 -1.0 7 2.1 0.3 -2.1 5.4 1.7 1 -5.2 0.0 3.5 Algeria 1,698 0.3 1,030 6.8 0.7 0.9 8.6 1.1 28 5.4 0.9 1.7 Bulgaria 9,527 1.4 553 0.9 4.4 1.8 13.8 -0.3 195 3.0 20.3 1.3 Mauritius 2 8.5 21 4.5 3.8 2.4 20.2 2.1 330 1.1 15.0 1.0 Malaysia 1,778 1.1 510 1.1 2.7 1.1 9.4 0.6 157 8.4 7.0 1.7 Argentina 17,407 1.8 3,210 0.3 2.1 2.4 20.4 2.9 5 4.3 1.0 1.9 Iran, Islamic Rep. 10,002 3.2 1,295 9.1 1.1 2.0 13.5 -0.8 80 15.4 9.8 0.5 Albania 1,036 4.4 88 1.8 3.0 4.0 9.1 1.6 151 7.2 38.1 2.8 Angola 289 -2.7 2,130 1.4 0.3 -4.2 4.1 1.1 7 2.5 . Lebanon 79 -2.6 235 4.8 2.0 2.8 17.8 2.7 92 0.4 27.7 1.3 Mongolia 839 5.7 156 10.3 1.2 3.2 12.3 2.6 12 12.6 0.1 13.1 Namibia 135 2.9 265 2.1 0.6 1.1 8.8 0.0 0 . . 0.0 0.0 Nicaragua 504 2.3 91 8.8 1.6 2.8 12.1 6.4 65 4.4 1.3 6.2 Yemen, Rep. . . 0 35.5 3.0 1.2 Upper-middle-income 149,241 2.6 41,341 -1.0 2.6 2.2 12.5 -0.2 82 4.5 2.6 2.3 Mexico 21,308 3.0 1,091 3.1 2.2 2.8 14.7 2.0 73 7.1 5.2 2.2 South Africa 14,911 2.0 1,300 4.0 2.2 2.1 13.8 1.1 58 3.2 1.2 1.0 Venezuela 1,830 4.9 692 0.8 2.2 2.8 8.3 0.4 151 12.2 1.2 2.7 Uruguay 1,491 2.4 188 0.3 2.6 4.6 6.3 0.8 45 0.8 0.7 4.8 Brazil 43,943 3.4 26,693 -1.0 2.0 1.5 12.5 -0.6 43 8.3 1.1 6.8 Hungary 15,417 3.1 1,334 -1.9 5.5 3.8 18.6 3.5 246 5.3 2.7 -0.7 Yugoslavia 16,110 1.4 2,359 -1.0 3.8 2.5 8.0 -0.1 116 3.6 1.2 1.5 Gabon 21 4.3 371 3.4 1.4 0.4 6.2 1.1 3 23.7 . Czechoslovakia 12,047 2.8 3,167 -2.3 4.9 3.0 18.6 1.1 321 2.7 4.6 3.6 Trinidad and Tobago 15 -2.3 9 -2.3 2.6 0.0 9.3 0.4 28 -4.3 16.8 2.8 Portugal 1,859 -0.6 1,194 -0.3 1.7 2.0 9.7 -0.6 73 2.9 14.0 0.1 Korea, Rep. 8,748 1.0 1,226 -4.5 6.0 3.2 22.7 2.0 425 3.2 61.0 0.7 Greece 5,743 3.1 1,109 3.0 4.0 3.7 20.1 2.8 175 4.3 13.0 2.8 Saudi Arabia 3,674 9.7 38 . . 4.2 5.9 15.8 . . 401 25.7 0.5 0.9 Iraq 1,497 -0.7 226 14.8 0.9 -0.3 17.5 2.7 40 16.2 27.0 1.9 Libya 322 3.9 131 12.8 0.7 3.9 7.5 2.1 37 12.9 1.6 2.2 Oman 2 -4.8 4 1.4 0.4 25.3 . . 111 19.6 3.9 2.5 Low- and middle-income 1,112,303 3.1 443,544 1.3 2.4 2.7 11.6 0.9 83 7.4 5.8 1.9 Sub-Saharan Africa 58,089 2.1 113,655 2.6 1.0 1.1 7.8 1.0 9 5.8 0.6 2.2 East Asia and Pacific 490,836 3.7 197,024 1.5 3.6 3.4 13.9 1.7 186 10.1 9.9 1.6 South Asia 271,760 3.1 24,884 3.6 2.0 2.7 14.0 2.0 69 10.2 27.5 2.1 Europe 130,583 2.2 52,693 -0.9 3.1 2.5 16.7 0.6 142 4.1 8.4 3.1 Middle East and N. Africa 41,342 2.0 6,603 7.5 1.4 1.5 14.5 1.5 63 9.2 5.5 0.8 Latin America and the Caribbean 104,782 2.9 47,385 0.0 2.1 2.1 11.6 -0.1 44 6.4 2.0 2.5 Other economies 212,387 1.3 75,644 -1.0 2.0 1.6 11.9 0.3 110 6.0 3.8 3.8 High-income 545,234 2.0 68,475 -1.2 3.9 1.6 29.2 1.7 118 1.5 3.0 1.1 OECD members 542,093 2.0 67,663 -1.0 3.9 1.6 29.4 1.6 117 1.5 3.0 1.1 Other 3,141 -0.5 812 -8.0 4.2 1.5 20.6 1.3 117 1.5 3.0 1.1 Ireland 2,051 2.9 668 -4.3 5.9 2.6 25.8 -0.8 722 6.0 . . Israel 208 -0.2 231 3.5 1.9 1.2 37.8 2.8 242 3.6 36.9 1.7 Spain 19,698 3.2 5,407 0.7 2.5 2.9 19.3 2.0 101 3.2 11.0 1.7 Singapore . . . . 0 -16.2 . . . . 16.8 1.1 5,600 11.7 . . Hong Kong 0 -35.1 0 -14.3 3.0 0.0 23.2 5.2 0 . . 25.0 -6.1 New Zealand 672 2.4 283 0.0 4.2 1.5 30.0 0.7 656 -0.7 2.0 5.6 Belgium" 2,300 0.8 1,750 0.3 6.2 2.5 40.7 1.3 502 -0.2 0.1 0.0 United Kingdom 22,725 2.8 6,262 -0.5 5.9 2.5 35.8 1.9 350 2.4 0.9 2.9 Italy 17,133 1.0 2,468 -2.1 3.7 2.1 19.7 2.3 151 4.2 18.3 1.0 Australia 22,551 3.2 1,054 2.2 1.7 1.5 29.7 2.6 23 -0.2 0.4 1.3 Netherlands 1,368 -1.3 6,856 2.1 6.8 3.0 41.5 1.2 642 0.6 27.5 2.2 Austria 5,009 3.3 845 -5.7 5.3 2.7 26.1 0.9 201 0.3 0.1 0.0 France 57,216 2.9 5,417 -1.9 6.1 2.8 28.5 2.3 319 2.3 3.8 2.2 United Arab Emirates 5 . . 5 19.1 4.8 . . 13.3 -2.2 162 5.5 2.1 0.9 Canada 48,199 1.9 2,811 1.3 2.2 1.0 24.8 1.7 47 5.2 1.1 3.6 United States 284,357 1.9 17,322 1.0 4.5 1.7 31.3 1.7 99 1.4 4.2 1.0 Denmark 8,795 1.2 1,238 1.4 5.6 1.4 36.9 2.0 250 0.9 15.5 9.7 Germany 26,113 2.1 7,948 -4.5 5.6 2.4 37.0 1.2 384 0.4 2.8 0.9 Norway 1,180 3.2 455 -3.7 3.4 1.4 24.2 0.3 242 1.2 9.6 6.6 Sweden 5,493 1.1 1,179 -0.6 4.3 1.3 35.0 1.3 127 -0.1 3.3 7.5 Japan 14,322 -1.4 5,689 -1.7 5.7 0.7 25.0 1.4 418 1.0 54.3 -0.7 Finland 3,800 1.4 981 -1.4 3.2 1.3 22.0 0.8 210 1.6 2.4 10.0 Switzerland 1,411 2.9 770 -1.3 6.8 2.5 38.5 1.3 426 1.1 1.2 0.2 Kuwait 3 44.4 1 30.4 5.5 6.4 16.7 3.6 200 1.5 4.1 World 1,880,693 2.5 596,829 0.5 2.7 2.2 12.6 0.7 97 4.3 4.9 1.9 Note: Growth rates are average annual rates. a. Includes Luxembourg 203 Table A.8 Nationally protected areas All nationally protected areas Protected areas as a Share of protected Share of protected (thousand square Number of share of total land areas totally areas partially kilometers) protected areas area (percent) protected (percent) protected (percent) Country group 1972 1990 1972 1990 1972 1990 1972 1990 1972 1990 Low-income 592 1,441 361 1,407 1.6 3.8 59 46 41 54 China and India 27 411 84 736 0.2 3.2 12 11 88 89 Other low-income 565 1,031 277 671 2.3 4.1 61 61 39 39 Middle-income 778 2,215 691 1,839 1.9 5.3 70 53 30 47 Lower-middle-income 623 1,316 377 975 2.7 5.8 71 65 29 35 Upper-middle income 156 899 314 864 0.8 4.8 67 35 33 65 Low- and middle-income 1,370 3,656 1,052 3,246 1.7 4.6 65 50 35 50 Sub-Saharan Africa 790 1,105 251 379 3.4 4.8 65 65 35 35 East Asia and the Pacific 58 611 150 857 0.4 3.9 38 37 62 63 South Asia 32 198 110 469 0.6 3.8 17 34 83 66 Europe 16 77 144 411 0.7 3.6 48 20 52 80 Middle East and North Africa 128 427 50 126 1.1 3.7 80 38 20 62 Latin America and the Caribbean 293 1,173 238 797 1.4 5.8 72 53 28 47 Other economies 75 247 109 231 0.3 1.1 95 97 5 3 High-income 988 3,412 1,840 3,632 2.9 10.2 49 67 51 33 OECD members 986 2,423 1,820 3,581 3.2 7.8 48 54 52 46 Other 2 989 20 51 0.1 41.5 71 100 29 0 World 2,434 7,354 3,012 7,152 1.6 4.9 59 60 41 40 a. Includes countries not elsewhere specified and some economies with populations under 30,000. Table A.9 Global carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels and cement manufacture Total emissions from Average Carbon dioxide emissions fossil fuels and cement annual rate of (tons of carbon) manufacture growth Per million Share of emissions from different (million tons of carbon) 1980-89 Per capita dollars of sources 1989 (percent) Country group 1965 1989 (percent) 1989 GDP 1989 Solid Liquid Gas Other Low-income 203 952 5.8 0.32 926 71 20 3 6 Chinab 131 652 5.9 0.59 1,547 82 12 1 4 Indiab 46 178 7.0 0.21 670 71 22 2 5 Middle-income 373 1,061 2.3 0.96 471 36 45 12 6 Lower-middle-income 176 478 2.3 0.70 551 39 42 14 5 Upper-middle-income 198 583 2.3 1.38 421 35 48 11 6 Low- and middle-income 576 2,013 3.8 0.50 614 53 33 8 6 Sub-Saharan Africa 12 61 4.9 0.13 376 19 55 4 22 East Asia and the Pacific 157 837 5.7 0.54 934 70 22 2 6 South Asia 47 201 7.0 0.18 567 64 25 6 5 Europe 191 391 1.0 2.00 809 61 25 11 4 Middle East and North Africa 37 189 4.3 0.76 516 2 66 23 9 Latin America and the Caribbean 97 258 1.2 0.61 278 9 67 17 7 Other economies 535 1,089 2.0 37 32 28 3 High-income 1,901 2,702 0.5 3.26 186 36 45 17 2 Germanyb 178 175 -1.2 2.82 147 44 39 15 2 Japan5 106 284 1.0 2.31 99 29 58 9 4 United Kingdomb 171 155 0.1 2.72 185 44 35 18 2 United Statesb 948 1,329 1.0 5.34 259 38 43 19 1 World 3,012 5,822 1.8 1.12 327 42 38 16 4 Other sources ot emissions are gas flaring and cement manufacture. Top six emitters of carbon dioxide; data refer to Federal Republic of Germany only. Includes countries not elsewhere specified and economies with populations under 30,000. 204 Table A.1O Energy: consumption, production and resources (millions of tons of oil equivalent, unless otherwise specified) Average annual growth rate (percent) Energy resource and country group 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989 1965-80 1980-89 Liquid fuels World consumption 1,537 2,255 2,709 3,002 2,797 3,081 4.8 0.6 Low- and middle-income 247 400 554 719 751 872 7.7 2.2 Sub-Saharan Africa 12 17 21 26 28 31 4.9 2.0 East Asia and the Pacific 32 78 127 174 174 219 12.2 2.9 South Asia 17 26 32 42 54 69 5.7 5.6 Europe 40 71 110 136 124 137 9.0 0.5 Middle East and North Africa 39 56 75 110 142 159 7.3 3.8 Latin America and the Caribbean 101 141 175 217 212 240 5.5 0.8 Other economies 191 278 391 462 439 457 6.4 -0.2 High-income economies 1,095 1,568 1,750 1,801 1,589 1,733 3.7 0.1 World reserves 48,016 83,150 89,581 88,199 95,219 135,879 Reserves/production ratio (years) 31 36 33 28 34 44 World price (constant 1987 dollars per barrel) 5.3 4.6 21.4 37.7 34.6 15.3 16.0 -13.1 Solid fuels World consumption 1,367 1,495 1,553 1,794 2,094 2,321 1.9 3.2 Low- and middle-income 338 425 528 658 853 989 5.1 5.1 Sub-Saharan Africa 3 3 3 3 3 5 -0.1 6.2 East Asia and the Pacific 120 182 247 321 453 543 8.0 6.6 South Asia 35 37 47 66 91 116 4.7 6.5 Europe 143 162 179 204 222 231 2.5 1.9 Middle East and North Africa 1 1 3 2 3 3 7.0 4.6 Latin America and the Caribbean 7 8 11 15 20 24 5.1 5.5 Other economies 290 315 352 365 374 407 1.8 1.8 High-income economies 680 693 617 711 800 858 0.0 2.0 World reserves . . 328,000 504,000 517,000 468,000 935,000 Reserves/production ratio (years) . . 218 317 282 222 405 . . World price (constant 1987 dollars per ton) . . 53.2 60.4 38.0 . . -6.7 Gas World consumption Low- and middle-income 572 49 848 80 1,017 119 1,253 173 1,471 251 1,681 323 5.0 - 3.8 8.9 8.1 Sub-Saharan Africa 0 0 1 1 3 4 21.8 11.1 East Asia and the Pacific 4 4 11 17 22 35 12.6 9.3 South Asia 2 3 5 8 14 19 11.0 10.1 Europe 20 34 48 67 75 82 8.2 2.3 Middle East and North Africa 3 11 18 23 75 109 15.1 22.8 Latin America and the Caribbean 20 28 37 56 63 75 6.6 3.2 Other economies 119 155 226 316 472 550 6.5 6.9 High-income economies 404 612 668 759 740 800 3.9 0.8 World reserves 26,556 40,459 56,938 67,193 88,877 107,346 Reserves/production ratio (years) 46 47 55 53 60 66 . . Primary electricity World production 236 316 458 616 855 985 6.8 5.6 Low- and middle-income 31 53 85 132 180 217 10.2 5.9 Sub-Saharan Africa 3 5 7 12 9 10 10.6 -1.5 East Asia and the Pacific 4 7 15 19 35 49 11.6 11.0 South Asia 5 8 11 16 19 20 8.5 2.9 Europe 6 9 14 23 30 39 9.1 7.0 Middle East and North Africa 1 2 4 6 5 5 11.9 2.7 Latin America and the Caribbean 13 21 34 57 81 93 10.5 5.7 Other economies 23 35 41 68 104 123 6.7 7.7 High-income economies 181 227 331 413 567 641 6.0 5.2 Fuelwood and charcoal World consumption 244 263 286 329 372 399 1.8 2.2 Low- and middle income 198 228 254 281 315 343 2.2 2.3 Sub-Saharan Africa 46 53 61 71 84 95 2.9 3.2 East Asia and Pacific 60 67 75 83 91 98 2.1 1.9 South Asia 44 50 56 62 70 76 2.3 2.3 Europe 9 13 12 8 7 7 -2.8 -1.7 Middle East and North Africa 2 3 3 3 3 4 2.6 1.3 Latin America and Caribbean 37 41 46 52 58 62 2.4 2.1 Other economies 24 20 19 19 21 19 -1.5 0.5 High-income economies 22 15 13 29 36 36 -0.1 2.3 205 World Development Indicators Contents Key 210 Introduction, maps, and charts 213 Tables 1 Basic indicators 218 Production 2 Growth of production 220 3 Structure of production 222 4 Agriculture and food 224 5 Commercial energy 226 6 Structure of manufacturing 228 7 Manufacturing earnings and output 230 Domestic absorption Growth of consumption and investment 232 8 Structure of demand 234 9 Structure of consumption 236 10 Fiscal and monetary accounts 11 Central government expenditure 238 12 Central government current revenue 240 13 Money and interest rates 242 Core international transactions 14 Growth of merchandise trade 244 Structure of merchandise imports 246 15 Structure of merchandise exports 248 16 17 OECD imports of manufactured goods: origin and composition 250 18 Balance of payments and reserves 252 External finance 19 Official development assistance from OECD and OPEC members 254 20 Official development assistance: receipts 256 21 Total external debt 258 22 Flow of public and private external capital 260 23 Aggregate net resource flows and net transfers 262 24 Total external debt ratios 264 25 Terms of external public borrowing 266 Human and natural resources 26 Population growth and projections 268 27 Demography and fertility 270 28 Health and nutrition 272 29 Education 274 30 Income distribution and ICP estimates of GDP 276 31 Urbanization 278 32 Women in development 280 33 Forests, protected areas, and water resources 282 Technical notes 284 Box A.1 Basic indicators for economies with populations of less than 1 million 285 Box A.2 Selected indicators for other economies 286 Data sources 305 Classification of economies 306 209 Key In the main tables, economies are listed within formation on the sources, are given in World Popu- their groups in ascending order of GNP per capita lation Projections, 1992-93 Edition (forthcoming). except those for which no GNP per capita can be Figures in colored bands in the tables are sum- calculated. These are italicized, in alphabetical or- mary measures for groups of economies. der, at the end of their group. The ranking below The letter w means weighted average; m, me- refers to the order in the tables. dian value; t, total. The key shows the years of the most recent All growth rates are in real terms. census and the years of the latest demographic Data cutoff date is March 31, 1992. survey or vital registration-based estimates. This The symbol. . means not available. information is included to show the currentness of The figures 0 and 0.0 mean zero or less than half the sources of demographic indicators, which can the unit shown. be a reflection of the overall quality of a country's A blank means not applicable. indicators. Beyond these years, demographic esti- Figures with asterisks indicate data that are for mates may be generated by projection models, in- years or periods other than those specified. terpolation routines, or other methods. Explana- The symbol 1- indicates economies classified by tions of how World Bank estimates and projections the United Nations or otherwise regarded by their are derived from the sources, as well as more in- authorities as developing. Country ranking Population Life Infant Total EConomy in tables census expectancy mortality fertility Afghanistan 38 1979 1979 1970 1979 Albania 78 1989 1986-87 1989 1989 Algeria 72 1987 1985 1985 1984 Angola 79 1970 1984 Argentina 76 1980 1979-81 1983 1988 Australia 111 1986 1989 1989 1989 Austria 113 1981 1990 1990 1990 Bangladesh 10 1991 1989 1989 1989 Belgium 108 1981 1990 1990 1990 Benin 22 1979 1961 1977-82 1976-80 Bhutan 7 1969 1984 Bolivia 44 1976 1989 1989 1989 Botswana 71 1981 1988 1983-88 1983-87 Brazil 89 1980 1986 1986 1986 Bulgaria 73 1985 1985 1990 1990 Burkina Paso 20 1985 1976 1971-76 1961 Burundi 11 1979 1970-71 1982-86 1981-86 Cambodia 39 1982 Cameroon 53 1987 1976-80 1973-78 1985-90 Canada 116 1986 1989 1989 1989 Central African Rep. 28 1975 1970-75 1970-75 1955-59 Chad 6 1964 1963-64 1962-64 1963-64 Chile 70 1982 1989 1989 1989 China 23 1982 1986 1986 1987 Colombia 61 1985 1990 1990 1990 210 Country ranking Population Life Infant Total Economy in tables census expectancy mortality fertility Congo 56 1984 1974 1969-74 1969-74 Costa Rica 69 1988 1990 1990 1990 Côte d'Ivoire 48 1975 1988 1978-79 1983-88 Czechoslovakia 92 1980 1989 1990 1989 Denmark 118 1981 [989 1989 1990 Dominican Rep. 49 1990 1986 1986 1986 Ecuador 54 1982 1987 1987 1987 Egypt, Arab Rep. 37 1986 1975-77 1988 1988 El Salvador 57 1971 1988 1988 1988 Ethiopia 3 1984 1988 Finland 123 1985 1990 1990 1990 France 114 1990 1989 1989 1989 Gabon 93 1981 1960-61 1960-61 1960-61 Germany 119 1987 1990 1989 [990 Ghana 27 1984 1988 1983-87 1983-87 Greece 97 1991 1985 1990 1990 Guatemala 51 1981 1987 1987 1987 Guinea 31 1983 1955 1954-55 1954-55 Haiti 24 1982 1970-71 1987 1987 Honduras 36 1988 1982 1982 1982 tHong Kong 106 1986 1985-86 1990 1990 Hungary 90 1980 1990 1990 1990 India 21 1991 1981-83 1986 1985 Indonesia 35 1990 1971-80 1986 1988-91 Iran, Islamic Rep. 77 1986 1986 1986 1971-75 Iraq 99 1987 1974-75 1974-75 1974-75 Ireland 102 1986 1990 1989 1990 tlsrael 103 1983 1990 1990 1990 Italy 110 1981 1990 1990 1990 Jamaica 64 1982 1969-71 1989 1990 Japan 122 1985 1989 1989 1989 Jordan 60 1979 1983 1983 1983 Kenya 25 1979 1977-78 1973-78 1984-89 Korea, Rep. 96 1985 1978-79 1985 tKuwait 125 1985 1987 1987 1987 Lao PDR 8 1985 1988 1988 Lebanon 80 1970 1971 1971 1971 Lesotho 34 1986 1977 1972-77 1972-77 Liberia 40 1984 1975 1981-86 1981-86 Libya 100 1984 1969 1971-75 Madagascar 14 1974-75 1984 1979-84 1975-80 Malawi 9 1987 1966-77 1977-82 1972-77 Malaysia 75 1980 1988 1988 1984 Mali 16 1987 1976 1982-86 1982-86 Mauritania 33 1988 1975 1987-88 Mauritius 74 1983 1989 1984-86 1985 Mexico 85 1990 1987 1987 1987 Mongolia 81 1989 1989 1985 Morocco 52 1982 1987 1987 1987 Mozambique 1 1980 1985 1975 1976-80 Myanmar 41 1983 1983 1983 Namibia 82 1970 Nepal 5 1991 1974-76 1986 1986 Netherlands 112 1971 1990 1990 1990 New Zealand 107 1986 1988 1989 1989 211 Country ranking Population Life Infant Total Economy in tables census expectancy mortality fertility Nicaragua 83 1971 1978 1978 1978 Niger 18 1988 1978 1977-78 1959-63 Nigeria 17 1991 1985-90 1985-90 Norway 120 1980 1989 1989 1989 Oman 101 1986 1986 1986 Pakistan 26 1981 1972-81 1972-81 1985 Panama 68 1980 1970-80 1985-87 1986 Papua New Guinea 50 1990 1980 1980 Paraguay 58 1982 1982 1990 1990 Peru 59 1981 1981 1986 1986 Philippines 47 1990 1979-81 1986 1988 Poland 67 1988 1990 1990 1990 Portugal 95 1981 1988 1989 1988 Romania 66 1977 1990 1990 1990 Rwanda 19 1978 1978 1978-83 1978-83 Saudi Arabia 98 1974 1974 1974 1974 Senegal 46 1988 1978 1981-85 1981-86 Sierra Leone 15 1985 1971 1971-75 tSingapore 105 1990 1989 1989 1989 Somalia 4 1987 1976-80 1976-80 1976-80 South Africa 86 1985 1970 1980 1976-81 Spain 104 1981 1989 1989 1989 Sri Lanka 32 1981 1980-81 1988 1982-86 Sudan 42 1983 1983 1978-83 1976-80 Sweden 121 1985 1990 1990 1990 Switzerland 124 1980 1990 1990 1990 Syrian Arab Rep. 55 1981 1976-78 1976-78 1976-80 Tanzania 2 1988 1977-78 1977-80 1977-78 Thailand 62 1990 1978 1989 1987 Togo 29 1981 1988 1983-88 1983-88 Trinidad and Tobago 94 1990 1987 1987 1987 Tunisia 63 1984 1988 1988 1988 Turkey 65 1990 1988 1988 1988 Uganda 13 1991 1991 1983-88 1983-89 tUnited Arab Emirates 115 1985 1980 1980 1980 United Kingdom 109 1981 1990 1990 1990 United States 117 1990 1990 1990 1990 Uruguay 88 1985 1985 1985 1985 Venezuela 87 1990 1981 1981 1986 VietNam 43 1989 1989 1985-89 Yemen, Rep. 84 1986-88 1979 1979 1981 Yugoslavia 91 1981 1990 1990 1990 Zaire 12 1984 1955-57 1979-84 1979-84 Zambia 30 1990 1980 1979-80 1976-80 Zimbabwe 45 1982 1988 1983-88 1983-88 Note: Economies with populations of less than 1 million are included only as part of the country groups in the main tables, but are shown in greater detail in Box Al. Other economies not listed in the main tables nor in Box Al, but also included in the aggregates, are shown in greater detail in Box A.2. For data comparability and coverage throughout the tables, see the technical notes. 212 Introduction This fifteenth edition of the World Development Indi- For ease of reference, only ratios and rates of cators provides economic, social, and natural re- growth are usually shown; absolute values are gener- source indicators for selected periods or years for 185 ally available from other World Bank publications, economies and various analytical and geographical notably the 1991 edition of the World Tables. Most groups of economies. Most of the data collected by growth rates are calculated for two periods, 1965-80 the World Bank are on low- and middle-income econ- and 1980-90, and are computed, unless otherwise omies. Because comparable data for high-income noted, by using the least-squares regression method. economies are readily available, these are also in- Because this method takes into account all observa- cluded. Additional information may be found in tions in a period, the resulting growth rates reflect other World Bank publications, notably the World general trends that are not unduly influenced by ex- Bank Atlas, World Tables, World Debt Tables, and Social ceptional values, particularly at the end points. To Indicators of Development. These data are now also exclude the effects of inflation, constant price eco- available on diskette, in the World Bank's STARS nomic indicators are used in calculating growth rates. retrieval system. Details of this methodology are given at the begin- Although every effort has been made to standard- ning of the technical notes. Data in italics indicate ize the data, full comparability cannot be ensured, that they are for years or periods other than those and care must be taken in interpreting the indicators. specifiedup to two years earlier for economic indi- The statistics are drawn from the sources thought to cators and up to three years on either side for social be most authoritative, but the data are subject to con- indicators, since the latter tend to be collected less siderable margins of error. Variations in national sta- regularly and change less dramatically over short pe- tistical practices also reduce the comparability of data, riods of time. All dollar figures are U.S. dollars unless which should thus be construed only as indicating otherwise stated. The various methods used for con- trends and characterizing major differences among verting from national currency figures are described economies, rather than taken as precise quantitative in the technical notes. indications of those differences. The Bank continually reviews methodologies in an The indicators in Table 1 give a summary profile of effort to improve the international comparability and economies. Data in the other tables fall into the fol- analytical significance of the indicators. Differences lowing broad areas: production, domestic absorp- between data in this year's and last year's edition tion, fiscal and monetary accounts, core international reflect not only updates for the countries but also transactions, external finance, and human and natu- revisions to historical series and changes in ral resources. methodology. In this edition, Table 30, Income distribution and In these notes the term "country" does not imply ICP estimates of GDP, offers more complete country political independence but may refer to any territory coverage of ICP data by the inclusion of extrapolated whose authorities present for it separate social or eco- and imputed data. Note also that Table 33, Forests, nomic statistics. protected land areas, and water resources, is comple- As in the Report itself, the main criterion used to mented by several environmental tables in the Envi- classify economies and broadly distinguish different ronmental Data Annex to this volume. stages of economic development is GNP per capita. Data on external debt are compiled directly by the This year, the per capita income groups are: low-in- Bank on the basis of reports from developing member come, $610 or less in 1990 (43 economies); middle- countries through the Debtor Reporting System. income, $611 to $7,619 (54 economies); and high-in- Other data are drawn mainly from the United Na- come, $7,620 or more (24 economies). One new Bank tions and its specialized agencies, the International member, Albania, is now included in the main tables, Monetary Fund, and country reports to the World in the middle-income group. Economies with popula- Bank. Bank staff estimates are also used to improve tions of less than 1 million are not shown separately currentness or consistency. For most countries, na- in the main tables, but are included in the aggregates. tional accounts estimates are obtained from member Basic indicators for these countries and territories, governments through World Bank economic mis- and for Puerto Rico, are in a separate table in Box A.1 sions. In some instances these are adjusted by Bank of the technical notes. staff to provide conformity with international defini- Further classification of economies is by geographi- tions and concepts, and consistency and currentness. cal location, and in this edition two changes have 213 occurred in the geographical groupings. "Europe" totals (indicated by t), weighted averages (w), or me- has been separated from last year's group "Europe, dian values (m) calculated for groups of economies. Middle East, and North Africa," and "other econ- Countries for which individual estimates are not omies" has been moved from the bottom of the page shown, because of size, nonreporting, or insufficient to the low- and middle-income section. Other classi- history, have been implicitly included by assuming fications include severely indebted middle-income they follow the trend of reporting countries during economies and fuel exporters. For a list of economies such periods. This gives a more consistent aggregate in each group, see Definitions and Data Notes and measure by standardizing country coverage for each the tables on Country Classification. period shown. Group aggregates also include coun- Data for "other economies," which includes Cuba, tries with less than 1 million population, even though the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the country-specific data for these countries do not ap- former Soviet Union, are shown only as aggregates in pear in the tables. Where missing information ac- the main tables because of paucity of data, differences counts for a third or more of the overall estimate, in methods of computing national income, and diffi- however, the group measure is reported as not avail- culties of conversion. Some selected indicators for able. The weightings used for computing the sum- these countries, however, are included in Box A.2 of mary measures are stated in each technical note. the technical notes. Increased World Bank data collec- Germany, recently unified, does not yet have a tion and analysis in the former Soviet Union will re- fully merged statistical system. Throughout the ta- sult in better coverage and reporting of these emerg- bles, data for Germany are footnoted to explain cov- ing economies in future editions. erage; most economic data refer to the Federal Re- The summary measures in the colored bands are public of Germany before unification, but demo- Groups of economies For this map, economies are classified by Canada income group, as they are for the tables that follow. Low-income economies are those with a GNP per capita of $610 or less in 1990; middle-income, $611-7,619; high-income, $7,620 or more. Uneed State, Bermuda (UB) Low-income economies Middle-income economies High-income economies Data not available Guatemala El Selvado, Costa Rio, Venezuela Suyana pa, re,cll Curare (F,) Cola n,bbO /, F,e,00 FoIy,eo,a (F,) Brazil Dan V9J)us) Anlg,a and Ba,buda US V001a blonds (US) St BEts Cuad,boupe (Fr) and Neal, Do nr in boa N,tlr,rB,d, MaoV,ique (F,) ArltJles (NetS) Aurbe QSt Loots (Nell,) St vi,onnt S,enada a,eomla 214 graphic and social data generally refer to the unified notes outline the methods, concepts, definitions, and Germany. As in previous editions, the data for China data sources used in compiling the tables. A biblio- do not include Taiwan, China, but footnotes to Tables graphic list at the end of the notes details the data 14, 15, 16, and 18 provide estimates of the interna- sources, which contain comprehensive definitions tional transactions for Taiwan, China. and descriptions of concepts used. It should also be The table format of this edition follows that used in noted that country notes to the World Tables provide previous years. In each group, economies are listed in additional explanations of sources used, breaks in ascending order of GNP per capita, except those for comparability, and other exceptions to standard sta- which no such figure can be calculated. These are tistical practices that Bank staff have identified in na- italicized and in alphabetical order at the end of the tional accounts and international transactions. group deemed appropriate. This order is used in all tables except Table 19, which covers only high-in- come OPEC and OECD countries. The alphabetical Comments and questions relating to the World De- list in the key shows the reference number for each velopment Indicators should be addressed to: economy; here, too, italics indicate economies with no estimates of GNP per capita. Economies in the Socio-Economic Data Division high-income group marked by the symbol t are those International Economics Department classified by the United Nations or otherwise re- The World Bank garded by their authorities as developing. 1818 H Street, N.W The technical notes and the footnotes to tables Washington, D.C. 20433. should be referred to in any use of the data. These Faenoelslancdn Nor 101, oh Man (UK) r Lataua Lr5rruarria Folabe Belarus Beemany Clia,rn,llslanVs (UK Cr,choeloualde Gloalne Netherlands AuuoSea u Moldova Be Ig iu hr Morrgolie Luxembour Switoerlan Liechtenstein P01 tu ga Turkey Gibraltar (UK) China Rep raG I? Jordan Slgerra For Sort Saudi Arabia United India HonZKoinZ (UK) Macad (Fort) rpe Verde S.. Muir Niger Chad Thailand Sedan he Gambia Vu inca-B issac BuAara b Ujib005 Caerbo Pis Uuaim (UU( Samoa [FFo tdbtat tM Nigeria - .t.Ma hail Islands Case Ethiopia Sierra Leone Lanka Central Gtrioan a Libeda Rep Camenoon Ghana Meld ion Malaysie..1 Bingo Uganda Kenya U Nauru Equatodal Guinea hoe Congo Rwand Lao Tome and Principe Zaire hr ania Co once /1- Seychelles ha - \bolonroe Tuador lands, Furgolo Zambia MomUdo Vaflutbu rr Zimbabwe Maurkiuc Acer' Cal,dn,ia ICunion (Fr) (Fr) Swaeilaod Lesatho Sooth GenOa Znalgnd 215 Population density Population per square kilometer 0 - 19 20 - 49 For this map, population density is calculated by 50- 199 dividing a country's population by its total surface area (square kilometers of land and inland water area). See 200 or more Table 1 for the population and area of the 125 economies in the main tables, Box A.1 for an additional 57 reporting Data not available economies, and Box A.2 for 3 other economies. Fertility and mortality Total fertility Infant mortality Life expectancy Births per woman Deaths per 1,000 live births Years 8 150 80 60 40 1965 1990 2000 1965 1975 1990 1965 1975 1990 Low-income economies High-income economies Middle-income economies Other economies !Vote: For explanations of terms or methods, see the technical notes for Tables 27, 28, and 32. 216 Share of agriculture in GDP Less than 6 percent 6 - 9 percent Share of agriculture in GDP is calculated by taking the value added of an economy's agriculture sector and 10- 19 percent dividing it by gross domestic product. The shares say nothing about absolute values of production. For 20 - 29 percent economies with high levels of subsistence farming, the 30 percent or more share of agriculture in GDP is difficult to measure because of difficulties in assigning subsistence farming its appropriate value. For more details, see the technical Data not available note for Table 3. Annual renewable water resources Cubic meters I per capita I 0- 999 1,000-3,999 I 4,000-29,999 30,000 or more Data not available The average amount of water available er person per year is calculated by dividing a country s annual internal renewable water resources by its population. See Table A.3 in the Environmental data appendix for additional regional information on water availability; see the note to the table for further definitions. 217 Table 1. Basic indicators GNP per capttaa Life As'erage annual Adult Iliteracy Area Average annual expectancy rate of tnflattona (percent) Population (thousands gros'th rate birth (percent) Total (millions) of square Dollars (percent) (years) Female mid-1990 kilometers) 1990 1965-90 1965-80 1980-90 1990 1990 1990 Low-income economies 3,058.3 I 37,780 I 350 w 2.9 w 8.0 w 9.6 w 62 w 52 w 40w China and India 1,983.21 12,849t 360 w 3.7 w 3.2 w 6.8 w 65 w 50 w 37 w Other low-income 1,075.1 24,931 320 w 1.7 w 17.3 w 15.1 w 55 w 56 w 45 w I Mozambique 15.7 802 80 . . . . 36.6 47 79 67 2 Tanzania' 24.5 945 110 -0.2 9.6 25.8 48 3 Ethiopia 51.2 1,222 120 -0.2 3.4 2.1 48 . 4 Somalia 7.8 638 120 -0.1 10.2 49.7 48 86 76 5 Nepal 18.9 141 170 0.5 7.8 9.1 52 87 74 6 Chad 5.7 1,284 190 -1.1 6.2 1.2 47 82 70 7 Bhutan 1.4 47 190 8.4 49 75 62 8 LaoPDR 4.1 237 200 49 9 Malawi 8.5 118 200 0.9 7.4 14.7 46 . . - - 10 Bangladesh 106.7 l44 210 0.7 15.9 9.6 52 78 65 II Bumndi 5.4 28 210 3.4 5.0 4.2 47 60 50 12 Zaire 37.3 2,345 220 -2.2 24.7 60.9 52 39 28 13 Uganda 16.3 236 220 -2.4 21.4 107.0 47 65 52 14 Madagascar 11.7 587 230 -1.9 7.7 17.1 51 27 20 15 Sierra Leone 4.1 72 240 0.0 7.9 56.1 42 89 79 16 Mali 8.5 1,240 270 1.7 9.0 3.0 48 76 68 17 Nigeria 115.5 924 290 0.1 14.6 17.7 52 61 49 18 Niger 7.7 1,267 310 -2.4 7.5 2.9 45 83 72 19 Rwanda 7.1 26 310 1.0 12.5 3.8 48 63 50 20 BurkinaFaso 9.0 274 330 1.3 6.3 4.5 48 91 82 21 India 849.5 3,288 350 1.9 7.5 7.9 59 66 52 22 Benin 4.7 113 360 -0.1 7.4 1.9 50 84 77 23 China 1,133.7 9,561 370 5.8 -0.3 5.8 70 38 27 24 Haiti 6.5 28 370 0.2 7.3 7.2 54 53 47 25 Kenya 24.2 580 370 1.9 7.2 9.2 59 42 31 26 Pakistan 112.4 796 380 2.5 10.3 6.7 56 79 65 27 Ghana 14.9 239 390 -1.4 22.9 42.5 55 49 40 28 Central African Rep. 3.0 623 390 -0.5 8.2 5.4 49 75 62 29 Togo 3.6 57 410 -0.1 7.1 4.8 54 69 57 30 Zambia 8.1 753 420 -1.9 6.3 42.2 50 35 27 31 Guinea 5.7 246 440 . . . . . . 43 87 76 32 SriLanka 17.0 66 470 2.9 9.4 11.1 71 17 12 33 Mauritania 2.0 1,026 500 -0.6 7.6 9.0 47 79 66 34 Lesotho 1.8 30 530 4.9 6.7 12.7 56 . 35 Indonesia 178.2 1,905 570 4.5 35.5 8.4 62 32 23 36 Honduras 5.1 112 590 0.5 5.7 5.4 65 29 27 37 Egypt, Arab Rep. 52.1 1,001 600 4.1 6.4 11.8 60 66 52 38 Afghanistan 652 . . . . . . 42 86 71 39 Cambodia 8.5 181 . . . . - . . . 50 78 65 40 Liberia 2.6 111 . . . . 6.3 . . 54 71 61 41 Myanmar 41.6 677 61 28 19 42 Sudan 25.1 2,506 1 l.5 50 88 73 43 VietNam 66.3 330 67 16 12 Middle-income economies 1,087.5 1 41,139 2,220 w 2.2 w 21.1 w 85.6w 66w 27w 22w Lower-middle-income 629.1 t 22,432 1,530w 1.5w 23.6 w 64.8 w 65 w 32w 25w 44 Bolivia 7.2 1,099 630 -0.7 15.9 317.9 60 29 23 45 Zimbabwe 9.8 391 640 0.7 5.8 10.8 61 40 33 46 Senegal 7.4 197 710 -0.6 6.3 6.7 47 75 62 47 Philippines 61.5 300 730 1.3 11.4 14.9 64 11 10 48 Cbted'Ivoirc 11.9 322 750 0.5 9.4 2.3 55 60 46 49 DominicanRep. 7.1 49 830 2.3 6.7 21.8 67 18 17 50 PapuaNewGuinea 3.9 463 860 0.1 8.1 5.3 55 62 48 51 Guatemala 9.2 109 900 0.7 7.1 14.6 63 53 45 52 Morocco 25.1 447 950 2.3 7.0 7.2 62 62 51 53 Cameroon Il .7 475 960 3.0 9.0 5.6 57 57 46 54 Ecuador 10.3 284 980 2.8 10.9 36.6 66 16 14 55 SyrianArabRep. 12.4 185 1,000 2.9 7.9 14.6 66 49 36 56 Congo 2.3 342 1,010 3.1 6.8 0.5 53 56 43 57 ElSalvador 5.2 21 1,110 -0.4 7.0 17.2 64 30 27 58 Paraguay 4.3 407 1,110 4.6 9.3 24.4 67 12 10 59 Peru 21.7 1,285 1,160 -0.2 20.6 233.9 63 21 15 60 Jordanc 3.2 89 1,240 . . . . . . 67 30 20 61 Colombia 32.3 1,139 1,260 2.3 17.5 24.8 69 14 13 62 Thailand 55.8 513 1,420 4.4 6.2 3.4 66 10 7 63 Tunisia 8.1 164 1,440 3.2 6.7 7.4 67 44 35 64 Jamaica 2.4 II 1,500 -1.3 12.8 18.3 73 65 Turkey 56.1 779 1,630 2.6 20,8 43.2 67 29 19 66 Romania 23.2 238 1,640 . . . . 1.8 70 . . Note: For economies with populations of tess than I million, see Box A. 1; for other economies, see Box A.2. For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 218 GNPper capita a Life Average annual Adult illiteracy Area Average annual expectancy rate of inflation5 (percent) Population (thousands growth rate birth (percent) (millions) of square Dollars (percent) (years) Female Total mid-1990 kilometers) 1990 1965-90 1965-80 1980-90 1990 1990 1990 67 Poland 38.2 313 1,690 . . . 54.3 71 . 68 Panama 2.4 77 1,830 1.4 5.4 2.3 73 12 12 69 Costa Rica 2.8 5! 1,900 1.4 11.2 23.5 75 7 7 70 Chile 13.2 757 1,940 0.4 129.9 20.5 72 7 7 71 Botswana 1.3 582 2,040 8.4 8.4 12.0 67 35 26 72 Algeria 25.1 2,382 2,060 2.! 10.9 6.6 65 55 43 73 Bulgaria 8.8 Ill 2,250 . . . . 2.2 73 74 Mauritius 1.1 2 2,250 3.2 11.8 8.8 70 . 75 Malaysia 17.9 330 2,320 4.0 4.9 1.6 70 30 22 76 Argentina 32.3 2.767 2,370 -0.3 78.4 395.2 71 5 5 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. 55.8 1,648 24901 0_I 15.5 13.5 63 57 46 78 Albania 3.3 29 . . 72 . 79 Angola 10.0 1,247 . 46 72 58 80 Lebanon . . 10 . . . . 65 27 20 8! Mongolia 2.1 1,565 . . . . -1.3 63 . 82 Namibia 1.8 824 . . . . . . 13.4 57 . 83 Nicaragua 3.9 130 . . -3.3 8.9 432.3 65 . 84 Yemen,Rep. 11.3 528 . . . . . . . . 48 74 62 Upper-middle-income 458.4 1 18,7061 3,410 w 2.8 w 19.3 w 102.1 w 68 w 19 w 16 w 85 Mexico 86.2 1,958 2,490 2.8 13.0 70.3 70 15 13 86 SouthAfrica 35.9 1,221 2,530 1.3 10.3 14.4 62 . 87 Venezuela 19.7 912 2,560 -1.0 10.4 19.3 70 10 12 88 Uruguay 3.1 177 2,560 0.8 58.2 61.4 73 4 4 89 Brazil 150.4 8,512 2,680 3.3 31.3 284.3 66 20 19 90 Hungaiy 10.6 93 2,780 . . 2.6 9.0 71 . 91 Yugoslavia 23.8 256 3.060 2.9 15.2 122.9 72 12 7 92 Czechoslovakia 15.7 128 3,140 . . . . 1.9 72 . 93 Gabon 1.1 268 3.330 0.9 12.8 -1.7 53 52 39 94 TrinidadandTobago 1.2 5 3,610 0.0 13.7 6.4 71 . 95 Portugal 10.4 92 4,900 3.0 11.7 18.1 75 19 15 96 Korea,Rep. 42.8 99 5,400 7.1 18.4 5.1 71 97 Greece 10.1 132 5,990 2.8 10.3 18.0 77 II 7 98 Saudi Arabia 14.9 2,150 7,050 2.6 17.9 -4.2 64 52 38 99 Iraq 18.9 438 . . . . . . . . 63 51 40 100 Libya 4.5 1,760 . . -3.0 15.4 0.2 62 50 36 101 Oman 1.6 212 . . 6.4 19.9 66 Low- and middle-income 4,145.81 78,9191 840 w 2.5 w 16.7 w 61.8 w 63 w 46 w 36 H Sub-Saharan Africa 495.2 1 23,0661 340 w 0.2 w 11.4 w 20.0 w 51 w 62 w 50 H East Asia & Pacific 1,577.2 1 15,572 I 600 w 5.3 w 9.3 w 6.0 w 68 w 34 w 24 H South Asia 1,147.71 5,1581 330 w 1.9 w 8.3 w 8.0 w 58 w 67 w 53 w Europe 200.3 1 2,171 2,400 w . . 13.9 w 38.8 w 70 w 22 w 15 H Middle East & N.Africa 256.41 11,3341 1,790w 1.8w 13.6w 7.5 w 61 w 60w 47 w Latin America & Caribbean 433.1 1 20,397 1 2,180 w 1.8 w 31.4 w 192.1 w 68 w 18 w 16 w Other economies 320.9 I 22,6341 . . . . . . . . 71 w 7 W 6W Severely indebted 455.2 I 21,0481 2,140 w 2.1 w 27.4 w 173.5 w 67 w 24 w 21 H High-income economies 816.41 31,790 1 19,590 w 2.4 w 7.7 w 4.5 w 77 w 5w 4ii OECD members 776.8 I 31,243 1 20,170 w 2.4 w 7.6 w 4.2 w 77 w 5w 4H tOther 39.6 1 547 I 13.8 w 26.1 w 75 w 33 w 27 H 102 Ireland 3.5 70 9,550 3.0 11.9 6.5 74 . 103 (Israel 4.7 21 10,920 2.6 25.2 101.4 76 . 104 Spain 39.0 505 11.020 2.4 12.3 9.2 76 7 5 105 (Singapore 3.0 1 11,160 6.5 5.1 1.7 74 106 tHong Kong 5.8 1 ll.490e 6.2 8.1 7.2 78 . 107 New Zealand 3.4 269 12,680 1.1 10.3 10,5 75 108 Belgium 10.0 31 15.540 2.6 6.6 4.4 76 109 United Kingdom 57.4 245 16,100 2.0 11.2 5.8 76 110 Italy 57.7 30! 16,830 3.0 11,3 9.9 77 4 3 III Australia 17.1 7,687 7,000 .9 9.5 7.4 77 f I 112 Netherlands 14.9 37 17,320 1.8 7.5 1.9 77 f I 113 Austria 7.7 84 19,060 2.9 5.8 3.6 76 114 France 56.4 552 19.490 2.4 8.4 6.1 77 115 (United Arab Emirates 1.6 84 19,860 . . . . 1.1 72 . 116 Canada 26.5 9,976 20,470 2.7 7.1 4.4 77 117 United States 250.0 9,373 21,790 1.7 6.5 3.7 76 118 Denmark 5.1 43 22,080 2.1 9.3 5.6 75 119 Germany1 79.5 22320h 2.4k 5.2k 27 76 120 Norway 4.2 324 23.120 3.4 7.7 5.5 77 121 Sweden 8.6 450 23,660 1.9 8.0 7.4 78 f 122 Japan 123.5 378 25,430 4.1 7.7 1.5 79 123 Finland 5.0 338 26,040 3.2 10.5 6.8 76 f f 24 Switzerland 6.7 41 32,680 1.4 5.3 3.7 78 125 '(Kuwait 2.1 18 . . -4.0 15.9 -2.7 74 33 27 World 5,283.91 133,342 I 4,200 w 1.5 w 9.2 w 14.7 w 66 w 45 w 35 w Fuel exporters, excl. former USSR 272.91 12,3871 1.1 w 14.5w 8.4w 58w 54w 44w t Economies classified by the United Nations or otherwise regarded by their authorities as developing. a. See the technical notes. h. In all tables GDP and GNP data cover mainland Tanzania only. c. In all tables data foriordan cover the East Bank only. d. Reflects last-minute revisions of population estimate (previous estimate was $2,450). e. Data refer to GDP. f. According to Unesco. illiteracy is less than 5 percent. g. In all tables, data refer to the unified Germany, unless otherwise specified. h. Data refer to the Federal Republic of Germany before unification. 219 Table 2. Growth of production Average annual growth rate (percent) GDP Agriculture industry Manufacturinga 5e,vices etc. b 1965 -80 1980-90 1965-80 1980-90 1965 -80 /980-90 1965-80 1980-90 1965-80 1980-90 Low-income economies 4.9 w 6.1 w 2.6 w 3.9 w 7.3 w 8.2 w 6.7 w 11.1 w 6.2 w 6.5 w China and India 4.9 w 7.6 w 2.7 w 4.6 w 7.0 w 10.3 w 6.8 w 12.0 w 6.5 w 7.7 w Other low-income 4.8 w 3.9 w 2.4 w 2.6 w 8.0 w 3.7 w 6.4 w 7.2 w 5.8 w 4.8 w I Mozambique . . -0.7 . 1.3 -4.1 . . . . . . -3.2 2 Tanzania 3.9 2.8 1.6 4.! 4.2 0.0 5.6 -0.4 10.8 1.3 3 Ethiopia 2.7 1.8 1.2 -0.1 3.5 2.9 5.1 3.1 5.2 3.7 4 Somalia 3.5 2.4 . . 3.3 1.0 . . -1.7 . . 0.9 5 Nepal 1.9 4.6 1.1 4.8 6 ChadC 0.1 5.9 -0.3 2.7 -0.6 7.9 . . 0.2 8.6 7 Bhutan . . 7.5 . . 4.8 . . 14.8 . 15.2 . . 7.4 8 Lao PDRC . . . . . . . . . 9 Malawi 5.5 2.9 4.1 2.0 6.4 3.0 . . 3.6 6.7 3.5 10 BangladeshC 1.7 4.3 0.6 2.6 1.5 4.9 2.8 2.8 3.6 5.8 11 Burandi 7.1 3.9 6.6 3.1 17.4 4.5 6.0 5.5 5.2 5.4 12 Zairec 1.9 1.8 . . 2.5 . . 2.3 . . 2.3 . . 1.6 13 Uganda 0.6 2.8 1.2 2.5 -4.3 5.5 -3.7 5.2 1.1 3.3 14 Madagascarc 1.6 1.1 . . 2.4 1.2 . . . . . . 0.3 15 SierraLeone 2.7 1.5 3.9 2.6 -0.8 -1.5 0.7 -1.6 4.3 1.4 16 MaliC 4.2 4.0 2.8 2.3 1.8 6.8 . . . . 7.6 5.6 17 Nigeria 6.0 1.4 1.7 3.3 13.1 -1.2 14.6 -1.0 5.9 2.7 18 Niger 0.3 -1.3 -3.4 .. 11.4 . . . . . . 0.6 19 Rwandac 4.9 1.0 -1.5 . . 1.2 . . 1.0 3.9 20 BurkinaFaso . . 4.3 3.3 . 4.4 . . 2.6 . . 4.9 21 India 3.6 5.3 2.5 3.1 4.2 6.6 4.5 7.1 4.4 6,5 22 Benin 2.1 2.8 3.6 . . 4.8 . . 5.8 . . 1.8 23 China 6.8 9.5 2.8 6.1 10.0 12.5 8.9 ' 14.4 11.9 9.1 24 Haiti 2.9 -0.6 25 Kenya 6.8 4.2 5.0 3.3 9.7 3.9 10.5 4.9 7.2 4.9 26 Pakistan 5.2 6.3 3.3 4.3 6.4 7.3 5.7 7.7 5.9 6.9 27 GhanaC 1.3 3.0 1.6 1.0 1.4 3.3 2.5 4.0 1.1 5.7 28 Central African Rep. 2.8 1.5 2.1 2.7 5.3 3.0 2.9 0.0 29 TogoC 4.3 1.6 1.9 5.4 6.8 0.3 0.7 4.7 -0.2 30 Zambia 2.0 0.8 2.2 3.7 2.1 0.7 5.3 3.5 1.8 0.2 31 Guineac , , . . . . . . . . 32 Sri Lanka 4.0 4.0 2.7 2.3 4.7 4.6 3.2 6.3 4.6 4.7 33 Mauritania 2.1 1.4 -2.0 0.7 2.2 4.9 . . 6.5 0.8 34 Lesotho 6.8 3.1 . . -0.7 . . 2.9 . . 13.5 . . 5.6 35 Indonesiac 7.0 5.5 4.3 3.2 11.9 5.6 12.0 12.5 7.3 6.7 36 Honduras 5.0 2.3 2.0 1.8 6.8 2.4 7.5 3.7 5.7 2.4 37 Egypt, Arab Rep. 7.3 5.0 2.7 2.5 6.9 4.3 . . 13.7 6.7 38 Afghanistan , . . . . 39 Cambodia . . , . . . . 40 Liberia . , . . . . . 41 Myanmar 42 Sudan 3.8 . . 2.9 3.1 .. .. .. 4.9 43 VietNam Middle-income economies 6.3 w 2.5 w 3.4 w 2.4 w 6.7 w 2.3 w 3.5 w 7.4w 2.6w Lower.middle-income 5.5 w 2.6 w 3.6 w 2.5 w 5.0 w 2.8 w 7.7w 2.5w 44 Bolivia' 4.4 -0.1 3.8 1.9 3.7 -1.7 5.4 -0.9 5.6 -0.4 45 Zimbabwe 5.0 2.9 . . 2.4 . . 2.4 2.8 . . 3.4 46 SenegaE 2.3 3.0 1.4 3.! 5.5 3.5 4.5 4.8 1.9 2.9 47 PhilippinesC 5.7 0.9 3.9 1.0 7.7 -0.8 6.8 0.1 5.0 2.6 48 Côte d'Ivoire 6.8 0.5 3.3 1.0 10.4 0.3 11.8 -0.1 49 Dominican Rep.0 8.0 2.1 6.3 1.3 0.8 2.3 8.9 0.8 7.3 2.3 50 Papua New Guinea 4.1 1.9 3.1 1.7 . , 2.7 . . 1.9 . . 1.4 51 Guatemala' 5.9 0.8 5.1 2.6 7.3 1.9 6.5 . . 5.7 2.1 52 Momcco' 5.7 4.0 2.4 6.4 6.1 2.8 . . 3.8 7.1 4.1 53 Cameroonc 5.1 2.3 4.2 1.6 7.8 3.! 7.0 10.2 4.8 2.1 54 Ecuador 8.8 2.0 3.4 4.4 13.7 1.5 11.5 0.3 7.6 1.5 55 Syrian Arab Rep.c 9.1 2.1 5.9 -0.6 12.0 6.8 . . . . 10.5 1.6 56 CongoC 6.2 3.6 3.1 3.6 9.9 4.9 . . 6.8 4.7 2.3 57 El Salvador 4.3 0.9 3.6 -0.7 5.3 -0.6 4.6 . . 4.1 1.7 58 Paraguayc 7.0 2.5 4.9 3.6 9.1 -0.5 7.0 5.3 7.4 3.4 59 PeruC 3.9 -0.3 1.0 2.8 4.4 -1.2 3.8 -0.5 4.2 -0.4 60 Jordan 61 Colombia 5,7 3.7 3.0 5.7 5.1 6.4 3.4 6.3 2.9 62 Thailand 7.3 7.6 4.6 4.1 9.5 9.0 11.2 8.9 7.4 7.8 63 Tunisia 6.5 3.6 5.5 2.3 7.4 2.6 9.9 6.0 6.4 4.5 64 Jamaica 1.4 1.6 0.5 0.8 -0.1 2.2 0.4 2.4 3.1 65 Turkey 6.2 5.l 3.2 3.0 7.2 6.2 7,5 7.2 7.6 5.2 66 Romania 1.2 0.1 0.7 2.4 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 220 Average annual growth rate (percent) GDP Agriculture Industry Manufacturinga Services, etc. b 1965-80 1980-90 1965-80 1980-90 1965-80 1980-90 /965-80 1980-90 1965-80 1980-90 67 PolandC . 18 . . . . . . . . 0 68 PanamaC 5.5 0.2 2.4 1.9 5.9 -3.4 4.7 -1.4 6.0 0.9 69 Costa RicaC 6.3 3.0 4.2 3.2 8.7 2.9 . . 3.1 5.9 3.1 70 ChileC 1.9 3.2 1.6 4.2 0.8 3.4 0.6 3.5 2.7 2.9 71 BotswanaC 13.9 11.3 9.7 -4.0 24.0 13.0 13.5 5.3 11.5 11.9 72 Algeriac . 3.1 4.3 . . 2.9 . . 3.0 . . 2.9 73 Bulgaria . . 2.6 -2.9 . . 4.6 . . . . . . 1.3 74 Mauritius 5.2 6.0 2.6 . . 9.2 . . 10.8 . . 5.1 75 Ma1aysia' 7.4 5.2 . . 3.8 . . 7.1 . . 8.8 . . 4.2 76 ArgentinaC 3.4 -0.4 1.4 1.1 3.3 -1.1 . . . . 4.1 -0.! 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. 6.1 2.5 4.5 4.0 2.2 3.4 9.9 0.3 13.5 1.1 78 Albania . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Angola . . . . -0.5 12.6 . . -4.6 80 LebanonC . . . . . . . . . 81 Mongolia . . 5.6 . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Nan/b/a . . 0.4 . . -1.0 . . -2.0 . . 1.4 . . 3.0 83 Nicaragua' 2.5 -2.2 3.8 -2.6 4.2 -4.4 5.1 4.3 1.0 -1.0 84 Yemen,Rep.c . . . . . . . . . . Upper-middle-income 7.0 w 2.4 w 3.2 w 2.3 w 7.8 w 2.0 w 8.9 w 3.5 w 7.4 w 2.7 w 85 Mexico° 6.5 1.0 3.2 0.4 7.6 1.0 7.4 1.4 6.5 1.1 86 South Africa 3.7 1.3 3.0 2.6 3.0 0.0 5.6 -0.1 4.7 2.4 87 Venezuelav 3.7 1.0 3.9 3.1 1.5 1.5 5.8 4.2 5.8 0.5 88 Uniguay 2.4 0.3 1.0 0.0 2.9 -0.2 . . 0.4 2.3 0.8 89 Brazil 9.0 2.7 3.8 2.8 10.1 2.1 9.8 1.7 9.4 3.4 90 Hungarye 5.7 1.3 2.7 1.6 6.4 -0,5 6.2 2.8 91 Yugoslavia 6.1 0.8 3.1 0.7 7.8 0.8 5.5 0.8 92 CeechoslovakiaC . 1.4 . . 0.3 . . 2.1 1.4 93 Gabonc 9.5 2.3 . . . . . 94 TrinidadandTobago 4.8 -4.7 0.0 -6.0 5.0 -5.5 2i -3.0 5.3 95 Portugal 5.3 2.7 96 Korea, Rep.c 9.9 9.7 3.0 2.8 16.4 12.2 18.7 12.7 9.6 9.2 97 Greece 5.8 1.8 2.3 0.7 7.1 1.0 8.4 0.6 6.4 2.6 98 Saudi Arabia' 10.6 -1.8 4.1 14.6 11.6 -4.4 8.1 8.8 9.8 -0.3 99 Iraq 100 Libya 4.2 10.7 . . 1.2 13.7 . . 15.5 101 Onion 13.0 12.8 5.1 . . 13.7 . . 27.0 . . 10.5 Low- and middle-income 5.9 w 3.2 w 2.9 w 3.2 w 6.8 w 3.8 w 8.0 w 6.0 w 7.1 w 3.6 w Sub-Saharan Africa 4.2 w 2.1 w 2.0w 2.1 w 7.2w 2.0w . . 3.1 w 4.7w 2.5 w East Asia & Pacific 7.3 w 7.8 w 3.2 w 4.8 w 10.8 w 10.2 w 10.3 w 12.4 w 8.9 w 8.0 w South Asia 3.6 w 5.2 w 2.5 w 3.0 w 4.3 w 6.5 w 4.5 w 6.8 w 4.5 w 6.3 w Europe 2.1 w . . 1.0w . . 2.7 w . . . . 2.7w Middle East & N.Africa 6.7 w 0.5 w 4.3w w 6.3w 0.7w . . 3.4 w 10.9 w 1.9 w Latin America & Caribbean 6.0w 1.6w 3.1 w 1.9w 6.6 w 1.2 w 8.3 w 1.7 w 6.6 w 1.7 w Other economies Severely indebted 6.3w 1.7w 3.3w 1.8w 6.6w 1.6w 8.4w 1.7w 6.8w 1.9w High-income economies 3.7 w 3.1 w 1.7w 2.7 w 3.2 w OECD members 3.7 w 3.1 w 1.7 w 2.8 w 3.1 w 33w tOther 2.3 w 102 Ireland 4.9 3.1 103 tIsrael' 6.8 3.2 104 SpainC 4.6 3.! 105 tSingaporec 10.0 6.4 2.8 11.9 5.4 13.2 9.i 7' 106 tHong Kong 8.6 7.1 107 New Zealandv 2.4 1.9 . . 4.7 '.7 1.3 . . 1.6 108 Belgiumc 3.9 2.0 . . 2.0 1.9 2.8 1.6 109 United Kingdom 2.3 3.1 . . -3.1 '.3 4.8 . . 3.0 110 Italyv 4.3 2.4 . . 0.8 1.9 2.7 2.9 Ill Australiac 4.0 3.4 . . 3.2 3.2 1.9 . . 3.7 112 Netherlands0 3.9 1.9 43C 3.6 2.3e 3,8e 1.8 113 Austriac 4.3 2.1 2.2 1.0 4.4 1.7 4.6 2.2 4.3 2.1 114 Francec 4.0 2.2 . . 2.0 0.6 0.2 . . 2.9 115 (United Arab Emirates -4.5 . . 9.3 -8.7 2.7 . . 3.7 116 Canada 4.8 3.4 0.7 0.2 3.5 3.2 3.8 3.4 6.4 3.5 117 UnitedStatesc 2.7 3.4 1.0 . . 1.7 . . 2.6 . . 3.3 118 Denmark 2.8 2.4 0.9 2.6 1.9 3.3 3.2 1.5 3.0 2.0 119 Germany 3.3 2.1 1.4 1.6 2.9 0.4 3.3 0.9 3.7 2.7 120 Norway 4.4 2.9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Sweden 2.7 2.2 . . 1.1 . . 2.8 . . 2.7 . . 1.4 122 Japan' 6.4 4.1 -0.6 1.3 7.1 4.5 7.8 5.3 6.8 3.8 123 Finland 4.0 3.4 0.0 -0.7 4.3 3.0 4.9 3.3 4.7 3.4 124 Switzerland0 2.0 2.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 tKusvait° 1.6 0.7 . . 18.8 . . .1.0 0.6 . . -0.2 . World 4.0 w 3.2 w 1.7 w 2.7 w . . . . . . . . . Fuel exporters, exci. formerUSSR 6.6w 0.8w 3.7w 4.3 w 6.0w -1.0w 8.3 w 3.0 w 9.6w 1.2 w a. Because manufacturing is generally the most dynamic part of the industrial sector, Its growth rate is shown separately. b. Services, etc. includes unallocated items. c. GDP and its components are at purchaser values. d. World Bank estimate. e. Data refer to the period 1970-1980. f. Data refer to the Federal Republic of Germany before unification. 221 Table 3. Structure of production Distribution of gross domestic product (percent) GDP (millions of dollars) Agriculture industry Manufacturinga Services, etc. b 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 Low-income economies 168,700 915,520 41 w 31 w 26 w 36 w 19w 27 w 32 w 35 w China and India 117,730 619,450 1 41 w 29 w 29 w 36 w 22 w 30 w 30 w 35 w Other low-income 49,810 307,040 I 42 w 30 w 20 w 34 w 8w 38 w 38 w I Mozambique . . 1,320 . . 65 . . 15 . . . . . . 21 2 Tanzania 790 2,060 46 59 14 12 8 10 40 29 3 Ethiopia 1,180 5,490 58 41 14 17 7 Il 28 42 4 Somalia 220 890 71 65 6 9 3 5 24 26 5 Nepal 730 2,890 65 60 II 14 3 5 23 26 6 ChadC 290 1,100 42 38 IS 17 12 14 43 45 7 Bhutan 280 43 27 10 29 8 Lao PDRC . 870 . . 0 . . 9 Malawi 220 1660 50 33 13 20 . . 14 37 46 10 HangladeshC 4,380 22,880 53 38 Il IS 5 9 36 46 11 Burundi ISO 1,000 . . 56 15 10 . . 29 12 Zaire 4,040 7,540 20 30 32 33 . 13 48 36 13 Uganda 1,100 2,820 52 67 13 7 8 4 35 26 14 Madagascarc 750 2,750 25 33 14 13 . 12 61 54 15 Sierra Leone 320 840 34 32 28 13 6 6 38 55 16 Mali 260 2,450 65 46 9 13 5 8 25 41 17 Nigeria 5,380 34,760 55 36 12 38 5 7 33 25 18 Nigerc 670 2,520 68 36 3 13 2 5 29 51 19 Rwandac 150 2,130 75 38 7 22 2 IS 18 40 20 Burkina Faso 350 3,060 37 32 24 24 11 14 39 44 21 India 50,530 254,540 44 31 22 29 16 19 34 40 22 Bcnin 220 1,810 59 37 8 15 . . 7 33 48 67,200 42 28d 38 27 23 China 364,900 38 27 35 31 24 HaitiC 350 2,760 .. . . . . . . . . . . 25 Kenya 920 7,540 35 28 18 21 11 11 47 51 26 Pakistan 5,450 35,500 40 26 20 25 14 17 40 49 27 Ghanac 2,050 6,270 44 48 19 16 10 9 38 37 28 CentralAfrican Rep. 140 1,220 46 42 16 17 4 . . 38 41 29 Togo' 190 1,620 45 33 21 22 10 9 34 46 30 ZambiaC 1,060 3,120 14 17 54 55 6 43 32 29 31 GuineuC . 2,820 . . 28 . . 33 . . 4 . . 39 32 Sri Lanka 1,770 7,250 28 26 2! 26 17 15 51 48 33 Mauritania 160 950 32 26 36 29 4 . . 32 44 34 Lesotho 50 340 65 24 5 30 1 14 30 46 35 IndonesiaC 5,980 107,290 51 22 13 40 8 20 36 38 36 Honduras 460 2,360 40 23 19 24 12 16 41 53 37 Egypt,ArabRep. 4,550 33,210 29 17 27 29 . 16 45 53 38 Afghanistan 970 . . . . . . . 39 Cambodia 870 . . . . . 0 40 Liberia 270 . . 27 . 40 . . 3 34 4! Myanmar 04: 42 Sudan 1,330 54: . . . 43 VietNam Middle-income economies 209,520 t 2,437,6601 19 w 12 w 34 w 37 w 20 w 46w 50 w Lower-middle-income 108,5701 930,0201 22 w 17 w 32 w 31 w 20 w 44w 50 w 44 Boliviac 710 4,480 23 24 31 32 15 13 46 44 45 Zimbabwe 960 5,310 18 13 35 40 20 26 47 47 46 SencgaC 810 5,840 25 21 18 18 14 13 56 61 47 Philippines 6,010 43.860 26 22 27 35 20 25 47 43 48 Côted'Ivoire 760 7,610 47 47 19 27 II . . 33 26 49 Dominican Rep.' 890 7,310 23 17 22 27 16 13 55 56 50 PapuaNcwGuineac 340 3,270 42 29 18 31 12 41 40 51 Guatemalac 1,330 7,630 . . 26 . . 19 . . . . . . 55 52 Morocco 2,950 25,220 23 16 28 33 16 18 49 51 53 Cameroonc 810 11,130 33 27 20 28 10 13 47 46 54 Ecuadorc 1,150 10,880 27 13 22 42 18 23 50 45 55 Syrian Arab Rep.0 1,470 14,730 29 28 22 22 . . . 49 50 56 Congo' 200 2,870 19 13 19 39 . . 7 62 48 57 ElSalvadorC 800 5,400 29 11 22 21 18 19 49 67 58 Paraguay 440 5,260 37 28 19 23 16 23 45 49 59 PeruC 5,020 36.550 18 7 30 37 17 27 53 57 60 Jordan . . 3,330 . . 8 . . 26 . . 12 . . 66 61 Colombia 5,910 41,120 27 17 27 32 19 21 47 5! 62 Thailandc 4,390 80.170 32 12 23 39 14 26 45 48 63 Tunisia 880 11,080 22 16 24 32 9 17 54 52 64 JamaicaC 970 3,970 10 5 37 46 17 20 53 49 65 Turkey 7,660 96,500 34 18 25 33 16 24 41 49 66 Romania . . 34,730 . . 18 48 . . 0 0 34 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 222 Distribution of gross domestic product (percent) GDP (millions of dollars) Agriculture Industry Manufacturinga Services, etc. b 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 67 PolandC 63,590 14 36 . . 50 68 Panamac 660 4.750 18 10 19 9 12 7 63 80 69 Costa Ricac 590 5,700 24 16 23 26 19 53 58 70 Chile' 5,880 27,790 9 40 24 . 52 71 Botswana' 50 2,700 34 3 19 57 12 6 47 40 72 Algeriac 42,150 13 47 . 12 . . 41 73 Bulgaria . 19,910 . . 18 . . 52 . . . 31 74 Mauritius 190 2,090 16 12 23 33 14 24 61 55 75 Malaysiac 3,130 42,400 28 . . 25 . . 9 47 76 ArgentinaC 19,410 93,260 17 13 42 41 33 42 45 77 Iran.IslamicRep. 6,170 116,040 26 21 36 21 12 8 38 58 78 Albania . . . . 79 Angola . 7,700 . . 13 . 44 . . 4 . 43 80 Lebanon0 1,150 . 12 . 21 . 67 81 Mongolia . . . . 17 . . 34 . . . . . 49 82 Namibia 0 11 . . 38 5 50 83 Nicaragua' 570 24 . . 18 . . SI 84 Yemen,Rep.0 6,690 20 . . 28 8 Upper-middle-income 103,9601 1,520,340 1 16w 9w 36w 40w 19w 25w 47w 51w 85 Mexicoc 21,640 237,750 14 9 27 30 20 23 59 6! 86 South Africa 10,170 90,720 tO 5 41 44 24 26 48 5! 87 Venezuelac 9,930 48,270 6 6 40 50 20 55 45 88 Uruguay 1,810 8,220 18 11 35 34 . 28 47 55 89 Brazil 19,470 414,060 19 10 33 39 26 26 48 51 90 HungaryC 32,920 12 32 27 56 9! Yugoslavia 11,190 82,310 23 12 42 48 35 40 92 CzechoslovakiaC 44,450 8 . . 56 . . . 36 93 Gabonc 230 4,720 26 9 34 49 7 7 40 42 94 TnnidadandTobago 690 4.750 8 3 48 48 . 13 44 49 95 PortugalC 3,740 56,820 . . . 96 Korea, Repf 3,000 236,400 38 9 25 45 18 31 37 46 97 Greece 5,270 57,900 24 17 26 27 16 14 49 56 98 Saudi Arabiac 2,300 80,890 8 8 60 45 9 9 31 48 99 Iraq 2,430 18 . 46 8 36 100 Libya 1,500 . 5 . . 63 . 3 33 101 OmanC 60 7,700 61 3 23 80 0 4 16 18 Low- and middle-income 382,780: 3,334,260 1 29 w 17 w 30 w 37 w 20 w 25 w 40 w 47 w Sub-Saharan Africa 27,020 1 162,940 t 40 w 32 w 20 w 30 w 7w 39 w 40 w East Asia & Pacific 92,540 I 821,230 t 37 w 21 w 32 w 45 w 24 w 34 w 30 w 36 w South Asia 64,510 1 345,640 I 44 w 33 w 21 w 26 w 15 w 17 w 35 w 41 w Europe . 489,240 1 31 w Middle East & N.Africa 27,960: . . 20 w . . 38 w 10 w 40 w Latin America & Caribbean 102,4801 1,015,160 i' 16 w 10 w 33 w 36 w 23 w 25 w 50 w 54 w Other economies - . - Severely indebted 97,440i 1,025,990: 16 w 10 w 34 w 35 w 23w 26w 49w 53w High-income economies 1,413,490: 16,316,290 Sw 43w 32w 54w OECD members 1,392,410: 15,993,410: 5w 43w 32w 54w (Other 102 Ireland 2,690 42,500 . . . . . . . . . 103 tIsrael 3,590 53,200 . . . . . 104 SpainC 24,020 491,240 . . . . . . . . . . . 105 tSingaporcv 970 34,600 3 0 24 37 15 29 74 63 106 tHongKong 2,150 59,670 2 0 40 26 24 18 58 73 107 New Zealande 5,640 42,760 .. 9 27 19 65 108 Belgiumc 16,600 192,390 . . 2 31 23 67 109 United Kingdom 100,690 975.150 3 46 . . 34 51 110 ItalyC 66,880 1,090,750 4 33 23 63 Ill AustraliaC 24,220 296,300 9 4 39 31 26 15 51 64 112 Netherlands' 19,890 279,150 .. 4 . 31 . . 20 . 65 113 Austriac 9,480 157,380 9 3 46 37 33 27 45 60 114 Francec 99,300 1,190,780 4 .. 29 21 . 67 115 tUnited Arab Emirates . 28,270 . . 2 . 55 S 9 . . 43 116 Canada 52,870 570,150 6 . . 40 . . 26 54 117 United StatesC 701.380 5,392,200 3 . 38 28 . . 59 118 Denmark 10,180 130,960 9 5 36 28 23 19 55 67 119 Germanyce 114,790 1,488,210 4 2 53 39 40 31 43 59 120 Norway 7,080 105,830 . . . . . . . . . . 121 Sweden 21,980 228,110 . . 3 . . 35 . . 24 . 62 122 Japanc 91,290 2,942,890 10 3 44 42 34 29 46 56 123 Finland 8,320 137,250 16 6 37 36 23 23 47 58 124 Switzerlandc 13,920 224,850 . . . . . 0 0 0 S 0 125 tKuwaitc 2,100 23,540 0 I 70 56 3 9 29 43 World 2,039,890: 22,298,850 I 10 w 41w 30w 51w Fuel exporters, excl. former USSR 33,8401 20 w 37w 42w a. Because manufacturing is generally the most dynamic part of the industrial sector, its share of GDP is shown separately. b. Services, etc. includes unallocated items. c. GDP and its components are at purchaser values. d. World Bank estimate. e. Data refer to the Federal Republic of Germany before unification. 223 Table 4. Agriculture and food Fertilizer consumption Average index of Value added in agriculture Food aid in cereals (hundreds of grams foodproduction (millions of current Cereal imports (thousands of ofplant nutrient per per capita dollars) (thousands of metric tons) metric tons) hectare of arable land) (1979-81 = 100) 1970 1990 1974 1990 1974/75 1989/90 1970/71 1989/90 1988-90 Low-income economies 84,4691 287,9581 26,538t 35,7481 6,6431 6,5991 178 w 946 w 119 w China and India 55,737 t 178,447 1 11,294 t 14,166 1 1,582 1 540 1 241 w 1,383 w 127 w Other low-income 28,323 109,352 15,243 t 21,582 1 5,061 1 6,059 1 91 w 394 w 105 w I Mozambiquc 854 62 416 34 493 22 8 8! 2 Tanzania 483 1,444 431 73 148 22 31 93 88 3 Ethiopia 931 2,271 118 687 54 538 4 70 84 4 Somalia 170 585 42 194 Ill 90 27 26 94 5 Nepal 579 1,743 18 21 6 27 256 115 6 Chada 142 416 37 36 20 27 7 15 85 7 Bhutan 119 3 11 . . 6 . . 8 93 8 Lao PDRa . 53 54 8 29 2 3 114 9 Malawi 119 554 17 115 0 175 52 227 83 10 Bangladesha 3,650 8,721 1,866 1,726 2,076 1,134 157 993 96 11 Burundi 159 557 7 17 6 2 5 35 92 12 Zairea 721 2,649 343 336 1 107 6 10 97 13 Uganda 929 1,880 36 7 . 35 14 1 95 14 Madagascara 243 906 114 183 7 31 61 36 88 IS Sierra Leone 108 265 72 146 10 37 17 3 89 16 Malia 207 1,125 281 61 107 38 31 54 97 17 Nigeria 4,787 12,582 389 502 7 . . 2 121 106 18 Nigera 420 744 155 86 73 35 1 8 71 19 Rwandaa 135 812 3 21 19 7 3 14 77 20 BurkinaFaso 121 970 99 145 28 44 3 58 114 21 India 23,916 78,099 5,26! 447 1,582 456 137 687 119 22 Benina . 8 126 9 13 36 18 112 23 Chinaa 31,82! 100,348 6,033 13,719 . 84 410 2,619 133 24 Haiti . . . 83 236 25 179 4 41 94 25 Kenya 484 2,131 15 188 2 62 238 481 106 26 Pakistan 3,352 9,165 1,274 2,048 584 428 146 890 101 27 Ghanaa 1,030 2,980 177 337 33 73 II 3! 97 28 CentralAfrican Rep. 60 515 7 37 I 4 12 4 91 29 Togoa 85 533 6 11! II II 3 83 88 30 Zambiaa 191 521 93 100 5 3 73 166 103 31 Guincaa . 776 63 210 49 25 44 II 87 32 SriLanka 627 1,910 95! 996 27! 231 555 1,015 87 33 Mauritania 58 248 115 205 48 72 II 116 85 34 Lesotho 23 . 48 97 14 30 10 144 86 35 Indonesiaa 4,340 23,368 1,919 1,828 30! 39 133 1,166 123 36 Honduras 212 546 52 162 31 134 156 185 83 37 Egypt,ArabRep. 1,942 5,771 3,877 8,580 610 1,210 1,312 4,043 118 38 Afghanistan . . 5 322 10 145 24 69 85 39 Cambodia . . 223 20 226 11 II . . 165 40 Liberia 9! 42 70 3 28 63 107 84 4! Myanmar . . . . 26 . . 9 . . 2! 86 93 42 Sudan 757 . . 125 586 46 335 28 39 71 43 VietNam .. . . 1,854 204 64 72 513 84! 127 Middle-income economies 49,480 1 290,333 I 39,283 1 77,607 1 1,284 t 4,483 i 363w 693w 102w Lower-middle-income 28,936 t 154,202 1 21,082 1 38,6691 1,013 1 4,122 t 300w 601w 98w 44 Boliviaa 202 1,069 209 147 22 93 7 23 109 45 Zimbabwe 214 688 56 83 . . 13 446 604 94 46 Senegala 208 1,199 34! 534 27 61 17 55 102 47 Philippinesa 1,975 9,686 817 2,545 89 59 287 674 84 48 Cbted'Ivoire 462 3,554 172 502 4 26 74 113 101 49 Dominican RCp.a 345 1,273 252 662 16 6 334 504 90 50 Papua New Gujneaa 240 942 7! 222 . . 0 58 399 103 51 Guatemalaa . 1,978 138 383 9 155 298 728 91 52 Morocco 789 3,963 891 1,578 75 219 117 344 128 53 Cameroona 364 2,964 81 398 4 34 41 89 54 Ecuadora 40! 1,435 152 474 13 38 133 338 100 55 SyrianArabRep.a 435 4,091 339 2,09! 47 22 68 454 80 56 Congoa 49 380 34 94 2 7 525 32 94 57 El Salvadora 292 605 75 176 4 249 1 043 I 064 97 58 Paraguaya 19! 1,462 71 2 10 3 98 89 116 59 Penia 1,351 2,420 637 1,562 37 194 300 41! 100 60 Jordan . . 252 17! 1,491 79 250 87 77! 100 6! Colombia 1,806 6,876 502 880 28 7 287 902 104 62 Thailanda 1,837 9,948 97 387 . . 95 59 365 106 63 Tunisia 245 1.807 307 1,439 59 479 76 232 87 64 Jamaicaa 93 209 340 262 1 165 873 1,156 95 65 Turkey 3,383 17,485 1,276 3,177 16 13 157 645 97 66 Romania . . 6,255 1,381 1,137 . . . . 565 1,332 92 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 224 Fertilizer consumption Average index of Value added in agriculture Food aid in cereals (hundreds of grams food production (millions of current Cereal imports (thousands of of plant nut rtent per per capita dollars) of metric tons) (thousands metric tons) hectare of arabic land) (1979-8] = 100) 1970 1990 1974 1990 1974/75 1989/90 1970/71 1989/90 1988-90 67 Poland . . 8,775 4,185 1,550 1,582 1,678 2,052 109 68 Panama' 149 482 63 125 3 1 387 541 90 69 CostaRica 222 915 110 326 1 60 1,001 2,027 91 70 Chilea 557 . . 1,737 247 323 4 322 800 113 71 Botswanaa 28 75 21 87 5 5 15 7 75 72 Algeriaa 492 5,288 1,816 5,185 54 11 163 283 96 73 Bu1garia . . 3,486 649 475 . . . 1,411 1,946 96 74 Mauritius 30 257 160 210 22 9 2,095 3,302 100 75 Malaysiaa 1,198 . . 1,023 2,582 1 1 436 1,572 147 76 Argentinaa 2,693 12,405 0 4 26 46 93 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. 2,120 24,484 2,076 6,250 . . 22 60 797 104 78 Albania . . . . 48 148 . . 736 1,506 92 79 Angola . . 997 149 272 . . 113 33 74 81 80 Lebanona 136 . . 354 356 26 16 1,354 917 135 81 Mongoliaa . 28 57 . . . . 22 124 86 82 Namibia . . 187 . . . . . . 4 . . . . 93 83 Nicaraguaa 199 . . 44 177 3 57 215 648 58 84 Yemen,Rep. . . 1,376 306 2,001 33 . . 1 11 Upper-middle-income 21,267 1 140,171 I 18,200 1 38,9381 271 1 361 1 459 w 824 w 109 w 85 Mexico 4,462 21,074 2,881 7,648 341 232 728 102 86 South Africa 1,292 4,594 127 876 . . 422 575 87 87 Venezuelaa 835 2,671 1,270 1,603 . . . . 170 1,507 96 88 Uruguay 378 893 70 55 6 . . 485 454 109 89 Brazil 4,388 42,288 2,485 3,421 31 20 186 430 115 90 Hungarya 1,010 4,091 408 503 1,497 2,463 113 91 Yugoslavia 2,212 9,641 992 1,407 . . . 770 1,155 95 92 Czechoslovakia . . 3,979 1,296 205 . 2,404 3,213 119 93 Gabon' 60 431 24 57 . . . . . . 27 84 94 Trinidad and Tobago 40 124 208 295 . . . . 880 275 87 95 Portugala . 1,861 1,725 . . . 326 727 106 96 Korea,Rep.a 2,311 21,364 2,679 9,087 234 2,450 4,250 106 97 Greece 1,569 8,234 1,341 588 861 1,752 103 98 Saudi Arabiaa 219 6,150 482 5,273 . 54 4,008 189 99 Iraq 579 . . 870 2,834 . . . 34 395 92 100 Libya 93 . . 612 2,290 . . . . 62 367 78 101 Oman 40 . . 52 338 . . . . . . 1,108 Low- and middle-income 135,8491 575,8641 65,8201 113,3551 7,9281 11,0831 256 w 833 w 115 W Sub-Saharan Africa 13,167 1 51,410 1 4,209 1 7,8381 910 1 2,677 I 33 w 89 w 94 w East Asia & Pacific 44,838 1 176,3681 14,948 1 30,955 1 923 1 391 1 364 w 1,903 w 127 w South Asia 32,980 1 112,436 1 9,4041 5,2741 4,522 1 2,2641 135 w 689 w 116 w Europe 1 59,4461 13,5641 11,030 I 16 1 1,595 1 878 w 1,424 w 102 w Middle East & N.Africa 7,2481 58,6991 11,8791 38,0831 9931 2,3731 138w 646w 101 w Latin America & Caribbean 19,843 1 104,7161 13,312 1 21,6981 563 1 1,783 1 201 w 468 w 106 w Other economies 10,4841 35,9221 464w 1,102 w 113 w Severely indebted 19,1941 106,991 t 15,765 1 26,512 I 288 1 2,610 1 321 w 549w 106w High-income economies 77,501 1 73,739 1 73,797 1 531 1,022 w 1,218 w 100 w OECD members 76,637 1 68,356 1 62,607 1 1,017 w 1,206w 101 w (Other 5,383 1 11,190 1 2,192 w 4,019 w 80 w 102 Ireland 559 640 367 . . . 3,067 7,225 109 103 (Israela 295 . . 1,176 1,802 53 . . 1,401 2,425 95 104 Spaina . 18,537 4,675 3,020 . . 593 1,009 112 105 tSingaporea 44 97 682 737 . . 2,500 5,600 69 106 tHong Kong 62 181 657 754 . . . . . . . . 80 107 New Zealanda 913 . . 92 279 . . . . 7,745 6,558 102 108 Belgiuma . 3,136 4585b 4597b . 5,648 5,018 108 109 United Kingdom 2,981 10,735 7,540 3,084 . . . . 2,631 3,502 105 110 Italya 8,387 30,542 8,101 6,699 . . . . 896 1,507 94 Ill Australia3 2,277 . . 2 41 . . . . 232 226 95 112 Netherlandsa 1,850 9,940 7,199 6,899 . . 7,493 6,424 111 113 Austriaa 992 3,915 164 92 2,426 2,008 106 114 Francea . 33,598 654 922 2,435 3,192 103 115 tUnited Arab Emirates . . 481 132 576 . . 1,615 116 Canada 3,224 . . 1,513 840 . . . . 191 472 108 117 United Statesa 27,856 . . 460 2,217 . . . . 816 985 92 118 Denmark 882 4,367 462 140 . . . . 2,234 2,503 126 119 Germanya 5951d 192071 9,985 5,389 . . . 3,844 3,705 120 Norway 624 2,551 713 379 . . 2,443 2,420 100 121 Sweden . . 5,426 300 116 . . . . 1,646 1,271 99 122 Japanc 12,467 74,085 27,008 19,557 . . . . 4,179 101 3,547 123 Finland 1,205 6,436 22246 . . 2,102 105 1,822 124 Switzerland . . . 450 1,458 4,262 101 3,831 125 (Kuwaita 8 238 101 427 2,000 . . World 239,431 1 150,043 1 223,0741 7,981 I 11,0831 493 w 974 w 112 w Fuel exporters, excl. former USSR 9,646 1 57,8281 8,163 1 25,7091 63 I 153 1 49 w 448 w 104 w a. Value added in agriculture data are at purchaser values. b. Includes Luxembourg. c. Value added tn agnculture data refer to net domestic product at factor cost. d. Data refer to the Federal Republic of Germany before unification. 225 Table 5. Commercial energy Energy Consumption Energy imports Average annual grosvlh rate (percent) per capita (kilograms as a percentage of Energy production Energy consumption of oil equivalent) merchandise exports 1965-80 1980-90 1965-80 1980-90 1965 1990 /965 1990 Low-income economies 10.0 w 4.7 w 8.2 w 5.5 V 124 w 339 w 7.0 w 4.0 w China and India 9.1 w 5.8 w 8.8 w 5.7 w 146 w 440 w 8.0 w 3.0 w Other low-income 12.2 w 1.7 w 5.7 w 4.3 w 76 w 153 w 7.0 w 6.0 w I Mozambique 19.8 -43.2 2.2 2.4 81 85 13.0 2.0 2 Tanzania 7.3 3.2 3.7 2.0 37 38 4.0 3 Ethiopia 7.5 5.5 4.1 3.5 10 20 8.0 25.0 4 Somalia . . . 16.7 2.0 11 64 9.0 8.0 5 Nepal 18.4 10.7 6.2 9.2 6 25 2.0 6 Chad . . 6.6 0.3 12 17 23.0 6.0 7 Bhutan . . . . . . . . 13 8 LuoPDR . . 0.5 4.2 1.8 24 39 . 9 Malawi 18.2 4.4 8.0 1.0 25 41 7.0 17.0 10 Bangladesh . . 12.1 . . 7.9 . . 57 . . 4.0 11 Burundi . . 7.2 6.0 7.3 5 21 11.0 1.0 12 Zaire 9.4 3.1 3.6 1.7 75 71 6.0 4.0 13 Uganda -0.5 3.3 -0.5 4.7 36 27 1.0 0.0 14 Madagascar 3.9 7.4 3.5 1.8 34 40 8.0 2.0 15 Sierra Leone . . 0.8 -0.1 109 77 11.0 4.0 16 Mali 38.6 6.6 7.0 2.1 14 24 16.0 2.0 17 Nigeria 17.3 0.2 12.9 4.8 34 138 7.0 4.0 18 Niger . . 11.3 12.5 2.3 8 40 9.0 2.0 19 Rwanda 8.8 4.4 15.2 3.1 8 41 10.0 2.0 20 Burkina Paso . . . . 10.5 1.! 7 17 11.0 2.0 21 India 5.6 7.0 5.8 5.9 100 23! 8.0 24.0 22 Benin 8.1 9.9 3.8 21 46 14.0 6.0 23 China 10.0 5.5 9.8 5.6 178 598 3.0 24 Haiti 5.9 8.4 2.0 23 53 2.0 25 Kenya 13.1 6.8 4.5 1.1 110 100 20.0 4.0 26 Pakistan 6.5 6.5 3.5 6.5 135 233 7.0 21.0 27 Ghana 17.7 -5.! 7.8 -4.1 76 68 6.0 4.0 28 CentralAfricanRep. 6.7 2.6 2.2 3.5 22 30 7.0 2.0 29 Togo 2.9 . . 10.7 0.7 27 51 6.0 12.0 30 Zambia 25.7 1.7 4.0 1.1 464 379 31 Guinea 16.5 4.0 2.3 1.5 64 73 . . 4.0 32 Sri Lanka 10.4 8.7 2.2 5.! 106 179 6.0 5.0 33 Mauritania 9.5 0.2 48 114 2.0 18.0 34 Lesotho 0 0 a a 35 Indonesia 9.9 1.0 8.4 4.1 9! 272 3.0 6.0 36 Honduras 14.0 4.7 7.6 2.! III 198 5.0 3.0 37 Egypt, Arab Rep. 10.7 4.8 6.2 5.0 313 598 11.0 10.0 38 Afghanistan 15.7 2.4 6.6 8.3 30 90 8.0 1.0 39 Cambodia . . 4.9 7.6 2.5 19 59 . 40 Liberia 14.6 1.8 7.9 -4.1 179 169 6.0 2.0 41 Myanmar 8.4 4.4 4.9 4.8 39 82 4.0 4.0 42 Sudan 17.8 2.1 2.0 0.7 67 58 5.0 3.0 43 I/let Nam 5.3 2.5 -2.6 2.6 97 100 . . 1.0 Middle-income economies 5.1 w 1.9 w 6.1 w 3.6 w 712 w 1,357 w 8.0 w 14.0 w Lower-middle-income 4.9 w 4.7 w 6.0 w 3.6 w 579 w 1,025 w 7.0 w 23.0 w 44 Bolivia 9.5 0.5 7.7 -0.4 156 257 1.0 2.0 45 Zimbabwe -0.7 3.8 5.2 1.2 441 525 . . 0.0 46 Senegal . . . . -1.2 -0.5 342 156 8.0 10.0 47 Philippines 9.0 7.5 5.8 2.3 158 215 12.0 17.0 48 Côted'Ivoire 11.1 -0.1 8.6 2.7 101 173 5.0 2.0 49 DominicanRep. 10.9 4.4 11.5 2.4 127 336 7.0 13.0 50 Papua New Guinea 13.7 5.9 13.0 2.4 56 233 7.0 51 Guatemala 12.5 4.9 6.8 0.6 150 171 9.0 6.0 52 Morocco 2.5 1.1 7.9 2.9 124 247 5.0 25.0 53 Cameroon 13.0 11.9 6.3 4.5 67 147 6.0 2.0 54 Ecuador 35.0 2.7 11.9 4.4 162 678 11.0 3.0 55 SyrianArabRep. 56.3 6.8 12.4 4.0 212 913 13.0 3.0 56 Congo 41.1 7.5 7.8 3.4 90 213 8.0 0.0 57 El Salvador 9.0 3.8 7.0 2.3 140 233 6.0 13.0 58 Paraguay . . 13.5 9.7 5.1 84 232 14.0 26.0 59 Pens 6.6 -1.5 5.0 1.5 395 509 3.0 9.0 60 Jordan . . . . 9.3 5.8 393 994 42.0 49.0 61 Colombia 1.0 11.2 6.0 3.3 412 811 1.0 4.0 62 Thailand 9.0 26.2 10.1 7.2 82 352 11.0 10.0 63 Tunisia 20.4 0.1 8.5 4.6 170 520 12.0 14.0 64 Jamaica -0.9 4.4 6.1 -1.5 703 931 12.0 24.0 65 Turkey 4.3 8.5 8.5 6.9 257 857 12.0 28.0 66 Romania 4.3 0.5 6.6 1.3 1,536 3.623 . . Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 226 Energy consumption Energy imports Average annual growth rate (percent) per capita (kilograms as a percentage of Energy production Energy consumption of oil equivalent) merchandise exports 1965-80 1980-90 /965-80 1980-90 1965 1990 1965 1990 67 Poland 4.0 1.1 4.8 1.2 2,027 3,416 . . 0 68 Panama 6.9 10.3 -1.2 0.0 3,065 1,694 61.0 54.0 69 Costa Rica 8.2 6.6 8.8 3.8 267 622 8.0 5.0 70 Chile 1.8 3.1 3.0 2.9 652 887 5.0 9.0 71 Botswana 8.8 2.6 9.5 3.1 191 425 a a 72 Algeria 5.3 5.9 11.9 17.8 226 1,956 0.0 2.0 73 Bulgaria 1.3 3.1 6.1 1.7 1,788 4,945 . 74 Mauritius 2.! 8.5 7.2 3.5 160 394 6.0 1.0 75 Malaysia 36.9 14.4 6.7 7.8 313 974 11.0 4.0 76 Argentina 4.5 3.3 4.3 3.5 975 1,801 8.0 5.0 77 Iran,IslamicRep. 3.6 5.8 8.9 4.5 524 1,026 0.0 3.0 78 Albania 9.4 1.7 7.1 3.1 420 1,152 . 79 Angola 19.9 12.5 5.3 2.5 114 203 2.0 1.0 80 Lebanon 2.0 -1.5 2.0 4.1 7l3 968 50.0 7.0 81 Mongolia 10.3 3.0 9.6 3.1 46! 1,277 . 82 Namibia a 83 Nicaragua 2.6 2.6 6.5 2.9 1 261 6.0 6.0 84 Yemen,Rep. 21.0 23.8 6 234 10.0 Upper-middle-income 5.1 w 0.4 w 6.1 w 3.6 w 884 w 1,818 w 8.0 w 12.0 w 85 Mexico 9.7 1.3 7.9 1.2 605 1,300 4.0 4.0 86 SouthAfrica 5.! 4.3 4.3 3.1 1,744 2,447 l0.0 87 Venezuela -3.1 0.2 4.6 2.1 2,319 2,582 0.0 2.0 88 Uruguay 4.7 7.9 1.3 0.5 765 82! 13.0 12.0 89 Brazil 8.6 7.9 9.9 4.9 286 915 14.0 /4.0 90 Hungary 0.8 1.1 3.8 1.4 1,825 3,21! 12.0 11.0 91 Yugoslavia 3.5 3.5 6.0 3.8 898 2,409 7.0 21.0 92 Czechoslovakia 1.0 0.5 3.2 0.8 3,374 5,08! . 93 Gabon 13.7 3.6 14.7 2.5 153 1,158 3.0 0.0 94 TrinidadandTobago 3.8 -3.3 3.6 1.4 4,492 5,940 59.0 5.0 95 Portugal 3.6 3.! 6.5 2.8 506 1,507 13.0 16.0 96 Korea,Rep. 4.1 10.4 12.1 8.! 238 1,898 18.0 12.0 97 Greece 10.5 6.4 8.5 2.7 615 2,092 29.0 14.0 98 SaudiArabia 11.5 -4.2 7.2 9.3 1,759 5,033 0.0 0.0 99 Iraq 6.2 7.5 7.4 5.3 399 774 0.0 0.0 100 Libya 0.6 -1.7 18.2 7.1 222 3,399 2.0 2.0 101 Oman 16.0 8.9 30.5 10.7 14 2,648 . . 1.0 Low- and middle-income 6.2 w 2.8 w 6.8 w 4.3 w 277 w 605 w 8.0 w 10.0 is Sub-Saharan Africa 15.5 w 2.8 w 5.3 w 2.6 w 74 w 103 w 7.0 w 28.0 w East Asia & Pacific 10.0 w 5.4 w 9.4 w 5.7 w 164 w 553 w 10.0 w 8.0 w South Asia 5.8 w 7.0 w 5.7 w 6.0 w 90 w 205 w 7.0 w Europe 3.3 w 1.7 w 5.2 w 2.0 w 1,372 w 2,677 w 12.0 w 19.0 w Middle East & N.Africa 7.1 w 0.6 w 8.4 w 7.8 w 355 w 1,102 w 3.0 w 20.0 is Latin America & Caribbean 1.9 w 2.5 w 6.2 w 2.7 w 579 w 1,057 w 8.0 w 5.0 is Other economies 4.9 w 2.9 w 4.6 w 2.8 w 2,470 w 4,828 w . Severely indebted 2.8 w 2.5 w 6.5 w 3.3 w 714 w 1,368 w 5.0 w 6.0 is High-income economies 2.3w 1.7w 3.1 w 1.4w 3,566w 5,158w 11.0w 10.0 is OECD members 2.2w 1.8w 3.0w 1.5w 3,649w 5,179w 11.0w 10.0 is tOther 3.2 w 1.6 w 7.0 w -0.4w 1,208 w 4,292 w 7.0 w 10.0 is 102 Ireland 0.1 2.7 3.9 0.5 1,504 2,653 14.0 5.0 103 lIsmel -15.2 -8.9 4.4 2.3 1,574 2,050 13.0 10.0 104 Spain 3.6 2.8 6.5 1.5 90! 2,20! 31.0 19.0 105 tSingapore 5.7 5.8 2,214 5,685 17.0 15.0 106 tHongKong . . . . 7.5 3.9 584 1,717 6.0 6.0 107 New Zealand 4.7 6.4 3.6 5.4 2,622 4,971 7.0 6.0 108 Belgium . . . . . . . . . . 2.807 . 109 United Kingdom 3.6 0.7 0.9 0.8 3,483 3,646 13.0 7.0 110 Italy 1.3 0.8 3.7 0.9 1,564 2,754 16.0 13.0 Ill Australia 10.5 6.0 5.0 2.2 3,287 5,041 10.0 6.0 112 Netherlands 15.4 -3.5 5.0 1.3 3,134 5,123 12.0 10.0 113 Austria 0.8 -0.2 4.0 1.5 2,060 3,503 10.0 7.0 114 France -0.9 6.9 3.7 1.1 2,468 3,845 16.0 10.0 115 tUnitedArabEmirates 14.7 4.0 36.6 13.9 126 10.874 . . 1.0 116 Canada 5.7 3.5 4.5 2.1 6,007 10,009 7.0 5.0 117 United States I .1 0.8 2.3 1.5 6,535 7,822 8.0 16.0 118 Denmark 2.6 38.2 2.3 -0.! 2,911 3,618 13.0 7.0 119 Germanyb -0.1 0.0 3.0 0.3 2,478 3,491 8.0 6.0 120 Norway 12.4 7.6 4.1 1.9 4,650 9.083 11.0 3.0 121 Sweden 4.9 4.5 2.5 1.7 4,162 6,347 12.0 7.0 122 Japan -0.4 4.2 6.! 2.1 1,474 3,563 19.0 16.0 123 Finland 3.8 4.8 5.! 3.0 2,233 5,650 11.0 10.0 124 Switzerland 3.7 1.1 3.1 1.5 2,501 3,902 8.0 4.0 125 tKuwait -1.6 1.6 -0.1 5.0 16,781 6,414 0.0 0.0 World 4.1 w 2.4 w 4.1 w 2.5 w 1,114 w 1,567 w 10.0 w 10.0 w Fuelexporters,excl.formerVSSR 6.0w 0.7w 7.9w 7.1w 439w 1,171 w 3.0w 5.0w a. Figures for the South African Customs Union comprising South Africa. Namibia. Lesotho. Botswana, and Swaziland are included in South Afncan data; trade among the component territories is excluded. b. Data refer to Federal Republic of Germany before unification. 227 Table 6. Structure of manufacturing Distribution of manufacturing value added (percent; current prices) Value added in Food, Machtnerv manufacturing (millions of beverages, Textiles and and transport current dollars) and tobacco clothing equipment Chemicals Othera 1970 1989 1970 1989 1970 1989 /970 1989 1970 1989 1970 1989 Low-income economies 43,345 243,089 I China and India 35,483 I 190,090 Other low-income 7,264 1 I Mozambique . 0 . 51 . 13 . . 5 . 3 . . 28 2 Tanzania 118 212 36 . 28 . 5 . 4 . . 26 3 Ethiopia 149 594 46 48 31 19 0 2 2 4 21 28 4 Somalia 27 47 88 . 6 . . 0 . . I 6 5 Nepal 32 151 35 . . 25 . 2 . 8 . . 30 6 Chadb 51 178 . 0 7 Bhutan . . 19 . . 8 Lao PDRb . . 9 Malawi . . 182 51 . . 17 . . 3 . . 10 . 20 10 Bangladesh5 527 1,730 30 23 47 36 3 5 II 18 10 18 II Bunindi 16 102 53 . 25 0 . 6 /6 12 Zaire5 . . 986 38 16 7 10 . . 29 13 Uganda 158 123 40 20 2 4 34 14 Madagascarb 36 28 6 . 7 . 23 15 Sierra Leone 22 60 . 16 Mali' 25 153 36 40 . 4 . 5 14 17 Nigeria 426 2,365 36 26 . I . 6 . 31 18 Nigerb 30 124 . 19 Rwandav 8 320 86 0 3 . 2 . 8 20 BurkinaFaso 65 360 69 . 9 2 . 1 19 21 India 7,928 44,445 13 II 21 12 20 26 14 17 32 33 22 Benint . . . 23 Ching' 27555C 14546C 12 14 . 26 . 12 . . 36 24 Haitin . 25 Kenya 174 832 33 4! 9 10 16 II 9 9 33 29 26 Pakistan 1,462 5,923 24 30 38 19 6 8 9 16 23 27 27 Ghanab 252 525 34 . 16 . 4 4 41 28 Central African Rep. 12 . . . 29 Togo5 25 114 . 30 Zambiab 181 1.588 49 40 9 13 5 8 10 II 27 28 31 Guinea' . . 108 . 32 SriLanka 369 969 26 52 19 20 10 2 II 3 33 23 33 Mauritania 10 . . 34 Lesotho 3 49 . . . . . . . 35 Indonesia' 994 17,272 65 . . 14 . . 2 6 . . 13 36 Honduras 91 461 58 49 10 7 I 3 4 5 28 36 37 Egypt,ArabRep. . . 17 3! 35 16 9 9 12 8 27 35 38 Afghanistan . . . . . 39 Cambodia . . . . 40 Liberia 15 . . . . . . . 41 Myanmar 42 Sudan 10 19 43 VietNam Middle-income economies 7,652 t 573,015 1 Lower-middle-income 8,385 I 44 BoIivia 135 585 33 37 34 8 1 1 6 6 26 47 45 Zimbabwe 293 1,384 24 31 16 16 9 10 11 II 40 32 46 Senegalb 141 609 51 . . 19 . . 2 . . 6 . . 22 47 Philippines b 1,665 10,728 39 41 8 8 8 9 13 10 32 32 48 Cbted'Ivoirc 149 . . 27 . . 16 10 . . 5 . . 42 49 Dominican Rep.b 275 925 74 5 . 1 6 . . 14 50 Papua New Guinea5' 35 392 23 . 1 . 35 . 4 . . 37 SI Guatemala" . . . 42 43 14 9 4 3 12 16 27 28 52 Morocco' 641 3,932 . . . 53 Cameroon5 119 1,447 50 . 15 4 3 . . 27 54 Ecuador5' 305 2,298 43 33 14 13 3 7 8 9 32 39 55 Syrian Arab Rep." . . . . 37 32 40 22 3 5 2 5 20 36 56 Congob . 173 65 4 . . I . . 8 . . 22 57 El Salvador' 194 1,042 40 - . 30 . . 3 8 18 58 Paraguay" 99 933 56 16 1 5 21 59 Perub 1,430 7,730 25 28 14 14 7 11 7 9 47 38 60 Jordan . . 443 21 22 14 4 7 2 6 11 52 61 61 Colombia 1,487 8,177 31 32 20 15 8 10 11 13 29 30 62 Thailandb 1,130 17,635 43 29 13 18 9 13 6 7 29 33 63 Tunisia 121 1,460 29 17 18 21 4 5 13 9 36 49 64 Jamaicab 221 783 46 7 Ii 5 . . 30 65 Turkey 1,930 18,030 26 17 15 15 8 14 7 14 45 41 66 Romania 14 21 23 . . 4 . . 38 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 228 Distribution ofmanafacturing value added (percent; current prices) Value added in Food, Machinerc manufacturing (millions of beverages, Textiles and and transport current dollars) and tobacco clothing equipment Chemicals Other° 1970 1989 1970 1989 1970 1989 1970 1989 /970 1989 1970 1989 67 Polandb . 20 16 19 16 24 27 8 6 28 35 68 Panamab 127 352 41 54 9 6 I 2 5 8 44 30 69 Costa Ricab 203 1,065 48 45 12 8 6 7 7 9 28 3! 70 Chilet' 2,088 . . 17 24 12 7 II 4 5 8 55 57 71 Botswana' 5 155 . 72 Algeriab 682 4,598 32 20 20 17 9 13 4 3 35 47 73 Bulgaria . . . 74 Mauritius 26 417 75 23 6 51 5 3 3 5 12 18 75 Malaysiab 500 . 26 18 3 7 8 23 9 14 54 39 76 Argentinab 5,523 . 18 20 17 10 17 13 8 12 40 44 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. 1,501 10,209 30 23 20 19 18 12 6 7 26 37 78 Albania . . . . . . . 79 Angola . 308 . . 80 Lebanont 27 19 . 3 49 81 Mongolia . . . . . 82 Namibia 80 83 Nicaraguab 159 53 14 2 8 23 84 Yemen, Rep.b 60! 20 . . 50 I . . 28 Upper-middle-income 39,1801 382,108! 85 Mexicob 8,449 51,138 28 20 IS II 13 14 II 14 34 42 86 South Africa 3,892 19,937 15 13 13 8 17 18 10 II 45 49 87 Vcnezuelab 2,163 9,064 30 19 13 6 9 7 8 10 39 57 88 Uruguay 619 2,202 34 32 21 18 7 9 6 30 32 3! 89 Brazil 10,421 120,845 16 12 13 12 22 24 10 12 39 40 90 Hungaryb . 8,724 12 10 13 9 28 29 8 13 39 40 91 Yugoslavia 30 16 15 19 23 24 7 8 45 31 92 Czcchoslovakiab 9 9 12 II 34 34 6 7 39 38 93 Gabonb 22 279 37 . 7 . 6 . 6 . 44 94 TrinidadandTobago 198 540 18 46 3 4 7 8 2 3 70 39 95 Portugal' . . . 18 17 19 20 13 14 10 10 39 39 96 Koraa,Rep." 1,880 66,215 26 12 17 14 II 30 Ii 9 36 36 97 Greece 3,642 8,29! 20 22 20 24 13 10 7 8 40 36 98 SaudiArabiab 372 7,292 . 99 Iraq 325 . 26 14 . 7 . 3 . 50 100 Libya 81 . 64 5 . 0 . 12 . 20 101 Omanh 0 319 . Low- and middle-income 112,550: 815,003 1 Sub-Saharan Africa 3,013 1 East Asia & Pacific 34,582 1 274,680 1 South Asia 10,545 1 54,788 Europe Middle East & N.Africa 4,813: 38,858 1 Latin America & Caribbean 35,817 1 258,271 1 Other economies Severely indebted 35,199 1 272,336 1 High-income economies 635,108 1 OECD members 627,996 1 tOther 102 Ireland 786 31 28 19 4 13 30 7 15 30 24 103 iisraelb . IS 16 14 8 23 28 7 30 41 38 104 Spainb . 102,313 13 17 15 8 16 25 II II 45 39 105 tSingaporet' 379 8,463 12 5 5 4 28 53 4 II 51 28 106 tHongKong 1,013 11,034 4 6 41 38 16 22 2 2 36 32 107 New Zealandb 1,809 7,845 24 26 13 9 15 14 4 6 43 45 108 Belgium' . 35,612 17 20 12 7 22 23 9 14 40 37 309 United Kingdom 35,489 . 13 12 9 5 31 32 10 12 37 38 110 Italyb 29,093 200,937 10 8 13 13 24 33 13 10 40 36 Ill Australiat' 9,551 44,505 16 18 9 7 24 20 7 8 43 47 112 Netherlands' 8,652 45,135 17 19 8 3 27 25 13 13 36 39 113 Austriab 4,873 33,748 17 IS 12 7 19 26 6 7 45 44 114 Franceb . 204,445 12 13 10 7 26 31 8 9 44 41 I IS tUnited Arab Emirates . . 2,507 . 116 Canada 16,711 16 13 8 5 23 25 7 10 46 46 117 UnitedStatesti 254,115 . 12 12 8 5 31 32 10 II 39 40 118 Denmark 2,929 16,74! 20 22 8 5 24 22 8 11 40 40 119 Gemsanybd 70,888 369,689 13 9 8 4 32 41 9 13 38 33 120 Norway 2,416 13,064 IS 20 7 2 23 22 7 8 49 47 12! Sweden . . 39,815 10 9 6 2 30 34 5 8 49 46 122 Japanb 73,339 829,238 8 9 8 5 34 39 11 10 40 37 123 Finland 2,588 23,477 13 12 10 4 20 22 6 8 51 54 124 Switzerlandb 10 7 3! 9 . 42 125 tKuwait5 120 2,032 5 4 1 . 4 . 86 World 848,690 I Fuel exporters, excl. former USSR 6,004 41,523 1 a. Includes unallocable data; see the technical notes. b. Value added in manufacturing data are at purchasers values. c. World Bank estimates. d. Data refer to the Federal Republic of Germany before unification. 229 Table 7. Manufacturing earnings and output Earnings per employee Total earnings usa Gross output per employee Growth rate imuIex (1980=100) percentage of value added (1980= 100) 1970-80 1980-89 1987 1988 1989 1970 1987 1988 1989 1970 1987 1988 1989 Low-income economies China and India 2 3 Other low-income I Mozambique Tanzania Ethiopia -4.6 . . . . -12.7 0.1 . 106 102 94 29 42 24 ...... 20 20 19 122 61 115 115 116 4 Somalia -5.1 . 28 . 5 Nepal . 0 . 25 26 6 Chad 7 Bhutan 8 LaoPDR 9 10 Malawi Bangladesh -3.0 . -0.8 0.9 101 100 100 26 32 30 31 126.... 151 112 117 120 11 Burundi -7.5 . . . 12 Zaire . . . 0 13 Uganda . . . . . 14 Madagascar -0.8 -8.3 36 . . 106 IS Sierra Leone . . . . 16 Mali 46 17 Nigeria 18 . 18 Niger 0.4 68 . . 7 6 19 Rwanda 22 10 20 Burkina Faso 21 India 0.4 3.0 123 124 127 47 49 48 48 83 166 171 169 22 Benin . . . . . . . . 23 China . . 4.2 24 Haiti -3.3 4.6 153 157 . . 25 Kenya -3.4 0.1 102 104 104 50 44 44 44 42 186 193 203 26 Pakistan 3.4 6.1 152 155 21 21 21 . . 51 157 164 27 Ghana 7.8 170 . . 23 193 . 28 Central African Rep. . . . 29 Togo . . . . 30 Zambia -3.2 6.5 170 172 150 34 27 27 27 109 117 128 93 31 Guinea . . 32 SriLanka 2.1 106 106 17 17 . 70 130 137 33 Mauritania . . 34 Lesotho . . . 35 Indonesia 5.0 5.9 26 42 . 36 Honduras . . 1.5 . . 41 40 38 37 Egypt,ArabRep. 4.1 -2.1 99 94 90 54 52 37 35 89 194 205 223 38 Afghanistan . 39 Cambodia . 40 Liberia . . 1.7 41 Myanmar 42 Sudan 31 43 VietNam Middle-income economies Lower-middle-income 44 Bolivia 0.0 -4.8 64 64 69 43 26 27 27 65 44 41 59 45 Zimbabwe 1.6 0.0 101 106 110 43 38 37 37 98 134 140 139 46 Senegal -4.9 44 47 Philippines -3.7 6.4 145 168 182 21 26 26 25 l04 110 123 139 48 Côte d'Ivoire -0.9 27 . . 52 49 DominicanRep. -1.1 -4.4 35 . . 63 50 Papua New Guinea 2.9 -1.9 40 SI Guatemala -3.2 -1.9 89 89 100 . . 19 19 20 . 52 Morocco . . -3.6 80 . . . . . . . 95 87 53 Cameroon 3.2 . . 30 . . 80 . 54 Ecuador 3.3 -0.2 98 95 108 27 38 33 36 83 113 114 103 55 Syrian Arab Rep. 2.6 -5.6 70 64 66 33 32 27 21 70 217 277 336 56 Congo 34 . . 57 El Salvador 2.4 -9.4 28 71 . 58 Paraguay 59 Pens . -3.0 95 . 18 . 82 70 . 60 Jordan . -1.0 99 101 . 37 25 23 . 61 Colombia -0.2 1.7 116 114 114 25 17 15 15 86 146 148 154 62 Thailand 1.0 6.5 25 24 24 24 68 135 . . 63 Tunisia 4.2 44 95 64 Jamaica -0.2 -0.8 104 101 . . 43 99 81 78 65 Turkey 6.1 -3.1 86 80 82 26 17 15 15 108 169 167 184 66 Romania . . . . . . Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 230 Earnings per employee Total earnings as a Gross output per employee Growth rate Index (1980=100) percentage of ralue added (1980=100) /970-80 1980-89 1987 /988 1989 1970 /987 1988 1989 1970 1987 /988 1989 67 Poland 24 22 23 . . 68 Panama 0.2 2.1 124 123 125 32 32 37 38 67 88 81 79 69 Costa Rica . 41 33 31 . . . 70 Chile 8.1 -1.0 99 lOS Ill 19 17 17 17 60 . 71 Botswana 2.6 -5.7 72 Algeria -1.0 . . 45 120 73 Bulgaria . . . . 74 Mauritius 1.8 -0.6 93 98 97 34 43 45 45 139 69 69 71 75 Malaysia 2.0 3.2 10 126 132 29 29 27 28 96 76 Argentina -2.! -0.8 99 94 75 28 22 20 16 78 60 56 54 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. -8.2 47 25 47 84 81 78 Albania . . 79 Angola . . . . 80 Lebanon 0 81 Mongolia . . . . 82 Namibia 83 Nicaragua 16 210 84 Yemen Rep. Upper-middle-income 85 Mexico 1.2 -3.9 74 73 76 44 20 20 20 77 112 113 128 86 South Africa 2.7 0.0 lOt 100 104 46 49 49 48 87 Venezuela 3.8 -2.9 102 98 77 31 25 28 21 118 132 139 121 88 Uruguay . . 0.8 116 112 III . . 26 26 26 110 109 110 89 Brazil 4.0 7.1 166 161 164 22 21 20 21 71 119 123 125 90 Hungary 3.6 2.6 112 125 127 28 33 39 36 41 112 105 103 91 Yugoslavia 1.3 -0.7 93 88 102 39 30 26 26 59 89 97 75 92 Czechoslovakia . 49 41 40 39 93 Gabon . . . 94 Trinidad and Tobago -0.7 . 72 70 . . 95 Portugal 2.5 0.3 100 102 103 34 36 36 36 96 Korea, Rep. 10.0 6.3 145 161 163 25 27 28 28 40 166 185 187 97 Greece 4.9 -0.5 95 98 100 32 39 39 39 56 104 108 110 98 Saudi Arabia 99 Iraq 36 25 100 Libya 37 45 101 Oman Low- and middle-income Sub-Saharan Africa East Asia & Pacific South Asia Europe Middle East & NAfrica Latin America & Caribbean Other economies Severely indebted High-income economies OECD members tOther 102 Ireland 4.1 1.8 108 Itt . . 49 31 29 103 (Israel 8.8 -3.4 93 95 73 36 63 62 38 104 Spain 4.4 0.8 101 106 110 52 37 38 38 . . 112 . lOS (Singapore 3.0 5.0 146 148 164 36 29 28 30 73 121 122 130 106 tHongKong 6.4 4.4 135 137 137 . . 57 56 56 107 NewZealand 1.1 -0.5 95 94 96 62 58 55 57 . . 136 140 108 Belgium 4.6 -0.1 99 104 . . 46 46 46 . . . . 122 130 109 UnitedKingdorn 1.7 2.8 119 123 125 52 41 40 40 93 135 . 110 Italy 4.1 1.1 103 109 112 41 41 41 41 50 130 139 145 Ill Australia 2.9 0.0 103 103 101 53 47 47 45 . . 120 121 121 112 Netherlands 2.5 0.8 104 106 106 52 47 47 46 68 107 110 113 Austria 3.4 1.9 113 114 120 47 56 54 54 65 114 117 124 114 France 2.0 112 117 121 . . 64 63 63 72 109 116 122 115 (United Arab Emirates 116 Canada 1.8 0.1 101 101 101 53 44 43 43 69 112 . 117 UnitedStates 0.1 0.9 107 107 106 47 37 36 35 63 125 . 118 Denmark 2.5 0.6 103 105 104 56 53 52 51 64 98 103 108 119 Germanya 3.5 1.8 110 113 114 46 43 42 60 60 103 107 113 120 Norway 2.6 1.6 109 110 110 50 59 56 54 74 116 118 127 121 Sweden 0.4 0.9 102 103 107 52 35 34 34 . . 119 125 130 122 Japan 3.1 2.0 113 117 120 32 35 34 33 48 110 120 129 123 Finland 2.6 2.7 118 122 126 47 46 44 43 73 127 132 142 124 Switzerland . . . . 125 (Kuwait . . 3.8 12 World Fuel exporters, cxci. former USSR a. Data refer to the Federal Republic of Germany before unification. 231 Table 8. Growth of consumption and investment Average annual growth rate (percent) General government Private Gross domestic consumption consumption, etc. investment 1965 -80 1980-90 1965-80 1980-90 1965-80 1980-90 Low-income economies 5.8 w 6.4 w 4.2 w 4.6 w 7.6 w 7.4 w China and India 5.3 w 8.5 w 4.2 w 6.0 w 7.0 w 10.1 w Other low-income 6.5 w 3.3 w 4.3 w 2.5 w 8.8 w 1.3 w I Mozambique . . -0.9 . . 0.8 1.8 2 Tanzania a 8.4 4.5 3.3 6.2 0.3 3 Ethiopia 6.4 . . 3.0 . . -0.1 4 Somalia 12.7 7.0 2.7 1.4 12.1 -2.6 5 Nepal . . 6 Chad . . 7 Bhutan . . . . 8 LaoPDR . . . . . . . 9 Malawi 5.7 6.2 3.5 2.2 9.0 -2.4 10 Bangladesh a a 2.0 3.7 0.0 -0.6 I Burundi 7.3 4.4 7.6 4.0 9.0 3.2 12 Zaire 0.7 0.3 1.4 2.8 6.6 -1.7 13 Uganda a 1.4 . . -5.7 14 Madagascar 2.0 0.9 1.2 -0.9 1.5 4.8 15 Sierra Leone a -0.1 4.1 -0.3 -1.0 -1.0 16 Mali 1.9 2.8 5.3 2.7 1.8 9.8 17 Nigeria 13.9 -3.6 6.2 -3.3 14.7 -10.2 18 Niger 2.9 1.8 -1.4 -0.9 6.3 -6.0 19 Rwanda 6.2 6.3 4.6 0.1 9.0 1.7 20 BurkinaFaso 8.7 7.! 2.8 2.4 8.5 10.3 21 India 4.7 7.8 3.1 5.3 4.3 5.0 22 Benin 0.7 0.1 2.7 0.2 10.4 -4.4 23 China 6.2 9.5 6.0 6.8 10.7 13.7 24 Haiti 1.9 -1.4 2.4 0.3 14.8 -3.4 25 Kenya 10.6 2.6 5.4 5.3 7.2 0.6 26 Pakistan 4.7 10.3 4.5 4.7 2.4 5.7 27 Ghana 3.8 -0.9 1.2 3.6 -1.3 7.7 28 Central African Rep. -1.1 -3.6 4.8 2.3 -5.4 6.6 29 Togo 9.5 2.2 1.2 5.1 9.0 -1.9 30 Zambia 5.! -4.1 -2.7 7.8 -3.6 -3.6 31 Guinea . . . . . . . 32 SriLanka 1.1 8.3 4.1 4.0 11.5 0.4 33 Mauritania 10.0 -4.7 1.3 3.7 19.2 -5.4 34 Lesotho 12.4 2.2 9.9 1.7 17.8 5.6 35 Indonesia 11.4 4.6 5.2 4.5 16.1 7.1 36 Honduras 6.9 4.3 4.8 2.4 6.8 -0.7 37 Egypt, Arab Rep. a 2.2 6.7 3.4 11.3 0.2 38 Afghanistan . . . . . . . 39 Cambodia . . . . . . . . . 40 Liberia 3,4 . . 3.2 . . 6.4 41 Myanmar 42 Sudan 0. 4.4 1. 43 VietNam Middle-income economies 7.4w 2.5w 5.9w 2.6w 8.6 w -0.1 w Lower-middle-income 9.3w 0.7w 4.7 w 3.0 w 8.1 w -0.4 w 44 Bolivia 8.2 -1.9 3.1 2.3 4.4 -10.7 45 Zimbabwe 10.6 8.9 5.1 2.6 0.9 -0.8 46 Senegal 2.9 3.2 2.0 2.3 3.9 2.8 47 Philippines 7.7 0.4 5.2 2.4 7.6 -2.5 48 Côte d'Ivoire 13.2 -3.7 6.6 2.5 10.7 -11.6 49 DominicanRep. 0.2 1.7 8.3 0.8 13.5 4.3 50 Papua New Guinea 0.1 -0.3 5.3 1.0 1.4 -1.7 51 Guatemala 6.2 2.6 5.1 0.9 7.4 -2.1 52 Morocco 10.9 5.8 5.2 3.4 10.6 2.6 53 Cameroon 5.0 6.9 4.1 2.8 9.9 -3.5 54 Ecuador 12,2 -1.5 7.2 2.0 9.5 -2.9 55 Syrian Arab Rep. . . -2.2 , . 3.9 . . -6.8 56 Congo 5.5 3.8 2.2 3.1 4.5 -11.7 57 El Salvador 7.0 2.7 4.2 0.5 6.6 2.2 58 Paraguay 5.1 0.9 6.6 1.9 13.9 -1.4 59 Pent 6.3 -2.3 4.9 0.9 0.3 -5.0 60 Jordan 61 Colombia 4.1 5.8 2.9 5.8 0.6 62 Thailand 9.5 4.3 6.4 6.5 8.0 8.7 63 Tunisia 7.2 3.8 8.9 3.7 4.6 -3.! 64 Jamaica 9.7 0.1 2.9 1.4 -3.1 4.1 65 Turkey 6.1 3.1 5.4 5.9 8.8 3.8 66 Romania -1.2 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 232 Average annual growth rate (percent) General government Private Gross domestic consumption consumption, etc. Investment 1965-80 1980-90 1965-80 1980-90 1965-80 1980-90 67 Poland . 1.0 . . 1.3 . . 1.0 68 Panama 7.4 0.5 4.6 1.4 5.9 -12.8 69 CostaRica 6.8 1.2 5.! 3.2 9.4 5.2 70 Chile 4.0 -0.1 0.9 1.7 0.5 4.3 71 Botswana 12.0 12.5 10.2 6.8 21.0 0.4 72 Algeria 8.6 3.7 4.4 2.5 15.9 -1.2 73 Bulgaria . . 3.5 . . 3.5 . . 1.8 74 Mauritius 7.1 3.1 6.1 5.7 8.3 10.0 75 Malaysia 8.5 2.7 6.2 4.2 10.4 2.9 76 Argentina 3.2 -4.0 2.9 -0.3 4.6 -8.3 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. 14.6 -4.3 5.4 5.5 11.5 -2.0 78 Albania 79 Angola 80 Lebanon 81 Mongolia 82 Namibia . . 4.3 . . 1.1 -7.0 83 Nicaragua 6.1 1.9 2.2 -1.9 . . -4.5 84 Yemen,Rep. . . . . . . . . . Upper-middle-income 5.9 w 4.1 w 7.1 w 2.3 w 9.0 w 0.2 w 85 Mexico 8.5 1.9 5.9 1.1 8.5 -3.4 86 South Africa 5.7 3.4 4.0 1.7 4.7 -4.3 87 Venezuela . . 2.1 . . 1.4 . . -5.4 88 Uruguay 3.2 1.9 0.9 1.0 8.2 -8.2 89 Brazil 6.8 8.8 8.7 1.7 11.3 0.2 90 Hungaiy 2.1 . . 0.8 9.1 -0.8 91 Yugoslavia 3.6 0.3 10.1 -1.1 6.5 -3.3 92 Czechoslovakia 2.6 . . 1.8 . . 0.1 93 Gabon 10.7 3.3 7.5 -0.2 14.1 -7.5 94 Trinidad and Tobago 8.9 1.5 4.2 -8.0 12.1 -7.5 95 Portugal 8.1 2.5 6.6 5.0 4.6 -2.7 96 Korea, Rep. 7.7 6.0 8.0 8.0 15.9 12.5 97 Greece 6.6 2.8 5.1 3.4 5.3 -1.9 98 Saudi Arabia 99 Iraq 100 Libya 19.7 19.! . . 7.3 101 Oman Low- and middle-income 7.0 w 3.5 w 5.4 w 3.2 w 8.3 w 2.3 w Sub-Saharan Africa 6.8 w 1.0w 4.2 w 0.8 w 8.7 w -4.3 w East Asia & Pacific 7.5 w 6.2 w 6.2 w 6.1 w 11.1 w 10.6 w South Asia 4.6 w 8.5 w 3.1 w 5.1 w 4.1 w 4.6 w Europe 1.8w 2.7 w -0.1 w Middle East & N.Africa Latin America & Caribbean w w 1.2 w 8.2 w -2.0 w Other economies Severely indebted 7.2w 3.9w 6.2 w 1.4w 9.3 w -1.8w High-income economies 2.9 w 2.5 w 4.0 w 3.1 w 3.3 w 4.2 w OECI3 members 2.8 w 2.5 w 4.0 w 3.1 w 3.2 w 4.3 w lOther 0.6 w 3.7 w -0.7 w 102 Ireland 6.6 -0.4 4.0 1.8 6.3 -0.5 103 ±Israel 8.8 0.4 5.9 5.0 5.9 1.7 104 Spain 5.1 5.1 4.9 3.0 3.6 5.7 105 (Singapore 10.2 6.6 7.8 5.9 13.3 3.6 106 tHong Kong 7.7 5.3 9.0 6.8 8.6 3.6 107 NewZealand 3.3 1.3 2.4 2.3 0.8 4.4 108 Belgium 4.4 0.4 4.3 1.7 3.0 3.3 109 UnitedKingdom 2.3 1.1 2.2 4.0 1.2 6.4 110 Italy 3.3 2.7 4.8 3.0 3.2 2.0 III Australia 5.0 3.4 4.1 3.5 2.7 3.0 112 Netherlands 3.1 1.0 4.5 1.6 1.6 2.3 113 Austria 3.6 1.3 4.4 2.4 4.5 2.8 114 France 3.6 2.2 4.1 2.4 3.3 2.6 115 tUnited Arab Emirates -3.9 . - -5.0 . . -8.7 116 Canada 4.8 2.3 5.0 3.6 4.7 4.9 117 UnitcdStates 1.3 3.3 3.3 3.4 2.1 4.4 118 Denmark 4.8 0.9 2.4 1.9 1.2 3.7 119 Germanyb 3.6 1.4 4.1 1.9 1.8 2.4 120 Norway 5.5 3.0 3.8 1.6 4.4 0.6 121 Sweden 4.0 1.5 2.5 2.1 0.9 4.2 122 Japan 5.3 2.4 6.2 3.7 6.9 5.7 123 Finland 5.3 3.6 3.8 4.6 2.9 3.3 124 Switzerland 2.7 2.9 2.3 1.7 0.8 4.9 125 tKuwait a 0.5 5.9 0.7 11.9 -5.1 World 3.2 w 2.6 w 4.2 w 3.2 w 4.0 w 3.8 w Fuel exporters, exci. former USSR . . . . . . a. General government consumption figures are not available separately; they are included in private consumption, etc. b. Data refer to the Federal Republic of Germany before unification. 233 Table 9. Structure of demand Distribution of gross domestic product (percent) General Exports of goods government Private Gross domestic Gross domestic and nonfactor Resource consusnption conswnption, etc. investment savings services balance 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 Low-income economies 9w 11w 74w 61w 19w 31w 18w 28w Sw 18w -2w -1w China and India 8w lOw 71w 57w 21w 32w 20w 33w 4w 14w Ow 1w Other low-income 11w 13w 76w 67w 15w 27w 13w 20w 16w 24w -2w -5w 1 Mozambique 20 92 37 -12 16 -49 2 Tanzania 10 10 74 95 15 25 16 -6 26 18 1 -31 3 Ethiopia 11 26 77 68 13 13 12 6 12 13 -1 -7 4 Somalia 8 a 84 78 11 16 8 22 17 10 -3 6 5 Nepal a 12 100 80 6 18 0 8 8 12 -6 -10 6 Chad 20 23 74 92 12 10 6 -15 19 25 -6 -26 7 Bhutan 20 58 36 22 29 -14 8 LaoPDR 12 89 12 -2 10 -14 9 Malawi 16 15 84 75 14 19 0 10 19 24 -14 -9 10 Bangladesh 9 9 83 89 11 12 8 2 10 8 -4 -10 11 Burundi 7 15 89 84 6 19 4 1 10 8 -2 -18 12 Zaire 10 75 17 11 16 26 25 -1 -6 13 Uganda 10 7 78 94 11 12 12 -1 26 7 1 -13 14 Madagascar 16 9 84 83 7 17 0 8 13 15 7 9 15 SierraLeone 8 10 83 85 12 11 8 5 30 17 -3 -6 16 Mali 10 10 84 80 18 26 5 10 12 18 -13 -16 17 Nigeria 7 11 83 59 15 15 10 29 11 39 -5 15 18 Niger 6 90 8 9 3 9 16 -5 -7 19 Rwanda 14 18 81 78 10 12 5 4 12 9 -5 -9 20 BurkinaFaso 5 13 90 83 10 20 4 5 6 11 -6 -15 21 India 9 12 76 68 17 23 15 20 4 8 -2 -3 22 Benin 11 11 87 87 11 12 3 2 13 20 -8 -10 23 China 8 8 68 49 24 39 25 43 4 18 1 4 24 Haiti 8 9 90 90 7 11 2 1 13 12 -5 -10 25 Kenya 15 18 70 63 14 24 15 18 31 25 1 -5 26 Pakistan 11 15 76 73 21 19 13 12 8 16 -8 -7 27 Ghana 14 8 77 82 18 15 8 11 17 -10 -4 28 CentralAfrican Rep. 22 14 67 88 21 11 11 -2 27 17 -11 -13 29 Togo 11 19 65 70 22 22 23 11 32 41 1 -11 30 Zambia 15 15 45 68 25 14 40 17 49 32 15 3 31 Guinea 8 71 20 21 30 32 SriLanka 13 9 74 76 12 22 13 15 38 30 1 -8 33 Mauritania 19 10 54 88 14 15 27 3 42 47 13 12 34 Lesotho 18 24 109 118 11 71 -26 -41 16 14 -38 -112 35 Indonesia 5 9 87 54 8 36 8 37 5 26 0 36 Honduras 10 15 75 80 15 13 15 6 27 40 0 -7 37 Egypt, Arab Rep. 19 10 67 80 18 23 14 10 18 20 -4 13 38 Afghanistan 11 1 11 -10 39 Cambodia 16 71 13 12 12 -1 40 Liberia 12 61 17 27 50 10 41 Myanmar S 42 Sudan 12 79 . 10 9 15 -1 43 VietNam . Middle-income economies 11w 14w 67w 62w 21w 23w 22w 24w 17w Ow Lower-middle-income lOw 12w 69w 65w 19w 23w 20w 23w 17w 28w Ow Ow 44 Bolivia 9 15 74 77 22 11 17 8 21 21 -5 -3 45 Zimbabwe 12 26 65 53 15 21 23 21 . 32 8 0 46 Senegal 17 14 75 77 12 13 8 9 24 26 -4 4 47 Philippines 9 9 70 75 21 22 21 16 17 28 0 -6 48 Cbted'Ivoire 11 18 61 68 22 10 29 14 37 37 7 4 49 Dominican Rep. 19 7 75 82 10 15 6 11 16 28 -4 -4 50 PapuaNewGuinea 34 24 64 66 22 25 2 10 18 37 20 -15 51 Guatemala 7 7 82 85 13 12 10 8 17 21 3 4 52 Morucco 12 16 76 65 10 26 12 20 18 25 1 -6 53 Cameroon 13 12 75 70 13 17 12 19 24 21 -1 2 54 Ecuador 9 8 80 70 14 19 11 22 16 31 -3 3 55 Syrian Arab Rep. 14 14 76 72 10 14 10 14 17 27 0 -1 56 Congo 14 19 80 51 22 16 5 31 36 49 -17 15 57 ElSalvador 9 11 79 88 15 12 12 1 27 16 -2 -11 58 Paraguay 7 6 79 70 15 22 14 23 15 34 -1 59 Pens 10 6 59 71 34 23 31 23 16 11 -3 0 60 Jordan 24 . . 85 . . 19 . . -9 . . 65 . . -27 61 Colombia 8 10 75 64 16 19 17 25 11 20 1 6 62 Thailand 10 10 72 57 20 37 19 34 16 38 -1 -3 63 Tunisia 15 16 71 64 28 27 14 19 19 42 -13 -7 64 Jamaica 8 15 69 56 27 30 23 30 33 59 -4 0 65 Turkey 12 14 74 68 15 23 13 18 6 19 -1 -5 66 Romania 5 68 34 27 -7 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. Distribution of gross domestic product (percent) General Exports of goods government Private Gross domestic Gross domestic and nonfactor Resource consumption consumption, etc. investment savings servtces balance 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 67 Poland 7 54 31 39 26 8 68 Panama Il 22 73 62 18 16 16 16 36 38 -2 0 69 Costa Rica 13 18 78 60 20 29 9 22 23 34 -10 -8 70 Chile 11 10 73 67 15 20 16 23 14 37 I 3 71 Botswana 24 89 6 -13 32 .. -19 72 Algeria 15 18 66 44 22 33 19 38 22 25 -3 5 73 Bulgaria IS 54 29 28 40 -2 74 Mauritius 13 12 74 66 17 30 13 21 36 67 -4 -9 75 Malaysia 15 13 61 54 20 34 24 33 42 79 4 -1 76 Argentina 8 5 69 79 19 9 22 16 8 14 3 7 77 Iran,IslamicRep. 13 II 63 69 17 21 24 20 20 15 6 -1 78 Albania 79 Angola 0 80 Lebanon 10 81 22 9 36 -13 81 Mongolia 24 73 30 3 23 -27 82 Namibia S 0 83 Nicaragua 8 29 74 73 21 20 18 -2 29 23 -3 -23 84 Yemen,Rep. 26 66 15 8 23 -8 Upper-middle-income 11 w 16 w 64 w 61 w 23 w 24 w 25 w 23 w 19 w 0w 85 Mexico 6 II 75 70 20 20 19 19 8 16 -2 0 86 SouthAfrica II 19 63 56 27 19 26 25 27 26 -1 6 87 Venezuela 10 9 56 62 25 9 34 29 26 39 9 20 88 Uruguay 14 13 65 67 14 12 2! 19 18 27 7 8 89 Brazil Il 16 67 61 20 22 22 23 8 7 2 2 90 Hungary a II 75 62 26 23 . 27 . 33 . . 4 91 Yugoslavia 18 7 52 72 30 21 30 21 22 24 0 -1 92 Czechoslovakia . 21 . 51 . . 30 . . 28 . . 33 . . 93 Gabon Il 20 52 43 31 19 37 37 43 56 6 8 94 TrinidadandTobago 12 16 67 52 26 17 21 33 65 46 -5 16 95 Portugal 12 13 68 66 25 32 20 21 27 35 -5 -10 96 Korea, Rep. 9 a 83 63 15 37 8 37 9 32 -7 -1 97 Greece 12 21 73 71 26 19 15 8 9 22 -1! -Il 98 Saudi Arabia 18 . . 34 . . 14 . . 48 . . 60 . . 34 99 Iraq 20 . . 50 . . 16 . . 31 . . 38 . . 15 100 Libya 14 . . 36 . . 29 . . 50 . . 53 . . 21 101 Oman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Low- and middle-income 10 w 13 w 70 w 63 w 20 w 26 w 20 w 24 w 13 w 24 w 1w 1) w Sub-Saharan Africa 11 w 15w 77w 68w 15w 16w 13w 16w 22w 29w -3w -1 w East Asia & Pacific 8w 10 w 69 w 55 w 22 w 37 w 22 w 35 w 8w 31 w 0w 0w South Asia 9w 12 w 77 w 69 w 17 w 21 w 14 w 19 w 6w 9w -3 w -4 w Europe 14 w 65 w 25 w 21 w 29 w -3 w Middle East & N.Africa 15 w 63 w 17 w 22 w - 26 w 3w Latin America & Caribbean 9w 12 w 69 w 66 w 20 w 19 w 22 w 22 w 13 w 15 w 0w 2w Other economies Severely indebted 9w 13w 68w 64w 21w 20w 23w 23w 13w 15w 2w 3w High-income economies 15w 17w 61w 61w 23w 22w 24w 22w 12w 20w 1w Ow OECD members 15w 17w 61w 61w 23w 22w 24w 22w 12w 19w Ow Ow tOther 102 Ireland 14 16 72 55 24 21 15 29 35 62 -9 8 103 tisracl 20 29 65 59 29 18 15 12 19 32 -13 -6 104 Spain 8 15 67 62 28 26 24 22 10 17 -3 -3 105 tSingapore 10 11 80 45 22 39 JO 45 123 190 -12 6 106 HongKong 7 8 64 59 36 28 29 33 71 137 -7 5 107 New Zealand 12 17 61 63 28 22 26 21 21 28 -2 -2 108 Belgium 13 14 64 62 23 2! 23 24 43 74 0 3 109 UnitedKingdom 17 20 64 63 20 19 19 17 19 25 1 -2 110 Italy 14 17 60 62 23 21 25 21 15 21 2 0 Ill Australia 13 18 61 61 28 21 25 2! 14 17 -2 0 112 Netherlands 15 15 59 59 27 21 26 26 43 57 -1 5 113 Austria 13 18 59 55 28 25 27 27 25 41 -1 114 France l4 18 59 60 26 22 27 22 13 23 1 0 115 tUnited Arab Emirates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 Canada 14 20 60 59 26 21 26 2! 19 25 0 0 117 UnitedStates 17 18 63 67 20 16 21 15 5 10 I -1 118 Denmark 16 25 59 52 26 17 25 23 29 35 -2 5 119 Germanyb 15 18 56 54 28 22 29 28 18 32 0 6 120 Norway 15 21 56 50 30 21 29 29 41 44 -I 7 121 Sweden 18 27 56 52 27 21 26 21 22 30 -1 0 122 Japan 8 9 59 57 32 33 33 34 II II I 123 Finland 14 21 60 53 28 27 27 26 20 23 -2 -t 124 Switzerland 10 13 60 57 30 29 30 30 29 37 -1 0 125 tKuwait 13 . . 26 . . 16 . . 60 . . 68 . . 45 World 14w 16w 63w 62w 23w 23w 23w 23w 11w 20w Ow Ow Fuel exporters, excl. former USSR 12 w 60 w 20 w 28 w . 29 w 8w a. General government consumption figures are not available separatety they arc included in private consumption, etc. b. Data refer to the Federal Republic of Germany before unification. 235 Table 10. Structure of consumption Percentage share of total household consumptiona Food Gross rents, Other consumption fidel and power Transport and Cereals Clothing Other communication and anti Fuel and Medical consumer Total tubers footwear Total power care Education Total Automobiles Total durables Low-income economies China and India Other low-income Mozambique 0 S 2 Tanzania 64 32 10 8 3 3 3 2 0 10 3 3 Ethiopia 50 24 6 14 7 3 2 8 1 17 2 4 Somalia S 5 Nepal 57 38 12 14 6 3 1 1 0 13 2 6 Chad 7 Bhutan 8 LaoPDR ,. .. .. .. .. 9 Malawi 55 28 5 12 2 3 4 7 2 IS 10 Bangladesh 59 36 8 17 7 2 I 3 0 10 11 Bururidi 12 Zaire 55 15 10 It 3 3 1 6 0 14 3 13 Uganda . . . . . . . . . . . S 14 Madagascar 59 26 6 12 6 2 4 4 1 14 I IS Sierra Leone 56 22 4 15 6 2 3 12 . 9 1 16 Mali 57 22 6 8 6 2 4 10 1 13 I 17 Nigeria 52 18 7 10 2 3 4 4 1 20 6 18 Niger . . . . . . . . . . 19 Rwanda 30 II II 16 6 3 4 9 28 9 20 Burkina Faso . . . . . . . . 0 . . 21 India 52 18 Ii 10 3 3 4 7 0 13 3 22 Benin 37 12 14 12 2 5 4 14 2 15 5 23 China 61b 13 8 3 / 1 I . . /5 24 Haiti . . . . . . S . . . S 25 Kenya 39 16 7 12 2 3 9 8 1 22 6 26 Pakistan 54 17 9 IS 6 3 3 I 0 15 5 5C 27 Ghana 50 . 13 11 . . 3 3 . . J5 28 Central African Rep. . . . . . . . . . 29 Togo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Zambia 37 8 10 II 5 7 13 5 I 16 I 31 Guinea 32 Sri Lanka 43 l 6 3 1 25 33 Mauritania 34 Lcsotho 4 35 Indonesia .a 13 4 o 2i 5C 36 Honduras 39 . . 9 21 8 3 . . IS 37 Egypt, Arab Rep. 50 10 II 9 3 6 4 1 18 3 38 Afghanistan 39 Cambodia 40 Liberia 41 Myanmar . . . . . . . . . 42 Sudan 60 5 15 4 5 I] 43 VietNam . . . . . . . Middle-income economies Lower-middle-income 44 Bolivia 33 . . 9 12 1 5 7 12 . . 22 45 Zimbabwe 40 9 II 13 5 4 7 6 1 20 3 46 Senegal 50 15 II 12 4 2 5 6 0 14 2 47 Philippines 51 20 4 19 5 2 4 4 2 16 2 48 Côted'Ivoire 40 14 10 5 I 9 4 10 . . 23 3 49 Dominican Rep. 46 13 3 15 5 8 3 4 0 21 8 50 Papua New Guinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S SI Guatemala 36 10 10 14 5 13 4 3 0 20 5 52 Morocco 40 12 II 9 2 4 6 8 1 22 5 53 Cameroon 24 8 7 17 3 II 9 12 I 21 3 54 7 I2e 30 Ecuador 30 10 1 5 6 . 55 Syrian Arab Rep. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Congo 42 19 6 II 4 3 1 17 I 20 4 57 ElSalvador 33 12 9 7 2 8 5 10 I 28 7 58 Paraguay 30 6 12 21 4 2 3 10 t 22 3 59 Peru 35 8 7 15 3 4 6 10 0 24 7 60 Jordan 35 . . 5 6 . . 5 8 6 35 6! Colombia 29 . . 6 12 2 7 6 13 . . 27 62 Thailand 30 7 16 7 3 5 5 13 0 24 5 63 Tunisia 37 7 10 13 4 6 9 7 I 18 5 64 Jamaica 39 . . 4 15 7 . . 17 . . 22 65 Turkey 40 8 15 13 7 4 1 5 . . 22 66 Romania Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 236 Percentage share of total household consumptiona Food Grots rents, Other consumption j11e1 and power Transport and Other Cereals Clothing Medical communication consumer and and Fuel and Total tubers footwear Total power care Education Total Automobiles Total durables 67 Poland 29 . 9 7 2 6 7 8 2 34 9 68 Panama 38 7 3 II 3 8 9 7 0 24 6 69 Costa Rica 33 8 8 9 1 7 8 8 0 28 9 70 Chile 29 7 8 13 2 5 6 II 0 29 5 71 Botswana 35 13 8 15 5 4 9 8 2 22 7 72 Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Bulgaria . . . . S . . . . . 74 Mauritius 24 7 5 19 3 5 7 11 I 29 4 75 Malaysia 23 . . 4 9 . . 5 7 /9 0 33 76 Argentina 35 4 6 9 2 4 6 13 0 26 6 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. 37 10 9 23 2 6 5 6 1 14 5 78 Albania . . 0 . . . 79 Angola . 0 . . . 80 Lebanon . . . . . . 81 Mongolia . . . . . . ' . . . . . 82 Namibia 83 Nicaragua 84 Yemen, Rep. Upper-middle-income 85 Mexico 35b 10 8 5 5 12 . . 25 S 86 South Africa 34 . . 7 12 17 . . 26 87 Venezuela 23 . 7 10 8 II . . 36 88 Uruguay 31 7 7 12 2 6 4 13 0 27 5 89 Brazil 35 9 10 II 2 6 5 8 1 27 8 90 Hungary 25 9 10 5 5 7 9 2 35 8 91 Yugoslavia 27 10 9 4 6 5 II 2 32 9 92 Czechoslovakia . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Gabon . . . . . . . . S 94 Trinidad and Tobago . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Portugal 34 . . 10 8 3 6 5 13 3 24 7 96 Korea, Rep. 35 14 6 II 5 5 9 9 . . 25 5 97 Greece 30 . . 8 12 3 6 5 13 2 26 5 98 Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . 0 100 Libya 101 Oman Low- and middle-income Sub-Saharan Africa East Asia South Asia Europe Middle East and N.Africa Latin America & Caribbean Other economies Severely indebted High-income economies OECD members tOther 102 Ireland 22 4 5 II 5 10 7 11 3 33 5 103 tlsracl 21 . . 5 20 2 9 12 10 . . 23 104 Spain 24 3 7 16 3 7 5 13 3 28 6 105 tSingapore 19 . . 8 II . . 7 12 13 . . 30 106 tHong Kong 12 I 9 IS 2 6 5 9 1 44 15 107 New Zealand 12 2 6 14 2 9 6 19 6 34 9 108 Belgium 15 2 6 17 7 10 9 II 3 31 7 109 United Kingdom 12 2 6 17 4 8 6 14 4 36 7 110 Italy 19 2 8 14 4 10 7 II 3 31 7 III Australia 13 2 5 21 2 10 8 13 4 31 7 112 Netherlands 13 2 6 18 6 II 8 10 3 33 8 113 Austria 16 2 9 17 5 10 8 15 3 26 7 114 France 16 2 6 17 5 13 7 13 3 29 7 115 tUnited Arab Emirates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 Canada II 2 6 21 4 5 12 14 5 32 8 117 UnitedStates 13 2 6 18 4 14 8 14 5 27 7 118 Denmark 13 2 5 19 5 8 9 13 5 33 7 119 Germany 12 2 7 18 5 13 6 13 4 31 9 120 Norway 15 2 6 14 5 10 8 14 6 32 7 121 Sweden 13 2 5 19 4 11 8 II 2 32 7 122 Japan 16 4 6 17 3 10 8 9 1 34 6 123 Finland 16 3 4 15 4 9 8 14 4 34 6 124 Switzerland 17 . . 4 17 6 15 9 . . 38 125 tKuwait 0 0 0 0 0 . . 0 0 0 World Fuel exporters, exel. former USSR a. Data refer to either 1980 or 1985. h. Includes beverages and tobacco. c. Refers to government expenditure. d. Excludes fuel. e. Includes fuel. f. Excludes government expenditure. g. Data refer to the Federal Republic of Germany before unification. 237 Table 11. Central government expenditure Percentage of total expenditure Housing, Total Ocerall amenities; expenditure as surplus/deficit social security Economic a percentage as a percentage Defense Education Health and welfarea services Other a of GNP of GNP 1972 1990 1972 1990 1972 1990 1972 1990 1972 1990 1972 1990 1972 1990 1972 1990 Low-income economies China and India Other low-income I Mozambique 2 Tanzania 11.9 17.3 7.2 H 2.1 39.0 22.6 1 . 19.7 . . -5.0 3 Ethiopia 14.3 14.4 . . 5.7 . . 4.4 22.9 38.3 . . 13.7 . , -1.4 4 Somalia 23.3 5.5 . . 7.2 . . 1.9 21.6 40.5 . . 13.5 . . 0.6 5 Nepal 7.2 6.0 7.2 10.9 4.7 4.8 0.7 8.4 57.2 41.2 23.0 28.6 8.5 20.4 -1.2 -8.1 6 Chad 24.6 . 14.8 . 4.4 . 1.7 . 21.8 . 32.7 . 14.9 . . -2.7 7 Bhutan . 0.0 . 11.6 . 5.3 4.7 . 56.6 . 21.9 . . 43.9 -7.2 8 La0PDR . . . . . . . . 9 Malawib 3.1 5.4 15.8 8.8 5.5 7.4 5.8 3.2 33.1 35.0 36.7 40.2 22.1 29.2 -6.2 -1.9 10 Bangladeshb 5.1 10.1 14.8 11.2 5.0 4.8 9.8 8.0 39.3 34.4 25.9 31.5 9.2 15.0 -1.9 -0.4 II Bumndi 10.3 . . 23.4 . . 6.0 . . 2.7 . . 33.9 . . 23.8 . . 19.9 . . 0.0 12 Zaire 11.1 6.7 15.1 1.4 2.4 0.7 2.1 1.5 13.2 25.0 56.2 64.7 14.1 13.0 -2.7 1.9 13 Uganda 23.1 . . 15.3 . . 5.3 . . 7.3 12.4 . . 36.6 . . 21.8 . . -8.1 14 Madagascar 3.6 . . 9.1 . . 4.2 . . 9.9 . . 40.5 . . 32.7 . . 16.7 . . -2.0 15 SierraLeone 3.6 5.3 15.5 10.4 5.3 3.6 2.7 2.3 24.6 9.0 48.3 69.4 23.9 11.1 -4.4 -1.4 16 Mali . 8.0 . 9.0 . . 2.1 . . 3.] . . 5.3 . . 72.4 . . 28.9 . . -4.6 17 Nigeriab 40.2 . 4.5 . 3.6 0.8 . . 19.6 31.4 . . 9.! . . -0.8 18 Niger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Rwanda 25.6 . 22.2 . 5.7 . . 2.6 . . 22.0 21.9 . . 12.5 . . -2.7 20 BurkinaFaso 11.5 . 20.6 . 8.2 6.6 15.5 37.6 . . 8.4 0.3 21 India 26.2 17.0 2.3 2.5 1.5 1.6 3.2 6.9 19.9 20.8 46.9 51.2 10.5 18.2 -3.2 -7.3 22 Benin . . . . . 23 China . . . . . . . 24 Haiti . . . . 14.5 . . . 25 Kenyab 6.0 7.8 21.9 19.8 7.9 5.4 3.9 3.6 30.1 26.6 30.2 36.9 21.0 31.4 -3.9 -6.8 26 Pakistan 39.9 30.9 1.2 2.0 1.] 0.7 3.2 3.1 21.4 12.4 33.2 50.9 16.9 23.6 -6.9 -7.2 27 Ghana' 7.9 3.2 20.1 25.7 6.3 9.0 4.1 11.9 15.1 19.2 46.6 31.1 19.5 /4.0 -5.8 0.4 28 Central African Rep . . . . . . 26.1 . 29 Togo . . . . . . . . 30 Zambia1' 0.0 0.0 19.0 8.6 7.4 7.4 1.3 2.0 26.7 24.8 45.7 57.2 34.0 21.9 -13.8 -5.0 31 Guinea . . . . . 24.9 . . -4.2 32 Sri Lanka 3.1 7.4 13.0 9.9 6.4 5.4 19.5 14.9 20.2 16.8 37.7 45.6 25.4 28.4 -5.3 -7.9 33 Mauritania . . . . . 33.5 . . -4.2 34 Lesotho 0.0 9.9 19.5 15.2 8.0 7.4 6.5 2.4 24.5 27.4 41.5 37.6 16.6 25.1 -0.9 -2.8 35 Indonesia 18.6 8.0 7.4 8.4 1.4 2.0 0.9 1.5 30.5 27.6 41.3 52.4 15.1 20.4 -2.5 -2.1 36 Honduras 12.4 . 22.3 . 10.2 . 8.7 . 28.3 . 18.1 . 16.1 . . -2.9 37 Egypt, Arab Rep . 12.7 . 13.4 . 2.8 . . 17.8 . 8.2 . 45.3 . . 40.2 . . 6.9 38 Afghanistan . . . . . 39 Cambodia . . . . . . 40 Liberia 5.3 9.8 /5.2 11.6 9.8 5.4 3.5 1.8 25.8 29.5 40.5 41.9 16.7 . . 1.1 41 Myanmar 31.6 24.7 15.0 16.8 6.1 4.6 7.5 15.4 20.1 20.5 19.7 /8.1 . . 42 Sudan' 24.1 . 9.3 . . 5.4 1.4 . 15.8 . 44.1 . 19.2 . . -0.8 43 t3etNam , . . . . . . Middle-income economies Lower-middle-income 44 Bolivia . 14.1 . 18.0 . 2.3 17.9 . 19.1 . 28.6 . . 18.8 0.0 -1.9 45 Zimbabwe . /6.5 . 23.4 . 7.6 3.9 . 22.4 . 26.2 . . 40.5 . . _7.9 46 Senegal . . . 17.4 . . -0.8 47 Philippines' 10.9 11.0 16.3 16.9 3.2 4.1 4.3 2.3 17.6 23.6 47.7 42.1 14.2 19.8 -2.1 3.5 48 Cdte d'Ivoire . . . . . . 49 DominicanRep. 8.5 4.6 14.2 9.5 11.7 11.3 11.8 24.2 35.4 36.7 18.3 13.6 17.7 15.3 -0.2 0.0 50 PapuaNewGuincab . 4.7 . . /5.3 . . 9.4 . . 3.] . . 20.8 . . 46.6 . . 29.0 . . -0.9 51 Guatemala 11.0 13.3 19.4 19.5 9.5 9.9 10.4 7.8 23.8 21.7 25.8 27.8 9.9 12.0 -2.2 -1.8 52 Morocco 12.3 . . 19.2 . . 4.8 . . 8.4 . . 25.6 . . 29.7 . . 22.8 . . -3.9 53 Cameroon . . 6.7 . . /2.0 . . 3.4 . . 8.7 . . 48.1 . . 21.2 . . 20.8 . . -3.2 54 Ecuador' /5.7 12.9 27.5 18.2 4.5 11.0 0.8 2.5 28.9 11.8 22.6 43.6 13.4 15.6 0.2 2.0 55 Syrian Arab Rep 37.2 40.7 11.3 8.6 1.4 1.3 3.6 3.3 39.9 30.4 6.7 15.7 29.0 28.0 -3.5 -0.7 56 Congo . . . . . . . . 57 El Salvador1' 6.6 24.5 21.4 16.2 10.9 7.8 7.6 5.5 14.4 16.7 39.1 29.3 12.8 9.9 -0.9 -0.1 58 Paraguay 13.8 13.3 12.1 12.7 3.5 4.3 18.3 14.8 19.6 12.8 32.7 42.1 13.1 9.3 -1.7 2.9 59 Perut' 14.5 11.2 23.6 16.2 5.5 5.1 1.8 0.1 30.9 . 23.6 67.4 16.1 10.0 -0.9 -5.0 60 Jordan 33.5 23.1 9.4 14.2 3.8 5.8 10.5 11.7 26.6 12.9 16.2 32.3 . . 39.4 . . -6.0 61 Colombia . . . 13.1 15.1 -2.5 -2.0 62 Thailand 20.2 17.3 19.9 20.1 3.7 6.8 7.0 5.8 25.6 22.1 23.5 28.0 16.7 15.1 -4.2 4.9 63 Tunisia 4.9 6.5 30.5 /6.3 7.4 6.1 8.8 14.4 23.3 31.0 25.1 25.7 23.1 37.2 -0.9 -4.5 64 Jamaica 65 Turkey 155 117 181 192 32 36 31 36 420 178 181 442 227 246 -22 -42 66 Romania 5.4 10.3 2.9 2.7 0.5 8.7 16.2 31.5 61.8 38.3 13.1 8.6 . . 34.2 . . 0.9 Note; For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics arc for years other than those specified. 238 Percentage of total expenditure Housing, Total Overall amenities; expenditure as surplus/deficit social security Economic a percentage as a percentage Defense Education Health and welfarea services Othera 0fGNP of GNP 1972 1990 1972 1990 1972 1990 1972 1990 1972 1990 1972 1990 1972 1990 1972 1990 67 Poland . . . . 40.4 . - -2.4 68 Panama 0.0 7.9 20.7 18.5 15.1 17.9 10.8 24.1 24.2 7.5 29.1 24.1 27.6 31.8 -6.5 -8.2 69 CostaRjca 2.6 . - 28.5 19.0 4.0 26.3 26.5 14.9 21.2 10.3 17.2 29.6 19.0 27,1 -4.5 -3.3 70 Chile 6.1 8.4 14.5 10.1 10.0 5.9 39.8 33.9 15.3 8.8 16.3 33.0 43.2 32.8 -13.0 -0.2 71 Botswana5 0.0 11.6 10.0 20.2 6.0 4.8 21.7 10.6 28.0 20.9 34.5 32.0 33.7 42.2 -23.8 12.6 72 Algeria . 0 . . . 73 Bulgaria . 6.5 . 6.0 . 4.1 . 24.0 . 47.2 . 12.1 . . 76.9 . . -1.5 74 Mauritius 0.8 1.3 13.5 14.4 10.3 8.6 18.0 17.0 13.9 16.5 43.4 42.2 16.3 24.2 -1.2 -0.5 75 Malaysia . . 26.5 31.3 -9.4 -2.8 76 Argentina . - 8.6 . 9.3 . 2.0 . 40.9 . 20.5 . - 18.7 . - 15.5 0.0 -2.7 77 Iran, Islamic Rep 24.1 13.6 10.4 22.0 3.6 8.5 6.1 18.4 30.6 14.7 25.2 22.8 30.8 16.9 -4.6 -4.0 78 Albania 79 Angola . . . . . . . . 80 Lebanon . . . . . . . 81 Mongolia . . . . . . . 82 Namibia - . 5.5 . . 20.8 - . 11.1 15.0 14.4 . . 33.2 42.8 7.0 83 Nicaragua 12.3 . . 16.6 . . 4.0 16.4 27.2 23.4 15.8 -4.0 84 Yemen,Rep. Upper-middle-income 85 Mexico 4.5 2.4 16.4 13.9 4.5 1.9 25.4 13.0 35.8 13.4 13.4 55.5 11.4 18.4 -2.9 0.8 86 SouthAfrica . . . 22.7 34.6 -4.4 -2.5 87 Venezuela 10.3 . 18.6 . 11.7 . 9.2 . 25.4 . 24.8 . 18.1 23.1 -0.2 -1.2 88 Uruguay 5.6 9.2 9.5 7.4 1.6 4.5 52.3 50.3 9.8 8.7 21.2 20.0 26.8 27.5 -2.7 0.4 89 Brazil 8.3 4.2 8.3 5.3 6.7 7.2 35.0 20.1 23.3 6.9 18.3 56.2 29.1 36.0 -0.3 -16.6 90 Hungary . 3.6 . 3.3 . - 7.9 . . 35.3 . 22.0 . . 27.9 . . 54.8 . . 0.8 91 Yugoslavia 20.5 53.4 24.8 . 35.6 6.0 12.0 19.6 7.0 21.0 21.1 5.2 4.0 0.3 92 Czechoslovakia . 6.7 . 1.8 . 0.4 . . 25.3 . 46.1 . . 19.9 . . 61.1 . . -7.1 93 Gabonb . 37.0 - . -11.9 94 Trinidad and Tobago . . . . . . . . . . - 95 Portugal . . . . . 43.3 . . -5.0 96 Korea, Rep 25.8 25.8 15.8 19.6 1.2 2.2 5.9 12.2 25.6 17.0 25.7 23.2 18.0 15.7 -3.9 -0.7 97 Greece 14.9 . 9.1 . 7.4 . 30.6 26.4 . 11.7 . 27.5 . . -1.7 98 Saudi Arabia . . . . . . 99 Iraq . . . - . . . . 100 Libya . . . . . . . . . 101 Oman 39.3 41.0 3.7 10.7 5.9 4.6 3.0 9.0 24.4 9.7 23.6 25.0 62.1 48.6 -15.3 -9.9 Low- and middle-income Sub-Saharan Africa East Asia & Pacific South Asia Europe Middle East & N.Africa Latin America & Caribbean Other economies Severely indebted High-income economies OECD members j'Other 102 Ireland . 2.8 . 11.3 . 12.1 . . 28.9 . 15.6 . 29.3 33.0 54.5 -5.5 -5.3 103 tlsrael 42.9 25.4 7.1 10.2 0.0 4.1 7.1 24.3 7.1 9.2 35.7 26.7 43.9 50.8 -15.7 -4.3 104 Spain 6.5 5.5 8.3 5.6 0.9 12.8 49.8 37.7 17.5 10.8 17.0 27.6 19.4 33.5 -0.5 -3.6 105 tSingapore 35.3 21.6 15.7 18.1 7.8 4.7 3.9 11.7 9.9 20.0 27.3 24.0 16.7 23.3 1.3 10.5 106 tHong Kong . . . . . . . . 107 New Zealand5 5.8 4.8 16.9 12.5 14.8 12.7 25.6 33.8 16.5 9.0 20.4 27.1 29.2 47.1 -3.9 4.3 108 Belgium 6.7 . . 15.5 . . 1.5 . . 41.0 . . 18.9 . - 16.4 . . 39.9 49.3 -4.4 -6.4 109 UnitedKingdom 16.7 12.2 2.6 3.2 12.2 14.6 26.5 34.8 11.1 7.4 30.8 27.9 32.0 34.8 -2.7 0.8 110 Italy 6.3 3.6 16.1 8.3 13.5 11.3 44.8 38.6 18.4 11.5 0.9 26.6 29.5 48.5 -8.7 -10.4 Ill Australia 14.2 8.5 4.2 6.8 7.0 12.8 20.3 29.7 14.4 7.1 39.9 35.1 18.7 25.8 0.3 1.9 112 Netherlands 6.8 5.0 15.2 10.8 12.1 11.7 38.1 42.3 9.1 7.4 18.7 22.8 41.0 52.8 0.0 -4.9 113 Austria 3.3 2.5 10.2 9.2 10.1 12.9 53.8 48.2 11.2 9.9 11.4 17.3 29.6 39.1 -0.2 -4.4 114 France . 6.7 . 6.8 . 15.2 . . 46.4 . 5.4 . 19.5 32.3 43.0 0.7 -2.2 115 tUnited Arab Emiratesb 24.4 43.9 16.5 15.0 4.3 6.9 6.1 3.6 18.3 4.3 30.5 26.3 3.8 13.0 0.3 -0.6 116 Canada 7.6 7.3 3.5 2.9 7.6 5.5 35.3 37.0 19.5 10.8 26.5 36.5 20.2 23.4 -1.3 -2.9 117 United States 32.2 22.6 3.2 1.7 8.6 13.5 35.3 28.2 10.6 10.2 10.1 23.8 19.0 24.0 -1.5 -4.0 118 Denmark 7.3 5.4 16.0 9.3 10.0 1.1 41.6 38.8 11.3 7.3 13.7 38.1 32.6 41.2 2.7 -0.4 119 GcrmanyC 12.4 8.3 1.5 0.6 17.5 19.3 46.9 48.2 11.3 8.0 10.4 15.5 24.2 29.4 0.7 -1.3 120 Norway 9.7 8.0 9.9 9.4 12.3 10.4 39.9 39.2 20.2 17.5 8.0 15.4 35.0 46.3 -1.5 0.7 121 Sweden 12.5 6.3 14.8 8.7 3.6 0.9 44.3 55.9 10.6 7.6 14.3 20.5 27.7 42.3 -1.2 3.2 122 Japanb - - - 12.7 16.7 -1.9 -2.9 123 Finland 6.1 4.6 15.3 14.4 10.6 10.8 28.4 35.1 27.9 20.8 11.6 14.3 24.3 31.1 1.2 0.1 124 Switzerland 15.1 . 4.2 . 10.0 - - 39.5 - 18.4 . - 12.8 - 13.3 . . 0.9 125 tKuwait 8.4 /9.9 15.0 14.0 5.5 7.4 14.2 20.5 16.6 14.5 40.1 23.7 34.4 31.0 17.4 -7.2 World Fuel exporters, excl. former USSR a. See the technical notes. b. Data are for budgetary accounts only. c. Data refer to the Federal Republic of Germany before unification. 239 Table 12. Central government current revenue Percentage of total current revenue Tax revenue Taxes on Taxes on Total current income, Domestic taxes international revenue as a profit, and Social security on goods and trade and percentage of capita/gains contributions services transactions Other taxesa Nontax revenue GNP 1972 1990 1972 1990 1972 1990 1972 1990 1972 1990 1972 1990 1972 1990 Low-income economies China and India Other low-income I Mozambique 2 Tanzania 29.9 0.0 . . 29.1 21.7 0: 18:8 15.8 3 Ethiopia 23.0 0.0 . 29.8 30.4 5.6 11.1 10.5 4 Somaliab 10.7 . 0.0 .. 24.7 45.3 5.2 14.0 13.7 5 Nepal 4.1 10.8 0.0 0.0 26.5 35.7 36.7 31.0 19.0 5.3 13.7 17.2 5.2 10.0 6 Chad 16.7 . 0.0 .. 12.3 . . 45.2 .. 20.5 . . 5.3 10.8 7 Bhutan .. 7.9 .. 0.0 ,, 17.6 0.4 .. 0.6 73.6 .. 21.0 8 LaoPDR .. ,. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. 9 Malawi 31.4 35.0 0.0 0.0 24.2 33.2 20.0 17.7 0.5 1.2 23.8 12.9 16.0 23.7 10 Bangladeshb 3.7 8.6 0.0 0.0 22.4 25.8 18.0 27.3 3.8 15.2 52.2 23.0 8.4 11.4 11 Burundi 18.1 . . 1.2 .. 18.3 .. 40.3 .. 15.6 . . 6.5 . . 11.5 12 Zaire 22.5 28.9 2.3 1.4 12.1 16.5 57.8 47.3 1.6 0.8 3.6 5.2 10.2 12.0 13 Uganda 22.1 5.5 0.0 0.0 32.8 19.1 36.3 75.3 0.3 0.0 8.5 0.0 13.7 5.3 14 Madagascar 13.1 . . 7.2 . . 29.9 . . 33.6 . . 5.5 . . 10.8 . . 14.7 15 SierraLeoneb 32.7 26.3 0.0 0.0 14.6 25.7 42.4 44.6 0.3 0.3 9.9 3.1 19.5 8.8 16 Mali .. 10.8 .. 4.4 .. 28.6 .. 12.0 .. 30.8 .. 13.5 .. 18.9 17 Nigeriab 43.0 .. 0.0 26.3 .. 17.5 .. 0.2 13.0 .. 10.3 18 Niger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Rwanda 17.9 4.4 14.1 . . 41.7 13.8 .. 8.1 9.8 20 BurkinaFaso 16.8 .. 0.0 .. 18.0 . . 51.8 3.2 10.2 8.6 21 India 21.3 15.4 0.0 0.0 44.5 35.5 20.1 28.8 0.9 0.4 13.2 19.9 10.2 14.8 22 Benin . . . . . . . 23 China 24 Haiti .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 25 Kenyab 35.6 27.4 0.0 0.0 19.9 42.8 24.3 15.8 1.4 1.2 18.8 12.8 18.0 22.6 26 Pakistan 13.6 10.0 0.0 0.0 35.9 32.2 34.2 30.6 0.5 0.2 15.8 26.9 12.5 19.0 27 Ghanab 18.4 28.7 0.0 0.0 29.4 28.3 40.6 35.2 0.2 0.1 11.5 7.8 15.1 13.9 28 Central African Rep. .. 23.9 0.0 .. I3.1 .. 45.2 .. 11.4 . . 6.4 .. 13.3 29 Togo .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 30 Zambiab 49.7 38.1 0.0 0.0 20.2 37.0 14.3 15.8 0.1 4.9 15.6 4.2 23.2 /1.9 31 Guinea . , . . . . . . . . 17.1 . . 74.4 . . 2.4 . . 6.1 . . 14.6 32 Sri Lanka 19.1 10.8 0.0 0.0 34.7 46.4 35.4 28.6 2.1 4.6 8.7 9.5 20.1 21.1 33 Mauritania . . 32.3 . . 0.0 . . 19.4 . . 36.8 . . 1.4 . . 10.1 . . 21.8 34 Lesotho 14.3 12,4 0.0 0.0 2.0 22.8 62.9 54.5 9.5 0.2 11.3 10.2 11.7 21.2 35 Indonesia 45.5 57.5 0.0 0.0 22.8 25.1 17.6 6.0 3,5 3.0 10.6 8.3 13.4 18.3 36 Honduras 19.2 .. 3.0 .. 33.8 .. 28.2 .. 2.3 .. 13.5 .. 13.2 37 Egypt, Arab Rep. 15.9 .. 14.2 .. 11.9 .. 14.0 .. 8.2 .. 35.8 .. 35.9 38 Afghanistan 39 Cambodia 40 Liberia 40.4 33.9 0.0 0.0 20.3 25.1 31.6 34.6 3.1 2.3 4.6 4.2 17.0 17.8 41 Myanmar 28.7 9.0 0.0 0.0 34.2 30.7 13.4 14.9 0.0 0.0 23.8 45.5 42 Sudan' 11.8 0.0 30.4 40.5 1.5 15.7 . . 18.0 43 VietNam Middle-income economies Lower-middle-income 44 Bolivia . . 4.9 8.8 . . 31.6 . . 7.3 2.9 . . 44.5 . . 15.7 45 Zimbabwe . . 44.9 . . 0.0 . . 26.3 . . 17.5 . . 1.1 . . 10.1 . . 35.6 46 Senegal 17.5 . . 0.0 . . 24.5 . . 30.9 . . 23.9 . . 3.2 . . 16.9 47 Philippinesb 13.8 28.3 0.0 0.0 24.3 30.7 23.0 25.1 29.7 2.9 9.3 12.9 13.1 16.3 48 Côte d'Ivoirc . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 49 DominicanRep. 17.9 20.9 3.9 4.1 19.0 19.8 40.4 41.1 1.7 4.7 17.0 9.4 17.2 15.1 50 PapuaNewGuineab . 44.6 . . 0.0 .. 10.5 .. 24.9 . . 1.8 .. 18.1 .. 23.2 51 Guatemala 12.7 18.1 0.0 0.0 36.1 23.2 26.2 33.8 15.6 7.2 9.4 17.7 8.9 9.8 52 Morocco 16.4 .. 5.9 ,, 45.7 ,. 13.2 .. 6,1 .. 12.6 .. 18.5 53 Cameroon . . 45.2 . . 6.4 .. 20.2 . . 14.0 . . 9.1 .. 5.1 . . 17.7 54 Ecuador' 19.6 56.9 0.0 0.0 19.1 21.5 52.4 14.3 5.1 5.5 3.8 1.7 /3.6 17.7 55 SyrianArabRep. 6.8 29.5 0.0 0.0 10.4 4.1 17.3 6.8 12.1 33.6 53.4 26.0 25.3 25.5 56 Congo 19.4 . . 0.0 . . 40.3 . . 26.5 . . 6.3 . . 7.5 . . 18.4 57 El Salvadorb 14.7 18.8 0.0 0.0 24.9 38.4 35.0 18.5 19.6 21.5 5.8 2.8 12.0 9.9 58 Paraguay 8.8 9.3 10.4 0.0 26.1 19.5 24.8 20.1 17.0 24.8 12.9 26.2 11.5 12,2 59 Perub 16.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 34.0 44.2 14.0 26.3 26.0 16.8 10.0 2.6 14.6 5.0 60 Jordan 9.4 10.0 0.0 2.0 15.6 20.7 36.2 29.7 3.1 8.4 35.6 29.2 . . 22.3 61 Colombia 37.1 27.8 13.7 12.6 15.2 27.7 19.8 17.8 7.1 6.7 7.1 7.4 10.6 13.4 62 Thailand 12.1 24.2 0.0 0.1 46.3 41.4 28.7 22.1 1.8 4.3 11.2 7.9 12.5 19.9 63 Tunisia 15.9 12.9 7.1 11.1 31.6 20.1 21.8 27.9 7.8 5.1 15.7 22.8 23.6 31.8 64 Jamaica 65 Turkey 30.8 43.3 0.0 0.0 31.0 32.1 14.6 6.2 6:1 3.0 17.5 15.4 20.6 19.3 66 Romania 18.9 . . 22.9 . . 32.6 . . 0.5 14.9 10.2 34.8 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 240 Percentage of total current revenue Tax revenue Taxes on Taxes on Total current income, Domestic taxes international revenue as a profit, and Social securux on goods and trade and percentage of capital gains contributions services trantactions Other taxesa Nontax revenue GNP /972 1990 /972 /990 /972 /990 1972 1990 1972 1990 1972 /990 1972 /990 67 Poland 30.4 .. 21.4 .. 30.4 .. 6.2 . . 6.5 . 5.1 . . 38.7 68 Panama 23.3 14.7 22.4 27.3 /3.3 17.9 16.0 8.3 7.7 3.5 17.3 28.2 21.8 24.5 69 CostaRica 18.0 9.8 13.9 28.8 37.7 27.4 18.9 23.0 1.6 -3.5 9.8 14.4 15.3 24.3 70 Chile 14.3 23.3 28.6 6.0 28.6 37.1 14.3 9.8 0.0 -0.2 14.3 24.1 30.2 31.1 71 Botswanab 20.1 38.6 0.0 0.0 1.4 1.5 47.7 13.2 0.4 0.1 30.3 46.6 30.4 60.9 72 Algeria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 73 Bulgaria .. 36.4 .. 12.7 .. 15.1 .. 6.1 .. 0.7 .. 29.0 . . 78.5 74 Mauritius 22.7 13.9 0.0 4,1 23.3 20.9 40.2 46.4 5.5 6.1 8.2 8.7 15.6 24.2 75 Malaysia 25.2 30.5 0.1 0.8 24.2 24.3 27.9 16.7 1.4 2.5 21.2 25.2 20.3 28.9 76 Argentina .. 4.3 .. 43.4 .. 22.4 . . 11.4 .. 10.3 .. 8.2 . . 13.3 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. 7.9 12.6 2.7 10.9 6.4 5.0 14.6 10.5 4.9 6.6 63.6 54.4 26.2 12.9 78 Albania . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 79 Angola . . . . . 0 . . . 80 Lebanon .. .. .. 81 Mongolia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Namibia . . 42.7 . . 0.0 . . 28.5 . . 16.4 . . 1.1 . . 11.3 . . 43.6 83 Nicaragua 9.5 .. 14.0 37.3 .. 24.4 .. 9.0 .. 5.8 .. 12.8 84 Yemen, Rep. . . . . . . .. . . . . . Upper-middle-income 85 Mexico 37.3 36.5 18.6 13.6 32.2 56.0 13.6 4.6 -8.5 -18.3 6.8 7.7 10.1 14.9 86 SouthAfrica 54.8 48.6 1.2 1.7 21.5 34.1 4.6 4.9 5.0 2.8 12.8 7.9 22.1 30.9 87 Venezuela 54.2 57.5 6.0 2.7 6.7 3.8 6.1 7.2 I.! 5.6 25.9 23.2 18.5 21.9 88 Uruguay 4.7 6.7 30.0 27.0 24.5 35.9 6.1 9.8 22.0 15.5 12.6 5.1 24.3 28.0 89 Brazil .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 90 Hungaly . . 17.9 . . 29.2 . . 31.3 . . 5.8 . . 0.2 . . 15.5 . . 55.6 91 Yugoslavia .. .. 60.0 . . 20.0 66.4 20.0 31.3 .. . . .. 2.3 18.7 5.5 92 Czechoslovakia . . 21.7 . . 0.0 . . 34.2 . . 6.0 . . 21.3 . . 16.8 . . 54.5 93 Gabo&' 18.2 .. 6.0 .. 9.5 .. 44.9 . . 4.2 .. 17.2 .. 26.1 94 Trinidad and Tobago .. .. .. .. .. .. 95 Portugal .. 23.8 .. 25.9 .. 36.9 .. 2.5 . . 3.2 . . 7.7 . . 36.6 96 Korea, Rep. 29.0 34.0 0.7 4.9 41.7 33.5 10.7 10.6 5.3 5.7 12.6 11.4 13.1 15.7 97 Greece 12.2 . . 24.5 . . 35,5 . . 6.7 . . 12.0 9.2 25.4 98 Saudi Arabia . . . . . . .. . . ,. . 99 Iraq .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 100 Libya .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 101 Oman 71.1 23.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 3.0 2.1 2.3 0.5 23.6 73.3 47.4 38.2 Low- and middle-income Sub-Saharan Africa East Asia & Pacific South Asia Europe Middle East & N.Africa Latin America & Caribbean Other economies Severely indebted High-income economies OECD members tOther 102 Ireland 28.3 38.0 9.0 13.6 32.1 31.0 16.7 7.7 3.2 3.2 10.6 6.6 30.3 47.1 103 tlsrael 40.0 35.9 0.0 8.9 20.0 33.1 20.0 1.7 10.0 3.9 10.0 16.5 31.3 40.3 104 Spain 15.9 28.4 38.9 37.9 23.4 24.1 10.0 2.5 0.7 1.1 11.1 6.0 19.5 30.3 105 tSingapore 24.4 24.3 0.0 0.0 17.6 19.6 11.1 2.5 15.5 14.9 31.4 38.8 21.5 27.9 106 tHong Kong .. . . . . .. .. . . .. . . . . .. .. 107 NewZealandb 61.4 53.1 0.0 0.0 19.9 27.1 4.1 2.1 4.5 3.1 10.0 14.6 28.0 45.6 108 Belgium 31.3 35.2 32.4 34.9 28.9 23.7 1.0 0.0 3.3 3.1 3.1 3.0 35.6 43.3 109 UnitedKingdom 39.4 40.3 15.6 17.1 27.1 30.8 1.7 0.1 5.4 2.1 10.8 9.6 32.8 35.5 110 Italy 16.6 36.6 39.2 29.0 31.7 29.1 0.4 0.0 4.3 2.2 7.7 3.1 24.9 39.0 Ill Australia 58.3 65.1 0.0 0.0 21.9 21.1 5.2 4.1 2.1 0.4 12.5 9.3 20.5 27.2 112 Netherlands 32.5 30.7 36.7 35.6 22.3 22.3 0.5 0.0 3.4 2.8 4.7 8.6 43.4 47.5 113 Austria 20.7 19.0 30.0 36.7 28.3 25.5 5,4 1.5 10.2 8.7 5.5 8.6 29.7 35.2 114 France 16.8 17.3 37.0 43.9 37.9 28.3 0.3 0.0 3.0 3.3 4.9 7.2 33.4 40.8 115 tUnitedArabEmiratesb 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 0.0 39.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 .57.2 0.2 1.3 116 Canada 54.0 53.7 8.8 14.2 15.9 19.6 11.0 3.5 -0.6 0.0 10.9 9.0 21.3 20.5 117 United States 59.4 51.6 23.6 34.6 7.1 3.2 1.6 1.6 2.5 1.1 5.7 7.9 17.6 20.0 118 Denmark 40.0 38.0 5.1 3.2 42.1 41.2 3.1 0.1 2.8 3.3 6.8 14.2 35.5 40.1 119 Gerrnanye 19.7 16.4 46.6 53.4 28.1 23.8 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.2 4.0 6.2 25.3 28.7 120 Norway 22.6 16.6 20.6 24.2 48.0 34.4 1.6 0.5 1.0 1.4 6.2 23.0 36.8 47.3 121 Sweden 27.0 18.1 21.6 30.5 34.0 28.9 1.5 0.5 4.7 8.9 11.3 13.2 32.2 45.3 122 Japanb 64.8 71.2 0.0 0.0 22.6 12.0 3.5 1.3 6.8 9.9 2.4 5.6 11.2 13.9 123 Finland 30.0 30.2 7.8 9.1 47.7 45.8 3.1 1.0 5.8 4.7 5.5 9.1 26.5 31.3 124 Switzerland 13.9 . . 37.3 . . 21.5 . . 16.7 . . 2.6 . . 8.0 . . 14.5 125 tKuwait 68.8 0.7 0.0 0.0 19.7 0.0 1.5 2.9 0.2 0.1 9.9 96.2 55.2 23.6 World Fuel exporters, cxci. former USSR a. See the technical notes. b. Data are for budgetary accounts only. c. Data refer to the Federal Republic of Germany before unification. 241 Table 13. Money and interest rates Monetary holdings, broadly defined Average Nominal interest rates of banks Average annaal annaal (average annual percentage) nominal growth Average oatstanding inflation rate (percent) as a percentage of GDP Deposit rate Lending rate (GDP deflator) 1965-80 /980-90 1965 1980 1990 1980-90 1980 1990 1980 1990 Low-income economies China and India Other low-income I Mozambique 36.5 2 Tanzania 19.7 21.5 37.2 25.7 4.0 17.0 11.5 31.0 3 Ethiopia 12.7 12.2 12.5 25.3 52.5 2.1 2.4 6.0 4 Somalia 20.4 50.0 12.7 17.8 49.7 4.5 25.0 5 Nepal 17.9 19.7 8.4 21.9 34.9 9.1 4.0 8.5 14.0 14.4 6 Chad 12.5 10.3 9.3 20.0 23.3 1.2 5.5 4.3 11.0 11.5 7 Bhutan 33.9 20.7 8.4 6.5 15.0 8 LaoPDR 7.2 14.0 4.8 15.0 9 Malawi 15.4 15;.] 17.6 20.5 14.7 7.9 12.1 16.7 21.0 10 Bangladesh 21.6 16.7 28.3 9.6 8.3 12.0 11.3 16.0 II Burandi 15.8 9.9 10.1 13.5 17.8 4.2 2.5 12.0 12 Zaire 28.2 69.1 8.6 6.4 10.7 60.9 13 Uganda 23.2 12.7 7.8 107.0 6.8 10.8 38.7 14 Madagascar 12.2 17.5 15.8 22.3 2/.4 17.1 5.6 9.5 IS Sierra Leone 15.9 55.6 11.7 20.6 16.1 56.2 9.2 40.5 11.0 52.5 16 Mali 14.4 9.4 17.9 20.8 3.0 6.2 7.0 9.4 8.8 17 Nigeria 28.5 14.1 10.7 23.8 17.6 18.2 5.3 /3.1 8.4 35.0 18 Niger 18.3 6.1 3.8 13.3 19.9 3.3 6.2 7.0 9.4 8.8 19 Rwanda 19.0 9.0 15.8 13.6 17.6 3.8 6.3 6.9 13.5 13.2 20 Burkina Faso 17.1 11.7 6.9 13.8 17.8 4.6 6.2 7.0 9.4 8.8 21 India 15.3 16.7 23.7 36.2 44.7 7.9 16.5 16.5 22 Benin 17.3 4.8 8.6 17.2 23.0 1.9 6.2 7.0 9.4 8.8 23 China 25.4 33.6 74.7 5.8 5.4 5.0 /1.2 24 Haiti 20.3 8.6 26.1 7.2 10.0 25 Kenya 18.6 14.9 36.8 38.3 9.2 5.8 13.7 10.6 18.8 26 Pakistan 14.7 13.3 40.7 38.7 36.8 6.7 27 Ghana 25.9 44.8 20.3 16.2 12.5 42.7 11.5 19.0 28 Central African Rep. 12.7 5.2 13.5 18.9 17.8 5.5 5.5 10.5 12.5 29 Togo 20.3 6.5 10.9 29.0 34.6 4.8 6.2 7.0 9.4 8.8 30 Zambia 12.7 32.6 42.3 7.0 11.4 9.5 18.4 31 Guinea 32 Sn Lanka I 5.4 15.1 32.3 35.3 32.6 11.0 14.5 19.4 19.0 13.0 33 Mauritania 20.7 11.4 5.7 20.5 24.4 8.8 34 Lesotho 17.8 39.8 13.0 13.0 11.0 20.4 35 Indonesia 544 25.8 13.2 36.2 8.4 6.0 17.3 . . 20.6 36 Honduras 14.8 12.5 15.4 22.8 33.1 5.4 7.0 8.6 18.5 /5.8 37 Egypt, Arab Rep. 17.7 21.9 35.3 52.2 93.2 11.9 8.3 12.0 13.3 19.0 38 Afghanistan 14.0 14.4 26.8 . . 9.0 . . 13.0 39 Cambodia 40 Liberia 10.3 6.8 18.4 13.8 4! Myanmar 11.5 11.2 1.5 1.5 8.0 8.0 42 Sudan 21.6 28.0 14.1 32.5 6.0 43 VietNam Middle-income economies Lower-middle-income 44 Bolivia 24.3 444.2 10.9 16.2 21.7 318.4 18.0 28.0 45 Zimbabwe 54.0 10.8 3.5 8.8 17.5 11.7 46 Senegal 15.6 6.4 15.3 26.6 22.6 6.6 6.2 7.0 9.4 8.8 47 Philippines 17.7 16. 1 19.9 11.0 21.1 14.9 12.3 19.5 14.0 24.1 48 Cole d'Ivoire 20.4 4.6 21.8 25.8 31.7 2.7 6.2 7.0 9.4 8.8 49 Dominican Rep. 18.5 26.9 18.0 21.8 22.0 21.8 50 Papua New Guinea 8.0 32.9 34.0 5.3 6.9 8.7 11.2 15.5 51 Guatemala 16.3 15.7 15.2 20.5 19.1 14.6 9.0 18.2 11.0 23.3 52 Morocco 15.7 14.5 29.4 42.4 7.2 4.9 8.5 7.0 9.0 53 Cameroon 19.0 7.9 11.7 18.3 22.7 5.6 7.5 7.5 13.0 14.0 54 Ecuador 22.6 35.5 15.6 20.2 13.4 36.7 43.6 9.0 37.5 55 Syrian Arab Rep. 21.9 19.4 24.6 40.9 14.7 56 Congo 14.2 7.3 16.5 14.7 19.8 0.7 6.5 8.0 11.0 12 57 El Salvador 14.3 16.9 21.6 28.1 25.8 17.2 18.0 21.2 58 Paraguay 21.3 20.0 12.1 19.8 24.4 59 Peni 25.9 157.0 18.8 16.5 233.7 60 Jordan 19.1 12.9 129.8 61 Colombia 26.5 19.8 23.7 24.8 27.7 19.0 28.2 62 Thailand 17.9 18.8 23.6 37.4 71.5 3.3 12.0 12.3 18.0 15.0 63 Tunisia 17.4 15.5 30.2 42.1 7.4 2.5 7.4 7.3 9.9 64 Jamaica 17.2 24.1 24.3 35.4 50.2 18.3 10.3 26.0 13.0 34.2 65 Turkey 27.5 51.9 23.0 17.2 21.3 43.2 8.0 47.6 25.7 66 Romania 33.4 1.8 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 242 Monelars' holdings, broadly defined Average Nominal interest rates of banks Average annual annual (aye rage annual percentage) nominal growth Average oulstanding inflation rate (percent) as a percentage of GDP Deposit rate lending rate (GDP deflator) 1965-80 /980-90 1965 /980 1990 1980-90 1980 1990 1980 1990 67 Poland 51.5 58.4 22.4 54.3 3.0 27.8 8.0 101.4 68 Panama 2.4 69 Costa Rica 24.6 25.6 19.3 38.8 38.1 23.5 21.2 32.6 70 Chile 30.3 16.3 21.0 20.5 40.3 47.1 48.8 71 Botswana 25.9 . . 30.7 32.0 12.1 5.0 6.1 8.5 7.9 72 Algeria 22.3 14.3 . . 58.5 82.2 6.6 73 Bulgaria 2.3 1.6 5.1 74 Mauritius 21.8 21.9 27.3 41.1 61.4 8.8 12.6 18.0 75 Malaysia 21.5 /2.6 26.3 69.8 1.6 5.9 7.2 76 Argentina 86.6 368.5 18.1 22.2 7.6 395.1 79.4 1,586.0 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. 28.4 16.7 21.6 54.5 13.8 78 Albania 79 Angola 80 Lebanon 16.2 72.7 83.4 176.1 16.9 39.9 81 Mongolia -1.3 82 Namibia 13.2 83 Nicaragua 15.0 IS.' 22.1 432.0 84 Yemen,Rep. th. 9.3 Upper-middle-income 85 Mexico 21.9 62.4 25.1 27.5 20.4 70.4 20.6 31.2 28.1 86 South Africa 14.0 16.6 58.8 50.9 56.2 14.4 5.5 18.9 9.5 21.0 87 Venezuela 22.9 17.8 17.4 43.0 33.8 19.3 . . 27.8 . . 28.2 88 Uruguay 65.8 65.9 26.8 32.1 45.7 61.4 50.3 97.8 66.6 174.5 89 Brazil -22.0 . . 20.6 18.4 284.4 115.0 9,387.5 . 90 Hungary . . . . . 9.0 3.0 23.0 9.0 28.0 91 Yugoslavia 25.7 119.0 43.6 59.1 29.7 122.8 5.9 5,644.8 11.5 4,353.8 92 Czechoslovakia . . 6. I . 69.2 1.9 2.7 2.8 . 93 Gabon 25.2 5.3 16.2 15.2 22.0 -1.7 7.5 8.8 12.5 12.5 94 TrinidadandTobago 23.1 . . 21.3 32.0 6.3 . . 6.0 10.0 12.9 95 Portugal 19.4 15.9 77.7 95.6 71.1 18.2 19.0 13.6 18.8 21.7 96 Korea, Rep. 35.5 21.0 11.1 31.7 53.2 5.1 19.5 10.0 18.0 10.0 97 Greece 21.4 27.5 35.0 61.6 18.0 14.5 19.5 21.3 27.6 98 Saudi Arabia 32.1 8.4 16.4 18.6 -5.2 99 Iraq 19.7 100 Libya 29.2 2.3 14.2 34.7 75.8 0.2 5.1 7.0 101 Oman 11.6 . . 13.8 8.3 9.7 Low- and middle-income Sub-Saharan Africa East Asia & Pacific South Asia Europe Middle East & N.Africa Latin America & Caribbean Other economies Severely indebted High-income economies OECD members tOther 102 Ireland 16.1 6.5 58.1 44.8 6.5 12.0 6.3 16.0 11.3 103 (Israel 52.7 101.8 15.3 56.4 63.6 101.4 14.1 176.9 31.6 104 Spain 19.7 10.4 58.5 74.4 65.0 9.2 13.1 10.7 16.9 16.0 105 tSingapore 17.6 13.3 58.4 74.4 121.9 1.7 9.4 4.7 11.7 7.4 106 tHong Kong 69.3 7.2 107 New Zealand 12.8 54.8 51.2 10.5 10.9 12.6 14.4 108 Belgium 10.4 7.1 59.2 57.0 4.4 7.7 6.1 13.0 109 United Kingdom 13.8 48.4 46.0 5.8 14.1 6.2 16.2 14.8 110 Italy 17.9 12.0 68.8 81.9 77.0 9.9 12.7 6.8 19.0 14.1 111 Australia 15.9 12.8 48.9 57.9 73.5 7.4 8.6 13.7 10.6 20,3 112 Netherlands 14.7 . . 54.5 79.0 1.9 6.0 3.3 13.5 11.8 113 Austria 13.3 7.3 49.0 72.6 86.1 3.6 5.0 3.4 114 France 15.0 9.9 53.7 69.7 6.1 6.3 6.7 18.7 16.0 115 (United Arab Emirates . . 11.1 . . 19.0 1.1 9.5 12.1 116 Canada 15.3 8.6 40.5 65.0 72.5 4.4 12.9 12.8 14.3 14.1 117 United States 9.2 8.4 63.8 58.8 66.6 3.7 15.3 10.0 118 Denmark 11.5 12.0 45.8 42.6 58.2 5.6 10.8 8.3 17.2 13.4 119 Germanya 10.1 6.1 46.1 60.7 66.6 2.7 8.0 7.1 12.0 11.6 120 Norway 12.8 10.8 51.9 52.9 63.6 5.5 5.0 9.7 12.6 14.2 121 Sweden 10.7 9.8 46.5 46.5 47.4 7.4 11.3 9.9 15.1 17.2 122 Japan 17.2 9.0 106.7 134.0 183.1 1.5 5.5 4.1 8.4 7.0 123 Finland 14.7 13.8 39.1 39.5 52.7 6.8 7.5 9.8 11.6 124 Switzerland 7.1 7.3 101.1 107.4 117.4 3.7 8.3 7.4 125 tKu wait 17.8 5.1 28.1 33.1 -2.9 4 4.5 6.8 6.8 World Fuel exporters, excl. former USSR a. Data refer to the Federal Republic of Germany before unification. 243 Table 14. Growth of merchandise trade Merchandise trade Average annual growth ratea (percent) (millions of dollars) Terms of trade Exports Imports (1987 = 100) Exports imports 1990 1990 1965-80 1980-90 1965-80 1980-90 1985 1990 Low-income economies 141,176 144,431 I 5.1 w 5.4 w 4.8 w 2.8 w 107 m 100 m China and India 80,059 I 77,037 4.1 w 9.8 w 4.4 w 8.0 w 103 m 103 m Other low-income 61,117 67,394 5.8 w 1.5w 5.0 w -1.9 w 107 m 100 m I Mozambique . . . . . . . . . 2 Tanzania 300 935 -4.2 -7.4 1.6 -0.5 101 108 3 Ethiopia 297 1,081 -0.5 -0.3 -0.9 4.2 117 84 4 Somalia 130 360 4.4 -3.3 4.4 4.3 107 /11 5 Nepal 162 543 . . . 98 6 Chad 200 450 . 0 . 7 Bhutan . . . 8 LaoPDR . . .. . .. . 9 Malawi 412 576 5.1 4.3 3.3 0.7 104 93 10 Bangladesh 1,674 3,646 7.6 8.0 109 95 11 Burundi 75 235 3.3 -1.9 -0.2 5.0 133 70 12 Zaire 999 888 4.7 -11.2 -2.9 -4.0 III 163 13 Uganda 151 458 -3.4 -1.9 -5.3 3.2 143 88 14 Madagascar 335 480 0.6 -1.5 -0.4 -0.4 98 102 IS Sierra Leone 138 146 -2.4 -1.4 -4.6 -2.3 106 80 16 Mali 347 640 9.5 9.9 4.4 6.7 95 97 17 Nigeria 13,671 5,688 11.1 -1.6 14.6 -15.1 167 100 18 Niger 435 230 12.8 4.3 6.6 -8.8 126 77 19 Rwanda 112 279 7.9 0.1 5.1 11.4 116 98 20 BurkinaFaso 160 480 3.6 10.1 5.7 1.0 108 100 21 India 17,967 23,692 3.0 6.5 1.2 4.2 96 96 22 Benin 93 483 . . . . . . . . . 23 China* 62,091 53,345 4.8 11.0 7.4 9.8 109 III 24 Haiti 138 272 4.2 -12.4 6.5 -6.2 89 97 25 Kenya 1,033 2,124 3.9 1.0 2.4 1.6 114 103 26 Pakistan 5,590 7,377 -1.8 9.0 0.4 4.0 90 95 27 Ghana 739 1,199 -2.6 3.8 -1.4 -0.1 106 75 28 Central African Rep. 130 170 -1.3 -1.3 -4.8 6.1 107 109 29 Togo 300 700 5.6 2.4 8.5 1.4 118 114 30 Zambia . . . . . . . 31 Guinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Sri Lanka 1,984 2,689 0.2 6.8 -1.2 2.1 103 90 33 Mauritania 468 248 4.0 3.8 6.3 -5.1 113 107 34 Lesothob . . . . . . . . . 35 Indonesia 25,553 21,837 9.6 2.8 13.0 1.4 134 III 36 Honduras 916 1,028 3.! 2.4 2.5 -0.7 III 104 37 Egypt, ArabRep. 2,985 10,340 -0.! 2.1 3.6 -1.7 131 76 38 Afghanistan . 39 Cambodia . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Liberia 500 450 4.4 -2.7 1.5 97 III 41 Myanmar 322 270 -2.1 -10.1 -4.4 -14.5 106 127 42 Sudan 400 600 -0.3 -0.9 2.3 -8.3 106 100 43 VietNam . . . . . Middle-income economies 491,128 I 485,897 I 3.9 w 3.8 w 6.1 w 0.9w 110 m 102 m Lower-middle-income 184,340 I 195,680 I 7.2 w 4.7w 2.1w hOrn 99m 44 Bolivia 923 716 2.7 1.4 5.0 -2.4 167 97 45 Zimbabwe . . 1,851 . . . . . . . . 100 46 Senegal 783 1,620 2.5 5.6 4.1 4.6 106 106 47 Philippines 8,681 13,080 4.6 2.5 2.9 2.3 93 93 48 Cole d'Ivoire 2,600 2,100 5.5 2.7 7.6 -1.2 110 80 49 DominicanRep. 734 2,057 0.3 1.3 4.9 3.5 109 98 50 PapuaNewGuinea 1,140 1,288 13.0 6.2 1.6 2.6 111 75 51 Guatemala 1,211 1,626 4.8 -1.7 4.6 -1.4 108 102 52 Morocco 4,263 6,918 3.7 6.1 6.5 2.9 88 86 53 Cameroon 1,200 1,300 4.9 -1.3 5.6 -3.3 139 91 54 Ecuador 2,714 1,862 15.1 4.3 6.4 -3.2 153 109 55 SyrianArabRep. 4,173 2,400 11.4 8.7 8.5 -8.3 125 87 56 Congo 1,130 570 10.3 5.9 0.6 -3.1 145 99 57 El Salvador 550 1,200 1.0 -0.8 2.7 -0.5 126 114 58 Paraguay 959 1,113 6.5 10.7 3.7 1.5 108 110 59 Pens 3,277 3,230 1.6 0.3 -1.4 -4.0 III 78 60 Jordan 1,146 2,663 11.2 10.3 9.7 -0.5 95 112 61 Colombia 6,766 5,590 1.4 10.6 5.3 -2.3 140 92 62 Thailand 23,002 33,129 8.6 13.2 4.1 10.2 91 99 63 Tunisia 3,498 5,471 10.8 4.8 10.4 1.1 lOS 99 64 Jamaica 1,347 1,685 -0.4 0.6 -1.9 I.! 95 88 65 Turkey 12,959 22,300 5.5 9.1 7.7 7.0 82 98 66 Romania . . . * Data for Taiwan, China, are: 67,025 54,696 18.9 12.1 15.1 10.! 103 109 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 244 Merchandise trade Average annual growth ratea (percent) (millions of dollars) Terms of trade Exports Imports Exports Imports (1987 100) /990 1990 1965-80 1980-90 /965-80 1980-90 1985 /990 67 Poland 13,627 9,781 . . 3.0 . . 1.2 94 103 68 Panama 321 1,539 -5.7 -0.3 -1.9 -3.0 130 138 69 CostaRica 1,457 2.026 7.0 3.1 5.7 2.5 111 114 70 Chile 8,579 7,023 8.0 4,8 1.4 0.6 102 131 71 Botswanab 72 Algeria 15,241 10,433 1.8 5.3 13.0 -4.6 174 99 73 Bulgaria . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Mauritius 1,182 1,616 3.1 9.6 5.2 11.2 83 114 75 Malaysia 29,409 29,251 4.6 10.3 2.2 5.6 117 94 76 Argentina 12,353 4,077 4.7 1.4 1.8 -8.4 10 112 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. 15,000 13,000 . . 21.1 . . 8.0 160 72 78 Albania . . . . . . . 79 Angola 3,000 1,200 - . . , . , - 80 Lebanon . . - 81 Mongolia , , , . . , , , . , . . - 82 Namibia' , , . . . , . . - . . - - - 83 Nicaragua 379 750 2.8 -5.3 1.3 -2.8 III 110 84 Yemen, Rep. . . . . . . . , . , . Upper-middle-income 306,789 1 290,217 3.9w 1.9w 7.2w 0.1 w 111 m 105 m 85 Mexico 26,714 28,063 7.7 3.4 5.7 -1.1 133 110 86 SouthAfricab 23,612 18,258 7.8 1.7 -0.1 -3.7 105 93 87 Venezuela 17,220 6,364 -9.5 1.8 8.1 -4.6 174 164 88 Uruguay 1,696 1,415 4.6 3.2 1.2 -1.1 89 104 89 Brazil 31,243 22,459 9.3 4.0 8.2 -0.3 92 123 90 Hungaty 9,588 8,646 . . 5.5 - - 1.3 104 87 91 Yugoslavia 14,365 18,911 5.6 0.1 6.6 0.6 95 121 92 Czechoslovakia 17,950 19,862 . . . . , , - - . - 93 Gabon 2,471 760 8.6 1.4 9.5 -1.8 140 96 94 TrinidadandTobago 2,080 1,262 -5.5 -3.7 -5.8 -12.8 156 ItO 95 Portugal 16,416 25,333 3.4 /1.7 3.7 8.2 85 105 96 Korea,Rcp. 64,837 69,585 27.2 12.8 15.2 10.8 103 108 97 Greece 8,053 19,701 11.9 3.8 5.2 4.3 94 105 98 Saudi Arabia 31,065 24,069 8.8 -9.7 25.9 -10.0 176 95 99 Iraq 16,809 4,314 . . . . . . . . , 100 Libya 14,285 3,976 3.3 1.8 11.7 -10.4 196 97 101 Oman 458 2,608 . . . . , . . , . Low- and middle-income 632,3041 630,3281 4.1 w 4.1 w 5.8 w 1.4 w 109 m 100 m Sub-Saharan Africa 34,056 1 32,3771 6.1 w 0.2 w 5.6 w -4.3 w 110 m 100 m East Asia & Pacific 217,030 1 224,021 t 8.5 w 9.8 w 7.1 w 8.0 w 106 m 103 m South Asia 27,6991 38,217 1 1.8 w 6.8 w 0.6 w 4.1 w 101 m 95 in Europe 94,082 1 126,493 1 . . . . . . . . 94 in 103 m Middle East&N.Africa 112,6441 89,8421 5.7w -1.1 w 12.8w -4.7w 130 in 96 m Latin America & Caribbean 123,181 1 101,119 1 -1.0 w 3.0 w 4.1 w -2.1 w 111 in 110 in Other economies . . . . . . . . . Severely indebted 135,856 I 99,721 I -0.5 w 3.4 w 6.6 w -2.! w 118 m 101 m High-income economies 2,555,661 1 2,725,4191 7.3 w 4.3 w 4.4 w 5.3 w 97 in 100 m OECD members 2,379,089 1 2,501,753 I 7.2 w 4.1 w 4.1 w 5.2 w 94 m 100 m tOther 176,573 1 223,666 1 8.8 w 8.3 w 9.8 w 6.7 w 100 in 100 m 102 Ireland 23,796 20,716 10.0 7.3 4.8 3.6 97 95 103 tlsrael 12,047 15,197 8.9 7.5 6.2 4.7 lOS 103 104 Spain 55,607 87,487 12.4 7.4 4.4 9.0 91 106 105 (Singapore 52,627 60,647 4.7 8.6 7.0 6.7 99 100 106 tHongKong 29,002 82,495 9.1 6.2 8.3 11.0 97 100 107 NewZealand 9,045 9,466 3.8 3.4 1.1 3.6 88 99 108 Belgiumc 118,002 119,725 7.8 4.7 5.2 3.1 94 96 109 UnitedKingdom 185,891 224.914 5.1 2.7 1.4 4.9 103 105 110 Italy 168,523 176,153 7.7 3.5 3.5 4.2 84 97 Ill Australia 35,973 39,740 5.4 3.9 1.0 4.7 III 115 112 Netherlands 131,479 125,909 8.0 4.4 4.4 3.5 101 102 113 Austria 41,876 49,960 8.2 6.2 6.1 5.2 87 92 114 France 209,491 232,525 8.5 3.4 4.3 3.2 96 102 115 tUnited Arab Emirates . . . . 13.3 . . , . . . , 116 Canada 125,056 115,882 5.4 5.9 2.5 8.4 110 109 117 United States 371,466 515,635 6.4 3.3 5.5 7.6 100 100 118 Denmark 34,801 31,562 5.4 5.1 1.7 4.2 93 104 119 Germany' 397,912 341,248 7.2 4.2 5.3 3.9 82 97 120 Norway 34,072 26,889 8.2 7.2 3.0 2.5 130 91 121 Sweden 57,326 54,536 4.9 4.4 .8 3.5 94 101 122 Japan 286,768 231,223 11.4 4.2 4.9 5.6 71 91 123 Finland 26,718 27,098 5.9 3.0 3.1 4.7 85 98 124 Switzerland 63,699 69,427 6.2 3.5 4.5 3.8 86 100 125 (Kuwait 8,300 4,800 18.5 -11.1 11.8 -5.7 175 77 World 3,187,965 1 3,355,7461 6.6 w 4.3 w 4.6 w 4.5 w 106 m 100 m Fuel exporters, excl. former USSR 138,638 1 76,773 1 -1.4 w 2.5 w -7.2 w 12.1 w 170 m 98 in a. See the technical notes. b. Figures are for the South African Customs Union comprising South Africa, Namibia. Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland; trade among the component territories is excluded. c. tncludes Luxembourg. d. Data refer to the Federal Republic of Germany before unificatton. 245 Table 15. Structure of merchandise imports Percentage share of merchandise imports Other Machinery primary and transport Other Food Fuels commodities equipment manufactures /965 /990 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 Low-income economies 17w 12w 5w 9w 8w 8w 33 w 33 w 37 w 38 w China and India 15w 8w 3w 7w 12w 10 w 38 w 34 w 31 w 41 w Other low-income 18 w 15w 5w 11 w 5w 7w 30 w 32 w 42 w 35 w I Mozambique t7 8 7 24 45 2 Tanzania 7 7 9 31 2 2 40 35 42 25 3 Ethiopia 6 17 6 tO 6 3 37 44 44 26 4 Somalia 3! 19 5 14 8 10 24 24 33 33 5 Nepal 9 9 10 26 46 6 Chad 13 14 20 14 4 3 21 29 42 40 7 Bhutan 8 LaoPDR 27 14 6 19 34 9 Malawi 15 7 5 13 3 3 21 29 57 47 10 Bangladesh 30 14 6 17 33 11 Burundi 16 18 6 9 8 7 15 29 55 37 12 Zaire 18 20 7 8 5 5 33 32 37 36 13 Uganda 6 8 2 30 3 2 34 27 55 34 14 Madagascar 19 15 5 22 2 3 25 29 48 31 IS Sierra Leone 17 20 9 20 3 3 29 25 41 32 16 Mali 20 20 6 27 5 3 23 18 47 32 17 Nigeria 9 16 6 1 3 2 34 44 48 37 18 Niger 12 21 6 15 6 6 21 26 55 32 19 Rwanda 12 9 7 16 5 6 28 35 50 35 20 BurkinaFaso 23 23 4 17 14 6 19 24 40 30 21 India 22 8 5 17 14 12 37 18 22 45 22 Benin 18 16 6 5 7 10 17 22 53 47 23 China5 7 8 1 2 10 9 39 41 43 39 24 Haiti 19 23 6 13 4 4 21 20 51 40 25 Kenya 6 10 10 32 4 4 34 25 46 30 26 Pakistan 20 19 3 17 5 8 38 27 34 29 27 Ghana 12 It 4 35 3 2 33 21 48 31 28 CentralAfricanRep. 13 20 7 2 2 4 29 34 49 41 29 logo 14 22 4 6 5 6 32 25 45 41 30 Zambia . . . . . . . . . . 31 Guinea . . . . S . . . . 32 Sri Lanka 41 16 8 IS 4 4 12 22 34 44 33 Mauritania 9 22 4 6 1 1 56 42 30 28 34 LCSOthnd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Indonesia 6 5 3 9 2 9 39 43 50 35 36 Honduras II 13 6 16 I 3 26 25 56 44 37 Egypt,ArabRep. 26 31 7 2 12 10 23 23 31 34 38 Afghanistan 17 4 . . I 8 69 39 Cambodia 6 . . 7 . 2 . . 26 . 58 40 Liberia 17 24 8 20 3 3 33 27 39 27 41 Myanmar 15 9 4 3 5 2 18 40 58 46 42 Sudan 23 18 5 19 4 4 21 22 47 37 43 VietNam . . S . S Middle-income economies 15w 11w lOw 12w 11w Sw 30w 34w 34w 35w Lower-middle-income 17w 11w 9w lOw 8w 8w 28w 34w 37w 37w 44 Bolivia 19 11 1 1 3 3 34 45 42 41 45 Zimbabwe 7 3 0 16 4 5 41 37 47 38 46 Senegal 36 27 6 16 4 5 15 21 38 30 47 Philippines 20 10 0 13 7 7 33 20 30 50 48 Côte d'Ivoire 18 t6 6 22 3 4 28 22 46 36 49 Dominican Rep. 24 12 10 35 4 3 23 23 40 27 50 Papua New Guinea 23 17 4 8 3 2 25 40 45 34 SI Guatemala 11 11 7 13 2 8 29 27 50 42 52 Morocco 36 12 5 15 10 12 18 28 31 33 53 Cameroon 11 15 5 I 4 3 28 31 51 49 54 Ecuador 10 9 9 4 4 7 33 34 44 46 55 Syrian Arab Rep. 22 17 10 18 9 7 16 26 43 32 56 Congo 15 18 6 2 1 2 34 36 44 42 57 ElSalvador 15 14 5 II 4 5 28 26 48 43 58 Paraguay 14 9 14 23 2 5 37 30 33 33 59 Peru 17 38 3 4 5 5 41 22 34 31 60 Jordan 28 19 6 16 6 5 18 23 42 38 61 Colombia 8 7 1 5 10 8 45 36 35 44 62 Thailand 6 5 9 9 6 8 31 41 49 37 63 Tunisia 16 10 6 9 7 9 31 28 41 43 64 Jamaica 21 19 9 14 5 4 23 2! 42 42 65 Turkey 6 7 10 2! 10 11 37 31 37 30 66 Romania S S S S . . S S S * Data for Taiwan, China, are: 13 6 5 9 25 14 29 37 29 34 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 246 Percentage share of merchandise imports Other Machinert prima rt and transport Other Food Fuels commodities equipment manufactures 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 67 Poland 14 12 18 13 II 11 27 33 24 32 68 Panama 11 15 21 17 2 2 21 18 45 48 69 CostaRica 9 8 5 10 2 5 29 28 54 49 70 Chile 20 4 6 12 10 4 35 44 30 36 71 Botswanaa . . . . . . 72 Algeria 27 27 0 2 6 8 15 28 52 35 73 Bulgaria . . . . . . . . . 0 . 74 Mauritius 35 25 5 19 3 5 15 12 42 39 75 Malaysia 25 II 12 5 10 6 22 45 32 33 76 Argentina 6 4 10 9 21 II 25 33 38 44 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. 16 12 0 0 6 5 36 44 42 38 78 Albania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Angola 17 14 2 4 3 4 24 34 54 43 80 Lebanon 28 . . 9 . . 9 . . 17 . . 36 81 Mongolia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Namibiaa . . . . . . . . . 83 Nicaragua 12 12 5 18 2 2 30 27 51 40 84 Yemen,Rep. 55 . . 8 . . 4 12 . . 21 Upper-middle-income 13 w 10 w 11 w 13 w 13 w 9w 32 w 33 w 31 w 34 w 85 Mexico 5 16 2 4 10 7 50 36 33 37 86 South Africaa 5 6 5 I II 5 42 41 37 48 87 Venezuela 12 12 I 3 5 9 44 39 39 37 88 Umguay 7 7 17 18 lb 6 24 30 36 39 89 Brazil 20 9 21 23 9 II 22 27 28 30 90 Hungary 12 7 II 14 22 8 27 35 28 36 91 Yugoslavia 16 12 6 17 19 8 28 26 32 37 92 Czechoslovakia 13 6 10 30 20 II 34 32 23 20 93 Gabon 16 17 5 2 2 2 37 40 40 38 94 Trinidad andTobago 12 19 49 II 2 7 16 23 21 39 95 Portugal 16 II 8 11 19 6 27 37 30 35 96 Korea,Rep. 15 5 7 16 26 15 13 34 38 29 97 Greece 15 15 8 8 II 7 35 31 30 40 98 SaudiArabia 30 15 I 0 5 4 27 39 37 42 99 Iraq 24 IS 0 0 7 4 25 48 44 33 100 Libya 13 16 4 1 3 3 36 37 43 43 101 Oman 1 18 4 4 2 2 17 37 75 39 Low- and middle-income 15w II w 9w Ii w lOw 8w 31 w 34w 35w 36w Sub-Saharan Africa 15 w 16 w 6w 14 w 3w 4w 30 w 30 w 46 w 36 w East Asia & Pacific 13 w 7w 6w 9w 9w 10 w 32 w 38 w 40 w 35 w SouthAsia 25w 13w 4w 16w 11w lOw 34w 20w 27w 41 w Europe 14 w II w 12 w 17 w 17 w 9w 32 w 34 w 28 w 34 w Middle East & N.Africa 24 w 17 w 5w 6w 7w 6w 24 w 33 w 40 w 37 w Latin America & Caribbean 12 w 12 w 13 w 13 w 8w 7w 32 w 31 w 35 w 35 w Other economies Severely indebted 14 w 15 w 9w 11 w 10 w 9w 32 w 31 w 34w 35w High-income economies 19w 9w 10w 11 w 19w 7w 20 w 34w 32 w 39 w OECD members 19 w 9w 11 w II w 20 w 8w 20 w 34 w 31 w 39 w fOther 23 w 7w 15 w 7w 22 w 33 w 42 w 45 w 102 Ireland 18 10 8 6 10 4 25 36 39 43 103 tlsrael 16 7 6 9 12 6 28 27 38 52 104 Spain 19 10 10 12 16 7 27 38 28 33 105 tSingapore 23 5 13 16 19 5 14 42 30 32 106 tHong Kong 25 6 3 2 13 5 13 26 46 60 107 New Zealand 7 7 7 8 10 4 33 41 43 41 108 Belgiumb 14 10 9 8 21 8 24 25 32 49 109 UnitedKingdom 30 10 Il 6 25 7 II 37 23 40 110 Italy 24 12 16 II 24 11 15 31 21 36 Ill Australia 5 5 8 5 10 4 37 42 41 44 112 Netherlands 15 12 10 10 13 6 25 30 37 42 113 Austria 14 5 7 6 13 7 31 38 35 44 114 France 19 9 15 10 18 7 20 34 27 40 115 fUnited Arab Emirates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 Canada 10 6 7 6 9 4 40 50 34 33 117 United States 19 6 10 13 20 5 14 40 36 36 118 Denmark 14 12 II 7 II 6 25 31 39 45 119 Germany5 22 10 8 8 21 8 13 32 35 42 120 Norway 10 6 7 4 12 10 38 36 32 39 121 Sweden 12 6 II 9 12 6 30 38 36 41 122 Japan 22 14 20 25 38 16 9 16 II 30 123 Finland 10 5 10 12 12 7 35 38 34 38 124 Switzerland 16 6 6 5 II 5 24 31 43 53 125 tKuwait 22 18 I 1 7 4 29 46 32 39 World 18 w 9w 10 w 11 w 17 w 8w 23 w 34 w 32 w 39 w Fuel exporters, exci. former USSR 16 w 16 w 6w 2w 5w 5w 31 w 38 w 42 w 39 w a. Figures are for the South African Customs Union comprising South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland; trade among the component temtones is exctuded. b. Includes Luxembourg. c. Data refer to the Federal Republic of Germany before unification. 247 Table 16. Structure of merchandise exports Percentage share of merchandise exports Fuels, Other Machinery minerals, prima n and transport Other Textiles and and metals commodities equipment manufactures clothing a 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 Low-income economies 17 w 27 w 52 w 20 w 3w 9w 28w 45w 17w 21w China and India 13w lOw 29 w 17 w 6w 15 w 52w 58w 31w 26w Other low-income 21 w 48 w 69 w 24 w 1w 1w lOw 28w 6w 15w I Mozambique 14 84 0 2 I 2 Tanzania 1 5 86 84 0 1 13 10 0 3 3 Ethiopia 0 3 100 94 0 0 0 3 0 I 4 Somalia 0 1 86 94 4 0 10 4 0 5 Nepal 0 25 0 74 57 6 Chad 5 9 92 83 0 5 3 3 0 1 7 Bhulan . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Lao PDR 62 . 32 . . 0 . . 6 . . 0 9 Malawi 0 0 99 95 0 0 1 5 0 3 10 Bangladesh . . I . 25 . 1 72 . 60 II Bunindi 0 0 94 98 0 0 6 1 0 0 12 Zaire 72 56 20 37 0 1 8 6 0 0 13 Uganda 13 3 86 97 0 . . I 0 0 0 14 Madagascar 4 8 90 85 I 2 4 6 1 3 15 Sierra Leone 25 38 14 32 0 . 60 31 0 0 16 Mali 1 0 96 98 1 . . 2 2 1 2 17 Nigeria 32 97 65 2 . 0 2 0 0 0 18 Niger 0 81 95 17 1 1 4 2 1 I 19 Rwanda 40 5 60 94 0 0 1 I . 0 20 Burkina Faso I 0 94 89 1 4 4 6 2 2 21 India 10 8 41 19 1 7 47 66 36 23 22 Benin I 4 94 48 2 4 3 44 0 2 23 China* 15 10 20 16 9 17 56 56 29 27 24 Haiti 17 12 57 37 . . 7 26 44 4 II 25 Kenya 13 19 77 70 0 0 10 II 0 1 26 Pakistan 2 1 62 29 1 0 35 70 29 58 27 Ghana 13 35 86 fi4 0 0 1 1 0 0 28 Central African Rep. 1 0 45 74 0 0 54 26 0 29 Togo 33 53 62 38 1 1 4 7 0 0 30 Zambia . . S . . . . . . . . S 31 Guinea . . . S 32 Sri Lanka 0 6 99 47 I 47 0 34 33 Mauritania 94 81 5 13 5 0 1 0 0 34 Lesothob . 35 Indonesia 43 48 53 16 34 0 II 36 Honduras 6 8 90 85 0 0 4 7 I 37 Egypt,ArabRep. 8 41 71 20 0 0 20 39 15 27 38 Afghanistan 0 87 . . 13 12 39 Cambodia 0 . . 99 . . 0 . . 0 . . 0 40 Liberia 72 65 25 34 1 0 3 I 0 . 41 Myanmar 5 4 94 93 0 . . 0 3 0 0 42 Sudan 1 5 99 94 . 0 0 1 0 43 VietNam . S . . . . . . . . . . . Middle-income economies 38 w 32 w 39w 20w 11w 17w 14w 33w 3w 9w Lower-middle-income 30 w 32 w 52w 30w 7w 11w 9w 27w 2w 9w 44 Bolivia 93 69 3 27 0 0 4 5 0 1 45 Zimbabwe 24 . . 47 . . 6 . 23 . . 6 46 Senegal 9 22 88 56 I 2 2 20 I I 47 Philippines II 12 84 26 0 10 6 52 I 7 48 COte d'Ivoire 2 10 93 80 I 2 4 8 1 2 49 Dominican Rep. 10 0 88 76 0 4 2 19 0 0 50 Papua New Guinea 0 61 90 34 . . 4 10 1 . 0 51 Guatemala 0 2 86 74 I 1 13 23 4 4 52 Morocco 40 23 55 30 0 4 5 42 1 20 53 Cameroon 17 29 77 55 3 5 2 11 0 2 54 Ecuador 2 49 96 48 0 0 2 2 1 0 55 Syrian Arab Rep. 1 45 89 17 1 1 9 37 7 25 56 Congo 4 89 45 8 2 1 49 2 0 0 57 ElSalvador 2 4 82 74 1 2 16 21 6 6 58 Paraguay 0 0 92 90 0 0 8 10 0 2 59 Peru 45 55 54 29 0 2 1 14 0 8 60 Jordan 33 45 60 10 2 1 5 44 1 5 61 Colombia 18 32 75 42 0 1 6 24 2 8 62 Thailand II 2 86 34 0 20 3 44 0 16 63 Tunisia 31 19 51 12 0 8 19 61 2 35 64 Jamaica 28 16 41 26 0 I 31 58 4 13 65 Turkey 9 7 89 25 0 7 2 61 I 37 66 Romania . . S S S S S S * Data for Taiwan, China, are: 2 2 57 41 4 36 37 57 15 15 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 248 Percentage share of merchandise exports Fuels, Other Machiners' minerals, primarc and transport Other Textiles and and metals commodittes equipment manufactures clothing a 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 67 Poland 20 18 9 15 36 34 25 34 6 5 68 Panama 35 2 63 78 0 0 2 19 1 7 69 Costa Rica 0 2 84 72 1 3 15 22 2 6 70 Chile 89 57 7 33 1 I 4 9 0 1 71 Botswanab 72 Algeria 57 96 39 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 73 Bulgaria . . . . . . S S . . . . S 74 Mauritius 0 0 100 70 0 0 0 30 0 24 75 Malaysia 34 19 60 37 2 27 4 17 0 5 76 Argentina 1 6 93 59 I 7 5 29 0 3 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. 88 98 8 I 0 0 4 1 4 0 78 Albania . . . . . . . . . 79 Angola 6 82 76 5 1 . 17 12 0 80 Lebanon 14 . . 52 14 . . 19 . 2 81 Mongolia . . . . S . . 82 Namibiab , . . . . . . 83 Nicaragua 4 0 90 94 0 0 6 6 0 1 84 Yemen, Rep, . . . . . . . , . . . Upper-middle-income 44 w 32 w 26 w 13 w 14 w 20 w 18 w 37 w 4w 9w 85 Mexico 22 43 62 13 1 25 15 19 3 2 86 South Africab 24 14 44 12 3 3 29 71 I I 87 Venezuela 97 87 I 2 0 2 2 9 0 1 88 Uruguay 0 0 95 60 0 2 5 37 2 14 89 Brazil 9 16 83 31 2 18 7 35 I 3 90 Hungary 5 9 25 26 32 26 37 40 9 6 91 Yugoslavia 10 9 33 12 24 30 33 49 8 7 92 Czechoslovakia 7 4 6 6 50 54 37 36 6 6 93 Gahon 52 86 37 8 I I 10 5 0 0 94 Trinidad and Tobago 84 68 9 6 0 2 7 25 0 0 95 Portugal 4 6 34 13 3 19 58 61 24 29 96 Korea, Rep. 15 2 25 5 3 37 56 57 27 22 97 Greece 8 14 78 32 2 4 II 50 3 27 98 Saudi Arabia 98 88 I I I 0 I II 0 0 99 Iraq 95 35 4 41 0 0 I 24 0 0 100 Libya 99 100 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 101 Oman 100 14 0 18 . . 41 0 27 . . 6 Low- and middle-income 33w 31 w 42w 20w 9w 15w 17w 35 w 7w 12 a Sub-Saharan Africa 23 w 63 w 70 w 29 w 0w Iw 7w 7w Ow 1w East Asia & Pacific 21 a' 13 w 48 w 18 w 5w 22 w 27 w 47 w 13w 19 a South Asia 6w 6w 57 w 24 w Iw 5w 36 w 65 w 29 w 33 a Europe 10 w 9w 21 w 16 w 33 w 27 w 32 w 47 w 8w 16 w Middle East & N.Africa 74 w 75 w 24 w 12 w 0w 1w 4w 15w 3w 4w Latin America & Caribbean 45 w 38 w 48 w 29 w 1w 11 w 6w 21 w 1w 3w Other economies Severely indebted 39 w 42 w 42 w 22 w 8w 14 w 9w 22 w 2w 4a High-income economies 10 w 8w 21 w 11 w 31 w 42 a' 38 a' 40 w 7w Sw OECD members 9w 7w 21 a' 12 w 31 w 42 w 38 w 39 w 7w 4w tOther 39 w 11 w 24 w 7 a' 5w 36 w 36 w 48 w 16 w 15 w 102 Ireland 3 2 63 24 5 32 29 43 7 4 103 tlsrael 6 2 28 II 2 24 63 62 9 6 104 Spain 9 7 51 17 10 39 29 37 6 4 105 tSingapore 21 19 44 8 10 48 24 25 6 5 106 tHong Kong 1 1 5 3 7 23 87 73 52 39 107 New Zealand 1 10 94 65 0 5 5 20 0 2 108 BclgiumC 13 8 II II 20 27 55 54 12 7 109 United Kingdom 7 II 9 8 42 40 42 41 7 4 110 Italy 8 3 14 7 30 38 47 52 15 13 Ill Australia 13 34 73 29 5 6 10 30 1 1 112 Netherlands 12 12 32 24 21 22 35 41 9 4 113 Austria 8 4 17 8 20 37 55 51 12 8 114 France 8 5 21 18 26 37 45 40 10 5 115 'tUnited Arab Emirates 99 . . I . . 0 . . . . . . . 116 Canada 28 19 35 18 15 37 22 26 1 I 17 United States 8 6 27 16 37 47 28 31 3 2 118 Denmark 2 5 55 31 22 26 21 38 4 4 119 Gcrmunyd 7 4 5 6 46 49 42 41 5 5 120 Norway 21 58 28 9 17 13 34 19 2 1 121 Sweden 9 6 23 9 40 35 44 2 33 2 122 Japan 2 1 7 I 31 66 32 17 60 2 123 Finland 3 5 40 12 12 31 52 2 45 3 124 Switzerland 3 3 7 4 30 32 62 10 60 5 125 tKuwait 98 5 1 7 1 26 58 0 9 0 World 16 a' 12 w 27 w 13 w 25 w 36 w 33 w 39 w 7 a' 6w Fuel exporters, excl. former USSR 85 a' 85 w 14 w 7w 0 a' 1w 2 a' 8w 0w 0w a. Sec the technical notes. b. Figures are for the South African Customs Union compnslng South Afnca, Namibta, Lesotho, Botswana. and Swaztland. trade among the component territories is excluded. c. tncludes Luxembourg. d. Data refer to the Federal Republic of Germany betore uniftcation. 249 Table 17. OECD imports of manufactured goods: origin and composition Value of imports of Composition of 1990 imports of manufactures (percent)a manufactures, by origin Electrical (millions of dollars)a Textiles and machinery and Transport 1990a 1970 clothing Chemicals electronics equipment Others Low-income economies 1,259 59,379 40 w 5w 7w 3w 45 w Chinu and India 777 I 43,249 I 38 w 6w 9w 1w 47 w Other low-income 483 I 16,130 I 46 w 4w 1w 8w 41 w 1 Mozambique 7 16 57 1 5 0 37 2 Tanzania 9 47 60 2 1 2 36 3 Ethiopia 4 74 II 7 2 4 75 4 Somalia 0 2 5 0 17 7 70 5 Nepal 1 214 92 0 1 I 7 6Chad 0 11 1 90 0 0 8 7Bhutan 0 1 8 1 0 0 91 8 La0PDR 0 7 86 0 1 0 13 9 Malawi 1 14 81 0 5 1 14 10 Bangladesh 0 1,212 87 0 0 0 13 11 Bunindi 0 3 36 2 1 3 57 12 Zaire 9 334 0 1 0 1 98 13 Uganda 1 2 7 9 13 30 42 14 Madagascar 7 46 59 11 0 2 28 15 Sierra Leone 2 87 1 0 0 0 99 16 Mali 2 23 3 1 5 23 68 17 Nigeria 13 269 6 16 2 1 76 18 Niger 0 280 0 82 0 0 18 19 Rwanda 0 1 2 14 12 0 72 20 BurkinaFaso 0 7 7 1 8 1 83 21 India 534 9,182 44 5 1 1 49 22 Benin 0 2 12 0 5 0 82 23 China 243 34,068 36 6 11 I 46 24 Haiti 17 373 54 2 13 2 29 25 Kenya 16 Ill 8 2 6 4 80 26 Pakistan 207 2,878 82 1 0 0 17 27 Ghana 8 130 0 1 I 0 98 28 Central African Rep. 12 77 0 0 0 0 100 29Togo 0 11 1 1 2 0 97 30 Zambia 4 41 27 1 0 4 68 31 Guinea 38 119 0 27 1 0 72 32 Sri Lanka 9 1,126 70 1 I 0 28 33 Mauritania 0 9 7 3 2 3 85 34 Lesothob . . . . . 35 Indonesia 15 5,827 36 2 2 1 60 36 Honduras 3 175 71 2 I 2 24 37 Egypt,ArabRep. 33 799 53 5 1 18 24 38 Afghanistan 9 49 93 1 I 0 6 39 Cambodia 1 2 41 0 5 0 55 40 Liberia 20 1,480 0 0 0 73 27 41 Myanmar 4 43 25 3 0 3 68 42 Sudan I Il 7 0 2 3 87 43 VietNam 0 78 77 3 0 0 19 Middle-income economies 5,0061 175,503 1 25 w 7w 17w 7w 44w Lower-middle-income 1,401 I 55,667: 34 w 7w 17w 3w 40w 44 Bolivia 1 48 16 3 0 1 80 45 Zimbabwe 0 279 19 0 1 1 78 46 Senegal 4 24 8 47 3 2 40 47 Philippines 108 5,035 36 2 29 I 33 48 Côte d'Ivoire 7 239 21 3 1 1 76 49 Dominican Rep. 10 1,498 51 1 7 0 42 50 Papua New Guinea 4 28 5 1 1 14 78 51 Guatemala 5 329 68 3 0 18 12 52 Morocco 32 2,326 67 16 7 I 10 53 Cameroon 4 57 19 0 1 2 78 54 Ecuador 3 77 16 3 4 14 64 55 Syrian Arab Rep. 2 40 66 1 1 5 28 56 Congo 4 160 0 0 0 0 99 57 ElSalvador 2 142 56 1 25 0 18 58 Paraguay 5 87 20 28 0 0 52 59 Peru 12 477 51 7 3 I 38 60 Jordan 1 99 10 23 4 26 37 61 Colombia 52 1,027 26 6 0 0 68 62 Thailand 32 10,515 22 2 16 1 60 63 Tunisia 19 2,041 69 9 8 3 12 64 Jamaica 117 797 34 62 0 0 3 65 Turkey 47 6,709 70 4 5 2 20 66 Romania 188 1,729 33 5 3 1 58 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those speciGed. 250 Value of imports of Composition sf1990 imports of manufactures (percent)u manufactures, by Sri gin Electrical frnillions of dollars)a Textiles and machinery and Transport 1990a 1970 clothing Chemicals electronics equipment Others 67 Poland 287 4,553 21 18 7 5 49 68 Panamu 18 893 8 2 0 58 32 69 Costa Rica 610 69 9 0 21 70 Chile 15 611 29 59 71 Bolswanab 72 Algeria 39 1,326 0 5 1 94 73 Bulgaria 68 489 24 18 4 6 48 74 Mauritius 800 82 0 0 3 15 75 Malaysia 39 9,703 15 3 53 28 76 Argentina 104 1,715 10 18 1 4 66 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. 133 546 93 0 0 0 7 78 Albania 45 40 4 1 0 56 79 Angola 2 273 0 0 0 2 98 80 Lebanon 17 144 17 6 4 4 69 81 Mongolia 0 4 64 14 1 0 22 82 Namibiat' 83 Nicaragua 19 14 8 56 84 Yemen, Rep. 0 Upper-middle-income 3,605 1 119,836 I 21w 7w 17w 9w 46w 85 Mexico 508 23,704 5 5 34 17 40 86 South Africa1' 325 3,236 5 16 2 3 75 87 Venezuela 24 955 4 II 3 7 75 88 Uruguay 23 321 47 4 0 2 48 89 Brazil 197 11,001 7 10 5 13 65 90 Hungaiy 210 3,433 23 1 10 4 45 91 Yugoslavia 443 9,229 28 9 11 44 92 Czechoslovakia 467 3,315 16 16 5 58 93 Gabon 8 76 0 56 0 2 41 94 Trinidad and Tobago 39 327 56 0 0 43 95 Portugal 396 13,069 38 6 9 10 37 96 Korea, Rep. 524 40,773 24 3 20 48 97 Greece 185 4,162 59 5 4 31 98 Saudi Arabia 16 1,871 0 47 10 38 99 Iraq 4 84 18 4 73 100 Libya 5 381 0 95 0 4 101 Oman 0 204 16 0 15 15 53 Low- and middle-income 6,266 234,882 1 29 w 7w 14w 6w 44w Sub-Saharan Africa 193 1 5,237 17w 8w 1w 22 w 53 w East Asia & Pacific 1,077 1 108,021 1 29 w 4w 19 w 3w 46w South Asia 755 14,676 1 58 w 3w 1w 1w 38 w Europe 2,316 1 47,712 I 38 w 9w 8w 7w 39 w Middle East & N.Africa 315 10,103 I 40w 20 w Sw 5w 31 w Latin America & Caribbean 1,285 45,896 1 11 w 9w 19 w 14w 47 w Other economies 369 1 5,618: 3w 23 w 3w 10 w 60w Severely indebted 1,296: 47,1151 11w 8w 19w 13 w 49 w High-income economies 120,192 1 1,566,722 1 6w 12w 12w 19 w 52 w OECD members 117,067 I 1,465,897 1 Sw 13w 11 w 20 w 52 w tOther 3,125 I 100,825 1 18 w 4w 18 w 3w 57 w 102 Ireland 439 15,204 7 26 11 2 55 103 tlsrael 308 7,998 9 14 9 3 65 104 Spain 773 30,894 5 10 31 47 105 tSingapore 112 19,504 6 30 2 57 106 tHong Kong 1,861 24,331 42 14 43 107 New Zealand 121 1,909 9 21 8 4 59 108 Belgiumd 7,660 80,341 8.8 19.7 5.9 20.8 44.9 109 United Kingdom 10,457 105,934 5 17 l0 12 56 110 Italy 7,726 115,210 16 8 11 58 Ill Australia 471 6,763 3 33 4 13 46 112 Netherlands 5,678 73,069 7 28 9 10 46 113 Austria 1,637 28,723 9 13 6 63 114 France 9,240 133,346 6 16 9 23 47 115 tUnited Arab Emirates 841 30 21 3 38 116 Canada 8,088 74,359 8 7 40 44 117 United States 21,215 206,284 2 12 13 21 52 118 Denmark 1,413 18,267 8 14 II 4 63 119 Germanye 23,342 280,732 5 14 10 21 50 120 Norway 1,059 8,964 2 22 7 9 61 121 Sweden 4,143 4 1,476 2 9 10 19 61 122 Japan 8,851 177,815 19 30 46 123 Finland 1,170 17,028 3 9 5 75 124 Switzerland 3,568 49,436 5 22 9 3 61 125 tKuwait 6 147 4 46 4 6 39 World 127,126 I 1,808,855 9w 11 w 12 w 17 w 51 w Fuel exporters, excl. former USSR 292 1 7,773 11 w 25 w 3w 5w 56 w Note: Data cover high-income OECD countries only. a. Trade data is based on the UN Comtrade data base, Revision I SITC for 1970 and Revision 2 SITC for 1990. b. Figures arc for the South African Customs Union comprising South Afnca, Numibia, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland; trade among the component territories is excluded. c. Excludes the Canal Zone. d. Includes Luxembourg. e. Data refer to the Federal Republic of Germany before unification. 251 Table 18. Balance of payments and reserves Current account balance Gross international reserves Net workers (millions of dollars) remittances In months of After official transfers Before official transfers (millions of dollars) Millions of dollars import coverage 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1990 Low-income economies 3,799 1 63,863 3.4 w China and India 1,023 40,113 4.4 w Other low-income 2,775 23,749 2.4 w Mozambique 335a _784a 45 . . . 2 Tanzania -36 -426 -37 -955 0 65 193 1.4 3 Ethiopia -32 _146a _308a . 72 55 0.6 4 Somalia -6 -81 -18 -346 . . 21 23 0.5 5 Nepal _Ia -264° _25a _316a 0a 354 5.4 6 Chad 2 -79 -33 -298 -6 0 2 133 3.5 7 Bhutan 19 -38 0 . . 86 7.4 S LaoPDR . . -106 . . -148 . . . 6 61 2.9 9 Malawi -35 -80 -46 -162 -4 . . 29 142 2.4 10 Bangladesh -114° _775a -234 l,54J 0° 761 . . 660 1.8 11 Bumndi 2a -56k' -2 -205 . . . 15 112 4.3 12 Zaire -64 -643 -141 -860 -98 . . 189 261 1.0 13 Uganda 20 -255° 434a 57 44 0.7 19 .5 . . 14 Madagascar 10 -153 -42 -324 -26 11 37 245 3.7 15 Sierra Leone -16 -95 -20 -136 0 39 5 0.2 16 Mali -2 -94 -22 -364 -1 68 I 198 2.7 17 Nigeria -368 5,126 -412 5,027 . . -14 223 4,129 5.1 18 Niger 0 -65 -32 -247 -3 12 19 226 4.6 19 Rwanda 7 -85 -12 -224 -4 -14 8 44 1.4 20 BurkinaFaso 9 -III -21 -383 16 83 36 305 4.2 21 India 385a _9304a -591 _9,828a 8o 1,947 1,023 5,637 1.9 22 Bcnin -3 -94° -23 -153 0 70a 16 69 1.4 23 China* -81 12,000a -81° Il,935a oa 108 . . 34,476 7.4 24 Haiti 11 -55 4 -158 13 47 4 10 0.3 25 Kenya -49 -477 -86 -684 . . -2 220 236 0.9 26 Pakistan -667 -1,362 -705 -1,902 86 1,947 195 1,046 1.2 27 Ghana -68 -229 -76 -442 9 3 43 309 2.3 28 Central African Rep. -12 -97 -24 -260 -4 -260 1 118 3.6 29 Togo 3 -100 -14 -208 -3 5 35 358 5.3 30 Zambia 108 -343 107 -490 -48 -23 515 201 0.9 31 Guinea . . -182 . . -283 . . . . . . . 32 Sri Lanka -59 -296 -71 -474 3 401 43 447 1.7 33 Mauritania -5 -199 -13 -199 -6 0 3 59 1.0 34 Lesotho 18a 97 _1a -148 29a 391 . . 72 1.2 35 Indonesia -310 -2,369 -376 -2,430 153 160 8,657 3.2 36 Honduras -64 -190 -68 -397 . . . . 20 47 0.4 37 Egypt, Arab Rep. -148 _1,425a -452 _2,535a 29 3744a 165 3,620 2.7 38 Afghanistan 142 454 49 638 10.3 39 Cambodia . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 40 Liberia _l6a _27a -l8 . . 8 41 Myanmar -63 _163a -81 -204° . 0 98 410 4.7 42 Sudan -42 _876a _43 1,217a 188 22 11 0.1 43 VietNam -213 -323 . . . . 243 . Middle-income economies 16,301 1 194,139 I 3.4 w Lower-middle-income 6,292 81,842 I 3.1 w 44 Bolivia 4 -194 2 -339 1 46 511 4.5 45 Zimbabwe 14 -158 -26° -266 . . - . 59 295 1.5 46 Senegal -16 -125 -66 -481 -16 32 22 22 0.1 47 Philippines -48 -2,695 -138 -3,052 . . 262 255 2,036 1.5 48 Côte d'Ivoire -38 -1,104 -73 -1,210 -56 -540 119 21 0.1 49 DominicanRep. -102 -59 -103 -114 25 315 32 69 0.3 50 Papua New Guinea _89a -352 239a -566 51 . . 427 2.6 51 Guatemala -8 -279 -8 -335 . . 64 79 362 2.1 52 Morocco -124 -200 -161 -520 27 1,995 142 2,338 3.2 Cameroon -30 278a _7 -11 3a 53 -278° 81 92 0.5 54 Ecuador -113 -136 -122 -236 . . . . 76 1,009 3.5 55 Syrian Arab Rep. -69 1,827 -72 1,747 7 375 57 . 56 Congo 45a -123 ..53a -197 _3 0.2 -41 9 21 57 ElSalvador 9 -135 7 -360 . . 345 64 595 4.4 58 Paraguay -16 lO2a -19 lO2a . 18 700 4.6 59 Pent 202 -674 146 -921 . . . . 339 1,891 4.3 60 Jordan -20 _754i -130 _1,147a 258 1,139 3.3 61 Colombia -293 391 -333 406 6 488 207 4,453 5.6 62 Thailand -250 -7,053 -296 -7,235 . . 74 911 14,258 4.4 63 Tunisia -53 -500 -88 -715 20 591 60 867 1.6 64 Jamaica -153 -271 -149 -386 29 . . 139 168 0.7 65 Turkey -44 -2,616 -57 -3,778 273 3,246 440 7,626 3.1 66 Romania -23 -3,254 -23 -3,254 . . S 1,374 1.7 * Data for Taiwan, China, are: 1 10,769 2 10,774 . . . . 627 77,653 13.4 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 252 Current account balance Gross international reserves Net workers' (millions ofdollars) remittances In months of After official transfers Before official transfers (millions of dollars) Millions of dollars import coverage 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1990 67 Poland . . 3,067 . 2,762 . 0 . 4,674 2.9 68 Panama -64 91 -79 -27 16 406 0.9 69 Costa Rica -74 -514 -77 -679 . . 16 525 2.3 70 Chile -91 -790 -95 -935 0 0 392 6,784 7.1 71 Botswana 30a 137 _35a -179 9° -41 . 3,385 17.0 72 Algeria -125 l,420 -163 1,419 178 321 352 2,703 2.6 73 Bulgaria . . -1,710 . -1,710 . 0 74 Maurjtjus 8 -I19 5 -128 . . 46 761 4.7 75 Malaysia 8 -1,672 2 -1,733 . . 667 l0,659 3.5 76 Argentina -163 1,789 -160 1,789 . . 0 682 6,222 5.6 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. -507 -385 -511 -385 . . 217 . 78 Albania . . -154 . . -154 . . . . . . . 79 Angola . . . . . . . 80 Lebanon . . . . . . . . . - 405 4,210 81 Mongolia . . -640 . . -647 . . 0 . . . 82 Namibia . . . . . 83 Nicaragua -40 -369 -43 -571 49 84 Yemen, Rep. . 620a 503 l.366a 280 Upper-middle-income 10,009 1 112,297 r 3.6 w 85 Mexico -1,068 -5,255 -1,098 -6,521 . . 2,020 756 10,217 2.4 86 SouthAfrica -1,215 2,253 -1,253 2,243 . . . . 1,057 2,583 1.2 87 Venezuela -104 8,198 -98 8,221 -87 -619 1,047 12,733 12.2 88 Uruguay -45 224 -55 216 . . . . 186 1,466 8.1 89 Brazil -837 -2,983 -861 -2,983 . . 1,190 9,200 2.8 90 Hungaly -25 230u -25 230u oa . 1,186 1.2 91 Yugoslavia -372 -2,364 -378 -2,362 441 9,360 143 6,208 2.2 92 Czechoslovakia 146 -1,227 156 -1,175 . . . . . 2,059 1.5 93 Gabon -3 224 -15 236 -8 -141 15 40 0.2 94 Trinidadandlobago -109 430 -104 434 3 3 43 5l3 3.3 95 Portugal _158a -139 -l58 -1,119 504 4,271 1,565 20,579 8.7 96 Korea,Rep. -623 -2,172 -706 -2,181 . . 0 610 14,916 2.2 97 Greece -422 -3,537 -424 -6,438 333 1,775 318 4.721 2.6 98 SaudiArabia 7! -4,l07 152 294 -l83 -l1,637 670 13,437 3.6 99 Iraq 105 . . l04 . . . . . . 472 . IOU Libya 645 2,203 758 2,239 -134 -446 1,596 7,225 9.2 101 Oman . . 1,095 . . 1,153 . - -845 l3 1,784 5.5 Low- and middle-income 20,1001 258,002 I 3.4 w Sub-Saharan Africa 2,028 t 12,684 t 2.3 w East Asia & Pacific 2,885 1 85,907 1 3.4 w South Asia 1,453 8,665 1 3.6 w Europe 2,624 1 49,920 I 3.7 w Middle East & N.Africa 4,526 1 39,533 I 4.2 w Latin America & Caribbean 5,5271 58,710 1 3.2 w Other economies Severely indebted 4.863 1 51,538 1 2.8 w High-income economies 71,917 1 892,347 I 3.1 w OECD members 69.975 1 846,1971 3.1 w tOther 1.942 1 46,151 1 4.1 w 102 Ireland -198 1,433 -228 -1,249 . . 698 5,362 2.1 103 tlsrael -562 702 -766 -3,105 . . . . 452 6,598 3.4 104 Spain 79 -16,819 79 -18,023 469 1,747 1,851 57,238 6.3 105 (Singapore -572 2,350 -585 2,445 . . . - 1,012 27,748 4.8 106 (Hong Kong 225 . . 225 . . . . . . . . . 107 New Zealand -232 -1,594 -222 -1,555 16 259 258 4,129 3.4 108 Belgiumb 717 4,548 904 5,967 38 -386 . . . 109 United Kingdom 1.970 -24,596 2,376 -16,314 . . . - 2,918 43,145 1.3 110 Italy 800 -12,733 1,096 -9,487 446 1,181 5,547 88,595 4.5 III Australia -777 -14,823 -682 -14,725 . . . - 1,709 19,319 3.3 112 Netherlands -489 10,393 -513 12,374 -51 -298 3,362 34,401 2.5 113 Austria -75 958 -73 1,067 -7 307 1,806 17,228 2.9 114 France -204 -9,875 l8 -3,648 -64! -1,983 5,199 68,291 2.4 115 (United Arab Emirates 90 . . 100 . . 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,89! 116 Canada 1,008 -18,815 960 -17,955 . 0 - 4733 23,530 1.6 117 UnitedStates 2,330 -92,160 4,680 -71,710 -650 -1.I00 15,237 173,094 2.9 118 Denmark -544 1,541 -510 1,551 . . . . 488 11,226 2.5 119 GennanyC 852 46,800 1,899 62,774 -1,366 -4,556 13,879 104,547 2.8 120 Norway -242 3,783 -200 4,991 . - -66 813 15,788 4.2 12! Sweden -265 -5,833 -160 -4,188 . . 18 775 20,324 2.9 122 Japan 1,990 35,870 2,170 40,380 . . 4,876 87,828 2.6 123 Finland -240 -6,682 -233 -5,947 . . . - 455 10,415 3.1 124 Switzerland 161 6,941 203 7,111 -313 -1,980 5,317 61,281 6.4 125 tKuwait 853a 8,445 853a 8,656 . . -1,287 4,120 209 4.3 World 1,150,349 I 92,016 1 3.1 w Fuel exporters, excl. former USSR 4,693 I 48,426 1 5.4 w a. World Bank estimate. b. Includes Luxembourg. c. Data prior to July 1990 refer to the Federal Republic of Germany before unification. 253 Table 19. Official development assistance from OECD and OPEC members OECD: Total net flowsa 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 Millions of US dollars 102 Ireland 0 0 8 30 39 51 57 49 57 107 New Zealand 14 66 72 54 87 104 87 95 108 Belgium 102 120 378 595 440 687 601 703 889 109 United Kingdom 472 500 904 1,854 1,530 1,871 2,645 2,587 2,638 110 Italy 60 147 182 683 1,098 2,615 3,193 3,613 3,395 Ill Australia 119 212 552 667 749 627 1,101 1,020 955 112 Netherlands 70 196 608 1,630 1,136 2,094 2,231 2,094 2,592 113 Austria 10 II 79 178 248 201 301 283 394 114 France 752 971 2,093 4,162 3,995 6,525 6,865 7,450 9,380 116 Canada 96 337 880 1,075 1,631 1,885 2,347 2,320 2,470 117 UnitedStates 4,023 3,153 4,161 7,138 9,403 9,115 10,141 7,676 11,394 118 Denmark 13 59 205 481 440 859 922 937 1,171 119 Germanyb 456 599 1,689 3,567 2,942 4,391 4,731 4,949 6,320 120 Norway II 37 184 486 574 890 985 917 1,205 121 Sweden 38 117 566 962 840 1,375 1,534 1,799 2,012 122 Japan 244 458 1,148 3,353 3,797 7,342 9,134 8,965 9,069 123 Finland 2 7 48 110 211 433 608 706 846 124 Switzerland 12 30 104 253 302 547 617 558 750 Total 6,480 6,968 13,855 27,296 29,429 41,595 48,114 46,713 55,632 As a percentage of donor GNP 102 Ireland 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.16 0.24 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.16 107 New Zealand 0.23 0.52 0.33 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.22 0.23 108 Belgium 0.60 0.46 0.59 0.50 0.55 0.48 0.39 0.46 0.45 109 United Kingdom 0.47 0.41 0.39 0.35 0.33 0.28 0.32 0.31 0.27 110 Italy 0.10 0.16 0.11 0.15 0.26 0.35 0.39 0.42 0.32 Ill Australia 0.53 0.59 0.65 0.48 0.48 0.34 0.46 0.38 0.34 112 Netherlands 0.36 0.61 0.75 0.97 0.91 0.98 0.98 0.94 0.94 113 Austria 0,11 0.07 0.21 0.23 0.38 0.17 0.24 0.23 0.25 114 France 0.76 0.66 0.62 0.63 0.78 0.74 0.72 0.78 0.79 116 Canada 0.19 0.41 0.54 0.43 0.49 0.47 0.50 0.44 0.44 117 United States 0.58 0.32 0.27 0.27 0.24 0.20 0.21 0.15 0.21 118 Denmark 0.13 0.38 0.58 0.74 0.80 0.88 0.89 0.93 0.93 119 Germanyb 0.40 0.32 0.40 0.44 0.47 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.42 120 Norway 0.16 0.32 0.66 0.87 1.01 1.09 1.13 1.05 1.17 121 Sweden 0.19 0.38 0.82 0.78 0.86 0.88 0.86 0.96 0.90 122 Japan 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.32 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.31 123 Finland 0.02 0.06 0.18 0.22 0.40 0.49 0.59 0.63 0.64 124 Switzerland 0.09 0.15 0.19 0.24 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.31 National currencies 102 Ireland (millions of pounds) 0 0 4 15 37 35 37 34 35 107 New Zealand (millions of dollars) . . 13 55 74 109 146 158 146 160 108 Belgium (millions of francs) 5,100 6,000 13,902 17,399 26,145 25,656 22,088 27,714 29,720 109 United Kingdom (millions of pounds) 169 208 409 798 1,180 1,142 1,485 1,577 1,478 110 Italy (billions of lire) 38 92 119 585 2,097 3,390 4,156 4,958 4,068 Ill Australia (millions of dollars) 106 189 402 591 966 895 1,404 1,286 1,223 112 Netherlands (millions of guilders) 253 710 1,538 3,241 3,773 4,242 4,410 4,440 4,720 113 Austria (millions ofschillings) 260 286 1,376 2,303 5,132 2,542 3,722 3,737 4,477 114 France(millionsoffrancs) 3,713 5,393 8,971 17,589 35,894 39,219 40,897 47,529 51,076 116 Canada (millions of dollars) 104 353 895 1,257 2,227 2,500 2,888 2,747 2,882 117 United States(millions ofdollars) 4,023 3,153 4,161 7,138 9,403 9,115 10,141 7,676 11,394 118 Denmark(millions ofkroner) 90 443 1,178 2,711 4,657 5,877 6,204 6,850 7,247 119 Germany (millions of deutsche marks)b 1,824 2,192 4,155 6,484 8,661 7,892 8,319 9,302 10,211 120 Norway (millions ofkroner) 79 264 962 2,400 4,946 5,998 6,418 6,335 7,542 121 Sweden (millions ofkronor) 197 605 2,350 4,069 7,226 8,718 9,396 11,600 11,909 122 Japan (billionsofyen) 88 165 341 760 749 1,062 1,171 1.236 1,313 123 Finland (millionsofmarkkaa) 6 29 177 414 1,308 1,902 2,542 3,031 3,236 124 Switzerland (millions of francs) 52 131 268 424 743 815 903 912 1,041 Summary Billions of US dollars ODA(currentprices) 6.5 7.0 13.9 27.3 29.4 41.6 48.t 46.7 55.6 ODA (1987 prices) 28.2 25.3 29.8 36.8 39.4 41.6 44.9 43.6 47.6 GNP(eurrentpnces) 1,374.0 2,079.0 4,001.0 7,488.0 8,550.0 12,082.0 13,547.0 13,968.0 15,498.0 Percent ODAasapercentageofGNP 0.47 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.33 0.36 Index (1987 = 100) GDPdeflatorc 23.0 27.6 46.5 74.1 74.6 100.0 107.1 107.0 116.8 254 OECD: Total net bilateral flows to low-income economiesa /965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 /987 1988 1989 1990 As a percentage of donor GNP 102 Ireland 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 107 New Zealand 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 108 Belgium 0.56 0.30 0.31 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.09 109 United Kingdom 0.23 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.05 110 Italy 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.12 0.09 Ill Australia 0.08 0.00 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05 112 Netherlands 0.08 0.24 0.24 0.32 0.23 0.28 0.25 0.27 0.23 0.25 113 Austria 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.10 114 France 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.13 116 Canada 0.10 0.22 0.24 0.13 0.14 0.13 0,15 0.13 0.09 0.10 117 United States 0.26 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.05 118 Denmark 0.02 0.10 0.20 0.17 0.26 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.24 119 Germanyb 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.10 120 Norway 0.04 0.12 0.25 0.28 0.34 0.43 0.34 0.37 0.32 0.37 121 Sweden 0.07 0.12 0.41 0.26 0.24 0.30 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.25 122 Japan 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.10 123 Finland 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.10 0.17 0.24 0.22 0.17 124 Switzerland 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.11 Total 0.20 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 OPEC: Total net flows' 1976 1980 1983 1984 /985 1986 1987 1988 /989 /990 Millions of US dollars 17 Nigeria 80 35 35 51 45 52 30 14 70 13 Qatar 180 277 20 10 8 18 0 4 -2 72 Algeria II 81 37 52 54 114 39 13 40 7 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. 751 -72 10 52 -72 69 -10 39 -94 2 87 Venezuela 109 135 142 90 32 85 24 55 52 15 99 Iraq 123 864 -10 -22 -32 -21 -35 -22 21 55 100 Libya 98 376 144 24 57 68 66 129 86 4 98 SaudiArabia 2,791 5,682 3,259 3,194 2,630 3,517 2,888 2,048 1,171 3,692 115 UnitedArabEmirates 1,028 1,118 351 88 122 87 15 -17 2 888 125 Kuwait 706 1,140 997 1,020 771 715 316 108 169 1,666 Total OPECd 5,877 9,636 4,985 4,559 3,615 4,704 3,333 2,369 1,514 6,341 Total OApECC 4,937 9,538 4,798 4,366 3,610 4,498 3,289 2,261 . As a percentage of donor GNP 17 Nigeria 0.19 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.13 0.12 0.05 0.28 0.06 Qatar 7.35 4.16 0.40 0.18 0.12 0.36 0.00 0.08 -0.04 0.02 72 Algeria 0.07 0.20 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.19 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.03 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. 1.16 -0.08 0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.02 87 Venezuela 0.35 0.23 0.22 0.16 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.03 99 Iraq 0.76 2.36 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.08 -0.04 0.04 100 Libya 0.66 1.16 0.51 0.10 0.24 0.30 0.30 0.63 0.41 0.oi 98 Saudi Arabia 5.95 4.87 2.69 3.20 2.92 3.99 3.70 2.53 1.37 3.90 115 United Arab Emirates 8.95 4.06 1.26 0.32 0.45 0.41 0.07 -0.07 0.02 2.65 125 Kuwait 4.82 3.52 3.83 3.95 2.96 2.84 1.15 0.40 0.54 Total OPECd 2.32 1.85 0.82 0.76 0.60 0.78 0.52 0.34 0.21 Total OAPECe 4.23 3.22 1.70 1.60 1.39 1.80 1.10 0.86 . a. Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. b. Data refer to the Federal Republic of Germany before unification. c. See the technical notes. d. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. e. Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries. 255 Table 20. Official development assistance: receipts Nd disbursement of ODA from all sources Per capita As a percentage Millions of dollars (dollars) of GNP 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1990 1990 Low-income economies 14,476 1 15,896 I 18,781 I 20,555 1 23,722 23,862 t 29,353 1 9.6 w 2.8 w China and India 2,471 I 2,532 I 3,2541 3,3001 4,086 4,048, 3,662 1 1.8 w 0.6 w Other low-income 12,006 1 13,3641 15,527 1 17,255 1 19,636 1 19,813 1 25,691 1 23.9 w 6.9 w I Mozambique 259 300 422 651 893 772 946 60.2 65.7 2 Tanzania 558 487 681 882 982 920 1155 47.1 48.2 3 Ethiopia 364 715 636 634 970 752 888 17.4 14.6 4 Somalia 350 353 511 580 433 427 428 54.8 45.9 5 Nepal 198 236 301 347 399 493 429 22.7 13.8 6 Chad 115 182 165 198 264 241 315 55.5 28.6 7 Bhutan 18 24 40 42 42 42 47 32.7 16.5 8 Lao PDR 34 37 48 58 77 140 152 36.6 17.5 9 Malawi 158 113 198 280 366 412 479 56.3 25.7 10 Bangladesh 1,200 1,152 1,455 1,635 1,592 1,800 2,103 19.7 9.2 Ii Bumndi 141 142 187 202 188 196 265 48.8 24.0 12 Zaire 312 325 448 627 576 634 823 22.0 10.9 13 Uganda 163 182 198 280 363 403 557 34.1 18.4 14 Madagascar 153 188 316 321 304 321 382 32.8 12.3 15 Sierra Leone 61 66 87 68 102 100 70 16.9 7.8 16 Mali 321 380 372 366 427 454 474 56.0 19.4 17 Nigeria 33 32 59 69 120 346 234 2.0 0.7 IS Niger 161 304 307 353 371 296 358 46.7 14.2 19 Rwanda 165 181 211 245 252 232 287 40.3 13.4 20 BurkinaFaso 189 198 284 281 298 272 315 34.9 9.9 21 India 1,673 1,592 2,120 1,839 2,097 1,895 1,586 1.9 0.6 22 Benin 77 95 138 138 162 263 261 55.1 23 China 798 940 1,134 1462 1,989 2,153 2,076 1.8 0.6 24 Haiti 135 153 175 218 147 200 183 28.3 6.6 25 Kenya 411 438 455 572 808 967 1,000 41.4 11.4 26 Pakistan 749 801 970 879 1,408 1,129 1,152 10.3 2.9 27 Ghana 216 203 371 373 474 552 465 31.2 7.4 28 CentralAfricanRep. 114 104 139 176 196 192 232 76.3 17.8 29 Togo 110 114 174 126 199 183 210 57.8 13.0 30 Zambia 239 328 464 430 478 392 438 54.0 14.0 31 Guinea 123 119 175 213 262 346 292 51.0 10.4 32 SriLanka 466 484 570 502 598 547 665 39.1 8.2 33 Mauritania 175 209 225 185 184 242 211 107.0 20.0 34 Lesotho 101 94 88 107 108 127 138 78.0 24.5 35 Indonesia 673 603 711 1,246 1,632 1,839 1,724 9.7 1.6 36 Honduras 286 272 283 258 321 242 448 87.8 16.4 37 Egypt,ArabRep. 1,794 1,791 1,716 1,773 1,537 1,568 5,604 107.6 15.9 38 Afghanistan 7 7 2 45 72 167 143 7.0 39 Cambodia 17 13 13 14 18 31 42 4.9 40 Liberia I33 90 97 78 65 59 115 44.9 41 Myanmar 275 356 416 367 451 184 170 4.1 0.8 42 Sudan 622 1,128 945 898 937 772 792 31.5 9.3 43 VietNam 109 114 147 III 148 129 190 2.9 2.1 Middle-income economies 9,5571 9,7561 11,4381 12,6071 11,8471 12,4461 17,8821 18.7w 0.7w Lower-middle-income 7,7301 7,851 I 8,847 1 9,997 1 9,3061 9,652 1 14,3651 26.0 w 1.6 w 44 Bolivia 172 202 322 318 394 440 491 68.4 10.9 45 Zimbabwe 298 237 225 294 273 265 343 35.0 5.5 46 Senegal 368 295 567 641 569 650 739 99.8 12.7 47 Philippines 397 486 956 770 854 844 1,277 20.8 2.9 48 Côte d'Ivoire 128 125 186 254 439 403 689 57.9 6.9 49 DominicanRep. 188 207 93 130 118 142 93 13.2 1.3 50 Papua New Guinea 322 259 263 322 380 339 376 96.1 11.4 51 Guatemala 65 83 135 241 235 261 199 21.6 2.6 52 Morocco 352 785 403 447 481 450 970 38.6 3.8 53 Cameroon 186 159 224 213 284 458 483 41.2 4.3 54 Ecuador 136 136 147 203 137 160 154 14.9 1.4 55 SyrianArabRep. 641 610 728 684 191 127 650 52.6 4.4 56 Congo 98 71 110 152 89 9! 209 92.0 7.3 57 ElSalvador 261 345 341 426 420 443 347 66.5 6.4 58 Paraguay 50 50 66 81 76 92 57 13.1 1.1 59 Peru 310 316 272 292 272 305 392 18.1 1.! 60 Jordan 687 538 564 577 417 273 891 282.5 22.8 61 Colombia 88 62 63 78 61 67 87 2.7 0.2 62 Thailand 475 481 496 504 563 739 805 14.4 1.0 63 Tunisia 178 163 222 274 316 234 316 39.2 2.5 64 Jamaica 170 169 178 168 193 262 280 115.7 7.1 65 Turkey 242 179 339 376 267 140 1,264 22.5 1.2 66 Romania . . . . . . . . . . Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 256 Net disbursement of ODA from all sources Per capita As a percentage Millions of dollars (dollars) of GNP 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1990 1990 67 Poland . . . . . . . . . . S 68 Panama 72 69 52 40 22 18 92 38.2 1.9 69 CostaRica 218 280 196 228 187 226 228 81.0 4.0 70 Chile 2 40 -5 21 44 61 94 7.1 0.3 71 Botswana 102 96 102 156 151 160 148 118.2 5.5 72 Algeria 122 173 165 214 171 152 227 9.! 0.4 73 Bulgaria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Mauritius 36 28 56 65 59 58 89 82.9 3.6 75 Malaysia 327 229 192 363 104 140 469 26.3 1.1 76 Argentina 49 39 88 99 152 211 172 5.3 0.2 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. 13 16 27 71 82 96 69 1.2 0.1 78 Albania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Angola 95 92 131 135 159 148 212 21.2 80 Lebanon 77 83 62 101 141 119 134 50.0 81 Mongolia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Namihia 0 6 15 17 22 59 57 32.0 83 Nicaragua 114 102 150 141 213 225 324 84.0 84 Yemen, Rep. 326 283 257 422 303 358 392 34.7 5.6 Upper-middle-income 1,827 1 1,905 I 2,591 1 2,610 1 2,541 I 2,7941 3,517 I 8.5 w 0.1 w 85 Mexico 83 144 252 155 173 86 140 1.6 0.! 86 South Africa , . . . . . . . . , , , . . . 87 Venezuela 14 11 16 19 18 21 79 4.0 0.2 88 Uruguay 4 5 27 18 41 38 47 15.1 0.6 89 Brazil 161 123 178 289 210 206 164 1.1 0.0 90 Hungary . . . . . . . . , , . . . . , 91 Yugoslavia 3 II 19 35 44 43 48 2.0 0.1 92 Czechoslovakia . . . . . , , , . , . . , . , 93 Gabon 76 61 79 82 106 133 140 123.0 3.0 94 TrinidadandTobago 5 7 19 34 9 6 10 8.3 0.2 95 Portugal 97 lOt 139 64 102 78 67 6.5 0.1 96 Korea, Rep. -37 -9 -18 II 10 52 52 1.2 0.0 97 Greece 13 II 19 35 35 30 35 3.5 0.1 98 Saudi Arabia 36 29 31 22 19 36 44 2.9 99 iraq 4 26 33 91 10 II 52 2.7 100 Libya 5 5 II 6 6 17 20 4.4 101 Oman 67 78 84 16 1 18 69 44.2 Low- and middle-income 24,033 1 25,653 1 30,2191 33,162 1 35,5701 36,307 1 47,235 1 11,8 w 1.4 w Sub-Saharan Africa 7,941 1 9,0061 11,0931 12,5001 14,0771 14,5051 16,8801 33.9w 9.6 w East Asia & Pacific 3,553 I 3,577 1 4,529 1 5,548 1 6,405 1 7,053 1 7,771 1 4.9 w 0.8 w South Asia 4,5851 4,655 1 5,8881 5,630 1 6,615 1 6,118 1 6,1741 5.4 w 1.6 w Europe 376 1 348 1 543 1 522 1 461 1 285 1 1,420 1 14.1 w 0.4 w Middle East & N.Africa 4,5061 4,668 1 4,405 1 4,745 1 3,743 1 3,622 I 9,680 1 37.8 w 3.4 w Latin America & Caribbean 3,072 1 3,4001 3,761 1 4,217 1 4,269 1 4,7241 5,380 1 12.3 w 0.4 w Other economies 121 181 181 301 201 241 331 1.0 w Severely indebted 2,3791 2,8361 3,0161 3,2671 2,9381 2,8771 4,6601 11.4 w 0.4 w High-income economies 1,5251 2,2321 2,3061 1,7461 1,6551 1,6671 1,8021 44.7w 0.8w OECD members .. .. .. .. .. -. tOther 1,525 1 2,232 1 2,3061 1,7461 1,655 I 1,667 I 1,802 1 44.7 w 0.8 w 102 Ireland S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S 103 tlsrael 1,256 1,978 1,937 1,251 1,241 1,192 1,374 295.0 2.6 104 Spain S S S S ' ' S S 5 0 5 ' S S S 105 '(Singapore 41 24 29 23 22 95 -3 -1.0 0.0 106 tHongKong 14 20 ¶8 19 22 40 37 6.4 0.1 107 New Zealand , . , S S S . , 108 Belgium , . S S S S S ' ' 109 United Kingdom . . S S S S S S S S ' ' 110 Italy , S ' S S ' ' III S Australia S S S S S S S S S S S 112 Netherlands S S S S S ' ' ' S S 113 Austria S S S S S S S S S 114 France S S ' S S S S S S 115 i'United Arab Emirates 3 4 34 115 -12 -6 5 353 116 Canada S S ' S S S ' ' S S S 117 United States 118 Denmark 119 Germany 120 Norway 121 Sweden 122 Japan . . S S S S S S S 123 Finland . , S S . . 124 Switzerland S S ' ' S S S S ' ' S S S 1251Kuwait 4 4 5 3 6 4 3 1.6 World 25,570 1 27,903 1 32,542 1 34,938 I 37,2441 37,997 1 49,0701 12.0 w 1.4w Fuel exporters, excl. former USSR 582 I 6371 8261 1,048 1 798 I 1,0771 1,3761 5.0 w 0.4 w 257 Table 21. Total external debt Long-term debt (millions of dollars) Public and publicly Private Use of IMF credit Short-term debt Total external debt guaranteed nonguaranteed (millions of dollars) (millions of dollars) (milltons of dollars) 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 Low-income economies China and India Other low-income I Mozambique 4,053 19 74 572 4,718 2 Tanzania 180 5,294 1 12 140 420 5,866 3 Ethiopia 169 3,116 0 6 128 . 3,250 4 Somalia 77 1,922 0 159 268 2,350 5 Nepal 3 1,557 0 44 20 . 1,621 6 Chad 33 430 0 31 31 492 7 Bhutan 80 0 0 3 83 8 LaoPDR 8 1,053 0 8 . 2 1,063 9 Malawi 122 1,366 3 115 . 60 1,544 10 Bangladesh 0 11,464 0 626 156 12,245 II Burundi 7 850 0 0 8 43 13 906 12 Zaire 311 8,851 0 0 0 521 744 . 10,115 13 Uganda 152 2,301 0 0 0 282 144 . 2,726 14 Madagascar 89 3,677 0 0 0 144 118 3,938 15 SierraLeone 59 606 0 0 0 108 475 1,189 16 Mali 238 2,306 0 0 9 69 . 57 2,433 17 Nigeria 452 33,709 115 391 0 0 1,968 . 36,068 18 Niger 32 1,326 0 261 0 85 157 1,829 19 Rwanda 2 692 0 0 3 0 48 741 20 Burkina Faso 21 750 0 0 0 0 84 834 21 India 7,838 61,097 100 1,488 0 2,623 4,908 70,115 22 Benin 41 1,262 0 0 0 9 157 . 1,427 23 China 45,319 0 0 0 469 6,766 . 52,555 24 Haiti 40 745 0 0 3 38 91 874 25 Kenya 319 4,810 88 578 0 482 971 . 6,840 26 Pakistan 3,064 16,532 5 124 45 836 . 3,191 . . 20,683 27 Ghana 511 2,670 10 33 46 745 . 50 3,498 28 CentralAfrican Rep. 24 815 0 1 0 37 48 901 29 Togo 40 1,096 0 0 0 87 . . 113 . . 1,296 30 Zambia 624 4,784 30 2 0 949 . . 1,488 . . 7,223 31 Guinea 312 2,230 0 0 3 52 . . 215 . . 2,497 32 SriLanka 317 4,911 0 136 79 410 394 5,851 33 Mauritania 26 1,898 0 0 0 70 259 . . 2,227 34 Lesotho 8 372 0 0 0 15 3 390 35 Indonesia 2,497 44,974 461 9,405 139 494 . 13,035 67,908 36 Honduras 90 3,159 19 66 0 32 . . 222 . . 3,480 37 Egypt,ArabRep. 1,517 34,242 0 1,000 49 125 . . 4,518 39,885 38 Afghanistan . . . . . . . . 39 Cambodia . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Liberia 158 1,127 0 0 4 322 . . 422 1,870 41 Myanmar 106 4,447 0 0 17 0 229 4,675 42 Sudan 298 9,156 0 496 31 956 . 4,775 15,383 43 VietNam . . . . . . . . . . Middle-income economies Lower-middle-income 44 Bolivia 480 3,683 II 177 6 257 . . 159 . 4,276 45 Zimbabwe 229 2,449 0 153 0 7 591 . . 3,199 46 Senegal 115 2,954 31 60 0 314 417 3,745 47 Philippines 625 24,108 919 1,006 69 912 . . 4,431 . . 30,456 48 Côte d'Ivoire 256 10,050 11 4,372 0 431 . 3,103 17,956 49 Dominican Rep. 212 3,440 141 99 7 72 789 4,400 50 PapuaNcwGuinea 36 1,509 173 965 0 61 . 72 2,606 51 Guatemala 106 2,179 14 127 0 67 . . 405 2,777 52 Morocco 712 22.097 15 200 28 750 477 23,524 53 Cameroon 131 4,784 9 230 0 121 . . 888 6,023 54 Ecuador 193 9,854 49 164 14 265 . . 1,823 12,105 55 Syrian Arab Rep. 233 14,959 0 0 10 0 . . 1,487 16,446 56 Congo 119 4,380 0 0 0 II . . 727 . . 5,118 57 ElSalvador 88 1,898 88 26 7 0 . . 209 . . 2,133 58 Paraguay 112 1,736 0 19 0 0 . . 376 . . 2,131 59 Peru 856 13,343 1,799 1,554 10 755 . . 5,453 21,105 60 Jordan 120 6,486 0 0 0 94 . . 1,097 7,678 61 Colombia 1,297 14,680 283 1,123 55 0 . . 1,438 . . 17,241 62 Thailand 324 12,572 402 4,973 0 I . . 8,322 . . 25,868 63 Tunisia 541 6,506 0 218 13 176 634 . . 7,534 64 Jamaica 160 3,873 822 34 0 357 . . 334 4,598 65 Turkey 1,846 38,595 42 1,054 74 0 9,500 49,149 66 Romania . . 19 0 0 0 0 . . 350 369 Notes For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes - Figures in italics are for years other than those spectfted 258 Long-term debt (millions of dollars) Public attd publicly Pri vale Use of IMF credit Short-term debt Total external debt guaranteed ton guaranteed (millions of dollars) (milliom of dollars) (millions of dollars) 1970 /990 1970 1990 1970 1990 /970 /990 /970 1990 67 Poland . . 39,282 0 0 0 509 . 9,595 - . 49,386 68 Panama 194 3,987 0 0 0 272 2,417 . . 6,676 69 CostaRica 134 3,077 112 304 0 II . - 380 . - 3,772 70 Chile 2,067 10,339 501 4,263 2 1,157 . . 3,356 - - 19,114 71 Botswana 17 510 0 0 0 0 . 6 . . 516 72 Algeria 945 24,316 0 0 0 670 1,820 26,806 73 Bulgaria . . 9,564 0 0 0 0 . - 1,363 10,927 74 Mauritius 32 739 0 148 0 22 30 939 75 Malaysia 390 16,107 50 1,489 0 0 1,906 19.502 76 Argentina 1,880 46,146 3,291 1,800 0 3,083 10,115 . . 61,144 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. . . 1,797 0 0 0 0 7,224 . . 9,021 78 Albania . - . . . . . . . . . . - - 79 Angola . . 7,152 0 0 0 0 558 . . 7,710 80 Lebanon 64 545 0 0 0 0 . . 1,387 . 1,932 81 Mongolia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Namibia 83 Nicaragua 147 8,067 2,430 . . 10,497 84 Yemen, Rep. 31 5,040 1,196 . . 6,236 Upper-middle-income 85 Mexico 3,196 76,204 2,770 4,409 0 6,551 . . 9,645 . - 96,810 86 South Africa . . . . . . . . - - . . . . . 87 Venezuela 718 24,643 236 3,650 0 3,012 . - 2,000 33,305 88 Uruguay 269 3,044 29 110 18 101 452 . . 3,707 89 Brazil 3,426 82,098 1,706 7,771 0 1,821 . . 24,483 116,173 90 Hungaiy . . 18,046 0 0 0 330 2,941 - . 21,316 91 Yugoslavia 1,199 13,492 854 3,860 0 467 - . 2,871 . - 20,690 92 Czechoslovakia . . 5,346 0 0 0 0 . - 2,885 - . 8,231 93 Gabon 91 2,945 0 0 0 140 . - 562 3,647 94 TrinidadandTobago 101 1,808 0 0 0 329 . . 169 2,307 95 Portugal 515 14,432 268 748 0 0 5,233 20,413 96 Korea,Rep. 1,816 17,814 175 5,400 0 0 10,800 34,014 97 Greece . . . - . . . . . 98 Saudi Arabia . . . . - - . . . . . 99 Iraq - . . . . . . . . . . . - 100 Libya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - lOt Oman . . 2,205 0 0 0 0 . . 279 . - 2,484 Low- and middle-income Sub-Saharan Africa East Asia & Pacific South Asia Europe Middle East & N.Africa Latin America & Caribbean Other economies Severely indebted High-income economies OECD members tOther 102 Ireland 103 tlsrael 104 Spain 105 tSingapore 106 tHong Kong 107 New Zealand 108 Belgium 109 United Kingdom 110 Italy Ill Australia 112 Netherlands 113 Austria 114 France 115 tUnited Arab Emirates 116 Canada 117 United States 118 Denmark 119 Germany 120 Norway 121 Sweden 122 Japan 123 Finland 124 Switzerland 125 tKuwait World Fuel exporters, excl. former USSR 259 Table 22. flow of public and private external capital Disbursements Repayment of principal Interest payments frnjllions of dollars) (millions of dollars) (,nillions of dollars) Long-term public Long-term pub/ic Long-term public and public/v Private and publicly Private and publicly Private guaranteed non guaranteed guaranteed non guaranteed guaranteed non guaranteed 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 Low-income economies China and India Other low-income I Mozambique 153 0 20 8 0 12 8 0 0 2 Tanzania 51 299 8 0 2 53 3 0 3 46 1 0 3 Ethiopia 28 277 0 0 15 144 0 0 6 44 0 0 4 Somalia 4 42 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 4 0 0 5 Nepal I /66 0 0 2 31 0 0 0 26 0 0 6Chad 6 96 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 7 Bhutan - 8 0 0 4 0 0 2 0 0 8 LaoPDR 6 107 0 0 1 8 0 0 0 3 0 0 9 Malawi 40 127 0 0 3 42 0 / 4 32 0 0 /0 Bangladesh 0 1,12/ 0 0 0 275 0 0 0 159 0 0 Ii Burundi I 94 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 12 0 0 /2 Zaire 32 226 0 0 28 51 0 0 9 93 0 0 13 Uganda 26 305 0 0 4 47 0 0 4 16 0 0 /4 Madagascar II 185 0 0 5 70 0 0 2 93 0 0 IS Sierra Leone 8 37 0 0 Il 3 0 0 3 3 0 0 16 Mali 23 110 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 17 0 0 17 Nigeria 56 727 25 0 38 1,205 30 15 20 1,758 8 3 /8 Niger /2 /12 0 43 2 7 0 37 / 6 0 /6 19 Rwanda 0 62 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 6 0 0 20 BurkinaFaso 2 79 0 0 2 18 0 0 0 10 0 0 21 India 883 5,191 25 214 289 2,/62 25 3/8 187 3,275 6 135 22 Benin 2 95 0 0 I 5 0 0 0 5 0 0 23 China 9,620 0 0 3,371 0 0 2,534 0 0 24 Haiti 4 37 0 0 3 6 0 0 0 6 0 0 25 Kenya 35 676 41 0 17 282 12 37 13 189 4 38 26 Pakistan 489 1,786 3 25 1/4 863 1 39 77 497 0 II 27 Ghana 42 380 0 8 14 /23 0 8 12 57 0 2 28 CentralAfricanRep. 2 /2/ 0 0 2 6 0 0 I 9 0 0 29 Togo 5 82 0 0 2 27 0 0 I 33 0 0 30 Zambia 351 152 11 2 35 91 6 0 29 58 2 0 3/ Guinea 90 150 0 0 11 37 0 0 4 16 0 0 32 Sri Lanka 66 464 0 0 30 /63 0 2 12 118 0 2 33 Mauritania 5 80 0 0 3 28 0 0 0 13 0 0 34 Lesotho 0 52 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 8 0 0 35 Indonesia 441 4,615 195 5,533 59 4,140 61 977 25 2,536 2! 485 36 Honduras 29 330 10 8 3 /62 3 25 3 181 1 37 Egypt,ArabRep. 199 2,192 0 102 227 1,715 0 183 40 1,054 0 89 38 Afghanistan . . . . . . - - 39 Cambodia . . . . - . - . - 40 Liberia 7 0 0 0 II 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 41 Myanmar 22 122 0 0 20 45 0 0 3 13 0 0 42 Sudan 53 185 0 0 22 14 0 0 12 8 0 0 43 HetNam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Middle-income economies Lower-middle-income 44 Bolivia 55 294 3 0 17 168 2 24 7 116 1 14 45 Zimbabwe 0 297 0 94 5 227 0 18 5 139 0 9 46 Senegal /9 212 I 15 7 128 3 12 2 82 0 3 47 Philippines 141 2,155 276 291 74 705 186 47 26 1,471 19 55 48 Cbted'Ivoire 78 826 4 900 29 280 2 529 12 187 0 212 49 Dominican Rep. 38 141 22 0 7 89 20 5 4 57 8 3 50 PapuaNew Guinea 43 275 III 205 0 174 20 199 1 86 8 90 51 Guatemala 37 /40 6 7 20 87 2 3 6 76 1 10 52 Morocco 168 1,345 8 8 37 742 3 8 24 873 1 5 53 Cameroon 29 764 II 53 5 127 2 130 4 173 I 17 54 Ecuador 41 629 7 30 16 470 /1 25 7 401 3 12 55 SyrianArabRep. 60 361 0 0 31 1,253 0 0 6 122 0 0 56 Congo 18 134 0 0 6 140 0 0 3 104 0 0 57 ElSalvador 8 109 24 0 6 III 16 14 4 72 6 3 58 Paraguay 14 80 0 0 7 III 0 9 4 75 0 0 59 Pent 148 248 240 0 100 149 233 35 43 89 119 10 60 Jordan 15 381 0 0 3 349 0 0 2 272 0 0 61 Colombia 253 1,857 0 146 78 /,876 59 296 44 1,240 15 101 62 Thailand 51 1,513 169 1,149 23 2,424 107 847 16 877 17 334 63 Tunisia 89 1,021 0 30 47 909 0 37 18 399 0 10 64 Jamaica 15 264 165 0 6 300 164 8 9 224 54 3 65 Turkey 331 4,344 1 543 128 3,426 3 283 42 2,763 2 61 66 Romania . . 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 260 Disbursements Repayment ofprincipal Interest payments (millions of dollars) (millions of dollars) (mt/lions of dollars) Long-term public Long-term public long-term public and pub/ic/v Private and public/c Private and pub/ic/v Private guaranteed non guaranteed guaranteed nonguaranteed guaranteed nonguaranteed 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 /970 1990 67 Poland 540 0 0 642 0 0 206 0 0 68 Panama 67 6 0 0 24 51 0 0 7 90 0 0 69 Costa Rica 30 202 30 5 21 263 20 6 7 169 7 2 70 Chile 408 707 247 1,545 166 474 41 271 78 1,096 26 252 71 Botswana 6 25 0 0 0 62 0 0 0 36 0 0 72 Algeria 313 5,568 0 0 35 6,156 0 0 10 1,914 0 0 73 Bulgaria 437 0 0 828 0 0 456 0 0 74 Mauritius 2 93 0 57 1 43 0 16 2 35 0 6 75 Malaysia 45 1,779 12 685 47 2,220 9 470 22 1,125 3 104 76 Argentina 482 914 424 0 344 1,664 428 0 121 2,129 217 144 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. 139 0 0 225 0 0 28 0 0 78 Albania S S S 79 Angola 628 0 0 133 0 0 89 0 0 80 Lebanon 12 76 0 0 2 56 0 0 I 32 0 0 81 Mongolia 82 Namibia 83 Nicaragua 44 445 0 0 16 4 0 0 7 5 84 Yemen,Rep. 6 261 0 0 0 73 0 0 0 23 Upper-middle-income 85 Mexico 772 7,901 603 1,484 475 2,615 542 1046 216 5.365 67 400 86 South Africa - S - 87 Venezuela 216 2,224 67 0 42 920 25 173 40 2,597 13 400 88 Uruguay 37 375 13 80 47 399 4 75 16 3t1 2 10 89 Brazil 896 2,686 900 875 256 2,718 200 1,008 135 2,223 89 460 90 Hungary 2,573 0 0 - - 2,233 0 0 1,571 0 0 91 Yugoslavia 179 446 465 1,215 170 776 204 1,210 73 1,266 32 380 92 Czechoslovakia 1,866 0 0 984 0 0 365 0 0 93 Gahon 26 161 0 0 9 53 0 0 3 75 0 0 94 Trinidadand Tobago 8 47 0 0 10 164 0 0 6 133 0 0 95 Portugal 18 2,332 20 185 81 3,310 22 99 55 1,007 5 48 96 Korea,Rep. 444 3,198 32 1,529 198 3,539 7 2,090 71 1,267 5 507 97 Greece S - S S S - S S S S 98 Saudi Arabia S S S S S S - - 99 Iraq S S S S S S - tOO Libya tOt Oman 104 0 0 0 567 0 0 0 177 0 0 Low- and middle-income Sub-Saharan Africa East Asia & Pacific South Asia Europe Middle East & N.Africa Latin America & Caribbean Other economies Severely indebted High-income economies OECD members tOther 102 Ireland 103 tlsrael 104 Spain 105 tSingapore 106 tHong Kong 107 New Zealand 108 Belgium 109 United Kingdom 110 Italy Ill Australia 112 Netherlands 113 Austria 114 France ItS tUnited Arab Emirates 116 Canada 117 United States 118 Denmark 119 Germany 120 Norway 121 Sweden 122 Japan 123 Finland 124 Switzerland 125 lKuwai( World Fuel exporters, exci. former USSR 261 Table 23. Aggregate net resource flows and net transfers Net flows on long-term debt (millions of dollars) Public and pub- Private Net foreign direct Aggregate net Aggregate net liclv guaranteed non guaranteed Official grants investment resource flows transfers 1970 1990 1970 1990 /970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 Low-income economies China and India Other low-income I Mozambique - 145 0 8 0 764 0 0 0 917 0 909 2 Tanzania 49 246 5 0 6 729 0 0 60 975 57 904 3 Ethiopia 13 133 0 0 6 590 4 0 23 723 10 678 4 Somalia 4 40 0 0 9 304 5 0 17 344 16 340 5 Nepal -2 135 0 0 16 160 0 0 14 295 14 269 6 Chad 3 93 0 0 11 179 1 0 15 271 13 268 7 Bhutan 4 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 32 0 29 8 LaoPDR 4 99 0 0 28 66 0 0 33 165 32 162 9 Malawi 37 84 0 -I 7 262 9 0 52 345 41 312 10 Bangladesh 0 846 0 0 0 891 0 3 0 1,740 0 1,582 11 Burundi 1 67 0 0 7 144 0 1 8 212 8 196 12 Zaire 3 175 0 0 37 319 0 0 41 494 2 393 13 Uganda 22 258 0 0 2 260 4 0 27 519 10 503 14 Madagascar 5 116 0 0 20 360 10 0 36 476 34 383 IS Sierra Leone -3 35 0 0 1 47 8 0 7 81 -1 78 16 Mali 23 87 0 0 12 229 0 -I 34 315 32 294 17 Nigeria 18 -479 -5 -15 40 149 205 588 259 243 -207 -1,653 18 Niger 11 105 0 6 IS 224 1 0 26 334 23 312 19 Rwandu 0 53 0 0 10 159 0 8 10 220 10 207 20 BurkinaFaso 0 61 0 0 13 170 0 0 13 230 II 220 21 India 594 3,029 0 -104 157 684 6 0 757 3,610 565 200 22 Benin 1 90 0 0 9 110 7 0 17 200 13 196 23 China - . 6,249 0 0 0 333 0 3,489 0 10,071 0 7,492 24 Haiti 1 31 0 0 2 88 3 8 6 128 2 114 25 Kenya 17 394 30 -37 4 942 14 26 64 1,324 -2 1,010 26 Pakistan 375 923 2 -13 79 381 23 249 479 1,540 395 978 27 Ghana 28 257 0 0 9 440 68 IS 104 712 79 646 28 CentralAfricanRep. -1 116 0 0 6 87 I 0 7 203 5 194 29 Togo 3 54 0 0 7 97 1 0 11 152 5 98 30 Zambia 316 61 5 2 2 633 -297 0 26 696 -65 638 31 Guinea 80 113 0 0 1 106 0 0 80 219 76 203 32 Sri Lanka 36 30! 0 -2 14 226 0 3! 50 556 30 409 33 Mauritania 1 51 0 0 3 97 1 0 5 148 -8 136 34 Lesotho 0 38 0 0 8 69 0 17 8 124 7 103 35 Indonesia 383 476 134 4,556 84 342 83 964 683 6,337 510 1,242 36 Honduras 26 167 7 -18 0 223 8 0 41 373 17 19! 37 Egypt, Arab Rep. -29 477 0 -81 150 4,376 0 947 122 5,719 82 4,558 38 Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . - - 39 Cambodia . . . - - . . . . . . . - - . . . . . . . . - 40 Liberia -4 0 0 0 1 49 0 0 -3 49 -9 49 41 Myanmar 2 77 0 0 16 75 0 0 Il 152 14 139 42 Sudan 30 17! 0 0 2 476 0 0 32 647 16 639 43 VietNam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Middle-income economies Lower-middle-income 44 Bolivia 38 125 I -24 0 193 -76 45 -37 340 -61 193 45 Zimbabwe -5 71 0 76 0 210 0 0 -5 356 -9 209 46 Senegal 13 83 -2 4 16 512 5 0 32 599 15 48! 47 Philippines 67 1,450 90 245 16 394 -25 530 148 2,618 80 78! 48 Côted'Ivoire 49 546 2 371 12 286 3! -48 94 1156 33 756 49 Dominican Rep. 31 52 2 -S 10 3! 72 133 115 210 102 150 50 Papua New Guinea 43 10! 9! 7 144 277 0 0 278 385 268 209 SI Guatemala 17 53 4 4 4 67 29 0 55 124 18 38 52 Morocco 131 603 5 0 23 472 20 165 179 1,240 134 292 53 Cameroon 24 637 9 -77 2! 376 16 0 70 936 61 746 54 Ecuador 26 159 -4 5 2 5! 89 82 112 297 83 -24! 55 SyrianArabRep. 29 -892 0 0 1! 582 0 0 4! -311 35 -433 56 Congo 13 -6 0 0 5 5! 0 0 18 46 15 -58 57 ElSalvador 2 -2 8 -14 2 160 4 0 15 145 -1 70 58 Paraguay 7 -31 0 -9 2 9 4 79 13 47 5 -43 59 Peru 48 99 7 -35 20 186 -70 34 4 285 -23! 169 60 Jordan 12 32 0 0 41 670 0 0 53 702 51 430 6! Colombia 174 -18 -59 -149 2! 59 43 50! 179 392 26 -1,99! 62 Thailand 28 -911 62 302 6 219 43 2,376 139 1,985 87 468 63 Tunisia 42 112 0 -7 42 184 16 58 99 347 61 -173 64 Jamaica 9 -37 1 -8 3 129 162 0 174 84 6 -143 65 Turkey 203 918 -2 260 21 817 58 697 280 2,692 202 -293 66 Romania 0 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 0 19 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 262 Net flows on long-term debt (millions of dollars) Public and pub- Private Net foreign direct Aggregate net Aggregate net liclv guaranteed nonguaranteed Official grants investment resource flows transfers 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 /990 67 Poland 24 -102 0 0 0 0 0 89 24 -13 24 -239 68 Panama 44 -45 0 0 0 91 33 -30 77 16 51 -98 69 CostaRica 9 -62 10 -1 4 119 26 III 49 168 3! -60 70 Chile 242 233 206 1,274 II 66 -79 595 381 2,167 172 484 71 Botswana 6 -37 0 0 9 90 0 148 IS 201 14 -133 72 Algeria 279 -589 0 0 56 76 47 0 381 -513 221 -2,578 73 Bulgaria . -391 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -391 0 -847 74 Mauritius 1 50 0 4! 3 27 2 41 5 160 3 96 75 Malaysia -2 -44! 3 215 4 54 94 2,902 99 2,730 -92 -417 76 Argentina 139 -749 -4 0 I 39 II 2,036 147 1,326 -264 -1,665 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. . . -86 0 0 0 52 28 0 28 -33 -788 -6! 78 Albania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S 79 Angola . . 495 0 0 0 160 0 0 0 655 0 566 80 Lebanon 10 20 0 0 2 95 0 0 12 114 11 83 8! Mongolia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Namibia 83 Nicaragua 28 441 0 0 2 251 15 0 45 692 iS 687 84 Yemen, Rep. 6 187 0 0 8 273 0 0 14 460 14 437 Upper-middle-income 85 Mexico 297 5,286 61 438 II 64 323 2,632 692 8,420 50 1,34! 86 South Africa . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Venezuela 174 1,304 41 -173 0 9 -23 451 192 1,59! -429 -1,630 88 Uruguay -10 -23 9 5 2 14 0 0 1 -4 -18 -325 89 Brazil 640 -32 700 -133 26 71 42! 1,340 1,787 1.247 1,177 -3,816 90 Hungary . . 340 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 340 0 -1,268 9! Yugoslavia 9 -331 26! 5 0 0 0 0 270 -326 166 -1,972 92 Czechoslovakia . . 882 0 0 0 0 0 207 0 1 089 0 724 93 Gabon 17 108 0 0 10 41 -1 -50 26 100 23 -45 94 TrinidadandTohago -3 -117 0 0 I 7 83 109 81 0 16 -331 95 Portugal -63 -978 -1 86 0 14 0 2,123 -64 1,245 -124 78 96 Korea,Rep. 246 -341 25 -561 119 13 66 715 456 -174 374 -2,214 97 Greece 98 Saudi Arabia 99 Iraq 100 Libya . . . . . . . . . . . S . . . 101 Oman . . -463 0 0 0 61 0 144 0 -259 0 -825 Low- and middle-income Sub-Saharan Africa East Asia & Pacific South Asia Europe Middle East & N.Africa Latin America & Caribbean Other economies Severely indebted High-income economies OECD members tOther 102 Ireland 103 tlsrael 104 Spain 105 tSingapore 106 Hong Kong 107 New Zealand 108 Belgium 109 United Kingdom 110 Italy Ill Australia 112 Netherlands 113 Austria 114 France 115 tUnited Arab Emirates 116 Canada 117 United States 118 Denmark 119 Germany 120 Norway 121 Sweden 122 Japan 123 Finland 124 Switzerland 125 ±Kuwait World Fuel exporters, excl. former USSR 263 Table 24. Total external debt ratios Total debt sen'ice as Total external debt as a percentage of a percentage of Interest pa3ments as a Exports of goods exports of goods percentage of exports and services GNP and services of goods and services 1980 1990 1980 1990 1980 1990 1980 /990 Low-income economies 105.1 w 218.5 w 16.4 w 41.0 w 10.3 w 20.1 w 5.1w 9.3w China and India 69.0 w 132.3 w 5.3 w 19.0 w 6,4 w 15.3 w 2.6w 7.6w Other low-income 120.4 w 306.5 w 33.2 w 82.6 w 11.9w 24.9w 6.1 w 11.0w I Mozambiquc 0.0 1,573.3 0.0 384.5 0.0 14.4 0.0 7.7 2 Tanzania 317.8 1,070.7 47.7 282.0 19.6 25.8 10.0 10.9 3 Ethiopia 136.2 480.3 19.5 54.2 7.6 33.0 4.7 8.1 4 Somalia 252.0 2,576.2 109.5 276.9 4.9 11.7 0.9 5.8 5 Nepal 85.5 402.6 10.4 53.0 3.2 18.2 2.1 7.4 6 Chad 305.9 207.1 30.2 44.8 8.3 5.1 0.7 2.2 7 Bhutan . . 81.9 0.0 32.3 . . 6.8 2.5 8 LaoPDR . . 1,113.5 . . 123.3 . . 12.1 3.2 9 Malawi 260.8 328.5 72.1 85.6 27.7 22.5 16.7 9.1 10 Bangladesh 345.6 448.2 31.3 53.8 23.2 25.4 6.4 7.7 II Burundi 180.1 930.1 18.2 83.2 9.5 43.6 4.8 14.5 12 Zaire 206.4 438.0 35.3 141.0 22.6 15.4 11.0 6.6 13 Uganda 240.2 1,175.2 62.9 92.1 18.3 54.5 3.7 14.5 14 Madagascar 242.4 805.5 31.5 134.1 17.2 47.2 10.9 22.5 15 Sierra Leone 157.7 773.7 40.7 146.2 22.9 l5.9 5.7 11.2 16 Mali 227.3 433.4 45.4 100.7 5.1 11.5 2.3 4.2 17 Nigeria 32.2 242.7 10.0 110.9 4.2 20.3 3.3 12.1 18 Niger 132.8 464.2 34.5 73.6 21.7 24.1 12.9 8.9 19 Rwanda 103.4 494.1 16.3 35.0 4.2 14.5 2.8 7.6 20 Burkina Faso 88.0 156.0 19.4 26.4 5.9 6.4 3.1 2.9 21 India 136.0 282.4 11.9 25.0 9.3 28.8 4.2 15.9 22 Benin 131.1 316.9 29.8 . . 6.3 3.4 4.5 1.9 23 China 21.2 77.4 1.5 14.4 4.4 10.3 1.5 4.6 24 Haiti 72.9 258.4 20.9 36.1 6.2 9.5 1.8 4.1 25 Kenya 165.1 306.3 48.3 81.2 21.4 33.8 11.3 14.8 26 Pakistan 208.8 249.6 42.4 52.1 17.9 22.8 7.6 9.8 27 Ghana 116.0 353.4 31.8 56.8 13.1 34.9 4.4 9.9 28 CentralAfricanRep. 94.7 400.7 24.3 70.6 4.9 11.9 1.6 5.1 29 Togo 180.1 212.2 95.3 81.8 9.0 14,1 5.8 7.0 30 Zambia 201.0 500.8 90.9 261.3 25.3 12.3 8.8 4.3 31 Guinea 201.9 287.1 . . 97.6 19.8 8.3 6.0 2.4 32 Sri Lanka 123.4 209.8 46.1 73.2 12.0 13.8 5.7 6.2 33 Mauritania 306.6 449.8 125.7 226.6 17.3 13.9 7.9 5.0 34 Lesotho 19.5 41.2 11.2 39.6 1.5 2.4 0.6 0.8 35 Indonesia 94.2 229.4 28.0 66.4 13.9 30.9 6.5 13.1 36 Honduras 152.0 322.2 61.5 140.9 21.4 40.0 12.4 19.4 37 Egypt, Arab Rep. 227.7 300.8 97.8 126.5 14.8 25.7 9.2 11.0 38 Afghanistan 39 Cambodia 40 Liberia 111.8 62.7 8.7 1 . 5.8 41 Myanmar 269.9 25.4 . . 9.4 42 Sudan 499.4 1,829.1 77.2 . . 25.5 5.8 12.8 4.0 43 VietNam Middle-income economies 135.2 w 155.6 w 31.9 w 39.9 w 24.3 w 19.1 w 12.5 w 8.3 w Lower-middle-income 115.2 w 179.0 w 31.7 w 53.3 w 18.8 w 20.3w 9.1 w 8.4w 44 Bolivia 258.2 428.7 93.3 100.9 35.0 39.8 21.1 15.9 45 Zimbabwe 45.4 155.0 14.9 54.1 3.8 22.6 1.5 9.6 46 Senegal 162.7 236.8 50.5 66.5 28.7 20.4 10.5 8.1 47 Philippines 212.3 229.2 53.8 69.3 26.6 21.2 18.2 13.0 48 Côted'Ivoire 160.7 487.4 58.8 204.8 28.3 38.6 13.0 13.3 49 Dominican Rep. 133.8 188.7 31.5 63.3 25.3 10.3 12.0 3.7 50 Papua New Guinea 66.1 168.6 29.2 83.9 13.8 36.0 6.6 11.7 51 Guatemala 62.3 175.2 14.9 37.5 7.7 13.3 3.6 6.9 52 Morocco 224.5 282.5 53.3 97.1 32.7 23.4 17.0 11.7 53 Cameroon 136.7 257.6 36.8 56.8 15.2 21.5 8.1 10.4 54 Ecuador 201.6 371.8 53.8 120.6 33.9 33.2 15.9 14.5 55 SyrianArabRep. 106.2 301.2 27.1 118.1 11.4 26.9 4.7 3.9 56 Congo 146.7 352.5 98.0 203.6 10.8 20.7 6.7 10.5 57 El Salvador 71.1 170.8 25.9 40.4 7.5 17.1 4.7 6.7 58 Paraguay 121.8 112.3 20.7 40.5 18.6 11.0 8.5 4.6 59 Peru 207.7 488.3 51.0 58.7 46.5 11.0 19.9 5.3 60 Jordan 79.2 249.2 . . 221.1 8.4 23.0 4.3 11.4 61 Colombia 117.1 183.4 20.9 44.5 16.0 38.9 11.6 15.8 62 Thailand 96.8 82.0 26.0 32.6 18.9 17.2 9.5 6.0 63 Tunisia 96.0 127.7 41.6 62.2 14.8 25.8 6.9 7.8 64 Jamaica 129.3 202.6 78.3 132.0 19.0 31.0 10.8 12.5 65 Turkey 332.9 195.0 34.3 46.1 28.0 28.2 14.9 13.3 66 Romania 80.3 5.5 1.1 12.6 0.4 4.9 0.4 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 264 Total debt service as Total external debt as a percentage of Interest payments as a a percentage of Exports of goods exports of goods percentage of exports and services GNP and services of goods and sers'ices 1980 1990 1980 1990 1980 1990 1980 1990 67 Poland 54.9 251.5 16.3 82.0 17.9 4.9 5.2 1.6 68 Panama 38.4 126.5 92.3 154.7 6.3 4.3 3.3 2.0 69 Costa Rica 224.7 184.2 59.5 69.9 29.0 24.5 14.6 10.1 70 Chile 192.5 181.3 45.2 73.5 43.1 25.9 19.0 16.8 71 Botswana 17.8 22.9 16.2 20.6 1.9 4.4 1.1 1.6 72 Algeria 130.0 193.0 47.1 53.1 27.1 59.4 10.4 15.1 73 Bulgaria 2.9 135.9 1.1 56.9 0.3 16.7 0.2 6.4 74 Mauritius 80.7 53.5 41.6 37.9 9.1 8.7 5.9 2.9 75 Malaysia 44.6 55.9 28.0 48.0 6.3 11.7 4.0 4.0 76 Argentina 242.4 405.6 48.4 61.7 37.3 34.1 20.8 18.4 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. 32.0 48.2 4,9 7.6 6.8 3.5 3.1 2.3 78 Albania 79 Angola 80 Lebanon 81 Mongolia 82 Namjbja . . . . . . . 0 . 83 Nicaragua 422.2 2,728.6 112.1 . . 22.3 4.1 13.4 3.0 84 Yemen,Rep. . . 214.2 . . 97.1 . . 5.4 . . 2.9 Upper-middle-income 159.6 w 132.1 w 32.0 w 29.8 w 31.0 w 17.9 w 16.6 w 8.2 w 85 Mexico 259.2 222.0 30.5 42.1 49.5 27.8 27.4 16.7 86 South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Venezuela 131.9 158.7 42.1 71.0 27.2 20.7 13.8 15.5 88 Uruguay 104.1 155.9 17.0 46.9 18.8 41.0 10.6 15.9 89 Brazil 304.9 326.8 31.2 25.1 63.1 20.8 33.8 8,2 90 Hungary 95.9 188.6 44.8 67.8 18.9 37.9 10.8 15.2 91 Yugoslavia 103.1 67.1 25.6 23.7 20.8 13.7 7.2 6.1 92 Czechoslovakia 68.6 55.6 9.8 18.6 9,5 10.4 9.5 3.8 93 Gabon 62.2 138.4 39.2 86.2 17.7 7.6 6.3 5.0 94 Trinidad and Tobago 24.6 99.4 14.0 50.8 6.8 14.5 1.6 7.4 95 Portugal 99.5 75.4 40.5 36.5 18.3 17.8 10.5 5.3 96 Korea, Rep. 130.6 44.0 48.7 14.4 19.7 10.7 12.7 3.5 97 Greece 98 Saudi Arabia 99 Iraq 100 Libya lOt Om,'rn 154 42.1 11.2 6.4 13.0 1'. 3.4 Low- and middle-income 127.0 w 171.3 w 26.2 w 40.2 w 20.5 w 19.4 w 10.5 w 8.5 w Sub-Saharan Africa 96.8 w 324.3 w 28.5 w 109.4 w 10.9 w 19.3 w 5.7 w 8.9 w East Asia & Pacific 88.8 w 91.1 w 16.8 w 26.9 is' 13.5 w 14.6 w 7.7 w 5.8 w South Asia 162.9 w 281.5 w 17.3w 30.7 is' 12.2 w 25.9w 5.2 w 13.1 w Europe 90.6 w 125.7 w 23.8 w 41.0 w 15.9 w 16.9 w 7.1 w 6.8 w Middle East & N.Africa 114.9 w 180.3 w 31.1 w 52.6 is' 16.4 w 24.4 w 7.4 w 8.1 w Latin America & Caribbean 196.8 w 257.4 w 35.2 w 41.6 is' 37.3 w 25.0 w 19.7 w 13.3 w Other economies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Severely indebted 180.7 w 273.8 w 34.4 w 46.4 is' 35.1 w 25.3 w 17.7 w 11.8w High-income economies OECD members tOther 102 Ireland 103 tlsrael 104 Spain l05 tSingapore 106 tHong Kong 107 New Zealand 108 Belgium 109 United Kingdom 110 Italy Ill Australia 112 Netherlands 113 Austria 114 France ItS i'United Arab Emirates 116 Canada 117 United States 118 Denmark 119 Germany 120 Norway 121 Sweden 122 Japan 123 Finland 124 Switzerland 125 tKuwait World Fuel exporters, excl. former USSR 265 Table 25. Terms of external public borrowing Average Average Public loans with variable Commitments interest rate Average maturity grace period interest rates, as a (millions of dollars) (percent) (years) (years) percentage of public debt 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 Low-income economies 4,823 t 36,364 3.2 w 5.4 w 29 w 23 w 8w 7w 0.1 w 19.0 w China and India 954 1 16,682 2.5 w 6.5 w 34 w 20 w 8w 6w 0.0 w 25.5 w Other low-income 3,869 I 19,682 1 3.3 w 4.4 w 27 w 26 w 9w 7w 0.2 w 16.0 w I Mozumbique . . 163 . . 1.6 . . 37 . . 10 . . 4.2 2 Tanzania 271 603 1.0 0.8 40 37 II 10 0.0 4.5 3 Ethiopia 21 383 4.4 2.4 32 30 7 8 0.! 3.2 4 Somalia 22 72 0.0 0.8 20 42 16 11 0.0 1.0 5 Nepal 17 204 2.8 0.9 27 40 6 10 0.0 0.0 6 Chad 10 66 5.7 1.0 8 35 1 1! 0.0 0.0 7 Bhutan . . 0 . . 0.0 . . 0 . . 0 . . 0.0 8 LaoPDR 12 139 3.0 0.8 28 40 4 15 0.0 0.0 9 Malawi 14 237 3.8 1.0 29 36 6 10 0.0 3.5 10 Bangladesh 0 1,325 0.0 2.0 0 34 0 9 0.0 0.0 11 Burundi 1 120 2.9 0.8 5 4! 2 II 0.0 0.0 12 Zaire 258 27 6.5 1.1 12 36 4 10 0.0 15.5 13 Uganda 12 469 3.9 1.0 29 33 7 9 2.4 1.7 14 Madagascar 23 207 2.3 1.0 39 37 9 10 0.0 6.4 15 SierraLeone 25 13 2.9 4.5 27 15 6 7 10.6 1.2 16 Mali 34 97 1.1 1.1 25 34 9 10 0.0 0.4 17 Nigeria 65 2,017 6.0 6.7 14 19 4 4 2.7 34.5 18 Niger 19 146 1.2 7.6 40 21 8 9 0.0 9.1 19 Rwanda 9 72 0.8 1.4 50 34 10 9 0.0 0.0 20 BurkinaFaso 9 76 2.3 2.2 36 29 8 9 0.0 0.3 21 India 954 6,896 2.5 4.8 34 25 8 8 0.0 17.5 22 Benin 7 47 1.8 0.8 32 48 7 10 0.0 1.7 23 China . . 9,786 . . 7.6 . . 17 . . 4 . . 36.4 24 Haiti 5 104 4.8 1.4 10 39 1 12 0.0 0.7 25 Kenya 50 582 2.6 4.4 37 23 8 6 0.1 3.5 26 Pakistan 951 2,997 2.8 5.5 32 21 12 6 0.0 12.6 27 Ghana 51 526 2.0 2.4 37 34 10 9 0.0 0.8 28 CentralAfrican Rep. 7 175 2.0 1.0 36 38 8 10 0.0 0.0 29 Togo 3 97 4.5 0.8 17 41 4 10 0.0 3.4 30 Zambia 557 52 4.2 9.0 27 6 9 2 0.0 13.8 31 Guinea 68 174 2.9 0.7 13 40 5 10 0.0 8.0 32 SriLanka 81 789 3.0 1.9 27 34 5 9 0.0 2.6 33 Mauritania 7 146 6.0 3.9 Ii 29 3 8 0.0 5.6 34 Lesotho 0 13 5.5 3.0 20 37 2 8 0.0 0.0 35 Indonesia 530 6,071 2.6 6.0 34 22 9 6 0.0 28.4 36 Honduras 23 287 4.1 6.3 30 22 7 6 0.0 18.2 37 Egypt, Arab Rep. 528 800 4.1 5.3 17 27 5 8 0.0 11.3 38 Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Cambodia . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . 40 Liberia 12 0 6.7 0.0 19 0 5 0 0.0 10.9 41 Myanmar 48 0 4.1 0.0 16 0 5 0 0.0 0.0 42 Sudan 98 0 1.8 0.0 7 0 9 0 0.0 16.1 43 VietNam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Middle-income economies 7,300 t 56,313 t 6,3 w 7.8 w 16 w 14 w 4w 5w 2.9 w 47.6 w Lower-middle-income 3,752 1 31,372 1 5.6 w 7.2 w 18 w 16 w 4w 5w 0.6 w 43.7 w 44 Bolivia 24 495 1.9 4.1 48 30 4 8 0.0 19.9 45 Zimbabwe 0 399 0.0 7.0 0 16 0 4 0.0 21.0 46 Senegal 7 376 3.9 1.8 23 33 7 9 0.0 2.7 47 Philippines 171 3,249 7.3 6.0 II 22 2 7 0.8 40.2 48 Côted'Ivoire 71 1,066 5.8 3.7 19 19 5 6 9.0 50.6 49 Dominican Rep. 20 193 2.4 5.9 28 25 5 6 0.0 29.3 50 Papua New Guinea 91 200 6.4 6.4 22 15 8 5 0.0 27.1 51 Guatemala 50 62 5.5 6.0 26 21 6 6 10.3 11.9 52 Morocco 187 1,503 4.6 6.3 20 21 3 7 0.0 45.1 53 Cameroon 42 451 4.7 6.9 29 16 8 5 0.0 11.9 54 Ecuador 78 643 6.2 7.2 20 15 4 4 0.0 61.6 55 SyrianArabRep. 14 375 4.4 5.8 9 21 2 5 0.0 0.0 56 Congo 31 158 2.8 4.7 18 17 6 7 0.0 29.1 57 El Salvador 12 131 4.7 4.6 23 30 6 7 0.0 8.8 58 Paraguay 14 98 5.7 2.6 25 33 6 10 0.0 16.6 59 Peru 125 195 7.4 6.7 14 8 4 2 0.0 31.6 60 Jordan 36 175 3.7 8.2 16 17 5 5 0.0 24.4 61 Colombia 363 1,268 6.0 8.2 21 16 5 5 0.0 45.4 62 Thailand 106 1,721 6.8 5.5 19 21 4 7 0.0 24.5 63 Tunisia 144 649 3.5 5.6 28 20 6 6 0.0 19.3 64 Jamaica 24 315 6.0 8.0 16 17 3 4 0.0 25.0 65 Turkey 489 3,654 3.6 8.9 19 10 5 5 0.9 32.4 66 Romania . . 19 3.0 . . 26 10 0.0 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 266 Average Average Public loans with variable Cornmitntents interest rate Average maturiry grace period interest rates, as a (millions of dollars) (percent) (years) (years) percentage ofpublic debt 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 1970 1990 67 Poland . . 1,474 . . 8.3 . . 14 . . 5 . . 67.0 68 Panama 111 0 6.9 0.0 15 0 4 0 0.0 58.1 69 CostaRica 58 220 5.6 6.9 28 15 6 4 7.5 24.6 70 Chile 361 1,041 6.8 7.8 12 17 3 4 0.0 65.6 71 Botswana 38 47 0.6 6.7 39 22 10 6 0.0 14.3 72 Algeria 378 6,753 5.7 8.7 12 9 3 2 2.8 37.8 73 Bulgaria . . 88 . . 8.8 . . 2 . . 2 . . 73.7 74 Mauritius 14 136 0.0 6.2 24 18 2 6 6.0 18.1 75 Malaysia 84 2,270 6.1 7.4 19 14 5 5 0.0 48.8 76 Argentina 494 459 7.3 8.5 12 9 3 2 0.0 80.3 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. . . 585 . . 7.7 . . 9 . . 4 . . 70.9 78 Albania 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Angola . . 196 . . 7.0 . 17 . . 3 . . 6.7 80 Lebanon 7 60 2.9 7.1 21 25 1 3 0.0 9.6 81 Mongolia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 Namibia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0 83 Nicaragua 23 304 7.1 5.8 18 9 4 1 0.0 23.2 84 Yemen,Rep. 72 134 0.5 1.5 19 34 10 9 0.0 1.6 Upper-middle-income 3,548 1 24,941 I 7.0 w 8.5 w 14 w 13 w 4w Sw 5.9 w 53.3 w 85 Mexico 858 8,004 7.9 8.6 12 13 3 4 5.7 46.3 86 South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Venezuela 188 2,976 7.6 8.3 8 14 2 6 2.6 56.0 88 Uruguay 71 358 7.9 9.2 12 11 3 2 0.7 74.0 89 Brazil 1,439 1,862 7.0 8.5 14 12 3 5 11.8 69.2 90 Hungalya . 3,285 . . 8.9 . . 8 . . 5 . . 59.5 91 Yugoslavia 199 991 7.0 8.7 17 15 6 5 3.3 660 92 Czechoslovakia . . 1,270 . . 8.9 . . 5 . . 3 . . 27.0 93 Gabon 33 25 5.1 7.4 II 21 1 6 0.0 10.0 94 TrinidadandTobago 3 357 7.4 8.0 10 17 1 5 0.0 47.4 95 Portugal 59 3,573 4.3 8.3 17 16 4 5 0.0 29.0 96 Korea,Rep. 691 2,027 5.8 7.1 19 13 6 7 1.2 22.7 97 Greece . . . . . . . . . . . 98 Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . 99 Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 Libya lOt Oman 395 . . 7.7 . . 13 . . . . 54.3 Low- and middle-income 12,123 1 92,677 t 5.0 w 6.8 w 21 w 18 w 6w 5w 1.7 w 37.8 w Sub-Saharan Africa 1,890 1 9,577 1 3.6 w 3.9 w 26 w 26 w 8w 7w 0.9 w 18.2 w East Asia & Pacific 1,689 1 25,581 I 5.0 w 6.8 w 23 w 19 w 6w 6w 0.5 w 33.1 w South Asia 2,052 I 12,223 1 2.7 w 4.4 w 32 w 26 w 30 w 8w 0.0 w 12.9 w Europe 755 1 14,3661 4.6 w 8.7 w 19 w 12 w 5w 5w 1.5 w 51.2 w Middle East & N.Africa 1,3661 11,429 I 4.3 w 7.7 w 17 w 13 w 5w 4w 0.6 w 24.1 w Latin America & Caribbean 4,372 1 19,501 1 7.0 w 8.0 w 14 w 15 w 4w 5w 4.0 W 55.9 W Other economies . Severely indebted 3,9101 26,3541 6.9 w 8.0 w 14 w 13 w 3w 4w 5.0 w 55.2 w High-income economies OECD members tOther 102 Ireland 103 tlsrael 104 Spain 105 tSingapore 106 tHong Kong 107 New Zealand 108 Belgium 109 United Kingdom 110 Italy 111 Australia 112 Netherlands 113 Austria 114 France 115 tUnited Arab Emirates 116 Canada 117 United States 118 Denmark 119 Germany 120 Norway 121 Sweden 122 Japan 123 Finland 124 Switzerland 125 tKuwait World Fuel exporters, excl. former USSR a. Includes debt in convertible currencies only. 267 Table 26. Population growth and projections Hypothetical size Age structure of population (percent) Acerage annual growth of population of stationary (percent) Population (millions) 0-14 sears l5- sears population 1965 -80 1980-90 1989299a 1990 2JQa 2025a (millions) 1990 2025u 1990 2025u Low-income economies 2.3 w 2.0 w 1.8 w 3,0581 3,6701 5,1541 35.2 w 26.3 w 60.3 w 65.6 w China and India 2.2 w 1,7 w 1.5 w 1,9831 2,3001 2,9451 31.2 w 22.2 w 63.6 w 67.4 w Other low-income 2.5 w 2.6 w 2.5 w 1,0751 1,3701 2,2091 42.5 w 31.8 w 54.2 w 63.3 w I Mozambique 2.5 2.6 3.0 16 2! 42 97 44.1 40.4 52.7 56.9 2 Tanzania 2.9 3.1 3.1 25 33 64 146 46.7 40.2 50.3 57.2 3 Ethiopia 2.7 3.1 3.4 51 71 156 420 47.0 43.1 50.2 54.4 4 Somalia 2.9 3.1 3.1 8 11 21 47 46.0 39.4 51.0 57.4 5 Nepal 2.4 2.6 2.5 19 24 37 59 42.0 28.7 54.9 66.2 6 Chad 2.0 2.4 2.7 6 7 14 28 41.9 37.0 54.5 58.9 7 Bhutan 1.6 2.1 2.4 I 2 3 5 39.9 32.7 56.8 63.1 8 LaoPDR 1.9 2.7 3,2 4 6 10 21 44.8 37.0 53.3 59.5 9 Malawi 2.9 3.4 3.4 9 12 24 63 46.7 42.3 50.7 55.2 10 Bangladesh 2.6 2.3 1.8 107 128 176 257 42.9 25.7 54.0 68.9 II Burundi 1.9 2.8 3.1 5 7 14 32 45.6 40.7 51.4 56.7 12 Zaire 3.1 3.2 3.0 37 50 89 172 46.4 35.5 51.0 61.0 13 Uganda 3.0 2.5 3.3 16 23 42 92 48.7 39.7 48.5 58.3 14 Madagascar 2.5 3.0 2.8 12 15 26 46 45.5 32.6 51.5 63.7 15 Sierra Leone 2.0 2.4 2.6 4 5 10 23 43.4 40.4 53.5 56.3 16 Mali 2.1 2.5 3.0 8 II 23 58 46.6 40.8 50.2 56.7 17 Nigeria 2.5 3.2 2.8 115 153 255 453 46.4 32.1 51.0 63.9 18 Niger 2.6 3.3 3.3 8 II 24 72 47.2 44.7 50.2 52.9 19 Rwanda 3.3 3.3 3.9 7 10 23 65 48.0 44.1 49.5 53.8 20 Burkina Faso 2.1 2.6 2.9 9 12 22 48 45.5 38.4 51.4 58.9 21 India 2.3 2.1 1.7 850 1,006 1,348 1862 36.9 24.0 58.7 68.4 22 Benin 2.7 3.2 2.9 5 6 10 19 47.6 33.5 49.7 63.4 23 China 2.2 1.4 1.3 1134 1,294 1,597 1890 27.0 20.8 67.2 66.5 24 Haiti 1.7 1.9 1.9 6 8 II 20 40.0 31.2 55.9 64.2 25 Kenya 3.6 3.8 3.5 24 34 64 125 49.9 35.2 47.3 61.6 26 Pakistan 3.1 3.1 2.7 t 12 t47 240 399 44.2 30.4 53.0 65.1 27 Ghana 2.2 3.4 3.0 IS 20 34 62 46.8 32.9 50.3 63.3 28 Central African Rep. 1.8 2.7 2.5 3 4 6 II 42.1 33.9 54.9 62.8 29 Togo 3.0 3.5 3.2 4 5 9 18 48.1 35.4 48.8 61.4 30 Zambia 3.0 3.7 3.1 8 II 20 42 49.3 38.6 48.5 59.2 31 Guinea 1.5 2.5 2.8 6 8 15 33 46.1 40.2 51.3 57.0 32 SriLanka 1.8 1.4 1.1 17 19 24 28 32.3 21.0 62.7 66.0 33 Mauritania 2.4 2.4 2.8 2 3 5 14 44.6 42.4 52.1 55.0 34 Lesotho 2.3 2.7 2.6 2 2 4 6 43.4 29.5 53.1 65.7 35 Indonesia 2.4 1.8 1.6 178 209 275 360 35.8 23.0 60.3 68.3 36 Honduras 3.2 3,4 2.9 5 7 II 18 44.8 28.1 52.1 66.9 37 Egypt, Arab Rep. 2.1 2.4 1.8 52 62 86 120 39.2 24.4 56.6 67.6 38 Afghanistan 2.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Cambodia 0.3 2.6 1.9 8 10 14 20 34.8 26.1 62.3 66.6 40 Liberia 3.0 3.1 3.0 3 3 6 It 44.9 32.2 52.0 63.6 41 Myanmar 2.3 2.1 2.0 42 5! 70 96 37.1 24.0 58.8 68.5 42 Sudan 3.0 2.7 2.8 25 33 55 102 45.2 33.6 52.2 62.5 43 VietNam 2.3 2.! 2.1 66 82 116 159 39.6 24.1 55.9 68.8 Middle-income economies 2.3w 2.0w 1.9w 1,0881 1,311 I 1,8781 35.8w 26.8w 58.1 w 64.7w Lower-middle-income 2.4 w 2.2 w 2.0 w 629 1 771 I 1,163 1 37.6 w 28.3 w 57.8 w 64.2 w 44 Bolivia 2.5 2.5 2.5 7 9 14 21 42.5 26.2 54.1 68.1 45 Zimbabwe 3.1 3.4 2.4 10 12 18 28 45.5 26.8 52.0 68.1 46 Senegal 2.9 2.9 3.1 7 10 19 44 46.7 40.0 50.6 57.6 47 Philippines 2.8 2.4 1.8 61 74 10! 137 39.9 23.9 56.8 68.4 48 Côte d'Ivoire 4.1 3.8 3.5 12 17 31 64 47.4 36.2 50.1 60.5 49 Dominican Rep. 2.7 2.2 1.6 7 8 II 14 37.3 22.9 59.3 68.0 50 PapuaNewGuinca 2.4 2.5 2.3 4 5 7 II 41.1 27.6 56.2 67.8 51 Guatemala 2.8 2.9 2.8 9 t2 20 33 45.2 28.7 51.8 66.4 52 Morocco 2.5 2.6 2.4 25 32 47 70 40.8 25.7 55.6 68.0 53 Cameroon 2.7 3.0 2.9 12 16 28 53 46.3 33.7 49.9 62.4 54 Ecuador 3.1 2.4 2.0 10 13 18 24 39.5 23.7 56.9 68.5 55 SyrianArabRep. 3.4 3.6 3.6 12 18 35 66 48.2 34.3 49.1 61.8 56 Congo 2.8 3.4 3.3 2 3 6 4 45.2 38.9 50.9 58.1 57 El Salvador 2.8 1.4 1.8 5 6 9 13 43.7 25.0 52.7 69.4 58 Paraguay 2.8 3.2 2.8 4 6 10 16 41.1 30.2 55.4 63.7 59 Peru 2.8 2.3 2.0 22 27 37 50 38.0 23.9 58.3 68.4 60 Jordanb 4,3 3.7 3.8 3 5 10 28 45.4 39.7 52.1 56.8 6! Colombia 2.4 2.0 1.5 32 38 50 63 35.4 22.0 60.6 68.0 62 Thailand 2.9 1.8 1.4 56 64 84 105 33.9 21.9 63.1 68.0 63 Tunisia 2.1 2.3 1.9 8 tO 14 18 37.8 23.4 58.1 68.5 64 Jamaica 1.3 1.3 0.7 2 3 3 4 34.2 21.7 59.3 67.6 65 Turkey 2.4 2.4 1.9 56 68 91 20 34.8 23.1 60.9 67.6 66 Romania 1.1 0.4 0.4 23 24 27 3! 23.8 20.3 65.9 64.1 Note; Fordata comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 268 Hpothettcal size Age structure of population (percent) Average annual growth ofpopulation of stationary (percent) Population (millions) 0-14 years 15-64 sears population - - 1965-80 1980-90 1989_2000u 1990 20000 2025a 1990 2025a 1990 2025a (millions) 67 Poland 0.8 0.7 0.4 38 40 44 50 25.! 19.9 64.9 62.3 68 Panama 2.6 2.1 1.6 2 3 4 5 34.9 21.9 60.4 67.2 69 CostaRica 2.7 2.4 1.9 3 3 5 6 36.! 22.1 59.7 66.2 70 Chile 1.7 1.7 1.3 13 15 19 23 30.5 21.3 63.6 65.7 7! Botswana 3.6 3.3 2.5 I 2 2 4 47.4 25.5 49.2 69.0 72 Algeria 3.1 3.0 2.8 25 33 52 78 43.6 25.7 52.7 68.5 73 Bulgaria 0.5 0.0 -0.2 9 9 9 9 19.9 17.9 66.6 60.9 74 Mauritius 1.6 1.0 0.9 I I I 2 29.4 19.0 65.2 67.0 75 Malaysia 2.5 2.6 2.3 18 22 32 44 38.3 23.9 58.1 67.4 76 Argentina 1.6 1.3 1.0 32 36 44 54 29.8 21.5 6!.! 65.0 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. 3.1 3.6 3.4 56 78 166 492 44.4 40.0 52.6 55.9 78 Albania 2.4 2.0 1.5 3 4 5 6 33.5 22.! 61.2 66.3 79 Angola 2.8 2.6 3.0 10 13 27 62 44.8 39.9 52.1 56.9 80 Lebanon 1.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Mongolia 2.6 2.8 2.5 2 3 4 6 40.7 25.9 55.7 67.9 82 Namibia 2.4 3.2 3.0 2 2 4 7 45.8 31.2 51.! 64.5 83 Nicaragua 3.1 3.4 3.0 4 5 9 14 45.9 28.4 51.5 66.4 84 Yemen, Rep. 2.3 3.1 3.7 II 16 37 110 48.7 44.2 48.2 54.! Upper-middle-income 2.2 w 1.7 w 1.7 w 458 r 541 1 715 t 33.8 w 24.3 w 60.9 w 65.7 w 85 Mexico 3.1 2.0 1.8 86 103 142 184 37.3 22.9 59.0 68.3 86 South Africa 2.4 2.4 2.2 36 45 65 96 38.2 25.6 57.8 67.0 87 Venezuela 3.5 2.7 2.! 20 24 34 45 38.3 23.3 58.2 67.5 88 Uruguay 0.4 0.6 0.6 3 3 4 4 25.8 20.0 62.8 63.9 89 Brazil 2.4 2.2 1.7 ISO 178 237 305 35.4 22.8 60.2 66.9 90 Hungaty 0.4 -0.2 -0.4 II 10 10 10 19.5 17.5 67.0 61.1 91 Yugoslavia 0.9 0.7 0.6 24 25 28 30 22.7 18.6 67.8 62.1 92 Czechoslovakia 0.5 0.3 0.3 16 16 17 19 23.2 19.1 65.0 62.8 93 Gabon 3.6 3.6 2.8 I 1 3 6 39.t 38.0 56.0 57.6 94 Trinidadandlobago 1.2 1.3 1.0 1 I 2 2 33.9 22.3 60.6 65.7 95 Portugal 0.4 0.6 0.4 10 II II II 20.7 16.4 66.3 63.5 96 Korea, Rep. 2.0 1.1 0.9 43 47 54 56 25.1 18.1 69.4 66.0 97 Greece 0.7 0.4 0.2 10 10 tO 9 19.0 15.5 66.9 60.7 98 Saudi Arabia 4.6 4.7 3.7 15 21 43 89 45.5 36.3 51.9 59.1 99 Iraq 3.4 3.6 3.4 19 26 48 85 46.5 32.0 50.8 63.6 100 Libya 4.3 4.! 3.6 5 6 14 36 46.0 39.5 51.6 56.7 101 Oman 3.6 4.7 3.9 2 2 5 10 46.3 36.8 51.3 58.5 Low- and middle-income 2.3 w 2.0 w 1.9 w 4,146 1 4,981 1 7,032 1 35.3 w 26.5 w 59.7 w 65.4 Sub-Saharan Africa 2.7 w 3.1 w 3.0 w 495 1 668 1 1,229 I 46.4 w 36.9 w 50.8 w 59.8 East Asia & Pacific 2.2 w 1.6 w 1.4 w 1,577 1 1,818 t 2,276 29.2 w 21.6 w 64.3 w 67.0 South Asia 2.4 w 2.2 w 1.8 w 1,1481 1,377 t 1,8961 38.2 w 25.0 w 57.7 w 68.0 Europe 1.1 w 0.1 w 0.8 w 2001 2171 2521 26.3 w 20.4 w 64.6 w 64.4 Middle East & N.Africa 2.8 w 3.1 w 2.9 w 2561 341 1 615 I 43.3w 34.1 w 53.4w 61.1 Latin America & Caribbean 2.5 w 2.1 w 1.8 w 433 1 515 1 6991 36.2 w 23.4 w 59.3 w 67.2 Other economies 1.0w 0.9w 0.7 w 321 1 3451 3551 25.2 w 20.2 w 63.4 w 63.1 Severely indebted 2,4 w 2.1 w 1.8 w 455 I 546 1 757 I 36.2 w 24.3 w 58.9 w 66.5 w High-income economies 0.9 w 0.6 w 0.5 w 8161 859 1 915 I 19.9 w 16.8 w 67.2 w 60.8 OECD members 0.8 w 0.6 w 0.5 w 777 I 814 t 861 1 19.5 w 16.7 w 67.3 w 60.6 tOther 2.5 w 1.8 w 1.4 w 401 45 I 55 1 27.8 w 18.9 w 65.9 w 64.0 102 Ireland 1.2 0.2 0.1 4 4 4 4 26.7 19.6 61.9 64.3 103 tlsrael 2.8 1.8 3.3 5 6 8 10 31.2 21.0 59.9 65.5 104 Spain 1.0 0.4 0.2 39 40 40 37 19.8 15.6 67.0 63.4 105 tSingapore 1.6 2.2 1.2 3 3 4 4 23.6 18.1 70.9 61.9 106 tHongKong 2.0 1.4 0.8 6 6 7 6 21.0 15.4 70.2 61.4 107 NewZealand 1.3 0.9 0.7 3 4 4 4 22.7 18.7 66.3 62.7 108 Belgium 0.3 0.1 0.1 tO 10 tO 9 17.9 15.6 67.0 59.6 109 United Kingdom 0.2 0.2 0.2 57 59 61 61 18.9 t7.4 65.4 61.3 110 Italy 0.5 0.2 0.1 58 58 55 46 16.4 14.1 68.7 60.4 Ill Australia 1.8 1.5 1.4 17 20 23 24 22.1 18.1 67.1 63.0 112 Netherlands 0.9 0.5 0.5 IS 16 16 14 17.6 15.6 69.2 59.9 113 Austria 0.3 0.2 0.2 8 8 8 7 17.5 5.5 67.4 60.6 114 France 0.7 0.5 0.4 56 59 63 62 20.1 17.3 66.2 60.5 115 tUnited Arab Emirates 16.5 4.3 2.2 2 2 3 3 30.8 22.2 67.5 60.7 116 Canada 1.3 1.0 0.8 27 29 32 31 20.9 16.9 67.8 60.7 117 UnitedStates 1.0 0.9 0.8 250 270 307 317 21.6 18.1 66.1 61.2 118 Denmark 0.5 0.0 0.0 5 5 5 4 16.9 15.3 67.8 60.2 t 19 Germany 0.2 0.1 0.1 79 80 78 67 16.2 IS.! 68.8 59.2 120 Norway 0.6 0.4 0.4 4 4 5 5 19.0 17.1 64.6 61.0 121 Sweden 0.5 0.3 0.3 9 9 9 9 17.4 17.2 64.6 59.3 122 Japan 1.2 0.6 0.3 124 128 128 114 18.4 15.2 69.7 58.7 123 Finland 0.3 0.4 0.2 5 5 5 5 19.5 16.7 67.2 58.9 124 Switzerland 0.5 0.6 0.4 7 7 7 6 17.0 15.8 68.1 58.3 125 (Kuwait 7.! 4.4 2.9 2 3 4 5 35.6 21.1 63.0 64.9 World 2.0 w 1.7 w 1.6 w 5,2841 6,1851 8,3031 32,3 w 25.1 w 61.1 w 64.8w Fuel exporters, excl. former USSR 3.0 w 3.3 w 3.0 w 273 1 3671 6591 44.8 w 33.9 w 52.3 w 61.5 w a. For the assumptions used in the projections, see the technical notes. b. Data for Jordan cover the East Bank Only. 269 Table 27. Demography and fertility Women of Assumed year Married women of Crude birth rate Crude death rate childbearing age ofreaching childbearing age (perl,000 (perl,004 as a percentage of net using contraception population) population) all women Totalftrti!itt' rate (percent)b reproduction 1965 1990 1965 1990 /965 1990 1965 1990 2000a rate of] 1988 Low-income economies 42 w 30 w 16 w 10 w 46w 51 w 6.3 w 3.8 w 3.3 w China and India 41 w 25 w 14 w 8w 46 w 53 w 6.3 w 3.1 w 2.5 w Other low-income 46 w 38 w 21 w 13w 45 w 47 w 6.4 w 5.2 w 4.6 w I Mozambique 49 46 27 18 47 45 6.8 6.4 6.7 2045 2 Tanzania 49 48 23 18 45 45 6.6 6.6 6.6 2045 3 Ethiopia 43 51 20 18 46 43 5.8 7.5 7.3 2050 4 Somalia 50 48 26 18 45 44 6.7 6.8 6.6 2045 5 Nepal 46 40 24 14 50 47 6.0 5.7 4.6 2025 15 6 Chad 45 44 28 18 47 46 6.0 6.0 6.1 2040 7 Bhutan 42 39 23 17 48 48 5.9 5,5 5.4 2035 8 LaoPDR 45 47 23 16 47 45 6.1 6.7 6.0 2040 9 Malawi 56 54 26 20 46 45 7.8 7.6 7.4 2050 tO Bangladesh 47 35 21 14 44 47 6.8 4.6 3.3 20l5 31 II Burundj 47 49 24 18 44 46 6.4 6.8 6.6 2045 9 12 Zaire 47 45 21 14 47 45 6.0 6.2 5.6 2035 13 Uganda 49 51 19 19 44 43 7.0 7.3 6.6 2045 14 Madagascar 47 45 22 15 47 45 6.6 6.3 5.2 2030 IS Sierra Leone 48 47 31 22 47 45 6.4 6.5 6.5 2045 16 Mali 50 50 27 19 46 45 6.5 7.1 7.0 2050 5 17 Nigeria 51 43 23 14 45 45 6.9 6.0 5.0 2030 18 Niger 48 51 29 20 45 44 7.1 7.2 7.3 2055 19 Rwanda 52 54 17 18 45 44 7.5 8.3 7.6 2055 20 BurkinaFaso 48 47 26 18 47 45 6.4 6.5 6.3 2045 21 India 45 30 20 II 48 49 6.2 4.0 3.0 2015 45 22 Benin 49 46 24 IS 44 44 6.8 6.3 5.2 2035 23 China 38 22 10 7 45 56 6.4 2.5 2.1 2000 24 Haiti 41 36 21 13 45 48 6.1 4.8 4.2 2035 10 25 Kenya 52 45 20 tO 41 42 8.0 6.5 5.5 2035 27 26 Pakistan 48 42 21 12 43 46 7.0 5.8 4.6 2030 12 27 Ghana 47 44 18 13 45 44 6.8 6.2 4.6 2030 13 28 Central African Rep. 34 42 24 16 47 46 4.5 5.8 5.3 2035 29 Togo 50 48 22 14 46 44 6.5 6.6 5.5 2035 30 Zambia 49 49 20 IS 46 44 6.6 6.7 6.1 2040 3! Guinea 46 48 29 21 45 45 5.9 6.5 6.5 2045 32 SriLanka 33 20 8 6 47 54 4.9 2.4 2.1 1995 62 33 Mauritania 47 48 26 19 47 44 6.5 6.8 6.8 2050 34 Lesotho 42 40 18 12 47 45 5.8 5.6 4.5 2025 35 Indonesia 43 26 20 9 47 52 5.5 3.1 2.4 2005 45 36 Honduras 51 38 17 7 44 46 7.4 5.2 4.1 2025 41 37 Egypt,ArabRep. 43 31 9 10 43 48 6.8 4.0 3.1 2015 38 38 Afghanistan 53 . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . 39 Cambodia 44 38 20 15 47 54 6.2 4.5 3.5 2015 40 Liberia 46 44 20 14 47 44 6.4 6.3 5.2 2035 41 Myanmar 40 31 18 9 46 50 5.8 3.8 2.9 2010 42 Sudan 47 44 24 IS 46 45 6.7 6.3 5.4 2035 43 l/ietNam 39 31 18 7 45 48 6.0 3.8 2.9 2010 53 Middle-income economies 37 w 29 w 12 w 8w 45 w 49 w 5.4 w 3.7 w 3.2 w Lower-middle-income 38 w 30 w 13 w 9w 45 w 49 w 5.6 w 4.0 w 3.4 w 44 Bolivia 46 36 2! 10 46 47 6.6 4.8 3.7 2020 30 45 Zimbabwe 55 37 17 8 42 47 8.0 4.9 3.4 2015 43 46 Senegal 47 45 23 17 45 44 6.4 6.5 6.3 2045 12 47 Philippines 42 29 12 7 44 50 6.8 3.7 2.7 2010 44 48 COted'lvoire 52 45 22 12 44 43 7.4 6.7 5.8 2040 49 Dominican Rep. 47 27 13 6 43 52 7.2 3.2 2.4 2005 50 50 Papua New Guinea 43 36 20 II 47 48 6.2 5.1 4.0 2020 51 Guatemala 46 39 17 8 44 45 6.7 5.4 4.3 2025 23 52 Morocco 49 35 18 9 45 48 7.1 4.5 3.4 2020 36 53 Cameroon 40 41 20 12 47 43 5.2 5.8 5.3 2035 54 Ecuador 45 30 13 7 43 50 6.8 3.7 2.8 2010 53 55 Syrian Arab Rep. 48 44 16 7 . . 43 7.7 6.5 5.4 2035 56 Congo 42 48 18 15 45 43 5.7 6.6 6.3 2045 57 ElSalvador 46 33 13 8 44 46 6.7 4.2 3.2 2015 58 Paraguay 41 35 8 6 41 48 6.6 4.6 4.0 2030 48 59 Peru 45 30 6 8 44 50 6.7 3.8 2.8 2010 46 60 Jordanc 53 43 2! 6 45 45 8.0 6.3 5.6 2055 61 Colombia 43 24 II 6 43 53 6.5 2.7 2.2 2000 66 62 Thailand 41 22 10 7 44 54 6.3 2.5 2.1 1995 66 63 Tunisia 44 28 16 7 43 50 7.0 3.6 2.7 2010 50 64 Jamaica 38 24 9 6 42 51 5.7 2.8 2.1 2000 55 65 Turkey 41 28 15 7 45 51 5.7 3.5 2.7 2010 63 66 Romunia IS 16 9 II 50 47 1.9 2.2 2.1 1990 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 270 Women of Assumed year Married women of Crude birth rate Crude death rate childbearing age childbearing age of reaching (per] .000 (per 1000 as a percentage of net using contraception population) population) all women Total fertilitt rate reproduction (percent)b 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 /965 1990 20013a rate ofl 1988 67 Poland 17 15 7 10 47 48 2.5 2.! 2.! 1990 68 Panama 40 24 9 5 44 52 5.7 2.9 2.2 2000 69 Costa Rica 45 26 8 4 42 52 6.3 3.1 2.3 2005 70 Chile 34 22 II 6 45 53 4.8 2.5 2. I 2000 71 Botswana 53 35 19 6 45 44 6.9 4.7 3.! 2015 33 72 Algeria 50 36 18 8 44 46 7.4 5.1 3.7 2020 36 73 Bulgaria 15 13 8 12 51 47 2.1 1.9 1.9 2030 74 Mauritius 36 17 8 6 45 56 4.8 1.9 1.8 2030 75 Malaysia 40 30 12 5 44 50 6.3 3.8 3.0 2015 76 Argentina 23 20 9 9 50 47 3.1 2.8 2.3 2005 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. 46 45 18 9 42 46 7.1 6.2 5.6 2060 78 Albania 35 25 9 6 44 51 5.4 3.1 2.3 2005 79 Angola 49 47 29 19 47 45 6.4 6.5 6.6 2045 80 Lebanon 40 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Mongolia 43 35 16 8 46 48 5.9 4.7 3.7 2020 82 Namibia 46 42 22 II 46 44 6.1 5.9 4.8 2030 83 Nicaragua 49 40 16 7 43 46 7.2 5.3 4.2 2025 84 Yemen,Rep. 49 53 27 18 47 43 7.0 7.7 7.5 2055 Upper-middle-income 35 w 26 w 11 w 7w 46 w 51 w 5.1 w 3.4 w 2.7 w 85 Mexico 45 27 II 5 43 52 6.7 3.3 2.4 2005 53 86 SouthAfrica 40 33 16 9 46 49 6.1 4.3 3.4 2020 87 Venezuela 42 29 8 5 44 51 6.1 3.6 2.7 2010 88 Uruguay 21 17 10 10 49 47 2.8 2.3 2.1 1995 89 Brazil 39 27 II 7 45 52 5.6 3.2 2.4 2005 65 90 Hungary 13 12 II 13 48 47 1.8 1.8 1.8 2030 73 91 Yugoslavia 21 IS 9 9 50 49 2.7 2.0 2.0 2030 92 Czechoslovakia 16 14 10 11 46 48 2.4 2.0 2.0 2030 93 Gabon 31 42 22 15 48 47 4.1 5.7 6.1 2045 94 Trinidad and Tobago 33 24 8 6 46 52 4.3 2.8 2.3 2005 53 95 Portugal 23 12 10 9 48 49 3.1 1.6 1.6 2030 96 Korea,Rep. 35 16 II 16 46 58 4.9 1.8 1.8 2030 77 97 Greece 18 II 8 9 51 47 2.3 1.5 1.6 2030 98 SaudiArabia 48 43 20 7 45 42 7.3 7.0 5.9 2040 99 Iraq 49 42 18 8 45 44 7.2 6.2 5.1 2030 100 Libya 49 43 17 8 45 44 7.4 6.7 5.8 2050 101 Oman 50 44 24 6 47 43 7.2 7.0 5.9 2040 Low- and middle-income 41 w 30w 15w 9w 46w 50w 6.1 w 3.8w 3.2w Sub-Saharan Africa 48 w 46 w 23 w 16 w 45 w 44 w 6.6 w 6.5 w 5.9 w East Asia & Pacific 39 w 23 w II w 7w 45 w 55 w 6.2 w 2.7 w 2.2 w South Asia 45 w 32 w 20 w 11 w 47 w 49 w 6.3 w 4.2 w 3.3 w Europe 22 w 19 w 10 w 9w 48 w 49 w 3.1 w 2.0 w 2.2 w Middle East & N.Africa 47 w 40w 20w 10w 44w 46w 7.1 w 5.7 w 4.8 w Latin America & Caribbean 39 w 27 w II w 7w 45 w 51 w 5.8 w 3.3 w 2.6 w Other economies 20w 18w 8w lOw 47 w 46w 2.7 w 2.3w 2.1 w Severely indebted 37 w 28 w 12 w 8w 46 w 50 w 5.5 w 3.5 w 2.8 w High-income economies 19 w 13 w lOw 9w 47 w 50 w 2.8 w 1.7 w 1.8 w OECD members 19 w 13 w 10 w 9w 47 w 50 w 2.7 w 1.7 w 1.7 w tOther 31 w 17 w 6w 5w 45 w 54 w 4.6 w 2.2 w 2.0 w 102 Ireland 22 16 12 9 42 49 4.0 2.2 2.1 1990 60 103 tlsrael 26 22 6 6 46 49 3.8 2.8 2.3 2005 104 Spain 21 II 8 9 49 49 2.9 1.5 1.5 2030 105 tSingapore 31 17 6 5 45 60 4.7 1.9 1.9 2030 106 tHongKong 27 13 6 6 45 56 4.5 1.5 1.5 2030 81 107 New Zealand 23 16 9 8 45 52 3.6 2.0 2.0 2030 108 Belgium 17 13 12 Il 44 48 2.6 1.6 1.6 2030 109 Unitedkingdom 18 13 12 II 45 48 2.9 1.8 1.9 2030 81 110 Italy 19 10 10 9 48 49 2.7 1.3 1.4 2030 Ill Australia 20 15 9 7 47 53 3.0 1.9 1.9 2030 76 112 Netherlands 20 12 8 9 47 53 3.0 1.6 1.6 2030 76 113 Austria 18 12 13 II 43 49 2.7 1.5 1.6 2030 114 France 18 13 Il 10 43 49 2.8 1.8 1.8 2030 80 115 tUnited Arab Emirates 41 22 14 4 47 47 6.8 4.6 3.6 2020 116 Canada 21 14 8 7 47 53 3.1 1.7 1.7 2030 117 United States 19 17 9 9 46 52 2.9 1.9 1.9 2030 74 118 Denmark 18 II 10 12 47 51 2.6 1.7 1.6 2030 119 Germany 17 II 12 II 45 47 2.5 1.5 1.6 2030 120 Norway 18 13 JO 10 45 49 2.9 1.8 1.8 2030 84 121 Sweden 16 15 10 12 47 48 2.4 1.9 1.9 2030 122 Japan 19 II 7 7 56 50 2.0 1.6 1.6 2030 56 123 Finland 17 13 10 10 48 49 2.4 1.8 1.8 2030 124 Switzerland 19 12 10 10 48 50 2.6 1.7 1.7 2030 125 tKuwait 48 25 7 3 45 53 7.4 3.4 2.6 2010 World 35 w 26 w 13 w 9w 46 w 50 w 5.1 w 3.4 w 3.0 w Fuelexporters,excl.formerUSSR 49w 42w 20w 11 w 44w 45w 6.9w 5.9w 5.0w a. For assumptionu used in the projections, see the technical notes to Table 26. h. Figures include women whose husbands practice contraceptiom see the technical notes. c. Data for Jordan cover the East Bank only. 271 Table 28. Health and nutrition Births infant mortalit' rate Population per attended by Babies with low per 1, live Daily calorie supply health staff birth weight Phsician Nursing person births) (per captta) (percent) (percent) 1965 1984 1965 198 4 1985 1985 1965 1990 1965 1989 Low-income economies 9,640 w 5,800 w 5,980 w 2,150 w 124 w 69 w 1,975 w 2,406 w China and India 2,930 w 1,650 w 4,420 w 1,650 w 114 w 56 w 1,966 w 2,464 w Other low-income 26,500 w 14,160 w 9,760 w 3,540 w 145 w 92 w 1,994 w 2,298 w 1 Mozambique 18,000 5,370 28 IS 179 137 1,712 1,680 2 Tanzania 21,700 24,970 2,100 5,480 74 14 138 115 1,831 2,206 3 Ethiopia 70,190 78,780 5,970 5,390 58 165 132 1,853 1,667 4 Somalia 43,810 19,950 4,700 1,900 2 . 165 126 1,718 1,906 5 Nepal 46,180 30,220 87,650 4,680 10 171 121 1,889 2,077 6 Chad 72,480 38,390 13,610 3,400 . II 183 125 2,395 1,743 7 Bhutan . 9,730 . . 0 3 171 122 8 LaoPDR 24,320 1,360 4,880 530 39 148 103 2,135 2,630 9 Malawi 47,320 11,340 40,980 . 59 10 200 149 2,259 2,139 10 Bangladesh 8,100 6,390 8,530 31 144 105 1,970 2,021 11 Burundi 55,910 21,020 7,320 4,380 12 14 142 107 2,131 1,932 12 Zaire 34,740 13,540 1,880 141 94 2,187 1,991 13 Uganda 11,080 3.120 . . 10 119 117 2,361 2,153 14 Madagascar 10,620 9.780 3,650 62 10 201 116 2,447 2,158 15 SierraLeone 16,840 13,620 4,470 1,090 25 14 208 147 2,014 1,799 16 Mali 51,510 25,390 3,360 1,350 27 17 207 166 1,938 2,314 17 Nigeria 29,530 6,410 6,160 900 25 162 98 2,185 2,312 18 Niger 65,540 39,670 6,210 460 47 20 180 128 1,996 2,308 19 Rwanda 72,480 35,090 7,450 3,690 17 141 120 1,856 l,971 20 BurkinaFaso 73,960 57,183 4,150 1,680 18 190 134 1,882 2,288 21 India 4,880 2,520 6,500 1,700 33 30 150 92 2,021 2,229 22 Benin 32,390 15,940 2,540 1,750 34 10 166 113 2,019 2,305 23 China 1,600 1,010 3,000 1,610 6 90 29 1,929 2,639 24 Haiti 14,350 7,140 13,210 2,280 20 17 158 95 2,045 2,013 25 Kenya 13,280 10,050 1,930 13 112 67 2,208 2,163 26 Pakistan 2,900 9,910 4,890 24 25 149 103 1,773 2,219 27 Ghana 13,740 20,390 3,730 1,660 73 17 120 85 1,937 2,248 28 CenlralAfricanRep. 34,020 3,000 15 157 101 2,055 2,036 29 Togo 23,240 8,700 4,990 1,240 20 153 88 2,454 2,214 30 Zambia 11,380 7,150 5,820 740 14 121 82 2,072 2,077 31 Guinea 47,050 4,110 18 191 138 2,187 2,132 32 SriLanka 5,820 5,520 3,220 1,290 87 28 63 19 2,171 2,277 33 Mauritania 36,530 11,900 1,180 23 10 178 121 1,903 2,685 34 Lesotho 20,060 18,610 4,700 28 10 142 93 2,049 2.299 35 Indonesia 31,700 9,410 9,490 43 14 128 61 1,791 2,750 36 Honduras 5,370 1,510 1,530 670 50 20 128 64 1,967 2,247 37 Egypt,ArabRcp. 2,300 770 2,030 24 7 145 66 2,399 3,336 38 Afghanistan 15,770 24.430 . . 206 2,304 39 Cambodia 22,410 . 3,670 134 117 2,292 2,166 40 Liberia 12,560 9,340 2,330 1,370 89 . 176 136 2,158 2,382 41 Myanmar 11,860 3,740 11,370 900 97 16 122 64 1,897 2,440 42 Sudan 23,500 10,190 3,360 1,260 20 15 160 102 1,938 1,974 43 VietNam . . 950 14,250 590 . . 18 134 42 2,041 2,233 Middle-income economies 3,910 w 2,250w 2,140 w 970w 94w 48 W 2,489 w 2,860 w Lower-middle-income 5,310 w 3,000 w 2,380 w 1,050 w 103 w 51 w 2,415 w 2,768 w 44 Bolivia 3,300 1,530 3,990 2,470 36 IS 160 92 1,868 1,916 45 Zimbabwe 8,010 6,700 990 1,000 69 15 103 49 2,075 2,299 46 Senegal 19,490 . . 2,440 2,030 . . 10 160 81 2,372 2,369 47 Philippines . . 6,570 1,140 2,680 . 18 72 41 1,875 2,375 48 Côte d'Ivoire 20,640 . . 2,000 . . 20 14 149 95 2,352 2,577 49 Dominican Rep. 1,700 1,770 1,640 1,210 57 16 110 56 1,834 2,359 50 Papua New Guinea 12,640 6,070 620 880 34 25 140 57 1,996 2,403 51 Guatemala 3,690 2/80 8,250 850 19 10 112 62 2,026 2,235 52 Morocco 12,120 4,730 2,290 1,050 . . 9 145 67 2,112 3,020 53 Cameroon 26,720 . . 5,830 . . . . 13 143 88 2,011 2,217 54 Ecuador 3,000 810 2,320 610 27 10 112 55 2,191 2,531 55 Syrian Arab Rep. 5,400 1,250 . . 890 37 9 114 43 2,177 3,003 56 Congo 14,210 . . 950 . . . . 12 129 116 2,260 2,590 57 ElSalvador . . 2,830 1,300 930 35 15 120 53 1,853 2,317 58 Paraguay 1,850 1,460 1,550 1,000 22 6 73 32 2,586 2,757 59 Pens 1,650 1,040 900 . . 55 9 130 69 2,323 2,186 60 Jordan 2,7t0 860 1,040 980 75 7 51a 2,277 2,634 61 Colombia 2,500 1,230 890 650 51 15 86 37 2,179 2,598 62 Thailand 7,160 6,290 4,970 710 33 12 88 27 2,138 2,316 63 Tunisia 8,000 2,150 . . 370 60 7 145 44 2,217 3,121 64 Jamaica 1,990 2,040 340 490 89 8 49 16 2,232 2,609 65 Turkey 2,900 1,390 . . 1,030 78 7 169 60 2,698 3,236 66 Romania 760 570 400 . . 99 6 44 27 2,988 3,155 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified 272 Births infant mortaltt, rate Population per attended by Babies with l (per 1000 lice Daily calorie supply health staff birth weight births) Physician Nursing person (per capita) (percent) (percent) 1965 1984 1965 1984 1985 1985 1965 1990 1965 /989 67 Poland 800 490 410 190 8 42 16 3,292 3,505 68 Panama 2,130 1,000 1,600 390 83 8 56 21 2,241 2,539 69 Costa Rica 2,010 960 630 450 93 9 72 16 2,367 2,808 70 Chile 2,120 1,230 600 370 97 7 98 17 2,581 2,581 71 Botswana 27,450 6,900 17,710 700 52 8 112 38 2,045 2,375 72 Algeria 8,590 2,340 11,770 300 9 154 67 1,70! 2.866 73 Bulgaria 600 280 410 160 100 31 14 3,443 3,707 74 Mauntius 3,930 1,900 2,030 90 9 65 20 2,269 2,887 75 Malaysia 6,200 1,930 1,320 1010 82 9 55 16 2,353 2,774 76 Argentina 600 370 610 980 6 58 29 3,163 3,113 77 lran,IslamicRep. 3,890 2,840 4,270 /110 9 152 88 2,060 3,181 78 Albania 2,080 540 7 87 28 2,374 2,76! 79 Angola 13,150 17,750 3,820 1010 15 17 192 130 1,907 1,807 80 Lebanon 1,010 2,030 56 2,485 81 Mongolia 730 320 99 10 113 62 2,364 2,479 82 Namibia 145 100 1,900 1,946 83 Nicaragua 2,560 1,500 1,390 530 15 121 55 2,305 2,265 84 Yemen,Rep. 31,580 1940 194 124 Upper-middle-income 2,240 w 940 w 1,870 w 870 w 84 w 45 w 2,584 w 2,987 w 85 Mexico 2,080 980 880 15 82 39 2,570 3,052 86 SouthAfrica 2,050 490 12 124 66 2,759 3,122 87 Venezuela 1,210 700 560 82 9 65 34 2,266 2,582 88 Uruguay 880 510 590 . 8 47 21 2,812 2,653 89 Brazil 2,500 1,080 3,100 1210 73 8 104 57 2,417 2,75! 90 Hungaly 630 310 240 170 99 10 39 15 3,134 3,644 91 Yugoslavia 1,200 550 850 250 7 72 20 3,243 3,634 92 Czechoslovakia 540 280 200 140 100 6 26 12 3,397 3,632 93 Gabon . 2,790 760 270 92 16 153 97 1,950 2,383 94 TrinidadandTobago 3,810 940 560 250 90 47 25 2,496 2,853 95 Portugal 1,240 140 1,160 . . . 8 65 12 2,647 3,495 96 Korea,Rep. 2,680 1,160 2.970 580 65 9 62 17 2,178 2,852 97 Greece 710 350 600 450 6 34 11 3,019 3,825 98 Saudi Arabia 9,400 730 6,060 340 78 6 148 65 1,850 2,874 99 iraq 5,000 1,740 2,910 1660 50 9 119 65 2,150 2,887 100 Libya 3,860 690 850 76 5 138 74 1,875 3,324 101 Oman 23,790 1,700 6.420 390 60 14 191 33 Low- and middle-income 8,170w 4,980w 5,010w 1,850w 117w 63w 2,108w 2,523w Sub-Saharan Africa 33,310 w 26,670 w 5,420 w 2180 w 157 w 107 w 2,074 w 2,122 w East Asia & Pacific 5,600 w 2,390 w 4,130 w 1,530 w 95 w 34 w 1,939 w 2,617 w South Asia 6,220 w 3,460 w 8,380 w 2,650 w 147 w 93 w 1,992 w 2,215 w Europe 1,260 w 700 w 510 w 480 w 71 w 30 w 3,069 w 3,433 w Middle East & N.Africa 7,740w 2,410w 6,160w 1,800w 151 w 79w 2,153w 3,011 w Latin America & Caribbean 2,380 w 1,220 w 2,100 w 1,010 w 94 w 48 w 2,445 w 2,721 w Other economies 500w 530w 300w 290w 30 w 23 w 3,125w 3,327w Severely indebted 3,140 w 1,250 w 2,220 w 920 w 93 w 50 w 2,569 w 2,883 w High-income economies 890 w 470 w 440 w 150 w 24 w 8w 3,091 w 3,409 w OECD members 880w 460w 440 w 150w 24 w 8w 3,099w 3,417 w tOther 1,660 w 880 w 760 w 210 w 31 w 13 w 2,546 w 3,072 w l02 Ireland 950 680 170 140 4 25 7 3,605 3,778 103 tlsrael 400 350 300 110 99 7 27 10 2,799 3,174 104 Spain 800 320 1,220 260 96 38 8 2,770 3,572 105 tSingapore 1,900 1,4/0 600 . . 100 7 26 7 2,285 3,198 106 tHongKong 2,520 1,070 1.250 240 4 27 7 2,486 2,853 107 New Zealand 820 580 570 80 99 5 20 10 3,238 3,362 108 Belgium 700 330 590 . 100 5 24 8 . 109 United Kingdom 870 200 98 7 20 8 3,304 3,149 110 Italy 1,850 230 790 . . 7 36 9 3,097 3,504 III Australia 720 440 150 110 99 6 19 8 3,053 3,216 112 Netherlands 860 450 270 4 14 7 3,024 3,15! 113 Austria 720 390 350 180 6 28 8 3,244 3,495 114 France 830 320 380 . . . 5 22 7 3,355 3,465 1l5 tUnited Arab Emirates . 1,020 . . 390 96 . . 103 23 2,639 3,309 116 Canada 770 510 190 . . 99 6 24 7 3,127 3,482 117 United States 670 470 310 70 100 7 25 9 3,234 3,671 118 Denmark 740 400 190 60 . 6 19 8 3,420 3,628 119 Germany 640" 380" 500k' 230" . 5 24 7 3088b 3443h 120 Norway 790 450 340 60 100 4 17 8 3,036 3,326 121 Sweden 910 390 310 . . tOO 4 13 6 2,930 2,960 122 Japan 970 660 410 180 100 5 18 5 2,668 2,956 123 Finland 1,300 440 180 60 4 17 6 3,126 3,253 124 Switzerland 710 700 270 . . . . 5 18 7 3,471 3,562 125 tKuwait 790 640 270 200 99 7 64 14 2,766 3,195 World 6,050 w 4,200 w 3,700 w 1,600 w 91 w 52 w 2,383 w 2,711 w Fuel exporters, cxci. former USSR 16,870 w 4,480 w 5,440 w 900 w 149 w 84 w 2,093 w 2,642 w a. Data for Jordan cover the East Bank only. b. Data refer to the Federal Republic ol Germany before unification. 273 Table 29. Education Percentage ofage group enrolled in education Primart' net Primar Secondar' enrollment Primary pupil- Total Female Total Female Tertiary (total) (percent) teacher ratio 1965 1989 1965 1989 1965 1989 1965 1989 1965 1989 1975 1989 /965 1989 Low-income economies 73w 105w 96w 20w 38w 31w 2w 37w 38w China and India 83w 119w 108w 25w 44w 35w 2w 35w 39w Other low-income 50w 77w 39w 70w lOw 28w Sw 23w 1w 4w 68w 43w 38w I Mozambique 37 68 26 59 3 5 2 4 0 0 45 78 2 Tanzania 32 63 25 63 2 4 1 4 0 0 48 52 33 3 Ethiopia 11 38 6 30 2 15 1 12 0 1 28 4! 43 4 Somalia 10 . . 4 . . 2 . . I . . 0 . l 26 5 Nepal 20 86 4 57 5 30 2 17 1 6 64 29 37 6 Chad 34 57 13 35 1 7 0 3 . . 1 38 83 67 7 Bhutan 7 26 1 20 0 5 . . 2 . . . . . . . . 37 8 LaoPDR 40 11] 30 98 2 27 1 22 0 2 70 37 28 9 Malawi 44 67 32 60 2 4 1 3 0 1 50 40 10 Bangladesh 49 70 31 64 13 17 3 II 1 4 63 45 60 II Burundi 26 71 IS 60 1 4 I 3 0 1 . 5] 40 66 12 Zaire 70 78 45 67 5 24 2 16 0 2 60 37 13 Uganda 67 77 50 . . 4 13 2 . . 0 1 . . 35 35 14 Madagascar 65 92 59 90 8 19 5 18 1 4 . 64 71 40 15 Sierra Leone 29 53 21 40 5 18 3 0 1 . . 32 32 16 Mali 24 23 16 17 4 6 2 4 0 . . . . 19 46 39 17 Nigeria 32 70 24 63 5 19 3 16 0 3 . . 33 37 18 Niger II 28 7 20 I 6 0 4 . . 1 17 42 41 19 Rwanda 53 69 43 68 2 7 1 6 0 1 65 67 57 20 Burkina Faso 12 35 8 27 1 7 I 5 0 1 . . 28 47 55 21 India 74 98 57 82 27 43 13 3! 5 . . . . 42 61 22 Benin 34 65 21 44 3 . . 2 . . 0 2 . . 52 41 35 23 China 89 135 . . 128 24 44 . . 38 0 2 . . 100 30 22 24 Haiti 50 84 44 81 5 19 3 19 0 . . . . 44 46 35 25 Kenya 54 94 40 92 4 23 2 /9 0 2 88 . . 34 33 26 Pakistan 40 38 20 27 12 20 5 12 2 5 42 41 27 Ghana 69 75 57 67 13 39 7 30 1 2 . . 32 27 28 Central African Rep. 56 64 28 48 2 11 1 6 . . 1 46 54 70 29 Togo 55 103 32 80 5 22 2 10 0 3 72 50 55 30 Zambia 53 95 46 91 7 20 3 14 . . 2 . . 80 51 44 31 Guinea 31 34 19 21 5 9 2 5 0 1 . . 26 43 38 32 Sn Lanka 93 107 86 106 35 74 35 76 2 4 . . 100 . . 14 33 Mauritania 13 5/ 6 42 1 /6 0 10 . . 3 . . 20 49 34 Lesotho 94 110 114 119 4 26 4 31 0 4 . . 72 57 56 35 Indonesia 72 118 65 115 12 47 7 43 1 . . 72 99 41 23 36 Honduras 80 108 79 109 10 . . 9 . . I 10 . . 29 37 Egypt,ArabRep. 75 97 60 89 26 81 15 71 7 20 39 24 38 Afghanistan 16 24 5 16 2 8 1 5 0 1 . 53 39 Cambodia 77 56 9 4 I . . 48 40 Liberia 41 23 . . 5 3 I 3 32 41 Myanmar 71 103 65 100 15 24 11 23 1 5 . . . . 53 43 42 Sudan 29 . . 21 . . 4 2 I 3 . , . . 48 43 VietNam . . . . . . ' . . . . . ' . . ' . . . . . . . . . Middle-income economies 93w 102w 87w 101w 26w 55w 23w 57w 7w 17w 89w 35w 27w Lower-middle-income 88w 101w 80w 99w 26w 54w 23w 56w 7w 17w - 86w 35w 28w 44 Bolivia 73 81 60 77 18 34 15 3! 5 23 73 83 28 25 45 Zimbabwe 110 125 92 /26 6 52 5 42 0 6 . , . . 38 46 Senegal 40 58 29 49 7 16 3 11 1 3 . . 48 43 58 47 Philippines 113 111 111 110 41 73 40 75 19 28 95 99 31 33 48 Côted'Ivoire 60 . . 4! . . 6 20 2 12 0 . . . 47 49 Dominican Rep. 87 95 87 96 12 . . 12 . . 2 . . 53 47 50 PapuaNewGuinea 44 73 35 67 4 13 2 10 . . . . . . 73 19 32 51 Guatemala 50 79 45 . . 8 2] 7 . . 2 . . 53 . . 33 35 52 Morocco 57 68 35 55 II 36 5 30 1 11 47 55 39 26 53 Cameroon 94 101 75 93 5 26 2 21 0 3 69 75 47 51 54 Ecuador 91 118 88 117 17 56 16 57 3 25 78 . . 37 3/ 55 SyrianArabRep. 78 108 52 102 28 54 13 45 8 20 87 97 36 26 56 Congo 114 . . 94 . . 10 . . 5 . . 1 6 . . . . 60 64 57 ElSalvador 82 78 79 78 17 26 17 26 2 17 . . 70 33 40 58 Paraguay 102 106 96 104 13 29 13 30 4 8 83 93 30 25 59 Peru 99 123 90 . . 25 67 2! . . 8 32 95 36 29 60 Jordan 95 . . 83 . . 38 . . 23 . . 2 . . . . 38 28 61 Colombia 84 107 86 108 17 52 16 53 3 14 69 36 30 62 Thailand 78 86 74 . . 14 28 11 . . 2 16 . . 35 18 63 Tunisia 91 115 65 107 16 44 9 39 2 8 95 56 30 64 Jamaica 109 105 106 105 51 61 50 64 3 5 90 99 57 34 65 Turkey 101 112 83 108 16 51 9 39 4 13 . . 84 46 30 66 Romania 101 95 100 95 39 88 32 92 10 9 . . . . 23 21 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 274 Percentage of age group enrolled in education Primary net Primary Secondary enrollment Pr/nary pupil- Total Female Total Female Tertiary (total) (percent) teacher ratio /965 1989 1965 1989 1965 /989 1965 /989 /965 1989 1975 1989 1965 1989 67 Poland 104 99 102 99 69 81 69 83 18 20 96 97 28 16 68 Panama l02 107 99 105 34 59 36 63 7 22 87 90 30 20 69 Costa Rica 106 100 105 99 24 41 25 42 6 27 92 86 27 32 70 Chile 124 100 122 99 34 75 36 78 6 19 94 89 52 29 71 Botswana 65 III 71 114 3 37 3 39 . . 3 58 93 40 32 72 Algeria 68 94 53 86 7 61 5 53 1 11 77 88 43 28 73 Bulgaria 103 97 102 96 54 75 55 76 17 26 96 86 23 16 74 Mauritius 101 103 97 104 26 53 18 53 3 2 82 94 34 24 75 Malaysia 90 96 84 96 28 59 22 59 2 7 . 29 21 76 Argentina 101 111 102 114 28 74 31 78 14 41 96 20 19 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. 63 109 40 101 18 53 11 44 2 7 94 32 24 78 79 80 Albania Angola Lebanon 92 39 106 99 94 . . 87 26 93 98 33 5 26 80 II 26 20 4 73 . . . . 8 0 14 . 9 . . . . 27 45 24 19 33 81 Mongolia 98 98 97 100 66 . . 66 . . 8 . . . 32 82 Namibia 83 Nicaragua 69 99 ll 14 43 13 58 8 65 76 34 32 84 Yemen,Rep. 13 3 3 I . . . . . . . . 56 45 Upper-middle-income 99 w 104w 96w 103w 26w 56w 23w 57w 5w 17w 79w 91w 36w 25w 85 Mexico 92 114 90 112 17 53 13 53 4 15 . 100 47 31 86 South Africa 90 88 . . IS 14 . 4 . . . 87 Venezuela 94 105 94 105 27 56 28 62 7 28 81 87 34 88 Umguay 106 106 106 106 44 77 46 . . 8 50 . . 88 31 23 89 Brazil 108 105 108 . . 16 39 16 45 2 II 71 84 28 23 90 Hungary 101 94 100 94 . . 76 . . 77 13 15 . . 92 23 13 91 Yugoslavia 106 95 103 95 65 80 59 79 13 19 . . . . 31 23 92 Czechoslovakia 99 92 97 93 29 87 35 90 14 18 . . 23 20 93 Gabon 134 122 . . II . . 5 . . . . 4 . . . . 39 46 94 Trinidad and Tobago 93 97 90 98 36 83 34 84 2 6 87 91 34 28 95 Portugal 84 Ill 83 108 42 53 34 54 5 18 91 92 32 17 96 Korea, Rep. 101 108 99 109 35 86 25 84 6 38 99 100 62 36 97 Greece 110 102 109 102 49 97 41 94 10 28 97 98 35 22 98 Saudi Arabia 24 76 II 70 4 46 1 39 I 12 42 . . 22 16 99 Iraq 74 96 45 87 28 47 14 37 4 14 79 84 22 23 100 Libya 78 44 . . 14 . . 4 . . I . . . . . . 31 101 Oman 102 . . 97 48 . . 40 . . 4 32 83 . . 28 Low- and middle-income 78 w 105 w 62 w 97 w 22 w 43 w 14w 37 w 3w 8w 89 w 37 w 35 H Sub-Saharan Africa 41 w 69 w 31 w 61 w 4w 18 w 2w 14w Ow 2w 47 w 43 w 40H East Asia & Pacific 88 w 129 w 124 w 46 w 16 w 42 w 1w Sw 100 w 33 w 23 H South Asia 68 w 90 w w 75 w w 38 w 12 w 27 w 4w 42 w 57 H Europe 102 w 102 w 97 w 100 w 45 w 73 w 41 w 70 w 11 w 17w 90 w 31 w 22 H Middle East & N.Africa 61 w 90 w 43 w 82 w 17 w 53 w 9w 45 w 3w 12w 85 w 38 w 25 H Latin America & Caribbean 99 w 107 w 97 w 107 w 20 w 50 w 19 w 55 w 4w 18w 87 w 34 w 27 H Other economies 104 w 105 w 104 w 105 w 70 w 96 w 77 w 94 w 29 w 25 w 95 w 12 w 10 H Severely indebted 96 w 105w 92w 100w 25w 52w 24w 54w 6w 18w 79w 88w 33w 25H High-income economies 104 w 105 w 106 w 104 w 61 w 95 w 59 w 96 w 21 w 42 w 88 w 97 w 28 w 18w OECD members 104 w 105 w 106 w 105 w 63 w 95 w 61 w 96 w 21 w 43 w 88 w 97 w 28 w 18w fOther 99 w 103 w 98 w 102 w 39 w 77 w 33 w 79 w 11 w 24 w 93 w 96 w 27 w 22 w 102 Ireland 108 101 108 101 51 97 50 102 12 26 91 89 33 28 103 tlsrael 95 93 95 95 48 83 51 86 20 33 20 19 104 Spain 115 111 114 1/0 38 105 29 111 6 32 100 /00 34 25 105 tSingapore 105 110 100 109 45 69 4! 71 to 100 tOO 29 26 106 tHong Kong 103 105 99 104 29 73 25 75 92 29 27 107 New Zealand 106 106 104 105 75 88 74 89 15 41 100 100 22 19 108 Belgium 109 101 108 101 75 99 72 100 15 34 . . 97 21 10 109 United Kingdom 92 107 92 107 66 82 66 84 12 24 97 99 25 20 110 Italy 112 96 110 96 47 78 41 78 11 29 97 . . 22 12 Ill Australia 99 106 99 105 62 82 61 83 16 32 98 97 28 17 112 Netherlands 104 116 104 117 61 103 57 101 17 32 92 100 31 17 113 Austria 106 104 lOS 103 52 82 52 83 9 31 89 93 20 II 114 France 134 113 133 III 56 97 59 100 18 37 98 100 30 16 115 tUnited Arab Emirates Ill 110 64 69 0 9 100 .. 18 116 Canada 105 105 104 lOS 56 105 55 105 26 66 96 26 16 117 United States 100 40 63 72 . . 29 118 Denmark 98 98 99 98 ]9 67 1 14 32 II 12 119 Germany 103 104 97 96 32 88 . . 18 120 Norway 97 98 98 98 64 98 62 tot II 36 100 98 21 16 121 Sweden 95 104 96 104 62 91 60 93 13 31 100 100 20 122 Japan 100 102 100 102 82 96 81 97 13 31 99 100 29 21 123 Finland 92 99 89 99 76 112 80 121 II 43 23 18 124 Switzerland 87 . . 87 37 . . 35 8 26 125 tKu wait 116 100 103 91 52 90 43 87 18 8. 21 18 World 85 w 105 w 74 w 98 w 31 w 52 w 29 w 45 w 9w 16 w 84 w 91 w 33 w 32 H Fuel exporters, excl. former USSR 51 w 87 w 37 w 80 w 11 w 37 w 7w 33 w Iw 8w 73 w 90 w 34 w 31 H 275 Table 30. Income distribution and ICP estimates of GDP ICP estimates of GDP per capita'5 Current Percentage share of household income, b' percentile group of householdsb international United States = 100 Lowest Fourth Highest Highest dollars Second Third 1985 ]99Q 1990C Year 20 percent quintile quinsile quintile 20 percent 10 percent Low-income economies China and India Other Low-income I Mozambiquc 30d 620d 2 Tanzania 2.6 2.5 540 3 Ethiopia 1.6 1.5 310 4 Somalia 3.ld 2.5' 540' 5 Nepal 45d 950" Chad 2.l 440d 6 2.4" 0 7 Bhutan 21" 2.4 520" . 8 LaoPDR . . . . .. 9 Malawi 3.6 3.1 670 . . . . . . S 10 Bangladesh 5.0 4.9 1,050 1985_86e 10.0 13.7 17.2 21.9 37.2 23.2 Burundi 3.0' 600d 11 2.8" 12 Zaire 55d 950" 13 Uganda 39d 800d 14 Madagascar 3.9 3.5 740 15 Sierra Leone 3.0 2.7 580 16 Mali 2.4 2.6 560 17 Nigeria 7.2 6.6 1,420 18 Niger 33d 28d 590" 19 Rwanda 3.8 2.9 610 20 BurkinaFaso 28d 2.6 560d 21 India 4.5 5.4 1,150 l983c 8.1 12.3 16.3 22.0 41.4 26.7 22 Benin 6.5 5.3 1,130 . . . . . 23 China 7.6" 9.1" 1,950" . 24 Haiti 5.8" 4.5' 960" . . . . . . 25 Kenya 5.3 5.2 1,120 . . . 26 Pakistan 8.1 8.3 1,770 l984-85f 7.8 11.2 15.0 20.6 45.6 31.3 27 Ghana Kid 1720d 198 8-89 7.1 11.5 15.9 21.8 43.7 28.5 28 Central African Rep. 5.l 4.2" 900" 29 Togo 5.4" 4.6 990" 30 Zambia 4.7 3.8 810 31 Guinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 SriLanka 11.2 11.1 2,370 I98S-86 4.8 8.5 12.1 18.4 56.1 43.0 33 Mauritania 6.4' 5.8' I ,24& . . . . . . . . 80d . 34 Lesotho 7.2' 1,70& . . . . . . 35 Indonesia 99h 11.0 2,350 1987e 8.8 . 12.4 16.0 . . 21.5 41.3 26.5 36 Honduras 84h 7.5 1,610 37 Egypt, Arab Rep. 15.8 14.5 3,100 38 Afghanistan 39 Cambodia 40 Liberia 8.l' 41 Myanmar 42 Sudan 6.6d 1180d 43 VietNam Middle-income economies Lower-middle-income 44 Bolivia 104h 8.9 1,910 . 45 Zimbabwe 9.9 9.2 1,970 . . . 46 Senegal 7.0 6.4 1,360 . . . . . . . . . 47 Philippines 10.9 10.9 2,320 l985 5.5 9.7 14.8 22.0 48.0 32.1 48 Cbted'Ivoire 10.2 7.2 1,540 1986_87c 5.0 8.0 13.1 21.3 52.7 36.3 49 Dominican Rep. l5.0' 13.4 2,860 . . . . 50 Papuu New Guinea 7.0 1,500 . . . . 51 Guatemala 13.7 2,920 1979-81 5.5 8.6 12.2 18.7 40.8 52 Morocco 13.1 12.5 2,670 l9848S 9.8 13.0 16.4 21.4 39.4 25.4 53 Cameroon 14.0 9.5 2,020 . . 54 Ecuador l9.8 17.4 3,720 55 Syrian Arab Rep. 19.2 4,110 56 Congo 16.4 12.6 2,690 57 El Salvador 97h 8.8 1,890 58 Paraguay 15.6" 14.6 3,120 59 Peru l7.3 12.7 2,720 1985_86e 4.4 8.5 13.7 21.5 51.9 35.8 60 Jordan 26.7 20.4" 4,530" . . 225h . . . . . . S 61 Colombia 23.2 4,950 l988 4.0 8.7 13.5 20.8 53.0 37.1 62 Thailand 15.9 21.6 4,610 . . . . . . . 63 Tunisia 19.8 18.6 3,979 . . . . . 64 Jamaica 13.3" 14.2 3,030 1988e 5.4 9.9 14.4 21.2 49.2 33.4 65 Turkey 21.8 23.5 5,020 . . . 66 Romania 40.0 31.7 6,780 . . . . . . Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified 276 ICP estimates of GD? per capita" Current international Percentage share of household income, hr percentile group of householdsb United States = 100 dollars Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest Highest 1990C 1985 I99O' Year 20 percent qutntile quintile quintile 20 percent /0 percent 67 Poland 24.5 21.2 4,530 1987g 14.2 22.9 35.2 21.0 18.0 68 Panama 2S.9 19.3 4,120 . . . . . . . . . 69 Costa Rica 22,6h 22.8 4,870 1986g 8.3 13.2 20.7 54.5 38.8 70 Chile 259h 29.0 6,190 . . . . . . . . . 71 Botswana 16.! 20.1 4,300 1985-86 2.5 6.5 11.8 20.2 59.0 42.8 72 Algeria 27.8 219° 4,680 . . . . . . . . 37Ød . 73 Bulgaria 41 3' 7900° . . . . . . . . . 74 Mauritius 24.8 30.4 6,500 . . . . . . . . . 75 Malaysia 2S.O 27.6 5,900 l987 4.6 9.3 13.9 21.2 51.2 34.8 76 Argentina 24.8k 21.9 4,680 . . . . . . . . . 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. 28.0 20.4 4,360 78 Albania . 79 Angola . 80 Lebanon 8! Mongolia . . . 82 Namibia 83 Nicaragua 84 Yemen, Rep. Upper-middle-income 85 Mexico 3t.9 28.0 5,980 . . 5500d . 86 South Africa 298° 257 0 ' 87 Venezuela 354h 31.6 6,740 4.7 9.2 21.5 1987° 14.0 50.6 34.2 88 Uruguay 27.O 28.! 6,000 . . . . . . . . 89 Brazil 249h 22.4 4,780 1983 2.4 5.7 62.6 . 46.2 10.7 18.6 90 Hungary 31.2 29.0 6,190 l987-89 10.9 14.8 17.8 22.0 34.5 20.7 91 Yugoslavia 29.2 23.8 5,090 !987 6.1 11.0 16.5 23.7 42.8 26.6 92 Czechoslovakia . . , , . , . 93 Gabon 23.8 215d 4,590° . . . 94 TrinidadandTobago 52.7° 39.8 8,5l0 . . , 95 Portugal 33.8 37.2 7,950 96 Korea,Rep. 24.1 33.7 7,190 97 Greece 35.5 34.4 7,340 98 Saudi Arabia 51 9d 99 Iraq . 100 Libya 531d 10! Oman 442d Low- and middle-income Sub-Saharan Africa East Asia South Asia Europe Middle East and N. Africa Latin America and Caribbean Other economies Severely indebted High-income economies OECD members tOther 102 Ireland 40.9 42.7 9,130 . , . , . . 103 tlsrael 56,7h 55.9 11.940 6.0 , . . 1979 12.1 17.8 24.5 39.6 23.5 104 Spain 46.0 50.7 10,840 1980-81 6.9 12.5 17.3 23.2 40.0 24.5 105 iSingapore 56.2° 69.8 14,920d 1982-83 5.1 9.9 21.4 48.9 14.6 33.5 106 1HongKong 61.8 76.0 16,230 1980 5.4 10.8 15.2 21.6 47.0 31.3 107 NewZealand 71.1 63.2 13,490 1981-82 5.1 10.8 16.2 23.2 44.7 28.7 108 Belgium 64.7 60.6 12,950 1978-79 7.9 13.7 18.6 23.8 36.0 21.5 109 UnitedKingdom 66.! 70.0 14,960 1979 5.8 11.5 18.2 25.0 39.5 23.3 310 Italy 65.6 68.1 14,550 1986 6.8 12.0 16.7 23.5 41.0 25.3 III Australia 76.9 75.! 16,050 1985 4.4 II.! 17.5 24.8 42.2 25.8 112 Netherlands 68.2 68.3 14,600 1983 6.9 13.2 17.9 23.7 38.3 23.0 113 Austria 66.! 69.1 14,750 . . . . . . . . . 114 France 69.3 71.2 15,200 1979 6.3 12.1 17.2 23.5 40.8 25.5 ItS tUnited Arab Emirates 99.2' 77,7d l6,590 . . . . . . . . . 116 Canada 92.5 92.0 19,650 1987 5.7 11.8 17.7 24.6 40.2 24.1 117 United States 100.0 100.0 21,360 1985 4.7 11.0 17.4 25.0 41.9 25.0 118 Denmark. 74.2 72.0 15,380 1981 5.4 12.0 18.4 25.6 38.6 22.3 119 Germany' 73.8 76.3 16,290 1984 6.8 12.7 17.8 24.1 38.7 23.4 120 Norway 84.4 80.6 17,220 1979 6.2 12.8 18.9 25.3 36.7 21.2 121 Sweden 76.9 74.9 16,000 1981 8.0 13.2 17.4 24.5 36.9 20.8 122 Japan 71.6 79.4 16,950 1979 8.7 13.2 17.5 23.1 37.5 22.4 123 Finland 69.5 73.1 15,620 1981 6.3 12.1 18.4 25.5 37.6 21.7 124 Switzerland l00.7 101.6(1 21,690° 1982 5.2 11.7 16.4 22.! 44.6 29.8 125 tKuwait 91.3° . . . . . . . . . . . . . World Fuel exporters, excl. former USSR a. ICP refers to the United Nations' International Comparison Program, (see the technical notes). b. These estimates should be treated with caution; see the technical notes for details of different distribution measures. c. Extrapolated from 1985 figure (see the technical notes). d. Regression results (see the technical notes). e. Data refer to per capita expenditure. f. Data refer to household expenditure. g. Data refer to per capita income. h. Extrapolated from earlier ICP exercises. i. Data refer to the Federal Republic of Germany before unification. 277 Table 31. Urbanization Urban population Population in cities of / million or more in Population in capital cirv as 1990, as a percentage of As a percentage of Average annual growth a percentage of total population rate (percent) Urban Total Urban Total 1965 1990 1965-80 1980-90 1990 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 Low-income economies 18 w 38 w 3.5 w 11 w 3w 41 w 31 w 7w 9w China and India 18 w 44w 2.9 w 3w 1w 42 w 29 w 8w 9w Other low-income 16 w 27 w 4.7 w 26 w 7w 38 w 35 w 6w 10 w I Mozambique 5 27 10.2 10.4 38 10 68 38 3 10 2 Tanzania 5 33 11.3 10.5 21 7 38 18 2 6 3 Ethiopia 8 13 4.9 5.3 29 4 27 30 2 4 4 Somalia 20 36 5.4 5.6 25 9 . . 5 Nepal 4 10 6.4 7.3 20 2 . . . 6 Chad 9 30 8.0 6.5 43 13 7 Bhutan 3 5 3.9 5.3 22 I . 8 LaoPDR 8 19 5.3 6.! 53 10 . 9 Malawi 5 12 7.4 6.2 31 4 . . 10 Bangladesh 6 16 6.8 6.2 38 6 50 47 11 Burundi 2 6 6.9 5.5 82 5 . . . . . 12 Zaire 26 40 4.9 4.8 24 9 17 25 5 10 13 Uganda 7 10 4.8 4.4 41 4 . . . 14 Madagascar 12 25 5.2 6.4 23 6 . . 15 Sierra Leone 15 32 5.2 5.3 52 7 . 16 Mali 13 19 4.4 3.7 4! 8 . . 17 Nigeria 17 35 5.7 6.0 19 7 23 24 4 18 Niger 7 20 7.2 7.6 39 8 19 Rwanda 3 8 7.5 8.0 54 4 . . . 20 BurkjnaFaso 5 9 4.! 5.3 51 5 . . . 21 India 19 27 3.7 3.7 4 1 32 32 6 9 22 Benin 13 38 8.9 5.1 12 4 . . . . . 23 China 18 56 2.3 . . 2 I 49 27 9 9 24 Haiti 18 28 3.7 3.7 56 16 47 56 8 16 25 Kenya 9 24 8.1 7.9 26 6 41 27 4 6 26 Pakistan 24 32 4.3 4.6 I 0 44 42 10 13 27 Ghana 26 33 3.2 4.2 22 7 27 22 7 7 28 Central Africun Rep. 27 47 4.3 4.8 51 24 . 29 Togo 11 26 6.6 6.9 55 14 . . . 30 Zambia 23 50 6.6 6.2 24 12 . 31 Guinea 12 26 4.9 5.7 89 23 47 88 5 23 32 Sri Lanka 20 2! 2.3 1.4 17 4 33 Mauritania 9 47 10.6 7.5 83 39 . . . 34 Lesotho 6 20 7.5 7.0 17 4 . . . . . 35 Indonesia 16 31 4.8 5.1 17 5 42 33 7 10 36 Honduras 26 44 5,5 5.4 35 15 . . . . . 37 Egypt, Arab Rep. 41 47 2.7 3.1 37 17 53 52 22 24 38 Afghanistan 9 . . . . . . . . . . 41 4 39 Cambodia 11 12 -0.4 3.8 98 II . . . . . 40 Liberia 22 46 6.2 6.1 57 26 . . . 41 Myanmar 21 25 3.2 2.4 32 8 23 32 5 8 42 Sudan 13 22 5.9 3.9 35 8 30 35 4 8 43 VietNam 16 22 3.3 3.4 22 5 37 30 6 7 Middle-income economies 42w 60w 3.9w 3.4w 25w 14w 41w 40w 17w 25w Lower-middle-income 38w 52w 3.7w 3.6w 29w 14w 39w 39w 15w 21w 44 Bolivia 40 51 3.2 4.0 34 17 28 33 II 17 45 Zimbabwe 14 28 6.0 5.9 31 9 . . . . . 46 Senegal 33 38 3.3 4.0 52 20 40 53 13 20 47 Philippines 32 43 4.0 3.8 32 14 28 32 9 14 48 Côte dIvoire 23 40 7.6 4.5 45 18 30 45 7 18 49 Dominican Rep. 35 60 5.2 4.0 52 31 46 5! t6 31 50 Papua New Guinea 5 16 8.2 4.5 32 5 . . . . . 5! Guatemala 34 39 3,5 3,4 23 9 . . . . . 52 Morocco 32 48 4.3 4.3 9 4 39 36 12 17 53 Cameroon 16 41 7.6 5.9 16 7 . . . . . 54 Ecuador 37 56 4.7 4.2 22 12 50 49 19 28 55 SyrianArabRep. 40 50 4.5 4.4 32 17 58 60 23 30 56 Congo 32 41 3.5 4.7 68 28 . . . 57 ElSalvador 39 44 3.2 2.1 26 11 . 58 Paraguay 36 48 3.8 4.6 47 22 59 Peru 52 70 4.3 31 41 29 37 41 19 29 60 Jordana . 61 . . 4.1 53 32 33 38 15 26 61 Colombia 54 70 3.6 2.9 21 15 38 39 20 27 62 Thailand 13 23 5.1 4.6 57 13 66 57 8 13 63 Tunisia 40 54 4.0 2.9 37 20 35 37 14 20 64 Jamaica 38 52 2.8 2.4 51 26 . . . . . . 65 Turkey 34 61 4.1 5.9 8 5 4! 35 14 22 66 Rumania 38 53 2.9 1.2 18 9 21 18 8 9 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technicat notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 278 Urban population Population in cities of] million or more in Population in capital cite as As a percentage of Average annual growth a percentage 1990, as a percentage of total population rate (percent) Urban Total Uthan Total 1965 1990 1965-80 1980-90 /990 1990 1965 /990 /965 /990 67 Poland 50 62 1.9 .3 9 6 32 28 16 18 68 Panama 44 53 3.4 2.9 37 20 . . . . 69 Costa Rica 38 47 3.5 3.3 77 36 62 72 24 34 70 Chile 72 86 2.6 2.3 42 36 39 42 28 36 71 Botswana 4 28 12.6 9.9 38 10 . . . . . 72 Algeria 38 52 3.9 4.8 23 12 24 23 9 12 73 Bulgaria 46 68 2.5 1.0 20 13 21 19 10 13 74 Mauritius 37 41 2.5 0.4 36 15 . . . . . 75 Malaysia 26 43 4.6 4.9 22 10 16 22 4 10 76 Argentina 76 86 2.2 1.8 4! 36 53 49 40 42 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. 37 57 5.2 5.0 21 12 43 4! 16 23 78 Albania 32 35 2.7 2.4 21 7 . . . . . 79 Angola 13 28 6.4 5.8 6! 17 49 61 6 17 80 Lebanon 50 . . 4.5 . . . . . 8! Mongolia 42 52 4.0 2.9 42 22 .. . 82 Namibia 17 28 4.6 5.3 30 8 83 Nicaragua 43 60 4.6 4.5 44 26 36 15 26 84 Yemen,Rep. II 29 6.6 6.9 II 3 Upper-middle-income 47 w 71 w 4.2 w 3.2 w 19 w 14 w 43w 42w 20w 30w 85 Mexico 55 73 4.4 2.9 32 23 41 45 22 32 86 South Africa 47 60 3.2 3.7 Il 6 40 30 19 18 87 Venezuela 70 84 4.8 2.8 25 21 34 29 24 27 88 Uruguay 81 86 0.7 0.8 45 39 53 45 43 39 89 Brazil 50 75 4.3 3.4 2 2 48 47 24 35 90 Hungary 43 61 1.9 1.2 33 20 43 33 19 20 91 Yugoslavia 31 56 3.5 2.8 12 7 II 12 3 7 92 Czechoslovakia 5! 78 2.4 1.6 II 8 15 II 8 8 93 Gabon 21 46 7.3 6.2 57 26 . . . 94 TrinidadandTobago 30 69 5.6 3.3 12 8 . . . 95 Portugal 24 34 1.8 1.9 46 45 44 46 Il 16 96 Korea, Rep. 32 72 5.8 3.5 36 26 74 69 24 50 97 Greece 48 63 2.0 1.2 55 34 59 55 28 34 98 Saudi Arabia 39 77 8.5 6.3 17 13 23 29 9 23 99 Iraq 51 71 5.3 4.4 30 21 40 29 20 21 100 Libya 26 70 9.8 6.3 . . . . 55 65 14 45 10! Oman 4 Il 7.5 8.6 41 Low- and middle-income 24 w 44 w 3.7 w 6.6 w 15 w 6w 41 w 33 w 10 w 13 w Sub-Saharan Africa 14 w 29 w 5.8 w 5.9 w 32 w 9w 30 w 29 w 4w 9w East Asia & Pacific 19 w 50 w 3.0 w 12.0 w 9w 3w 48 w 30 w 9w 11 w South Asia 18 w 26 w 3.9 w 3.9 w 8w 2w 35 w 34 w 6w 9w Europe 40 w 60 w 2.7 w 2.6 w 15 w 10 w 31 w 27 w 12 w 16 w Middle East & N.Africa 35 w 51 w 4.6w 4.4 w 27 w 13 w 42 w 42w 15 w 21 w Latin America & Caribbean 53 w 71 w 3.9 w 3.0 w 23 w 16 w 44 w 45 w 24 w 33 w Other economies 52 w 66w 2.3 w 1.4w 6w 4w 25 w 23 w 13 w 15 w Severely indebted SI w 69 w 3.8 w 3.0 w 20 w 13 w 41 w 42 w 22 w 29 w High-income economies 72 w 77 w 1.3 w 0.8 w 12 w 9w 38 w 37 w 27 w 29 w OECD members 72w 77w 1.2w 0.8w II w 7w 37w 36w 27w 28w bOther 70 w 79 w 3.2 w 2.2 w 65 w 60 w 73 w 77 w 65 w 73 w 102 Ireland 49 57 2.1 0.6 46 26 . . . . . 103 ttsrael 81 92 3.5 2.1 12 II 43 45 34 41 104 Spain 61 78 2.2 1.1 17 13 26 28 16 22 105 tSingapore 100 100 1.6 2.2 100 100 100 100 100 100 106 tHongKong 89 94 2.1 1.7 100 94 90 99 81 93 107 NewZealand 79 84 1.6 1.0 12 10 . . . 108 Belgium 93 97 0.4 0.3 10 10 . . . . . 109 United Kingdom 87 89 0.3 0.2 14 13 33 26 28 23 110 Italy 62 69 1.0 0.6 8 5 42 37 26 25 Ill Australia 83 86 2.0 1.5 2 1 60 59 50 51 112 Netherlands 86 89 1.2 0.5 8 7 18 16 16 14 113 Austria 51 58 0.8 0.8 47 27 51 47 26 28 114 France 67 74 1.3 0.6 20 15 30 26 20 19 115 lUnited Arab Emirates 41 78 23.7 3.9 . . . . . . . . . 116 Canada 73 77 1.5 1.1 4 3 37 39 27 30 117 United States 72 75 1.2 1.1 2 1 49 48 35 36 118 Denmark 77 87 1.1 0.4 31 27 38 31 29 27 119 Germany 78 84 0.6 0.5 . . 120 Norway 58 75 1.9 1.0 21 16 . . . . . . 121 Sweden 77 84 0.9 0.4 23 19 17 23 13 20 122 Japan 67 77 2.1 0.7 19 15 37 36 25 27 123 Finland 44 60 2.6 0.4 34 20 27 34 12 20 124 Switzerland 53 60 1.0 1.1 7 4 . . . . . . 125 1Kutvait 78 96 8.2 5.0 53 50 100 55 78 53 World 36 w 50 w 2.6 w 4.5 w 14 w 6w 39 w 33 w 14 w 16 w Fuel exporters, excl. former USSR 30 w 50 w 5.5 w 5.0 w 23 w 12 w 30 w 31 w 10 w 16 w a. Data for Jordan cover the East Bank only. 279 Table 32. Women in development Health and welfare Education Under-5 Percentage of cohort mortality rate Maternal mortalirc persisting to grade 4 Females per 100 males Life expectancY at birth (rears) (per / 000/ice births) (per 100,000 Female Male Female Male Primary Secondarvu Female Male live births) 1990 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 1980 /970 /985 1970 1985 1965 1989 /965 /989 Low-income economies 91 w 98 w 50 w 62 w 48 w 61 w 60w 78w 40w 64w China and India 69w 72w 52w 66w 50w 65w 61w 78w 42w 64w Other low-income 131w 145w 45w 56w 44w 54w 65w 68w 74w 74w 58w 77w 34w 65w I Mozambique 194 215 39 48 36 45 479b 56 78 85 54 2 Tanzania 182 203 45 49 41 46 370b 82 91 88 90 60 98 33 74 3 Ethiopia 185 205 43 50 42 46 2,000h 45 56 50 38 64 28 67 4 Somalia 200 223 40 50 37 47 1,100 46 . SI . 27 . . II 5 Nepal 183 175 40 51 41 53 . 17 47 17 6 Chad 198 221 38 49 35 45 700 57 . 63 23 44 6 22 7 Bhutan 183 179 40 47 4! 50 . 26 . 29 8 59 . . 41 8 La0PDR 159 179 42 51 39 48 , 59 77 59 66 9 Malawi 242 255 40 47 38 46 250 55 67 60 71 59 81 40 54 10 Bangladesh 160 142 44 51 45 52 600 40 . . 37 44 78 14 47 II Burundi 167 187 44 48 41 45 . . 47 85 45 85 42 80 10 57 12 Zaire 143 162 45 54 42 50 800h 56 54 65 58 48 73 IS 43 13 Uganda 185 206 48 47 46 46 300 . 58 . . 30 14 Madagascar 160 178 45 52 42 50 300 65 63 . 83 95 64 96 IS Sierra Leone 236 261 34 44 31 40 450 . 55 62 37 16 Mali 209 238 39 50 37 46 . . 52 68 89 75 49 58 30 48 17 Nigeria 152 171 43 54 40 49 1,500 64 . . 66 . . 63 82 43 75 18 Niger 204 227 38 47 35 420i 75 . . 74 . . 46 57 19 42 19 Rwanda 192 213 45 50 42 47 210 63 82 65 81 69 99 37 52 20 BurkinaFaso 190 210 40 49 37 46 600 71 87 68 87 48 61 27 48 21 India 121 116 44 58 46 60 500 42 45 . . 57 69 35 54 22 Benin 155 173 43 52 41 49 1,680b . . 67 . . 44 5/ 44 23 China 29 40 57 71 53 69 44 . . 76 79 65 85 47 71 24 Haiti 126 144 47 56 44 53 340 . . 40 . . 40 . . 93 44 96 97 50 46 57 SlO 94 38 25 Kenya 112 61 84 77 84 76 57 70 26 Pakistan 151 145 45 55 47 56 600 56 60 31 50 27 39 27 Ghana 127 144 49 57 46 53 1,070b . . 82 . . 71 81 34 65 28 CentralAfricanRep. 156 176 41 51 40 48 600 67 67 67 72 34 63 19 38 29 Togo 133 151 44 55 40 52 47&' 85 80 88 87 42 63 26 31 30 Zambia 123 140 46 52 43 48 110 93 . . 99 . . 78 91 39 59 31 Guinea 221 245 36 43 34 43 . . . . 71 . . 81 44 45 19 32 32 Sri Lanka 21 26 64 73 63 69 90 94 97 73 99 86 93 102 105 33 Mauritania 193 215 39 48 36 45 119 . . 83 . . 83 31 69 II 45 34 Lesotho 125 142 50 57 47 55 . . 87 85 70 76 157 122 100 147 35 Indonesia 75 90 45 64 43 60 800 67 83 89 98 82 93 . . 82 36 Honduras 70 85 51 67 48 63 82 38 63 35 59 98 98 69 37 Egypt.ArabRep. 95 110 50 62 48 59 500 85 93 64 81 41 77 38 39 40 Afghanistan Cambodia Liberia 241 16! 168 180 193 46 46 52 56 43 43 49 53 640 173 . 64 ........ 71 56 40 17 . . . . 23 26 33 41 42 43 Myanmar Sudan VietNam Middle-income economies 78 159 46 57w 94 178 59 49 41 5! 68w 60w 69w 56w 64w 64 52 69 46 39 48 59 64 140 607' 110 39 ............ . 78w 86w 77w 90w 84w 90w 58 . 84 55 92 . 57 30 . 83w 105w 90 Lower-middle-income 44 45 46 Bolivia Zimbabwe Senegal 62w 109 66 120 73w 58w 67w 55w 63w 127 78 137 47 50 42 62 63 49 42 46 40 58 59 46 480 iü 530b ........ 79w 87w 78w 87w 78w 89w 74 . 83 91 80 . . 83 95 68 57 . . 98 72 89 57 35 . 79w . 109w 73 51 47 Philippines 45 57 57 66 54 62 80 . . 82 . . 78 94 94 96 48 Côted'lvoire 126 144 44 57 40 54 . . 77 83 . . 51 . . 19 44 49 Dominican Rep. 68 75 57 69 54 65 56 . . 52 . . 70 . . 98 104 50 Papua New Guinea 70 84 44 56 44 54 1,000 76 84 61 79 27 60 51 Guatemala 76 91 50 66 48 61 110 33 . . 73 . . 80 . . 67 52 Morocco 84 99 51 64 48 60 327b 78 79 83 82 42 65 31 68 53 Cameroon 117 134 47 59 44 55 303 59 85 58 86 66 85 28 68 54 Ecuador 58 72 57 68 55 64 220 69 . . 70 . . 91 96 46 91 55 SyrianArabRep. 55 67 54 68 51 64 280 92 96 95 97 47 87 28 71 56 Congo 172 185 47 56 41 50 . . 86 90 89 98 71 92 29 75 57 El Salvador 63 76 56 68 53 60 74 56 56 -. 93 98 75 95 ........ . . . 58 Paraguay 33 44 67 69 63 65 469 70 75 71 75 88 93 89 104 59 Pent 78 93 52 65 49 61 310 82 . . 69 62c 68c 52c 69 49C 66' 60 Jordan . . 90 97 92 89 72 93 40 95 61 Colombia 40 49 61 72 57 66 130 57 72 51 68 102 98 57 100 62 Thailand 28 38 58 68 54 63 270 71 69 89 68 97 ........ . . . . . . 63 Tunisia 50 63 52 68 51 66 1,000(1 . 90 . . 94 52 83 37 75 64 Jamaica 16 22 67 75 64 71 100 99 98 121 65 Turkey 73 80 55 69 52 64 207 76 98 81 98 66 89 37 62 66 Romania 23 32 70 73 66 67 180 90 . . 89 94 95 147 233 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. 280 Health and welfare Educatton Under-5 Percentage of cohort niortalirv rate Maternal mortality persisting to grade 4 Females per 100 males Life expectancY at birth (rears) (per 1,0(X) live births) (per 100,000 Secondart,a Female Male Female Male Primary Female Male live births) 1990 1990 1965 1990 1965 /990 /980 1970 /985 1970 1985 1965 1989 1965 1989 67 Poland 18 23 72 75 66 67 12 99 . 97 . . 93 95 217 264 68 Panama 21 29 65 75 62 71 90 97 87 97 86 93 93 100 103 69 Costa Rica 18 22 66 78 63 73 26 93 91 91 90 94 94 110 102 70 Chile 18 23 63 76 57 69 55 86 96 83 97 96 95 106 110 71 Botswana 41 53 49 69 46 65 300 97 94 90 92 129 106 -77 109 72 Algeria 83 91 51 66 49 65 129 90 95 95 97 62 81 45 77 73 Bulgaria 14 19 73 76 68 70 22 91 97 100 98 95 93 . . 188 74 Mauritius 21 28 63 73 59 67 99 97 98 97 99 90 97 53 98 75 Malaysia 17 22 60 72 56 68 59 84 95 . . 102 76 Argentina 30 40 69 75 63 68 85 92 . 69 . 97 103 60 172 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. 103 122 52 63 52 63 . 75 89 74 92 46 84 44 71 78 Albania 28 33 67 75 65 70 . 87 92 77 121 79 80 81 82 83 Angola Lebanon Mongolia Namibia Nicaragua 207 . 76 119 66 . 230 . 91 140 80 . 37 64 51 47 52 48 . 64 59 66 . 34 60 49 44 49 44 . 61 56 63 . . . 140 . 65 48 .......... 62 45 55 49 76 99 . . 109 107 89 . . 69 . . 128 162 84 Ye,nen,Rep. 172 191 41 49 39 48 . . Upper-middle-income 49 w 60 w 62 w 71 w 58 w 65 w 76 w 86 w 76 w 95 w 92 w 93 w 88 w 98 w 85 Mexico 41 51 61 73 58 66 92 . 73 . 94 91 94 53 90 98 54 65 49 550d 99 86 South Africa 81 59 . . 87 87 Venezuela 36 45 65 73 61 67 65 84 84 61 87 98 96 109 119 88 Uruguay 22 28 72 77 65 70 56 . 98 . 96 96 95 110 89 Brazil 62 75 59 69 55 63 ISO 56 . 54 . 98 . . 93 90 Hungary 16 22 72 75 67 67 28 90 97 99 97 94 95 197 198 91 Yugoslavia 25 30 68 76 64 69 27 9! . . 99 . . 91 94 86 97 92 Czechoslovakia 13 17 73 75 67 68 8 96 97 98 96 93 97 195 133 93 Gabon l48 167 44 55 41 52 l24b 73 80 78 78 84 98 39 81 94 TrinidadandTobago 25 34 67 74 63 69 81 78 99 74 96 97 99 107 102 95 Portugal 14 17 68 78 62 72 15 92 . . 92 . . 95 91 92 99 96 Korea,Rep. 17 24 58 73 55 67 34 96 99 96 99 91 94 59 87 97 Greece l3 15 72 80 69 74 12 97 99 96 99 93 94 86 102 98 Saudi Arabia 72 87 50 66 47 63 52 93 93 91 93 29 84 8 74 99 Iraq 81 89 53 66 SI 61 84 86 90 92 42 79 29 63 100 Libya 84 100 51 64 48 60 . . 92 . . 95 . . 39 . . 13 101 Oman 36 46 45 68 43 64 . . 82 97 82 100 88 . . 75 Low- and middle-income 82 w 90 w 52 w 64 w 50 w 62 w 61 w 77 w 65 w 81 w 67 w 80 w 52 w 72 w Sub-Saharan Africa 160 w 179 w 43 w 52 w 41 w 49 w 66 w 70 w 69 w 72 w 56 w 78 w 36 w 64 w East Asia & Pacific 37 w 48 w 55 w 70 w 52 w 67 w 78 w 82 w 69 w 87 w 50 w 73 w South Asia 124 w 121 w 45 w 58 w 46 w 59 w 45 w 48 w 54 w 68 w 34 w 53 w Europe 35 w 40 w 68 w 74 w 63 w 67 w 90 w 98 w 93 w 98 w 88 w 93 w 131 w 148 w Middle East & N.Africa 102 w 117 w 49 w 62 w 48 w 60 w 81 w 89 w 85 w 92 w 47 w 75 w 34 w 68 w Latin America & Caribbean 52 w 64 w 60 w 71 w 56 w 65 w 64 w 75 w 59 w 84 w 95 w 96 w 77 w 110 w Other economies 24w 32 w 72 w 76w 65 w 66 w 75 w 95 w 96 w 116 w 100 w Severely indebted 56 w 67 w 61 w 70 w 57 w 64 w 74 w 80 w 71 w 92 w 88 w 91 w 88 w 124 w High-income economies 9w 12 w 74 w 80 w 68 w 74 w 95 w 97 w 94 w 96 w 94 w 95 w 92 w 100 w OECD members 9w Ii w 74w 80w 68w 74w 95 w 97w 94w 96w 94w 95w 92w 100w tOther 14 w 18 w 70 w 77 w 65 w 73 w 96 w 97 w 96 w 97 w 88 w 93 w 90 w 106 w 102 Ireland 8 10 73 77 69 72 7 . . 98 . . 96 97 95 113 101 103 tlsrael II 15 74 78 71 74 5 96 98 96 98 94 97 127 118 104 Spain 9 l2 74 79 69 73 10 76 97 76 96 93 93 70 10/ 105 ('Singapore 7 10 68 77 64 71 II 99 100 99 100 85 90 91 100 106 tHong Kong 7 10 71 80 64 75 4 94 . . 92 . . 85 92 72 104 107 New Zealand 10 15 74 79 68 72 . 96 94 94 95 . . 97 ........ . . 108 Belgium 10 12 74 80 68 73 10 . 87 . 85 94 96 85 103 109 United Kingdom 9 12 74 78 68 73 7 95 95 94 96 110 Italy 10 l2 73 80 68 75 13 93 95 80 98 Ill Australia 8 II 74 80 68 74 II 77 100 98 95 95 92 99 112 Netherlands 8 10 76 80 71 74 5 99 . . 96 . . 95 98 93 110 113 Austria 9 13 73 80 66 73 II 95 99 92 97 95 95 95 94 114 France 8 10 75 81 68 73 13 97 96 90 99 95 94 108 107 115 tUnited Arab Emirates 23 32 59 74 56 69 . . 97 96 93 94 . . 93 0 102 116 Canada 7 9 75 81 69 74 2 95 95 92 93 94 94 94 96 117 United States 10 13 74 80 67 73 9 . . 96 . . 94 92 . . . 118 Denmark 9 II 75 78 70 73 4 98 100 96 100 96 96 104 lOS 119 Germany 8 II 73 80 67 73 ll 97 99 96 97 . . 96 . . 98 120 Norway 9 II 76 81 71 74 . . 99 99 98 99 96 95 95 104 121 Sweden 6 8 76 81 72 75 4 98 . . 96 . . 96 95 104 108 122 Japan 5 7 73 82 68 76 15 100 100 1(8) 100 96 95 101 99 123 Finland 7 9 73 79 66 73 5 . . 99 . 99 90 95 115 111 124 Switzerland 7 9 75 82 69 75 5 94 . . 93 96 . . 99 125 '(Kuwait 14 20 65 76 61 72 18 96 92 98 93 76 96 63 92 World 64 w 70 w 58 w 67 w 55 w 64 w 67 w 85 w 70 w 85 w 73 w 83 w 59 w 76 w Fuel exp., excl. former USSR 117 w 133 w 48 w 60 w 46 w 57 w 74 w 89 w 74 w 92 w 59 w 84 w 47 w 77 w a. See technical notes. b. Data refer to maternal mortality in hospitals and other medical institutions only. c. Data for Jordan cover the East Bank only. d. Commu- nity data from rurat areas only. e. Data refer to the Federal Republic of Germany before unification. 281 Table 33. Forests, protected areas, and water resources Forest area Nationally protected areas Internal renewable water resources; annual withdrawal (thousands of square kilometers) (1991) (1970-87) Annual Per capita (cubic meters) Area Asa As a Total area deforestation (thousands percentage Total percentage of Industrial 1980 1981-85 of square of total (cubic total water and Total Closed Total Closed kilometers) Number land area kilometers) resourcet Total Domestic agricultural Low-income economies China and India Other low-income I Mozambique 154 9 1.2 0.1 0.0 1 0.0 0.8 1 53 13 40 2 Tanzania 420 14 3.0° . 130.0 28 13.8 0.5 1 36 8 28 3 Ethiopia 272 44 0.9 0.1 25.3 11 2.1 2.2 2 48 5 43 4 Somalia 91 15 0.! 0.0 1.8 I 0.3 0.8 7 167 5 162 5 Nepal 21 19 0.8 0.8 11.3 13 8.0 2.7 2 155 6 149 6 Chad 135 5 0.8 . . 4.1 2 0.3 0.2 0 35 6 29 7 Bhutan 21 21 0.0 0.0 9.1 5 19.3 0.0 0 15 5 10 8 La0PDR 136 84 1.3 1.0 0.0 0 0.0 1.0 0 228 18 210 9 Malawi 43 2 1.5 . . 10.6 9 8.9 0.2 2 22 7 15 10 Bangladesh 9 9 0.1 0.1 1.0 8 0.7 22.5 1 211 6 205 11 Burundi 0 0 0,0 0.0 0.9 3 3.1 0.1 3 20 7 13 12 Zaire 1,776 1,058 3.7 1.8 85.8 8 3.7 0.7 0 22 13 9 13 Uganda 60 8 0.5 0.1 18.7 32 7.9 0.2 0 20 6 14 14 Madagascar 132 103 1.6 1.5 11.2 37 1.9 16.3 41 1,675 17 1,658 IS SierraLeone 21 7 0.1 0.1 0.8 2 1.1 0.4 0 99 7 92 16 Mali 73 5 0.4 . . 40.1 11 3.2 1.4 2 159 3 156 17 Nigeria 148 60 4.0 3.0 28.7 21 3.1 3.6 1 44 14 30 18 Niger 26 1 0.7 0.0 97.0 6 7.7 0.3 I 44 9 35 19 Rwanda 2 1 0.1 0.0 3.3 2 12.4 0.2 2 23 6 17 20 BurkinaFaso 47 3 0.8 0.0 26.4 11 9.6 0.2 I 20 6 14 21 India 640 378 o.sa . 137.7 362 4.2 380.0 18 612 18 594 22 Benin 39 0 0.7 0.0 8.4 2 7.5 0.1 0 26 7 19 23 China 1,150 978 0.0 . . 283.6 396 3.0 460.0 16 462 28 434 24 Haiti 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.1 3 0.3 0.0 0 46 II 35 25 Kenya 24 II 0.4 0.2 34.7 36 6.0 1.1 7 48 13 35 26 Pakistan 25 22 0.1 0.1 36.5 53 4.6 153.4 33 2,053 21 2,032 27 Ghana 87 17 0.7 0.2 10.7 8 4.5 0.3 1 35 12 23 28 Central African Rep. 359 36 0.6 0.1 58.6 12 9.4 0.1 0 27 6 21 29 Togo 17 3 0.1 0.0 6.5 II 11.4 0.1 1 40 25 15 30 Zambia 295 30 0.7 0.4 63.6 20 8.5 0.4 0 86 54 32 31 Guinea 107 21 0.9 0.4 1.7 3 0.7 0.7 0 115 12 104 32 SriLanka 17 17 0.6 0.6 7.8 43 11.9 6.3 15 503 10 493 33 Mauritania 6 0 0.1 0.0 17.5 4 1.7 0.7 10 473 57 416 34 Lesotho 0 0 . . 0.1 1 0.2 0.1 1 34 7 27 35 Indonesia 1,169 1,139 boa 192.3 194 10.1 82.0 3 452 9 443 36 Honduras 40 38 0.9 0.9 7.2 35 6.4 1.3 1 508 20 488 37 Egypt,ArabRep. 0 0 . . 8.0 13 0.8 56.4 97 1,202 84 1,118 38 Afghanistan 12 8 . . . . 1.8 5 0.3 26.1 52 1,436 14 1,422 39 Cambodia 126 75 0.3 0.3 0.0 0 0.0 0.5 0 69 3 66 40 Liberia 20 20 0.5 0.5 1.3 1 1.2 0.1 0 54 15 39 41 Myanmar 319 319 6.Oa . 1.7 2 0.3 4.0 0 103 7 96 42 Sudan 477 7 5.0 0.0 93.6 14 3.7 18.6 14 1,089 Il 1,078 43 VietNam 101 88 2.0° . . 9.0 59 2.7 5.1 I 81 II 70 Middle-income economies Lower-middle-income 44 Bolivia 668 440 1.2 0.9 98.6 27 9.0 1.2 0 184 18 166 45 Zimbabwe 198 2 0.8 0.0 30.7 25 7.9 1.2 5 129 18 Ill 46 Senegal 110 2 0.5 . . 21.8 10 11.1 1.4 4 201 10 191 47 Philippines 95b 95 I .4 1.4° 5.7 27 1.9 29.5 9 693 125 568 48 Cbte d'Ivoire 98 45 2,6a . 19.9 12 6.2 0.7 1 68 15 53 49 Dominican Rep. 6 6 0.0 0.0 9.6 17 19.8 3.0 15 453 23 430 50 Papua New Guinea 382 342 0.2 0.2 0.3 5 0.1 0.1 0 25 7 18 51 Guatemala 45 44 0.9 0.9 8.3 17 7.7 0.7 1 139 13 126 52 Morocco 32 15 0.1 . . 3.6 10 0.8 11.0 37 501 30 471 53 Cameroon 233 165 1.9° 1.0° 20.3 13 4.3 0.4 0 30 14 16 54 Ecuador 147 143 3.4 3.4 107.5 18 37.9 5.6 2 561 39 522 55 SynanArabRep. 2 1 0.0 . . 0.0 0 0.0 3.3 9 449 31 418 56 Congo 213 213 0.2 0.2 13.3 10 3.9 0.0 0 20 12 8 57 El Salvador 1 1 0.1 0.1 0.3 9 1.2 1.0 5 241 17 224 58 Paraguay 197 4! 45a . 12.0 14 3.0 0.4 0 111 17 94 59 Peru 706 697 2.7 2.7 26.9 20 2.1 6.1 ., 15 294 56 238 60 Jordan 1 0 . . . . 1.0 8 1.1 0.4 41 173 50 123 61 Colombia 517 464 8.9 8.2 90.5 41 7.9 5.3 0 179 73 106 62 Thailand 157 92 2.4° 1.6° 55.1 90 10.7 31.9 18 599 24 575 63 Tunisia 3 2 0.1 . . 0.4 7 0.3 2.3 53 325 42 283 64 Jamaica 1 1 0.0 0.0 0.4 2 3.5 0.3 4 157 Ii 146 65 Turkey 202 89 . . . . 2.7 18 0.3 15.6 8 317 76 241 66 Romania 67 63 . . 10.9 40 4.6 25.4 12 1,144 92 1,052 Note: For data comparability and coverage, see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. For more extensive coverage and documentation of data on protected areas and water resources, see the Environmental data appendix. 282 Forest area Nationally protected areas Internal renewable water resources: annual withdrawal (thousands of square kilometers) (1970-8 7) (1991) Annual Asa Per capita (cubic meters) Area Asa Total area deforestation (thousands percentage Total percentage of Industrial 1980 1981-85 of square of total (cubic total water and Total Closed Total Closed kilometers) Number land area kilometers) resources Total Domestic agricultural 67 Poland 87 86 . . . , 22.4 80 7.2 16.8 30 472 76 396 68 Panama 42 42 0.4 0.4 13.3 16 17.2 1.3 1 744 89 655 69 Costa Rica 18 16 0.4a 0.4 6.2 31 12.2 1,4 1 770 31 739 70 Chile 76 76 0.5 . . 137.2 66 18.1 16.8 4 1,625 98 1,528 71 Botswana 326 0 0.2 . . 100.3 9 17.2 0.1 0 98 5 93 72 Algeria 18 15 0.4 . . 127.0 18 5.3 3.0 16 161 35 126 73 Bulgaria 37 33 . . . . 2.6 50 2.4 14.2 7 1,600 112 1,488 74 Mauritius 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3 2.2 0.4 16 415 66 349 75 Malaysia 210b 210 2.7a 4.5 14.9 51 9.4 2 765 176 589 76 Argentina 445 445 1.8a 94.0 115 3.4 27.6 3 1,059 95 964 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. 38 28 0.2 . . 75.3 60 4.6 45.4 39 1,362 54 1,308 78 Albania . . . . . . . . 0.4 13 1.5 0.2 I 94 6 88 79 Angola 536 29 0.9 0.4 26.4 6 2.1 0.5 0 43 6 37 80 Lebanon 0 0 0.0 . . 0.0 1 0.3 0.8 16 271 30 241 81 Mongolia 95 95 . . . 61.7 15 3.9 0.6 2 272 30 242 82 Namibia 184 . . 0.3 . , 103.7 11 12.6 0.1 2 79 9 69 83 Nicaragua 45 45 1.2 1.2 3.6 II 2.8 0.9 1 370 93 278 84 Yemen, Rep. 0 0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 1.5 147 127 5 122 Upper-middle-income 85 Mexico 484 463 bOa . 100.7 63 5.1 54.2 15 90! 54 847 86 South Africa 3 3 . . . . 73.9 229 6.1 9.2 18 404 65 339 87 Venezuela 339 319 2.5 1.3 283.1 104 31.0 4.1 0 387 166 221 88 Uruguay 5 5 . . . . 0.3 8 0.2 0.6 I 241 14 227 89 Brazil 5,145 3,575 l3.8 . . 215.7 172 2.5 35.0 1 212 91 121 90 Hungary 16 16 . . . . 5.8 54 6.2 5.4 5 502 45 457 91 Yugoslavia 105 91 7.9 62 3.1 8.8 3 393 63 330 92 Czechoslovakia 46 44 . . . . 20.6 65 16.1 5.8 6 379 87 292 93 Gabon 206 205 0.2 0.2 10.5 6 3.9 0.! 0 51 37 14 94 TrinidadandTobago 2 2 0.0 0.0 0.2 7 3.0 0.2 3 149 40 109 95 Portugal 30 26 . . . . 5.6 25 6.0 10.5 16 1,062 159 903 96 Korea, Rep. 49 49 . . . . 7.6 26 7.6 10.7 17 298 33 265 97 Greece 58 25 . . . . 1.0 21 0.8 7.0 12 721 58 663 98 SaudiArabia 2 0 . . . , 212.0 10 9.9 3.6 164 255 115 140 99 Iraq 12 1 . . 0.0 0 0.0 42.8 43 4,575 137 4,438 100 Libya 2 1 . . 1.6 3 0.! 2.8 404 623 93 530 10! Oman 0 0 . . . . 0.5 2 0.3 0.4 22 561 17 544 Low- and middle-income Sub-Saharan Africa East Asia South Asia Europe Middle East & N.Africa Latin America & Caribbean Other economies Severely indebted High-income economies OECD members tOther 102 Ireland 4 3 . . . . 0.3 6 0.4 0.8 2 267 43 224 103 (Israel I I . . . , 2.1 21 10.0 1.9 88 447 72 375 104 Spain 108 69 . . . 35.0 163 6.9 45.3 41 l,l74 14! 1,033 105 tSingapore 0 0 . . . . 0.0 I 4.4 0.2 32 84 38 46 106 tHong Kong . . . . . . . . 0.4 12 36.4 . . , . 107 New Zealand 95 72 29.1 152 10.7 1.2 0 379 174 205 108 Belgium 8 7 . . 0.7 2 2.4 9.0 72 917 101 816 109 United Kingdom 22 20 . . 46.4 140 18.9 28.4 24 507 .101 406 110 Italy 81 64 . . 20.1 144 6.7 56.2 30 983 138 845 Ill Australia 1,067 417 . . 812.6 746 10.6 17.8 5 1,306 849 457 112 Netherlands 4 3 . . . , 3.5 67 9.4 14.5 16 1,023 5! 972 113 Austria 38 38 . . 20.9 178 24.9 3.1 3 417 79 338 114 France 151 139 53.6 81 9.7 40.0 22 728 116 612 115 tUnited Arab Emirates 0 0 . . . . 0.0 0 0.0 0.9 300 565 62 503 116 Canada 4,364 2,64! . . 494.5 426 5.0 42.2 1 1,752 193 1,559 117 UnitedStates 2,960 2,096 l.6a 982.0 972 10.5 467.0 19 2,162 259 1,903 118 Denmark 5 5 4.1 66 9.5 1.4 II 277 83 194 119 Germany 'l2c 70C 440 23.6 41.2C 668C 67C 6010 . 58.6 26' 120 Norway 87 76 . . 14.9 82 4.6 20 0 489 98 391 121 Sweden 278 244 . . 29.2 195 6.5 4.0 2,,, 479 172 307 122 Japan 253 239 . . 46.6 684 12.3 107.8 20 923 157 766 123 Finland 232 199 . . 8.1 35 2.4 3.7 3 774 93 68! 124 Switzerland 1! 9 . . 7.5 3.2 112 18.2 6 502 115 387 125 tKuwait 0 0 . . . . 0.3 1.7 0.5 1 . 238 . 152 86 World Fuel exporters, excl. former USSR a. Data are forthe periods as follows: Tanzania 1989, India 1983-87, Indonesia 1982-90, Myanmar 1984, Viet Nam 1986, Philippines 1981-88. Côte d'Ivoire 1981-86, Cameroon 1976-86, Paraguay 1989-90, Thailand 1985-88, Costa Rica 1973-89, Malaysia 1979-89, Argentina 1980-89, Mexico 1981-83, Brazil (Legal Amazon only) 1989-90, United States 1977-87. b. See the technical notes for alternative estimates. c. Data refer to the Federal Republic of Germany before unification. 283 Technical notes The World Development Indicators provide informa- count in interpreting the indicators, particularly tion on the main features of social and economic when making comparisons across economies. development. To provide long-term trend analysis, facilitate inter- The main criterion of country classification is gross national comparisons and include the effects of national product (GNP) per capita. With the addition changes in intersectoral relative prices, constant price of new World Bank member, Albania, the main tables data for most economies are partially rebased to three now include country data for 125 economies, listed in base years and linked together. The year 1970 is the ascending order of GNP per capita. Box Al, showing base year for data from 1960 to 1975, 1980 for 1976 to basic indicators for economies with populations of 1982, and 1987 for 1983 and beyond. These three pe- less than 1 million, covers another fifty-seven econ- riods are "chain-linked" to obtain 1987 prices omies including, this year, Marshall Islands and the throughout all three periods. Federated States of Micronesia, former members of Chain-linking is accomplished for each of the three the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. As only subperiods by rescaling; this moves the year in which sparse data are available for three additional econ- current and constant price versions of the same time omies, Cuba, People's Democratic Republic of Korea, series have the same value, without altering the trend and the former Soviet Union, these are not included of either. Components of GDP are individually re- in the main tables except in summary form under scaled and summed to provide GDP and its subag- "other economies." Selected data are presented for gregates. In this process, a rescaling deviation may them in Box A.2. Other changes are outlined in the occur between the constant price GDP by industrial Introduction. origin and the constant price GDP by expenditure. Considerable effort has been made to standardize Such rescaling deviations are absorbed under the the data; nevertheless, statistical methods, coverage, heading private consumption, etc. on the assumption practices, and definitions differ widely among coun- that GDP by industrial origin is a more reliable esti- tries. In addition, the statistical systems in many de- mate than GDP by expenditure. veloping economies are still weak, and this affects the Because private consumption is calculated as a re- availability and reliability of the data. Moreover, sidual, the national accounting identities are main- cross-country and cross-time comparisons always in- tained. Rebasing does involve incorporating in pri- volve complex technical problems that cannot be fully vate consumption whatever statistical discrepancies and unequivocally resolved. The data are drawn from arise for expenditure. The value added in the services the sources thought to be most authoritative, but sector also includes a statistical discrepancy, as re- many of them are subject to considerable margins of ported by the original source. error. With some exceptions, use of 1987 rather than 1980 Most social and demographic data from national values as country weights does not greatly alter the sources are drawn from regular administrative files, group indexes and growth rates reported here. Most although some come from special surveys or periodic exceptions relate to oil exporters and reflect declining census inquiries. In the case of survey and census shares of group GNP, trade, and so on from 1980 to data, figures for intermediate years have to be inter- 1987. This is most notable for Sub-Saharan Africa, polated or otherwise estimated from the base refer- with the dramatic decline in Nigeria's weight. In con- ence statistics. Similarly, because not all data are up- trast, changing the base year for country series them- dated, some figuresespecially those relating to selves, as described above, is likely to alter trends current periodsmay be extrapolated. Several esti- significantly. Differences of half a percentage point a mates (for example, life expectancy) are derived from year in growth rates could be quite common; larger models based on assumptions about recent trends changes may occur for economies that have under- and prevailing conditions. Issues related to the re- gone significant structural change, such as exporters liability of demographic indicators are reviewed in of fuels. the U.N. 's World Population Trends and Policies. The summary measures are calculated by simple Readers are urged to take these limitations into ac- addition when a variable is expressed in reasonably 284 Box A.1 Basic indicators for economies with populations of less than 1 million GNP per capitaa Average Area Average annual expncy Adult illiteracy Population growth rate rate of inflationa at birth (percent) (thousands (thousands) of square Dollars (percent) (percent) (years) Female Total mid-1990 kilometers) 1990 1965-90 1965-80 1980-90 1990 1990 1990 1 Guinea-Bissau 980 36 180 . . . . 54.4 39 76 64 2 The Gambia 875 11 260 0.7 8.1 13.8 44 84 73 3 Guyana 798 215 330 -1.3 7.9 25.5 64 5 4 4 Equatorial Guinea 417 28 330 . . . . . . 47 63 50 5 São Tome and Principe 117 1 400 . . . . 19.9 67 . . 33 6 Maldives 214 b 450 2.8 . . . 62 7 Comoros 475 2 480 0.4 . . . . 55 . 8 Solomon Islands 316 29 590 . . 7.7 10.0 65 . 9 Western Samoa 165 3 730 . . . . 9.2 66 . 10 Kiribati 70 1 760 . . . . 5.5 55 . 11 Swaziland 797 17 810 2.2 9.0 11.1 57 . 12 Cape Verde 371 4 890 . . . . 9.8 66 . 13 Tonga 99 1 1,010 . . . . . . 67 . 14 Vanuatu 151 12 1,100 . . . . 4.9 65 . 15 St. Vincent 107 b 1,720 2.9 10.9 4.6 70 . 16 Fiji 744 18 1,780 1.9 10.3 5.4 65 . 17 St. Lucia 150 1 1,900 . . . . 4.2 72 . 18 Belize 188 23 1,990 2.6 7.1 2.3 68 . 19 Grenada 91 b 2,190 . . . . . . 70 . 20 Dominica 72 1 2,210 1.3 12.6 6.1 75 . 21 Suriname 447 163 3,050 1.0 . . 6.4 68 5 5 22 St. Kitts and Nevis 40 b 3,330 . . . . 6.5 70 . 23 Antigua and Barbuda 79 b 4,600 . . . . 7.8 74 . 24 Seychelles 68 b 4,670 3.2 12.2 3.3 71 . 25 Barbados 257 b 6,540 2.3 11.0 5.4 75 . 26 Malta 354 b 6,610 7.1 3.5 2.0 73 . 27 Cyprus 702 9 8,020 . . . . 5.7 77 . 28 The Bahamas 255 14 11,420 1.1 6.4 6.0 69 . 29 Qatar 439 11 15,860 . . . . . . 70 . 30 Iceland 255 103 21,400 3.4 26.7 32.8 78 . 31 Luxembourg 379 3 28,730 2.3 6.7 4.2 75 . 32 American Sanwa 39 b c . . . . . . 72 . 33 Andorra 52 . . c . . . . . . . . . 34 Arubs 61 b d . . . . . . . . . 35 Bahraiti 503 1 c . . . . -1,5 69 31 23 36 Bermuda 61 b c . . 8.1 9.1 . . . 37 Brunei 256 6 c . . . . -6.9 76 . 38 Channellslands 144 . . c . . . . . . 77 . 39 Djihouti 427 23 e . . . . . . 48 . 40 Faeroe Islands 48 1 c .. . . . . . . . 41 Fed. Sts. of Micronesia 103 1 . . . . . . . . . . . 42 French Guiana 92 90 d . . . . . . . . . 43 French Polynesia 197 4 c . . . . . . 73 . 44 Gibraltar 31 h d . . . . . . . . . 45 Greenland 57 342 c . . . . . . . . . 46 Guadeloupe 387 2 c . . . . . . 74 . 47 Guam 137 1 c . . . . . . 73 . 48 Isle of Man 69 . . c . . . . . . . . . 49 Macao 459 b d . . . . . . 72 . 50 Marshall Islands 34 0 . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Martinique 360 1 d . . . . . 76 . . 52 Mayotte 73 . . c . . . . . . . . . 53 Netherlands Antilles 189 1 c .. . . . 77 . . 54 New Caledonia 165 19 d . . . . . 69 . . 55 Puerto Rico1 3530 9 c . . . . . 76 . . 56 Reunion 593 3 d . . . . 72 . . . 57 Virgin Islands (U.S.) 110 b c 2.9 2.3 3.9 74 . Note: Economies in italics are those br which 1990 GNP per capita cannot be calculatcd figures in italics are for years other than those spe- cified, a. See the technical note for Table I. h. Less than 500 square kilometers. c. GNP per capita estimated to be in the high-income range. d. GNP per capita estimated to he in the upper-middle-income range. e. GNP per capita estimated to he in the lower-middle-income range. f. Population is more than I nullion. 285 Box A.2 Selected indicators for other economies People's Democratic Republic of Cuba Korea Former USSR 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 Population (millions) 8 11 12 22 232 289 Urban population (percentage of total) 58 75 45 60 52 66 Life expectancy at birth (years) 67 76 57 71 69 71 Crude birth rate (per 1,000 population) 34 17 44 22 18 17 Crude death rate (per 1,000 population) 8 6 12 5 7 10 Population per physician 1,150 530 . . 420 480 270 Total fertility rate 4.4 1.9 6.5 2.3 2.5 2.3 Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 38 12 63 26 28 24 Low birth weight (percent) . . 8 . . . . 6 Under-5 mortality (per 1,000 live births, female) . . 13 . . 27 . . 24 Under-S mortality (per 1,000 live births, male) . . 16 . . 36 . . 33 Daily calorie supply (per capita) 2,461 3,141 2,039 2,823 3,205 3,386 Food production per capita index (1979-81 = 100) 82 99 73 110 86 112 Female primary education (percentage of female age group) 119 100 . . 106 103 105 Total primary education (percentage of total age group) 121 103 . . 103 103 105 Area (thousands of square kilometers) . . 111 . . 121 . . 22402 Population projected to year 2000 (millions) . . 12 . . 25 . . 308 Note: For data comparability and coverage. see the technical notes. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. comparable units of account. Economic indicators been computed using the least-squares method. The that do not seem naturally additive are usually com- least-squares growth rate, r, is estimated by fitting a bined by a price-weighting scheme. The summary least-squares linear regression trend line to the log- measures for social indicators are weighted by arithmic annual values of the variable in the relevant population. period. More specifically, the regression equation The World Development Indicators, unlike the takes the form log X = a + bt + e5 where this is World Tables, provide data for (usually) two reference equivalent to the logarithmic transformation of the points rather than annual time series. For summary compound growth rate equation, X = X,, (1 + r)t . In measures that cover many years, the calculation is these equations, X is the variable, t is time, and a = based on the same country composition over time log X,, and b = log (1 + r) are the parameters to be and across topics. The World Development Indicators estimated; e is the error term. If b* is the least-squares permit group measures to be compiled only if the estimate of b, then the average annual percentage country data available for a given year account for at growth rate, r, is obtained as [antilog (b*)1 - 1 and least two-thirds of the full group, as defined by the multiplied by 100 to express it as a percentage. 1987 benchmarks. So long as that criterion is met, noncurrent reporters (and those not providing ample history) are, for years with missing data, assumed to Table 1. Basic indicators behave like the sample of the group that does provide estimates. Readers should keep in mind that the pur- For basic indicators for economies with populations pose is to maintain an appropriate relationship across of less than 1 million, see Box Al. For selected indi- topics, despite myriad problems with country data, cators for three "other economies," see Box A.2. and that nothing meaningful can be deduced about Population numbers for mid-1990 are World Bank behavior at the country level by working back from estimates. These are usually projections from the group indicators. In addition, the weighting process most recent population censuses or surveys; most are may result in discrepancies between summed sub- from 1980-1990 and, for a few countries, from the group figures and overall totals. This is explained 1960s or 1970s. Note that refugees not permanently more fully in the introduction to the World Tables. settled in the country of asylum are generally consid- All growth rates shown are calculated from con- ered to be part of the population of their country of stant price series and, unless otherwise noted, have origin. 286 The data on area are from the Food and Agriculture cusing on the coverage and concepts employed and, Organization. Area is the total surface area, mea- where appropriate, making adjustments to improve sured in square kilometers, comprising land area and comparability. As part of the review, Bank staff esti- inland waters. mates of GNP (and sometimes of population) may be GNP per capita figures in U.S. dollars are calculated developed for the most recent period. according to the World Bank Atlas method, which is The World Bank also systematically assesses the described below. appropriateness of official exchange rates as conver- GNP per capita does not, by itself, constitute or sion factors. An alternative conversion factor is used measure welfare or success in development. It does (and reported in the World Tables) when the official not distinguish between the aims and ultimate uses exchange rate is judged to diverge by an excep- of a given product, nor does it say whether it merely tionally large margin from the rate effectively applied offsets some natural or other obstacle, or harms or to foreign transactions. This applies to only a small contributes to welfare. For example, GNP is higher in number of countries. For all other countries the Bank colder countries, where people spend money on calculates GNP per capita using the Atlas method. heating and warm clothes, than in balmy climates, The Atlas conversion factor for any year is the aver- where people are comfortable wearing light clothes in age of a country's exchange rate for that year and its the open air. exchange rates for the two preceding years, after More generally, GNP does not deal adequately adjusting them for differences in relative inflation be- with environmental issues, particularly natural re- tween the country and the United States. This three- source use. The Bank has joined with others to see year average smooths fluctuations in prices and ex- how national accounts might provide insights into change rates for each country. The resulting GNP in these issues. The possibility of developing "satellite" U.S. dollars is divided by the midyear population for accounts is being considered; such accounts could the latest of the three years to derive GNP per capita. delve into practical and conceptual difficulties, such Some sixty low- and middle-income economies as assigning a meaningful economic value to re- have suffered declining real GNP per capita in con- sources that markets do not yet perceive as "scarce" stant prices during the 1980s. In addition, significant and allocating costs that are essentially global within currency and terms of trade fluctuations have af- a framework that is inherently national. fected relative income levels. For this reason the GNP measures the total domestic and foreign value levels and ranking of GNP per capita estimates, cal- added claimed by residents. It comprises GDP (de- culated by the Atlas method, have sometimes fined in the note for Table 2) plus net factor income changed in ways not necessarily related to the rela- from abroad, which is the income residents receive tive domestic growth performance of the economies. from abroad for factor services (labor and capital) less The following formulas describe the procedures for similar payments made to nonresidents who contrib- computing the conversion factor for year t: uted to the domestic economy. In estimating GNP per capita, the Bank recognizes (e_2,) = 1 ( Pt i) + ) + e] that perfect cross-country comparability of GNP per t-2 capita estimates cannot be achieved. Beyond the clas- and for calculating per capita GNP in U.S. dollars for sic, strictly intractable index number problem, two year t: obstacles stand in the way of adequate comparability. One concerns the GNP and population estimates (Y) = (YIN - e) themselves. There are differences in national ac- where counting and demographic reporting systems and in = current GNP (local currency) for year the coverage and reliability of underlying statistical = GNP deflator for year information among various countries. The other ob- = average annual exchange rate (local currency to the stacle relates to the use of official exchange rates for U.S. dollar) for year N = midyear population for year converting GNP data, expressed in different national = U.S. GNP deflator for year t. currencies, to a common denominationconven- tionally the U.S. dollarto compare them across Because of problems associated with the availabil- countries. ity of comparable data and the determination of con- Recognizing that these shortcomings affect the version factors, information on GNP per capita is not comparability of the GNP per capita estimates, the shown for some economies. World Bank has introduced several improvements in The use of official exchange rates to convert na- the estimation procedures. Through its regular re- tional currency figures to U.S. dollars does not reflect view of member countries' national accounts, the the relative domestic purchasing powers of curren- Bank systematically evaluates the GNP estimates, f o- cies. The United Nations International Comparison 287 Program (ICP) has developed measures of real GDP Tables 2 and 3. Growth and structure of production on an internationally comparable scale, using pur- chasing power parities (PPPs) instead of exchange Most of the definitions used are those of the U.N. rates as conversion factors. Table 30 shows the most System of National Accounts (SNA), Series F, No. 2, recent ICP estimates. Information on the ICP has Revision 3. Estimates are obtained from national been published in four studies corresponding to the sources, sometimes reaching the World Bank through first four phases; and in separate reports for Phase V, other international agencies but more often collected published by the Economic Commission for Europe during World Bank staff missions. (ECE), the Economic and Social Commission for Asia World Bank staff review the quality of national ac- and the Pacific (ESCAP), the European Communities counts data and in some instances, through mission (EC), and the Organization for Economic Coopera- work or technical assistance, help adjust national se- tion and Development (OECD). ries. Because of the sometimes limited capabilities of The ICP figures reported in Table 30 are prelimi- statistical offices and basic data problems, strict inter- nary and may be revised. The United Nations and its national comparability cannot be achieved, especially regional economic commissions, as well as other in- in economic activities that are difficult to measure, ternational agencies, such as the EC, the OECD, and such as parallel market transactions, the informal sec- the World Bank, are working to improve the meth- tor, or subsistence agriculture. odology and to extend annual purchasing power GDP measures the total output of goods and ser- comparisons to all countries. However, exchange vices for final use produced by residents and nonresi- rates remain the only generally available means of dents, regardless of the allocation to domestic and converting GNP from national currencies to U.S. foreign claims. It is calculated without making deduc- dollars. tions for depreciation of "manmade" assets or deple- The average annual rate of inflation is measured by tion and degradation of natural resources. Although the growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator for each SNA envisages estimates of GDP by industrial origin of the periods shown. The GDP deflator is first calcu- to be at producer prices, many countries still report lated by dividing, for each year of the period, the such details at factor cost. International comparability value of GDP at current values by the value of GDP at of the estimates is affected by differing country prac- constant values, both in national currency. The least- tices in valuation systems for reporting value added squares method is then used to calculate the growth by production sectors. As a partial solution, GDP es- rate of the GDP deflator for the period. This measure timates are shown at purchaser values if the compo- of inflation, like any other, has limitations. For some nents are on this basis, and such instances are foot- purposes, however, it is used as an indicator of infla- noted. However, for a few countries in Tables 2 and 3, tion because it is the most broadly based measure, GDP at purchaser values has been replaced by GDP showing annual price movements for all goods and at factor cost. services produced in an economy. The figures for GDP are dollar values converted Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years from domestic currencies using single-year official ex- a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of change rates. For a few countries where the official mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively ap- throughout its life. Data are World Bank estimates plied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an al- based on data from the U.N. Population Division, the ternative conversion factor is used (and reported in U.N. Statistical Office, and national statistical offices. the World Tables). Note that Table 3 does not use the Adult illiteracy is defined here as the proportion of three-year averaging technique applied to GNP per the population over the age of fifteen who cannot, capita in Table 1. with understanding, read and write a short, simple Agriculture covers forestry, hunting, and fishing as statement on their everyday life. This is only one of well as agriculture. In developing countries with high three widely accepted definitions, and its application levels of subsistence farming, much agricultural pro- is subject to qualifiers in a number of countries. The duction is either not exchanged or not exchanged for data are from the illiteracy estimates and projections money. This increases the difficulty of measuring the prepared in 1989 by Unesco. More recent information contribution of agriculture to GDP and reduces the and a modified model have been used, therefore the reliability and comparability of such numbers. data for 1990 are not strictly consistent with those Industry comprises value added in mining; manu- published in last year's indicators. facturing (also reported as a separate subgroup); con- The summary measures for GNP per capita, life struction; and electricity, water, and gas. Value added expectancy, and adult illiteracy in this table are in all other branches of economic activity, including weighted by population. Those for average annual imputed bank service charges, import duties, and rates of inflation are weighted by the 1987 share of any statistical discrepancies noted by national com- country GDP valued in current U.S. dollars. pilers, are categorized as services, etc. 288 Partially rebased, chain-linked 1987 series in do- The average index of food production per capita shows mestic currencies, as explained at the beginning of the average annual quantity of food produced per the technical notes, are used to compute the growth capita in 1988-90 in relation to the average produced rates in Table 2. The sectoral shares of GDP in Table 3 annually in 1979-81. The estimates are derived by are based on current price series. dividing the quantity of food production by the total In calculating the summary measures for each indi- population. For this index food is defined as compris- cator in Table 2, partially rebased constant 1987 U.S. ing nuts, pulses, fruits, cereals, vegetables, sugar dollar values for each economy are calculated for each cane, sugar beet, starchy roots, edible oils, livestock, year of the periods covered; the values are aggre- and livestock products. Quantities of food production gated across countries for each year; and the least- are measured net of animal feed, seeds for use in squares procedure is used to compute the growth agriculture, and food lost in processing and rates. The average sectoral percentage shares in Table distribution. 3 are computed from group aggregates of sectoral The summary measures for fertilizer consumption GDP in current U.S. dollars. are weighted by total arable land area; the summary measures for food production are weighted by Table 4. Agriculture and food population. The basic data for value added in agriculture are from Table 5. Commercial energy the World Bank's national accounts series at current prices in national currencies. Value added in current The data on energy are primarily from U.N. sources. prices in national currencies is converted to U.S. dol- They refer to commercial forms of primary energy lars by applying the single-year conversion pro- petroleum and natural gas liquids, natural gas, solid cedure, as described in the technical note for Tables 2 fuels (coal, lignite, and so on), and primary electricity and 3. (nuclear, geothermal, and hydroelectric power)all The figures for the remainder of this table are from converted into oil equivalents. Figures on liquid fuel the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAQ). Cereal consumption include petroleum derivatives that have imports are measured in grain equivalents and de- been consumed in nonenergy uses. For converting fined as comprising all cereals in the Standard Interna- primary electricity into oil equivalents, a notional tional Trade Classification (SITC), Revision 2, Groups thermal efficiency of 34 percent has been assumed. 041-046. Food aid in cereals covers wheat and flour, The use of firewood, dried animal excrement, and bulgur, rice, coarse grains, and the cereal component other traditional fuels, although substantial in some of blended foods. The figures are not directly compa- developing countries, is not taken into account be- rable because of reporting and timing differences. Ce- cause reliable and comprehensive data are not real imports are based on calendar-year data reported available. by recipient countries, and food aid in cereals is based Energy imports refer to the dollar value of energy on data for crop years reported by donors and inter- importsSection 3 in the Standard International Trade national organizations, including the International Classification, Revision 1and are expressed as a per- Wheat Council and the World Food Programme. Fur- centage of earnings from merchandise exports. Be- thermore, food aid information from donors may not cause data on energy imports do not permit a distinc- correspond to actual receipts by beneficiaries during a tion between petroleum imports for fuel and those given period because of delays in transportation and for use in the petrochemicals industry, these percent- recording, or because aid is sometimes not reported ages may overestimate the dependence on imported to the FAQ or other relevant international organiza- energy. tions. Food aid imports may also not show up in The summary measures of energy production and customs records. The earliest available food aid data consumption are computed by aggregating the re- are for 1974. The time reference for food aid is the spective volumes for each of the years covered by the crop year, July to June. periods and then applying the least-squares growth Fertilizer consumption measures the plant nutrients rate procedure. For energy consumption per capita, used in relation to arable land. Fertilizer products population weights are used to compute summary cover nitrogenous, potash, and phosphate fertilizers measures for the specified years. (which include ground rock phosphate). Arable land The summary measures of energy imports as a per- is defined as land under temporary crops (double- centage of merchandise exports are computed from cropped areas are counted once), temporary group aggregates for energy imports and merchan- meadows for mowing or pastures, land under market dise exports in current dollars. or kitchen gardens, and land temporarily fallow or lying idle, as well as land under permanent crops. Table 6. Structure of manufacturing The time reference for fertilizer consumption is the The basic data for value added in manufacturing are crop year, July to June. from the World Bank's national accounts series at cur- 289 rent prices in national currencies. Value added in cur- has, where possible, standardized the coverage of es- rent prices in national currencies is converted to U.S. tablishments to those with five or more employees. dollars by applying the single-year conversion pro- The concepts and definitions are in accordance cedure, as described in the technical note for Tables 2 with the International Recommendations for Industrial and 3. Statistics, published by the United Nations. Earnings The data for distribution of manufacturing value added (wages and salaries) cover all remuneration to em- among industries are provided by the United Nations ployees paid by the employer during the year. The Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and payments include (a) all regular and overtime cash distribution calculations are from national currencies payments and bonuses and cost of living allowances; in current prices. (b) wages and salaries paid during vacation and sick The classification of manufacturing industries is in leave; (c) taxes and social insurance contributions and accordance with the U.N.'s International Standard In- the like, payable by the employees and deducted by dustrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC), the employer; and (d) payments in kind. Revision 2. Food, beverages, and tobacco comprise ISIC The term "employees" in this table combines two Division 31; textiles and clothing, Division 32; machin- categories defined by the U.N., regular employees ery and transport equipment, Major Groups 382-84; and and persons engaged. Together these groups com- chemicals, Major Groups 351 and 352. Other comprises prise regular employees, working proprietors, active wood and related products (Division 33), paper and business partners, and unpaid family workers; they related products (Division 34), petroleum and related exclude homeworkers. The data refer to the average products (Major Groups 353-56), basic metals and number of employees working during the year. mineral products (Divisions 36 and 37), fabricated "Value added" is defined as the current value of metal products and professional goods (Major gross output less the current cost of (a) materials, Groups 381 and 385), and other industries (Major fuels, and other supplies consumed, (b) contract and Group 390). When data for textiles, machinery, or commission work done by others, (c) repair and chemicals are shown as not available, they are also maintenance work done by others, and (d) goods included in other. shipped in the same condition as received. Summary measures for value added in manufac- The value of gross output is estimated on the basis turing are totals calculated by the aggregation of either production or shipments. On the production method noted at the beginning of the technical notes. basis it consists of (a) the value of all products of the establishment, (b) the value of industrial services ren- Table 7. Manufacturing earnings and output dered to others, (c) the value of goods shipped in the same condition as received, (d) the value of electricity Four indicators are showntwo relate to real earn- sold, and (e) the net change in the value of work-in- ings per employee, one to labor's share in total value progress between the beginning and the end of the added generated, and one to labor productivity in the reference period. In the case of estimates compiled on manufacturing sector. The indicators are based on a shipment basis, the net change between the begin- data from the United Nations Industrial Develop- ning and the end of the reference period in the value ment Organization (UNIDO), although the deflators of stocks of finished goods is also included. are from other sources, as explained below. Earnings per employee are in constant prices and are Tables 8 and 9. Growth of consumption derived by deflating nominal earnings per employee and investment; structure of demand by the country's consumer price index (CPI). The CPI is from the International Monetary Fund's Interna- GDP is defined in the note for Tables 2 and 3, but for tional Financial Statistics. Total earnings as a percentage of these two tables it is in purchaser values. value added are derived by dividing total earnings of General government consumption includes all current employees by value added in current prices to show expenditure for purchases of goods and services by labor's share in income generated in the manufactur- all levels of government. Capital expenditure on na- ing sector. Gross out put per employee is in constant tional defense and security is regarded as consump- prices and is presented as an index of overall labor tion expenditure. productivity in manufacturing with 1980 as the base Private consumption, etc., is the market value of all year. To derive this indicator, UNIDO data on gross goods and services, including durable products (such output per employee in current prices are adjusted as cars, washing machines, and home computers) using the implicit deflators for value added in manu- purchased or received as income in kind by house- facturing or in industry, taken from the World Bank's holds and nonprofit institutions. It excludes pur- national accounts data files. chases of dwellings but includes imputed rent for To improve cross-country comparability, UNIDO owner-occupied dwellings (see the note for Table 10 290 for details). In practice, it includes any statistical dis- other tubers. For high-income OECD members, how- crepancy in the use of resources. At constant prices, it ever, this subitem does not include tubers. Gross also includes the rescaling deviation from partial re- rents, fuel and power consist of actual and imputed basing, which is explained at the beginning of the rents and repair and maintenance charges, as well as technical notes. the subitem fuel and power (for heating, lighting, cook- Gross domestic investment consists of outlays on ad- ing, air conditioning, and so forth). Note that this ditions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net item excludes energy used for transport (rarely re- changes in the level of inventories. ported to be more than 1 percent of total consump- Gross domestic savings are calculated by deducting tion in low- and middle-income economies). As men- total consumption from GDP. tioned, medical care and education include government Exports of goods and nonfactor services represent the as well as private consumption expenditure. Transport value of all goods and nonfactor services provided to and communication also includes the purchase of auto- the rest of the world; they include merchandise, mobiles, which are reported as a subitem. Other con- freight, insurance, travel, and other nonfactor ser- sumption, the residual group, includes beverages and vices. The value of factor services, such as investment tobacco, nondurable household goods and house- income, interest, and labor income, is excluded. Cur- hold services, recreational services, and services (in- rent transfers are also excluded. cluding meals) supplied by hotels and restaurants; The resource balance is the difference between ex- carry-out food is recorded here. It also includes the ports of goods and nonfactor services and imports of separately reported subitem other consumer durables, goods and nonfactor services. comprising household appliances, furniture, floor Partially rebased 1987 series in constant domestic coverings, recreational equipment, and watches and currency units are used to compute the indicators in jewelry. Table 8. Distribution of CDP in Table 9 is calculated Estimating the structure of consumption is one of from national accounts series in current domestic cur- the weakest aspects of national accounting in low- rency units. and middle-income economies. The structure is esti- The summary measures are calculated by the mated through household expenditure surveys and method explained in the note for Tables 2 and 3. similar survey techniques. It therefore shares any bias inherent in the sample frame. Since, conceptually, Table 10. Structure of consumption expenditure is not identical to consumption, other apparent discrepancies occur, and data for some Percentage shares of selected items in total household countries should be treated with caution. For exam- consumption expenditure are computed from details ple, some countries limit surveys to urban areas or, of GDP (expenditure at national market prices) de- even more narrowly, to capital cities. This tends to fined in the U.N's System of National Accounts (SNA), produce lower than average shares for food and high mostly as collected from the International Compari- shares for transport and communication, gross rents, son Program (ICP) Phases IV (1980) and V (1985). For fuel and power, and other consumption. Controlled countries not covered by the ICP, less detailed na- food prices and incomplete national accounting for tional accounts estimates are included, where avail- subsistence activities also contribute to low food able, in order to present a general idea of the broad shares. structure of consumption. The data cover eighty-four countries (including Bank staff estimates for China) Table 11. Central government expenditure and refer to the most recent estimates, generally for 1980 and 1985. Where they refer to other years, the The data on central government finance in Tables 11 figures are shown in italics. Consumption here refers and 12 are from the IMF Government Finance Statistics to private (nongovernment) consumption as defined Yearbook (1990) and IMF data files. The accounts of in the SNA and in the notes for Tables 2 and 3, 4, and each country are reported using the system of com- 9, except that education and medical care comprise mon definitions and classifications found in the IMF government as well as private outlays. This ICP con- Manual on Government Finance Statistics (1986). cept of "enhanced consumption" reflects who uses For complete and authoritative explanations of con- rather than who pays for consumption goods, and it cepts, definitions, and data sources, see these IMF improves international comparability because it is sources. The commentary that follows is intended less sensitive to differing national practices regarding mainly to place these data in the context of the broad the financing of health and education services. range of indicators reported in this edition. Cereals and tubers, a major subitem of food, comprise The shares of total expenditure and current revenue by the main staple products: rice, flour, bread, all other category are calculated from series in national curren- cereals and cereal preparations, potatoes, yams, and cies. Because of differences in coverage of available 291 data, the individual components of central govern- Health covers public expenditure on hospitals, ma- ment expenditure and current revenue shown in ternity and dental centers, and clinics with a major these tables may not be strictly comparable across all medical component; on national health and medical economies. insurance schemes; and on family planning and pre- Moreover, inadequate statistical coverage of state, ventive care. Note that Table 10 also provides a mea- provincial, and local governments dictates the use of sure of expenditure on medical care, private as well central government data; this may seriously under- as public, relative to household consumption. state or distort the statistical portrayal of the alloca- Housing, amenities; social security and welfare cover tion of resources for various purposes, especially in expenditure on housing (excluding interest subsidies, countries where lower levels of government have which are usually classified with "other") such as considerable autonomy and are responsible for many income-related schemes; on provision and support of economic and social services. In addition, "central housing and slum-clearance activities; on community government" can mean either of two accounting con- development; and on sanitation services. These cate- cepts: consolidated or budgetary. For most countries, gories also cover compensation for loss of income to central government finance data have been consoli- the sick and temporarily disabled; payments to the dated into one overall account, but for others only the elderly, the permanently disabled, and the unem- budgetary central government accounts are available. ployed; family, maternity, and child allowances; and Since all central government units are not always in- the cost of welfare services, such as care of the aged, cluded in the budgetary accounts, the overall picture the disabled, and children. Many expenditures rele- of central government activities is usually incom- vant to environmental defense, such as pollution plete. Countries reporting budgetary data are abatement, water supply, sanitary affairs, and refuse footnoted. collection, are included indistinguishably in this Consequently, the data presented, especially those category. for education and health, are not comparable across Economic services comprise expenditure associated countries. In many economies, private health and ed- with the regulation, support, and more efficient oper- ucation services are substantial; in others, public ser- ation of business; economic development; redress of vices represent the major component of total expen- regional imbalances; and creation of employment op- diture but may be financed by lower levels of portunities. Research, trade promotion, geological government. Caution should therefore be exercised surveys, and inspection and regulation of particular in using the data for cross-country comparisons. Cen- industry groups are among the activities included. tral government expenditure comprises the expendi- Other covers interest payments and items not in- ture by all government offices, departments, estab- cluded elsewhere; for a few economies it also in- lishments, and other bodies that are agencies or cludes amounts that could not be allocated to other instruments of the central authority of a country. It components (or adjustments from accrual to cash includes both current and capital (development) accounts). expenditure. Total expenditure is more narrowly defined than the Defense comprises all expenditure, whether by de- measure of general government consumption given fense or other departments, on the maintenance of in Table 9 because it excludes consumption expendi- military forces, including the purchase of military ture by state and local governments. At the same supplies and equipment, construction, recruiting, time, central government expenditure is more and training. Also in this category are closely related broadly defined because it includes government's items such as military aid programs. Defense does gross domestic investment and transfer payments. not include expenditure on public order and safety, Overall surplus/deficit is defined as current and capi- which are classified separately. tal revenue and official grants received, less total ex- Education comprises expenditure on the provision, penditure and lending minus repayments. management, inspection, and support of preprimary, primary, and secondary schools; of universities and Table 12. Central government current revenue colleges; and of vocational, technical, and other train- ing institutions. Also included is expenditure on the Information on data sources and comparability is general administration and regulation of the educa- given in the note for Table 11. Current revenue by tion system; on research into its objectives, organiza- source is expressed as a percentage of total current tion, administration, and methods; and on such sub- revenue, which is the sum of tax revenue and nontax sidiary services as transport, school meals, and revenue and is calculated from national currencies. school medical and dental services. Note that Table 10 Tax revenue comprises compulsory, unrequited, provides an alternative measure of expenditure on nonrepayable receipts for public purposes. It includes education, private as well as public, relative to house- interest collected on tax arrears and penalties col- hold consumption. lected on nonpayment or late payment of taxes and is 292 shown net of refunds and other corrective transac- (deposit rate) and charged by the banks on loans to tions. Taxes on income, profit, and capital gains are taxes prime customers (lending rate). The data are, how- levied on the actual or presumptive net income of ever, of limited international comparability, partly be- individuals, on the profits of enterprises, and on capi- cause coverage and definitions vary and partly be- tal gains, whether realized on land sales, securities, cause countries differ in the scope available to banks or other assets. Intragovernmental payments are for adjusting interest rates to reflect market eliminated in consolidation. Social security contribu- conditions. tions include employers' and employees' social secu- Because interest rates (and growth rates for mone- rity contributions as well as those of self-employed tary holdings) are expressed in nominal terms, much and unemployed persons. Domestic taxes on goods and of the variation among countries stems from differ- services include general sales and turnover or value ences in inflation. For easy reference, the Table 1 indi- added taxes, selective excises on goods, selective cator of recent inflation is repeated in this table. taxes on services, taxes on the use of goods or prop- erty, and profits of fiscal monopolies. Taxes on interna- Table 14. Growth of merchandise trade tional trade and transactions include import duties, ex- port duties, profits of export or import monopolies, The main data source for current trade values is the exchange profits, and exchange taxes. Other taxes in- U.N. Commodity Trade (Comtrade) data file supple- clude employers' payroll or labor taxes, taxes on mented by World Bank estimates. The statistics on property, and taxes not allocable to other categories. merchandise trade are based on countries' customs They may include negative values that are adjust- returns. ments, for instance, for taxes collected on behalf of Merchandise exports and imports, with some excep- state and local governments and not allocable to indi- tions, cover international movements of goods across vidual tax categories. customs borders; trade in services is not included. Nontax revenue comprises receipts that are not a Exports are valued f.o.b. (free on board) and imports compulsory nonrepayable payment for public pur- c.i.f. (cost, insurance, and freight) unless otherwise poses, such as fines, administrative fees, or entrepre- specified in the foregoing sources. These values are in neurial income from government ownership of prop- current dollars. erty. Proceeds of grants and borrowing, funds arising The growth rates of merchandise exports and im- from the repayment of previous lending by govern- ports are based on constant price data, which are ments, incurrence of liabilities, and proceeds from obtained from export or import value data as deflated the sale of capital assets are not included. by the corresponding price index. The World Bank uses its own price indexes, which are based on inter- Table 13. Money and interest rates national prices for primary commodities and unit value indexes for manufactures. These price indexes The data on monetary holdings are based on the are country-specific and disaggregated by broad com- IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS). Monetary modity groups. This ensures consistency between holdings, broadly defined, comprise the monetary and data for a group of countries and those for individual quasi-monetary liabilities of a country's financial in- countries. Such consistency will increase as the stitutions to residents but not to the central govern- World Bank continues to improve its trade price in- ment. For most countries, monetary holdings are the dexes for an increasing number of countries. These sum of money (IFS line 34) and quasi-money (IFS line growth rates can differ from those derived from na- 35). Money comprises the economy's means of pay- tional practices because national price indexes may ment: currency outside banks and demand deposits. use different base years and weighting procedures Quasi-money comprises time and savings deposits from those used by the World Bank. and similar bank accounts that the issuer will readily The terms of trade, or the net barter terms of trade, exchange for money. Where nonmonetary financial measure the relative movement of export prices institutions are important issuers of quasi-monetary against that of import prices. Calculated as the ratio liabilities, these are also included in the measure of of a country's index of average export prices to its monetary holdings. average import price index, this indicator shows The growth rates for monetary holdings are calcu- changes over a base year in the level of export prices lated from year-end figures, while the average of the as a percentage of import prices. The terms of trade year-end figures for the specified year and the pre- index numbers are shown for 1985 and 1990, where vious year is used for the ratio of monetary holdings 1987 = 100. The price indexes are from the source to GOP. cited above for the growth rates of exports and The nominal interest rates of banks, also from IFS, imports. represent the rates paid by commercial or similar The summary measures for the growth rates are banks to holders of their quasi-monetary liabilities calculated by aggregating the 1987 constant U.S. dol- 293 lar price series for each year and then applying the Table 17. OECD imports of manufactured goods: least-squares growth rate procedure for the periods origin and composition shown. The data are from the United Nations, reported by Tables 15 and 16. Structure of merchandise imports high-income OECD economies, which are the OECD and exports members excluding Greece, Portugal, and Turkey. The table reports the value of imports of manufac- The shares in these tables are derived from trade tures of high-income OECD countries by the economy values in current dollars reported in the U.N. trade of origin, and the composition of such imports by data system and the U.N. 's Yearbook of International major manufactured product groups. Trade Statistics, supplemented by World Bank esti- The table replaces one in past editions on the origin mates, as explained in the technical note for Table 14. and destination of manufactured exports, which was Merchandise exports and imports are also defined in based on exports reported by individual economies. that note. Since there was a lag of several years in reporting by The categorization of exports and imports follows many developing economies, estimates based on var- the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), ious sources were used to fill the gaps. Until these Series M, No. 34, Revision 1. For some countries, estimates can be improved, the current table, based data for certain commodity categories are unavailable on up-to-date and consistent but less comprehensive and the full breakdown cannot be shown. data, is included instead. Manufactured imports of In Table 15, food commodities are those in SITC the predominant markets from individual economies Sections 0, 1, and 4 and Division 22 (food and live are the best available proxy of the magnitude and animals, beverages, oils and fats, and oilseeds and composition of the manufactured exports of these nuts) excluding Division 12, tobacco, which is in- economies to all destinations taken together. cluded in other primary commodities; thus the data are Manufactured goods are the commodities in the Stan- not strictly comparable with those published last dard International Trade Classification (SITC), Revision year, particulartly if tobacco is a major import item. 1, Sections 5 through 9 (chemical and related prod- Fuels are the commodities in SITC Section 3 (mineral ucts, basic manufactures, manufactured articles, ma- fuels, and lubricants and related materials). Other pri- chinery and transport equipment, and other manu- mary commodities comprise SITC Section 2 (crude ma- factured articles and goods not elsewhere classified), terials, excluding fuels), less Division 22 (oilseeds and excluding Division 68 (nonferrous metals). This def i- nuts), plus Division 12 (tobacco) and Division 68 nition is somewhat broader than the one used to de- (nonferrous metals). Machinery and transport equip- fine exporters of manufactures. ment are the commodities in SITC Section 7. Other The major manufactured product groups reported manufactures, calculated residually from the total are defined as follows: textiles and clothing (SITC Sec- value of manufactured imports, represent SITC Sec- tions 65 and 84), chemicals (SITC Section 5), electrical tions 5 through 9, less Section 7 and Division 68. machinery and electronics (SITC Section 72), transport In Table 16, fuels, minerals, and metals are the com- equipment (SITC Section 73), and others, defined as the modities in SITC Section 3 (mineral fuels, and lubri- residual. SITC Revision 1 data are used for the year cants and related materials), Divisions 27 and 28 1970, whereas the equivalent data in Revision 2 are (minerals and crude fertilizers, and metalliferous used for the year 1990. ores), and Division 68 (nonferrous metals). Other pri- mary commodities comprise SITC Sections 0, 1, 2, and Table 18. Balance of payments and reserves 4 (food and live animals, beverages and tobacco, in- edible crude materials, oils, fats, and waxes), less Di- The statistics for this table are mostly as reported by visions 27 and 28. Machinery and transport equipment the IMF but do include recent estimates by World are the commodities in SITC Section 7. Other manufac- Bank staff and, in rare instances, the Bank's own cov- tures represent SITC Sections 5 through 9, less Sec- erage or classification adjustments to enhance inter- tion 7 and Division 68. Textiles and clothing, represent- national comparability. Values in this table are in U.S. ing SITC Divisions 65 and 84 (textiles, yarns, fabrics, dollars converted at current exchange rates. and clothing), are a subgroup of other manufactures. The current account balance after official transfers is the The summary measures in Table 15 are weighted difference between (a) exports of goods and services by total merchandise imports of individual countries (factor and nonfactor) as well as inflows of unre- in current dollars; those in Table 16 by total merchan- quited transfers (private and official) and (b) imports dise exports of individual countries in current dollars. of goods and services as well as all unrequited trans- (See the technical note for Table 14.) fers to the rest of the world. 294 The current account balance before official transfers is ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) the current account balance that treats net official un- to promote economic development and welfare. Al- requited transfers as akin to official capital move- though this definition is meant to exclude purely mili- ments. The difference between the two balance of tary assistance, the borderline is sometimes blurred; payments measures is essentially foreign aid in the the definition used by the country of origin usually form of grants, technical assistance, and food aid, prevails. ODA also includes the value of technical which, for most developing countries, tends to make cooperation and assistance. All data shown are sup- current account deficits smaller than the financing plied by the OECD, and all U.S. dollar values are requirement. converted at official exchange rates. Net workers' remittances cover payments and re- Total net flows are net disbursements to developing ceipts of income by migrants who are employed or countries and multilateral institutions. The disburse- expect to be employed for more than a year in their ments to multilateral institutions are now reported new economy, where they are considered residents. for all DAC members on the basis of the date of issue These remittances are classified as private unrequited of notes; some DAC members previously reported on transfers and are included in the balance of payments the basis of the date of encashment. Total net bilateral current account balance, whereas those derived from flows to low-income economies exclude unallocated bilat- shorter-term stays are included in services as labor eral flows and all disbursements to multilateral income. The distinction accords with internationally institutions. agreed guidelines, but many developing countries The nominal values shown in the summary for classify workers' remittances as a factor income re- ODA from high-income OECD countries are con- ceipt (hence, a component of GNP). The World Bank verted at 1987 prices using the dollar GDP deflator. adheres to international guidelines in defining GNP This deflator is based on price increases in OECD and, therefore, may differ from national practices. countries (excluding Greece, Portugal, and Turkey) Gross international reserves comprise holdings of measured in dollars. It takes into account the parity monetary gold, special drawing rights (SDRs), the changes between the dollar and national currencies. reserve position of members in the IMF, and holdings For example, when the dollar depreciates, price of foreign exchange under the control of monetary changes measured in national currencies have to be authorities. The data on holdings of international re- adjusted upward by the amount of the depreciation serves are from IMF data files. The gold component to obtain price changes in dollars. of these reserves is valued throughout at year-end The table, in addition to showing totals for OPEC, (December 31) London prices: that is, $37.37 an shows totals for the Organization of Arab Petroleum ounce in 1970 and $385.00 an ounce in 1990. The re- Exporting Countries (OAPEC). The donor members serve levels for 1970 and 1990 refer to the end of the of OAPEC are Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, year indicated and are in current dollars at prevailing Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. ODA data exchange rates. Because of differences in the defini- for OPEC and OAPEC are also obtained from the tion of international reserves, in the valuation of OECD. gold, and in reserve management practices, the levels of reserve holdings published in national sources do Table 20. Official development assistance: receipts not have strictly comparable significance. Reserve holdings at the end of 1990 are also expressed in Net disbursements of ODA from all sources consist of terms of the number of months of imports of goods loans and grants made on concessional financial and services they could pay for. terms by all bilateral official agencies and multilateral The summary measures are computed from group sources to promote economic development and wel- aggregates for gross international reserves and total fare. They include the value of technical cooperation imports of goods and services in current dollars. and assistance. The disbursements shown in this ta- ble are not strictly comparable with those shown in Table 19. Official development assistance Table 19 since the receipts are from all sources; dis- from OECD and OPEC members bursements in Table 19 refer only to those made by high-income members of the OECD and members of Official development assistance (ODA) consists of net OPEC. Net disbursements equal gross disbursements disbursements of loans and grants made on conces- less payments to the originators of aid for amortiza- sional financial terms by official agencies of the mem- tion of past aid receipts. Net disbursements of ODA bers of the Development Assistance Committee are shown per capita and as a percentage of GNP. (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation The summary measures of per capita ODA are and Development (OECD) and members of the Or- computed from group aggregates for population and 295 for ODA. Summary measures for ODA as a percent- Disbursements are drawings on long-term loan com- age of GNP are computed from group totals for ODA mitments during the year specified. and for GNP in current U.S. dollars. Repayment of principal is the actual amount of princi- pal (amortization) paid in foreign currency, goods, or Table 21. Total external debt services in the year specified. Interest payments are actual amounts of interest paid The data on debt in this and successive tables are in foreign currency, goods, or services in the year from the World Bank Debtor Reporting System, sup- specified. plemented by World Bank estimates. That system is concerned solely with developing economies and Table 23. Aggregate net resource flows does not collect data on external debt for other groups and net transfers of borrowers or from economies that are not members Net flows on long-term debt are disbursements less the of the World Bank. The dollar figures on debt shown repayment of principal on public, publicly guaran- in Tables 21 through 25 are in U.S. dollars converted teed, and private nonguaranteed long-term debt. Of- at official exchange rates. ficial grants are transfers made by an official agency in The data on debt include private nonguaranteed cash or in kind in respect of which no legal debt is debt reported by twenty-six developing countries incurred by the recipient. Data on official grants ex- and complete or partial estimates for an additional clude grants for technical assistance. twenty-one others that do not report but for which Net foreign direct investment is defined as investment this type of debt is known to be significant. that is made to acquire a lasting interest (usually 10 Public loans are the external obligations of public percent of the voting stock) in an enterprise operating debtors, including the national government, its agen- in a country other than that of the investor (defined cies, and autonomous public bodies. Publicly guaran- according to residency), the investor's purpose being teed loans are the external obligations of private an effective voice in the management of the enter- debtors that are guaranteed for repayment by a public prise. Aggregate net resource flows are the sum of net entity. These two categories are aggregated in the ta- flows on long-term debt (excluding IMF) plus official bles. Private nonguaranteed loans are the external oblig- grants (excluding technical assistance) and net for- ations of private debtors that are not guaranteed for eign direct investment. Aggregate net transfers are repayment by a public entity. equal to aggregate net resource flows minus interest Use of IMF credit denotes repurchase obligations to payments on long-term loans and remittance of all the IMF for all uses of IMF resources, excluding those profits. resulting from drawings in the reserve tranche. It is shown for the end of the year specified. It comprises Table 24. Total external debt ratios purchases outstanding under the credit tranches, in- cluding enlarged access resources, and all special fa- Total external debt as a percentage of exports of goods and cilities (the buffer stock, compensatory financing, ex- services represents public, publicly guaranteed, pri- tended fund, and oil facilities), Trust Fund loans, and vate nonguaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF operations under the enhanced structural adjustment credit, and short-term debt drawn at year-end, net of facilities. Use of IMF credit outstanding at year-end (a repayments of principal and write-off s. Throughout stock) is converted to U.S. dollars at the dollar-SDR this table, goods and services include workers' remit- exchange rate in effect at year-end. tances. For estimating total external debt as a percentage Short-term debt is debt with an original maturity of of GNP, the debt figures are converted into U.S. dol- one year or less. Available data permit no distinctions lars from currencies of repayment at year-end official between public and private nonguaranteed short- exchange rates. GNP is converted from national cur- term debt. rencies to U.S. dollars by applying the conversion Total external debt is defined for the purpose of this procedure described in the technical note for Tables 2 Report as the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and and 3. private nonguaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF Total debt service as a percentage of goods and services is credit, and short-term debt. the sum of principal repayments and interest pay- ments on total external debt (as defined in the note Table 22. Flow of public and private external capital for Table 21). It is one of several conventional mea- sures used to assess a country's ability to service Data on disbursements, repayment of principal (am- debt. ortization), and payment of interest are for public, Interest payments as a percentage of exports of goods and publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed services are actual payments made on total external long-term loans. debt. 296 The summary measures are weighted by exports of reproduction rate (defined in the note for Table 27) goods and services in current dollars and by GNP in equals 1. In such a population, the birth rate is con- current dollars, respectively. stant and equal to the death rate, the age structure is constant, and the growth rate is zero. Table 25. Terms of external public borrowing Population projections are made age cohort by age cohort. Mortality, fertility, and migration are pro- Commitments refer to the public and publicly guaran- jected separately, and the results are applied iter- teed loans for which contracts were signed in the year atively to the 1985 base-year age structure. For the specified. They are reported in currencies of repay- projection period 1985 to 2005, the changes in mortal- ment and converted into U.s. dollars at average an- ity are country specific: increments in life expectancy nual official exchange rates. and decrements in infant mortality are based on pre- Figures for interest rates, maturities, and grace periods vious trends for each country. When female second- are averages weighted by the amounts of the loans. ary school enrollment is high, mortality is assumed to Interest is the major charge levied on a loan and is decline more quickly. Infant mortality is projected usually computed on the amount of principal drawn separately from adult mortality. Note that the data and outstanding. The maturity of a loan is the inter- reflect the potentially significant impact of the human val between the agreement date, when a loan agree- immunodeficiency virus (HIV) epidemic. ment is signed or bonds are issued, and the date of Projected fertility rates are also based on previous final repayment of principal. The grace period is the trends. For countries in which fertility has started to interval between the agreement date and the date of decline (termed "fertility transition"), this trend is the first repayment of principal. assumed to continue. It has been observed that no Public loans with variable interest rates, as a percentage country where the population has a life expectancy of of public debt, refer to interest rates that float with less than 50 years has experienced a fertility decline; movements in a key market rate; for example, the for these countries fertility transition is delayed, and London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) or the U.S. then the average decline of the group of countries in prime rate. This column shows the borrower's expo- fertility transition is applied. Countries with below- sure to changes in international interest rates. replacement fertility are assumed to have constant The summary measures in this table are weighted total fertility rates until 1995-2000 and then to regain by the amounts of the loans. replacement level by 2030. International migration rates are based on past and Table 26. Population growth and projections present trends in migration flows and migration pol- icy. Among the sources consulted are estimates and Population growth rates are period averages calcu- projections made by national statistical offices, inter- lated from midyear populations. national agencies, and research institutions. Because Population estimates for mid-1990 and estimates of of the uncertainty of future migration trends, it is fertility and mortality are made by the World Bank assumed in the projections that net migration rates from data provided by the U.N. Population Division, will reach zero by 2025. the U.N. Statistical Office, and country statistical of- The estimates of the size of the stationary popula- fices. Estimates take into account the results of the tion are very long-term projections. They are in- latest population censuses, which in some cases are cluded only to show the implications of recent fertil- neither recent nor accurate. Note that refugees not ity and mortality trends on the basis of generalized permanently settled in the country of asylum are gen- assumptions. A fuller description of the methods and erally considered to be part of the population of their assumptions used to calculate the estimates is con- country of origin. tained in the forthcoming, 1992-93 edition of World The projections of population for 2000, 2025, and Population Projections. the year in which the population will eventually be- come stationary (see definition below) are made for Table 27. Demography and fertility each economy separately. Information on total popu- lation by age and sex, fertility, mortality, and interna- The crude birth rate and crude death rate indicate re- tional migration is projected on the basis of gener- spectively the number of live births and deaths occur- alized assumptions until the population becomes ring per thousand population in a year. They come stationary. from the sources mentioned in the note to Table 26. A stationary population is one in which age- and Women of childbearing age are those from age 15 to sex-specific mortality rates have not changed over a 49. long period, and during which fertility rates have re- The total fertility rate represents the number of chil- mained at replacement level; that is, when the net dren that would be born to a woman if she were to 297 live to the end of her childbearing years and bear first aid workers, traditional birth attendants, and so children at each age in accordance with prevailing on. The inclusion of auxiliary and paraprofessional age-specific fertility rates. The rates given are from personnel provides more realistic estimates of avail- the sources mentioned in the note for Table 26. able nursing care. Because definitions of doctors and The net reproduction rate (NRR), which measures the nursing personnel varyand because the data shown number of daughters a newborn girl will bear during are for a variety of yearsthe data for these two indi- her lifetime, assuming fixed age-specific fertility and cators are not strictly comparable across countries. mortality rates, reflects the extent to which a cohort Data on births attended by health staff show the per- of newborn girls will reproduce themselves. An NRR centage of births recorded where a recognized health of 1 indicates that fertility is at replacement level: at service worker was in attendance. The data are from this rate women will bear, on average, only enough WHO, supplemented by UNICEF data. They are daughters to replace themselves in the population. based on national sources, derived mostly from offi- As with the size of the stationary population, the cial community reports and hospital records; some assumed year of reaching replacement-level fertility reflect only births in hospitals and other medical in- is speculative and should not be regarded as a stitutions. Sometimes smaller private and rural hos- prediction. pitals are excluded, and sometimes even relatively Married women of childbearing age using contraception primitive local facilities are included. The coverage is are women who are practicing, or whose husbands therefore not always comprehensive, and the figures are practicing, any form of contraception. Contracep- should be treated with extreme caution. tive usage is generally measured for women age 15 to Babies with low birth weight are children born weigh- 49. A few countries use measures relating to other ing less than 2,500 grams. Low birth weight is fre- age groups, especially 15 to 44. quently associated with maternal malnutrition and Data are mainly derived from demographic and tends to raise the risk of infant mortality and lead to health surveys, contraceptive prevalence surveys, poor growth in infancy and childhood, thus increas- World Bank country data, and Mauldin and Segal's ing the incidence of other forms of retarded develop- article "Prevalence of Contraceptive Use: Trends and ment. The figures are derived from both WHO and Issues" in volume 19 of Studies in Family Planning UNICEF sources and are based on national data. The (1988). For a few countries for which no survey data data are not strictly comparable across countries since are available, and for several African countries, pro- they are compiled from a combination of surveys and gram statistics are used. Program statistics may un- administrative records that may not have representa- derstate contraceptive prevalence because they do tive national coverage. not measure use of methods such as rhythm, with- The infant mortality rate is the number of infants drawal, or abstinence, nor use of contraceptives not who die before reaching one year of age, per thou- obtained through the official family planning pro- sand live births in a given year. The data are from the gram. The data refer to rates prevailing in a variety of U.N. publication Mortality of Children under Age 5: years, generally not more than two years before the Projections, 1950-2025 as well as from the World year specified in the table. Bank. All summary measures are country data weighted The daily calorie supply (per capita) is calculated by by each country's share in the aggregate population. dividing the calorie equivalent of the food supplies in an economy by the population. Food supplies com- Table 28. Health and nutrition prise domestic production, imports less exports, and changes in stocks; they exclude animal feed, seeds for The estimates of population per physician and per nurs- use in agriculture, and food lost in processing and ing person are derived from World Health Organiza- distribution. These estimates are from the Food and tion (WHO) data and are supplemented by data ob- Agriculture Organization. tained directly by the World Bank from national The summary measures in this table are country sources. The data refer to a variety of years, generally figures weighted by each country's share in the ag- no more than two years before the year specified. The gregate population. figure for physicians, in addition to the total number of registered practitioners in the country, includes Table 29. Education medical assistants whose medical training is less than that of qualified physicians but who nevertheless dis- The data in this table refer to a variety of years, gener- pense similar medical services, including simple op- ally not more than two years distant from those spe- erations. Nursing persons include graduate, practi- cified; however, figures for females sometimes refer cal, assistant, and auxiliary nurses, as well as to a year earlier than that for overall totals. The data paraprofessional personnel such as health workers, are mostly from Unesco. 298 Primary school enrollment data are estimates of tal household income, per capita income, or children of all ages enrolled in primary school. Fig- expenditure. ures are expressed as the ratio of pupils to the popu- The 1985 indexed figures on GDP per capita lation of school-age children. Although many coun- (US=100) are presented in the first column. They in- tries consider primary school age to be 6 to 11 years, clude: (i) preliminary results of ICP Phase V for 1985; others do not. For some countries with universal pri- (ii) the latest available results from either ICP Phase mary education, the gross enrollment ratios may ex- III for 1975 or Phase IV for 1980 extrapolated to 1985 ceed 100 percent because some pupils are younger or for countries that participated in only the earlier older than the country's standard primary school phases; and (iii) estimates obtained by regression for age. countries that did not participate in any of the The data on secondary school enrollment are calcu- phases. Economies whose 1985 figures are extrapo- lated in the same manner, but again the definition of lated from earlier work or imputed by regression are secondary school age differs among countries. It is footnoted accordingly. most commonly considered to be 12 to 17 years. Late The blend of actual, extrapolated and regression- entry of more mature students as well as repetition based 1985 figures underlying the first column is ex- and the phenomenon of "bunching" in final grades trapolated to 1990 using World Bank estimates of real can influence these ratios. per capita GDP growth and expressed as an index The tertiary enrollment ratio is calculated by divid- (US=100) in the second column. These are converted ing the number of pupils enrolled in all post-second- to 1990 "international dollars" in the third column by ary schools and universities by the population in the scaling all results up by the U.S. inflation rate be- 20-24 age group. Pupils attending vocational schools, tween 1985 and 1990. The adjustment does not take adult education programs, two-year community col- account of changes in the terms of trade. leges, and distance education centers (primarily cor- ICP recasts traditional national accounts through respondence courses) are included. The distribution special price collections and disaggregation of GDP of pupils across these different types of institutions by expenditure components. ICP details are prepared varies among countries. The youth populationthat by national statistical offices, and the results are coor- is, 20 to 24 yearshas been adopted by Unesco as the dinated by the U.N. Statistical Office (UNSO) with denominator since it represents an average tertiary support from other international agencies, particu- level cohort even though people above and below larly the Statistical Office of the European Commu- this age group may be registered in tertiary nities (Eurostat) and the Organization for Economic institutions. Cooperation and Development (OECD). The World Primary net enrollment is the percentage of school- Bank, the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), age children who are enrolled in school. Unlike gross and the Economic and Social Commission for Asia enrollment, the net ratios correspond to the country's and the Pacific (ESCAP) also contribute to this exer- primary-school age group. This indicator gives a cise. A total of sixty-four countries participated in ICP much clearer idea of how many children in the age Phase V, and preliminary results are now available for group are actually enrolled in school, without the fifty-seven. For one country (Nepal), total GDP data number being inflated by over- (or under-) age were not available, and comparisons were made for children. consumption only. Luxembourg and Swaziland, two The primary pupil-teacher ratio is the number of pu- economies with populations under 1 million (for pils enrolled in school in a country, divided by the which Table 1 indicators are reported, in Box Al), number of teachers in the education system. have participated in ICP; their 1985 results, as a per- The summary measures in this table are country centage of the U.S. results, are 81.3 and 13.6, respec- enrollment rates weighted by each country's share in tively. More comprehensive ICP results for 1985 (in- the aggregate population. cluding several Caribbean countries) are expected to be available in 1992. The figures given here are sub- Table 30. Income distribution and ICP estimates ject to change and should be regarded as indicative of GDP only. The "international dollar" (1$) has the same pur- The first three columns of this table contain the re- chasing power over total GDP as the U.S. dollar in a sults of the U.N. International Comparisons Program given year, but purchasing power over subaggregates (ICP), this year combined with World Bank staff esti- is determined by average international prices at that mates for countries not covered in the most recent level rather than by U.S. relative prices. These dollar ICP study, Phase V for 1985. The rest of the table values, which are different from the dollar values of reports distribution of income or expenditure accru- GNP or GDP shown in Tables 1 and 3 (see the techni- ing to percentile groups of households ranked by to- cal notes for these tables), are obtained by special 299 conversion factors designed to equalize the purchas- Thus fixity is always maintained between members of ing powers of currencies in the respective countries. the European Communities, even within the OECD This conversion factor, commonly known as the Pur- and world comparison. For Austria and Finland, chasing Power Parity (PPP), is defined as the number however, the bilateral relationship that prevails of units of a country's currency required to buy the within the OECD comparison is also the one used same amounts of goods and services in the domestic within the global comparison. But a significantly dif- market as one dollar would buy in the United States. ferent relationship (based on Central European The computation involves deriving implicit quantities prices) prevails in the comparison within that group, from national accounts expenditure data and spe- and this is the relationship presented in the separate cially collected price data, and then revaluing the im- publication of the European comparison. plicit quantities in each country at a single set of aver- To derive ICP-based 1985 figures for countries that age prices. The average price index thus equalizes are yet to participate in any ICP survey, an estimating dollar prices in every country so that cross-country equation is first obtained by fitting the following re- comparisons of GDP based on them reflect differ- gression to 1985 data: ences in quantities of goods and services free of price- ln (r) = .5726 ln (ATLAS) + .3466 ln (ENROL) + .3865; level differentials. This procedure is designed to (.0319) (.0540) (.1579) bring cross-country comparisons in line with cross- RMSE = .2240; Adj.R-Sq = .9523; N=76 time real value comparisons that are based on con- where all variables and estimated values are ex- stant price series. pressed as US = 100; The ICP Phase V figures presented here are the results of a two-step exercise. Countries within a re- r = ICP estimates of per capita GDP converted to gion or group such as the OECD are first compared U.S. dollars by PPP, the array of r consisting of all using their own group average prices. Next, since 1985 actual ICP values and extrapolations of the latest group average prices may differ from each other, available ICP numbers for countries that participated making the countries belonging to different groups in the 1980 or 1975 exercise but not in 1985; not comparable, the group prices are adjusted to ATLAS = per capita GNP estimated by the Atlas make them comparable at the world level. The adjust- method; ments, done by UNSO, are based on price differen- ENROL = secondary school enrollment; and tials observed in a network of "link" countries repre- RMSE = root mean squared error. senting each group. However, the linking is done in a ATLAS and ENROL are used as rough proxies of manner that retains in the world comparison the rela- inter-country wage differentials for unskilled and tive levels of GDP observed in the group compari- skilled human capital, respectively. Following Isen- sons, called "fixity." man (see Paul Isenman, "Inter-Country Compari- The two-step process was adopted because the rel- Sons of 'Real' (PPP) Incomes: Revised Estimates and ative GDP levels and rankings of two countries may Unresolved Questions," in World Development, 1980, change when more countries are brought into the vol. 8, pp. 61-72), the rationale adopted here is that comparison. It was felt that this should not be al- ICP and conventional estimates of GDP differ mainly lowed to happen within geographic regions; that is, because wage differences persist among nations due that the relationship of, say, Ghana and Senegal to constraints on the international mobility of labor. A should not be affected by the prices prevailing in the technical paper providing fuller explanation is avail- United States. Thus overall GDP per capita levels are able on request. For further details on ICP pro- calculated at "regional" prices and then linked to- cedures, readers may consult the ICP Phase IV re- gether. The linking is done by revaluing GDPs of all port, World Comparisons of Purchasing Power and Real the countries at average "world" prices and reallocat- Product for 1980 (New York: United Nations, 1986). ing the new regional totals on the basis of each coun- The income distribution data cover rural and urban try's share in the original comparison. areas for all countries. The data refer to different Such a method does not permit the comparison of years between 1979 and 1989 and are drawn from a more detailed quantities (such as food consumption). variety of sources. These include the Economic Com- Hence these subaggregates and more detailed expen- mission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the diture categories are calculated using world prices. Luxembourg Income Study, the OECD, the U.N. 's These quantities are indeed comparable interna- National Accounts Statistics: Compendium of Income Dis- tionally, but they do not add up to the indicated tribution Statistics, 1985, the World Bank, and national GDPs because they are calculated at a different set of sources. Data for many countries have been updated, prices. and some of the income distribution data previously Some countries belong to several regional groups. published have been deleted because they refer to A few of the groups have priority; others are equal. years long past. 300 In many countries the collection of income distribu- The summary measures for urban population as a tion data is not systematically organized or integrated percentage of total population are calculated from with the official statistical system. The data are de- country percentages weighted by each country's rived from surveys designed for other purposes, share in the aggregate population; the other sum- most often consumer expenditure surveys, that also mary measures in this table are weighted in the same collect information on income. These surveys use a fashion, using urban population. variety of income concepts and sample designs, and in many cases their geographic coverage is too limited Table 32. Women in development to provide reliable nationwide estimates of income distribution. Although the data presented here repre- This table provides some basic indicators disaggre- sent the best available estimates, they do not avoid all gated to show differences between the sexes that il- these problems and should be interpreted with lustrate the condition of women in society. The mea- caution. sures reflect the demographic status of women and Similarly, the scope of the indicator is limited for their access to health and education services. Statisti- certain countries, and data for other countries are not cal anomalies become even more apparent when so- fully comparable. Because households vary in size, a cial indicators are analyzed by gender, because re- distribution in which households are ranked accord- porting systems are often weak in areas related ing to per capita household income, rather than specifically to women. Indicators drawn from cen- according to total household income, is superior for suses and surveys, such as those on population, tend many purposes. The distinction is important because to be about as reliable for women as for men; but households with low per capita incomes frequently indicators based largely on administrative records, are large households, whose total income may be such as maternal and infant mortality, are less reli- high, whereas many households with low household able. More resources are now being devoted to devel- incomes may be small households with high per cap- oping better information on these topics, but the re- ita income. Information on the distribution of per liability of data, even in the series shown, still varies capita household income exists for only a few coun- significantly. tries and is infrequently updated. Where possible, The under-5 mortality rate shows the probability of a distributions are ranked according to per capita in- newborn baby dying before reaching age 5. The rates come; more often they are ranked by household in- are derived from life tables based on estimated cur- come, with others ranked by per capita expenditure rent life expectancy at birth and on infant mortality or household expenditure. Since the size of house- rates. In general, throughout the world more males hold is likely to be small for low-income households are born than females. Under good nutritional and (for instance, single-person households and couples health conditions and in times of peace, male chil- without children), the distribution of household in- dren under 5 have a higher death rate than females. come may overstate the income inequality. Also, These columns show that female-male differences in since household savings tend to increase faster as the risk of dying by age 5 vary substantially. In indus- income levels increase, the distribution of expendi- trial market economies, female babies have a 23 per- ture is inclined to understate the income inequality. cent lower risk of dying by age 5 than male babies; The World Bank's Living Standards Measurement the risk of dying by age 5 is actually higher for f e- Study and the Social Dimensions of Adjustment proj- males than for males in some lower-income econ- ect (the latter covering Sub-Saharan African coun- omies. This suggests differential treatment of males tries) are assisting a few countries in improving their and females with respect to food and medical care. collection and analysis of data on income Such discrimination particularly affects very young distribution. girls, who may get a smaller share of scarce food or receive less prompt costly medical attention. This pat- Table 31. Urbanization tern of discrimination is not uniformly associated Data on urban population and agglomeration in large with development. There are low- and middle-in- cities are from the U.N. 's World Urbanization Prospects, come countries (and regions within countries) where supplemented by data from the World Bank. The the risk of dying by age 5 for females relative to males growth rates of urban population are calculated from approximates the pattern found in industrial coun- the World Bank's population estimates; the estimates tries. In many other countries, however, the numbers of urban population shares are calculated from both starkly demonstrate the need to associate women sources just cited. more closely with development. The health and wel- Because the estimates in this table are based on fare indicators in both Table 28 and in this table's different national definitions of what is urban, cross- maternal mortality column draw attention, in particu- country comparisons should be made with caution. lar, to the conditions associated with childbearing. 301 This activity still carries the highest risk of death for earlier or later cohorts. The data are based on enroll- women of reproductive age in developing countries. ment records. The slightly higher persistence ratios The indicators reflect, but do not measure, both the for females in some African countries may indicate availability of health services for women and the gen- male participation in activities such as animal eral welfare and nutritional status of mothers. herding. Life expectancy at birth is defined in the note to All things being equal, and opportunities being the Table 1. same, the ratios for females per 100 males should be Maternal mortality refers to the number of female close to 100. However, inequalities may cause the ra- deaths that occur during childbirth per 100,000 live tios to move in different directions. For example, the births. Because deaths during childbirth are defined number of females per 100 males will rise at second- more widely in some countries to include complica- ary school level if male attendance declines more rap- tions of pregnancy or the period after childbirth, or of idly in the final grades because of males' greater job abortion, and because many pregnant women die opportunities, conscription into the army, or migra- from lack of suitable health care, maternal mortality is tion in search of work. In addition, since the numbers difficult to measure consistently and reliably across in these columns refer mainly to general secondary countries. The data in these two series are drawn education, they do not capture those (mostly males) from diverse national sources and collected by the enrolled in technical and vocational schools or in full- World Health Organization (WHO), although many time apprenticeships, as in Eastern Europe. national administrative systems are weak and do not All summary measures are country data weighted record vital events in a systematic way. The data are by each country's share in the aggregate population. derived mostly from official community reports and hospital records, and some reflect only deaths in hos- Table 33. Forests, protected areas, and water pitals and other medical institutions. Sometimes resources smaller private and rural hospitals are excluded, and sometimes even relatively primitive local facilities are This table on natural resources represents a step to- included. The coverage is therefore not always com- ward including environmental data in the assessment prehensive, and the figures should be treated with of development and the planning of economic strate- extreme caution. gies. It provides a partial picture of the status of for- Clearly, many maternal deaths go unrecorded, par- ests, the extent of areas protected for conservation or ticularly in countries with remote rural populations; other environmentally related purposes, and the this accounts for some of the very low numbers availability and use of fresh water. The data reported shown in the table, especially for several African here are drawn from the most authoritative sources countries. Moreover, it is not clear whether an in- available. Perhaps even more than other data in this crease in the number of mothers in hospital reflects Report, however, these data should be used with cau- more extensive medical care for women or more com- tion. Although they accurately characterize major dif- plications in pregnancy and childbirth because of ferences in resources and uses among countries, true poor nutrition, for instance. (Table 28 shows data on comparability is limited because of variation in data low birth weight.) collection, statistical methods, definitions, and gov- These time series attempt to bring together readily ernment resources. available information not always presented in inter- No conceptual framework has yet been agreed national publications. WHO warns that there are in- upon that integrates natural resource and traditional evitably gaps in the series, and it has invited coun- economic data. Nor are the measures shown in this tries to provide more comprehensive figures. They table intended to be final indicators of natural re- are reproduced here, from the 1986 WHO publication source wealth, environmental health, or resource de- Maternal Mortality Rates, supplemented by the UNI- pletion. They have been chosen because they are CEF publication The State of the World's Children 1989, available for most countries, are testable, and reflect as part of the international effort to highlight data in some general conditions of the environment. this field. The data refer to any year from 1977 to The total area of forest refers to the total natural 1984. stands of woody vegetation in which trees predomi- The education indicators, based on Unesco sources, nate. These estimates are derived from country statis- show the extent to which females have equal access tics assembled by the Food and Agriculture Organiza- to schooling. tion (FAO) in 1980. Some of them are based on more Percentage of cohort persisting to grade 4 is the per- recent inventories or satellite-based assessments per- centage of children starting primary school in 1970 formed during the 1980s. In 1992 the FAO will com- and 1985, respectively, who continued to the fourth plete and publish an assessment of world forest ex- grade by 1973 and 1988. Figures in italics represent tent and health that should modify some of these 302 estimates substantially. The total area of closed forest hectares that fall into one of five management catego- refers to those forest areas where trees cover a high ries: scientific reserves and strict nature reserves; na- proportion of the ground and there is no continuous tional parks of national or international significance ground cover. Closed forest, for members of the Eco- (not materially affected by human activity); natural nomic Commission for Europe (ECE), however, is de- monuments and natural landscapes with some fined as those forest areas where tree crowns cover unique aspects; managed nature reserves and wild- more than 20 percent of the area. These natural life sanctuaries; and protected landscapes and sea- stands do not include tree plantations. More recent scapes (which may include cultural landscapes). This estimates of total forest cover are available for some table does not include sites protected only under local countries. Total forest area in the Philippines was es- or provincial law or areas where consumptive uses of timated to be between 68,000 and 71,000 square kilo- wildlife are allowed. These data are subject to varia- meters in 1987. The most recent estimate for Malaysia tions in definition and in reporting to the organiza- is 185,000 square kilometers. tions, such as the World Conservation Monitoring Total annual deforestation refers to both closed and Centre, that compile and disseminate these data. open forest. Open forest is defined as at least a 10 Internal renewable water withdrawal data are subject percent tree cover with a continuous ground cover. In to variation in collection and estimation methods but the ECE countries, open forest has 5-20 percent accurately show the magnitude of water use in both crown cover or a mixture of bush and stunted trees. total and per capita terms. These data, however, also Deforestation is defined as the permanent conversion hide what can be significant variation in total renew- of forest land to other uses, including pasture, shift- able water resources from one year to another. They ing cultivation, mechanized agriculture, or infrastruc- also fail to distinguish the variation in water availabil- ture development. Deforested areas do not include ity within a country both seasonally and geographi- areas logged but intended for regeneration, nor areas cally. Because freshwater resources are based on degraded by fuelwood gathering, acid precipitation, long-term averages, their estimation explicitly ex- or forest fires. In temperate industrialized countries cludes decade-long cycles of wet and dry. These data the permanent conversion of remaining forest to are compiled from national, international, and pro- other uses is relatively rare. Assessments of annual fessional publications from a variety of years. In the deforestation, both in open and closed forest, are dif- absence of other measures, estimates of sectoral with- ficult to make and are usually undertaken as special drawals are modeled when necessary (based on in- studies. The estimates shown here for 1981-85 were formation on industry, irrigation practices, livestock calculated in 1980, projecting the rate of deforestation populations, crop mix, and precipitation). Data from during the first five years of the decade. Figures in small countries and arid regions are thought less reli- italics are estimates from other periods and are based able than those from large countries and more humid on more recent or better assessments than those used zones. These data do not include fresh water created in the 1980 projections. by desalination plants. Special note should be taken of Brazilthe country Annual withdrawal refers to the average annual with the world's largest tropical closed forestwhich flows of rivers and underground waters that are de- now undertakes annual deforestation assessments. rived from precipitation falling within the country. The estimate of deforestation in Brazil is the most The total withdrawn and the percentage withdrawn of recent. Brazil is unique in having several assessments the total renewable resource are both reported in this of forest extent and deforestation that use a common table. The total water withdrawn for use can exceed methodology based on images from Landsat satel- the total renewable resource of a country for two rea- lites. Closed forest deforestation in the Legal Amazon sons. Water might be withdrawn from a lake or river of Brazil during 1990 is estimated at 13,800 square shared with another country, or it might be with- kilometers, down from the 17,900 square kilometers drawn from an aquifer that is not part of the renew- estimated in 1989. Between 1978 and 1988, deforesta- able cycle. Domestic use includes drinking water, mu- tion in this region averaged about 21,000 square kilo- nicipal use or supply, and uses for public services, meters, having peaked in 1987 and declined greatly commercial establishments, and homes. Direct with- thereafter. By 1990, cumulative deforestation (both drawals for industrial use, including withdrawals for recent and historical) within the Legal Amazon to- cooling thermoelectric plants, are combined in the taled 415,000 square kilometers. Deforestation out- final column of this table with withdrawals for agricul- side the Legal Amazon also occurs, but there is much ture (irrigation and livestock production). Per capita less information on its extent. A 1980 estimate, that water withdrawal is calculated by dividing a coun- open forest deforestation in Brazil totaled about try's total withdrawal by its population in the year 10,500 square kilometers, is the most recent available. that withdrawal estimates are available. Nationally protected areas are areas of at least 1,000 303 Data sources Production U.N. Department of International Economic and Social Affairs. Various years. Statistical Yearbook. New and domestic York. absorption . Various years. Energy Statistics Yearbook. Statistical Papers, series J. New York. U.N. International Comparison Program Phases IV (1980) and V (1985) reports, and data from ECE, ESCAP, Eurostat, OECD, and U.N. FAQ, IMF, UNIDO, and World Bank data; national sources. Fiscal and International Monetary Fund. Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. Vol. 11. Washington, D.C. monetary . Various years. International Financial Statistics. Washington, D.C. accounts U.N. Department of International Economic and Social Affairs. Various years. World Energy Supplies. Statistical Papers, series J. New York. IMF data. Core International Monetary Fund. Various years. International Financial Statistics. Washington, D.C. international U.N. Conference on Trade and Development. Various years. Handbook of International Trade and transactions Development Statistics. Geneva. U.N. Department of International Economic and Social Affairs. Various years. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. New York. Various years. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. New York. FAQ, IMF, U.N., and World Bank data. External Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Various years. Development Co-operation. finance Paris. 1988. Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries. Paris. IMF, OECD, and World Bank data; World Bank Debtor Reporting System. Human Eduard Bos, Patience W. Stephens, and My T Vu. World Population Projections, 1992-93 Edition resources (forthcoming). Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press. Institute for Resource Development/Westinghouse. 1987. Child Survival: Risks and the Road to Health. Columbia, Md. Mauldin, W. Parker, and Holden J. Segal. 1988. "Prevalence of Contraceptive Use: Trends and Issues." Studies in Family Planning 19, 6: 335-53. Sivard, Ruth. 1985. WomenA World Survey. Washington, D.C.: World Priorities. U.N. Department of International Economic and Socia! Affairs. Various years. Demographic Yearbook. New York. Various years. Population and Vital Statistics Report. New York. Various years. Statistical Yearbook. New York. 1989. Levels and Trends of Contraceptive Use as Assessed in 1988. New York. 1988. Mortality of Children underAge 5: Projections 1950-2025. New York. 1991. World Urbanization Prospects 1991. New York. 1991. World Population Prospects: 1990. New York. U.N. Educational Scientific and Cultural Qrganization. Various years. Statistical Yearbook. Paris. 1988. Compendium of Statistics on Illiteracy. Paris. UNICEF. 1989. The State of the World's Children 1989. Qxford: Qxford University Press. World Health Organization. Various years. World Health Statistics Annual. Geneva. 1986. Maternal Mortality Rates: A Tabulation of Available Information, 2nd edition. Geneva. Various years. World Health Statistics Report. Geneva. World Resources Institute. 1990. World Resources 1990-91. New York. FAQ and World Bank data. 305 Classification of economies Part 1 Classification of economies by income and region Sub-Saharan Africa Asia Europe and Central Asia Middle East and North Africa East and Eastern Europe Income Southern East Asia and and Central Rest of Middle North group Subgroup Africa West Africa Pacific South Asia Asia Europe East Africa Americas China India Large Burundi Benin Cambodia Bangladesh Afghanistan Egypt, Arab Guyana Comoros Burkina Faso Indonesia Bhutan Rep. Haiti Ethiopia Central Afri- Lao PDR Maldives Honduras Kenya can Rep. Solomon Myanmar Lesotho Chad Islands Nepal Madagascar Equatorial Viet Nam Pakistan Malawi Guinea Sri Lanka Mozambique Gambia, The Rwanda Ghana Low- Somalia Guinea income Sudan Guinea-Bis Small Tanzania sau Uganda Liberia Zaire Mali Zambia Mauritania Niger Nigeria São Tome and Principe Sierra Leone Togo Angola Cameroon Fiji Albaniaa Turkey Iran, Islamic Algeria Argentina Botswana Cape Verde Kiribati Bulgaria Rep. Morocco Belize Djibouti Congo, Rep. Korea, Poland Jordan Tunisia Bolivia Mauritius Côte d'Ivoire Dem. Rep. Romania Lebanon Chile Namibia Senegal Malaysia Syrian Arab Colombia Swaziland Mongolia Rep. Costa Rica Zimbabwe Papua New Yemen, Rep. Cubaa Guinea Dominica Philippines Dominican Thailand Rep. Lower Tonga Ecuador Vanuatu El Salvador Western Grenada Samoa Guatemala Jamaica Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru St. Lucia Middle- St. Vincent income Reunion Gabon American Czecho- Gibraltar Bahrain Libya Antigua and Seychelles Samoa slovakia Greece Iraq Barbuda South Africa Guam Hungary Isle of Man Oman Barbados Korea, Rep. Former Malta Saudi Arabia Brazil Macao USSR Portugal French New Cale- Yugoslavia Guiana donia Guadeloupe Pacific Is., Martinique Trust Terr. Mexico Netherlands pper Antilles Puerto Rico St. Kitts and Nevis Suriname Trinidad and Tobago Uruguay Venezuela No.oflow-& middle- 37 25 23 23 8 8 6 10 5 (Continues on the following page.) 306 (continued) Sub-Saha ran Africa Asia Europe and Central Asia Middle East and North Africa East and Eastern Europe Income Southern East Asia and and Central Rest of Middle North group Subgroup Africa West Africa Pacific South Asia Asia Europe East Africa Americas Australia Austria Canada Japan Belgium United New Denmark States Zealand Finland France Germany Iceland Ireland OECD Italy countries Luxembourg Netherlands Norway High- Spain income Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom Mayotte Brunei Andorra Israel Aruba French Channel Kuwait Bahamas Polynesia Islands Qatar Bermuda Non-OECE Virgin Hong Kong Cyprus United Arab countries Islands (US) Singapore Faeroe Emirates OAEb Islands Greenland Note: Economies with populations of less than 30,000 are not included. Not included in regional measures because of data limitations. Other Asian economiesTaiwan, China. Definitions of groups Part 1 (SITC 5 to 9, minus 68) and services (factor and nonfactor Income group: The economies are divided according to 1990 service receipts plus workers' remittances). If no single GNP per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas category accounts for 50 percent or more of total exports, that method. The groups are: low-income, $610 or less; economy is classified as diversified. lower-middle-income, $61 1-2,465; upper-middle-income, Indebtedness: Standard World Bank definitions of severe and $2,466$7,619; and high-income, $7,620 or more. moderate indebtedness, averaged over three years (1988-90) Subgroup: Low-income economies are further divided by are used to classify economies in this table. Severely-indebted size, and high-income by membership of OECD. means three of four key ratios are above critical levels: debt to GNP (50 percent), debt to exports of goods and services Region: Economies are divided into five major regions and (275 percent), accrued debt service to exports (30 percent), eight additional subregions. and accrued interest to exports (20 percent). Moderately indebted means three of the four key ratios exceed 60 percent Part 2 of, but do not reach, the critical levels. Less indebted economies Major export category: Major exports are those that account and those not covered in the World Bank Debtor Reporting for 50 percent or more of total exports from one category, in System are also listed. the period 1987-89. The categories are: nonfuel primary (SITC 0, 1, 2, and 4, plus 68), fuels (SITC 3), manufactures 307 Part 2 Classification of economies by major export category and indebtedness Low- and middle-income More indebted economies Low-income Middle-income High-income High-income Severely Moderately Severely Moderately Less indebted Debtor Reporting non-OECD OECD Group indebted indebted indebted indebted economies System Bulgaria Hungary China Korea, Dem. French Canada Poland Czechoslovakia Rep.' Polynesia Finland Korea, Rep. Macan Hong Kong Germany Exporters of Lebanon New Caledonia Israel Ireland manufactures Romania Singapore Italy OAEb Japan Sweden Switzerland Burundi Rwanda Argentina Chile Bhutan Afghanistan Faeroe Iceland Equatorial Togo Côte d'Ivoire Costa Rica Botswana Albania' Islands New Zealand Guinea Nicaragua Guatemala Chad American Greenland Ethiopia Papua New Samoa Ghana Guinea Cuba' Guinea Paraguay French Guiana Guinea-Bissau Solomon Guadeloupe Guyana Islands Guam Honduras St. Vincent Mongolia Liberia Swaziland Namibia Exporters Madagascar Zimbabwe Reunion of nonfuel Malawi Suriname primary products Mauritania Viet Nam Myanmar Niger São Tome and Principe Somalia Sudan Tanzania Uganda Zaire Zambia Nigeria Algeria Angola Iran, Islamic Gibraltar Brunei Exporters Congo, Rep. Gabon Rep. Iraq Qatar of fuels Venezuela Oman Libya United Arab (mainly oil) Trinidad and Saudi Arabia Emirates Tobago Former uSSRa Egypt, Arab Benin Dominican Burkina Faso Antigua and Bahamas United Rep. Republic Cape Verde Barbuda Bermuda Kingdom Jamaica Djibouti Barbados Cyprus Jordan Fiji Cambodia Aruba Yemen, Rep. Grenada Greece Haiti Kiribati Lesotho Martinique Maldives Netherlands Exporters Malta Antilles of services Nepal Panama Seychelles St. Kitts and Nevis St. Lucia Tonga Vanuatu Western Samoa Kenya Bangladesh Bolivia Cameroon Belize Bahrain Kuwait Australia Mozambique Central African Brazil Colombia Dominica South Africa Austria Sierra Leone Rep. Ecuador El Salvador Gambia, The Belgium Comoros Mexico Philippines Lao PDR Denmark India Morocco Senegal Malaysia France Diversified Luxembourg exporters Indonesia Peru Turkey Mauritius Mali Syrian Arab Uruguay Portugal Netherlands Pakistan Rep. Thailand Norway Sri Lanka Tunisia Spain Yugoslavia United States No. of economies 178 26 11 15 17 44 29 15 21 Note: Economies with populations of less than 30,000 are not included. a. Not included in regional measures because of data limitations. b. Other Asian economiesTaiwan, China. c. Economies in which no single export category accounts for more than 50 percent of total exports. 308 The World Bank Between 1990 and 2030 the world's population will grow by 3.7 billion, demand for food will almost double, and industrial output and energy use will probably triple world- wide and increase sixfold in developing countries. Under current practices, the result could be appalling environmental conditions in cities and countryside alike. This fifteenth annual World Development Report presents that outcome as a clear possibility, but it also presents an alternative pathone that, if taken, would allow the coming generation to witness improved environmental conditions accompanied by rapid economic development and the virtual eradication of widespread poverty. This is the more difficult path. Choosing it will require that both industrial and developing countries seize the current moment of opportunity to reform policies, institutions, and aid programs. A twofold strategy is required. First, take advantage of the positive links between economic efficiency, in- come growth, and protection of the environment. This calls for accelerating programs for reducing poverty, removing distortions that encourage the wasteful use of energy and natural resources, clarifying property rights to encourage people and communities to manage resources better, and expanding programs for education (especially for girls), family planning services, sanitation and clean water, and agricultural extension, credit, and research. Second, break the negative links between economic activity and the environ- ment. The Report describes targeted measures that can bring dramatic improvements in environmental quality at modest cost in investment and economic efficiency. To imple- ment them will require overcoming the power of vested interests, building strong insti- tutions, improving knowledge, encouraging more participatory decisionmaking, and building a partnership of effort between industrial and developing countries. As in previous editions, this Report includes the World Development Indica- tors, which give comprehensive, current data on social and economic development in more than 180 countries and territories. These data will also be available on diskette for use with personal computers. 90000> Cover design by Walt Rosen quist 9 780195 208764 ISBN O-1-S2O?6-