The aim of this report therefore is to focus on adaptation to climate change in India and to examine its fiscal implications, with a view of reducing as much as possible the burden of adjustment on the central and state budgets.
... See More + Estimates of the global costs of adaptation have been made in a number of studies, and some also provide a breakdown at the regional level. This note will use those estimates, along with work done by the World Bank for South Asia, from which estimates for India are inferred. All the work to date is regarded as having several shortcomings and these are noted in the next section. The note is structured as follows. Section two presents the available estimates of costs of adaptation, world-wide, for developing countries, for regions and finally for South Asia and India. The estimates need to be qualified in many respects and these limitations are noted. Section three places the estimates for India in the context of the public sector budget, now and as it may evolve in the period to 2050. Adaptation measures are evaluated for each sector in some detail and the scope for transferring the burden to the private sector and to public-private partnerships is discussed. Section four provides some conclusions and recommendations for further work.
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The Leadership and Communication Capacity for National Renewal program(LCCNR) trained 107 Timorese in its second program year. They invested a high degree of expense, effort, and time to enhance the leadership, communication, and negotiation skills of their trainees.
... See More + On balance, emphasizing quality for a small number of trainees, this proved to be the right choice. Overall, given the challenges that LCCNR faced in training Timorese, the program proved very successful in its training work. Its adaptability to changing contexts, its decision to produce and distribute a training manual, and its success at enhancing the capacities of Timorese officials with LCCNR, were all direct contributors to its overall success.
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This Country Assistance Evaluation (CAE) provides an independent assessment of World Bank assistance to Indonesia during the period 1999-2006. The CAE evaluates the Bank program in Indonesia against four objectives or pillars, three of which are derived from the FY01 and FY04 country assistance strategy (CAS) documents.
... See More + These three pillars are: restoration o f growth and investment, improving governance and building institutions, and poverty reduction and social service delivery. The fourth pillar, disaster and natural resource management, became a major part of the Bank program following the 2004 tsunami. In each of these areas the CAE sets out the objectives of the Bank program as defined by the CAS. The CAE then uses the actual outcomes, quantified if possible, as a basis for rating the extent to which the objectives were achieved. The CAE finds the outcomes in this area moderately satisfactory relative to the Bank's objectives. The Bank support in this area included adjustment lending in the aftermath of the crisis. After a hiatus from 2001-2003, the Bank resumed its lending in support of broad policy change and institutional development in 2004 with a series of development policy loans and investment loans for infrastructure.
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This evaluation recommends that future Bank strategy in Ukraine should strive for greater selectivity, centered on public financial management, private sector development, energy, and social protection, with a crosscutting focus on governance and institutional development.
... See More + In economic and sector work, it would be desirable to focus on private sector development and infrastructure. In lending, the design of investment projects needs to be simplified to match implementation capacity and needs to be aligned with the government's priorities. With regard to development policy lending, a shift to more narrowly focused, single-tranche operations would likely encourage deeper policy and institutional reforms. Ukraine's economic performance improved substantially after 1999. The economy experienced robust growth between 2000 and 2004. The renewed growth cut across sectors and was relatively broad-based, with the industrial sector growing most strongly. In 2004, Ukraine achieved the highest growth rate in Europe (12.1 percent). This spectacular performance was due to improved macroeconomic policies and management, a highly favorable external environment, and a revival of the country's traditional industrial base. Economic activity rebounded strongly in 2006, with growth estimated at 7.1 percent, which demonstrates the considerable resilience of Ukraine's economy. The negative impacts of higher gas prices on the economy were less than anticipated and pass-through of rising energy prices to consumers and producers helped improve energy efficiency, Ukraine has one of the lowest levels of energy efficiency in the world. At the same time, capital inflows, foreign direct investment (FDI) in particular, were buoyant, reflecting improved perceptions of Ukraine as an investment location. Fiscal policy continued to support macroeconomic balance and the general budget deficit did not exceed 2.5 percent of GDP.
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This report evaluates the International Development Association's (IDA's) support to Ethiopia during the period July 1, 1998 through June 30, 2006.
... See More + The overarching goal of IDA during this period was to support the Ethiopian Government's efforts to reduce poverty and improve human well-being. The IDA program focused on helping to foster pro-poor growth, private sector development, human development, post-conflict and emergency rehabilitation, and improved governance. IDA was Ethiopia's single largest development partner, providing about 22 percent of the total of US$11.6 billion in overseas development assistance (ODA) during the period 1998-2006. It was a major player not only in terms of finance, but also as a purveyor of development knowledge and as a leader in donor coordination. IDA's engagement with other development partners through the Development Assistance Group (DAG), established in Ethiopia in 2000 and co-chaired by IDA and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), led to improved donor coordination and better alignment of the respective development partners' objectives with the Government's priorities. The assessment concludes that IDA's strategy during the period was relevant. IDA assistance during the review period had positive outcomes inter alia in post conflict rehabilitation, pro-poor economic growth, roads development and human development. In contrast, the outcomes were less favorable in the key areas of private sector development and governance, which are crucial to sustaining growth over the long-term and ensuring that its benefits are widely shared. Based on lessons from the evaluation, Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) recommends that IDA: (I) tighten the link between the policy dialogue and resource transfers in support of particular areas; (ii) take a clearer position on governance, notably by identifying some of the most binding constraints on private sector development, and hence on the prospects for pro-poor growth; (iii) improve the knowledge base on how social, political, and cultural factors can influence the effectiveness of its support, particularly at the local level; and (v) extend and deepen partnerships with a broad range of in-country stakeholders.
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This Country Assistance Evaluation (CAE) provides an independent assessment of World Bank assistance to Mali during the period FY95-05. The CAE examines whether: (a) the objectives of Bank assistance were relevant; (b) the Bank's assistance program was effectively designed and consistent with its objectives; and (c) the Bank's program achieved its objectives and had a substantial impact on the country's development during this period.
... See More + The findings of this evaluation can be summarized as follows. First, in the areas where significant progress was made, there were both acceptances by the Government of the need for reform and of the path to it, as well as a determined effort by IDA to further government ownership of the reform. This was the case in the area of public finance management, where IDA staff collaborated closely and persistently with the authorities, as well as in the areas of building an improved road maintenance system and advancing the decentralization process. Second, in the many areas where there was little or insufficient reform progress, the Government may have accepted the need for reform, but the solutions and policies proposed were either resisted, because they did not incorporate a full appreciation of the nature and complexity of the issue at hand, or they were only a partial solution to the development problem in question. The paper goes on to give four major recommendations: first, it is imperative to focus on education quality; second, in the area of rural development, the envisaged reforms in the cotton sector remain a major challenge as long as the sector is a drain on the budget; third, a viable strategy for development of the electric power sector is urgent; and finally, a renewed effort is needed to reform the financial sector and improve access to finance.
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This Country Assistance Evaluation (CAE) report reviews the Bank's assistance strategy for Angola from FY91 to FY06. It sought to promote economic growth with equity, help address macroeconomic imbalances, create transparent and accountable mechanisms for service delivery, and build consensus for future reforms.
... See More + The program partially achieved its objectives, and its overall outcome was moderately unsatisfactory. The war and the gap between what the Bank and the authorities sought to achieve contributed to that outcome. Most of the economic reforms were not achieved, nor were the institutional reforms in health, education, and infrastructure, and the rehabilitation of infrastructure fell short of its goals. Opacity persists in many areas and perception-based measures continue to indicate a high incidence of corruption. As the Bank calibrates the extent of its engagement in countries where governance remains weak and corruption prevalent, the way forward in Angola is not obvious. The Country Assistance Evaluation recommends engagement. There is a strong case for a substantial program of Analytical and Advisory Activities (AAA), but its form of delivery is important. Given the limited absorption capacity of the government and other national stakeholders, the CAE favors emphasizing the provision of advice and technical assistance through short policy notes and face-to-face contact, with a general mandate of building capacity.
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This Country Assistance Evaluation (CAE) reviews the Bank's assistance strategy for Madagascar for the period 1995-2005 (FY94-06). Overall, the objectives that the Bank has pursued can be grouped under three PRSP pillars: broad-based growth, good governance, and human and material security.
... See More + This paper lists the following findings: it is difficult to monitor donor-supported program outcomes in Madagascar, as the country suffers from an overload of indicators, most of which are neither closely monitored nor reliable, and, at times, inconsistent; unless links between the dynamic sectors and the rural areas -- where the great majority of the poor are located -- can be improved, growth in Madagascar will not be pro-poor; an increase in aid flows to assist a committed government is consistent with the need to scale up aid to meet the Millennium Development Goals; in general, poverty reduction support credits (PRSCs) seem to be good instruments for bringing coherence to a government's plans, for prioritizing budget allocations in line with agreed targets, and for accelerating and coordinating policy and financial support from the Bank and other donors; and targeted activities addressing specific constraints of the poor can be effective in protecting vulnerable groups.
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This country assistance evaluation for Honduras covers the period FY95-05. The International Development Association (IDA) has played a major role in Honduras' development efforts over these years, not only as a source of development assistance, but also through the contribution of its analytical work to the design of government reform efforts.
... See More + IDA'S strategy was presented in three country assistance strategies (CASs) over this period, all with the same two basic objectives: accelerated and equitable growth, and poverty reduction through investments in health, education and social safety nets. The objectives were certainly relevant for Honduras. The CAS proposals, both in terms of lending and in terms of analytical work were largely implemented as planned. At the same time, the strategy was all encompassing and lending was spread over a wide variety of sectors, suggesting a lack of focus. In particular, the strategy, as it evolved, placed much more emphasis on addressing the short-term needs of the poor than on tackling long term growth opportunities in, for example, agriculture. On the other hand, the leadership provided by IDA in the area of analytical work was much appreciated by its development partners.
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During the review period, the strategic objectives of Bank assistance in Yemen were: a) improved governance; b) ore attractive investment climate; c) better human capital; and d) ensuring sustainability of the environment, especially water.
... See More + The Bank's strategy and policy dialogue in the review period was dominated by the view that Yemen needed to improve the quality of governance and to enhance public sector capacity. Among the sub-objectives under this strategic goal were effective personnel management, staff reduction, decompression of the pay scale, devolution of service delivery to local communities and reduced corruption top priority in the Bank's strategy. The Bank's proposed assistance program included support for deregulation, privatization, investment promotion, financial reform, and land titling as well as related non-lending services. The outcomes of the overall Bank program are rated moderately satisfactory. The Bank experience in Yemen point to the following lessons: coordinating corrective actions produce satisfactory results; learning local conditions for better effective Bank interventions; and finally, moderating optimism in assessing the depth and durability of Government commitment. The report includes a contribution by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG-IFC) of the World Bank International Finance Corporation(Box 3), prepared by Denis T. Carpio and Cherian Samuel.
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This Country Assistance Evaluation (CAE) provides an independent assessment of World Bank assistance to Malawi during the period FY96-05. The CAE examines whether: (a) the objectives of Bank assistance were relevant; (b) the Bank's assistance program was effectively designed and consistent with its objectives; and (c) the Bank's program achieved its objectives and had a substantial impact on the country's development during this period.
... See More + Examining these questions allows the CAE to draw lessons and recommendations for future Bank assistance. The report finds that overall, the Bank activities in Malawi have had limited success in achieving the ultimate program objectives set out in the Bank's strategies. It offers a number of recommendations for: adjustment lending and fiscal management, agriculture, social sectors, economic and sector work, partnerships, country office and task management, and accuracy in reporting.
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This Country Assistance Evaluation (CAE) provides an independent assessment of World Bank program in Senegal from fiscal 1994 through fiscal 2004.
... See More + The evaluation examines whether: (a) the objectives of Bank support were relevant; (b) the Bank's program was effectively designed and consistent with its objectives; and (c) the Bank's program achieved its objectives and had a substantial impact on the country's development during this period. The overall outcome of the Bank's program during the FY94- 04 period is rated moderately satisfactory, while the institutional development impact is rated modest. The sustainability of the overall program is rated likely. Three lessons emerge from this assessment. First, when the Bank makes a conscientious effort to reach consensus with the government on the approach and pace of reforms it gets better outcomes. Second, donor agreement on major reforms is essential to the success of these reforms. Third, an emphasis on infrastructure is insufficient unless there is adequate attention to the linkages between urban and rural areas. Based on the evaluation of its program over the past decade, IEG recommends that the Bank emphasize the following: 1) providing support for rural development and rural-urban linkage; 2) continuing to strengthen capacity and governance at multiple level; and 3) enhancing donor coordination.
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This Country Assistance Evaluation for Pakistan needs a clear strategy and a defined program to support it. The Bank has recently been working with the government on supporting devolution to increase accountability at lower levels of government.
... See More + This, coupled with administrative reform, is expected to increase the effectiveness of government services. However, since many of the patronage problems have occurred at the local level, and the Bank is primarily working with federal and provincial counterparts, the Bank will need to ensure that the strategy and project design address problems at the right level. Projects should be more focused and scaled to fit the capacity of the implementing agencies. A shift from very broad adjustment loans to more focused loans designed to address a limited number of sectors or issues would be more appropriate for the current implementing capacity, and would likely lead to more effective loans.
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This Country Assistance Evaluation (CAE) assesses the outcomes of the World Bank's assistance to Turkey during the period July 1, 1993, to June 30, 2004.
... See More + It focuses on the objectives of that assistance and the extent to which outcomes were consistent with those objectives. It looks at the Bank's contribution to the achievement of those outcomes and the lessons for the Bank's future activities both in Turkey and more broadly. The Bank program during the period encompassed four broad strategic pillars: macroeconomic management; growth, competitiveness and productivity, which included the financial sector and infrastructure; poverty reduction and social development; and natural resource management. This report's assessments are as follows: The outcomes of the overall Bank program are rated moderately satisfactory, with substantial institutional development impact and likely sustainability. In the coming years the Bank should continue a high level of support to Turkey, but some rethinking of its approach is needed. With the improvements in public sector management, the program should be re-balanced with greater support for private sector development (including its role in generating employment and reducing poverty) and environmental management, but without relinquishing the efforts to improve infrastructure management and support social development. Within these areas, greater attention needs to be given to developing the capacity of key agencies responsible for program implementation. Support for private sector development would benefit from a coordinated approach from the Bank, the International Finance Corporation, and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, which has been lacking until now. Finally, improved environmental management will be an important area of Bank support to Turkey as it seeks to negotiate accession to the European Union.
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This Country Assistance Evaluation (CAE) assesses the outcomes of the World Bank's assistance to Turkey during the period July 1, 1993, to June 30, 2004.
... See More + It focuses on the objectives of that assistance and the extent to which outcomes were consistent with those objectives. It looks at the Bank's contribution to the achievement of those outcomes and the lessons for the Bank's future activities both in Turkey and more broadly. The Bank program during the period encompassed four broad strategic pillars: macroeconomic management; growth, competitiveness and productivity, which included the financial sector and infrastructure; poverty reduction and social development; and natural resource management. This report's assessments are as follows: The outcomes of the overall Bank program are rated moderately satisfactory, with substantial institutional development impact and likely sustainability. In the coming years the Bank should continue a high level of support to Turkey, but some rethinking of its approach is needed. With the improvements in public sector management, the program should be re-balanced with greater support for private sector development (including its role in generating employment and reducing poverty) and environmental management, but without relinquishing the efforts to improve infrastructure management and support social development. Within these areas, greater attention needs to be given to developing the capacity of key agencies responsible for program implementation. Support for private sector development would benefit from a coordinated approach from the Bank, the International Finance Corporation, and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, which has been lacking until now. Finally, improved environmental management will be an important area of Bank support to Turkey as it seeks to negotiate accession to the European Union.
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This evaluation of the Bank's assistance program for Albania covers the period FY98 to FY04, and follows on previous evaluations for the 1992-1997 period.
... See More + After the European Community, the Bank is the second largest donor to Albania, with 32 credits granted for a total of US$485 million, or about US$22 per capita per year. Annual net transfers from the Bank were US$50 million per year. The Operations Evaluation Department (OED) ratings of projects completed during the period indicate that Albania ranks higher than the ECA region and the Bank in terms of satisfactory outcomes, but lower in terms of sustainability and institutional development impact. OED ratings also indicate that projects in Albania have lower satisfactory outcomes than in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, and Macedonia, but higher than in Romania. The overall development impact of IDA'S assistance is rated as moderately satisfactory. Albania made gains in economic growth and price stabilization, alleviation of poverty, fiscal sustainability of the pension system, and, in the electricity and roads sectors. Albania has also shown some gains in civil service reform and stands to gain much in the water sector. However, reform has barely reached health and education which are important for ensuring broad-based growth and poverty reduction. Nor has there been much improvement in governance or the investment climate. Where Bank assistance established specific targets for outcomes, such as in energy, results of the assistance have been better than in areas such as governance, where the Bank's objectives were vaguely articulated. Lessons provide the following recommendations: 1) country strategies and project design need to move to an outcome-oriented approach; 2) Bank assistance should increase selectivity, with priority in infrastructure-including urban-health and education; 3) the Bank should fill existing gaps in Economic and Sector Work (ESW) on health, infrastructure, and urban development; and, 4) the International Development Association (IDA) should start working with the present administrative structures of government and its organizations.
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This Country Assistance Evaluation (CAE) assesses the outcomes of the World Bank's assistance to Bolivia during the period July 1, 1998 through June 30, 2004.'
... See More + It examines the relevance and realism of Bank objectives in the context of the development constraints facing Bolivia, the political environment for development and the capacity of the government during this period, and it assesses the sustainability and institutional development impacts of the Bank's assistance. The report rates the overall development impact of the Bank's assistance during this period is rated as Moderately Unsatisfactory. Evaluation ratings of the Bank's Bolivia projects are in line with Bank-wide averages, and progress was made toward a number of the specific objectives of Bank support. This progress did not translate into satisfactory development outcomes, however, due to the effects of adverse factors, e.g., strong political and social opposition to major elements of its development program that materialized during implementation. The Bank had identified most of these possible adverse developments as risks in its program documentation, but had discounted them heavily in its program and operational design decisions. The development impact of Bank assistance could have been improved had these risks been appraised more realistically and addressed through program and operational design. Hence five lessons emerge from this evaluation: 1) Unbiased, balanced assessments of risk, and re-assessment during implementation, improve the prospects for ex-post development effectiveness.2) Indicators typically used by the Bank and other donors ~ including those intimately related to some aspects of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) - do not, and probably cannot, fully capture aspects of development that are critical from political and socialperspectives.3) The capacity of instruments and processes such as the CDF/PRSP to build consensus and resolve political and social conflicts is limited when sharp divisions exist. 4) Prolonged high levels of aid involve a risk that recipients' ability to implement hard budget constraints could be impaired. 5) Donors can stimulate improvements in health and education in poor countries.
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This Country Assistance Evaluation (CAE) assesses the outcomes of the World Bank's assistance to Bolivia during the period July 1, 1998 through June 30, 2004.'
... See More + It examines the relevance and realism of Bank objectives in the context of the development constraints facing Bolivia, the political environment for development and the capacity of the government during this period, and it assesses the sustainability and institutional development impacts of the Bank's assistance. The report rates the overall development impact of the Bank's assistance during this period is rated as Moderately Unsatisfactory. Evaluation ratings of the Bank's Bolivia projects are in line with Bank-wide averages, and progress was made toward a number of the specific objectives of Bank support. This progress did not translate into satisfactory development outcomes, however, due to the effects of adverse factors, e.g., strong political and social opposition to major elements of its development program that materialized during implementation. The Bank had identified most of these possible adverse developments as risks in its program documentation, but had discounted them heavily in its program and operational design decisions. The development impact of Bank assistance could have been improved had these risks been appraised more realistically and addressed through program and operational design. Hence five lessons emerge from this evaluation: 1) Unbiased, balanced assessments of risk, and re-assessment during implementation, improve the prospects for ex-post development effectiveness.2) Indicators typically used by the Bank and other donors ~ including those intimately related to some aspects of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) - do not, and probably cannot, fully capture aspects of development that are critical from political and socialperspectives.3) The capacity of instruments and processes such as the CDF/PRSP to build consensus and resolve political and social conflicts is limited when sharp divisions exist. 4) Prolonged high levels of aid involve a risk that recipients' ability to implement hard budget constraints could be impaired. 5) Donors can stimulate improvements in health and education in poor countries.
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This country assistance evaluation (CAE) provides an independent assessment of the Bank assistance to Mauritania during the period 1992-2003, when 24 Bank operations were approved, with an increasing trend, so that by the latter half of the period, Bank commitments averaged about US$21 per capita, significantly above that of countries of comparable size and income level in the Africa region, as well as above the IDA allocations.
... See More + Mauritania also received substantial net ODA inflows from other sources, averaging about US$76 per capita during this period. The sectoral allocation of Bank lending reflected a shift in the focus of the Bank's strategy from the 1980s towards education and health, which accounted for some 27 percent of total commitments, and urban development, at about 14 percent. The Bank continued to focus on agriculture and rural development, but lending to this sector was relatively lower. Adjustment lending was significant, accounting for about 29 percent of commitments over the period; however, efforts to promote private sector development have met with limited success, and the foreign exchange market and financial intermediation are still inefficient. The overall outcome of the Bank's assistance is rated as unsatisfactory, while the institutional development impact is rated as modest. The sustainability of the benefits of Bank assistance is rated, on balance, likely but there are important risks. Macroeconomic stability appears to have deteriorated sharply in recent years; accountability and transparency in the use of oil revenues are not assured; and the lack of competition in banking and other key economic activities is exacerbating the economy's duality. In developing the future assistance strategy, it will be essential for the Bank to help Mauritania formulate a more pro-poor growth strategy, with a stronger focus on reducing inequalities. Greater attention needs to be given to removing the institutional constraints to private sector development, addressing the difficulties in obtaining foreign exchange in commercial banks, expanding access to credit beyond the few businesses associated with bankers, and helping to strengthen the judiciary system. Finally, governance issues deserve more emphasis. As the government expects to begin receiving oil revenues in 2006, and there are already issues of fiscal transparency, the Bank needs to condition its support on ensuring that the oil sector is managed transparently, and the benefits reach all segments of the population.
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The Bank strategy for Romania correctly reflected the important role that the private sector must play for generating growth and reducing poverty: 60 percent of its commitments were for private sector development, and supporting infrastructure, and another 18 percent for agriculture, while fifteen percent of the Bank's commitments were devoted to social sector development.
... See More + Despite the large volume of Bank assistance in the 1990s, progress in market reforms was slow, and development outcomes were unsatisfactory during this period. The Government's unwillingness, or inability to implement reforms is the main reason. However, the Bank failed in practice to recognize that Government commitment was weak, and persisted with adjustment lending in an un-reforming economy. Also, despite its financial clout, the Bank failed to have any impact on some of the crucial issues of the time. However, there were some bright spots: in agriculture, considerable progress was made in 1997 in reducing subsidies, making them transparent, and privatizing or closing loss-making large enterprises. But the process was derailed as government commitment waned. On balance, during most of the 1990s, outcomes of the Bank's interventions were unsatisfactory. The 1999 crisis was a turning point in Romania's reform process, and he Bank, through a well-designed adjustment program, broke the impasse, accompanying its adjustment lending with technical assistance (TA) loans to ensure the country had the right kind of technical expertise to implement the reforms. The adverse considerations, however, are far outweighed by the Bank's success in helping turn the tide in private sector development reforms. The overall outcome of the Bank's assistance strategy since mid-1999 has therefore been satisfactory.
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