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Robert Buckley

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Foreword, Prefacio, Préface

Executive Summary, Resumen, Résumé Analytique

Abbreviations and Acronyms

1. Development Effectiveness in a Volatile World
   1. Institutional Weaknesses
   4. Broadening the Agenda to Maximize Development Effectiveness
   4. The New Primacy of the External Environment

2. Trends in Project Performance
   7. Outcomes More than 75 Percent Satisfactory
   11. Gains in Development Effectiveness
      14. Institutional Development Impact—Improving but Still Weak
      14. Sustainability—Low and Weakening?
      15. Bank and Borrower Performance Improving—But Greater Gains from Borrowers
   16. Outstanding Projects—7 Percent of the Total
   17. Sector Analysis

3. Development Effectiveness at the Country Level
   19. The Country as the Unit of Account
   20. Institutions, Aid, and Growth
   23. Adjusting to the External Environment
      24. Outward Orientation and Growth
      24. Outward Orientation and Poverty Alleviation

4. Thematic Evaluations and Institutional Development
   27. Financial Sector
      28. Capitalization and Bad Loan Exposure
      28. Government Interventions
      28. Accounting and Prudential Standards
      28. Enforcement Capabilities
   29. Governance Issues
      29. Governance Institutions

5. Implications for the Bank and for Evaluation
   33. Global Risks
   35. Prospects for Poverty Reduction
   36. Implications for the Bank
      36. Poverty Alleviation
      36. Country Strategies
      36. Institutional Development

Annexes
   42. Annex 2: Glossary of Selected Terms
   44. Annex 3: Data on Outcome, Sustainability, and Institutional Development Impact
   48. Annex 4: Report from Committee on Development Effectiveness (CODE)
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Director-General, Operations Evaluation: Robert Picciotto
Director, Operations Evaluation Department: Elizabeth McAllister
Manager, Corporate Evaluations and Methods: Wendy Jarvie
Task Manager: Robert Buckley
The ongoing financial crisis has raised questions about the underpinnings of development assistance and the role of international financial institutions. A new development assistance framework, grounded in partnership, is emerging. That is the backdrop for this year’s Annual Review of Development Effectiveness by the World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department (OED).

As in past years, the Review tracks the Bank’s operational performance based on the findings of recent evaluations. The trends are highly encouraging, but when countries that have performed so well for so long suddenly stumble as dramatically as they did in the past year, the meaning of project-level trends deserves careful consideration.

Accordingly, this Review draws on the work of scholars convened by the Institute of Development Studies of Sussex University to assess the implications of the crisis. It also relies on a relatively new OED instrument—country assistance evaluations—to place the lessons from the Bank’s project experience in a broader context.

The Review complements the Annual Report on Portfolio Performance, which documents the Quality Assurance Group’s findings about active operations, and the...
Annual Report on Operations Evaluation, which presents OED’s assessment of the status and prospects of internal evaluation processes.

enseñanzas derivadas de los proyectos del Banco en un contexto más amplio.

El examen complementa el Informe anual sobre el desempeño de la cartera, en el cual se exponen las conclusiones del Grupo de garantía de calidad acerca de las operaciones activas, y el Informe anual sobre evaluación de operaciones, en el que se presenta el análisis que hace el DEO de la situación y las perspectivas de los procesos de evaluación interna.

conclusions du Groupe pour le contrôle de la qualité sur les opérations en cours et le Rapport annuel sur l’évaluation des opérations, dans lequel l’OED fait le point de la situation en ce qui concerne les processus d’évaluation interne et les perspectives qu’ils offrent.

Robert Picciotto
Director-General, Operations Evaluation
This Review of development effectiveness comes at a time of crisis. In East Asia, about 20 million people have fallen back into poverty in the last year. Russia has been beset by political and economic upheaval. Japan is in recession, with profound implications for the world economy. Economic problems have been compounded by natural disasters, such as floods in Bangladesh, in China, and in Central America. The prospects for achieving the OECD poverty reduction targets have dimmed.

The crisis is rich in lessons for both development practitioners and evaluators. Developing countries now confront a severe deterioration in the enabling environment, highlighting the effects of unregulated private flows and global interdependence and the growing influence of exogenous factors in determining development impacts.
A stable macro economy is not enough

Sound macroeconomic conditions are not enough to sustain equitable growth. Unlike the debt crisis of the 1980s, the present financial crisis started in countries with relatively strong fiscal situations, sound monetary policies, and outward-oriented trade regimes. When the crisis hit, government budgets in most crisis-affected countries were balanced or moving into surplus, inflation was contained, interest rates were going down, and recorded unemployment was low.

Institutions matter

The crisis showed just how costly weaknesses in institutions can be—especially in the financial and social sectors. Indeed, it is now clear that strong institutions are essential for economic and social stability. Poor institutions increase the vulnerability of developing and transition economies to shifts in private investor confidence. The importance of institutional development goes far beyond avoiding crises:

• For Bank-supported projects, the quality of institutions can have important effects on development effectiveness. These effects are particularly pronounced in low-income countries.
• Where institutions are systematically weak, projects yield lower returns and entail higher risk.
• Better institutions strengthen a country’s ability to adjust. They can more than double the likelihood that a country undergoing adjustment can stay the course.

La estabilidad macroeconómica no es suficiente

Las condiciones macroeconómicas no bastan para mantener un crecimiento con equidad. A diferencia de lo ocurrido durante la crisis de la deuda de los años ochenta, la actual crisis financiera se originó en países con una situación financiera relativamente sólida, una política monetaria acertada y sistemas de comercio orientados al exterior. Al producirse la crisis, los presupuestos públicos de la mayoría de los países afectados estaban equilibrados o incluso mostraban superávit, la inflación estaba controlada, las tasas de interés estaban bajando y el desempleo registrado era reducido.

Las instituciones revisten importancia

La crisis mostró claramente el costo que pueden significar las deficiencias de las instituciones, sobre todo en los sectores financiero y social. En efecto, ahora no cabe duda de lo importante que es contar con instituciones sólidas para lograr la estabilidad económica y social. Cuando las instituciones son deficientes las economías en desarrollo y en transición se vuelven más vulnerables ante los cambios en la confianza de los inversionistas privados. El desarrollo institucional no sólo es esencial para evitar las crisis:

• Para los proyectos respaldados por el Banco, la calidad de las instituciones puede tener efectos de consideración en la eficacia en términos de desarrollo. Estas repercusiones son especialmente notables en los países de ingreso bajo.
• Cuando las instituciones son
An analysis of 41 low-income countries shows that only one was rated satisfactory on institutional quality. Only 40 percent of Bank-supported projects have substantial impact on institutional development; civil service reforms undertaken as components of structural adjustment loans have mixed outcomes; and public sector management projects, while improving, have historically performed below the Bank average. An OED evaluation showed that Bank-supported financial sector projects had satisfactory and sustained outcomes in just 50 percent of countries. Institutional development is slow and difficult to achieve in a fragile institutional environment and requires strong aid coordination and the development of capacity to absorb aid and reduce the risks of overload.

Poverty reduction and social safety nets
A corollary lesson is that social development should come center stage—both in assessing development effectiveness and in financing country assistance programs.

Serious reductions in employment of 10–15 percent are estimated for Indonesia and Thailand. With devaluations and the removal of subsidies, the newly unemployed will suffer from drastic losses in income and sharp rises in prices. The increasingly integrated global environment means that country susceptibility to shocks will not disappear. Much greater attention must be given to systemic financial difficulties, the projects yield a lower return and entail greater risks.

Moreover, if a country already has a program to prevent the poor and near poor from suffering the effects of large price increases, the probability of maintaining the momentum of poverty alleviation is much higher.

Gracias a éstas, al emprender ajustes, las probabilidades del país de mantener el rumbo son doblemente mayores.

Un análisis de 41 países de ingresos bajos muestra que tan sólo uno de ellos obtuvo una calificación satisfactoria en lo que respecta a la calidad de las instituciones. Apenas el 40% de los proyectos respaldados por el Banco tienen un efecto considerable en el desarrollo institucional; los resultados de las reformas de la administración pública que se han emprendido como componentes de los préstamos para ajuste estructural han sido variados; los proyectos de gestión del sector público, si bien están mejorando, generalmente han registrado resultados por debajo del promedio para el Banco. Una evaluación realizada por el OED reveló que los proyectos del sector financiero respaldados por el Banco arrojaban resultados satisfactorios y duraderos tan sólo en la mitad de los países estudiados. El desarrollo institucional avanza lentamente y es difícil de lograr cuando las condiciones de las instituciones son precarias; se requiere una buena coordinación de la ayuda y es preciso crear la capacidad para absorberla y para reducir los riesgos de sobrecarga.

Redución de la pobreza y redes de protección social
Un corolario es que el desarrollo social debería pasar al primer plano a la hora de evaluar la eficacia en términos de desarrollo y de financiar los programas de asistencia a los países.

Executive Summary
programs. The crisis countries are not the only ones experiencing increasing inequality. Data for 74 countries show an overwhelming increase in inequality within countries in the 1990s—49 countries experienced increasing inequality, while only 10 had decreasing inequality. This confirms the need to emphasize inclusion, social development, and safety nets in the design and implementation of reform strategies and development programs.

A country focus based on partnership

Financial, institutional, and social factors must be considered together. For growth to result in sustainable development requires country assistance strategies that give adequate weight to structural factors, capacity building, and social equity, and that identify potential holes in the boat—where structural faults might cause development gains to unrelive.

A credible Bank role begins with effective projects. This implies operations linked to the broader social, civil, and economic environment. To scale-up successes, the Bank must work in partnership with borrowers, donors, and other stakeholders to focus on maximizing development impact at the country level. To do so the Bank must consider the important side effects that interrelated activities entail.

Se prevé una fuerte reducción del empleo, de entre 10% y 15%, en Indonesia y Tailandia. Con las devaluaciones y la eliminación de subsidios, los trabajadores que pierden su empleo sufrirán las consecuencias de las graves pérdidas de ingresos y del fuerte aumento de los precios. Con un entorno mundial cada vez más integrado se mantendrá la susceptibilidad de los países a las crisis. Se debe prestar mucha más atención a las redes de protección social a fin de evitar que la población pobre y la que está cerca a la pobreza tenga que soportar excesivamente el costo que entrañan las connociones.

Los países en crisis no son los únicos afectados por el aumento de la desigualdad. Datos correspondientes a 74 países revelan un incremento extraordinario de la desigualdad en la década de 1990: ésta ha aumentado en 49 países, y ha disminuido tan sólo en diez. Lo anterior confirma la necesidad de insistir en la inclusión, el desarrollo social y las redes de protección social a la hora de diseñar y aplicar las estrategias de reforma y los programas de desarrollo.

Centrar la atención en los países recurrentiendo a las asociaciones de colaboración

Los aspectos financieros, institucionales y sociales deben considerarse en conjunto. Para que el crecimiento conduzca al desarrollo sostenible, en las estrategias de asistencia a los países se debe dar la debida importancia a los aspectos estructurales, el fortalecimiento de la capacidad y la equidad social, y se deben determinar las posibles deficiencias estructurales que podrían hacer desaparecer los avances en materia de desarrollo.

El Banco debe participar en proyectos eficaces; es decir, las

inégalités. Les données relatives à 74 pays révèlent que ce phénomène a été très marqué dans les années 90. Les inégalités se sont en effet aggravées dans 49 pays et n’ont diminué que dans 10. Cela montre combien il est nécessaire de mettre l’accent sur la lutte contre l’exclusion, le développement social et les filets de sécurité lorsque l’on conçoit et met en œuvre des stratégies de réforme et des programmes de développement.

Une aide aux pays fondée sur des partenariats

Les facteurs financiers, institutionnels et sociaux doivent être considérés simultanément. Pour que la croissance débouche sur un développement durable, les stratégies d’aide aux pays doivent accorder un poids suffisant aux facteurs structurels, au renforcement des capacités et à la justice sociale, et identifier les lacunes potentielles d’ordre structurel qui risquent de réduire à néant les acquis du développement.

La Banque doit opérer dans le cadre de projets efficaces. Cela veut dire que les opérations doivent être liées au contexte social, civil et économique dans son ensemble. Pour être plus efficace, la Banque doit opérer en partenariat avec les emprunteurs, les bailleurs de fonds et les autres parties prenantes afin de maximiser l’impact de son action sur le développement à l’échelon des pays. Pour ce faire, la Banque doit examiner les importants effets secondaires qu’ont des activités liées entre elles sur les politiques et institutions des pays. Il faut également que tous les participants reconnaisse leurs points faibles et points forts respectifs et soient en même temps désireux de définir et de partager les responsabilités en jeu. Une stratégie fondée sur un partenariat est une bonne
can have on country policies and institutions. It also requires recognition by all participants of their relative strengths and weaknesses, together with a willingness to define and share accountability. A partnership-based strategy is good policy from a development perspective, and good corporate finance.

Much remains to be done to enhance the quality of country assistance strategies. Where country assistance evaluations have been undertaken, OED estimates that assistance strategies have been satisfactory only 68 percent of the time. Analysis confirms that project outcomes are highly dependent on the country strategy. For example, no country that had a satisfactory country strategy demonstrated weak project performance.

Project performance has improved substantially

The percentage of Bank-supported projects with a satisfactory outcome at the end of loan disbursement increased from an average of 65–70 percent in the 1990–96 period to an expected 75 percent or higher in 1997–98, including 7 percent with outstanding outcomes. This remarkable improvement demonstrates Bank and borrower commitment to improving development effectiveness.

There have been major quality improvements in two of the poorest-performing sectors (finance and public sector management) and in Africa, particularly in agriculture. Better borrower performance, more realistic project designs, and operations deben estar relacionadas con las condiciones sociales, civiles y económicas generales. Para ampliar la proporción de proyectos satisfactorios, el Banco debe trabajar en asociación con los prestatarios, los donantes y otras partes interesadas, concentrándose en maximizar el impacto en el desarrollo al nivel de los países. Para ello, debe tener en cuenta los importantes efectos secundarios que pueden producir las actividades interrelacionadas en las políticas e instituciones nacionales. También es necesario que todos los participantes reconozcan sus fortalezas y debilidades relativas, y expresen su disposición a definir y asumir su cuota de responsabilidad. Una estrategia basada en una relación de colaboración es acertada desde el punto de vista del desarrollo y de las finanzas institucionales.

Es mucho lo que queda por hacer para elevar la calidad de las estrategias de asistencia a los países. El DEO estima que éstas han sido satisfactorias solamente en el 68% de los casos. Los analistas confirman que los resultados de los proyectos dependen en gran medida de la estrategia aplicada. Por ejemplo, en ningún país en que la estrategia de asistencia del Banco ha sido satisfactoria se han obtenido resultados deficientes en los proyectos.

Mejora sustancial de los resultados de los proyectos

El porcentaje de proyectos financiados por el Banco que registran resultados satisfactorios al término de los desembolsos del préstamo aumentó de un promedio de 65% a 70% en el periodo de 1990-96 a un 75% o más en 1997-98, incluido un 7% de resultados sobresalientes. Esta notable mejora ha demostrado el empeño del Banco y de los prestatarios en

chose du point de vue non seulement du développement, mais aussi de la situation financière de l’institution.

Il reste beaucoup à faire pour améliorer la qualité des stratégies d’aide aux pays. L’OED estime que celles-ci n’ont été satisfaisantes que dans 68 % des cas. Une analyse confirme que les résultats des projets dépendent largement de la stratégie dont un pays fait l’objet, et lorsque celle-ci est bien conçue, les projets exécutés dans le pays en question ne donnent jamais de mauvais résultats.

Nette amélioration des résultats des projets

Le pourcentage des projets soutenus par la Banque et donnant des résultats satisfaisants une fois les décaissements de prêts effectués est passé d’une moyenne de 65-70 % durant la période de 1990 à 1996 à au moins 75 % (chiffre prévisionnel) en 1997–98, 7 % des projets ayant même donné d’excellents résultats. Ce progrès remarquable témoigne de la volonté qu’ont la Banque et les emprunteurs de rendre plus efficace l’impact de leur action sur le développement.

Des progrès considérables ont été constatés dans deux des secteurs où les résultats laissaient le plus à désirer (finances et gestion du secteur public) ainsi qu’en Afrique, en particulier dans le secteur agricole. Ces progrès tiennent à une meilleure performance des emprunteurs, à la conception plus réaliste des projets et à une meilleure gestion du portefeuille. Toutefois, la durabilité des projets et leur impact sur le développement institutionnel sont deux points qui laissent encore beaucoup à désirer.

Une perspective mondiale

L’Examen de l’an passé concluait que
better portfolio management explain the improved outcomes. But sustainability and institutional development impact both remain considerably below those levels.

**A global perspective**

Last year’s Review concluded that “the challenge is to find the right fit between country policy and institutional factors and strategies to try to improve conditions favorable to improved growth and development.” In a much more complex and hostile environment, this year’s Review reaches a similar conclusion. It is now even clearer that improvements in project performance—important though they are—are not enough.

The architecture of the Bank’s new approach to providing development assistance has been tested by the events of the past year. To be sure, adjustments and refinements in strategy must be made, and the risks of the external environment must be recognized and internalized. Nevertheless, the Bank’s new strategy for maximizing development effectiveness in a volatile global environment appears well conceived. The increased emphasis on partnership and poverty alleviation stressed in the Strategic Compact, and President Wolfensohn’s call to move “beyond projects” in his 1998 Annual Meetings speech, are key to maintaining the performance improvements that have been realized in the past two years.

**Implications**

The above diagnosis has the following implications for:

- aumentar la eficacia en términos de desarrollo.
- le problème consiste à parvenir à faire coïncider la politique du pays et les stratégies et facteurs institutionnels pour tenter de créer des conditions plus favorables à une croissance plus forte et à un développement plus efficace ».
- Se han observado importantes mejoras de la calidad de los proyectos en dos de los sectores con resultados menos satisfactorios (el financiero y el de gestión del sector público), y en África, sobre todo en la agricultura. Este progreso se atribuye al mejor desempeño de los prestatarios, al diseño más realista de los proyectos y a una gestión más acertada de las carteras.
- « le problème consiste à parvenir à faire coïncider la politique du pays et les stratégies et facteurs institutionnels pour tenter de créer des conditions plus favorables à une croissance plus forte et à un développement plus efficace ».
- Con todo, tanto desde el punto de vista de la sostenibilidad como de su impacto en el desarrollo institucional, los resultados de los proyectos siguen siendo muy inferiores a estos niveles.

Una perspectiva global

En el examen del año pasado se concluía que el desafío consiste en encontrar la justa medida entre la política para el país y los aspectos institucionales, y las estrategias para tratar de mejorar las condiciones propicias para un mayor crecimiento y desarrollo. Ante un entorno mucho más complejo y hostil, en el examen de este año se llega a una conclusión similar. Ahora es incluso más evidente que no basta mejorar los resultados de los proyectos, por muy importante que sea este aspecto.

La arquitectura del nuevo enfoque del Banco para proporcionar asistencia para el desarrollo ha sido puesta a prueba por los acontecimientos del año pasado. No cabe duda de que hay que ajustar y afinar las estrategias, y que es preciso reconocer e internalizar los riesgos que plantean las condiciones externas. El mayor énfasis en las relaciones de colaboración y en el alivio de la pobreza que se destaca en el Pacto Estratégico, y el llamado que ha formulado el Presidente Wolfensohn en su discurso durante las Reuniones Anuales de 1998 en el sentido de ir “más allá de los proyectos”, son
performance measurement and evaluation:

- Performance monitoring and assessment need greater transparency, with governance and institutional performance at center stage. More attention must be paid to monitoring structural, social, and poverty indicators.
- Evaluation has to move to a higher plane, focusing on the country, sector, and global levels.
- Evaluation rating systems have to give more explicit weight to the social impact of projects and programs and to the important effects that external shocks can have on the poor.

Bank operations need to:

- Scale-up successes, considering the important side effects that interrelated activities can have on country policies and institutions.
- Strengthen support for institutional development, particularly for financial institutions and social protection.
- Shift from a project to a long-term country focus in both the design and implementation of operational strategies.

fundamentales para continuar las mejoras del desempeño que se han conseguido en los últimos dos años.

Repercusiones
El diagnóstico antes expuesto tiene las siguientes repercusiones para la medición y la evaluación del desempeño:

- Para hacer el seguimiento y la evaluación del desempeño se requiere mayor transparencia, poniendo en primer plano la función de gestión y la actuación de las instituciones. Se debe prestar más atención al seguimiento de los indicadores estructurales, sociales y de pobreza.
- La evaluación debe pasar a un plano más elevado y concentrarse a nivel de país, sectorial y global.
- Los sistemas de calificación que se aplican en la evaluaciones deben dar más importancia en forma explícita a las repercusiones sociales de los proyectos y programas, así como a los graves efectos que las conmociones externas pueden tener sobre la población pobre.

Con respecto a las operaciones del Banco, es preciso:

- Ampliar la proporción de proyectos satisfactorios, teniendo en cuenta los importantes efectos secundarios que pueden tener las actividades interrelacionadas en las políticas e instituciones de un país.
- Aumentar el apoyo para el desarrollo institucional, sobre todo de las instituciones financieras y de las redes de protección social.
- Dejar de concentrarse en el proyecto y centrar la atención en el país y en el largo plazo a la hora de diseñar y aplicar las estrategias operacionales.

En ce qui concerne les opérations de la Banque, il faut:

- Consolider les succès, en examinant les importants effets secondaires que peuvent avoir des activités liées entre elles sur les politiques et institutions d’un pays.
- Renforcer le soutien au développement institutionnel, en particulier pour les institutions financières et la protection sociale.
- Passer du stade de projets isolés à une approche à long terme des pays au niveau aussi bien de la conception que de l’exécution des stratégies.
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<td>ARDE</td>
<td>Annual Review of Development Effectiveness</td>
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<td>Annual Report on Portfolio Performance</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
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<td>Consultative Group for Assistance to the Poor</td>
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<td>CSR</td>
<td>Civil Service Reform</td>
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<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>Institute of Development Studies at Sussex University</td>
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<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>LCR</td>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean Region</td>
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<td>Middle East and North Africa Region</td>
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<td>OECO</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
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<td>Operations Evaluation Department</td>
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<td>OED Corporate Evaluation and Methods</td>
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<td>OEDCR</td>
<td>OED Country Evaluation and Regional Relations Group</td>
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<td>Quality Assurance Group</td>
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DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS IN A VOLATILE WORLD

The current crisis confirms two main lessons for development effectiveness—and provides a new one. First, good macroeconomic fundamentals are necessary but insufficient for stable and sustainable growth. In today’s global economy, sound institutions, especially in the financial and social sectors, are essential to economic and social stability. Second, projects are no longer the appropriate vehicles for development assistance unless they are connected to balanced country assistance strategies focused on structural reform and capacity development and owned by borrowers and other partners. An important new lesson is that exogenous factors are far more influential in determining development impacts than had been previously thought.

The past year produced a severe deterioration in the economic conditions of the developing world. Russia’s economic reform collapsed in a year when transition economies were finally growing after seven years of decline. The sharp reversal for some of the world’s fastest-growing economies and the greater caution of private investors have chilled global economic growth. The perceived risk of investing in emerging markets made a very large one-year jump.

The crisis has induced concern about the ability of the global system to contain the contagion. The economic turbulence and uncertainty call into question the consensus reported in last year’s Annual Review of Development Effectiveness. Is good macroeconomic policy a sufficient foundation for development effectiveness? Does the crisis invalidate the broadly based consensus in the development community about what constitutes sound economic policy?

Institutional weaknesses

With the crisis having lasted more than a year, one fact has become evident: the costs of unregulated movements of private capital must be balanced against the risks. Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand received net private inflows worth almost 7 percent of their combined GDP in 1995–96. The reversal from 1996 to 1997 involved a swing of 11 percent of their combined GDP. Changing risk perceptions by commercial banks, and particularly portfolio investors (rather than foreign direct investors), explain the reversal. The sudden downgrading of country credit ratings sparked panic and flight among private investors.

Unlike the debt crisis of the 1980s, the current crisis started in countries with relatively strong fiscal situations, sound monetary policies, and outwardly oriented
trade regimes (table 1.1). Except in Thailand, government budgets were balanced or moving into surplus when the crisis hit. Inflation was contained, interest rates were going down, and recorded unemployment was low. Taking into account foreign direct investment, current account deficits were not excessive.

Weaknesses in economic management helped trigger the crisis. In all cases the capital account was the main vulnerability. Imbalances between short-term debt and official reserves—combined with premature financial liberalization and weak financial discipline in domestic banking systems—created situations vulnerable to speculative pressures.

Many fundamentals were sound in crisis-affected countries. The financial panic would not have spread without weaknesses in domestic institutions. As in the Southern Cone crisis 15 years earlier, banking discipline was weak and links among economic conglomerates, banks, and governments were too close. This led to excessive borrowing, disproportionate real estate booms, poor private investments, and escalating levels of nonperforming loans. Why did policymakers and international financial institutions give these weaknesses appropriate weight? Because the lessons of the general debt crisis were guiding them, not the more relevant institutional lessons of Chile's 1982 crisis and Mexico's 1994–95 crisis. OED's (1990) audit report on Chile's structural adjustment loans highlighted the lack of prudential supervision of financial institutions in increasing the economy's vulnerability to the point of collapse. A key lesson of that audit was: "prudential rules and surveillance are necessary safeguards for the operation of domestic financial markets, rather than unnecessary restrictions" (p. 12).

Microeconomic dysfunctions are more difficult to spot than macroeconomic weaknesses. Relying as they did on macroeconomic indicators, decisionmakers in the private sector and international financial institutions found it difficult to argue with success. In East Asia, as in Chile and Mexico before, credible domestic reforms, low interest rates, and good growth prospects contributed to an explosion of private flows. Attracting those flows were exchange rate pegs, profitable interest rate spreads, and liberalizations of the capital account. Given the "halo effect" typical of investment booms, decisionmakers overlooked the failure of Asian countries to comply with basic tenets of the much-abused Washington consensus, a listing of sound economic practices on which most analysts agree.

Using the benchmarks of this consensus, Rodrik (1996) notes that the policies of Korea and Taiwan (China) have long been well below par. We extend Rodrik's analysis to Indonesia and Thailand in light of OED's recent country assistance evaluations (table 1.2). Cumulatively, the analysis confirms that East Asian countries were following policies consistent with only 6 or 7 of the 10 tenets of the consensus. Caprio (1998) finds that banking sectors were extremely weak in Indonesia and Thailand. In contrast, according to Rodrik, many Latin American economies—in particular, Argentina, Bolivia, and Mexico—fulfilled most of the consensus conditions. The conclusion: Washington consensus policies were neither the cause of high growth, nor the cause of the crisis.

Macroeconomic policy weaknesses were linked to competition policies and financial liberalization—the sequencing of which needed to be made coherent with prior institutional development and structural policy reforms. It is significant that their neglect featured prominently in the Chile and Mexico crises. In the

### TABLE 1.1: TRADITIONAL CRISIS INDICATORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Rep. of Korea</th>
<th>Malaysia</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government budget deficit (percentage of GDP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average, 1990–94</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average, 1995–96</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation rate (change in the consumer price index)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average, 1990–94</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average, 1995–96</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current account (percentage of GDP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average, 1990–94</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-7.4</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
<td>-7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average, 1995–96</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>-9.7</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
<td>-9.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

words of Claessens and Glaessner (1997, p. 8), “liberalization is inexpensive, fast, and easy to implement; building institutional capacity is expensive, slow, and complex.” In sum, mistakes in macroeconomic policy played a part in the East Asian downturn, and an even bigger part in Russia, but the more critical dysfunction was institutional. Financial sectors, governance standards, and corporate investment regimes (and in Russia, fiscal regimes) seemed adequate as long as the booms lasted.4 But they proved fatally flawed once external conditions deteriorated. Given the unprecedented volume and reversibility of short-term capital flows, weak banking institutions and ineffective regulatory systems proved a lethal combination.

The reversal of capital flows was especially deep and disruptive where domestic interest rates were higher than in the international markets. Financial supervision, corporate governance, and corruption—let alone social safety nets—were too often given minimal emphasis in the “metrics” of performance monitoring and assessment. As stressed in last year’s Review, institutional development lies at the core of develop-
ment effectiveness. The “silent crisis” of poverty and destitution that affects low-income countries is deeply rooted in capacity constraints. How important is the quality of the institutional environment for Bank-supported projects in low-income countries? Very important indeed, because stronger institutions are associated with a 20 percentage point increase in the likelihood of a project’s outcome being rated satisfactory (figure 1.1). For the Bank’s lending to low-income countries over the past two years, this improvement would translate into a more than $1 billion increase in effective Bank support.

Broadening the agenda to maximize development effectiveness

The need to scale up from a strictly project-specific focus to a broader, more inclusive orientation is now well recognized. This perspective has been realized by hard-learned lessons—for example, from experience with large dams. As OED (1996d) shows, large dams were viewed as being synonymous with modernization and development in the 1950s and 1960s; but growing evidence of their adverse indirect and secondary impacts turned them into targets of public criticism in the 1970s and 1980s. As a result, new policies and standards emerged that scaled-up the scope of the World Bank’s intervention to include avoidance or mitigation of the adverse environmental and social consequences of large dams and, by extension, of all projects with significant potential adverse side effects. To move beyond isolated success stories, the full array of factors affecting development results must be examined, and more inclusive, participatory approaches must be developed.

Such enhanced participation is essential if the complementarities across sectors and activities are to be fully exploited. However, besides developing broader, more inclusive approaches, the Bank and its partners must identify “holes in the boat.” Donors cannot simply focus on projects or sectors that they know will perform well. They must also identify points of stress—such as financial weaknesses—that can cause gains to unravel. To achieve development effectiveness at the country level, Bank interventions must begin by designing effective projects. But these must link individual operations to the broader social, civil, economic, and international environment. They cannot neglect existing weaknesses that could more than offset the development effectiveness gains from a project. To be successful, the country assistance program must be firmly rooted in the borrower’s ownership of reform objectives.

Another lesson of the crisis is that social development should take center stage in the financing of recovery or development programs. The shocks of recent years have plunged millions into absolute poverty. The lack of formal social safety nets for the unemployed is being felt severely, partly because of the weakening of traditional systems that once supported the poor. Cuts in public spending for the social sectors and rises in prices associated with devaluations and the removal of subsidies add to the burden on the middle class and the poor. If the global objectives for poverty alleviation of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) are to be attained, more attention must be paid to social development and social safety nets.

The new primacy of the external environment

The central emerging lesson of the crisis is that a risky external environment can strangle development prospects. Developing countries face the prospects of

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**FIGURE 1.1: INSTITUTIONS AND PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average project performance (percent satisfactory)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>![Diagram showing institutional quality and project performance]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The institutional quality index is composed of three variables based on data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) covering 1982-98. These variables are corruption, rule of law, and bureaucratic quality. Countries are assigned income groups based on classifications in World Development Indicators 1998. The average project performance for the country groups are based on project-level outcome data. Source: ICRG; OED, World Bank.
continuing reductions in aid; they also confront a more uncertain environment than the developed countries do (see Chapter 5). Private investors will give even greater scrutiny to the country and institutional conditions that allow entry to global financial markets. That is why development effectiveness requires a perspective that goes beyond country-level concerns, especially for small countries.

Particularly important for the external environment are donor efforts to bolster financial systems and to help restore the confidence that is needed for the capital flows vital to restart growth. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) now lead in the provision of information on regional and global trends—certain to be an important global public good. The Bank is especially well placed to assist in developing, processing, and understanding the often important fragments of information with broader implications.

A series of recent reports on international financial architecture laid out a range of actions to strengthen the international financial system. The recommendations call for enhanced transparency and greater discipline in balancing market incentives and public control. They also stress the need for improved vigilance by international organizations. The novelty of these reports lies not in the proposals themselves, but in their urging the practice of what has long been preached.

The following chapters review recent evidence about the Bank’s development effectiveness. Chapter 2 describes project and sector performance trends. Chapter 3 considers recent evaluation lessons at the country level. It uses OED’s country assistance evaluations to help draw out the lessons of the ongoing crisis. Chapter 4 draws lessons that can be inferred from OED’s thematic studies. The final chapter discusses the implications for Bank operations and evaluation.
TRENDS IN PROJECT PERFORMANCE

Among evaluated projects exiting the Bank’s portfolio in fiscal 1997 and 1998, more than 75 percent had satisfactory project outcomes. Thus the improvement in performance presaged by last year’s Review has been sustained. There has also been a convergence in performance across regions and sectors, the result of major advances in Africa and in two of the poorest-performing sectors (finance and public sector management). Better borrower performance and more realistic project designs, as well as better portfolio management, explain most of the improvement. But sustainability and institutional development remain sorely neglected in project design and portfolio management.

OED evaluates all closed projects, assessing results likely to be achieved in each project’s operational phase. Since last year’s Review, OED has evaluated 298 operations across all regions and sectors. Africa has the largest regional share of the evaluated cohort (28 percent), followed by Latin America and the Caribbean and East Asia and the Pacific, with shares of roughly 20 percent each. Nearly half the projects are in the finance, private sector, and infrastructure network, led by the transportation sector (30 projects). Agriculture projects make up an additional 21 percent.

Outcomes more than 75 percent satisfactory

The percentage of satisfactory project outcomes has continued to improve in recent years. The proportion of satisfactory projects for fiscal 1997 exits—the latest year for which complete results are available—is 75 percent. The figure for exits in the first half of fiscal 1998 is 80 percent, exceeding the target of the Strategic Compact. While this preliminary figure is likely to be biased upward, it represents a substantial improvement. We estimate the percentage of satisfactory projects for fiscal 1998 exits to be 76 percent, only slightly above the level for fiscal 1997. But it is now clear that the Bank has moved in the past two years above the plateau in fiscal 1990–96, when the percentage satisfactory remained in the 65–70 percent range.

Some qualifications are in order. First, the unusually large risks in the international economy call for substantial discounts in the long-term effects likely to be reaped from many completed projects. Second, more than 60 percent of the gains were in Africa, which has aggressively implemented a portfolio restructuring...
Beyond the assessment of goal-oriented performance captured by the outcome rating, two examples show how explicit consideration of institutional development and sustainability can provide a richer description of the development impact of Bank-financed projects.

In 1995 an irrigation project in Pakistan was rated as having a marginally unsatisfactory outcome. The project sought to help farmers to invest in their own small wells in areas where there was fresh groundwater—directly useful for irrigation. Behind the outcome rating were two factors. First, the estimated economic return fell short of the 10 percent minimum threshold for satisfactory outcomes. Second, subsidies and free hook-ups to the power grid resulted in the installation of too many private electric wells. But the project was rated as having substantial institutional development because it closed down the loss-making public institution formerly responsible for fresh groundwater pumping, replacing it with a market-based institution. Sustainability was rated as likely for two reasons. First, the project used diesel pumps, which do not depend on the highly subsidized and unreliable electric distribution system. Second, the water-users group worked well in coordinating the decisions of nearly 4,000 independent pump owners; no depletion of water resources was expected.

Contrast this with the outcome of the Rehabilitation Project of the port of Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania, rated as marginally satisfactory. Although there were delays in implementation and part of the project was not undertaken, the port facilities were converted to containerized operations, the...
In aggregate, this year’s evaluation results confirm that improvements in development outcomes have been sustained and broadly based. But in the meantime, the overall development environment has shifted in dramatically challenging ways. This shift underscores the need for more reliable and timely evaluation measures and even greater use of evaluation findings. With demand for lending boosted by the crisis, concessional resources declining, and Bank loans more costly to borrowers, concern with development effectiveness should not be allowed to flag.

Now consider how the two projects would compare with one using an aggregate measure of performance that included sustainability and institutional development, and one that considered only project outcome. Using the development effectiveness index, the project in Pakistan scores a 6.75, well above the Bank average of 6.38 for fiscal 1994–97. The project in Tanzania receives a 5.25. An analysis based solely on a binary classification of outcome does not take into account the contrasting performance of sustainability and institutional development. The descriptions of the two projects indicate that the first had better overall performance than the second, and that is the information the development effectiveness index conveys. A crude binary analysis based strictly on goal-based evaluation (outcome) would have reversed the ranking in favor of the project in Tanzania. These issues are discussed more fully in Annex 1.
FIGURE 2.3: SATISFACTORY OUTCOME BY REGION

Note: By exit fiscal year. Broken lines (exit fiscal year 1998) indicate preliminary results, with less than 50 percent coverage of exited operations.

Source: OED, World Bank.
Gains in development effectiveness
As part of its search for a more comprehensive measure of project performance than the outcome rating, OED has piloted the development effectiveness index for this Review. It integrates current OED measures of outcomes, sustainability, and institutional development impact. The measure ranges from 2 (for a project with a highly unsatisfactory outcome, which also has unlikely sustainability and negligible institutional development impact), to 10 (where high achievements on all three measures are realized).

The index improves the presentation of performance trends in three ways (box 2.1). First, it uses the spectrum of outcome assessments made by OED rather than the binary assignment to satisfactory or unsatisfactory outcome. Second, it qualifies a project's outcome judgment by rewarding the robustness of achievements into the future, in some cases recognizing the lasting benefits of significant achievements that fall short of expectations. Third, institutional development impact is given special emphasis. Together these aspects of the index provide a more complete picture of trends. The new index facilitates performance analysis of sectors and countries. Additional analysis is under way to confirm the robustness of the development effectiveness index, as well as its consistency and complementarity to measures used by the Networks and the Quality Assurance Group. Annex 1 summarizes the index’s construction.

While also showing improvement over the past two years, the development effectiveness index trend is less dramatic than the trend in outcomes (figure 2.2). Outcome ratings gains have not been matched by gains in project sustainability or institutional development.

Weighted by disbursements, the data show a similar pattern of improvement, with the share of outcomes rated satisfactorily reaching 78 percent in fiscal 1997. For fiscal 1998 exits, the preliminary satisfactory outcome achievement rate is 84 percent, although using the development effectiveness index, the fiscal 1998 figure shows no gain over fiscal 1997, holding steady at 7.02.

**BOX 2.2: IMPROVEMENT IN AFRICA**

Performance gains in Africa have been driven by improvements in agriculture, public sector management, and finance. Of the projects exiting in fiscal 1997–98, agriculture dominates the Africa portfolio (26 percent share). Satisfactory outcome ratings for agriculture projects increased from 54 percent in fiscal 1993–96 to 76 percent in fiscal 1997–98.

One explanation of this extraordinary improvement is the success of capacity-building work. There has been a 16 percentage point improvement in the number of projects having substantial institutional development impact in Africa. For example, the National Agricultural Services project in Côte d’Ivoire strengthened the monitoring, evaluation, and cooperative support activities of the Ministry of Agriculture. The Technical Assistance project in Mozambique supported the country’s transition from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy, and illustrates well the improvement in African public sector management projects. The pace of institutional development in Mozambique was rapid, with key economic institutions such as the Ministry of Finance and the central bank significantly strengthened, while progress was steady in improving the quality of financial reporting in both the public and private sectors.

A financial sector project more than achieved its objectives through better fiscal and monetary management and privatization of the banking and industrial sector. This result contributed to a sharp drop in inflation, and increased private investment and higher economic growth. Expansion of social spending also resulted in a noticeable improvement in health and education.
But regional analysis shows the disbursement-weighted index to have fallen in most regions, with the largest drop in East Asia and the Pacific (1 point, for 27 percent of Bankwide disbursements). This was offset by a large increase in Latin America and the Caribbean (1.15 points, for 23 percent of Bankwide disbursements). The drop in East Asia reflects movement in China and Indonesia especially, which together account for roughly 80 percent of the region’s disbursements.

All regions except East Asia and the Pacific show improvement in fiscal 1997–98 compared with long-term averages for fiscal 1990–96 (figure 2.3). Improvements in project outcomes were largest in Africa (box 2.2) and Latin America and the Caribbean, with 14 and 15 percentage point gains in the share of satisfactory outcomes, respectively. These improvements—particularly in Africa, where performance has historically lagged behind other regions—have raised the global average and reduced regional disparities (figure 2.4).6

Improvements in project performance were noticeable in most sectors (figure 2.5). The most notable decline, among sectors with significant numbers of recently evaluated projects, was in industry. In that sector there was a fall from 54 percent satisfactory performance in fiscal 1990–96 to a dismal 36 percent satisfactory in fiscal 1997–98, as well as a 7 percent

Note: Only sectors with at least 10 exiting projects in fiscal 1997–98 are included.
Source: OED, World Bank.
drop in the average development effectiveness index. This represents the continuation of a downward trend in a sector with declining emphasis in the Bank.

The fastest-improving sectors were concentrated in the previously poorest-performing groups. Public sector management, finance, and industry were the worst-performing sectors in fiscal 1990–96 (by projects), with development effectiveness and project outcomes well below the Bank average. Public sector management and finance now show more than a 10 percentage point increase in the share of projects with satisfactory outcomes and a significant increase in the average development effectiveness index in fiscal 1997–98. Significant improvements (by projects) were also evident in agriculture, urban, transportation, and population, health, and nutrition.

Care should be taken in interpreting these sector changes as potentially lasting shifts in performance trends. A comparison with performance assessments of the active portfolio currently under supervision provides a complementary gauge. This provides modest support for the view that sector improvements are likely to be sustained. For example, active agriculture projects have improved to above-average performance in fiscal 1998, with lending scheduled to increase in the near future as the Rural Action Plan is implemented. The assessments indicate declining performance for the shrinking number of industry projects. The current portfolio data do not support the probability of sustained gains in the finance sector.

Adjustment loans continue to have higher average outcomes and sustainability than investment loans, although the gap has narrowed. The share of satisfactory outcomes for adjustment loans rose from 74 percent in fiscal 1990–96 to 82 percent in fiscal 1997–98, compared with a rise from 66 to 76 percent for investment loans. Institutional development performance has evened to roughly 38 percent substantial for both types of loans.

Last year’s performance results suggested only minor progress in IDA and blend-financed projects. This year’s results display much stronger improvement—with IDA and blend projects among the fiscal 1997–98 exits performing at par with IBRD-financed projects in outcome, sustainability, and institutional development impact. Considering outcomes alone, the share of satisfactory projects among IDA loans and blends was actually above that for IBRD-financed projects: 79 percent were judged satisfactory in fiscal 1997–98 compared with 74 percent for IBRD loans.

**FIGURE 2.6: INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IMPACT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By projects (percent)</th>
<th>By disbursements (percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1990</td>
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<td>1997</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: By exit fiscal year. Broken lines (exit fiscal year 1998) indicate preliminary results, with less than 50 percent coverage of exited operations.
Source: OED, World Bank.
Institutional development impact—improving but still weak

The first two objectives of a five-point development framework offered by President Wolfensohn in his address at the 1998 Annual Meetings relate to institutional development. This is particularly important in low-income countries, where the potential gains are the greatest and, as Chapter 3 illustrates, the quality of institutions the lowest.

Recent evaluations show that the institutional development impacts of Bank projects are improving, but there is enormous scope for further improvement (figure 2.6). Current exits show historical highs of only 40 percent of operations with substantial institutional development. Between fiscal 1991 and 1995 the share of projects with negligible institutional development rose from roughly 20 percent to nearly 30 percent. That share dropped to the lowest on record, of just 15 percent, in fiscal 1997. By disbursements, however, the historical trend of larger projects having greater institutional development impacts shows signs of weakening. The share of disbursements with substantial impact was below the project-weighted average in two of the past three years. In Chapters 3 and 4 we show the fundamental importance of institutional development in development effectiveness. The main finding: the spillover effects from better monitoring and closer attention to institutional development have been neglected, and need much greater emphasis in Bank operations.

Sustainability—low and weakening?

The fiscal 1997–98 data send a mixed signal on sustainability that may well be a precursor of future declines in performance attributable to a deteriorating external climate (figure 2.7). The proportion of projects judged as having likely sustainability that exited in fiscal 1997 maintained an upward trend, increasing to 54 percent from 46 percent in fiscal 1990–96. But these projects closed at the latest in June 1997, well before the East Asian crisis. The partial results for fiscal 1998...
Trends in Project Performance

projects, exiting in the unfolding of the Asian crisis, show a decline to 50 percent of projects judged to have likely sustainability. This decrease is largely because of the drop in East Asia and the Pacific projects—those most directly affected by the crisis—from 66 percent likely sustainability in fiscal 1997 to 43 percent in fiscal 1998. Similarly, there has been an almost doubling of the share of active projects in the Region at risk of not achieving their development objectives.

Bank and borrower performance improving—but greater gains from borrowers

Analysis in past Reviews on the determinants of successful project outcomes found project-specific borrower performance to be the most important determinant of project success. Bank performance and the country macroeconomic policy environment were found to be less significant.11

In fiscal 1997–98 borrower performance improved to 75 percent satisfactory from 66 percent satisfactory in fiscal 1990–96 (figure 2.8). This increase is pronounced in IDA countries, particularly in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. Borrower inputs have improved dramatically in finance and public sector management projects—rising from satisfactory performance in 57 percent of operations exiting in fiscal 1990–96 to 84 percent exiting in fiscal 1997–98. These sectors enjoyed large gains in outcomes over the same period, confirming the importance of borrower inputs in project performance. Improvements of more than 10 percentage points were found in urban and transport operations.

The increase in borrower performance reflects improvements in project preparation and in compliance with legal covenants. Implementation performance remains the poorest-performing dimension, with

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**TABLE 2.1: RECENTLY EVALUATED PROJECTS: OUTSTANDING PERFORMERS AND POOR PERFORMERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Project name</th>
<th>Loan/credit number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outstanding performers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Urban Rehabilitation and Management</td>
<td>C2338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Land Management I - Parana</td>
<td>L3018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Parana Municipal Development</td>
<td>L3100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Second Public Sector Management</td>
<td>L3411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Ertan Hydroelectric</td>
<td>L3387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Integrated Regional Health Development</td>
<td>C2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>National Afforestation</td>
<td>C2145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Northern Irrigation - Part A</td>
<td>C1885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Ship Waste Disposal</td>
<td>C2391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Primary Education Development</td>
<td>L3351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Highway Maintenance</td>
<td>L3731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Human Resources Development</td>
<td>L3313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Second Telecommunications</td>
<td>C2101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Agricultural Development</td>
<td>L3695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Contractual Savings Development Program</td>
<td>L4123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Telecommunications Sector</td>
<td>L3557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Second Economic Recovery</td>
<td>C2628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Debt and Debt Service Reduction</td>
<td>L4133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Population and Family Health</td>
<td>L3307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment</td>
<td>C2657</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poor performers</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Second Water Supply</td>
<td>L2774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Rural Primary Education</td>
<td>L3026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>Land Mobilization</td>
<td>L3051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Sectoral and Pre-Investment Studies</td>
<td>C1796</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Covers the 298 projects evaluated since the last ARDE.

Source: OED, World Bank.
an unsatisfactory assessment in more than a third of evaluated projects. The overall increase in performance puts the overall quality of borrower inputs at par with Bank inputs. Three of every four evaluated projects now show satisfactory Bank and borrower inputs.

Bank performance, by contrast, improved modestly for fiscal 1997–98 exits, with only a 1 percent increase in the overall average over the 75 percent satisfactory average for fiscal 1990–96 (figure 2.9). Lower-quality project identification has been offset by better supervision, while project appraisal improved slightly. These results, however, conceal some areas of particular improvement. Latin America and the Caribbean showed improvement in both appraisal and supervision, raising the overall Bank performance average to 80 percent. Conversely, borrower performance in East Asia and the Pacific projects dropped in all three dimensions in fiscal 1997–98, with appraisal performance showing the largest decrease. Finance and public sector management and population, health, and nutrition projects show improvements in Bank performance.

In fiscal 1997–98 borrower performance improved to 75 percent satisfactory.

Outstanding projects—7 percent of the total

Of the 298 operations evaluated in the past year, OED assessed 20 (7 percent) as outstanding and 4 (1 percent) as exceptionally poor (table 2.1). The 20 outstanding operations all had highly satisfactory outcomes, likely sustainability, and substantial institutional development impact. These projects met or exceeded their main goals, had highly innovative designs, and are replicable in other countries or sectors. They featured strong borrower ownership, enjoyed highly satisfactory or satisfactory quality at entry, and were well supervised.

The success of the outstanding projects can be traced to flexibility in responding to changing conditions—the result of consistent monitoring, good supervision, and partnership building. Even projects with complex designs succeeded because of extensive and effective Bank staff involvement and judicious technical assistance (box 2.3). In contrast, only one poor performer had satisfactory quality at entry. The characteristic features of poor performers are a general lack of supervision and low borrower ownership.

Sector analysis

For a successful development strategy, assessing risk (as measured by the variability of rewards) is as critical as assessing the expected development impact. Risks and rewards in the 12 sectors with more than 10 projects exiting in fiscal 1997–98 are shown in figure 2.10. The origin of the axes corresponds to a reward equal to the average development effectiveness index in the 1997–98 portfolio, and risk is equal to the standard deviation of the index in that portfolio. The axes measure differences for specific sectors relative to the Bankwide average and the standard deviation of the development effectiveness index. Thus each quadrant, starting from the upper-left and moving clockwise, corresponds to one of the four classes: high risk–low reward, high risk–high reward, low risk–high reward, and low risk–low reward. The coordinates corresponding to each sector measure the sector’s risk-reward combination relative to the average project.

Figure 2.10 allows a comparison of average project results for each sector and the dispersion of these results around the corresponding Bankwide values. However, these comparisons are not meant to rank sectors. Instead they suggest that the relative risk-reward framework may be useful for the Bank Networks in considering potential weaknesses and strengths of Bank interventions in specific sectors, and external challenges that the sectors may face. Take the
Trends in Project Performance

industry sector, where the average development effectiveness index is far below the Bankwide average, and volatility is much higher. This raises questions. Does the Bank have comparative advantages in supporting industrial projects relative to the private sector? Or can the below-par results for this sector be attributed to a concentration of these projects in countries lacking good infrastructure? How much of the volatility in industry projects is the result of poor selectivity by the Bank? How much can be explained by exogenous shocks (such as contagion effects in regional crises), which are likely to affect industry projects more than less market-oriented interventions?

Similarly, the relatively low rewards of water and sanitation projects—and the relatively high confidence that performance in this sector will be weak—raise several questions. Why do this sector’s results stand in such contrast to the rest of the Bank’s portfolio? Do measurement problems drive the results? Or is a sector with such important potential effects on health and poverty really a relatively weak performer? We do not try to answer these questions here. The point is to present a framework that the Bank Networks can use to compare and contrast their sector performance with the results in other sectors. The framework itself should be scrutinized and tested for robustness over time.

Note: Only sectors with at least 10 exiting projects in fiscal years 1997–98 are included. While the development effectiveness index has desirable mathematical properties for this kind of analysis, a similar performance distribution occurs when measurement relies on project outcome measures.

Source: OED, World Bank.
BOX 2.3: TWO OUTSTANDING PROJECTS

The importance of borrower ownership, commitment of Bank staff, and good supervision is illustrated by Chile’s Public Sector Management Loan. The loan’s main objectives were to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of key public management agencies, remedy the government’s inadequate economic analysis and coordination capabilities, and improve policymaking in the legislature. These objectives were well exceeded because of the dedicated, competent action of the borrower, supported by an excellent Bank team. Capacity improvements and the beginning of cultural change were achieved in several key policymaking agencies and in the Library of Congress—above-average achievements for a freestanding technical assistance loan.

The crucial role of borrower commitment and strong Bank leadership is similarly illustrated by Latvia’s Agricultural Development Project—the first Bank-financed investment project in Latvia. Its overall development objectives were to enhance the privatization of agriculture, agroprocessing, and forest industries through financial and technical assistance. Well-focused objectives, a simple design, and such innovative features as the mobile credit officers of the new Agricultural Finance Company were important contributors to project success. Firmly underpinning these successes was the government’s commitment to the project, which was strongly influenced by the effectiveness and staffing continuity of the project management unit and by Bank supervision.
DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS AT THE COUNTRY LEVEL

Country evaluations confirm that weak institutional development has been a key problem in improving development effectiveness. Risk-bearing institutions—particularly the financial system and social safety nets—have been neglected by the development process. In many low-income countries, channeling aid through isolated, uncoordinated enclave projects has left capacity inadequate. Where the enabling environment is weak, projects should be justified largely for their policy reform and capacity development impacts, with the attendant risks reduced through judicious testing of borrower ownership. Country evaluations show that institution building is needed to ensure that a country’s outward orientation can safely reap the benefits of globalization—and shield the poor from its shocks.

In 1995 OED inaugurated country assistance evaluations to assist the Board deliberations on country assistance strategies. By now, 17 such country assistance evaluations (CAEs) have been produced. They assess the relevance, efficacy, efficiency, sustainability, and institutional development of assistance strategies. Using the insights of independent professionals, they are case studies of aid effectiveness in the tradition of Cassen and associates (1994) and Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye (1991). They identify lessons of experience and draw the implications for future strategies. More than 90 percent of operational staff preparing country assistance strategies found them helpful. The following findings emerge from an overview of CAEs:

- When graded as projects have traditionally been evaluated by OED, CAEs rate the overall outcome of the Bank’s country strategy as satisfactory 68 percent of the time.²
- The rating of the Bank’s country strategy from the CAEs is a relatively strong predictor of the average performance of Bank-supported projects.
- The most important development issues identified by CAEs are consistent with those that would be inferred from other empirical analyses of growth and poverty alleviation.³

The country as the unit of account

For this Review, OED undertook a pilot analysis of the linkages between country strategy and project performance. As a first step, all completed CAEs were subjected to a formal rating process consistent in structure with OED project ratings, which are based on evaluative conclusions about the design, outcome, and
impact of the Bank’s assistance strategy in a country. OED staff preparing CAEs were asked to summarize their views on the outcome, sustainability, and institutional development of Bank country strategies as they would on projects (table 3.1).

Project performance is strongly correlated with the quality of the country assistance strategy. None of the countries that had a satisfactory country strategy experienced weak project performance. In only 2 of 25 periods rated did an unsatisfactory Bank country strategy result in satisfactory performance on projects.

CAEs’ judgments about key strategic issues are similar to those that would be suggested by empirical studies of growth and poverty. However, the relatively low aggregate outcome measure, 68 percent satisfactory, suggests room for considerable improvement in Bank country assistance strategies. In what follows we consider some of the common lessons from CAEs.

Institutions, aid, and growth
Development assistance has achieved much (table 3.2). For low-income countries the rate of improvement on most measures of deprivation is considerably better than that for high-income countries. But improvements in growth have been less propitious (Ingram 1992). For example, the weighted average per capita growth rate for low-income countries for 1980–96 (outside China and India) has been negative. So low-income countries do not—as economic convergence models predict—catch up with high-income economies. Instead they fall farther behind.

Poor policies have a lot to do with disappointing

### TABLE 3.1: PERFORMANCE OF BANK-SUPPORTED COUNTRY STRATEGIES AND PROJECTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average project outcome performance</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Satisfactory</strong></td>
<td><strong>Unsatisfactory</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania (1992–97)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina (1991–96)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh (1980–96)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia (1986–97)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire (1960–79)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire (1994–98)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana (1982–96)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica (1987–96)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi (1995–97)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco (1983–88)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique (1984–96)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines (1986–97)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland (1986–96)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand (1987–96)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia (1994–96)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jamaica (1980–86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kenya (1990s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malawi (1990–94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Togo (1985–90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Togo (1991–96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zambia (1980–93)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Average Bank-supported project outcomes over 50 percent are categorized as “satisfactory.” Country strategy ratings of 4 and above are rated “satisfactory.” Other approaches to categorizing relatively strong and weak performance, using central tendencies such as mean and median, produce similar results.

Source: OED, World Bank.
Development Effectiveness at the Country Level

income growth. Yet even the low-income African countries described as sustained policy reformers (IMF 1995) have had average growth of only 0.5 percent a year. The growth rate among this group is only slightly higher than that realized by Europe over the 400-year pre-capitalist period before 1820 (Maddison 1997). So something other than weak macroeconomic policies is impeding growth.

There is no simple explanation for such poor performance. But one factor, which recurs in OED’s country evaluations, is the weakness of institutions. For instance, only 30 percent of low-income countries enjoy an institutional environment rated as marginally satisfactory—less than half the level for middle-income countries (box 3.1). Only 1 of 41 low-income countries scores a satisfactory rating on institutional quality, while more than 30 percent of middle-income countries do.6 By contrast, OECD countries (except Korea) boast satisfactory institutional quality ratings. Among low-income countries, a low institutional rating is more common than a weak policy environment: 40 percent of low-income countries and 77 percent of middle-income countries have good policy regimes.7

Since the 1980s a new development perspective has emerged. It holds that institutions and economic organizations are the key determinants of economic, social, and political progress. Six Nobel prizes have been awarded to scholars who made pioneering contributions to neo-institutional economics. In parallel, development evaluators have established the crucial role of capacity building in ensuring the sustainability of development programs. Yet the links between development practice and academics are not strong. In addition, the evaluation profession has been slow to adapt its methods and processes to the new development consensus.

The papers presented at a recent OED conference (1998) illustrate that institutions matter. The papers explore not only how to get the institutions right but also how to assess the fit between institutions and development challenges through evaluative techniques. The papers show that:

- Variable combinations of competition, cooperation, and hierarchy are needed to achieve positive societal outcomes in specific country circumstances.
- Getting the incentives right is crucial to overcoming the restrictions that arise from the neo-classical model.

The papers argue that if institutional analysis is to become operational, it will have to provide greater clarity in the area of incentives. Institutions matter because incentives trigger motivation and action in both the public and private sectors. Incentives are thus the first building block for policy design and implementation, and the evaluation of results. The difficulty lies in aligning the incentives structure with the collective interest.


### TABLE 3.2: TRENDS IN SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS AND INCOME, 1970–96 (PERCENTAGE CHANGE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country group</th>
<th>Crude death rate (per 1,000 people)</th>
<th>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)</th>
<th>Life expectancy (years at birth)</th>
<th>Access to safe water (% of population)</th>
<th>GNP per capita (1987 constant $US)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High-income</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-income</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-income excluding</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China and India</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Policies and institutions are weaker than they might otherwise be because of inadequate donor coordination. Zambia’s country assistance strategy provides a stark example. In 1987 the Bank concluded that Zambia’s policy regime was not appropriate for the Bank to provide further lending. The Bank maintained this position until 1991, when it resumed lending. In the 12 years before the Bank’s withdrawal of assistance, aid averaged more than 9 percent of GDP a year. During the hiatus in Bank lending, donor assistance as a share of GDP rose to more than 15 percent of GDP a year. So during a period when the Bank found the policy environment such that aid was unlikely to promote development effectiveness, donor assistance increased—and exceeded total investment. This pattern of donor support was motivated by donors’ humanitarian concern with the problems of a very poor country. But it did little to increase borrower ownership, to strengthen institutions, or to reduce poverty.

CAEs of low-income countries—Albania, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia—as well as recent work by African policymakers on the African Capacity Building Study (World Bank 1996a), argue that a central problem has been lack of capacity to absorb the volumes of aid provided. Rather than directly addressing this, however, many development agencies, including the Bank, have established parallel methods to channel financial assistance, ignoring the adverse effects on capacity creation. This finding is not new, but it bears repeating. For example, Johnston and Van de Walle (1996, p. 66) argue that “aid has rarely contributed to effective institution building as it has bypassed local institutions in project implementation and design. The preference for enclave projects and parallel management structures to ministerial administrations has been particularly destructive.”

A Danish government report on development cooperation issues in Tanzania (Helleiner and others 1995) reaches similar conclusions about how donor practices often undermine ownership. For example, in primary education, the report finds that agencies frequently manipulate the choice of government departments they work with in order to achieve their objectives. The report contends that where the govern-

BOX 3.2: THE LONG-RUN EXPECTED BENEFITS OF ADJUSTMENT

Can a country with a weak policy environment adjust? Can it shift from a bad to a good regime and sustain it over a decade or more? Or, as a number of analysts have observed, do countries that attempt to adjust not make it—and adjust over and over again? If durable adjustment is possible, do adjuster countries grow more rapidly?

To consider some of these questions, we use the Burnside and Dollar (1997) measure of macropolicy, based on the financial deficit, inflation, and openness for 1975–96. We considered 43 countries for which data were available. The Burnside and Dollar policy index was constructed annually, and the changes in it were used to categorize countries:

- Durable adjusters are those that maintained a good index for at least nine years. Not yet durable adjusters are those that have adjusted for at least the past four years but have not maintained adjustment long enough (nine years) to be classified as durable adjusters.
- Oscillators are those that do not adjust but continue to oscillate between weak and strong policy environments. Their policy index remains volatile over time.

The sample has 12 durable adjusters, 20 not yet durable adjusters, and 11 oscillators. Durable adjusters are further divided into countries that adjusted and maintained it at the first attempt, and countries where the policy index oscillated between good and bad before the adjustment to a good policy environment was sustained. Eleven of the 12 countries successful at maintaining a good policy index, according to the Burnside and Dollar measures, did so on the first attempt. The oscillators have
had a weak policy index, on average, for about 13 years and for more than 60 percent of the period for which data were available. They also perform badly on Bank adjustment loans—with only 49 percent satisfactory outcomes. The average number of oscillations between strong and weak policy regimes for this group is four. If we add up the times all three categories of countries have attempted to adjust, the probability for a country to adjust durably is about 12 percent. Of course, this measure depends fundamentally (and arbitrarily) on the period chosen to qualify as a successful adjuster. It also depends on the quality of the country's institutional environment. For example, in countries that have satisfactory institutional environments, the probability of successfully adjusting increases to 30 percent.

The threshold of nine years is arbitrary—and conservative. If we reduce it to seven years, the odds of success increase to 16 percent—one in six. And as measured by OED, the outcome of adjustment loans in not yet durable adjusters would be strong and very similar (if slightly higher, 85 percent satisfactory) to that of durable adjusters.

But regardless of the threshold, it is clear that the probability of success is not high. So, for adjustment to have a lasting, high payoff, the gains from adjustment must be substantial. Are they? Does this turnaround to good policy make a difference? The payoff associated with successful adjustment can be illustrated by the differences in average growth, per capita income, inflation, and volatility of these variables in the different country classes. In successful adjusters, per capita GNP grew at almost three times the rate of countries that have not yet achieved durable adjustment, and six times faster than oscillators. The adjusters increased their growth rates more than sixfold.

Adjusting to the external environment
The quality of lending and the support for institution building are only parts of the equation. Equally important for development effectiveness is how well a country
adjusts to the external environment, so that opportunities for growth can be exploited and the poor can be insulated from adverse shocks. CAEs provide detailed and useful examples of how countries adjust, or fail to do so.

Outward orientation and growth
To nurture sustained ownership, reform requires a clear understanding of borrower interests in the light of political economy considerations. Where the seeds of borrower ownership are in place, lending can be a useful instrument of reform. But as CAEs show, development assistance is not science—it is art. In unstable policy environments, there is no substitute for case-by-case assessments, framed to distinguish risks worth taking (Côte d’Ivoire and the Philippines) from risks that are inappropriate (Kenya).

The expected gain from assistance is the product of the probability of success times the rewards of adjusting. The enormous gains that can be realized from adjusting are often overlooked (box 3.2). Many studies focus only on whether adjustment took place—not on the payoff. A perspective that considers only the risk of failure and not the gains from success can be misleading. It is the perspective that might be used by a lender facing roughly the same level of loss with each failure, and a payoff that does not increase with the gains from success. This kind of decisionmaking is inappropriate for an equity investor—or for the kind of development partner described in the Strategic Compact.

What happens if a high standard is set for what is judged to be a permanent, lasting improvement in the policy environment? In the cases considered, only about 12 percent of adjuster countries realized a permanent and major improvement in their macroeconomic policy environment. But for them, per capita income growth rates have been almost three times those for unsuccessful countries, and more than six times higher than their pre-adjustment growth rates.

Thus a review of the broader adjustment experience supports a key lesson of CAEs: realization of high-payoff successes requires careful analysis and cooperation, rather than the use of simple rules to determine whether support should be provided. This complexity does not mean that indicators are not available. For instance, information on seeming intangibles—including concepts such as borrower ownership—can be made operational, and obvious tests can be used to sort out the likely sustainability of investments in policy change (box 3.3).

By relying on such characteristics to guide Bank support for adjustment lending, the probability of success can be improved. Indeed, the probability of success in Bank-supported adjustment lending has increased significantly in recent years—because the Bank has become more conscious of the importance of borrower ownership. Combining this insistence on ownership with a greater concern for institutional quality could improve performance even more. It could also increase the legitimacy of subsequent reform efforts.

Outward orientation and poverty alleviation
In low-income countries, capacity weaknesses are pervasive. In middle-income countries they tend to be

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**BOX 3.3: MEASURING BORROWER OWNERSHIP AND ITS RELATION TO ADJUSTMENT OUTCOMES**

Borrower ownership of adjustment programs is often cited as vital for making policies credible, safeguarding against policy reversals, and ensuring that the benefits are sustainable. An OED evaluation of nearly 100 adjustment programs in 42 countries by Johnson and Wasty (1993) highlights the symbiotic relationship between borrower ownership and program outcomes. It presents the following performance measurement criteria for ownership:

- Is the initiative for formulating and implementing the adjustment plan the borrower’s?
- Is there observable consensus among key ministries and decisionmakers on the nature of the crisis and the necessary actions?
- Have specific up-front actions been initiated before the program?
- Has participation taken place within the society?

The evaluation shows that measures of ownership are strong predictors of outcomes. And through selected country case studies, it ascertains the important factors that account for differences in the intensity of borrower ownership.
specific. The country evaluation of Poland (OED 1997e) suggests that reform of the social safety net remains one of the most important items on the unfinished policy agenda. Recent reports on Thailand and Indonesia (World Bank 1998) and a growing body of empirical work summarized in Levine (1997) show that in middle-income countries the institutions that specialize in bearing risk—financial intermediaries and social safety nets—have been neglected by the development process. Such oversight has had serious economic and social consequences, as recently demonstrated in Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Russia, and Thailand.

Over the long term, openness helps poor countries grow faster, and assists in reducing inequalities (Edwards 1997). But openness makes it more important to put in place well-functioning risk-bearing institutions. To estimate the effects of shocks on income distribution, OED updated data from Deininger and Squire (1996) and added estimates for other countries. The data indicate an overwhelming increase in inequality within countries. Increases in inequality were 5 times more frequent than decreases: 49 countries experienced increasing inequality, 15 appear to have no trend, and 10 had decreasing inequality. Inequality is particularly acute in transition economies (box 3.4). But it is also increasing in countries that previously had no trend or a decreasing trend.

To sum up, growth and an outward orientation are keys to reducing poverty. But alone, they are not enough. For sustainable progress, better safety nets and better-targeted expenditures on those aspects of poverty for which markets do not work are essential. As Sala-i-Martin (1997) documents, such expenditures can have strong positive effects on growth. Similarly, OED’s Social Dimensions of Adjustment (1996e) found that no country has achieved sustainable poverty reduction without growth. It also showed that the quality of growth is critical to the distribution of benefits. Much greater emphasis on safety nets—and expenditures on sectors not adequately funded by market processes—are needed if poverty is to be alleviated.

**BOX 3.4: GREATER POVERTY AND INCOME INEQUALITY IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES**

Poverty has increased across Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Life expectancy at birth has declined precipitously in several countries, most notably Russia, where the average life expectancy for men in 1995 (58.3 years) was three years below that in India and a stunning six years lower than at the start of transition. The drop in life expectancy in other countries, such as Ukraine and the Baltics, is similarly concentrated among men, and there were declines in 14 of 17 countries for which there are data. The income and health dimensions of poverty have also deteriorated. Nine of the 17 countries with data experienced increases in infant mortality, and 10 of 16 countries with data experienced a deterioration in secondary school enrollment.

The close relationship between poverty and income inequality distinguishes three groups of countries. In the first group—the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia—inequality was historically low and has risen moderately. In the second group—Poland, Romania, and the Baltics—inequality was slightly higher than in the first group at the start of the transition and has since increased to levels at or above the OECD average. In the third group—primarily Russia and Bulgaria, and perhaps including other Commonwealth of Independent States countries—inequality has shot up from moderate to levels typical of the more unequal developing countries.

Poverty and income inequality have increased in all transition economies since the late 1980s. Some increase in income inequality in the region, even in the long run, is probably an unavoidable consequence of the introduction of market-based rewards. But aside from this, structural change and economic dislocation have introduced additional inequality and poverty.

*Source: Based on EBRD (1997), annex 2.2.*
THEMATIC EVALUATIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The current financial crisis has far-reaching implications for development practitioners, and for evaluators. A higher priority must go to monitoring financial sector performance—and to the wide range of institutions involved in improving governance. Emphasis must also be given to the institutions—such as NGOs and civil society—that help those not served by formal institutions. And to improve the effectiveness of public expenditures, practitioners and evaluators should help to introduce results-based manage-

ment in the administration of development programs.

Structural and social constraints to development need far more scrutiny. OED’s Process Review of World Bank Grant Programs (OED 1998) shows that progress has been made on broadening the Bank’s agenda and developing instruments to nurture the many kinds of institutions that can address these constraints. For example, the Institutional Development Fund (IDF) and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) promote institutional capacity-building and donor coordination. Similarly, the mainstreaming of new lending instruments—such as Learning and Innovation Loans and Adaptable Program Lending—represents tangible progress in the development of stronger, more sustainable institutions. But much more needs to be done.

Although it is well known that institutional factors are essential ingredients of economic growth and social stability, these factors remain neglected. This chapter considers the lessons of OED thematic evaluations for the wide range of institutional development issues involved in improving governance.

Financial sector

The financial institutions in crisis countries violated virtually all the institutional norms recommended by a recent OED study on Financial Sector Reform: A Review of World Bank Assistance (OED 1998f). The OED analysis of financial sector interventions focused on analyzing how the elements of the Bank’s evolving financial sector policy were reflected in Bank-supported projects. In examining 23 countries, the study found a satisfactory and sustainable outcome in only 12. The recommendations of the study—especially on the timing, sequencing, and scope of regulatory intervention—are more relevant than ever in light of the past year’s events. According to Reisen (1998), careful monitoring of financial institution conditions in the crisis countries would have revealed serious weaknesses in their financial systems. Consider four key
indicators of financial system strength developed in the OED study in the crisis countries.

Capitalization and bad loan exposure
At the outbreak of the crisis, nonperforming loans were highest in the Republic of Korea (16 percent of total assets), but similarly high in Thailand (15 percent) and Indonesia (11 percent; table 4.1). These figures are much higher than the 9 percent in Mexico in early 1995, where the cost of rescuing banks has been estimated at about 15 percent of GDP (Caprio and Klingebiel 1996). In Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand, capital-asset ratios were 6–10 percent. So even before the crisis, nonperforming loans far outweighed (on average) bank equity capital.

Government interventions
Banks in crisis countries may have been affected by certain kinds of government intervention in bank lending and corporate finance. The governments often directed lending toward particular sectors, both formally and informally. In addition to explicit guarantees, there were implicit guarantees that led to presumptions of government bailout for nonperforming loans in favored sectors. This encouraged excessive investment and risky lending. Once the bubble burst, the shaken investor confidence was further undermined by the uncertain fiscal implications of honoring these explicit and implicit government guarantees.

Accounting and prudential standards
The weaknesses of accounting standards in crisis countries are common in many emerging markets: inconsistent financial reporting; limited power of auditors to examine company records; lax auditing and accounting standards, out of line with international good practice; lack of penalties for incorrect reporting of information; and tolerance of multiple accounts. In such environments, even detailed examinations by supervisors and regulators may not reveal the information needed to regulate properly or to ensure prudential soundness.

Enforcement capabilities
Although some of the crisis countries had strengthened their supervisory and regulatory infrastructure during the 1980s and 1990s, partly in response to costly banking crises in Indonesia and Malaysia a decade earlier, enforcement capabilities remained weak (Fischer and Reisen 1993). Bank regulators had imposed limits on bank lending, including liquidity requirements, exposure limits, and risk-based capital requirements. But according to Reisen (1998), these standards and ratios were poorly enforced.

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**TABLE 4.1: BANK SYSTEM RISK EXPOSURE IN EAST ASIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Rep. of Korea</th>
<th>Malaysia</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bank system exposure to risk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(percentage of assets, end-1997)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonperforming loans</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital ratio</td>
<td>8–10</td>
<td>6–10</td>
<td>8–14</td>
<td>15–18</td>
<td>6–10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collateral valuation</td>
<td>80–100</td>
<td>80–100</td>
<td>80–100</td>
<td>70–80</td>
<td>80–100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory features during the 1990s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank lending to connected firms</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Government-directed bank lending</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bank deposit insurance</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Importance of state-owned banks</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Accounting standards</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement of regulations</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incentives for capital flows</td>
<td>Limited (promoted)</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Promoted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term inflows</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Promoted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term inflows</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outflows</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Limited</td>
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</table>

The crisis makes it urgently necessary to adopt a central recommendation of the OED study on financial sector reform: “more resources should be allocated to monitor and evaluate countries’ financial sector programs, with performance indicators” (p. 83). The crisis also is the reason for Bank management’s seeking special budget authority from the Board to support financial sector work. But above all, it confirms the serious adverse effects of neglecting institutional development.

Governance issues
The crisis has reinforced the already-strong evidence that growth in per capita income is enhanced by strong property rights, sound legal foundations, and capable civil servants—all operating in an effectively managed institutional system. There is clear evidence that corruption in these institutions hampers growth. Do better governance and lower corruption improve the development effectiveness of projects? Unambiguously, yes. As measured by the development effectiveness index, Bank-supported projects in countries with an inadequate bureaucracy are on average the weakest performers. In countries with a well-functioning bureaucracy, projects perform much better, with significantly lower risks than average.

Bank-supported projects in high-corruption economies have had significantly lower returns with significantly higher risk. Corruption is almost always associated with low bureaucratic quality, so that public sector management projects in corrupt countries are particularly likely to be low-return/high-risk projects. Only education projects have a high return and a low risk in countries with high corruption. Projects in low-corruption economies nearly always have a higher return and a lower risk than comparable projects in other countries.

Perhaps the most difficult governance issues arise where the state has collapsed or failed, particularly in countries that have recently emerged from conflict. In general, projects in these countries tend to have lower rewards and higher risks, reflecting the turbulence that conflict engenders. But risk-reward performance varies significantly across sectors and, as might be expected, many types of infrastructure projects perform well in societies that have experienced destruction and civil conflict.

Another message of OED’s (1998k) study of the Bank’s experience with post-conflict countries is that the Bank can assist best if it avoids the overzealous pursuit of fiscal rectitude. The circumstances of these countries require that the first emphasis be on support for rebuilding the institutions of government and civil society.

Figure 4.1: Performance of Civil Service Reform Interventions

Do better governance and lower corruption improve the development effectiveness of projects? Unambiguously, YES.

meager. OED recently evaluated more than 300 civil service reform interventions supported by 124 lending operations approved during 1980–97. A significant percentage of completed and ongoing operations lacked the adequate monitoring and evaluation information needed to make meaningful assessments of performance. Only 33 percent of the interventions that could be evaluated achieved satisfactory outcomes (figure 4.1). Institutional development impact was rated as substantial in only 16 percent of completed operations—and in only 10 percent of completed stand-alone projects.

Overall project performance in the public sector management sector is improving, but civil service reform components remain among the weakest-performing interventions in the Bank’s portfolio. As with financial institutions, a central recommendation of the OED analysis is that far greater priority should be given to integrating the use of performance indicators to monitor and support more effective public administration efforts. Results-based management systems can be an effective way to focus public sector performance on outcome measures (box 4.1).

Public expenditure analysis is central to the Bank’s policy dialogue with member countries. It is a rapidly expanding aspect of the Bank’s economic and sector work, having grown from 3 reviews before 1979 to 39 in fiscal 1998. Public expenditure reviews are a means for the external evaluation of a borrower’s fiscal policies and sector reform efforts. They provide a framework for coordinating external assistance and assessing its effectiveness, and they can provide a micro foundation for the IMF’s macroeconomic framework. IDA’s deputies have stressed the importance of public expenditure reviews as instruments for client capacity development as well as for enhancing development effectiveness by integrating review results with country assistance strategies.

OED’s (1998g) study of The Impact of Public Expenditure Reviews found that quality has improved in recent years. But it also found that public expenditure reviews provided good (but often dated) analyses of spending policies with little concern for cost efficiency or the quality of public services. Then reviews had only a modest effect on Bank lending strategies, client expenditure policies, and aid coordination. The study argued that such reviews could become significantly more effective if they were more demand-responsive, if they were better synchronized with authorities’ budget cycles, and if they gave due recognition to institutional constraints.

In many societies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs) provide a closer link to the poor than public sector institutions. According to an OED (1998h) study of NGOs in Bank-Supported Projects, 38 percent of Bank-supported projects include NGOs or CBOs in their plans. This involvement increased to 46 percent of projects in 1997, more than doubling from 20 percent in 1989. The study found that these institutions can be particularly important in projects targeted at improving gender equality (80 percent), the environment (54 percent), and poverty alleviation (48 percent). But their capacity is often limited by erratic funding and a lack of financial independence.

Low government capacity to work effectively with NGOs and CBOs is also important. While there are some outstanding examples of government agencies that have shown a strong ability to work with NGOs, these are exceptions. The Bank’s capacity to encourage NGO and CBO involvement in projects remains limited. And as for financial institutions and public sector institutions, the Bank’s database and statistics on NGOs and CBOs do not provide a reliable picture of their involvement in Bank-supported projects. Nor do they describe results. The database mainly records whether provision was made for NGO or CBO involvement, not the actual involvement.

Much remains to be done to develop a better understanding of the task of institutions in assessing and encouraging development effectiveness. As measured by the performance of Bank projects, there are significant, broad gains to be realized from developing and maintaining well-run and effectively managed public institutions. Increased vigilance on corruption—and increased reliance on new public sector management techniques, such as results-based management—could have positive spillover effects on the overall quality of Bank assistance. The Bank could more systematically engage the institutions of civil society in addressing gender equality and poverty alleviation. The Institutional Development Fund, the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest, and the new lending instruments are promising vehicles for doing this.
An OED study of Public Expenditure Reviews (1998g) discusses how this analysis might give greater emphasis to output measures rather than traditional input measures. It says that to provide relevant analysis of public expenditures, a public sector performance review must begin by developing an understanding of three contextual dimensions of the country’s public sector.

Public sector mission and values. Societal values and norms—as embodied in the constitution or in annual budget policy statements—may be useful points of reference for public sector mandates and the values inherent in those mandates. In industrial countries, the mission and values of the public sector are spelled out in a medium-term policy framework. For example, in New Zealand a policy statement of this type must be tabled in Parliament two to three months before the budget statement. In contrast, public sector values are rarely addressed in developing countries, because the orientation is to “command and control” rather than to serve the citizenry.

Authorizing environment. This includes formal (budget processes and institutions) and informal institutions of participation and accountability. Do these institutions and processes provide an enabling environment for the public sector to meet its goals? Do the various levels of government act in the spirit of the constitution in exercising their responsibilities? What are the checks and balances against deviant behavior? Are there formal rules to ensure fiscal discipline? Is public sector borrowing subject to financial market discipline? How is government performance measured? Are output and outcome indicators for public services monitored? In industrial countries, institutional norms are strictly adhered to, and there are severe moral, legal, voter, and market sanctions against noncompliance. In developing countries, non-compliance often is neither monitored nor subject to sanctions.

Operational capacity and constraints. What is authorized is not necessarily what will get done: available operational capacity may not be consistent with the task at hand. Even the operational capacity that is available may be circumvented by the bureaucratic culture or by incentives that reward command and control—and corruption. Some key questions: Do the agencies responsible for various tasks have the capacity to undertake them? Are there binding contracts on public managers for output performance? Does participation by civil society help alleviate some of these constraints? In industrial countries, answers to most of these questions are expected to be yes; in developing countries, this will not be the case.

The analysis and recommendations in such a review must be consistent with (and recognize) any inconsistencies among a country’s mission and values, its authorizing environment, and its operational capacity. If so, the review will enable the client and external partners, including the World Bank, to understand better how to improve public sector performance. It will further serve as a catalyst to introduce results-based management in developing countries. Such an approach to public sector management would help to change bureaucratic culture from its emphasis on command and control, with arbitrary and oppressive rules, to one focused on serving its citizens, earning their trust, achieving results, and working better for less money.

BOX 4.1: PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE REVIEW: INTEGRATING PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE WITH A RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BANK AND FOR EVALUATION

The implications of the current financial crisis are sobering for the Bank and for the evaluation profession. It has become amply clear that the value added by development assistance programs and by evaluations would be substantially enhanced by more explicit attention to exogenous factors and long-term structural constraints. There should be a sharper focus on the measurement of poverty reduction as the acid test of development, and better methods of assessing institutional development at both project and country levels.

The 1997 Annual Review of Development Effectiveness concluded that “the challenge is to find the right fit between country policy and institutional factors and strategies to try to improve conditions favorable to improved growth and development” (p. 51). In a much more complex—and hostile—external environment, this year’s Review reaches similar conclusions. It is now even clearer that improvements in project performance are not enough. Broader structural and social constraints impede project effectiveness, but so too does the riskiness of the global environment for developing countries.

Before considering what these constraints mean for Bank operations and their evaluation, longer-term trends in Bank performance and development effectiveness need to be evaluated and placed in the context of the unprecedented events of the past year. It is particularly important to consider the implications of these events for the prospects of sustainable growth and poverty reduction.

**Global risks**

How hostile the current environment is to developing countries is shown by Euromoney’s country risk ratings. For this Review, OED calculated a GDP-weighted measure of country risk for developing and industrial countries. The measure for developing countries shows a deterioration in the past year to the riskiest level since the Latin American debt crisis—and one of the biggest adverse shifts since World War II. The measure also shows that in the aftermath of the crisis, the external environment for developing countries remains, unlike that for industrial countries, at a high level of uncertainty—again, the highest since the debt crisis. For industrial countries,
the aggregate trend is the opposite: toward less volatility. Developing countries are now perceived as very risky investment environments. Does this matter? Perhaps a great deal. While the relationship among such aggregate measures as country risk, investment flows, and project performance is not simple, the broad dimensions of the relationship are clear. As the debt crisis took hold in the mid-1980s, risk measures increased, and Bank performance deteriorated to below 70 percent satisfactory outcomes. Then, as the crisis was resolved and the environment improved, private capital flows increased sharply and project performance improved, particularly in the past few years. These relationships are hardly precise. But they cannot be ascribed to coincidence. In disentangling some of the possible effects for development effectiveness, examining the relationship to Bank performance is instructive.

Measures of country risk are expectations about likely performance—expectations often not realized. The measures can change after investments have taken place and been evaluated, either to reflect the changes that occurred or to correct expectations. Countries can do much better than was expected—as many did in the years before the East Asian crisis—and much worse than expected—as in East Asia and Russia over the past year. How did changes in country risk affect the performance of Bank projects exiting in fiscal 1997 and 1998? Consider three types of economies: those where country risk during the implementation of Bank projects was stable, those where the country risk rating improved significantly during project implementation, and those where it deteriorated.

Twenty-two poverty assessments were completed in fiscal 1996 (17 countries and 5 updates) and 10 (8 countries and 2 updates) in fiscal 1997. By 2000 the plan is to complete the remaining 22 assessments and 9 scheduled updates. When the Bank’s World Development Report on poverty was published in 1990, poverty measures could be calculated for only 11 countries. These surveys covered the 10 years leading to 1990 and together accounted for 40 percent of the total population of the developing world and 50 percent of its poor. The quality and availability of household survey data for developing countries have improved considerably since then. Today 138 surveys are available for 69 countries. The timeliness of data has also improved from an average lag of 11 years in the mid-1980s to about 5 years now. Even so, World Development Indicators (World Bank 1997d) reports estimates of the population living below $1 a day per person for only 60 countries. The most commonly used measure—the head count index—counts people below the poverty line but ignores what is happening to them and whether they are becoming poorer. In the extreme, the measure actually improves if the poor die from poverty (Sen 1976). World Development Report 1990 recognized that for any given increase in the incomes of the poor, the reduction in poverty depended on where the poor were relative to the poverty line. If they were concentrated just below the line, the increase in their incomes would have
Implications for the Bank and for Evaluation

initiated. Fortunately, outcomes appear to be more robust with respect to unexpected deterioration in country risk. Countries that experienced an increase in risk, even those that had a substantial increase, did not experience a large reduction in project performance. Overall, in deteriorating economies, the likelihood of a satisfactory outcome was 73 percent. So at least from a preliminary analysis of performance, the deterioration in conditions should not be devastating for the existing portfolio. But the effects on future projects may be more serious.

In some respects the recent improvement in overall performance on Bank-supported projects has been the result of projects being implemented in economies undergoing improvements in broad fundamentals. In this light, performance improved because it was being swept along by a rising tide. But what will happen if this tide has crested, and future performance is no longer buoyed by a continually improving external environment? If current forecasts of country risk are accurate and a large portion of Bank borrowers do not experience an improving external environment during implementation, overall satisfactory performance of future projects could be reduced by as much as 5 percentage points. Clearly then, evaluation must give greater prominence to the effects of the external environment, particularly for sustainability.

Prospects for poverty reduction

The events of the past year confirm that the assessment of development effectiveness should give pride of place to poverty alleviation. Chapter 3 reviewed the effects that the recent financial crisis and the ongoing transition from socialism have had on income distribution. What these shocks mean for poverty alleviation can be seen by considering what they mean for the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) goals in poverty alleviation, which call for a reduction in the number of people in absolute poverty of 1 billion by 2015. To do this means that about 50 million people must be raised from poverty each year for the next 20 years. The East Asian crisis has already put the DAC program nearly a year behind schedule. But this was not the only poverty-increasing shock. The increase in poverty brought about by the collapse of safety nets in transition economies is larger than the East Asian effect: to offset these increases will require another three to four years of successful effort in poverty reduction for the DAC goals to be realized.
Together these two shocks have moved the goal posts four to five years farther away than when the targets were established only two years ago. Much more must be done in improving poverty measures if the Bank and the donor community are to come to grips with the full dimensions of global poverty (box 5.1). While the goals may be a useful structure, greater detail is needed to flesh out all the important dimensions of poverty reduction. Better data are needed so that the poor truly become visible in our evaluations and goals. More than safety nets and income growth are needed to achieve DAC’s poverty goals (box 5.2).

Implications for the Bank
What does all this mean for Bank operations and evaluations? Beyond doubt, three issues require greater emphasis: poverty alleviation, country strategies, and institutional development.

Poverty alleviation
In recent years poverty alleviation and social concerns have been afforded more attention in Bank strategies, as mandated by the Strategic Compact. This year’s Review finds that much closer donor coordination is essential, particularly in low-income countries. In these countries, declining volumes of external assistance must be better coordinated and be more sharply focused on poverty reduction.

OED evaluation efforts should give more emphasis to social aspects of Bank operations. Rating systems should give more weight to the social impact of projects and programs. Recent shocks have had a profound negative effect on poverty, and we cannot exaggerate the importance of measures to address these concerns systematically. Safety nets should be at the forefront of poverty alleviation concerns, rather than being comfortably assumed away as they have been in many analyses of world poverty.

Country strategies
The Bank has made progress on broadening the development effectiveness spectrum—for example, it has already moved beyond projects in its strategic perspective. But as discussion of the external environment showed, continual improvements in Bank and borrower performance may not be enough to maintain the performance of recent years, much less continue the steady improvements. In such a context, even the best-designed project will not contribute to development effectiveness without a greater understanding of how it fits into the broader country and international environment.

For evaluation, OED will reemphasize and intensify its shift in focus to the country as the appropriate unit for evaluation. It will also give more attention to sector performance. These new emphases will build on—not substitute for—OED’s traditional concern with project performance.

Institutional development
The events of the past year have revealed how costly weak institutions can be. The importance of sound institutions has long been known. Not known was how costly a systemic institutional failure can be. Bank operations have made significant progress in focusing resources on this important issue. And as discussed in Chapter 1, a major dimension of this work will be on financial institutions: recent events underscore that much more needs to be done.

For evaluation, greater emphasis should be placed on the metrics of institutional development. The development effectiveness index is but a first step on this journey, and further work should be done toward giving institutional development more emphasis in evaluation measures. Simpler, concrete steps are needed. For example, today’s project supervision and completion reports do not require a rating of institutional development impact. This shortcoming should be rectified. OED should make sure that its new country evaluation instrument gives adequate attention to institutional development issues.

The past year has tested the Bank’s new framework for providing development assistance. So far the results are promising. The Bank’s general strategy appears to be well conceived. With continued adjustment and refinement, it should permit the Bank to help developing countries confront a much tougher external environment.

Evaluation is central to adjusting the Bank’s approach. For example, systematically addressing poverty alleviation requires making the poor visible through better data and monitoring systems. Output targets must be linked more tangibly to policy inputs and must recognize the increased risks of the external environment. With the help of evaluators, those targets must be embedded in the scorecards of country and sector assistance strategies.
In assessing human welfare, advocates of human development would place indicators of social conditions—notably life expectancy and educational achievement—on an equal footing with such traditional economic measures as GDP per capita and a poverty index. Some would include indicators of political and civil liberties. To the broader measure of human development, a common reaction among economists and economic historians is skepticism, because they view improved life expectancy as a by-product of economic development.

But new techniques of disease control, using new knowledge of disease, have been sources of improved life expectancy. And public intervention has been crucial for implementing them. The free market institutions commonly considered to be behind economic growth have not been responsible for adopting the new techniques of disease control. Nor do free market institutions appear to have generated the new technology of disease control.

But perhaps economic growth has been necessary for increasing life expectancy—by providing the resources needed to fund public spending on the new technology, either directly or through international aid, or to fund the research responsible for the advance in knowledge. At most, economic growth may have been helpful, but it was not required to finance the advance in knowledge that brought infectious disease under control.

So higher life expectancy cannot be taken as simply a by-product of economic growth or the free market conditions that foster it. Indeed, public policy initiatives have been essential to the improvement of life expectancy, and these can be—and have been—undertaken in the absence of economic growth. Thus, broader measures of development are important.

The current Bank evaluation system assesses project results through a set of three ordinal ratings—on project outcome, sustainability, and institutional development impact:

- **Outcome** is established by answering the following question: Did the project achieve satisfactory development results considering the relevance of its main stated objectives, and the associated costs and benefits? The outcome rating takes into account relevance (to check whether the project’s objectives were consistent with the country’s development strategy), efficacy (to examine whether the operation achieved its stated goals), and efficiency (to assess results relative to inputs by costs, implementation times, and economic and financial returns). Outcome is rated on a six-point ordinal scale: highly satisfactory, satisfactory, marginally satisfactory, marginally unsatisfactory, unsatisfactory, and highly unsatisfactory.

- **Sustainability** is defined as the likelihood, at the time of evaluation, that the project will maintain its results. In assessing sustainability, evaluators focus on features (country conditions, government and economic policies, the political situation, and conditions specific to the operations, such as availability of funds for maintenance) that determine whether the operation will last over its intended useful life. Sustainability is rated on a three-point ordinal scale: likely, uncertain, and unlikely.

- **Institutional development impact** is defined as the extent to which a project has improved an agency’s or country’s ability to use its human and financial resources effectively and to efficiently organize economic and social activities. Institutional development impact is rated on a three-point ordinal scale: substantial, modest, and negligible.

As in previous years, we report trends on each evaluation dimension separately (see Chapter 2). In this year’s Review, however, we have introduced a new measure of overall project results—the development effectiveness index is based on the three ratings. This instrument allows us to take the analysis of portfolio trends a step forward, making it possible to compare overall average results—and their variability—across different groups of projects.

The development effectiveness index is defined by assigning cardinal weights to the ratings of each of the three results-oriented counts, then combining them in a simple way. The index formula is:

\[
\text{Development Effectiveness Index} = \text{Outcome Weight} + \text{Sustainability Weight} + \text{Institutional Development Impact Weight}.
\]

**Outcome weight**
- Highly satisfactory: 7.75
- Satisfactory: 6.00
- Marginally satisfactory: 5.25
- Marginally unsatisfactory: 4.50
- Unsatisfactory: 3.75
- Highly unsatisfactory: 2.00

**Sustainability weight**
- Likely: 0.75
- Uncertain: 0.25
- Unlikely: 0.00

**Institutional development impact weight**
- Substantial: 1.50
- Modest: 0.50
- Negligible: 0.00

Thus, the development effectiveness index ranges from 2—for a project with highly unsatisfactory outcome, unlikely sustainability, and negligible institutional development impact—to 10—for a project with highly satisfactory outcome, likely sustainability, and substantial institutional development impact. It is easy to see that outcome is the main force behind the index. Note also how the index separates between satisfactory and unsatisfactory outcomes, where an index measure of 6 represents such a “divide.” A project with an unsatisfactory outcome will never score higher than 6, no matter what ratings it receives on the other two dimensions.

The average development effectiveness index in the fiscal 1990–98 portfolio is 6.47. The standard deviation is 1.85. The contribution of outcome to the average index in the portfolio is about 80 percent; the remaining 20 percent is almost evenly split between the other two evaluation components.

A similar cardinal measure of overall project performance was presented in last year’s Review. In building that index, the aim was to establish, using subjective assessment, the relative importance of the three results-
oriented counts, and then combine them in an intuitively appealing way. But this approach, by ignoring the information embedded in the historically observed portfolio, tended to excessively penalize underperforming projects and over-reward overperforming ones. It induced a double-counting effect that duplicated a satisfactory-unsatisfactory dichotomy, rather than conveying the extra information contained in the six-point classification of outcome results and the data about institutional development impact and sustainability.

The new measure improves on that index, making the inferences based on such an instrument more robust. It does so by explicitly taking into account the information coming from the historically evaluated portfolio, and by keeping to a minimum—and transparently stating—the set of subjective judgments needed to choose a specific index among the many ways of defining one.

Weights are assigned, using the historically evaluated portfolio as a benchmark, and taking into account the strong positive association among evaluation dimensions, to avoid double-counting effects and to extract the most information from the empirical observations.

The fact that good (bad) ratings on one dimension are associated with good (bad) ratings on the other dimensions allows us to unambiguously rank more than 70 percent of the projects in the observed portfolio using only the ordinal information conveyed by the three sets of ratings. Using only two clear assumptions—premised on the Bankwide consensus about the importance of outcome ratings and on the most efficient way to use information embedded in the observed portfolio—we are able to increase the total of projects that can be ranked to more than 81 percent.

Such rankings are then used to assign scores to each dimension separately. Choosing a formula that defines the index as the sum of three scores makes it easy to understand and calculate within the Bank, as well as outside, and allows us to readily calculate changes in the overall index associated with changes in the distribution of ratings in a given group of projects (by sector, region, and so on).

Caution should be exercised in interpreting the scores on each separate dimension, since these are derived by looking at the additional informational content that each result-based count contained relative to the other two in the historically evaluated portfolio. The fact that the ratings on outcome appear to be driving the index is the result of two forces. First, in establishing the ranking of observed projects on which the index is built, we used (although parsimoniously) outcome as a tie-breaking rule. Second, the fact that outcome was rated on a six-point basis, as opposed to the three-point basis used for the other two counts, resulted in outcome ratings conveying more information, and thus receiving more weight. That outcome evaluation is based on a finer scale is a testimony to its prominence among the ratings. We welcome this asymmetry, because we did not have to impose any subjective mechanism to give outcome more weight in the determination of the index.

Although we report the percentage that each result-based count contributed to the index, this was done only for completeness. After all, the index’s purpose is to summarize information as far as possible: researchers interested in examining performance on each count will find it optimal to look only at the ratings in the chosen dimension (rather than look at the components of the weights, which are intimately connected to one another).

Another point worth stressing about the index is the nature of its cardinality. This should be understood as interval-scale cardinality: because it is impossible to locate an absolute, nonarbitrary, zero point for the scale, distances between index values, although meaningful, are not ratios. We choose a 2–10 range because this makes the index readily comparable with other indexes used within the Bank, while allowing us to space index values in a way that may be appealing for practitioners and nonpractitioners alike.

Although it is not of the ratio-scale nature (ratios of indexes are not meaningful, given the arbitrary range), the cardinality of the development effectiveness index makes it a valuable instrument for analyzing Bank project performance. The index makes it possible to compare overall performance across, for instance, Sectors, Networks, and Regions, using the information contained in the project ratings. This represents a step forward with respect to standard comparisons based simply on binary classification (satisfactory or unsatisfactory) of outcome, which leave out the sustainability and institutional development components of project results, and ignore the nuances embedded in the six-point scale on outcome. This is the use of the index we are mainly concerned with in this report (see Chapter 2).

But the usefulness of the index is not limited to what we have suggested here. Using the index, means and variances for different groups of projects—representing different types of investment—can be calculated, and the
portfolio can be evaluated, using the standard tools of portfolio theory.

The richer information embedded in the index can be used as an alternative dependent variable in regression studies that seek to identify the factors behind the Bank’s intervention successes and failures (see Burnside and Dollar 1997). The index could also be used as an explanatory variable in the right-hand side of regression analyses linking Bank efforts to development results (reduced poverty or inequality, increased growth, and so on).

The guiding rationale of translating into a cardinal measure an ordinal system of performance ratings is to come up with an evaluation instrument with desirable properties, to be used to trace out the major trends, factors, and effects of Bank investments. The development effectiveness index is not meant to be a substitute for direct cardinal measures of project performance, like the rate of return approach to project evaluation. But given the shift of development economics toward greater attention to policy and institutions, the rate of return methods are ill-fitted to capture the policy reform and institution-building components of Bank projects. This discrepancy motivated the adoption of an evaluation system applicable to all projects (for about a third of Bank projects, rate of return is still calculated) that sacrifices the advantages of cardinality to capture the many facets of project results. Thus the development effectiveness index represents an attempt to solve the tradeoff between these two conflicting factors, and should not be construed as an attempt to “faithfully and precisely” measure in a cardinal way the underlying reality.
Annex 2. Glossary of Selected Terms

Adjustment loans: Financing aimed at promoting policy reform. Disbursement of these funds, directed at alleviating the costs of the transition to a different policy and institutional environment, is contingent on the fulfillment of a set of conditions by the recipient country (usually based on macroeconomic indicators).

Bank performance: The quality of service delivered by the Bank, especially in tasks for which it has primary responsibility, such as appraisal and supervision.

Borrower ownership: The extent to which the recipient country is involved in and committed to a project’s strategy and goals. Ownership is greater when the borrower initiates the formulation and implementation of a project, when there is clear consensus among government officials and other decisionmakers on the course of action, and when there is broad public support for the initiative.

Borrower performance: Defined as the assumption of ownership rights and responsibilities and delivery of the inputs needed to prepare and implement the project.

Contagion: Transmission of destabilizing conditions from one open economy to others closely connected to it, resulting in regional crisis.

Country assistance strategy: The main vehicle for Board review of the Bank Group’s assistance to IDA and IBRD borrowers. The strategy document describes the Bank Group’s strategy, which is derived from an assessment of country priorities and indicates the level and composition of assistance to be provided consistent with the strategy and the country’s portfolio performance. The heart of the country assistance strategy is the ongoing Bank-country dialogue and joint efforts in preparing and implementing the strategy. Strong country ownership and consultation with key stakeholders—pursued with sensitivity and the general agreement of the government—are crucial features of a successful country assistance strategy.

DAC goals: A set of six internationally accepted development goals for the twenty-first century in the areas of poverty, gender, education, environment, and health. The goals were published by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee in a 1996 policy paper (OECD 1996).

Demandingness, complexity, and riskiness: Demandingness refers to the extent to which the project could be expected to strain the economic, institutional, and human resources of the government/implementing agency. Complexity refers to such factors as the range of policy and institutional improvements contemplated, the number of institutions involved, the number of project components and their geographic dispersion, and the number of cofinanciers. Riskiness refers to the likelihood that the project, as designed, would be expected to fail to meet relevant project objectives efficiently. In determining project riskiness, evaluators consider the extent to which the project could reasonably have been expected at the time of project preparation and appraisal to face known risk factors, such as lack of borrower commitment, inadequate counterpart funding, and war or civil disorder.

Development effectiveness: A demonstrable contribution to economically sound, socially equitable, and environmentally sustainable growth.

Development effectiveness index: A measure of overall project-specific results using the index aggregation of three OED project ratings: outcome, sustainability, and institutional development.

Efficacy: A measure of whether an operation achieved its physical, financial, and institutional objectives.

Efficiency: An assessment of results in relation to inputs, including costs, implementation times, and economic and financial returns.

Global public goods: Goods that are available for the benefit of all countries, and for which one country’s use does not reduce another’s consumption. Yet no single country could or would invest in these goods because the costs generally outweigh the aggregate benefits.

Institutional development: Improvement in the ability of an agency or country to make effective use of human and financial resources and to efficiently organize economic and social activities.
**Macroeconomic policy:** Government actions designed to affect the entire economy rather than specific sectors or markets, especially with respect to the general level of income, employment, prices, interest rates, and balance of payments. Policy measures are usually categorized as fiscal or monetary, depending on which instruments—taxes, public spending and debt, control of money supply, and central bank discount rates—are used.

**Outcome:** In project ratings, outcome refers to the extent to which a project achieved its major objectives in a cost-efficient way. Under the results-based management framework, outcomes are the immediate effects and changes that result from a project’s outputs (their services and products). For example, the outcome of a health publicity campaign might be a 5 percent increase in awareness among those targeted.

**Relevance:** The consistency of goals with the country’s overall development strategy and the Bank’s assistance strategy for the country.

**Risk-bearing institutions:** Organizations designed to share the risks and costs of unpredictable events among large groups. Examples include unemployment support programs, health programs, and life insurance.

**Safety nets:** Mechanisms that aim to alleviate the burden on the vulnerable of an unfavorable economic situation (for example, by unemployment insurance).

**Strategic Compact:** The Strategic Compact between the Bank’s management and Executive Board provides a long-term framework for guiding the Bank’s renewal and calculating the associated resource needs. The Compact, approved in March 1997, adds $250 million to the Bank’s $1.2 billion administrative budget, to be used over 30 months to improve how the Bank does business. The Compact is complemented by substantial redeployments and savings throughout the Bank, identified through an ongoing review of cost-effectiveness. The Compact focuses on refueling current business activities, refocusing the development agenda, retooling the Bank’s knowledge base, and revamping institutional capacities.

**Sustainability:** The likelihood, at the time of evaluation, that a project will maintain its results in the future.

**Washington Consensus:** An internationally agreed set of 10 measures that are typically implemented during policy reform, including fiscal discipline, financial and trade liberalization, deregulation, taxation and public expenditure adjustments, and privatization.
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Note: Sust. = sustainability; sat. = satisfactory; sub. = substantial. Income group categories are derived from the World Development Indicators 1998. A full set of supplemental statistical tables providing further project evaluation results is available electronically at http://www.worldbank.org/html/oed/
### TABLE 1: OUTCOME, SUSTAINABILITY, AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (ID) IMPACT FOR EXIT FISCAL YEARS 1990–96, 1997, AND 1998, BY SECTOR, NETWORK, LENDING TYPE AND SOURCE, REGION AND INCOME GROUP (BY PROJECTS) (CONTINUED)

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<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
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**Note:** Sust. = sustainability; sat. = satisfactory; sub. = substantial. Income group categories are derived from the World Development Indicators 1998. **A full set of supplemental statistical tables providing further project evaluation results is available electronically at [http://www.worldbank.org/html/oed](http://www.worldbank.org/html/oed)
### TABLE 2: OUTCOME, SUSTAINABILITY, AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (ID) IMPACT FOR EXIT FISCAL YEARS 1990–96, 1997, AND 1998, BY SECTOR, NETWORK, LENDING TYPE AND SOURCE, REGION AND INCOME GROUP (BY DISBURSEMENTS)

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#### Network

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<td>1,285</td>
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### TABLE 2: OUTCOME, SUSTAINABILITY, AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (ID) IMPACT FOR EXIT FISCAL YEARS 1990–96, 1997, AND 1998, BY SECTOR, NETWORK, LENDING TYPE AND SOURCE, REGION AND INCOME GROUP (BY DISBURSEMENTS) (CONTINUED)

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<td>Total/average</td>
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Note: Disburse = disbursements; sust. = sustainability; sat. = satisfactory; sub. = substantial. Disbursements are measured in real terms, deflated to fiscal 1996 US dollars. Income group categories are derived from the World Development indicators 1998. A full set of supplemental statistical tables providing further project evaluation results is available electronically at http://www.worldbank.org/html/oed

Annex 3: Data on Outcome, Sustainability, and Institutional Development Impact
ANNEX 4. REPORT FROM COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS (CODE)

On December 9, 1998, the Committee on Development Effectiveness (CODE) reviewed the annual summary entitled Managing Development Effectiveness: An Overview of FY98 Apex Evaluation Report (SecM 98-941). This “chapeau” document is prepared jointly by OED and management to facilitate Board discussion by highlighting the main conclusions and priority concerns arising from the FY98 Annual Review of Development Effectiveness (ARDE), the 1998 Report on Operations Evaluation (AROE), and the Annual Review of Portfolio Performance (ARPP).

In general, the Committee commended OED and management for the excellent quality of the reports. It welcomed the continued improvement in the overall quality of the Bank’s portfolio, but recognized that the improvements should be interpreted with caution and that there are major challenges ahead. The Committee endorsed the overall recommendations of the reports and stressed the need to communicate general recommendations widely and to convert them into definitive follow-through that will lead to poverty reduction.

First, one of the main messages emerging from the three reports is that we are continuing to enhance evaluation processes, and that the Bank is at an early stage of practicing results-based management (RBM), which is both a management system and a performance reporting system. RBM provides a coherent framework for learning and accountability in a decentralized environment. CODE endorsed OED’s strong recommendation for implementing RBM, which was first made in the 1997 AROE. According to the 1998 AROE, progress has been made in enhancing performance management and the use of lessons learned for development effectiveness in the Bank. However, the reports conclude that the Bank needs to accelerate progress toward the implementation of full-fledged RBM. This would entail linking corporate resource allocation processes to results achieved and incorporating evaluation information into management performance assessment. A clear statement of goals and objectives at the corporate level is the essential precursor for this. The Strategic Compact has given the institution as a whole a clear sense of momentum and direction, and the new development framework will help sharpen it. At the sectoral level, the Committee stressed the urgent need for sectors to develop strategies with clear goals, targets, and indicators that the Networks can use in developing goals and targets for the “Corporate Scorecard.” The Committee welcomes the launching of a new program of sector strategy papers to assist in this regard. Furthermore, it emphasized strongly that the Networks must become more involved in evaluation and must contribute more to the dissemination and communication of information on results and to the promotion of learning. At the country level, the Committee noted that significant progress has been made in enhancing the strategic focus of CASs, but said that CASs should routinely analyze portfolio experience, OED lessons, and QAG findings, and the link between portfolio performance and new lending should be made more explicit.

Second, the Committee believes that a closer link among strategic planning, budgeting, and evaluation is needed. This requires more systematic, timely, and user-friendly evaluation processes, as well as a tighter coordination among the Strategy and Resource Management Vice Presidency, self-evaluation activities in Operations, and independent evaluation in OED. The Committee urged management to accelerate progress toward developing an integrated work program combining independent and self-evaluation, as recommended by the Evaluation Learning Group and endorsed by CODE and the Board. It looks forward to reviewing a progress report on monitoring and self-evaluation in FY99.

Third, in view of the shift toward the country level in the new development framework, the Committee emphasized the need to strengthen partnerships with
borrowers and with donors. It stressed the critical importance of stakeholder participation in setting development goals and in the design and implementation of appropriate monitoring and evaluation (M & E) systems at the project, sector, and country levels. Although progress has been made and participation has brought substantial benefits in enhanced stakeholder buy-in, better implementation, and reduced risk, the Committee was concerned that M & E and evaluation capacity development are receiving too little attention. Evaluation in the Bank cannot substitute for an effective system of evaluation in borrowing countries. Evaluation capacity development must be a priority for Bank operations. This has been a recurring theme in CODE statements in the last few years, and we urge management to assure action on this priority. The Committee looks forward to seeing the results of a review of the implementation of the 1994 Evaluation Capacity Development Task Force. It also urged management to make evaluation capacity development a major focus of partnership pilots, and a key theme in the Bank’s forthcoming sector strategy for assisting public sector reform.

Fourth, the Committee stressed that poverty reduction must continue to be the ultimate goal of all Bank activities. Strengthening partnerships must be a key element of the Bank’s poverty reduction strategy. The crisis in East Asia has highlighted the importance of giving considerable attention to the strength and resilience of institutions, particularly in the financial and social protection areas. The Committee concurred with the recommendation that the Bank should move institution building to center stage and mainstream institutional concerns fully across all Bank work. It also endorsed the recommendation that social development should become central to the Bank’s work. The Committee looks forward to hearing from management about how these recommendations will be implemented.

Conclusion. These reports clearly identify the major challenges the World Bank faces and make strong, well-founded recommendations for how these challenges might be met. We must now translate these recommendations into action. The Board and management need to work together to ensure that, as an institution, we accelerate the pace at which we implement RBM and all the attendant systemic changes required. The Committee recognizes that the broad systemic changes needed to achieve a full-fledged RBM system in the Bank will take a sustained effort over a number of years. However, we urge management to be more explicit about its commitment to achieving this goal and how it plans to address these issues.

Working closely with management, CODE will develop a work program for 1999 that will, in large part, be derived from the conclusions and recommendations of the apex evaluation reports. We will discuss the most appropriate and effective ways for CODE to monitor progress in key areas. An indicative work program for CODE will be circulated shortly.

Jan Piercy
Chairperson, CODE
ENDNOTES

Chapter 1

1. World Bank 1998e.
2. Based on Euromoney’s ratings for country risk.
4. The glossary (Annex 2) defines terms related to institutional development. In addition, box 3.1 illustrates the general perspective taken by analysts who focus on institutional issues.
5. In April 1998, finance ministers and central bank governors from a number of large economies formed three working groups—on transparency and accountability, on strengthening financial systems, and on international financial crises—to discuss the policy issues raised by the financial crisis. In October 1998, each working group presented its findings and recommendations in a separate report.

Chapter 2

1. The terms “operation” and “project” refer to both IDA and IBRD lending and are used interchangeably. Unless otherwise stated, all time period references relate to the fiscal year in which evaluated operations exited the portfolio.
2. The results for fiscal 1998 are based on a sample of 114 evaluated operations—40 percent of the 283 exiting operations—for which regional staff have prepared completion reports. A complete set of data by region and sector will be provided on OED’s Web site for reference and follow-up.
3. The likely bias arises from problems of sample representation for the preliminary fiscal 1998 results. According to project data from the Quality Assurance Group (QAG) at exit, the cohort evaluated so far includes far fewer problem projects (16 percent) than the projects remaining to be evaluated (26 percent). Of the evaluated cohort, those rated as problem projects by QAG at exit were only 18 percent satisfactory, while the rest were more than 90 percent satisfactory. Assuming the same relationship between QAG and OED assessments for those fiscal 1998 exits yet to be reviewed by OED yields an estimate of 73 percent satisfactory for the part of the cohort not reviewed here. Combining this group with the exits reviewed implies an overall 76 percent satisfactory rating for the entire group of fiscal 1998 exits.
5. Disbursements are measured in real terms, deflated to fiscal 1996 US dollars.
6. The standard deviation of the regional shares of satisfactory projects has dropped 40 percent, from 10 percentage points for fiscal 1990–96 to 6 percentage points for fiscal 1997–98.
7. Data on the active portfolio under supervision are taken from the Annual Report on Portfolio Performance, Fiscal Year 1998 (ARPP), prepared by the Quality Assurance Group. The basic measure of performance used in the ARPP is the number of projects at risk of not achieving their development objectives. Projects at risk consist of actual and potential problem projects. Actual problem projects are those for which implementation progress is unsatisfactory or development objectives are not likely to be achieved. Potential problem projects are rated satisfactory on implementation progress/development objectives, but have other risk factors historically associated with unsatisfactory outcomes.
8. “The Other Crisis,” delivered in Washington, D.C., on October 6, 1998, emphasized the essentials of good governance and the need to specify the regulatory and institutional fundamentals essential to a workable market economy.
9. Institutional development impact measures the extent to which a project has improved the ability of an agency or country to make effective use of its human and financial resources. This impact, possible even in the absence of explicit institutional development objectives, includes both traditional impacts, through new or improved organizations, and the impact projects have on the rules of the game governing public and private sector behavior.
10. Sustainability is defined as the likelihood, at the time of evaluation, that a project will maintain its results in the future. To judge the sustainability of an operation, evaluators take into account country conditions, government policies, and other conditions specific to the operation, such as availability of funds for operation and maintenance. Basic factors behind the original project appraisal are also considered—such as technical, financial, and economic viability; susceptibility to external shocks; and the social, environmental, and governance environment.
11. Looking at shifts in country macroeconomic environments, the fiscal 1997–98 evaluated exits have slightly more projects in the poorly performing country group than do those exiting in fiscal 1990–96 (12 percent, compared with 9 percent), with a slight decrease in projects in the lower-performing group (from 17 percent to 14 percent). The three other groupings of high, lower-medium, and upper-medium performing countries show even less variation when analyzed for fiscal 1990–96 and fiscal 1997–98. While slight, the movement toward poorer-performing economic environments makes it unlikely that country selectivity affected the improved performance results of fiscal 1997–98.
12. Borrower performance is assessed for three project processes—preparation, implementation, and compliance. Implementation is the broadest of these three project measures, with dimensions under the government’s control—such as broad project commitment, appointment of key staff, and counterpart funding—as well as implementing agency factors such as management, staffing, cost changes, and beneficiary participation.
13. Bank performance is assessed for three project processes—identification, appraisal, and supervision. Assessments of the Bank’s performance during project identification include looking at the involvement of the government and beneficiary, whether the project is consistent with the Bank’s country assistance strategy, and whether there is a grounding in economic and sector work. The quality of appraisal includes the following dimensions: technical and financial analysis, cost benefit analysis, institutional capacity analysis, and environmental and social analysis. Dimensions taken into account for assessing project supervision include progress reporting, identification/assessment of problems, use of performance indicators, advice to the imple-
menting agency, and flexibility in suggesting/approving modifications.

14. Findings that supervision improved are consistent with the latest Quality Assurance Group self-evaluation assessments of supervision in Supervision Quality in FY98: A QAG Assessment (RSA2).

Chapter 3

   2. OEDC R staff were asked to rate country assistance strategies (quality at entry, implementation, outcome, sustainability, and institutional development) from their evaluations in CAEs. Where the evaluator thought appropriate, the country strategy was rated separately for different periods. For the 17 countries reviewed, CAEs identify 25 time slices—that is, different and distinct strategies for the country within the time period covered by the evaluations. Project ratings corresponding to the same countries and periods show that project outcome was satisfactory 68 percent of the time. The latter figure is similar to the average project performance during the period of the CAE analysis.
   4. The evaluation form follows the style of OED’s project information form, and the methodology is that of OED’s methodology for evaluating completed lending operations. See OED 1997b.
   5. In addition to comparing the perspectives on growth and poverty reduction in CAEs with those of empirical models, we compared how well these judgments on country strategy performance served as a predictor of subsequent Bank project performance. While 25 observations limited the degrees of freedom, these judgments nevertheless serve as stronger predictors of project performance than do macroeconomic policy measures.
   6. The data on institutional quality refer to country ratings for bureaucratic quality, rule of law, and corruption as defined by the International Country Risk Guide. An average of the three ratings of greater than 4 on a 1–6 scale is considered satisfactory. A rating of greater than 3.33 and less than 4.0 is considered marginally satisfactory.
   7. This rating is based on a more limited sample of low- and middle-income countries. The policy index has been calculated on an annual basis for 1995, as in Burnside and Dollar (1997).
   8. Using comparable data on income distribution for 45 countries, Deininger and Squire (1996) show that over the 30-year period up to the early 1990s, there was no trend in within-country income inequality. In 29 countries the Gini coefficient—a measure of income distribution—remained virtually constant, in 8 it increased, and in another 8 it decreased. In the 16 countries with an increasing or decreasing trend, in 12 the change was small. Our shorter-term perspective, focusing on changes over five or more years, suggests that in recent years a very different pattern has emerged. The trends in transition economies are an important aspect of the changing pattern. But even in the 45 countries considered by Deininger and Squire, an updating of their data and a more short-term focus shows that about five times as many countries (24) have an increasing trend as have a decreasing trend (5 countries). Of course, given the limited amount of observations, our classification was necessarily based on a heuristic approach.

Chapter 4

   2. To consider the effects that country characteristics might have on Bank performance, we examined performance in a wide range of countries. For example, we grouped countries by such characteristics or whether they were post-conflict societies, transition economies, Sub-Saharan Africa economies, had high or low levels of corruption, good or weak bureaucracies, and persistently poor policy environments.

Chapter 5

1. Euromoney’s semiannual country risk ratings range from 0 (most risky) to 100 (least risky). Each rating is calculated as a weighted average of nine categories of indicators representing analytical, credit, and market indicators. The categories are economic data (25 percent weighting), political risk (25 percent), debt indicators (10 percent), rescheduled debt or debt in default (10 percent), sovereign credit ratings (10 percent), access to bank finance (5 percent), access to short-term finance (5 percent), access to international bond and syndicated loan markets (5 percent), and access to and discount on forfeiting (5 percent).
   2. The change in risk rating between the year of approval and the year of exit has been used to classify countries. Improvement refers to betterment in risk rating of more than 5 percent; performance as expected refers to countries whose rating changed by less than 5 percent; deteriorating economies are those with an increase in risk between the year of approval and the year of exit.
   3. The estimated relationship between country risk and portfolio performance during 1997–98 is used to forecast ratings for projects exiting in 1999. The forecast of a 5 percentage point deterioration in fiscal 1998 satisfactory projects is used as a baseline scenario, assuming that country risk ratings in 1999 would be the same as in 1998. In a more pessimistic scenario, country risk ratings would deteriorate by 6 percentage points.
   6. The estimated number of poor people in 2015, given the expected increase in population and assuming a 50 percent reduction in poverty, is 900 million. This would call for lifting almost 1 billion people out of poverty over the next 20 years, or about 50 million people a year.
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