Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: ICR00004347 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT IDA - 45790 ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 71.2 MILLION (US$105 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF SENEGAL FOR THE DAKAR DIAMNIADIO TOLL HIGHWAY ( P087304 ) July 30, 2018 Transport & Digital Development Global Practice Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective July 19, 2018) Currency Unit = CFA Franc 0.71 SDR = US$1 US$ 1 = CFA 566 FISCAL YEAR July 1 – June 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AFD Agence Française de Développement (French Development Agency) AfDB African Development Bank AGETIP Agence d’Exécution des Travaux d’Intérêt Public (Public Interest Works Implementing Agency) AIBD Blaise Diagne International Airport APIX Agence Nationale Chargée du Développement de l'Investissement et des Grands Travaux (Investment Promotion and Large Projects Agency) CAS Country Assistance Strategy CD Country Director CPS Country Partnership Strategy DDTH Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway FA Financing Agreement GDA Greater Dakar Area GDP Gross Domestic Product GoS Government of Senegal ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report IFC International Finance Corporation IRR Internal Rate of Return M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MFD Maximizing Finance for Development NGO Nongovernmental Organization PAD Project Appraisal Document PAFCM Mbao Forest Management Plan PAP Project-affected Person PIS Pikine Irrégulier Sud (Irregular South Pikine) PPF Project Preparation Fund PPIAF Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility PPP Public-Private Partnership PSE Plan Senegal Emergent RAP Resettlement Action Plan RN Route Nationale (National Road) ROW Right-of-way RS Resettlement Site TP Tivaouane Peulh WADB West African Development Bank Regional Vice President: Hafez M. H. Ghanem Country Director: Louise J. Cord Senior Global Practice Director: Jose Luis Irigoyen Practice Manager: Nicolas Peltier-Thiberge Task Team Leader(s): Eric R. Lancelot ICR Main Contributor: Ndeye Anna Ba TABLE OF CONTENTS DATA SHEET ....................................................................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ....................................................... 6 A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL .........................................................................................................6 B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE) ..................................... 12 II. OUTCOME .................................................................................................................... 13 A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs ............................................................................................................ 13 B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) ...................................................................................... 14 C. EFFICIENCY ........................................................................................................................... 19 D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING .................................................................... 21 E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY) ............................................................................ 21 III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME ................................ 23 A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION ................................................................................... 23 B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................................. 24 IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .. 25 A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ............................................................ 25 B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE ..................................................... 27 C. BANK PERFORMANCE ........................................................................................................... 31 D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ....................................................................................... 32 V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................. 33 ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ........................................................... 36 ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION ......................... 46 ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT ........................................................................... 49 ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 50 ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIERS AND OTHER PARTNERS/STAKEHOLDERS COMMENTS55 ANNEX 6. SUCCESSFUL PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP TO BUILD THE DAKAR- DIAMNIADIO TOLL ROAD .......................................................................................................................... 56 ANNEX 7. DETAILS ON RAPS AND PAPS FOR THE DDTH PROJECT .......................................... 59 ANNEX 8. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS .................................................................................. 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) DATA SHEET BASIC INFORMATION Product Information Project ID Project Name P087304 Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway Country Financing Instrument Senegal Investment Project Financing Original EA Category Revised EA Category Full Assessment (A) Full Assessment (A) Organizations Borrower Implementing Agency Ministry of Finance APIX Project Development Objective (PDO) Original PDO The Objective of the project is to : (i) improve mobility between Dakar and Diamniadio; and (ii) provide communities affected by the construction of the highway access to basic social and economic services. Page 1 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) FINANCING Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$) World Bank Financing 105,000,000 99,572,767 97,437,817 IDA-45790 Total 105,000,000 99,572,767 97,437,817 Non-World Bank Financing Borrower 186,640,000 155,400,000 235,820,000 African Development Bank 49,000,000 49,000,000 47,460,000 FRANCE: French Agency for 80,000,000 76,900,000 76,900,000 Development Foreign Private Commercial 110,760,000 110,760,000 110,760,000 Sources (unidentified) Total 426,400,000 392,060,000 470,940,000 Total Project Cost 426,400,000 491,632,767 568,377,817 KEY DATES Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing 02-Jun-2009 13-Oct-2010 01-Nov-2013 31-Jul-2015 31-Jan-2018 RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions 13-Oct-2010 0 Change in Legal Covenants 29-Dec-2010 6.62 Change in Legal Covenants 15-May-2013 55.64 Change in Legal Covenants 31-Oct-2013 61.80 Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Reallocation between Disbursement Categories 22-Dec-2016 88.79 Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Reallocation between Disbursement Categories 31-Jan-2018 97.44 Cancellation of Financing Reallocation between Disbursement Categories Page 2 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) KEY RATINGS Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Substantial RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs Actual No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Disbursements (US$M) 01 30-Nov-2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.28 02 08-Jun-2010 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 1.33 03 01-Feb-2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.62 04 29-Oct-2011 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 40.72 05 13-May-2012 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 46.94 06 03-Dec-2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 51.43 07 20-Jun-2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 57.29 08 28-Dec-2013 Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 62.21 09 05-May-2014 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 66.65 10 30-Dec-2014 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 72.15 11 12-Jun-2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 75.07 12 14-Dec-2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 79.27 13 30-Jun-2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 84.77 14 23-Jan-2017 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 89.66 15 20-Oct-2017 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 94.93 16 08-Mar-2018 Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory 97.44 Page 3 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) SECTORS AND THEMES Sectors Major Sector/Sector (%) Education 7 Other Education 7 Social Protection 36 Social Protection 36 Transportation 50 Public Administration - Transportation 14 Rural and Inter-Urban Roads 36 Industry, Trade and Services 7 Other Industry, Trade and Services 7 Themes Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%) Private Sector Development 33 Jobs 23 Job Creation 23 Public Private Partnerships 10 Social Development and Protection 14 Social Inclusion 13 Other Excluded Groups 13 Fragility, Conflict and Violence 1 Forced Displacement 1 Page 4 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) Urban and Rural Development 64 Urban Development 41 Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery 41 Rural Development 23 Rural Infrastructure and service delivery 23 ADM STAFF Role At Approval At ICR Regional Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Hafez M. H. Ghanem Country Director: Habib M. Fetini Louise J. Cord Senior Global Practice Director: Jose Luis Irigoyen Jose Luis Irigoyen Practice Manager: C. Sanjivi Rajasingham Nicolas Peltier-Thiberge Moctar Thiam, Raymond Task Team Leader(s): Eric R. Lancelot Bourdeaux ICR Contributing Author: Ndeye Anna Ba Page 5 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL Context 1. At project appraisal in 2009, the population of Senegal was estimated at 12.4 million. Over the past 10 years, gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaged 4 percent while the population growth hovered around 2.5 percent. Unemployment rate was at 38 percent. Senegal was in the group of poor countries with a per capita GDP of US$710. The country had been witnessing a rapid decline of poverty between 2001 and 2005 from 55.2 percent to 48.3 percent, but such progress had then slowed down due to poor governance and other shocks including poor rains and high fuel price. 2. The Greater Dakar Area (GDA), the driver of economic growth in Senegal, was struggling in the face of rapid urbanization. The GDA covered less than 0.3 percent of the territory but hosted about 25 percent of the population. It had been growing at a rate of 150,000 to 200,000 additional people per year over the past three decades. Consequently, basic social and economic infrastructure, initially built to accommodate about 300,000 people, was seriously overstretched. 3. This rapid urbanization had not been properly planned and had resulted, over the years, in the spontaneous creation of several slums in the outskirts of the city. Pikine Irrégulier Sud, (PIS), the largest informal settlement in the GDA was home to 250,000 habitants and was built in a flood-prone area and lacked proper infrastructure and services. With changes in rain patterns, PIS had started to be exposed to severe flooding during rainy seasons creating health issues such as cholera and other waterborne illnesses. Further, the lack of roads within PIS was an additional hurdle as it severely hampered movement of populations, safety, and emergency response (accessibility for firefighters and ambulances). 4. By the mid-1990s, owing to the rapid urbanization, competitiveness and growth of the GDA were levelled off by the high economic costs of massive traffic congestion. More than 80 percent of industrial and economic activities and the quasi-totality of administrative and business services were concentrated in the GDA. In 1998, congestion in the GDA was estimated to cost the country a staggering US$200 million or 4.6 percent of its GDP. Further, it was estimated that 16,850 hours per day were lost in traffic on many of the most critical road sections in Dakar and that the commercial speed of public transport vehicles had been reduced to 10–20 km per hour.1 The high loss of productivity for local and regional businesses due to heavy congestion and the impact on the free flow of regional trade were threatening Senegal’s ability to serve as a regional economic hub. 5. Entering and exiting Dakar was only possible through National Road 1 (Route Nationale 1, RN1), which was the backbone of the GDA’s transport system. At the time of appraisal, it was taking on average two hours during off-peak and up to four hours during rush hour to enter or exit Dakar using the 30 km long road that links the city center to Diamniadio through Pikine, the largest suburb of Dakar. Consequently, the viability of major new investments in the Port of Dakar, the proposed economic zone 1 Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) of the Urban Mobility Improvement Program, Report No. ICR0000955. Page 6 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) near Diamniadio, the new Blaise Diagne International Airport (AIBD), and the highly popular tourist destinations near Mbour were all severely hampered by the absence of a reliable and efficient connection in and out of Dakar. 6. Given the increasingly severe situation in the GDA, the Government of Senegal (GoS) decided in the early 2000s to develop an alternate route to RN1 to ease congestion and improve mobility in the Dakar region.2 Further to a multicriteria analysis based on technical, social, economic, and urban mobility factors, it was determined that the optimal alignment of the new motorway would connect Dakar (Malick Sy) to the new city of Diamniadio and would traverse the densely populated PIS area (see paragraph 3 and Figure 1) and the Mbao forest reserve, which was the last protected forest area in the GDA. The toll highway construction project was split into three Phases (see Figure 1). Figure 1. Map of the Highway Source: DDTH PAD 7. In 2004, the GoS decided to finance the construction of the first two Phases (Malick Sy-Patte d’Oie, and Patte d’Oie-Pikine, 12 km combined) and requested assistance of the World Bank Group for the construction of the third Phase (Pikine-Diamniadio, 20 km) under a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) scheme. By early 2000, the GoS had started to establish the legislative framework relating to the PPP, putting in place a conducive legal and regulatory environment for private sector participation.3 In view of the size and costs of the motorway and the timetable required to implement a PPP, the GoS decided to 2 The Dakar Region includes Dakar, Diamniadio, and Rufisque. 3 See annex 6 for more details. Page 7 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) fully finance the development and construction of the first two Phases, which were eventually completed in 2010. Through the Private Investment Promotion Project (P051609) managed by the Senegalese Private Investment Promotion Agency (Agence Nationale Chargée du Développement de l'Investissement et des Grands Travaux, APIX), the World Bank financed the mobilization of transaction advisory services to advise the Government for the selection of a private concessionaire for the construction of the third Phase and the operation of a tolling system for the second and third Phases (“Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway”, DDTH). Financial and technical prefeasibility studies on traffic, toll sensitivity, and acceptability were financed through a Project Preparation Fund (PPF) provided by the World Bank and were also carried out on behalf of the Government by well-known consulting firms (Axelcium, SETEC, and Tecsult). 8. By project appraisal in 2009, the PPP procurement process for the construction and operation of Phase 3 of the DDTH was successfully completed. Prequalification was launched in April 2007, and the selection of the private operator was carried out through an international call for tenders resulting in three qualified bidders. Two of them submitted technical bids, and ultimately, the 30-year concession contract in the amount of approximately US$125 million4 was awarded to Eiffage in December 2008 and the contract was signed on July 2, 2009. Eiffage, which has experience working in Senegal, formed SENAC S.A. as a special-purpose vehicle to serve as the concessionaire. For the Government, the key criterion was the amount each company was willing to invest in the construction Phase, given its financial model and the set toll rates. As a result, financial aspects received a heavier weighting (60 percent) in the consideration than did the modified technical aspects (40 percent). 9. The construction of the motorway entailed significant social and environmental externalities that were outside the scope of the concession. The GoS had prepared the resettlement action plans for Phases 1 and 2 of the motorway in accordance with the World Bank policies and implemented them with the World Bank support. As the alignment of the DDTH (Phase 3) crossed densely populated areas in PIS, the Government was required to clear the right-of-way (ROW) prior to the start of works. Additionally, the DDTH crossed the Mbao forest and its impact on the forest had to be mitigated. Overall, the construction of motorway required the acquisition by the GoS of several hectares of ROW, the massive relocation of nearly 30,000 affected people and the displacement of hundreds of small businesses and other social infrastructure. To respond to the high resettlement needs, the GoS had acquired 165 ha of land in Tivaouane Peulh (TP) outside of Dakar to build a Resettlement Site (RS) where populations affected by the construction of Phase 3 of the DDTDH and the restructuring of PIS could relocate. 10. The RS was about 2 km from the Mbeubeuss open dumpsite, which had been collecting trash from the GDA for decades. Because of its proximity to TP, the project planned to support the GoS in mitigating one of the largest source of pollution in Dakar by closing the Mbeubeuss dumpsite before PAPs could resettle in TP and operationalize the new landfill to Sindia5 to receive the collected trash. 11. In that context, the World Bank’s contribution to the toll highway project took the form of a credit dedicated to the mitigation of the negative externalities of this major infrastructure and the restoration and improvement of the living conditions of the road’s dwellers. In doing so, the project was 4Amount in 2009 based on exchange rates for currencies used (euros and CFA francs). 5“Sindia” is the capital of the rural community of Sindia and the district of Sindia. It is attached to the department of M'bour, in the region of Thiès and is a crossroads town located at the intersection of the RN1 which connects Dakar to M'bour and the road that connects Thies to Popenguine. Page 8 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) expected to serve as a model of large-scale resettlement, slum upgrading, urban restructuring, and environmental protection. 12. The project was aligned with the GoS’s strategy and the World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS).6 The project was to contribute to the following pillars in the 2006–2010 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper7 adopted by the country in 2006: (a) wealth creation and pro-poor growth, (b) improving access to basic social services, (c) protecting vulnerable groups against shocks, and (d) greater transparency combined with participatory processes. Moreover, the project was to contribute to the following three pillars in the World Bank’s CAS for Senegal for FY07–10: (a) fostering economic growth through support to private sector development; (b) improving human development through better delivery of social services, notably to the most vulnerable groups; and (c) enhancing rural and urban synergies. Both strategies highlighted the importance of the transport sector for the country. Theory of Change (Results Chain) 13. The IDA-financed project was designed as an enabler for the construction of the highway (Phases 2-3), which was financed by the GoS (US$71.8 million), the African Development Bank (AfDB) (US$49 million), the French Development Agency (Agence Française de Développement, AFD) (US$33 million), and the concessionaire (US$110.7 million).8 IDA resources were allocated to co-finance the social and environmental measures required to restore and improve the living conditions of the communities affected by the toll highway More specifically: • The construction of a RS with basic infrastructure and services to relocate the people displaced by the DDTH; • The closing of the Mbeubeuss open dumpsite located 2 km from the RS conditional on the opening of the Sindia Landfill; • The restructuring of PIS to improve living conditions of the populations (see paragraph 3); • The implementation of the Mbao Forest Management Plan (PAFCM) to mitigate the impacts of the DDTH on the Mbao forest, the last forest reserve in the GDA. 14. Figure 2 shows the theory of change with longer-term outcomes the project was expected to contribute beyond its closing date. The project activities were designed under the following assumptions: (a) under Component A, not financed by the World Bank, the private sector shareholders would be interested to invest in the toll road concession and mobilize the required financing and road users would be able and willing to pay the toll fees; (b) under Components B and C, financially supported by the World Bank, affected people needing to resettle as the result of the construction of the infrastructure (Phase 3) as well as the restructuring of PIS (component C) would resettle in the identified RS in TP ; the Sindia landfill would be operational; and (c) the French Development Agency (AFD) financing for the restructuring of PIS (Component C) will be available. 6 Senegal - Country Assistance Strategy, Report No. 36608-SN. 7 Senegal - Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Report No. 07/316. 8 See annex 6 for more details on the concession. Page 9 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) Figure 2. Theory of Change Project Development Objectives (PDOs) 15. The development objective of the project as stated in the Financing Agreement (FA) and the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) is to (i) improve mobility between Dakar and Diamniadio; and (ii) provide communities affected by the construction of the highway access to basic social and economic services. Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators 16. The PDO remained the same throughout the life of the project and comprises two sub-objectives measured through six outcome indicators. Objective 1: To improve mobility between Dakar and Diamniadio • Average travel time between Dakar and Diamniadio (minutes) • Volume of traffic on toll highway (number) Objective 2: To provide communities affected by the construction of the highway access to basic social and economic services • People within 150 meters of an asphalted all year round road in PIS (number) • Surface area in PIS liable to flooding (hectares) Page 10 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) • Displaced children sent to school in PIS and Resettlement Zone (%) • Population displaced satisfied with relocation services (%) Components 17. The project consisted of four components, described in Table 1. Component A was financed by the GoS, the African Development Bank (AfDB), and the private sector. The World Bank focused on supporting the GoS in the implementation of the resettlement plans for clearing the ROW and provision of social services for the populations affected by the construction of the highway under Components B and C. The management of the project was also financed by the World Bank. The total cost of the project was estimated in the PAD at US$492 million9 and cost US$570.71 million at completion; however, this amount includes the costs of additional works requested by the GoS during construction (see Table 1).10 Table 1. Project Components and Description Amount of Actual Loan/Financing at Amount Components Description Financiers Appraisal (US$, (US$, millions) millions) Total amount 491.9 570.71a Component A: Construction of the 20-km highway from Total amount 264.5 351.35 Road Pikine interchange to Diamniadio (Phase Concessionaire 110.7 110.7 Infrastructure 3: Sections 3 and 4) that would cross PIS AfDB 49 47.46 (Phase 3) and the Mbao forest (Section 3 = Pikine- Keur Massar; Section 4 = Keur Massar- AFD 33 32.79 Diamniadio) and the provision of the toll GoS 71.8 71.8 systems for Phases 2 and 3 Amendment for accelerated GoS 0 10 commissioning of the Rufisque bypass Price indexation GoS 0 66 Amendment for additional works: Keur GoS 0 12.6 Massar interchange, construction of storage trenches along the Rufisque route to prevent flooding, additional walkways, compensation for lost revenue for the concessionaire following the decision to open the toll road free of charge due to flooding on the RN1 between Patte d’Oie and Camberene Component B: Development of the new RS in TP Total amount 158.3 147.08 Right of Way including construction of urban clearing, Urban infrastructure, public facilities, and GoS 74.6 57.61 development of housing to allow people affected by the 9 The total original amount in the PAD is different from the original amount in the ICR datasheet due to the exchange rate for financing in euros and CFA francs between appraisal and completion. 10 This ICR is not assessing the concession as it is an ongoing contract. International Finance Corporation (IFC) will be preparing a detailed report in due time. Page 11 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) Amount of Actual Loan/Financing at Amount Components Description Financiers Appraisal (US$, (US$, millions) millions) Tivaouane Peulh construction of the highway to resettle to IDA 58.5 61.06 (TP) Resettlement a new neighborhood, TP. Clearing the and ROW and compensation of PAPs, closing Implementation of the Mbeubeuss waste disposal site AFD 25.2 28.41 of the Mbao that is near the RS of TP, and Forest implementation of the PAFCM for the Management Mbao forest crossed by the highway Plan Component C: Urban restructuring of PIS, which was Total amount 55 54.71 Urban split in two by the highway, including IDA 27.3 21.2 Restructuring of construction of urban roads, drainage Pikine Irregulier networks, and public facilities and AFD 18.7 15.7 Sud (PIS) delivery of land titles to occupants GoS 9 17.81 Component D: Coordination and supervision of project Total amount 14.1 15.82 Program activities performed by APIX IDA 14.1 15.82 Implementation Note: a. Difference between this amount and the total amount in annex 3 is because of the rate of exchange between U.S. dollar, euro, and CFA franc. B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE) 18. The PDO, associated outcomes, indicators, and components were not revised throughout the life of the project. The project was restructured six times. Table 2 provides the timeline and rationale for all six project restructurings. Table 2. Project Restructurings Restructurings/Date Reasons Approved by the CD To amend the FA to extend the deadline for the opening of a fully operational on October 13, 2010 replacement open dumpsite that was to replace the Mbeubeuss open dumpsite from May 30, 2010, to March 31, 2011, because the populations of Sindia, where the new landfill would be located, were strongly against it and the deadline could not be met (Component B). This restructuring also amended two effectiveness conditions related to postponing the execution of the concession agreement between the borrower and the concessionaire (Component A) to a later date. Approved by the CD To introduce further amendments to the FA of the project to address changes in the on December 29, Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) Addendum-3 to include a cash option, rental allowances, 2010 and valuation of compensation rates because many PAPs expressed their preference for cash payments rather than receiving project-built houses (Component B). Additionally, works needed in the RS of TP to make it viable were still ongoing and PAPs had to rent accommodation while waiting for the site to be functional. The restructuring was also needed to update the timeline for RAP implementation, taking into account the new addendum, in particular for the clearing of the ROW of the Pikine-Keur Massar section of the DDTH. Page 12 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) Restructurings/Date Reasons Approved by the CD To allow the relocation of PAPs in the RS before the closure of the Mbeubeuss open on May 15, 2013 dumpsite site as previously planned (Component B). Amendments were introduced in the FA as follows: (a) the clause that prohibits the commencement of sub-projects that would cause the effective resettlement of PAPs before the Mbeubeuss open dumpsite closing down was dropped because of studies confirming that the proximity of the Mbeubeuss open dumpsite did not affect the RS and would not affect the health of the populations; (b) the dated covenants related to the opening of the Sindia landfill and to the closure of Mbeubeuss open dumpsite were postponed to December 15, 2013, as both actions would require more time in light of the strong opposition of the populations in Sindia; and (c) the dated covenants related to the availability of a functional RS in TP were postponed from June 30, 2012, to May 15, 2013, as works needed to make the site viable took longer to complete than expected. Approved by the CD To reallocate credit proceeds among the categories of eligible expenditures and move on October 31, 2013 funds from Component B to Component C to accommodate additional works in PIS and to extend the project’s closing date from July 31, 2015, to January 31, 2017, to allow implementation of remaining activities. Under Component B, the closing of the Mbeubeuss open dumpsite was still delayed in light of the uncertainty around the opening of the new landfill in Sindia for which negotiations with the local populations stopped. Bidding documents for remedial works in Mbeubeuss needed revision to consider the change in thickness and level of permeability of the top layer. Under Component C, local roads construction was delayed because of the slow clearing of the ROW worsened by the lack of counterpart funding and the difficulties in completing PAPs’ files. The works could therefore not be completed by the closing date of July 31, 2015, hence the extension of closing date to January 31, 2017. Approved by RVP on To extend the project’s closing date by 12 months from January 31, 2017, to January 31, December 22, 2016 2018, to finalize pending activities. Under Component B, the extension was needed to finalize ongoing works such as the construction of the church in TP and the completion of the pending activities under the PAFCM. The Mbeubeuss open dumpsite was still not closed despite the efforts of the GoS, and so, funds were reallocated to develop a new strategy to better manage solid waste in Dakar. This extension of closing date would also allow continuous support and payment to PAPs identified in the different RAPs. This restructuring also involved reallocation of funds between disbursement categories to move funds from Component C to Component D to take into account the operating costs increase as a result of the closing date extension and from Component C to Component B to finalize the works in TP and finance the new waste management strategy as mentioned earlier. Approved by the CD With the project closing on January 31, 2018, the uncommitted funds in the amount of on January 31, 2018 US$5 million equivalent would not be disbursed and the GoS requested their cancellation. Note: CD = Country Director; RVP = Regional Vice President. II. OUTCOME A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating Page 13 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) 19. The current PDOs remain highly relevant. The current Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) FY13– FY17 (Report No: 73478-SN) focuses, among others, on accelerating inclusive growth and generating employment through private sector participation on provision of infrastructure investments in roads and urban transport. The objective of improving mobility between Dakar and Diamniadio is directly linked to one of the CPS outcomes, namely ‘Improved mobility in targeted urban and inter-urban areas’, and remains a top priority for the country as outlined in the GoS’s Plan Senegal Emergent (PSE) adopted in 2014. Within the framework of the PSE strategy, the Government is committed to improving the well- being of the population, creating jobs for the youth through opportunities for learning and development, and fighting inequalities. The issues of flooding, insalubrity, and lack of basic services in peri-urban areas such as Pikine are still priorities for the Government as highlighted in the Pillar 2 of the PSE (Access to social services), Pillar 1 of the CPS (Improving service delivery), and the country’s National Social and Economic Development Strategy approved in October 2012. The Systematic Country Diagnostic, that is currently under finalization, argues that the country has one of the fastest growing economies in Sub- Saharan Africa but that this growth will need to be strengthened and more inclusive, evening out the distribution of human capital, increasing access to basic services for the poor, and improving connectivity. The PSE’s priorities remain consistent with those of the CPS as highlighted in the 2015 P erformance and Learning Review (Report No: 93146-SN), and the project highly contributes to this vision notably for the development of the economic pole of Diamniadio. 20. Rating. As outlined previously, the PDOs are still very relevant and aligned with the World Bank and borrower’s current strategies and the rating for relevance of PDO is High. B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome PDO 1: To improve mobility between Dakar and Diamniadio 21. Mobility between Dakar and Diamniadio was improved as the average travel time on the highway (from Malick Sy to Diamniadio) was reduced from 90 minutes in 2009 to 25 minutes in 2018, exceeding the project’s target of 30 minutes. Furthermore, the volume of traffic on the toll highway (from Patte d’Oie to Diamniadio reached 60,000 vehicles per day by January 2018 and 73,000 vehicles per day by end of May 2018. Already in 2015, the volume of traffic had reached 45,000 against a baseline of 25,000 and target of 37,500 vehicles per day.11 Additionally, the number of roundtrips between Dakar and Rufisque12 on weekdays in public mini-buses doubled from two to four after the construction of the toll highway. The project built the 20 km highway from Pikine-Diamniadio (Phase 3) (launched during the last quarter of 2010 and officially inaugurated on August 1, 2013) as well as the toll systems for Phases 2 and 3 on time and within budget, while the Government financed the construction of Phases 1 and 2 from Malick Sy to Patte d’Oie (7 km) and from Patte d’Oie to Pikine (5 km) by 2010 (see paragraph 7). 11 The target was set for 2015 before the extension of the project and was not updated taking into account the 2.5 years extension. 12 Rufisque is a suburb of Dakar (13 kms from Dakar centre) and the fourth-most-populous city in Senegal where a large number of commuters to the city center reside (see figure 1) Page 14 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) Figure 3. Aerial View of Toll Highway 22. As PDO1 broadly addresses the mobility between Dakar and Diamniadio, it’s worthy to note that the GoS financing the rehabilitation of the existing RN1 (between Patte d’Oie and Pikine) to provide an enhanced alternative route to users was an unintended positive outcome. The travel time between the center of Dakar and its suburbs (Pikine) has been reduced from 30 minutes in 2009 to currently 11 minutes (using the project-financed toll road) and 17 minutes (using the rehabilitated RN1). PDO 2: To provide communities affected by the construction of the highway access to basic social and economic services 23. The project provided communities affected by the construction of the highway (Phase 3) access to basic social and economic services. The new socioeconomic facilities increased access to economic opportunities (markets and women centers) as well as access to education (schools and training centers). The drainage systems put in place and the roads built in PIS helped drastically reduce the floods and provided easy access and improved mobility for the people. 24. First, the project has significantly improved storm water drainage in PIS. To respond to the recurrent flooding experienced by the population of PIS, the project successfully constructed six of the eight13 storm water management ponds and 4.7 km of drainage network against the 3.6 km originally targeted. As a result, the surface area in PIS liable to flooding significantly dropped from 210 ha in 2009 to 142 ha at the end of the project against a target of 119 ha (see paragraph 64). The newly built drainage infrastructure functioned well during the 2017 rainy season, thus relieving the population of PIS, and additional works to be completed under the PIS II project financed by AFD will increase the surface of PIS not exposed to flooding. 25. Second, about 199,226 PIS dwellers have access to a year-round asphalted road compared to 109,000 in 2009. The target of 250,000 people was not fully achieved as the project only financed the construction of 4.2 km of roads compared to an initial target of 28 km due to the slow clearing of the right of way in PIS that affected the construction of the local roads. However, the newly constructed drainage systems (see paragraph 23) made approximately 0.5 km of previously flooded roads accessible all year round. Additional works in PIS outside of this project also contributed to an additional 2 km of year-round asphalted roads. 13 The two remaining ponds are not critical for the rainy season. Page 15 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) 26. Third, affected communities benefitted from several new socioeconomic facilities built in TP and PIS, all fully equipped and functional. Four women centers, one cultural center, one sports center, one market, and one bus station were constructed in PIS. They were all functional and fully utilized by project closing, thus enabling diverse training opportunities for women and youth, as well as recreational activities, which were lacking in PIS. 27. In TP, two health centers, one market, and two mosques were constructed as well. All these facilities are functional with equipment and supplies in place. Utilization of the constructed socioeconomic facilities, which is currently low, is expected to increase significantly once all dwellings are constructed by PAPs (see paragraph 29). It is also expected that nearby developments currently under construction will benefit from the existing facilities of the RS. Overall at project completion and based on the surveys performed by the implementing agency, 100% of the population displaced were satisfied with the relocation services against of target of 90% thanks to the wide range of benefits offered to PAPs as part of the resettlement package (see table 4). 28. Additionally, the concerned municipalities in PIS have taken measures to ensure the sustainability of these investments including maintenance, water and electricity connections at all times, and security and safety of sites. 29. Fourth, access to schools has significantly improved in the project area. The project has built a total of three childcare centers in PIS, five elementary schools (three in PIS and two in TP), two high schools (one in PIS and one in TP), and two vocational training centers (one in PIS and one in TP). Six additional new classrooms, toilets, and administrative offices were built and equipped in the primary school, and the secondary school acquired new toilets and equipped administrative offices. All new and rehabilitated facilities are being fully utilized. As a result, the percentage of students walking more than 1 km to go to school has dropped by 38 percent for primary level and 20 percent for secondary level. 85 percent of displaced children were sent to school in PIS and TP compared to a target of 80 percent. Further, according to a recent survey,14 parents of 71 percent of primary school students and 65 percent of secondary school students were satisfied with education services provided under the project. 14 Survey performed by EXA Consulting for the impact evaluation study for the DDTH project. Page 16 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) Figure 4. New Elementary School Built in PIS Source: DDTH project 30. Finally, the development of TP has set a new standard for new urban plans in the suburbs of Dakar with high-quality infrastructure. The new RS features 2,000 plots with basic facilities such as electricity, roads, drainage systems, and a wastewater system, including a wastewater treatment plant as well as several socioeconomic facilities (see paragraphs 25 and 26). Unlike the situation in PIS in 2009, the new RS of TP features all basic services such as piped drinking water and electricity. However, the project did not build houses in TP as originally planned because PAPs opted to build their own dwellings (see paragraph 66). Consequently, resettlement in TP became optional, and 1,662 out of 2,000 available lots have been allocated15 to PAPs. To date, 602 houses are under construction by PAPs and 215 houses are occupied. The remaining 338 plots are reserved for the PAPs of the PIS II project financed by AFD for which the implementation of the RAP has yet to begin.16 31. The occupancy rate of TP is expected to significantly increase as the GoS is currently extending transport services and infrastructure to connect to TP, including a major expressway (Voie de Dégagement Nord). There are also concerns over the maintenance and management of these infrastructures, and as many of the plots are vacant, safety concerns (banditry) from the populations who are currently living in TP are legitimate. It should also be noted that to date, the delivery of formal ownership rights (land titles) to PAPs in TP is still not carried out after so many years. 15 Lots were either sold to PAPs or given for free. 16 The PIS II project financed by AFD will complete scale-up activities in PIS. Page 17 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) Figure 5. Pictures of TP before and after Project TP under construction TP after project Source: DDTH project 32. To respond to a strong request from populations living in PIS, the project intended to provide support to the ‘Fondation Droit à la Ville’, a foundation that has been working with the populations in the quest of securing land titles as appropriate. The process of land titling in PIS is complex,17 and the project realized early enough that the nongovernmental organization (NGO) ‘Fondation Droit à la Ville’ was not the proper channel for such endeavor. The project therefore financed the services of a consultant to explore practical solutions for land regularization as part of the restructuring of PIS and share the results with the Department of Urban Planning to integrate this activity into their program. This exercise contributed in raising awareness of these land titles issues in PIS, and the project-financed studies would benefit the Department of Urban Planning. 33. The project planned to close the Mbeubeuss open dumpsite before the relocation of populations in TP, but this undertaking was overly ambitious and not strictly necessary as demonstrated by the environmental studies performed during implementation. The environmental studies indicated that the presence of the Mbeubeuss dumpsite in the vicinity of the RS of TP did not pose a direct public health risk to its future residents. For instance, the level of soil pollution18 in the RS was well below dangerous levels and it was observed that the wind dynamics kept the smoke and smell from the dumpsite flowing in the opposite direction of the RS. For these reasons, closure of the dumpsite did not remain a condition for allowing project-affected persons (PAPs) to resettle in TP. Despite these findings, Mbeubeuss still poses a health risk for the whole city hence the desire of the Government to close it. First, the project struggled to find a sustainable approach to address the situation of the waste-pickers active in the Mbeubeuss dumpsite, some of whom were born and raised there. Second, the fact that the dumpsite was the final destination of most of GDA’s solid waste made it impossible to fully close it. Finally, although a new landfill site was already constructed in Sindia,19 local populations strongly opposed its 17 It is a two-step process that requires extensive land surveys combined with household surveys and an owner census: (a) the state will become the official owner of all lands where current owners have no official land title and (b) the state will give back each plot to the current owner. 18 Level of dioxins, furans, and polychlorinated biphenyls. 19 Sindia is a rural community outside the GDA in the region of Thiès. Page 18 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) commissioning despite the numerous attempts to convince them of the benefits of the facility (study tours to Italy to visit sanitary landfills, production of fertilizers, job creation, and so on). 34. The earmarked budget was reallocated to carry out additional works in TP and PIS and finance studies on a new solid waste management scheme in the Dakar region. The results of these studies recommending various technical, social, and financial options were exploited for the preparation of a new solid waste management project financed by the World bank and other donors.20 The successful closure and remediation of the Mbeubeuss dumpsite was a highly desirable aim given its potential widespread public health benefits for the population of the GDA, particularly the populations in Keur Massar. However, it was not linked to the project’s core objectives. The project sought to use the construction of the new toll highway as a leverage to resolve a lingering waste management and environmental issue affecting the GDA. Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating 35. Based on the assessment of the project’s achievements against the specific project objectives described previously, the overall efficacy is rated Substantial. First, the project allowed the construction of an infrastructure that substantially reduced costs and delays of traveling between Dakar and Diamniadio. Second, the project, through its activities in PIS and TP, provided access to basic social and economic services to an estimated 280,00021 dwellers. 36. Despite the positive outcomes of the project, at project closing, there was a backlog of 1,047 PAPs whose compensation had not yet been fully completed, in part due to the complexity of some cases and in part due to insufficient counterpart resources made available on time. The resettled populations in TP are also awaiting their land titles. (see paragraph 78). 37. Despite the shortcomings, the project substantially met its objectives, reducing the travel time in and out of Dakar, successfully restructuring PIS, and developing a new neighborhood in TP with well- paved roads, drainage systems, and equipped and operational socioeconomic infrastructures. C. EFFICIENCY Assessment of Efficiency and Rating 38. An ex post economic analysis was conducted on the project reproducing the original analysis (see annex 4 for more details). The economic rate of return at appraisal was 11.3 percent, and the economic profitability at 7 percent was to be met after six years of operation. 39. The economic analysis at the completion of the project was done using the same HDM-4 model as the one used at the preparation for the ex-ante economic evaluation on all road sections likely to be 20 US$45 million is provisionally allocated to the closure of Mbeubeuss by the proposed Senegal Municipal Solid Waste Management Project (P161477) to be presented to the Board in December 2018. 21 Estimated population in PIS in 2018. Page 19 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) affected by the new motorway and two different project construction sections (Patte d’Oie-Pikine, Phase 2, and Pikine-Diamniadio, Phase 3). 40. HDM was run for the different construction sections individually (Patte d’Oie-Pikine and Pikine- Diamniadio) and for the project as a whole, for an analysis period of 30 years, with two scenarios for each section: • The base case scenario, called ‘Base Alternative’, with no constructions but routine and periodic maintenance of the national roads; • The ‘with project case’ scenario, where the actual works carried out with their real costs and construction dates were triggered 41. The main economic results in present values over the whole analysis period of 30 years are presented in Table 3. The analysis compared, year by year, costs and benefits of the options ‘with project’ and the base scenario without investment. With the rapid increase of motorization, the initial traffic on the new sections exceeds the original expectations, leading to the very high economic return of 35 percent when compared to the initial analysis (11 percent). The economic results on the section from Pikine to Diamniadio (Phase 3) are lower than the surrounding sections and slightly lower than expected (10.5 percent compared to 12 percent in the PAD). This results from a lower traffic diversion from the congested national roads to the toll road. Table 3. Results of the economic analysis performed at project completion Section Patte d’Oie-Pikine Pikine-Diamniadio Patte d’Oie-Diamniadio Road User Benefits 390,886 144,299 521,041 (CFAF, millions) Increase of Road 55,932 138,578 145,447 Agency Costs (CFAF, millions) Net Benefits (CFAF, 322,147 5,721 322,147 millions) Rate of Return (%) 35.9 10.5 34.5 42. The project’s length of implementation affected its efficiency. The project was in particular extended twice, leading to additional supervision costs. Despite the extension, all planned activities could not be completed and at project closing, there are still 1,047 PAPs awaiting compensations. The cost for construction of the highway borne by the Government was higher than initially envisioned as (a) under the concession contract, the public sector was bound to cover the costs related to price indexation (this led to a cost overrun of US$66 million) and (b) a couple of addenda to the contract were signed upon request for the Government to accelerate some works so as to open earlier sections of the toll road and additional works on interchanges, new pedestrian bridges, and so on. 22 43. Based on the above discussion, the efficiency rating is Modest. 22 See table 1 for more details. Page 20 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING 44. The overall outcome is rated Moderately Satisfactory. As described previously, the project remains highly relevant throughout and after its closing. It achieved substantial efficacy, and the efficiency is also rated Substantial. However, there are remaining PAPs to be compensated at project closing, and a few complementary activities were not completed. E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY) Gender 45. While this was not a requirement under World Bank policy at appraisal and the project’s Result Framework did not specifically monitor gender indicators, the project was gender informed and included several activities that specifically targeted women. First, the preparation of RAPs made the effort to understand the main concerns of women regarding the resettlement process. Those concerns were, among others, the possible loss of revenue and the disruption of social networks. Further, the RAP process recognized the necessity to itemize the compensation of households to account for the small revenue-generating activities and businesses mostly owned and operated by women (small vegetable stands, fish selling, and so on) and compensate the latter directly. Second, the project designed and implemented a strategy to extend additional financial and in-kind assistance to vulnerable households, most of which were led by women (mostly widows). Finally, to address the above-mentioned concerns, the project implemented several activities that specifically targeted women for helping them restore their social networks and improve their revenues. These activities included the construction and equipment of four women’s centers, which provide a space for women to receive job training; engage in social networking; and take part in financial activities such as catering, sewing, sale of fruits and vegetables, and fishery products. Further, the two markets built in the project area (PIS and TP) provided an outlet for women to partake in economic activities to generate revenues for themselves and their families. The project also created several opportunities for youth and vulnerable groups (including women) with the creation of jobs during the implementation and operational Phases. Institutional Strengthening 46. The project undeniably contributed to the development of capacity in PPPs within the Government. As the first large infrastructure PPP in the country, APIX as well as other agencies involved in the project benefitted from trainings, study tours, and knowledge exchange in Europe and South America where PPPs had been successfully implemented. A core team with PPP expertise was put together within APIX and was provided with the necessary tools and training to ensure a successful execution. 47. The project laid the foundation for best practice social safeguards in Senegal. The project positively influenced the approach on compensations of PAPs in the country, considering formal and informal rights, compensating for losses in revenues, centralization of resettlement activities in one office onsite, and support from NGOs to identify PAPs and maintain dialogue. It allowed the development and testing of different consultation and participation mechanisms for beneficiaries and PAPs that are being replicated on several projects involving resettlement or projects with an impact to communities in Page 21 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) general. Further, a pool of social and environmental safeguards specialists within APIX benefitted from in- depth capacity building on safeguards policies and compensation policies for PAPs, which helped improve the quality of dialogue between the Government through APIX and the populations. 48. Activities under Component D also contributed to the institutional strengthening through the hiring of additional staff who benefitted from trainings and who either stayed within the implementing agency or moved to other governmental agencies. Mobilizing Private Sector Financing 49. The project exemplifies how private sector participation can contribute to reduce the infrastructure gap of a country without overburdening public finance while improving the quality of management of the infrastructure both at the construction and operation stages. It is widely considered a flagship project in the region as the first greenfield toll PPP in West Africa. The Government’s commitment in setting up a PPP including instituting the required reforms (legal environment and creation of APIX) was effective in attracting private investment in large infrastructure projects despite the context of post financial crisis in 2009. The private sector invested US$120 million for the construction of the highway (approximately 40 percent of the costs of construction), and the country provided an up-front investment subsidy to fund part of the construction costs when the feasibility studies confirmed that the private sponsor would not be able to recover its costs and maintain the road over the life of the concession if the concessionaire were to fully finance the toll road. That decision was crucial in attracting potential private sponsors. The involvement of the World Bank Group (including IFC and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency), which was regarded as an honest broker, was a key enabler of the project and valuable in building trust among other stakeholders and financiers such as the AFD and AfDB to facilitate this US$555 million project.23 50. In light of the successful concession to design, build, and operate the toll road from Dakar to Diamniadio, the Government awarded another 25-year concession to SENAC for the construction of the toll road extension to the new airport, AIBD, 17 km from Diamniadio. The success of these two transactions guided the interest of the private sector actors who are considering investing in Senegal.24 Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity 51. The project contributed to reducing disparities between Dakar and its suburbs, which are now more accessible and possess additional health and education infrastructures. With the higher level and quality of social infrastructures plus road connection, people who could not afford housing in Dakar have now the possibilities to move just outside of Dakar bringing new revenues to the area. The project financed an evaluation analysis25 to take a deeper look at the impact of the project in the country. The analysis estimated that the project expenditure contributed to boosting national GDP growth by 3.3 percent, 4.7 percent, and 3.5 percent for 2009, 2010, and 2011, respectively. The cumulative effect over 2009–2013 amounted to 16.6 percent. Additionally, the highway construction brought positive effects to 23 See annex 6 for more details on the PPP arrangements. 24 Other infrastructures have been conceded since then including a container terminal in 2008, a RoRo terminal, and a bulk terminal in 2014. 25 See annex 7 to access to the impact evaluation analysis document prepared by APIX in 2016. Page 22 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) the city and had created approximately 700 temporary jobs during the construction Phase and 250 permanent jobs during the operations Phase.26 52. According to the evaluation of project’s impacts conducted in 2018, the induced effects of project expenditure contributed to an increase in local firms’ income of 0.69 percent over 2014–2015. Further, a survey27 performed in 2015 found that 87.1 percent of businesses mostly in transportation, construction, manufacturing, and trade (compared to 80 percent in 2012) believe that the new highway improved the delivery of their inputs. This improvement is mostly due to the reduction of travel time on RN1. The survey also indicated that 59.7 percent of businesses became more competitive as mobility increased thus providing access to new markets. III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION 53. Project preparation took almost five years starting in 2004 and was overall funded by the Government, the World Bank through a US$1.5 million PPF, and an initial Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) grant of US$250,000. Financial and technical prefeasibility studies on traffic, toll sensitivity, and acceptability were financed through the PPF and were carried out by well-known consulting firms (Axelcium, SETEC, and Tecsult). The preparation for the bidding process started in 2006 through a World Bank financed project, the Private Investment Promotion Project (P051609), which was approved in 2003 with the objective of creating conditions to increase private investment, and by December 2008, the contract was awarded to the concessionaire.28 During preparation, APIX underwent a reorganization financed through the PPIAF grant to prepare for the project. Project preparation required 202 World Bank staff weeks and US$1.15 million in expenses, which attests to the level of due diligence from concerned parties (extensive feasibility studies, commitment, identification of alternative solutions, comprehensive communication and consultations, and so on). 54. Contributing to one of the largest resettlement activities in West Africa, APIX was the first agency in Senegal to manage such a high number of PAPs in a complex environment and, despite the learning curve and setbacks, was overall able to carry out the process. 55. It was the first greenfield toll road project in Africa other than South Africa and was an excellent example of cross collaboration between institutions of the World Bank Group and also with other development partners. The objectives of the project were clear and highly relevant, and the design structure was logical among the three components. Understandably, the project aspired to solve the many issues raised as a cascade effect of the toll road construction, but then the design was overly complex. As the first PPP of its kind involving resettlements at levels unseen in the region, the project was already complex enough and may have been overly ambitious in trying to address a wide urban restructuring beyond the restructuring of PIS such as exemplified by the case of the Mbeubeuss closing, not an absolute necessity as demonstrated by the studies at appraisal for the PDO. 26 See completion report of the AfDB project (Component 1) in annex 8. 27 Results of survey included in the impact evaluation report. 28 See annex 6 for more details. Page 23 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) 56. A program or series of projects could have been optimal. Although this option was considered at preparation, the reason it was not selected was to mitigate the risk of the different actors losing interest in the other components once construction of the highway was completed and functional. 57. The project was a high-risk, high-reward undertaking. A comprehensive risks matrix was formulated during preparation considering the complexity of the project. In particular, the risk of deficiency in counterpart funding, which was one of the main issues during implementation, was identified but with weak long-term mitigation measures. The Government already had in fact accumulated arrears in payment of counterpart funding for the compensations of the PAPs on other World Bank-financed projects and on the Government-funded segment of the highway (Malick Sy to Pikine - Phase 1) but strong measures were not in place to mitigate this risk. B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION 58. As mentioned previously, the project was complex, but it benefitted from a strong implementing agency (APIX) and contract management structure (Public Interest Works Implementing Agency [Agence d’Exécution des Travaux d’Intérêt Public, AGETIP]) equipped with the required expertise and experience needed to fulfill the mission as well as commitment from the Government and financiers. The project had a large number of stakeholders and relied on many governmental agencies and local government. Coordination between them was essential for the continuity of works and achievement of results. APIX was responsible for the overall coordination, financial reporting, and procurement for the project, and throughout implementation, communication was constant with the World Bank team and other financiers. 59. The opening of a local APIX office called ‘the Office of the Highway in Pikine’ was a major innovation for the project. The ‘Office’, located near the affected people, facilitated on-the-spot and same-day processing of files (submission of paperwork, verification, receipt of payment, and allocation of land in TP as needed) and enabled constant communication with the people. This arrangement was effective, but the ‘Office’ was closed in 2016,29 compelling PAPs to file their requests at the Department of Taxes and Domains where PAPs from other projects were also being handled. This created a backlog of files as the treatment required 5–10 days for processing. 60. The project was restructured twice before its effectiveness to amend the FA to address delays in the Government’s opening a fully operational replacement landfill in Sindia and closing the Mbeubeuss dumpsite. The FA was amended through three restructurings and the loan closing date was extended cumulatively by 30 months from its original closing date (July 31, 2015). Overall, the project was restructured six times since its approval in 2009. These changes were necessary but did not affect the original theory of change as the PDO objectives remained relevant and unchanged. The Government requested a third extension of the project closing date from January 31, 2018, to September 30, 2018, to complete the remaining works.30 The request was declined considering the slow progress in implementing project activities and agreed actions plans, evidencing the unlikeliness of concluding the remaining activities even with this new extension. The last three months of project implementation were focused on securing and cleaning up works sites and concluding compensations for PAPs. The compensation of 29 The office was located in a building in the military camp in Pikine and the military requested its release. 30 These works include complementary works that were added during implementation. Page 24 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) the outstanding PAPs remains a challenge at the time of the drafting of the ICR, and the World Bank team will continue to closely monitor the situation.31 World Bank budget was provided to the team to continue this exercise beyond the closing date of the project and until appropriate resolution mechanisms are in place. 61. The project planned to build houses for PAPs resettling in TP. Although intensive communication campaigns were held during preparation and 80 percent of the PAPs at that time were in favor of the project building the houses in TP, the trend was reversed and ultimately the concerned PAPs expressed their preference for building their own houses in TP or relocating elsewhere. The change was due to the delay in developing the RS because of the delay in selecting the construction firm and signing the contract, thus forcing PAPs to find alternative accommodations since they had to vacate their current homes, and for some, these arrangements became permanent. Additionally, PAPs were concerned that the RS of TP would be similar to the one built by a government-funded project after the excessively severe 2005 floods.32 The project had to request a waiver33 to convert these funds earmarked for the construction of the houses to cash to be used for PAP compensations. 62. APIX was adequately staffed throughout implementation, but attention toward remaining activities seemed to have gradually declined. Particularly, the pace of treating of the PAPs’ files as well as actual compensation slowed down, and due diligence in complying with the safeguards requirements as well as management of the different contractors weakened resulting in delays. Supervision and monitoring of health, safety, and environment on site was inadequate at times, including insufficient safety signals at sites and lack of personal protective equipment for workers. IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) M&E Design 63. To track progress against the PDOs, six PDO indicators were selected, and all components were associated with at least two intermediate indicators. Two indicators, specifically, the ‘Average travel time between Dakar and Diamniadio (minutes)’ and the ‘Volume of traffic on toll highway (number)’ were adequate to measure PDO 1 - To improve mobility between Dakar and Diamniadio. Although only Phase 3 was built under the project, these two indicators measured the impact of Phases 1, 2 and 3 in relation to the average travel time and Phases 2 and 3 in relation to the volume of traffic on the toll highway. This made sense since the objective was to improve mobility in and out of Dakar. Additionally, the project tolling system in Phase 2 was included in the concession, and the World Bank support on social and environmental safeguards comprised all three Phases. Similarly, the intermediate indicator ‘number of kilometers of roads built’ measured the progress toward PDO 1. 31 World Bank budget was approved after project closing to continue the monitoring of the social safeguards issues. 32 The GoS built an RS in Jaxaay, 25 km from Dakar for the displaced populations affected by the floods in 2005. The houses were of lower standard, and the site did not offer social and economic services such as health centers, markets, and a drainage system. 33 The waiver was approved by the World Bank in October 2010. Page 25 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) 64. PDO 2 - To provide communities affected by the construction of the highway access to basic social and economic services) was measured through four indicators: (a) People within 150 meters of an asphalted all-year-round road in PIS (number); (b) Surface area in PIS liable to flooding (hectares); (c) Displaced children sent to school in PIS and Resettlement Zone (%); and (d) Population displaced satisfied with relocation services (%), most of which were also adequate (see paragraph 63). The intermediate indicator ‘Unresolved complaints after one year of lodging complaint (Percentage)’ was relevant in measuring the progress toward PDO 2 as it did assess the satisfaction of the communities affected by the project and the reactivity of the project to resolve issues as they arise. Although the project did not build the houses in TP as originally planned, the intermediate indicator ‘number of housing units constructed’ was still relevant in measuring the attractiveness of the new site and willingness of PAPs to relocate there. The remaining two intermediate indicators— ‘the number of new socioeconomic services constructed’ and the ‘length of drainage canals constructed’—were adequate in measuring progress toward PDO 2. 65. All the selected indicators were measurable, achievable, and timebound with baseline data available. Overall, the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) was appropriately designed to measure the achievement of the project’s objectives and provided clear guidance on what to collect, how and when to collect it, and the responsible party. The PDO indicators were clear outcome indicators, and the data collection instruments were appropriate and helped monitor and measure progress toward achievement of the PDOs. Nevertheless, the M&E framework presented few shortcomings. At appraisal, the baseline for the indicator ‘Surface area in PIS liable to flooding (hectares)’ was 90 ha and the target was set at 15 ha. In 2009, a study conducted by APIX concluded that the surface in PIS liable to flooding was 210 ha (30 percent of the total surface of PIS - 700 ha) instead of 90 ha, and the objective of the project was to decrease that area to 119 ha. Unfortunately, the indicator was not updated during implementation. The M&E framework could have also been complemented by sub-indicators directly linked to the project activities. For example, a sub-PDO Indicator for ‘Average travel time’ and the ‘Volume of traffic’ measuring time and traffic on Phase 3 of the toll road. The World Bank project could hardly be considered in isolation from the rest of the Dakar–Diamniadio motorway infrastructure, turning de facto those transport-related indicators particularly relevant. 66. Finally, the M&E framework could also have been more comprehensive, measuring specific project outputs such as the closing of Mbeubeuss, the distribution of land titles in PIS for current residents, and the implementation of the PAFCM. One important aspect of the RS that was not measured relates to the distribution of land titles and/or land rights for PAPs who chose to move to TP. M&E Implementation 67. Data collection was not an issue throughout the project, and baseline data were already available. The indicators were regularly tracked by the concessionaire (for indicators linked to the toll road) and by APIX, which had a dedicated M&E specialist working full time on the project. The Project Implementation Unit diligently and regularly reported on the indicators and worked closely with the other responsible agencies to ensure timely and accurate reporting. As mentioned in paragraphs 64 and 65, there were indicators that should have been modified to reflect the underlined changes during project implementation. Page 26 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) M&E Utilization 68. The project’s M&E findings were regularly shared with stakeholders through progress reports and the World Bank’s aide memoires after each mission. The indicators linked to the mobility between Dakar and Diamniadio (see paragraph 63) will continue to be monitored by the concessionaire and the Government. The indicator values were greatly useful in evidencing that the project objectives were achieved. The indicators linked to the resettlement of populations in TP including easy access to social services and satisfaction of PAPs would inform projects in education, health and the PIS II project whose PAPs will be resettled in TP. Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E 69. The quality of M&E is rated Substantial based on the clarity and usefulness of the indicators selected as well as the methodology and framework put in place for consistent data collection and utilization. Overall, the selected indicators and intermediate indicators provided useful insight for monitoring the results of the project and measure achievement of the PDOs. In addition to monitoring the selected indicators as agreed during preparation, the project financed a detailed impact evaluation including additional indicators. The results of this analysis helped measure the achievement of the objectives of the project. B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE Environmental Safeguards 70. The Environmental Assessment category was rated ‘A’ at appraisal. The following safeguards policies were triggered: Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01), Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4.04), Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4.11), Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12), and Forests (OP/BP 4.36). Further, the World Bank safeguards policies applied to the Government-funded sections of the highway (Phases 1 and 2) as well as the PPP-funded section (Phase 3). All safeguards documents were reviewed by the World Bank and disclosed according to the guidelines. Safeguard audits of Phases 1 and 2 were performed, and the GoS was required, as an effectiveness condition for the World Bank project, to compensate or secure in an escrow account the funds needed for the remaining PAPs of Phases 1 and 2. 71. The project successfully mitigated the impact of the toll highway on the Mbao forest. The forest is considered the ‘green lung’ of Dakar and is home to a variety of economic activities such as gardening, livestock farming, and medicinal plants, to name a few, contributing to the growth of the area. The toll road crossed the Mbao forest, and about 35 ha of forest was affected and 8,000 trees were cut down. To mitigate this impact, the project financed the implementation of the PAFCM. The following activities were successfully completed: (a) compensatory reforestation and enrichment of about 116 ha (two trees planted for each tree cut down); (b) development of an arboretum complex; (c) studies for the construction of a national herbarium; and (d) construction of a produce storage facility, a processing unit for vegetables, fruits, and cereals, a honey farm, and toilets and sanitary blocks for gardeners active within the forest. Overall, the PAFCM presents an opportunity to efficiently manage the forest and provide to the city and surrounding suburbs a green space for leisure, which is practically nonexistent in Dakar. Page 27 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) 72. All environmental and social management plans of works were satisfactorily implemented. The RS of TP was developed, and drainage and sanitation works have been carried out to preserve the roadway and protect residents against flooding. Additionally, nuisances were minimized during construction with the construction of a sound barrier protection wall. The impacts on the Mbao forest reserve were contained in consultation with water and forestry services. 73. While Mbeubeuss dumpsite was not closed during the project, the studies relating to the preparation of a closure plan and the opening of the Sindia landfill were carried out and validated by the Government and the World Bank. With the development of new urban hubs in Diamniadio–Mbour area, it is imperative for the GoS to devise alternative solutions (see paragraph 32). Social Safeguards 74. The project’s overall complexity was translated into the different safeguards instruments. Overall, two Resettlement Policy Frameworks, nine Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs), and six RAP addenda were prepared for the clearing of the ROW for the toll road (all Phases) as well the restructuring of PIS and the development of the TP RS including the closing of the Mbeubeuss dumpsite. Figure 6. ROW of the Toll Highway Source: APIX 75. The commitment of the authorities as well as the involvement of NGOs greatly facilitated the RAP process. Specifically, the clearing of the ROW for the toll road (Phase 3) was on the critical path and could have jeopardized the ability of the concessionaire to build the highway on time if it had been delayed. Any such delay would have negatively affected the concessionaire financing and ultimately the cashing of toll revenues. A major achievement for the project was to clear on time the ROW for the toll road despite the magnitude of the task at hand. PAPs were presented with options to receive full financial compensations or a combination of financial compensations and resettlement in TP. Additional benefits were offered to PAPs according to Table 4, which could be considered as good practice as they provide benefits beyond the standard level of support to PAPs. Page 28 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) Table 4. Benefits provided to PAPs for the DDTH project Principal Additional Optional Free counselling services Compensation of Physical Moving expenses Plot in the TP at full price structures at full replacement Compensation for lost rental income cost Architectural assistance Rental expenses Legal assistance Free realtor services Free or half-priced plot in the RS Financial assistance (vulnerable PAPs) (vulnerable PAPs) Compensation of land at market Discounted construction material price Social Fund Tax exemption on the transaction of the plot in the RS Recycling of materials from compensated structures 76. The preparation and implementation of RAPs were based on a sound communication strategy. APIX developed an overall communication strategy for the project that included a strong social communication component. The strategy was implemented through meetings (public hearings, community meetings, and home visits); press releases and posters; television and radio broadcasts, especially on community radio stations; the publication of leaflets and brochures (guide for the displaced, guide to resettlement, and leaflet presenting the project); and local activities (youth groups and sports tournaments). The approach attracted and informed the populations especially the ones that were directly affected by the project. 77. APIX adopted a participatory strategy with the affected communities. To better support the PAPs, a local APIX office called the ‘Office’ was opened in Pikine where most of the PAPs were located. The ‘Office’ housed all the stakeholders involved in the involuntary relocation and resettlement process and acted as a one-stop shop for PAPs to seek information, submit their paperwork, and receive their compensations. The project also opened smaller local offices in specific neighborhoods and established consultation groups involving local authorities and PAPs with different committees such as Local Monitoring Committees, PIS Information Committees, Social Mediation Committees, and so on. A partnership with local community organizations, sports and cultural associations, and women’s groups was also established. Several public meetings and hearings were held to inform and consult with PAPs throughout the process, from RAP development to implementation. These local offices have also made it possible to receive PAPs on a permanent basis and to record their concerns or complaints. This widespread communication approach was key to ensuring that the clearing of the ROW was successful, especially for the construction of the highway. 78. To date, 10,584 PAPs, of which 13734 are awaiting additional checks, have been compensated out of 11,494 identified PAPs (92 percent). The process will continue beyond project closing according to the conditions of the signed FA.35 Initially, 12,022 PAPs were identified, and 528 have been removed from the list as they were no longer considered eligible for compensations according to the RAP (318 are PAPs 34 These PAPs received principal payments for their houses or businesses and are awaiting complementary checks for lost rental income or payment of additional rental charges. 35 See details of the number of PAPs in annex 7. Page 29 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) who could not be located after more than six years of active search by various means of communication and 210 are PAPs who are located in areas where works will no longer be performed). Ultimately, 11,494 PAPs (including families and businesses) were to be compensated representing approximately 30,000 individuals. At project closing, 1,047 PAPs (8.8 percent), of which 137 have received partial payments, are awaiting payments for a total estimated amount of US$11.3 million as follows: (a) 39736 eligible PAPs still remained to be compensated for a total estimated amount of US$5.7 million, pending release of compensation funds from the Government. (b) 51337 PAPs were considered complicated cases involving heredity and ownership issues as well as cases with incomplete files and, in some cases, lost files, for which compensation funds to the tune of US$5.6 million are required. 79. The process of payment of the compensations is ongoing, and the GoS has committed to concluding this process on time. The World Bank will continue close supervision of the management of the remaining cases. 80. Project’s safeguard management has significantly contributed to improving the Senegalese national practices for resettlement, and remains overall a reference for future large projects with significant social impact, being one of the largest and most complex case of resettlements in Africa. At closing, the percentage of unresolved complaints from PAPs after one year has reached the target of 0 percent. This means that all complaints were managed within the year. According to the different surveys performed throughout the life of the project, the percentage of the population satisfied with the relocations services also reached 100 percent, above the initial target of 90 percent. 81. However, because of the pending compensations, safeguards performance is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. Despite the above-mentioned positive environmental and social safeguards outcomes, the pace of compensations of PAPs slowed down considerably during the last years of implementation due to the lack of public funding. As a result, there are 1,047 PAPs still remaining to be compensated by project closing. Further, the Mbeubeuss dumpsite is still open and continues to cause significant adverse impacts in the GDA, and the resettled PAPs in TP are still awaiting their land titles. Financial Management 82. The project’s financial management was moderately satisfactory. APIX was identified as the best agency to handle the fiduciary responsibilities for this PPP project especially after the agency was able to build its financial management capacity under the Private Investment Promotion Project (P051609). The accounting system and financial and accounting manual remained adequate throughout the project. However, some delays were noted in the submission of interim financial reports as well as approval of annual budgets. The disbursement rate reached 95 percent at the end of the grace period. A World Bank financial management specialist based in Dakar supported the project through implementation. Audit reports were provided on time, and all audits were unqualified. At project closing, the physical inventory of assets and final audit were successfully performed. 36 Of which 21 are awaiting complementary payments. 37 Of which 116 are awaiting complementary checks once their additional files are complete. Page 30 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) Procurement 83. The project’s procurement performance was moderately satisfactory. Procurement was carried out using the World Bank’s standard bidding documents by AGETIP for technical aspects of the project (Components B and C) and by APIX for project management (Component D). Both agencies have an effective in-house structure and experience in managing contracts. In both structures, key staff responsible for procurement received training in the World Bank’s procurement procedures. At the end of the project, there were no red flags in procurement. However, the monitoring and updating of the Procurement Plan was not performed regularly, and the management of the contracts, including the activities of Components B and C carried out by AGETIP, had many requests for addendum and important modifications. C. BANK PERFORMANCE Quality at Entry 84. The World Bank worked closely with the GoS based on the defined country strategy to identify and prepare the project with the best financing instrument at that time. The project benefitted from numerous detailed technical, financial, and economic feasibility studies that allowed an optimal design of the project, and many different options were reviewed and analyzed before selecting this final design. As mentioned in paragraph 55, the project’s design was too complex, including activities that were out of scope. 85. The project involved many stakeholders and pioneered the maximizing finance for development (MFD) approach for private sector financing in infrastructure projects in the country. It leveraged resources from various governmental agencies, private sector actors, and international finance institutions, and the World Bank played an important role coordinating between all parties and providing assistance during the course of preparation. 86. The necessary studies and documents focusing on the social and environmental aspects of the project as well as fiduciary assessments were initiated early during the project preparation, which took many years and attests to the depth of the groundwork accomplished in preparing the project. The PAD prepared by the World Bank included the arrangements (implementation, M&E, and fiduciary) needed to ensure that the outcomes of the project are attained as planned. The project also planned for a detailed impact evaluation exercise, which was innovative at that time. All through the preparation, the World Bank maintained a multidisciplinary team which worked closely with the other partners. The project experienced delays in becoming effective as the FA required two restructurings,38 indicating a few oversights during preparation. Quality of Supervision 87. The project was of unprecedented nature with high risks, complex design, and a large number of affected people. The World Bank supervision team was however present with enough resources and a 38 Refer to ‘key factors during implementation’ section and table 4. Page 31 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) task team leader based in Dakar to ensure proactivity and constant communication with the Government, other donors, and the concessionaire. The World Bank remained fully engaged during the project implementation, and considering the complex social aspects of the project, the World Bank appointed a safeguards specialist in the Dakar office to help mitigate the risks and support the client as needed. The project also benefitted from higher-level management support (site visits by the Country Director, Transport Director, and Manager and regular communication with high-level government representatives), which helped keep the momentum and facilitated progress. 88. The World Bank team provided constant support during implementation through supervision missions, site visits, and communications (e-mails, official communication, and video and audio conferences). With the 2.5 years extension, the World Bank supervision over the last years of the project was substantially strengthened with weekly meetings, especially regarding the social safeguards aspects and several site visits per year. The supervision missions were carried out with a multidisciplinary team to ensure that all aspects of the project were reviewed and problems addressed promptly. 89. During missions, the World Bank team ensured that the various partners in the project such as AFD, the contractors, the supervision engineer, the different ministries involved, and local governments as well as the implementing agency actively participated. The World Bank team ensured that all fiduciary arrangements were respected according to the FA. In light of the complex social aspects of the project, the World Bank adopted a particularly hands-on supervision of social safeguards. The supervision of the World Bank always resulted in constructive recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the project actions with clear action plans prepared and used as reference point for next steps. Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance 90. The World Bank performance is overall rated Moderately Satisfactory. D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME 91. The DDTH project achieved considerable results and contributed to substantially improve urban mobility in Dakar. However, there are risks that some of the outcomes achieved would not be sustained over time: • In PIS, some of the drainage systems could not be concluded by project closing, including two retention basins as well as two sections of the primary collector. While the two basins are not critical for the usual rainy season, they are needed for exceptional rainy seasons and may require specific pumping to flow the excess of water. Similarly, the stream of water that should be channeled through the primary collector not fully completed will require a channeling toward an existing exhaust and pumping solutions. In the short term, it is important that specific measures are put in place and maintained by the Government (for example, water pumping) to prevent future flooding. Ideally, the Government should finalize these downstream collectors and basins as soon as possible, a project for which the GoS indicated its commitment to undertake with other funding. • The socioeconomic infrastructures built under the project in PIS and TP such as schools, day cares, women’s centers, market, and health centers indubitably contribute to improve the Page 32 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) living conditions of the dwellers. Looking ahead, maintaining those infrastructures in good conditions will rely on the commitment and capacity of the municipalities to ensure their operation and mitigate the risk of misuse, closing, or depreciating over time. Several mayors met during field visits in the last year of the project implementation demonstrated such commitment to handle those infrastructures transferred to them. • The counterpart funding expected to finance the compensation of PAPs was lacking during the project implementation, which affected the pace of execution of the RAPs. The GoS remains formally responsible for the conclusion of these compensations in accordance with the World Bank procedures until their full conclusion even after project closing. The risk that uncompensated PAPs remain despite the commitment of the Government to finalize all payments is not negligible and will require a continued follow-up by the World Bank with the Government. Such follow-up is already planned in FY19, including through the preparation of a comprehensive social audit of the project, and should the situation not be settled soon, it could affect other World Bank-financed projects in the country. • The rate of occupancy in TP was still low at project closing, entailing a risk of degradation of the infrastructure due to underuse, notably for the treatment plant, the community market and socioeconomic center’s lack of maintenance, and security issues. Although 1,662 out of 2,000 available parcels were allocated in the RS of TP, official land titles or Right of Land Occupancy had still not been issued to the PAPs at closing. This poses a risk to the populations who agreed to resettle in TP, especially as they do not have legal ownership of the land where they built their houses putting them at risk in the long term with the ongoing land speculation in TP. Such situation will continue to be followed up by the World Bank even after closing, and if not settled soon, it could also affect other World Bank financed projects in the country. • The project implementation scheme involved an agency whose mandate is the promotion of foreign investments in the country (APIX). As such, its involvement in the project was perfectly legitimate during project implementation and, as mentioned previously, the agency demonstrated excellent capacity to implement the project, particularly during the construction Phase. Looking ahead and as the Government ambitions to further expand the toll road network, a reflection might be useful on the best way to regulate that kind of complex contracts in the long term, including through the structuring of a dedicated regulatory body granted with adequate levels of competences, capacities, and independence. V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 92. The following are the lessons from this project and recommendations: • Project rationale. The intervention of the World Bank in this project, dedicated to the mitigation of the impacts of this major infrastructure on dwellers, combined with IFC support in the form of a loan to the private sector, was instrumental to enable the mobilization and coordination of both international funding institutions (AfDB and AFD) and the private sector Page 33 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) in the financing and operation of the toll road. It is a vivid demonstration of both the leverage and coordination capacity of the World Bank as well as the relevance of the MFD, an approach adopted more recently by the World Bank. Conversely though, the absence of participation of the World Bank in the financing of the infrastructure reduced the World Bank’s leverage on the Government to accelerate the works planned under the World Bank- financed activities in the upgrading of PIS, particularly once the main infrastructure opened and the focus of the Government was directed to other flagship projects. For similar future projects, the World Bank’s participation in the financing of the PPP arrangement for more leverage could be considered. • Project scope. Clearly defining the boundaries of a project may sometimes be a delicate task, and teams should always keep a clear view of the project’s objectives at preparation. While temptation may be fueled to add more activities from different review meetings at preparation, refrain from complicating projects. In the present case, while the project was already intrinsically complex, several activities have been incorporated in its scope that were not an absolute necessity to achieve its objective, such as the Mbeubeuss landfill decommissioning. • Implementation of projects with large groups of affected people. A set of actions to handle the resettlement processes were piloted during the project that appeared very relevant and should be considered best practices, including the opening of a local office in the affected areas serving as a ‘one-stop shop’ near the affected people in Pikine for the processing of compensations and collection of complaints; the hiring of NGOs and independent safeguards specialists to help dialogue with the people, mitigating the risks of misunderstanding and speeding-up the processes; and the design and implementation of an extensive communication strategy. Unfortunately, the observed reduction in the pace of implementation of the resettlement processes stemmed in part from the reduced focus of the various agencies involved in the processes. • Payment of compensation. As detailed in this ICR, the key target of the activities financed by the World Bank under the project specifically was to mitigate the impacts of the infrastructure on the dwellers, both in the construction and operation stages. However, the payment of the compensations of the PAPs remained the responsibility of the Government according to the project design, with the exception of the affected people that were to be resettled in TP who finally decided to opt for cash compensations.39 Upon conclusion of the infrastructure, the pace of implementation of the resettlement processes slowed down substantially, affecting the overall project implementation. o While it is theoretically possible, payment of the compensations to PAPs by a World Bank-financed project remains an exception. Looking ahead, easing the possibility to pay compensations to PAPs from the credit or the loan of World Bank-financed projects 39For those PAPs, an addendum to the FA was signed in 2011 to specifically authorize cash compensations financed from the proceeds of the credit. Page 34 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) through a revision of the procedures could allow more speedy and efficient execution of projects. o In the specific cases of projects that trigger revenues (for example, concessions), an alternative could be designing innovative financing schemes where the compensation would be sourced from the payment of the tolls, for example, directing the value added tax and/or other taxes collected to the payment of compensations. . Page 35 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS A. RESULTS INDICATORS A.1 PDO Indicators Objective/Outcome: To improve mobility between Dakar and Diamniadio Objective/Outcome: Provide communities affected by the construction of the highway access to basic social and economic services Unlinked Indicators Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Average travel time between Minutes 90.00 30.00 25.00 Dakar and Diamniadio 06-May-2009 31-Jul-2015 31-Jan-2018 Comments (achievements against targets): Target exceeded at 115%. This indicator measured the travel time on the highway including Phases 1, 2 and 3 Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Volume of traffic on toll Number 25000.00 37500.00 60000.00 Page 36 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) highway 06-May-2009 31-Jul-2015 31-Jan-2018 Comments (achievements against targets): Target exceeded at 133%. In July 2015, the volume had already reached 45,000 and by May 2018, the volume of traffic reached 73,000. This indicator measured the volume of traffic on Phases 2 and 3 which have toll systems financed by the project. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion People within 150 meters of Number 109000.00 250000.00 199226.00 an asphalted all year round road in PIS 06-May-2009 31-Jul-2015 31-Jan-2018 Comments (achievements against targets): Partially achieved (80%). The target of 250,000 people was not fully achieved as the project only financed the construction of 4.2 kms of roads compared to an initial target of 28 km due to the slow clearing of the right of way in PIS that affected the construction of the local roads. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Surface area in PIS liable to Text 210 119 142 flooding (hectares) 06-May-2009 31-Jul-2015 31-Jan-2018 Comments (achievements against targets): Indicator partially achieved. After project,142 ha remain liable to flooding against a target of 119. The RF includes the corrected baseline and target established during implementation. At appraisal, the baseline for the indicator ‘Surface area in PIS liable to flooding (hectares)’ was 90 ha and the target was set at 15 ha. However, in 2009, a study conducted by APIX concluded that the surface in PIS liable to flooding was 210 ha (30 percent of the total surface of PIS - 700 ha) instead of 90 ha, and the objective of the project was to decrease that area to 119 ha. Page 37 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Displaced children sent to Percentage 58.00 80.00 85.00 school in PIS and Resettlement Zone 06-May-2009 31-Jul-2015 31-Jan-2018 Comments (achievements against targets): Target exceeded at 106% Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Population displaced satisfied Percentage 0.00 90.00 100.00 with relocation services (%) 06-May-2009 31-Jul-2015 31-Jan-2018 Comments (achievements against targets): Target fully achieved. Overall at project completion and based on the surveys performed by the implementing agency, 100% of the population displaced were satisfied with the relocation services against of target of 90% thanks to the wide range of benefits offered to PAPs as part of the resettlement package. A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators Component: Component A: Road Infrastructure (motorway sections 3 and 4) Component: Component B: Right of Way Clearing, Urban Development of the Tivaouane Peulh Resettlement Site and Implementation of the Mbao Forest Management P lan Page 38 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) Component: Component C: Urban Restructuring of Pikine-Irregulier Sud (PIS) Component: Program management Unlinked Indicators Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Roads constructed, non-rural Kilometers 7.00 32.00 32.00 06-May-2009 31-Jul-2015 31-Jan-2018 Comments (achievements against targets): Fully achieved. Phase 1: Malick Sy – Patte d’Oie : 7 km financed by GoS; Phase 2: Patte d’Oie – Pikine: 5 km financed by GoS but toll system included under this project; Phase 3: Pikine – Diamniadio: 20 km built under this project with toll systems. The baseline already included the first section of the highway from Malick Sy to Patte d'Oie. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Roundtrips between Dakar Number 2.00 4.00 4.00 and Rufisque on weekdays per public transpot mini-bus 06-May-2009 31-Jul-2015 31-Jan-2018 (Number) Comments (achievements against targets): Fully achieved. The first buses to operate earlier morning can even go up to 5 round trips/day. Rufisque is a suburb of Dakar (13 kms from Dakar centre) with a large number of commuters using public transport services to reach the city centre for work, school or economic activities. The number of round trips between Dakar and Rufisque is a very good indicator to measure the improvement of urban mobility in Dakar. Page 39 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Housing units constructed Number 0.00 2000.00 215.00 06-May-2009 31-Jul-2015 31-Jan-2018 Comments (achievements against targets): Target not achieved. Originally this indicator was supposed to compute the number of houses built by the project in TP. During project implementation, it was agreed that the beneficiaries would build their own houses and thus this indicator should have been revised accordingly. Not all 2000 lots were allocated as originally planned. Out of 1662 lots allocated, 215 houses are constructed and occupied and 602 are under construction by PAPs. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Length of drainage canals Number 0.00 3624.00 4780.00 constructed (meters) 06-May-2009 31-Jul-2015 31-Jan-2018 Comments (achievements against targets): Target exceeded at 131%. The length of drainage canal increased thanks to complementary drainage works completed. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion New socioeconomic services Number 203.00 214.00 219.00 constructed 06-May-2009 31-Jul-2015 31-Jan-2018 Page 40 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) Commercial spaces Number 197.00 198.00 198.00 06-May-2009 31-Jul-2015 31-Jan-2018 Markets Number 6.00 8.00 8.00 06-May-2009 31-Jul-2015 31-Jan-2018 Comments (achievements against targets): Target exceeded at 102%. An additional 16 facilities was constructed compared to the 11 originally planned in PIS. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Unresolved PAPs after one Percentage 0.00 7.00 0.00 year of lodging complaint (Percentage) 06-May-2009 31-Jul-2015 31-Jan-2018 Comments (achievements against targets): Fully Achieved. All complaints received were resolved within a year. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Keur Massar - Diamniadio Kilometers 0.00 13.00 13.00 06-May-2009 31-Jul-2015 31-Jan-2018 Comments (achievements against targets): Fully achieved. This is a breakdown of the roads constructed, non rural indicator and represents section 4 of Page 41 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) Phase 3. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Patte d'Oie -Pikine Kilometers 0.00 5.00 5.00 06-May-2009 31-Jul-2015 30-Nov-2016 Comments (achievements against targets): Fully achieved. This is a breakdown of the roads constructed, non rural indicator and represents Phase 2. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion PIS Restructuring Kilometers 0.00 28.00 4.20 06-May-2009 31-Jul-2015 31-Jan-2018 Comments (achievements against targets): Target not achieved. This indicator should be "Kilometers of roads constructed in PIS" instead of "PIS restructuring" and is supposed to measure the length of local roads in PIS as part of the urban restructuring. The construction of the roads in PIS could not be completed as planned because the right of way in some sections was not cleared. The lack of funds for compensations affected the completion of these works. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Malick Sy- Patte d'Oie Kilometers 0.00 7.00 7.00 06-May-2009 31-Jul-2015 31-Jan-2018 Page 42 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) Comments (achievements against targets): Fully achieved. This is a breakdown of the roads constructed, non rural indicator and represents phase 1. Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Target Completion Pikine - Keur Massar Kilometers 0.00 7.00 7.00 06-May-2009 15-Jul-2015 31-Jan-2017 Comments (achievements against targets): Fully achieved. This is a breakdown of the roads constructed, non rural indicator and represents section 3 of Phase 3. Page 43 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT Objective/Outcome 1 1. Average travel time between Dakar and Diamniadio (minutes) Outcome Indicators 2. Volume of traffic on toll highway 1. Malick Sy-Patte d'Oie (Phase 1) 2. Patte d'Oie-Pikine (Phase 2) 3. Pikine-Keur Massar (First section of Phase 3) Intermediate Results Indicators 4. Keur Massar-Diamniadio (second section of Phase 3) 5. Roundtrips between Dakar and Rufisque on weekdays per public transport mini- bus (Number) Key Outputs by Component Component A: 20 kms of toll highway constructed with tolling systems in place for (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1) Phases 2 and 3. Objective/Outcome 2 1. People within 150 meters of an asphalted all year round road in PIS 2. Surface area in PIS liable to flooding (hectares) Outcome Indicators 3. Displaced children sent to school in PIS and Resettlement Zone 4. Population displaced satisfied with relocation services (%) 1. PIS Restructuring 2. Unresolved PAPs after one year of lodging complaint (Percentage) Intermediate Results Indicators 3. New socioeconomic services constructed 4. Length of drainage canals constructed (meters) 5. Housing units constructed Key Outputs by Component Component B: 2,000 viable lots, 1 market, 2 mosques, 2 health centers, 2 (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 2) elementary schools, 1 high school, 1 vocational training center, drainage system Page 44 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) installed, local access roads built, wastewater treatment plant installed Component C: 4.2 km of local roads constructed 5.4 km drainage system and 16 ha of retention basin built 16 new socio-economic facilities built (3 nurseries, 3 primary schools, 1 secondary school, 1 market, 4 women centers, 1 cultural center, 1 vocational training center, 1 sport center, 1 bus station) Page 45 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS Name Role Preparation Alain Labeau Program Coordinator Moctar Thiam Sector Leader, TTL Jacqueline Veloz Lockward Program Assistant Ntombie Siwale Sr. Program Assistant Gordon Appleby Consultant Ibou Diouf Sr. Transport Specialist Francois Lavouc Intern Felly Kaboyo Operations Analyst Arnaud Desmarchelier Consultant Nathalie Munzberg Senior Counsel Amine Benis Intern Christian Diou Sr. Municipal Engineer Yvette Djachechi Sr. Social Development Specialist Wolgang Chadab Senior Disbursement Specialist Soulemane Fofana Operations Officer Sidy Diop Sr. Procurement Specialist Seynabou Thiaw Seye Program Assistant Saidou Diop Financial Management Specialist Ronnie Hammad Sr. Operations Officer Robert Robelus Consultant Raymond Bourdeaux Sr. Infrastructure Specialist, co-TTL Supervision/ICR Eric R. Lancelot Task Team Leader Mountaga Ndiaye, Mamata Tiendrebeogo Procurement Specialist(s) Page 46 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) Fatou Fall Samba Financial Management Specialist Fabio Galli Team Member Yacouba Konate Team Member Antoine V. Lema Team Member Anta Tall Diallo Team Member Fatou Fall Social Safeguards Specialist Medou Lo Environmental Safeguards Specialist Tojoarofenitra Ramanankirahina Team Member Ndeye Anna Ba Team Member Eric R. Lancelot Task Team Leader B. STAFF TIME AND COST Staff Time and Cost Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks US$ (including travel and consultant costs) Preparation FY05 12.012 92,413.11 FY06 38.945 206,724.01 FY07 34.421 223,791.36 FY08 31.807 225,555.17 FY09 85.166 407,171.61 FY10 0 0.00 Total 202.35 1,155,655.26 Supervision/ICR FY10 79.288 302,910.31 FY11 105.875 391,042.43 FY12 33.637 288,566.50 FY13 26.276 167,532.26 FY14 13.318 93,900.73 Page 47 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) FY15 17.258 91,014.59 FY16 21.274 120,126.64 FY17 25.062 134,709.20 FY18 32.295 200,717.68 Total 354.28 1,790,520.34 Page 48 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT Actual at Project Amount at Approval Components Closing (US$, Percentage of Approval (US$, millions) millions) Road Infrastructure 264.5 351.3540 132.8 (motorway sections 3 and 4) Right of Way Clearing, Urban Development of the Tivaouane Peulh 158.3 147.08 92.9 Resettlement Site and Implementation of the Mbao Forest Management Plan Urban Restructuring of 55 54.71 99.4 Pikine-Irregulier Sud Program Implementation 14.1 15.82 112.2 Total 491.9 568.96 115.6 40 See paragraph 42 for explanation of increased costs Page 49 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) ANNEX 4. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS General Context and Objectives of the Analysis 1. To address the mobility challenge in the GDA, the GoS launched in mid-2000 the construction of a 32 km urban motorway, the Dakar toll road. The first section covering 12 km from Malick Sy to Pikine was financed by the GoS, and the second section of 20 km between Pikine and Diamniadio was built under a PPP scheme. 2. In the initial economic assessment, using the HDM-4 model, performed at the time of the technical study, the project yielded a very high economic return. The total construction costs required to construct the motorway section of 32 km were estimated at CFAF 96.7 billion in 2005, spread over three years. The economic benefits outnumbered the economic costs by CFAF 157.7 billion. 3. The objective of the present analysis is to compare the economic results of the feasibility study with the actual project as implemented by the GoS, using the actual implemented works and costs, as well as the traffic as monitored since the opening of the sections. Available Data and Methodology 4. For the preparation of the initial study, the feasibility created a network model, including all road sections likely to be affected by the new motorway, and two different project construction sections (Patte d’Oie-Pikine and Pikine-Diamniadio). The same network with the same technical data and initial conditions was used in the present analysis. 5. Regarding traffic volumes, data were available from the counts and the transport model in 2005 and from the toll stations on the motorway and traffic counts on the national roads in 2017. Breakdown into vehicle categories was not available for the national roads and had to be extrapolated. Based on this data, an average traffic growth volume could be calculated for each section. A slight problem had to be overcome regarding the difference in terms of vehicle categories considered in the feasibility study and currently available from the toll. 6. Data on maintenance works unit costs were retrieved from the feasibility study and increased by 20 percent to reflect the actual costs, as recommended by APIX. Operational costs for the motorway (toll collection and operation) were provided by the concessionaire for 2017. 7. Data on the construction costs and implementation period were provided by APIX, showing the first section (Patte d’Oie-Pikine) was opened in 2009, the second from Pikine to Thiaroye in 2012, and the remaining section to Diamniadio in 2013. 8. The modeling was done based on the initial HDM model used during the feasibility study using the initial sections description of 2005, both for the motorway sections to be constructed as for the surrounding national and regional roads in the area likely to be affected by the project. Traffic and vehicle operating costs were also derived from the 2005 study (see tables 4.4–4.8). The traffic growth was adjusted to correspond to the average growth over 2005–2017 on all road sections included in the road network analyzed. Page 50 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) 9. HDM was run for the different construction Phases individually (Patte d’Oie-Pikine and Pikine- Diamniadio), and for the project as a whole, for an analysis period of 30 years, with two scenarios for each section: • The base-case scenario, called ‘Base Alternative’, with no constructions but routine and periodic maintenance of the national roads; • The ‘with project case’ scenario, where the actual works carried out with their actual costs and construction dates were triggered Results 10. The results of the analysis are summarized in tables 4.1 to 4.3. The analysis compared, year by year, costs and benefits of the options ‘with-project’ and the base scenario without investment. Tables 4.1 to 4.3 present the main economic results in present values over the whole analysis period of 30 years. Table 4.1. Economic Analysis Summary for Section 1: Patte d’Oie-Pikine Road user benefits (CFAF, million) 390,886 Increase of road agency costs 55,932 (CFAF, millions) Net benefits (CFAF, millions) 322,147 Rate of return (%) 35.9 Table 4.2. Economic Analysis Summary for Section 2–3: Pikine-Thiaroye-Diamniadio Road user benefits (CFAF, millions) 144,299 Increase of road agency costs 138,578 (CFAF, millions) Net benefits (CFAF, millions) 5,721 Rate of return (%) 10.5 Note: Due to the allocation of traffic diversions, the whole length from Pikine to Diamniadio has to be analyzed together. Table 4.3. Economic Analysis Summary for the Overall Project, Patte d’Oie -Diamniadio Road user benefits (CFAF, millions) 521,041 Increase of road agency costs 145,447 (CFAF, millions) Net benefits (CFAF, millions) 322,147 Rate of return (%) 34.5 11. The rapid increase in traffic over the whole analysis period results in a very congested RN network, where the use of the motorway represents an important gain for the users (mainly in terms of reduction of travel time), compensating the high investment costs. With this rapid increase of traffic, the initial traffic on the new sections exceeds the original expectations, leading to the very high economic return of 35 percent when compared to the initial analysis (11 percent). The economic results on the middle section from Pikine to Diamniadio are lower than the surrounding sections and slightly lower than expected (10.5 percent compared to 12 percent in the PAD). This results from a lower traffic diversion from the national roads, which remain fully congested despite the motorway. Page 51 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) 12. The simulations, based as much as possible on the real data, show the good technical and economic results of the project as a whole. It has to be mentioned that the cost of the first section Patte d’Oie-Pikine has increased significantly above the initial estimate, while that for the section from Pikine to Diamniadio increased only moderately. In addition, the implementation period was longer than initially planned, which however does not affect the economic evaluation, because traffic volumes have been constantly rising during this period. Main Input Data into the HDM Model Table 4.4. Network Characteristics Length Width Traffic AADT Section on the Existing Network Cross-section (km) (m) 2005 R#2:1. RN1 - Patte d’Oie-Pikine Quatre voies 4.82 12 89,108 R#2:2. RN1 - Pikine–Thiaroye Quatre voies 1.89 12 57,630 R#2:3. RN1 - Thiaroye–Rufisque est Quatre voies 12.32 12 42,694 R#2:4. RN1 - RN2 - Rufisque est–Diamniadio Deux voies 9.42 7 15,179 R#3:1. Route de Niayes–Aero a Guediawaye Deux voies 5.79 7 28,169 R#3:2. Route de Niayes–Guediawaye a Thiaroye Deux voies 3.39 7 7,483 R#3:5. Route de Niayes–Keur Massar a Sangalkam Deux voies 10.86 7 1,415 R#3:4. Route de Niayes–Malika a Keur Massar Deux voies 3.34 7 3,890 R#3:3. Route de Niayes–Thiaroye a Malika Deux voies 6.37 7 7,059 R#1. Route Rufisque Deux voies 3.93 7 21,535 Length Width Traffic AADT Sections of the new motorway Cross-section (km) (m) 2009 S #1. Patte d’Oie-Pikine Six voies 4.2 21 41,789 S #2. Pikine–Thiaroye Six voies 2.8 21 S #3. Thiaroye–Diamniadio Quatre voies 17.6 14 Note: AADT = Annual average daily traffic. Table 4.5. Vehicle Fleet and Vehicle Operating Costs (in CFAF 2005) Medium Car 4x4 Pickup Bus Motorcyclea Truck Economic Unit Costs New vehicle cost (CFAF, 10,000.00 15,000.00 32,700.00 35,000.00 656.00 thousands per vehicle) New tire cost (CFAF, 65.00 48.00 220.00 225.00 30.00 thousands per tire) Fuel (CFAF per liter) 435.98 372.40 372.40 372.40 435.98 Oil (CFAF per liter) 1,180.00 2,010.00 2,010.00 2,010.00 1,180.00 Maintenance cost (CFAF per 2,000.00 2,000.00 2,000.00 2,000.00 2,000.00 hour) Crew wages (CFAF per hour) 2,000.00 2,000.00 2,000.00 2,000.00 2,000.00 Overheads (CFAF) 250,000.00 250,000.00 500,000.00 500,000.00 50,000.00 Interest rates (%) 12 12 12 12 12 Passenger Working time 800.00 80.00 600.00 600.00 300.00 (CFAF per hour) Page 52 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) Medium Car 4x4 Pickup Bus Motorcyclea Truck Cargo time (CFAF per hour) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Basic Characteristics Kilometers driven per year 25,000 45,000 65,000 75,000 10,000 (km) Working hours per year (h) 550 1,000 1,300 1,500 400 Average life (years) 8 8 6 6 10 Private use (%) 85 0 0 0 100 Number of passengers 2 4 40 0 1 Work-related passenger trips 85 100 75 100 75 Operating load (tons) 1.2 1.8 10.0 13.0 0.2 Load equivalent single axle 0.00 0.00 0.5 1.5 0.00 factor Note: a. In the initial analysis, motorcycles were not included, but have been added as they are one category in the tolling system. b. Although some values in the vehicle fleet seem not appropriate (very low axle loads), the values used in 2005 were retained for this analysis. Table 4.6. Main Diverted Traffic Volumes AADT Year Section Patte d’Oie-Pikine Pikine-Thiaroye Thiaroye-Rufisque 2005 Initial traffic on RN1 49,370 30,334 36,111 2009 Remaining traffic on RN1 89,108 57,630 42,694 2009 Traffic on the motorway 41,789 n.a. n.a. 2009 % of traffic diverted 32 — — 2013 Remaining traffic on RN1 125,475 85,145 42,694 2013 Traffic on the motorway 52,361 16,751 11,226 2013 % of traffic diverted 29 16 21 2018 Remaining traffic on RN1 139,898 110,480 42,691 2018 Traffic on the motorway 69,412 35,389 24,269 2018 % of traffic diverted 33 24 36 Table 4.7. Works Costs according to Civil Works Contract Total Section Cross- Detail of Investment Section Name Length Investment Opening No. section Measures Cost • 3 interchanges • 3 pedestrian Patte d’Oie- CFAF 51.5 Section 1 4.2 km 2 x 3 lanes overpasses August 2009 Pikine billion • 3 bridges • 1 deviation Page 53 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) Total Section Cross- Detail of Investment Section Name Length Investment Opening No. section Measures Cost Rufisque Ouest- Section 2 Diamniadio 8.5 km 2 x 2 lanes • 4 interchanges January 2012 (Rufisque • 3 pedestrian CFAF 148.4 bypass) overpasses billion Pikine-Keur • 3 deviations 2 x 3 lanes Massar- 11.8 • 10 culverts Section 3 to August 2013 Rufisque km 2 x 2 lanes Ouest Table 4.8. Average Financial Costs for Works and Services (in CFAF) Financial Cost Code Work Activity Unit (CFAF) RM Routine maintenance 2,700,000 km per year TO Toll operation 300,000,000 year RS Overlay 50 mm AC 5,400 m² HM Heavy maintenance 100 m AC 12,000 m² NDP Patching 21,000 m² EBR Edge break repair 21,000 m² CS Crack sealing 1,400 m² DR Drainage 145,000 km Note: AC = Asphalt concrete. Page 54 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIERS AND OTHER PARTNERS/STAKEHOLDERS COMMENTS Page 55 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) ANNEX 6. SUCCESSFUL PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP TO BUILD THE DAKAR- DIAMNIADIO TOLL ROAD 1. The ambition of the GoS to build the Dakar-Diamniadio highway through a PPP required commitment at the highest level along with a process that started with a defined strategy, legal reforms to attract private investors, and detailed prefeasibility studies as shown in figure 6.1. The Government established the legislative framework relating to the PPP as follows: • Law No. 2004-13 of March 1, 2004, establishing the legal framework for PPP projects • Law No. 2004-14 of March 1, 2004, establishing the Presidential Council for Investment • Law No. 2009-21 of May 4, 2009, indicating the process of implementation of the Dakar- Diamniadio toll motorway concession • Decree No. 2007-169 of February 13, 2007, specifying the content of the contracts for the construction of the Dakar-Diamniadio motorway in PPP • Decree No. 2010-489 of April 13, 2010, establishing a simplified procedure for the implementation of PPP projects of less than US$30 billion Figure 6.1. Timeline for setting up the PPP concession Page 56 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) 2. The Dakar-Diamniadio highway project became the first PPP in West Africa, a flagship project for Senegal and neighboring countries. Although the project comprised four components, only the construction of the highway (Component A) was executed under a PPP arrangement. To express its commitment to this project, the GoS financed the first two sections of the highway from Malik Sy in downtown Dakar to Pikine and reached out to private investors to build the 20.4 km highway from Pikine to Diamniadio. APIX was designated as the implementing agency and thus responsible for the tender process and managing the contract. Figure 6.2. The Dakar-Diamniadio Highway Project Source: APIX 3. Prequalification was launched in April 2007, and the selection of the private operator was carried out through an international call for tenders resulting in three qualified bidders. Two of them submitted technical bids, and ultimately, the contract in the amount of approximately US$125 million41 was awarded to Eiffage in December 2008 and the contract was signed on July 2, 2009. Eiffage, which has experience working in Senegal, formed SENAC S.A. as a special-purpose vehicle to serve as the concessionaire. 4. Under the concession contract, SENAC S.A. is authorized to collect tolls based on contractual tariffs fixed according to the sections travelled by users. These rates were considered in the financing model to generate revenue projections. In return, the concessionaire was to build, finance, operate, and maintain the Pikine-Diamniadio segment and to operate and maintain the Patte d’Oie-Pikine segment for 30 years. All necessary repairs as well as periodic maintenance and reinforcement of the pavement are the responsibility of the concessionaire who also pays taxes to the Treasury. In addition, once Eiffage has ensured its return on investment, forthcoming revenues will be shared with the Government. 5. The cost of the highway in the amount of €226 million was financed by Eiffage at 41 percent (€93 million), and the remaining 59 percent (€133 million) was financed by the Government through loans from development institutions in the amount of €75.75 million (provided by AfDB and AFD) and direct contribution from the Government in the amount of €57.25 million. Eiffage invested its own funds and was able to secure additional funding from private lenders such as the West African Development Bank (WADB) and by the private arm of the AfDB, IFC, and the West African Banking Company (CBAO Groupe Attijariwafa, one of the leading Senegalese banks. IFC acted as the lead arranger and global coordinator for the PPP portion of the Dakar toll road. 41 Amount in 2009 based on exchange rates for currencies used (euros and CFA francs). Page 57 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) Figure 6.3. Cost of Financing the Dakar-Diamniadio Toll Road (Phase 3) Source: APIX Figure 6.4. Project Financing Scheme 6. The Pikine-Diamniadio toll road was effectively opened to traffic in August 2013. In light of this success and to link the capital, Dakar, to the newly built international airport (AIBD), a follow-up Phase consisting of a 17 km 2x2 lanes highway with two sets of toll plazas connecting Diamniadio to AIBD was awarded to Eiffage ensuring overall consistency in both the quality of the service level and the toll system. The extension was opened to traffic in October 2016 and eased transit between Dakar and the country’s third largest city, Thiès. Page 58 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) ANNEX 7. DETAILS ON RAPs AND PAPs FOR THE DDTH PROJECT Number of Number of Remaining PAPs to RAPs Year Prepared PAPs to Consignb PAPs PAPs Paid Compensatea Initial PAR Malick Sy-Patte d’Oie 2005 236 236 0 0 Addendum n°1 PAR of Malick Sy-Patte d’Oie hors TF 2010 177 144 23 10 Addendum n°2 PAR of Malick Sy-Patte d’Oie (TF) 2011 80 57 4 19 Initial PAR Patte d'Oie-Pikine 2006 343 337 1 5 Addendum n°1 PAR Patte d’Oie-Pikine 2009 292 270 0 22 c PAR Pikine-Keur Massar 2010 5,424 5,419 0 5 PAR Keur Massar-Diamniadio 2010 1,039 1,039 0 0 Addendum PAR Keur Massar-Diamniadio 2017 171 6 113 52 PAR PIS 2014 2,588 2,239 176 173 PAR Mbeubeuss Landfill 2010 61 51 3 7 Addendum PAR Mbeubeuss 2017 81 0 45 36 Initial PAR TP 2010 765 712 0 53 Addendum PAR TP 2013 160 74 6 80 Land Titles of 2015 decree 2015 18 0 5 13 Land Titles in PIS 59 0 21 38 10,584 397 513 of which 137 plus 21 PAPs plus 116 PAPs TOTAL PAPsd 11,494 received awaiting awaiting partial complementary complementary payments checks checks Note: a. Files complete, PAPs in the process of getting compensated; b. Complicated cases (heredity and incomplete files); c. 137 of these PAPs received a first check and are awaiting complementary checks; d. Canceled PAPs not included. Page 59 of 60 The World Bank Dakar Diamniadio Toll Highway (P087304) ANNEX 8. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS (1) http://www.ansd.sn/ressources/ses/chapitres/13-transport-SESN2013.pdf (2) https://www.sec.gouv.sn/IMG/pdf/PSE.pdf (3) https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07316.pdf (4) http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/776191468338369513/pdf/937780NWP00PUB0aper 00SSATPWP1020PPP.pdf (5) AfDB Completion Report.doc (6) https://books.google.com/books?id=XPmvllZcapgC&pg=PA81&lpg=PA81&dq=dakar+diamniadio+t oll+road+feasibility+studies&source=bl&ots=YDh7kIENZv&sig=OYMwQ3ZqWkQFzwLoHw0dxUQco 6o&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwipuqT9hLDXAhUji1QKHdDbD24Q6AEINzAD#v=onepage&q=dakar% 20diamniadio%20toll%20road%20feasibility%20studies&f=false (7) http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/527551468103763222/pdf/NonAsciiFileName0.pdf (8) https://www.sec.gouv.sn/IMG/pdf/SNDES_2013-2017_-_version_finale_-_08_novembre_2012.pdf (9) http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/180721468001191421/pdf/96936-P3Briefs- SenegalDakarTollRoadExtension-Box391454B-PULBIC-Colltitle-PPP-BRIEF.pdf (10) http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/180721468001191421/pdf/96936-P3Briefs- SenegalDakarTollRoadExtension-Box391454B-PULBIC-Colltitle-PPP-BRIEF.pdf (11) https://www.ssatp.org/sites/ssatp/files/publications/SSATPWP102-PPP.pdf (12) https://one.oecd.org/document/COM/DAF/INV/DCD/DAC(2014)4/en/pdf (13) http://www.initiative-ppp-afrique.com/Afrique-zone-franc/Pays-de-la-zone-franc/Senegal/Cadre- juridique (14) https://hubs.worldbank.org/docs/imagebank/Pages/search.aspx#/search?k=P087304 (15) http://www.ipar.sn/IMG/pdf/SNDES_2013-2017_-_consolidation_version_24_oct_2012.pdf (16) Impact Evaluation Report (17) Note sur la demande d'elagage de PAPs.pdf (18) Senegal Development Projects Page 60 of 60