Document of The World Bank Report No.: ICR2089 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORTS (Cr. 3740) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 13.5 MILLION (US$18.4 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE PEOPLE‘S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH FOR A SOCIAL INVESTMENT PROGRAM PROJECT December 21, 2011 Sustainable Development Sector Unit Agriculture and Rural Development Bangladesh Country Management Office South Asia Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective April 2011) Currency Unit = Bangladeshi Taka Tk. 1.00 = US$ 0.012987 FISCAL YEAR July 1 - June 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AF Additional Financing CAS Country Assistance Strategy CNRS Center for Natural Resource Studies DCA Development Credit Agreement GP Gram Parishad GS Gram Samity JG Jibikayan Group KPI Key Performance Indicators PAD Project Appraisal Document PDO Project Development Objective PKSF Palli Karama-Sahayak Foundation SDF Social Development Foundation Vice President Isabel Guerrero Country Director Ellen Goldstein Sector Manager Simeon Ehui Project Team Leader Ousmane Seck ICR Team Leader Ousmane Seck Primary Authors Benoist Veillerette, Florentina Williamson Noble Contents 1. .... Project Context, Development Objectives And Design .................................................................... 1 2. .... Key Factors Affecting Implementation And Outcomes ................................................................... 5 3. .... Assessment Of Outcomes .................................................................................................................. 11 4. .... Assessment Of Risk To Development Outcome.............................................................................. 21 5. .... Assessment Of Bank And Borrower Performance......................................................................... 23 6. .... Lessons Learned ................................................................................................................................ 24 7. .... Comments On Issues Raised By Borrower, Implementing Agencies And Partners ................... 25 Annex 1 – Project Cost And Financing ................................................................................................... 26 Annex 2 – PDO Achievement Tables ....................................................................................................... 28 Annex 3 – Outputs By Component .......................................................................................................... 38 Annex 3 – Appendix 1 ............................................................................................................................... 40 Annex 4 – Financial And Economic Analysis ......................................................................................... 45 Annex 5 - Bank Lending And Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ................................. 49 Annex 6 – Beneficiary Survey Results ..................................................................................................... 52 Annex 7 – Stakeholder Workshop Report And Results......................................................................... 56 Annex 8 – Summary Of The Borrower’s Completion Report And Comments On The Draft ICR .. 59 Annex 9 - Comments of Co-Financers and Other Partners……………………………………… …. 65 Annex 10 – Government Comment on the Draft ICRR......................................................................... 66 Annex 11 - List Of Supporting Documents……………………………………………………… . ……67 A. Basic Information Social Investment Country: Bangladesh Project Name: Program Project IDA-37400,IDA- Project ID: P053578 L/C/TF Number(s): 37401,IDA-44500,IDA- H3490 ICRR Date: 12/21/2011 ICR Type: Core ICR PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: OF BANGLADESH Original Total XDR 13.50M Disbursed Amount: XDR 36.45M Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 40.70M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Social Development Foundation Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: NA B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 06/24/1998 Effectiveness: 04/20/2003 04/20/2003 Appraisal: 10/28/2002 Restructuring(s): Approval: 03/18/2003 Mid-term Review: 12/12/2005 05/23/2006 06/30/2011 Closing: 06/30/2007 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICRR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate Bank Performance: Satisfactory Satisfactory Borrower Performance: C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Borrower Satisfactory Satisfactory Performance: Performance: i C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments (if Indicators Rating Performance any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry No None at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of Supervision No None time (Yes/No): (QSA): DO rating before Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status: D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) General education sector 5 3 General transportation sector 40 35 Media 5 7 Other social services 50 55 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Gender 14 17 Other rural development 29 29 Poverty strategy, analysis and monitoring 14 3 Rural policies and institutions 14 19 Rural services and infrastructure 29 32 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Isabel M. Guerrero Isabel M. Guerrero Country Director: Ellen A. Goldstein Ellen A. Goldstein Sector Manager: Simeon Kacou Ehui Simeon Kacou Ehui Project Team Leader: Ousmane Seck Ousmane Seck ICR Team Leader: Ousmane Seck ICR Primary Author: Benoist Veillerette Florentina WilliamsonNoble ii F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The objective of the project is to develop effective and efficient financing and institutional arrangements for improving the access to local infrastructure and basic services through the implementation of community-driven small-scale infrastructure works and social assistance programs. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) (a) PDO Indicator(s) Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Indicator 1: No. of hard core poor and poor benefiting from the project. Value quantitative or 0 3 million 2.5 million Qualitative) Date achieved 02/14/2003 04/20/2003 06/30/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) Indicator 2: A direct financing model for hard core poor and poor is tested. For the first time in Bangladesh, an Value quantitative or effective and 0 NA Qualitative) efficient community financing model is in place. Date achieved 02/14/2003 04/20/2003 06/30/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Indicator 1: No. of community-driven small-scale infrastructure built. Value (quantitative or 0 1800 1734 Qualitative) Date achieved 02/14/2003 04/20/2003 06/30/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) Indicator 2: No. of youth employed or self-employed. Value (quantitative or 0 NA 55193 Qualitative) Date achieved 02/14/2003 04/20/2003 06/30/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) iii Indicator 3: Percentage of women benefiting from the project. Value (quantitative or 0 90 95 Qualitative) Date achieved 02/14/2003 04/20/2003 06/30/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) No. of Gram Samitys' covering at least 80% of target households' that have Indicator 4: access to the village development fund and managed it according to the project rules and guidelines. Value (quantitative or 0 760 822 Qualitative) Date achieved 02/14/2003 04/20/2003 06/30/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) No. of villages having quarterly Gram Parishad meetings and attended by at Indicator 5: least 70% of targeted members. Value (quantitative or 400 (80% of 353 (71% of 0 Qualitative) villages) villages) Date achieved 02/14/2003 04/20/2003 06/30/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) No. of Gram Samities that have mobilized O&M funds/resources to cover their Indicator 6: costs. 760 (80% of 736 (77% of Value (quantitative or 0 consolidation consolidation Qualitative) villages) villages) Date achieved 02/14/2003 04/20/2003 06/30/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) No. of employment days generated for the flood effected community in the Indicator 7: target villages through the provision of community infrastructure works. Value (quantitative or 0 600,000 421,709 Qualitative) Date achieved 06/12/2007 07/15/2008 06/30/2011 Comments (incl. % achievement) iv G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 05/22/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.00 2 10/08/2003 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.28 3 03/30/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.41 4 05/17/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.50 5 11/16/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.09 6 05/26/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.87 7 10/26/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 6.98 8 04/28/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 10.47 9 06/29/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 12.81 10 12/19/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 14.30 11 06/13/2007 Highly Satisfactory Satisfactory 14.63 12 12/23/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 15.74 13 06/28/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 16.22 14 12/27/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 24.28 15 05/26/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 27.04 16 11/30/2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 33.73 17 05/28/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 40.14 18 12/11/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 44.87 19 07/05/2011 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 54.43 20 10/26/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 55.25 v H. Restructuring (if any) Not Applicable I. Disbursement Profile vi 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal At the time of appraisal (2002-2003), Bangladesh experienced high levels of poverty and malnutrition. The two original project districts, Jamalpur and Gaibandha, ranked among the highest in poverty incidence, both in terms of income and human development. Both Bangladesh‘s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and the World Bank‘s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) expanded the a definition of poverty and the interventions to address beyond material wealth concerns to include focus on human development, recognizing that inequality and exclusion (particularly for women) from basic services such as health, safe water and education, participation in the development process equally contribute to poverty. In this light, SIPP-I aimed to develop institutions, promote community-driven principles, pioneer performance-based social assistance programs for the poorest, and leverage private financing for basic utilities. These human approaches to poverty alleviation were directly in line with the overarching development goals at the time of appraisal, and they are still relevant today. Additional Financing I (consolidation phase) of SIPP-I was began in 2007 in order to consolidate the gains from the original SIPP and deepen the activities in villages already served by the project. Its design contained a particular focus on strengthening community-driven institutions of the poor. Also in 2007, Bangladesh was hit by two waves of floods, which directly affected over 13 million people in 46 districts, caused over 1,000 deaths; affected 2 million acres of agricultural land; and damaged infrastructure, social and educational facilities and private assets. In response to the Government‘s request for assistance, the World Bank provided financial support in various forms, including the Additional Financing II of SIPP-I, channeled through the Social Development Foundation (SDF) and the Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation (PKSF). The disastrous Cyclone Sidr hit southern Bangladesh on November 15, 2007. The cyclone caused extensive damage to lives and property, particularly in the southwestern districts: Bagherat, Barguna, Patuakhali, Pirojpur and Barisal. About 9 million people were affected and an estimated 2 million people lost their livelihood and basic assets. In response to a request from the Government, the World Bank financed a cyclone assistance program, part of which was the Additional Financing III of SIPP-I. The combination of the first additional financing to consolidate successes and the disaster response led to SIPP expanding from an $18 million program to a $101 million program in less than six months. 1.2 Original Project Development Objective and Key Indicators The original PDO was to ―develop effective and efficient financing and institutional arrangements for improving access to local infrastructure and basic services through the implementation of community- driven small-scale infrastructure works and social assistance programs.‖ PDO results were to be measured by the following key performance indicators (provided in PAD section A and in PAD Annex 1: Project Design Summary).1 1 Text in italics are from Annex 1 1  About 1,800 community sub-projects successfully completed, in terms of participation of the poor and women, beneficiary satisfaction, technical quality, cost-effectiveness and operation and maintenance;  About 50% of the poor and vulnerable groups in the project area benefit from small-scale rural infrastructure and social assistance programs.  At least 50% of communities continuing to prioritize needs using participatory processes at least one year beyond sub-project completion;  At least 10% of the community groups mobilized under the project able to leverage external resources to support additional needs;  Increased awareness and opportunities to reduce vulnerability (such as, 50-60 percent of participants in the SAP are aware of their basic rights; use health services, such as immunization, pregnancy related care; access to wage/self employment);  Minimum 50% of community infrastructure sub-projects effectively managed and maintained by community groups by EOP;  At least 50% of VDCs formed continuing to manage activities in an inclusive manner;  Community-driven development principles adopted as a policy, local planning, and implementation of small scale infrastructure by EOP. 1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators Additional Financing 1 (consolidation phase) maintained the same PDO, except for the addition of incoming generating activities, which were included in response to the demand of communities. The following indicators were included under this additional financing:  Number of poor benefited;  Number of viable community organizations formed and functioning;  Savings mobilized and non-project funds/financing leveraged by community organizations.  The PDO for Additional Financing II (flood) is the same as the original PDO. The following indicators were added and are reproduced as they are in the AFII Project Paper:  Livelihood of very poor people affected by floods is restored;  Chronic indebtedness is reduced;  Capacity to cope with disasters is strengthened. The PDO for Additional Financing III (cyclone) remains the same, and states that the project will continue to support the Government of Bangladesh and Social Development Foundation in developing effective and efficient financing and institutional arrangements to empower the poorest and most vulnerable and improve their access to small-scale local infrastructure, assets and livelihoods, with special emphasis on Cyclone Sidr affected communities and families (AF III Project Paper). The following indicators were added under this additional financing:  Evidence of access to basic infrastructure and social services to improve quality of life of the affected communities, with at least 80% of target households benefiting from project interventions; 2  Evidence of incremental employment and increased income of target families, with at least 70% generating 20% more income;  Evidence of increased savings and/or decreased indebtedness of target families, with at least 50% decreasing indebtedness. 1.4 Main Beneficiaries (original and revised) Originally, the project was to be implemented in approximately 1,400 villages, about 54% of all villages in the two districts of Jamalpur and Gaibandha. About 250,000 households were to benefit from infrastructure sub-projects, and an additional 300,000 poor and socially excluded were to benefit from the social assistance program. Additional Financing I (Consolidation) aimed to consolidate activities for the 2 million rural people in Jamalpur and Gaibandha, corresponding to the above 1,400 villages revised to 950 villages after the Mid-Term Review. Under AF I, target groups for village institutions were restricted to the poor, hardcore poor1 and unemployed youth (about 152,000 out of 300,000 families originally planned). As under the original design there were some issues with elite capture. Under Additional Financing II (Flood), project activities targeted about 500,000 flood affected people to benefit from flood-proof infrastructure in 200 consolidation villages in Jamalpur and Gaibandha, as well as 100 villages in the neighboring district of Sirajganj. The project also targeted 16,000 families in the 100 villages to directly benefit from livelihood support activities. Under Additional Financing III (Cyclone), project activities expanded to 4 Cyclone Sidr- affected districts in the south: Bagerhat, Barguna, Pirojpur and Patukhali. About 500 villages in 14 of the most affected upazilas were to be covered. About 120,000 families were to benefit directly from the livelihood support activities, and about 0.9 million people from infrastructure rehabilitation and local- level institutional development. In total, the project was designed to benefit about 3.0 million people through rural infrastructure and 288,000 families from livelihood activities. All Additional Financings instituted the participatory identification of the poor (PIP) methodology to collectively identify project beneficiaries: the poor and hardcore poor within each targeted village. 1.5 Original Components The original project design had the following four components: Component A, Strengthening the Social Development Foundation (SDF) (WB-financed: US$ 1.39 million) included four sub-components: (i) information and communication (IC); (ii) capacity building of SDF; (iii) monitoring and learning (M&L); (iv) project management support. Component B, Institutional Development at the Community Level (WB-financed: US$ 0.30 million) provided support to the community in terms of raising awareness, motivating and engaging the rural poor to participate in community-driven initiatives, changing attitudes and behaviors among local stakeholders, developing organizations at the village level, and preparing Community Action Plans (CAP). It included two sub-components: (i) information and communication campaign; (ii) 1 Hard Core poor are the bottom most category of a list of target poor self prepared by the community through a well facilitated participatory targeting methodology and the wealth ranking criteria are decided by the community specific to each village. 3 formation and strengthening of Village Development Committees (VDCs), Community Groups (CGs), the project management committees of CGs, and the development of demand-led Community Action Plans (CAPs). Component C: Implementation of Community Action Plans (CAP) (WB-financed: US$ 15.84 million). CAPs prioritized community‘s needs for small-scale infrastructure and social assistance based on informed choice and eligibility criteria indicated in the menu of options in the project Operational Manual (OM). This component financed (i) 85% of expenditures of approved community infrastructure sub-projects (while 15% was contributed by the communities in the form of labor and cash); (ii) costs of NGO services to implement the social assistance programs; and (iii) costs of services for appraisal and supervision of sub-projects. Component D: Pilot Private Financing in Community Utilities (WB-financed: US$ 0.71 million). Under this component, the project financed technical assistance and a maximum of 70 percent of the approved costs of sub-projects. Technical assistance was used to help SDF identify, develop, appraise and supervise pilot sub-projects in piper water supply. 1.6 Revised Components Additional Financing I (Consolidation) (US$ 8million) maintained the same components as the original project design. However, under component 3 (implementation of Community Action Plans- CAPs) income generating activities were added, which marked the beginning of work in the area of livelihood strengthening. The livelihood restoration program forming Additional Financing II (Flood) was divided into two parts: The first part (US$10 million) was implemented through SDF and included two sub-components: (i) a flood assistance program to provide emergency assistance to help the most vulnerable flood-affected families meet their immediate consumption needs and rehabilitate community infrastructures that was severely damaged by the flood; and (ii) livelihood development to restore livelihoods of flood affected communities through appropriate skill development training, revolving financial assistance and market linkages. Disaster risk management activities were also included. The second part (US$15 million) was implemented by the Palli Karma Sahayak Foundation (PKSF) under its Disaster Management Fund and through its Partner Organizations (POs) and provided micro- credit to affected communities to help them recover from the losses caused by the floods. Additional Financing III (Cyclone) (US$50 million) maintained the same components as the original project but also included restoration and recovery from damage to livelihoods and long-term disaster preparedness. 1.7 Other Significant Changes Under Additional Financing III (Cyclone), US$40 million was cancelled on April 19, 2011. See section 2.2 on implementation for further changes in project approach. Total Project Budget (PAD) Budget Actual Financing Govt. IDA allocation Disbursement % disbursed Original + consolidation 2.51 26.24 28.75 27.98 97% Flood Additional Financing 0.67 25.00 25.67 22.94 89% Cyclone Additional Financing 50.00 50.00* 9.38 19% TOTAL 3.18 101.24 104.42 60.30 58% (*) Of which US$ 40 million was cancelled. 4 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry SIPP-I aimed to address two major constraints limiting the success of existing poverty programs: (i) the exclusion of the poorest strata of the population from development interventions, including micro-credit schemes; and (ii) poor local governance, including lack of Government engagement and community-level institutions. To this end, a Community Driven Development (CDD) approach was chosen as an innovative means to promote participatory governance and develop community owned institutions. This approach would enable access by the poorest to key infrastructure and basic services. It adequately built on the need for a human development approach to poverty alleviation, as outlined in the CAS, as well as lessons learned from other CDD projects globally, in particular the effectiveness of direct financing of community groups. While relatively complicated, long, and qualitative, the PDO adequately contained the three elements against which project performance can be assessed: the project purpose (―develop effective and efficient financing and institutional‖), the final aim (―improve access to infrastructure and services‖) and the means to do so (―the implementation of community-driven small scale infrastructure works and social assistance‖). SIPP-I faced two other challenges in addition to that of introducing the CDD approach: (i) project interventions were to take place in two of the poorest districts of Bangladesh at the time, Jamalpur and Gaibandha; and (ii) project implementation was to occur through the newly created Social Development Foundation (SDF), an autonomous organization under the Ministry of Finance, charged with promoting community driven development initiatives to meet the needs of the poorest, previously unmet by the work of NGOs and development programs. The fledgling nature of SDF meant there was a steep learning curve during early project implementation. Pilot Community Utilities 1% SDF Strengthening and Project Management 17% Community Institutional Development 11% Community Action Plans 71% In view of its innovative approach and the associated uncertainties and challenges, SIPP-I was conceived as a pilot project. This enabled it to: (i) be very responsive, implementing a series of changes and improvements; (ii) experiment with a number of promising innovations such as 5 community procurement, community operational manuals, the village matrix and community professionals; and (iii) eventually establish an effective institutional and financial model best suited to the complex conditions on the ground. SIPP-I represents an unprecedented attempt by the Government of Bangladesh to implement CDD activities on the ground. The Government showed its commitment through the establishment of SDF in June 2001. The four project components were straightforward and adequately reflected of the CDD project approach. Component 1 and 2, respectively, built institutions and developed their capacities at the level of SDF and the community level. The third component represented the core of the project. The fourth component provided space for innovations, some foreseen at appraisal, others developed during implementation. While institutional development at the community level (component 2) was only projected to absorb 1.7% of costs, project experience showed that this was largely insufficient. The actual cost of this component was US$ 5.0 million, corresponding to 11% of project cost (excluding the share sub-contracted to PKSF) as shown in the following graph. Project designers performed a thorough risk analysis and indemnified a number of risk areas related to SDF capacity. One of the most substantial risks identified was elite capture of project benefits. Though there were instances of this during the first years of implementation, the issue was addressed after the MTR, through participatory identification of the poor and properly defining and implementing a village level institutional structure safeguarding the interest of the poor, women and youth. 2.2 Implementation Two major events shaped SIPP-I implementation. The first benefited the project, but the second led to some of its main weaknesses. The first event was the important change of the project approach, the nature of project interventions and implementation modalities. The change took place after 3-4 years of implementation and led to the first additional financing (AF). The second event was the response to the 2007 floods and Cyclone Sidr and the subsequent AF II and AF III. The radical changes associated with the first AF (―consolidation‖) reflect how both SDF and the WB were responsive to the outcomes of on-going monitoring and learning activities. Both were able to make radical changes to address the main bottlenecks identified by the process monitoring mechanisms (see 2.3) during the first half of the project, and crystallized during an in-depth mid-term review. These were:  mis-targeting, including the exclusion of some poor and HCP from project interventions;  the questionable sustainability of project interventions due to the relative lack of community ownership of infrastructure sub-projects, resulting from the inability of partner organizations (POs) to facilitate a genuine participatory process. POs were unable to adequately contribute to community institution building, lacked institutional memory (due to rapid staff turnover) and lacked consistency of approach. Another threat to the sustainability of interventions was the fact that the one-time grants to the hard core poor were not leading to income-generating activities and not having lasting impacts on livelihoods.  During the MTR, critical improvements have been introduced in response to these bottlenecks. They included among others, the revision in implementation arrangement which resulted in SDF to expand and directly engage with local communities instead of contracting NGOs. These are summarized here: 6 Improvement Area Before MTR / issue faced After MTR / improvements ―Participatory Identification of Poor‖ enabled communities to limit project participants to the Entire community targeted; mix of poor and hard core poor (and youth development men and women, including influential Target group activities), thereby eliminating elite capture and or better off households which tended facilitating much broader participation. Women to capture project benefits. actually became the vast majority of beneficiaries and the driving force of village institutions. Village Development Committee An inclusive and accountable village institution, (VDC) and Project Management the Gram Parishad (GP), organized into various Committees (PMCs) faced risks: (i) entities such as the Gram Samity (GS), Jibikayan Village Institutions lack of inclusiveness and Groups (JGs), savings groups (SSCs), Village promoted by the transparency; (ii) monopolization of Credit Organizations (VCOs), ensured the project decision making by a few families separation of functions and participation of many (elite capture); (iii) insufficient women, who were given specific responsibilities. sustainability due to lack of There was also an increased focus on capacities. strengthening capacities of these institutions. Focus on institution strengthening as a prerequisite to other project interventions; Excessive priority on ―delivering‖ Introduction of more comprehensive village infrastructure at the expense of development fund (VDF), including the Village sustainable village institutions and a livelihood fund which became a successful interventions / genuine community facilitation means of poverty reduction and a Village Village process that took into consideration Disaster Risk Reduction Fund with well defined Development Fund actual village needs and preferences. sub funds. (VDF) Savings and credit were voluntary. Mandatory savings and internal loans were systematically introduced. O&M of the CIW by the community was promoted. One time seed capital grant of 4000 Through PIP, participatory selection of all HCPs Hard Core Poor taka to 40 externally selected HCPs to benefit from all project activities per village SDF contracted Participating SDF directly intervened at village level, thus Implementation Organizations and Community ensuring a coherent implementation approach modalities Support Organizations to intervene at and long term institutional memory and village level. sustainability As a result of this major re-orientation, the project dramatically improved its performance in terms of targeting, institution development, community empowerment, creation of relevant activities by communities, and the overall demand-responsiveness of the project. The restructuring took SDF sometime to incorporate the design changes especially in establishing a decentralized field based institutional structure and its adequate staffing. The second event, responding to the 2007 floods and cyclone, greatly tested SDF’s implementation capacity. While SIPP-I was being restructured after the MTR and the first additional 7 financing, decisions were made to dramatically increase its size through two more additional financings in response to flood and cyclone disasters. In less than 6 months, the size of the project was quadrupled (from US$ 26 million to US$ 101 million). While annual disbursement had averaged US$ 3.5 million between project effectiveness in 2003 and the end of 2007, this new increased size meant that SDF would have to affect a sevenfold increase in its annual disbursements (US$ 24.4 million) to ensure full disbursement by project completion. While the AFs were made at the request of the Government to WB management, it seemed that decisions on their size did not adequately involve the direct SIPP-Implementing stakeholders, SDF and the WB task team. In fact SIPP was the primary vehicle in the WB portfolio at that time that could provide the livelihood program needed to assist the disaster affected population. These two AFs were intended to be responses to humanitarian crisis. However, the nature of activities planned was of a recovery and development nature as they aimed to ―rehabilitate infrastructure, restore livelihoods and improve communities‘ preparedness to cope with future shocks while applying the same core approach to community development. However, adding disaster risk management interventions, working in difficult post disaster conditions should probably have led the project team to revisit project design as a whole. Also, a more realistic time line for the achievement of the intended outcome for the additional financings could have been envisaged. Furthermore, designers of AF II and III overestimated the capacity of SDF to hire, orient and field the project staff and set up offices in the new geographic areas to provide direct facilitation support to the communities. Consequently, it took 2 years between natural disasters and the first field activities (March 09 for flood; Nov-Dec 09 for cyclone). This was too late to contribute in a timely manner to infrastructure rehabilitation and recovery efforts. Many of the activities initiated under the operations could not be logically completed within the 3-year project cycle resulting in shortfalls in the intended outcomes. The rapid fire additional financings added other dimensions at a time when SDF was not fully ready for it. In fact, the three additional financings were pushed without assessing in detail the real implementation capacity of the SDF and without considering the fact that CDD programs require a long time line to be implemented. These decisions weakened SIPP-I by putting too much pressure on SDF –which was unable to cope with such an increase in project budget and scope, while maintaining the same rigor and careful focus on institutional development. This decision resulted in two shortcomings, in particular: In order to speed up disbursement in Additional Financing II, SDF signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with PKSF for an amount of US$15 million to provide micro loans to flood affected households. PKSF disbursed the entirety of the funds through its partner organizations; however, its interventions did not necessarily contribute to the PDO in terms of institutional strengthening and access to services. Further, while SDF was building the capacities of community institutions to manage their finances, PKSF was providing external microfinance without the same institutional development criteria sending mixed message to communities. Furthermore, PKSF interventions did not contribute to the development of sustainable village because contrary to the core of SIPP-I, funds were repaid to PKSF instead of revolving back to the communities; Finally, PKSF could not demonstrate its impact on the project target group, due to poor reporting and monitoring. In short, though PKSF have been an efficient disbursement channel for the US$15 million, it appears not to have been an effective development channel towards achievement of the PDO. US$40 million (80% of total) of the cyclone additional financing had to be cancelled, and the reasons include: (i) the ex ante over-estimation of SDF to quickly expand its operations; (ii) the fact that interventions were in a new, challenging geographic area, e.g. communications difficulties, limited construction period for infrastructure which complicated and prolonged the development of SDF field activities; (iii) the occurrence of a second disaster (cyclone ‗Aila‘) and the resulting, largely in un- 8 coordinated, relief operations which disrupted the longer-term development operations, including those of SIPP-I; and (iv) the selection of an NGO, the Bangladesh Disaster Preparedness Center (BDPC) to implement, despite the post-MTR decision to switch from NGO-led to SDF implementation. Though competent in DRM surveying work, BDPC has little operational experience, and this delayed actual implementation by a further 10-12 months. While the initial closing date for the original SIPP was 30 June 2007, it was extended to 30 June 2011, thus doubling its implementation period. This slower than expected implementation has three main causes: (i) the nature of project activities (confidence building, institution developing, building long term capacities) which require more time than anticipated at appraisal. Also, since communities drive their own development, some delays are attributable to a slower pace set by the communities themselves; (ii) the disruptions caused by the flood and cyclones; (iii) the lack of SDF management during some key periods-e.g., no managing director for 5.5 months, no General Manager for Programs for 1.5 years. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation Design, Implementation and Utilization The design of the M&E system was less than satisfactory. Overall, M&E played an important role in guiding project management to improve design, implementation effectiveness and governance. However, the system was less effective, documenting project achievements and results. The definition of performance and result indicators were unclear, causing major difficulties in preparing the ICRR. In addition, , the indicators are not consistent between: (i) the PAD core text in the (―Key performance indicators‖ section); (ii) the PAD project design summary in the log frame in Annex 1; (iii) the indicators developed for the 3 AFs; (iv) the indicators reported by SDF in its end-of-project Result Framework; and (v) the indicators measured by independent impact assessment surveys. This led to difficulties in implementation of M&E activities. Insufficient attention was paid to systematic reporting on concrete, practical indicators of project achievements, as the use of infrastructure works, development of livelihood activities and poverty reduction. M&E implementation was also made difficult by the post-MTR switch to a more complex project. While the original M&E system was based on the original PAD indicators, the new system, based on an SDF- WB agreed upon Project Implementation Plan, was radically different. A results framework was created to reflect the new project design, but with inconsistencies between the various AFs and the original PAD. Though not originally designed in the PAD, the technical assistance provided by the World Bank subsequently developed and added three noteworthy, effective M&E features:  The village matrix, aggregates information on community features, institutions, activities and achievements, updated monthly in a participatory manner and is posted on a board outside the GS office to share with community members. They proved to be a powerful tool for transparency and accountability at community level.  A third party process monitoring system was successfully implemented by an independent agency, the Centre for Natural Resource Studies (CNRS). This streamlined process monitoring was instrumental in restructuring the project approach at MTR. The system (i) provided in-depth recommendations for post MTR project reshaping; (ii) provided monthly recommended action tables, highlighting problems and strategies to overcome them; and (iii) reported on irregularities and corruption cases.  Monthly monitoring review meetings took place at the district and cluster level to track progress, resolve implementation issues and learn from implementation in a participatory 9 manner. Further, quarterly Monitoring & Learning sharing forums including all field staff were organized with field visits and community involvement. They led to comprehensive action plans to address emerging issues. Though a robust web based-base MIS was developed to track project implementation progress, its effectiveness was limited due to: (i) continuous changes in project design; (ii) the fact that SDF was not properly equipped to handle management of the software. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance In the context of Bangladesh, where misappropriation of funds is a major impediment to most development activities, an important achievement of SIPP-I was to successfully establish mechanisms that minimized leakages and maximized the share of project funding directly used by communities for development activities. First, project funds were transferred from SDF directly to the accounts of communities, who were given responsibility for their management. These disbursements were made in installments based on appraisals by SDF‘s Appraisal and Monitoring Team (AMT) of village fund proposals and completion of physical milestones. The fiduciary arrangement and obligations were systematized by signing of Umbrella Financing Agreements and addenda. A well-defined governance structure for the community institutions and social accountability tools strengthened by the project were a guarantee for the transparent use of these funds. Second, the Community Operational Manual (COM) developed with and adopted by the communities included a community procurement manual to serve as a practical guide to procurement committees for the purchase of goods and contracting of works. At completion, an estimated 2,000 community members had been trained in procurement. However, the limited staffing of the procurement team has meant that the pace of delivery of these trainings was been slower than optimal. Third, another community safeguard was the establishment of community-level social audit committees (SACs), independent from the other community and project institutions, which had the mandate of reviewing procurement, funds management and decision making processes. Fourth, the aforementioned process monitoring system was an important tool for ensuring accountability of interventions. In order to establish and maintain mutual trust between CNRS, the communities and SDF, CNRS did not behave as a disempowering, policing body. Instead, in an estimated 90% of cases, it managed to address problem cases directly with those concerned in the field, without needing to involve SDF management. However, some corruption cases did require reporting to and involvement of SDF management (mostly during the first half of project implementation period). At completion, according to CNRS records, corruption cases occurred in about 20 to 25 villages (2% of villages) and concerned 40 to 50 people (0.02% of people involved). In very rare cases, members of SDF staff were involved and were consequently fired. Financial management by the SDF team was always reported as satisfactory. SDF developed an effective internal audit arrangement to reduce fiduciary delinquency. It also appointed an External Audit Agency to look after compliance issues. A governance and downward accountability framework was introduced and a community-driven financial management approach was followed. One of the challenges progressively addressed, has been to differentiate financial management functions at the corporate and community level. WB procurement rules were strictly applied by SDF although, in some cases, they were found cumbersome and not flexible enough by SDF, which also led to the delays caused by the need for WB approval on too many items. 10 2.5 Post-completion Operation and Next Phase SDF and the WB have carefully planned for a smooth transition to SIPP-II—the Empowerment and Livelihood “Nuton Jibon� project (approximately US$115 million). SIPP-II was developed by the SIPP-I team during 2009 and 2010 and was approved on June 23, 2010 almost one year before the completion of SIPP-I. SIPP-II is a direct continuation of SIPP-I. It will work in additional districts and continue working in SIPP-I villages in order to consolidate the gains of the original project. This continuation of support to SIPP-I villages is essential for the sustainability of project achievements. SIPP-II started disbursement in April 2011 and by the completion date of SIPP-I (30 June 2011), had already disbursed US$1.87 million. This smooth transition arrangement avoids any disruption in services provided by SDF to the communities. Under SIPP-I, the main elements to ensure effective implementation of SIPP-II as a follow up and scaling up of the project were worked out: (i) the project implementation plan and an updated Community Operational Manual were prepared; (ii) in order to substantially increase the human capacity of SDF from the current 800 staff to over 2100 staff, a new HR policy has been developed, along with a new organogram with much stronger decentralized offices at the regional and district levels aimed to support field staff at community and cluster level; (iii) the restructuring of SDF and a mass recruitment process took place in early 2011 to improve the implementation effectiveness and capacity of SDF; (iii) revised financial management procedures to reflect the decentralized SDF structure and revised institutional, procurement and legal arrangements for SIPP-II activities, including new features such as the development of second generation institutions have been established. A missing block, however, is an effective, straightforward and results-oriented M&E system, better able to clearly reflect SDF achievements ad impacts. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation The main SIPP-I features remain relevant at completion. The original PDO to ―develop‖ financing and institutional arrangements is less relevant today as it was largely achieved (see 3.2 below). Indeed, the need moving forward is to apply this model at wider scale, which is the purpose of SIPP-II. The other main purpose of SIPP-I to improve access to infrastructure and basic services by the poorest strata of the population remains valid and more than ever relevant as a main means to reduce poverty. The other project purposes, livelihood development and disaster risk management, remain highly relevant. All are consistent with the aim of the Government‘s 6th Five Year Plan, which is to bring Bangladesh to the level of a middle income country through massive poverty reduction efforts. Further, SIPP-II is also consistent with the current World Bank Country Assistance Strategy (FY 2011-2014) which aims to contribute to ―accelerated, sustainable and inclusive growth, underpinned by stronger governance at central and local levels.‖ The updated SIPP-I design developed after the MTR remains very relevant and has been adopted by SIPP-II. It consists of a succession of well defined steps, outlined in the Community Operational Manual, including: awareness campaigns; participatory identification of the poor; building and developing capacities of community institutions; initiating saving activities; developing community action plans and committees in charge of their implementation and monitoring; improving livelihoods through the development of IGAs; improving access to formal financial systems and mobilizing project credit funds and delivering credit to members. 11 The rationale for the involvement of a Government agency (SDF) in implementing CDD activities, including credit provision, in a country with many NGOs providing community-level support, including microfinance, has to be examined. The MTR exercise gave partial clarity on this. While the original design foresaw SDF as an apex organization providing support to communities through NGOs, the MTR reversed this choice as it became clear that it was not the best approach to reach the goal of increasing the self-reliance, and therefore the long term resilience of communities. The revised approach, with SDF conducting field-level implementation, built this self-reliance and long term resilience by:  Giving priority to strengthening community institutions and developing their capacities in contrast to NGOs, which often delivered goods, training, and services, but paid less attention to developing capacities of community members, as they are more interested in recovering their cost for sustainability their own institutions.  Benefiting from the institutional memory of SDF built through long- term involvement at field level and the reduced risk of leakages to the ad hoc and, often, shorter-term actions by NGOs.  Empowering of communities to design, implement, monitor and maintain infrastructure and other activities, instead of their previous role as passive ―beneficiaries‖ of interventions designed by external NGOs;  Transferring credit management decision making, and permanent financial resources, directly to communities, more importantly to the hard core poor, as opposed to having them rely on external sources of funds from NGOs. Community members interviewed during the preparation of the ICRR largely preferred the SIPP-I credit arrangement to NGO microfinance programs because it gave them the autonomy to own the capital funds, decide on interest rates, and fix the loan ceilings (which are often too low when provided by micro-finance institutions).  Promoting a community-to-community learning approach through community professionals to improve the implementation effectiveness of the project. 3.2 Achievement of PDO As mentioned earlier, the main challenge of the ICRR team has been to assess the achievement of the most relevant performance indicators, as these have not been consistent between the PAD, project papers prepared for the three AFs, the final SDF Result Framework Table, and indicators collected by independent impact assessments. In spite of the above challenge, the team has been able to undertake a fair assessment of the project. Overall, the project has achieved its PDO, both in its qualitative and quantitative dimensions. Four elements are reviewed regarding achievement of the PDO. The original PDO has been sub- divided into 2 parts: (i) ―to develop effective and efficient financing and institutional arrangements for improving access to local infrastructure and basic services; (ii) through the implementation of community-driven small-scale infrastructure works and social assistance programs‖. Further, AFs I, II and III introduced two new objectives: (iii) improved livelihoods as a result of access to financial resources, income generating activities and employment creation; and (iv) improved resilience to natural disasters for AFs II and III. The assessment of these four elements is presented below in sections 3.2.1-3.2.4. 12 3.2.1 Institutional Development At project completion, SIPP-I had achieved the first part of the PDO: ―effective and efficient financing and institutional mechanisms‖ are in place. SDF has now a solid model of intervention at community level to develop these institutional and financial mechanisms: SIPP-I I established 1407 village level community institutions touching the lives of about 2.5 million hard core poor and poor. The foundation of these institutions includes 258,113 households that have been mobilized into 20, 414 Jibikayan (livelihood) groups. A direct financing mechanism to communities has been instituted, including a village envelope based on the size of the village. In the original project, the eligible amount was Taka 550, 000 to Taka 1,050,000 per village for CIWs. In addition, in each village, 40 most vulnerable people received a grant of Taka 4000 each. In the consolidation phase, an additional investment of Taka 2500 per family was provided as Village Development Fund (VDF) intended for institutional building and livelihood. For flood-affected villages, the allocation was calculated at the rate of Taka 2500 per household named as Flood Rehabilitation Fund (FRF). The village fund envelope has been accessed by the village institutions in installments based on achievement of physical milestones. The self governed effective community institutions established include the Jibikayan Groups (JGs for livelihood and saving; the Gram Parishads (GPs) that are the a general assembly of project participants; the Gram Samitys (GSs) which are the executive bodies of the GPs that include -amongst others- one representative from each JG of the village; the Village Credit Organization acts as the financial arm of the GS, in charge of managing the community finance activities and the independent Social Audit Committee, which ensures compliance to project guidelines. The functioning of the village institutions and financing mechanism are summarized below:  1224 of GSs (87%) of total (against a target of 1125) accessed the village development fund amounting to more than US$47.26 million representing about 80 percent of the total project expenditures;  129,960 hard core poor and poor households, most of which are normally not creditworthy to access traditional microfinance, have now accessed livelihood funds loans;  In all village institutions, over 90 percent of the decision making positions are occupied by women against a target of 50 percent;  1238 villages against a target of 1125 have regular quarterly meetings;  90 percent of the 1407 Social Audit Committees formed in the villages submit quarterly reports to their respective GP, thus ensuring transparency and accountability at community level. At project completion, communities had saved a total of 92 million taka (over US$1.2 million) had been saved which is only 65 percent of initial target of 141 million taka. This is partly due to the slower than expected implementation pace of the project and, in some cases and particular areas, less than optimum follow-up by SDF to oversee saving groups. However, after completion, all of these JGs continue to save at the same pace and further funds are being accumulated and used for more internal loans; On time repayment rates are 93 percent and 92 percent for loans from the saving funds and from the livelihood funds, respectively, which is close to the internationally accepted standard of 95%. Close monitoring is performed by SDF, which regularly grades the VCOs with A, B or C, based on their performances. 13 For the first time in Bangladesh, a Community Financing model, a ―community-to-community‖ capacity building model, and a participatory targeting model were tested and scaled up. The community financing model ensured: (i) easy access to credit for those who otherwise were not credit worthy; (ii) collection of service charges paid by members, in order to build the fund for enhanced future credits and to meet the operating expenses of village institutions, thereby ensuring financial sustainability. The project developed community Professionals drawing from experienced community leaders who voluntarily developed their own villages to then offer their skills and knowledge to new communities for a fee. These systems of ―community-to-community‖ capacity building technical assistance were institutionalized through the establishment of community professional centers. Two such centers have already been developed in the original project districts and are offering services to the villages in the additional financing areas. Finally, the participatory targeting model was successful in helping the communities themselves fix the criteria and identify the project‘s target beneficiaries. 3.2.2. Access to Infrastructure and Services SIPP-I also substantially improved ―access to local infrastructure and basic services through the implementation of community-driven small-scale infrastructure works and social assistance programs,‖ the second part of the original PDO. At completion, SIPP-I had financed the construction of 1734 community infrastructure works, including 1376 works under the original project and 358 under the flood and cyclone additional financings. This compares with the original PAD target of 1800 sub-projects; no quantitative targets were set for the 3 AFs. About 2,500,000 people from 1407 villages benefited from these infrastructures. Four major categories of infrastructure works were successfully completed: 2,490 km of earthen roads were built; 3160 culverts were constructed, which considerably improved drainage and communication; 2940 hand tube-wells were drilled to provide safe drinking water and 85 schools were repaired. At project completion, almost all infrastructure works were in good condition and in use by villagers. Furthermore, 100 percent of villages had established an Operation & Maintenance (O&M) plan and 77 percent of them (against the target of 80 percent) had mobilized O&M funds. The construction of these infrastructures has led to:  Improved access to markets, goods, inputs and information through better communication as a result of road and culvert construction. The final assessment survey revealed that communication in the village was improved for 84 percent of villagers as a result of road construction and 66 percent of villagers as a result of culvert construction. Road construction led to an increase in trade and commerce (for 48% of respondents) and of marketing of agricultural products (for 39 percent of respondents). These percentages are respectively 35% and 33 percent for beneficiaries of culvert construction. These benefits can largely be attributed to the project as non- project Government infrastructure works address inter-village infrastructure not covered in SIPP-I. In addition to these four areas of infrastructure, 6 pilots piped water supply projects were implemented. Further, two Community Information Centers (CICs) with the aim to improve communities‘ access to relevant information, were successfully established as an innovation by the project. By project completion, 21,300 people had accessed ICT based basic services for education, health and information. Over 8,000 people accessed information regarding government documentation and data on non-farm economic activities. Ninety-two youth have received basic operational training on computer and 529 farmers have accessed e- agricultural services. 14  As a result of culvert construction, 60 percent of households reported time savings, 76 percent of households saved time from road construction. An impact evaluation of CIWs produced in 2010 showed that while the majority of people spent up to 60 minutes on communication per day before SIPP-I, this amount was reduced to less than 30 minutes a day as a result of the project. A weighted average was calculated, and the time saved averaged 17 minutes per person per day according to the survey;  Access to safe drinking water had led to improved health through the reduction of water borne diseases. The impact evaluation survey of CIWs shows that 34 percent, 30 percent and 19 percent of respondents saw a reduction of incidence of diarrhea, dysentery and hepatitis respectively. Further, time spent fetching water was also reduced. The project financed 2940 hand tube wells. Assuming that, on average 12 households use a tube well (as reported by monitoring reports), with an average size of five members per household, the total number of beneficiaries is estimated at 176,000 persons;  Access to education was also improved, both as a result of the rehabilitation of 85 schools and of road and culvert construction, which enabled increased school attendance in 58 percent and 41 percent of villages, respectively. Under the Social Assistance Program, a dedicated pilot health program was implemented from October 2004 to June 2007. It reached 65,000 rural poor in 22 villages. This led to increased awareness of health issues, increased capacity building, and access to local level health care services. 3.2.3. Improved Livelihoods Project restructuring after MTR introduced a focus on livelihood improvement. SIPP-I developed income generating activities and created employment through loans for enterprise investment and skills development and through direct grants to the most vulnerable. At project completion 258,113 people were engaged in saving activities in their respective JGs and had saved a total of 92 million taka (US$ 1.23 million). The provision of loans and grants (as of June 30, 2011) is summarized in the following table: No of Total Amount (million Total Amount Type of loan / grant recipients BDT) (*) (million US$) (**) Internal lending (from JGs) 141,283 127 (135) 1.69 Livelihood loans 110,000 555 (753) 7.40 One time grant for most vulnerable 17,710 45.6 0.61 Seed capital grant (@ 4000 taka per 19,960 79.8 1.06 person) (before MTR) Youth development loan 10,660 22 (37) 0.29 TOTAL 162,291 829.4 11.06 (*) Initial target in parentheses (**) Exchange rate at completion: US$ 1 = BDT 75 The amounts are slightly below target, mostly due to: (i) the slower than foreseen pace of implementation; (ii) the fact that saving activities in some communities are not continuous, as field monitoring visits have shown that some groups tend to stop or reduce their level of internal savings once they access the livelihood fund. However, the provision of loans from internal savings and the livelihood fund continues to grow after completion of the project and original targets will likely be reached a few months after completion. The uses of these funds are described below: 15 Increasing family income through the development of income generating activities. In particular, livelihood loans were invested to purchase goats or cattle (55 percent of total), small trade business (30 percent), purchase rickshaws (9 percent) and invest in agriculture and fisheries (6 percent). The financial analysis (Annex 4) shows that on average, taking into account unsuccessful IGAs by some recipients, these activities generated an incremental monthly income of about 1300 taka (US$17.3), which represents an increase of over 100 percent from before the project. Field visits show that diversification in income generating activities (IGA) and improved business development guidance provided to families could have further increased these benefits. At project completion, assuming that the 110,000 households will sustain their activities over time, the annual value added created by the project would amount to about US$23 million; Creating employment. At project completion, 7893 youth were employed as a result of targeted professional training financed by the project in the form of loans to unemployed young people. This does not include people who considered themselves to be self-employed, as a result of developing their own business (garments, repair shops, mechanics, and electronics). They are accounted for in the previous paragraph. According to sample surveys, 43 percent of JG members (47,300 HCP and Poor) were employed after benefiting from the livelihood fund. In addition, 5.75 million employment days were generated by the construction of CIWs that were mostly built using paid community labor. Supporting the most vulnerable to gain to membership in VCOs. Out of 17,710 most vulnerable (hardcore poor) who have received one-time grant, 14,361 graduated to accessing loans from VCOs and started IGAs. Finally, while in usual micro-credit interventions, capital funds, interest and profit flow back to the MFIs, village credit provided under SIPP-I remained within the village to provide opportunities for their villagers (except for the sub-component implemented by PKSF). The project‘s village livelihoods funds continue to revolve at the community level and meet community credit needs. 3.2.4. Disaster Recovery and Preparedness. As mentioned earlier, development of SIPP-I village institutions was a relatively lengthy process, meaning that SIPP-I could not support flood and cyclone communities in the first 1.5 years after the disasters and therefore, did not have an impact on the direct recovery and restoration of livelihoods immediately after the disasters. Community members rehabilitated their houses and recovered from agricultural losses on their own, with support from humanitarian agencies and NGOs. Because of the lengthy institution development process, SIPP-I may not have been the correct vehicle to provide this support. However, though not the most appropriate mechanism for immediate disaster response, SIPP-I did bring benefits to the affected communities. For the first time in Bangladesh, participatory vulnerability analysis has been mainstreamed into the village development planning mechanism and disaster risk preparedness at the community level implemented. In addition to contributing to the original PDO, the flood and cyclone AFs had the objective to enhance the capacity of communities to cope with potential future disasters. Communities were trained in disaster management and prepared disaster management plans. They were also provided with equipment (hand microphones, first aid kits, raincoats and boots, radios, etc.). However, the sense during community consultations during ICR preparation was that this support might not actually be sufficient to improve the preparedness and resilience of communities to floods and cyclones. While formally disaster management had been worked out and training had taken place, the actual preparedness of the communities remains unknown in the absence of disasters, especially in flood areas. Yet, regular mock drills have been performed, management committees have been formed and 16 communities‘ contribution to the disaster management fund has been set in many cases. The following related responses were obtained during the final impact assessment survey (300 interviews): Question percentage of yes À disaster management plan was prepared in your village 99.7% Any member of your family has participated in the preparation of it 91.1% Awareness of community on disaster preparedness has increased 100.0% Training programs were organized on DRM 98.3% Radio and Hand Microphones are used during disasters 89.4% The equipment received is enough to cope with disasters 26.7% The disaster management plan is completely implemented 29.4% The disaster management plan is partly implemented 58.6% 3.3 Efficiency 3.3.1 Cost Effectiveness The final project cost was US$60.3 million, including US$29.21 million from the original credit and the first AF, US$23.75 from the flood AF and US$10.83 million from the cyclone AF. Final costs implemented by SDF (total minus US$15 million implemented by PKSF) were US$45.25 million, covering 1407 villages, representing an average cost per village of about US$32,160. The number of villages roughly corresponds to the initial target of 1400 in the original PAD, but these were expected to be covered with the original cost of US$18.26 million, corresponding to an average cost per village of US$13,000. The actual cost at project completion was therefore 2.5 times the projected one. Taking the number of JG members (258,113) as a proxy for the total number of project beneficiaries from SDF implemented components, the project cost per beneficiary amounts to approximately US$175. This is substantially higher than the cost per beneficiary of micro-finance activities undertaken by PKSF under the flood additional financing. Indeed, SDF and PKSF have radically different modes of operation at community level, with SDF providing a more comprehensive set of activities including savings and credit, CIW, institution development and capacity development. According to PKSF, 270,317 loan recipients benefited from their intervention, corresponding to an average per beneficiary cost of US$55.5 (average loan of 4262 taka), however, the actual impact of Staff and operating Miscellaneous costs 5% 7% Contracts, capacity development 18% Community grants 67% Goods and vehicles 3% 17 these PKSF loans on income and access to services remains undocumented. Another indicator of efficiency is the percentage of project funds that actually reached final beneficiaries in the form of community grants. As shown in the attached chart, community grants accounts to 67 percent, of project funds while operating costs make up only seven percent. A comparative analysis of implementation before and after MTR, i.e. implementation through contracting community work to NGOs vs. direct implementation by SDF. The share of project costs reaching communities is remarkably the same between the two options, i.e. 68 percent and 67 percent. This is even more evident as the share of funds directly or indirectly benefiting the communities amounted to a higher 85 percent, taking into account the facilitation, institutional development and community capacity building. Further NGOs were only facilitating the delivery of infrastructure projects, while SDF was providing a more comprehensive support to community institution development, access to infrastructure, services and saving and credit activities. 3.3.2. Cost Benefit Analysis Annex 4 presents a simplified financial and economic analysis. The original PAD analysis focused on valuing time saved from fetching drinking water as a result of the construction of tube wells. While Annex 4 provides time saving estimates from the construction of tube wells and earthen roads, valuing them in financial terms was not considered appropriate. Instead, the financial analysis is on IGAs, considered by project beneficiaries as the main source of their cash income. It is based on simple models that were developed in 2009 by an FAO consultant to SDF, on the basis of direct interviews in a sample of villages, for more common IGAs undertaken by recipients of the livelihood funds. These activities include: (i) goat rearing, which enables the owner to benefit from offspring and the consequent sale of the animals at market within six months; (ii) cattle fattening, taking about four to six months to increase body weight and sell the fattened animal; (iii) purchasing rickshaw to provide transportation services; (iv) rice husking, an example of small business, and; (v) small trade. The average annual income range resulting from these enterprises is about 11,000-13,000 taka, except for those with rickshaws, which average 27,000 taka. Adjusted for inflation, the weighted average income generated from IGAs is calculated at 15,765 taka per year, i.e. 1314 taka per month (US$ 17.5). This is double the average original household incomes estimated at about 633 taka per month before project intervention, according to the final impact assessment report. The economic analysis was undertaken with the following assumptions: (i) all projects costs (US$ 63.8 million) were factored in and phased over the eight years of implementation period; (ii) to be conservative, only benefits from IGAs were calculated (valuing other social benefits would further increase project economic performance); (iii) financial prices of costs and benefits reflect economic values; (iv) total incremental project benefits at project completion, were calculated only by considering the IGAs from the livelihood fund, i.e. by multiplying the above average benefits per household by the total number of beneficiaries from the livelihood fund (110,000), reaching a total of US$ 23,12 million in project year eight and the following years; (v) these benefits were phased in slowly starting in year 2008 and reaching full benefit in 2011 and subsequent years, and; (vi) the economic rate of return (ERR) was calculated over a 20 year period at 24.7 percent which is considered is very good, especially as the calculation is done on a conservative basis, only accounting for benefits from IGAs. This is consistent with the independent final impact assessment undertaken in 2011 – after the project closure. The summary of the assessment is given in Annex 6. In addition, the project generated considerable social benefits that were not quantified in the above analysis: (i) time saved in transportation from the construction of the roads and culvert (average of 17 minutes per day according to the impact assessment survey); (ii) better access to drinking water resulting in improved health. According to a qualitative assessment in 2010, the incidence of diarrhea 18 declined by 34 percent with beneficiaries from tube wells; (iii) better access to economic activities, education, information and goods as a result of improved connectivity; (iv) general empowerment of communities as a whole and of their female and poorest members. 3.4 Justification of the Overall Outcome Rating Rating: moderately satisfactory. The Project largely achieved its PDO: (i) its features (design, implementation modalities, institutional development, financial models) remain relevant and are a solid basis for replication and up scaling of CDD activities in Bangladesh; (ii) it led to an empowerment of communities and women in rural areas, giving them tools to eventually graduate from poverty; (iii) it helped develop a sustainable community financing model friendly to the poorest of the poor, who were otherwise considered un- bankable; (iv) it led to substantial social and financial benefits. Hence, the original SIPP along with the AF- I could be considered satisfactory. Though the project satisfactorily achieved its development objectives, the overall outcome faced some shortcomings. SIPP-I suffered from the rapid expansion of its scope of activities, its geographic coverage, and the amount of funds it managed with the introduction of AFs II and III in the most constrained of the flood and cyclone areas. SIPP had not developed any institutions in the flood and cyclone areas prior to the disasters, which limited its ability to implement quickly and effectively. The situation was worsened by the lack of trained SDF staff in sufficient numbers, the lack of tested models for the prompt and effective response for rehabilitation and preparedness of communities, and the slow pace of creating the Disaster Risk Management Unit (DRMU) and the Appraisal and Monitoring Team at regional level on the part of SDF. Moreover, the NGO contracted to implement AF-III lacked the prior experience community development and community disaster preparedness to be effective on the ground. Ultimately out of the US$50 million, only 9.38 Million could be disbursed resulting in the cancellation of US$40 million. Though the intensions were right, pushing large amounts with little time for implementation lead to slowing down the overall project performance. There is no evidence that the disbursement of US$15 million through PKSF, under the flood AF, contributed to the achievement of the PDO, in terms of proper institution building and targeting of affected beneficiaries, community preparedness and empowerment and livelihood development. The project has continuously strived to move funds to the communities for institutional and livelihood development as evidenced from the disbursement figures of the last years of implementation. Hence, the Bank supervision missions were assessing the AF-II and III as satisfactory. However, as SDF could not catch up the required speed of implementation leading to a slowdown in disbursements, the mission in May 2011 downgraded the assessment to MS. Would a realistic assessment of the SDF‘s implementation capacity had been made earlier, it would have helped the management take a timely decision. For these above reasons, the AF II and III can only be considered as moderately satisfactory. 3.5 Over-arching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts 3.5.1 Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects and Social Development One of the remarkable achievements of the project was that it successfully reached the intended target group-the poor and HCP, unlike the vast majority of on-going programs. In SIPP-I villages, 85 percent of the poor and HCP participated. This was achieved through two mechanisms: (i) 19 participatory identification of the poor (PIP); (ii) the condition set by SDF to intervene in a village only if their members mobilize at least 80 percent of the poor and HCP. Poverty reduction was not a direct objective of the project, so the impact of the project on poverty was not assessed. However, since SIPP-I aimed to establish a model that would contribute to poverty reduction; SIPP-II should more systematically measure its impact on poverty. Qualitative evidence shows that prior to SIPP I, the two main project districts, (Jamalpur and Gaibandha), were often in the news because of widespread famine - this is not the case today. While general food security improved during the past decade in Bangladesh, this can partly be attributed to SIPP-I who intervened in these particularly food insecure areas. SIPP-I turned out to be a women’s empowerment project. Over 95 percent of participants were women and many attribute part of SIPP-I‘s success to this. This was captured in the following indicators collected during the final impact assessment survey (sample of 1200 participating households). As a result of SIPP-I, 99.4 percent of those surveyed (all but 5) said that the social status of women has increased. Most decisions are now jointly made by men and women: Participation of men and women in decision making related to… Before Project After Project Women Men Both Women Men Both Loans 3% 57% 39% 13% 6% 81% Sale or purchase of assets 3% 57% 40% 8% 8% 84% Savings 13% 33% 46% 23% 2% 75% Education of children 6% 19% 53% 13% 1% 65% Family planning 1% 12% 65% 3% 1% 71% (Note: totals do not add to 100%, as the question was not considered applicable for all participants) Community workshops during ICRR mission showed a lot of evidence of this empowerment, contrasting with the usual place of women in rural Bangladesh. During workshops, women spoke out, debated, argued and joked. They are now in a position to defend their views, to participate in decisions both in the community and in their families. One woman summarized this change: ―Before, I was seen as the wife of the bicycle repairer; now I am Ms. XXX, recognized for who I am.� The project empowered women to prepare their own village development projects, to lead the various newly established institutions (JG, GP, GS, various committees), and to open and manage bank accounts. ―Contrary to the first day, now the head of the branch of the bank puts a chair for me when I enter his office,‖ said another woman. 3.5.2 Institutional Change and Strengthening The core project achievement was institutional strengthening at community level. At project completion SDF is a strong institution with cluster, district and national capacities, able to undertake CDD interventions. For the first time in the country, the project could provide a multipurpose building for the hard core poor and poor to meet together and share their concerns, instead of the open courtyard of the landlords. Considering its positive impact, GoB is scaling up the SIPP model to a total of 10 new districts under SIPP II. The key elements of the model are also being adopted in other programs/projects. 3.5.3 Unintended Outcomes and Impacts From a psychological point of view, the project also restored trust, pride and some positive behaviors in the communities. They now have a trusting relationship with SDF, which contrasts with the initial 20 fear and skepticism due to prior negative experience with external institutions taking advantage of their weak situations. There are also indications that food and nutrition security improved resulting from: (i) better communication and decreased water logging as a result of rural roads and culverts (39 percent of respondents of the final assessment survey saw improved marketing of agricultural products; 12 percent said that agriculture was diversified, 12 percent said that crops intensified); (ii) the fact that 55 percent of loan recipients invested in livestock, leading to an increased production and consumption of animal products (milk, dairy and meat); (iii) increased welfare from Social Assistance Program (SAP), wages from infrastructure construction and other livelihood activities, which increased purchasing power used to purchase additional food. The impact assessment survey revealed that the number of households having three meals per day increased to 60 percent of the households compared to the before project situation of eight percent. Meanwhile, the long duration migration from the villages remarkably reduced as the employment opportunities increased by 20 percent. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome The overall risk to development outcome can be considered moderate as most risks will be mitigated by activities under SIPP-II. A summary risk analysis is provided below: Nature and likelihood of the Potential Impact on Existing or recommended mitigation risk Development outcome measures Rating External Risks Disasters (floods, Death or wounded people; SIPP-I developed disaster risk management Moderate cyclones) are likely activities (participatory vulnerability Damage to infrastructure, to occur in the future analysis and preparedness) that partly leading to reduced access given vulnerability improved community preparedness, but to services; of the country and more efforts are required; climate change Disruption of livelihood Livelihood activities and increased income activities and employment increased resilience of communities; Need to develop linkages with main stream initiatives in disaster management; Need for wider area planning (basin level planning which is beyond the capacity of a particular community) Political Absence of governing SDF built strong procedures, working Moderate to Interference (in the bodies or of managing methods and a more effective organogram; significant Government and WB director; A strong human resource policy developed higher management) Politically appointed staff; in 2008 aims to mitigate the risk of on management of interference and guides the current major the project is Inaccurate/ inappropriate recruitment process to increase SDF possible decisions regarding capacity to 2100+ staff. project scope and costs 21 Internal Risks Institutional The majority of SIPP-I SDF management is aware of the issue and Moderate Sustainability of staff is considered in agreement with the World Bank should SDF: There is a competent and put in place mechanisms to retain the good current lack of clarity experienced. Their loss quality staff, through a particular whether SDF will be would constitute a major recruitment process for SIPP-I staff and/or able to retain some loss of human capital and increasing the importance of experience in of its best and considerably reduce the selection criteria of candidates. The experienced staff: the SDF‘s capacity to new HR policy and manual adopted by external recruitment implement SIPP-II. SDF management address this issue but process creates careful implementation by the external anxiety among SIP-I recruiting firm has to be secured staff that need to re- apply and are unsure whether or not they will be selected. Sustainability of CNRS estimates that only SIPP-II was not only designed to upscale Moderate Village Institutions: about 20% of the SIPP-I, but also to take over support to all Communities‘ community institutions communities having benefited from SIPP-I institutions are not developed under SIPP1 to enable their self-sustainability. sustainable without are ―mature,‖ i.e. they can In addition, community owned institutions support from SDF. now run on their own with are being developed to provide support With no further no further external independently from SDF: SIPP-I has support, they could support. empowered 975 Community Professionals disappear. They are The dissolution of who already provided 23,253 person days numerous and community institutions of service; SIPP-II will establish second complex. Book would lead to progressive generation institutions able to federate keeping requirements disappearance of project existing institutions and ensure further are demanding and achievements. support and sustainability. cumbersome. Infrastructures built This would lead to the The fact that communities planned, low to under SIPP-I are not progressive deterioration implemented, own and monitor moderate sustainable. of the infrastructure. infrastructure is a guarantee for sustainability; 785 villages under consolidation phase (83% of total) have developed O&M plans for CIW and 744 villages (79%) implemented these plans as scheduled. 22 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank 5.1.1 Ensuring Quality at Entry Overall, quality at entry is satisfactory. The design of the original project and of the consolidation phase was satisfactory: they proposed solid processes and arrangements, building on existing experiences and introducing the necessary flexibility. Only the M&E design was relatively poor. 5.1.2 Quality of Supervision Quality of supervision was satisfactory. Supervision was regular, delving deep into issues, providing accurate technical assistance and practical guidance to the project implementation team. Missions were concluded by detailed aide-memoires, with practical recommendations and agreed actions. Rather than adopting a controlling attitude, supervision teams provided advice, support and guidance. TTLs were responsive to issues and SDF greatly appreciated their support. The Bank Team undertook successfully the huge challenge of post MTR design change in addition to withstanding the pressure created due to rapid financial expansion resulting in unrealistic disbursement targets. Out of the four TTLs, two of them were located in Dhaka, which greatly facilitated communication, engagement and speedy action. In addition, regular technical assistance and south to south exchanges were organized from similar projects in the region. SDF benefitted from all these efforts the effect of which has been demonstrated from the fact that SDF performance began to pick up and could meet many of the targets. The quality of supervision would have been rated highly satisfactory. The supervision team made important efforts to support the implementation agency in creating its Disaster Risk Management Unit and to work out modalities to expand SDF activities in the disaster affected areas. However, they could not properly estimate the challenges and potential risks that might have affected the effective implementation of the flood and cyclone AFs. Moreover, the decision to channel funds through PKSF and to use an NGO as implementing agency in the cyclone affected districts turned out to be inappropriate. 5.1.3 Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance In the light of above, quality at entry and supervision were satisfactory. Despite the implementation issues associated with the rapid increase of project allocation, the overall design and supervision have been carefully managed. Hence, the overall Bank performance is rated satisfactory. 5.2 Borrower 5.2.1 Government Performance Government performance is rated satisfactory. The Economic Relations Division (ERD) of the Ministry of Finance supervises all externally financed projects and was extensively briefed by all WB supervision missions, after which ERD ensured adequate momentum by the implementing agency to follow WB recommendations. The Government provided good support to CDD activities implemented by SDF and was responsive to the needs for change during implementation, including as a result of the MTR. However, the Government failed to appoint the key decision making bodies of SDF, the Governing Body for 5.5 months and its infrequent meetings prevented timely decision. It also failed to appoint the Managing Director of SDF for about five months in 2010. 23 5.2.2 Implementing Agency (or Agencies) Performance The main implementing agency, SDF is rated satisfactory. At completion, it had 800 staff, mostly dedicated, experienced and competent. SDF was able to effectively implement the project and adjust throughout implementation. As a new institution (created in 2001), SDF faced some shortfalls, including: (i) the lack of a human resource policy throughout SIPP-I: (ii) SDF was without a general manager program for 1.5 years in 2008 and 2009; (iii the ineffective M&E system. However, during the last project year, SDF made considerable progress, justifying the satisfactory rating. These areas of progress were: (i) the completion and/or smooth rollover of unfinished tasks of flood and cyclone AF to SIPP II; (ii) successful preparation for and negotiation of SIPP-II; (iii) adoption and implementation of a new human resource policy; (iv) a significant increase in delivery capacity – resulting in disbursement as high as about US$ 13 million, which is unprecedented and represents an increase by over 30 percent compared to previous years, while keeping the same quality standards at field level. Also, the analysis provided in Section 3.3.1 shows that SDF has been a cost effective institutions as 67 percent of project expense have reached their intended communities and beneficiaries. 5.2.3 Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance The Government and the implementing agency being rated satisfactory, the overall borrower performance is rated satisfactory. 6. Lessons Learned Three main lessons emerge from SIPP-I: (a) Thoughtful planning in order to strike a meaningful equilibrium is critical for the success of CDD operations. The Project suffered from the rapid expansion of scope of activities, coupled with steeply rising funds allocation to the project, through AFs II and III, all in the most constrained and adversely affected flood and cyclone areas. Placing multiple burdens on a fledgling and developing SDF was damaging, as village institutions need time and continuous support to properly mature and perform. SIPP-I also suffered from an inadequate assessment of the real implementation capacity of the implementing agency. This is even more critical in countries prone to natural disasters, such as Bangladesh. Most importantly, successful CDD programs usually evolve over time and should be allowed to take root before expansion. In the case of SIPP-I, what first started as a pure capacity strengthening operation focused on developing effective and efficient financing and institutional arrangements for improving access to local infrastructures and basic services, changed into a multi sectoral program, including livelihood development and employment creation. But the rapid transformation of adding resilience to natural disasters may have put additional pressure on the design along with time constraints. Hence, the design of CDD operations should be flexible enough to adapt to emerging challenges. Equally critical is thoughtful planning for making balanced decisions on the expected outcomes, size of operation, scope of activities, institutional arrangements and time available for implementation. (b) Institution development and an enabling policy environment are pre-requisites for scaling up CDD operations. Building strong institutions of the poor at community level is central to CDD and plays an important role in facilitating access of the poor to resources and services. Also, the absence of a supportive national policy framework that allows for institutional strengthening of key stakeholders at various levels, lead to slow adoption of the model by other projects and programs in the country. 24 Integration and interaction of all levels as well as horizontal and vertical learning and experience sharing from similar operations within and outside the country, provide critical leverage to build and deliver more meaningful and inclusive programs. The sustainability of the strengthened primary institutions will be further addressed by transcending the village boundaries through networking, federating and strategizing second generation issues. In order to achieve all these, strong ongoing technical support from the Bank, field presence of TTL, managing to constantly raise and deepen the dialogue on the performance benchmarks and keeping the central agencies fully briefed are essential. (c) A successful CDD operation involves innovative, community-friendly tools that reach the hard core poor and poor and empower women. This includes, though is not limited to the following: (i) a participatory targeting methodology to ensure ownership of the operation by the beneficiaries and prevents elite capture of its benefits; (ii) user-friendly community operational manuals developed with participation of the community to help internalize the rules and guidelines of the approach, and develop a shared understanding among community leaders, members of the community institutions and facilitating staff; (iii) a successful community financing model to provide new opportunities for improved access of the hard core poor and poor, including women to financial services; (iv) a proper social auditing mechanism, governance and accountability action plan and community assessment mechanism, to ensure improved governance, downward accountability and transparency of the operation; and (v) an independent and effective process monitoring system as a permanent checking and informing mechanism in order to ensure timely addressing of impediments as well as learning. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower, Implementing Agencies and Partners (a) Borrower/Implementing Agencies (b) Co-financiers There was no co-financier of SIPP-I (c) Other Partners and Stakeholders As the main process monitoring agency, CNRS emphasized: (i) the importance of some of the social benefits of the project (which could not be documented) such as increased child education/ enrollment, better health awareness (increasingly shifted from taboo based interventions to modern medical interventions), use of ICT, information and opportunity of jobs outside of respective locality, decrease in out migration; (ii) institutional features on which SIPP-II should focus, such as the linkages with local government bodies (so that local government bodies will not be feeling threatened by a parallel body) and the importance of ensuring greater community cohesion (poor and rich). 25 Annex 1 – Project Cost And Financing This series of tables was provided by SDF. Original and Final Project costs (US$ million) Project Budget (PAD) Total Budget Actual Financing Govt. IDA allocation Disbursement % disbursed Original + consolidation 2.51 26.24 28.75 27.98 97% Flood Additional Financing 0.67 25.00 25.67 22.94 89% Cyclone Additional Financing 10.00 10.00* 9.38 94% TOTAL 2.98 61.24 64.22 60.30 94% Note: *The original allocation was US$ 50.0 million but US$ 40.0 million already cancelled and used in another sector in Bangladesh. Component wise Final Project cost Period up to June 30, 2011 Consolidation Phase (Additional Financing- 1)- IDA Credit no. 3740-BD & 37401-BD Sl. Project Components Amount in USD BDT Component-1:Strengthening of SDF and Project 1 4.97 340.31 management Component-2:Institutional Development at Community 2 2.01 137.99 Level 3 Component -3: Implementation of Community Action Plans 20.63 1,413.23 4 Component- 4: Pilot Pvt. Financing of Community Utilities 0.37 25.26 Total 27.98 1,916.79 26 (Grant number H349-BD), 2nd Addl. Financing, Flood Project (Figures in Millions) Sl. Project Components Amount in USD BDT 1 Component-1: Strengthening of SDF and Project management 0.97 66.62 2 Component-2: Institutional Development at Community Level 1.69 115.84 3 Component-3: Implementation of Community Action Plans 5.27 360.77 4 Component-4: Pilot Pvt. Financing of Community Utilities 0.01 0.49 5 Total (1+2+3+4) 7.94 543.72 6 Livelihood Restoration under PKSF 15.00 1,047.21 7 Total (5) 15.00 1,047.21 8 Total Disbursement (5+7) 22.94 1,590.93 Note: An amount of USD 1.38 million expenditure occurred under component 3 and USD 0.18 million expenditure occurred under component 2 respectively from SIPP II. (Credit number 4450-BD), 3rd Addl. Financing, SIDR Cyclone Project (Figures in Millions) Sl. Project Components Amount in USD BDT 1 Component-1: Strengthening of SDF and Project management 1.69 116.02 2 Component-2: Institutional Development at Community Level 1.30 89.35 3 Component-3: Implementation of Community Action Plans 6.36 435.64 4 Component-4: Private Sector - Technical Assistance 0.02 1.58 Total 9.38 642.60 Conversion rate 1 USD = BDT 68.5 (average) Note: An amount of USD 0.72 million expenditure occurred under component 3 expenditure made from SIPP II. 27 Annex 2 – PDO Achievement Tables This annex aims to provide a logical, clear way to analyze progress of the project, based on indicators deemed by the ICRR team as core to the aims and spirit of the PDO and of the project. The results framework established in the original PAD was not strictly followed throughout the project, nor did the additional financing project papers provide a solid basis upon which to track progress. Project Implementation Plans (PIPs) were put in place, which contained revised results frameworks with indicators that were tracked. However, these frameworks were not completely in line with the original PAD. It must be stated, though, that the project approach has indeed evolved quite substantially as a result of the Mid Term Review and Additional Financings, meaning that the original PAD indicators taken literally, are in some cases, less relevant. As such, the ICRR team has established a set of core areas of progress against which meaningful, relevant analysis has been undertaken. The core areas and explanations for their selection are as follows: Beneficiary coverage. This serves to give an at-a-glance picture of project achievement as well as a measure of inclusiveness – a topic that comes directly from the PAD results framework. Sustainability of institutions. Institution building is a core part of the PDO and measuring the sustainability of these institutions is included in the PAD results framework. Access to services through infrastructure work. Improving access to local infrastructure is part of the PDO and has been an important part of project implementation. Livelihoods. The original PAD does not envision activities to improve livelihoods. The Consolidation Project Paper, however, introduces income generating activities under the third component. Further, as the project approach evolved, livelihoods became an integral part of project interventions and an important area in which to track progress. Scaling up and policy level mainstreaming of community-driven development. This comes directly from the original PAD results framework. Reduction of vulnerability. Part of the original PAD results framework, this indicator, however, has not been tracked directly, but is included here nonetheless. Each table below represents one of these core areas of progress and provides, where applicable:  The original most relevant PAD or Additional Financing Project Papers indicator(s), including targets, where available;  The most relevant indicator(s) and targets from the Final Report (June 2011) of SDF Results Framework (based on the PIPs);  Achievement on these indicators;  Relevant notes.  Beneficiary Coverage 28 Targets for Number of People Social Assistance Program/ Phase Infrastructure Livelihoods Notes Original PAD 2 million (950 40,000 (SAP) The original PAD envisioned village-level villages) activities occurring in 4 phases; however the fourth phase villages were dropped by the project. Consolidation 152,000 The Consolidation Project Paper is not very clear on whether these additional 150,000 beneficiaries would benefit from SAP or livelihood activities. The ICRR team assumption is that there was a mixture, but this is not specified in the project paper. Flood 0.5 million (300 16,000 (livelihoods) out of the 300 villages, 200 are form the villages) consolidated phase and only 100 are new villages It is to mention that all 300 villages will benefit from flood proofed infrastructure, while 100 villages will benefit from livelihood interventions. Cyclone 0.9 million (500 120,000 (livelihoods) These targets come from the Cyclone Project villages) Paper and do not take the cancellation of US$40 million into account. TOTAL 3 million 288,000 29 Beneficiary Coverage Indicators and Achievement Original PAD Indicator/Project SDF Results Framework Category Paper Indicator Indicator with Target Achievement1 Notes The project did not report exactly on the original PAD indicator, as the project 258,113 HHs are members of approach evolved to a more robust JG, 83% of which are engaged institutional and livelihoods approach, in savings and the social assistance programs were 110,000 JG members received dropped. However, the data provided Original PAD: About 50% of the N/A Shabalombi Fund loan gives a good picture of achievement in poor and vulnerable groups in the 17,710 vulnerable beneficiaries terms of how many of the vulnerable and Number of people project area benefit from small- received one time grant poor groups benefited from the project. scale rural infrastructure and 19,960 beneficiaries received These figures include achievements social assistance programs seed capital under additional financings. SOURCE: PCR Flood: Number of households 91,300 HHs directly benefited benefited from improved from improved village village infrastructures (flood- community infrastructures resistant) through CISF/FRF (flood-resistant) Target: 105,000 HHs (87% of target) This number was calculated by adding the number of Gram Samitys formed 943 consolidation villages under consolidation (943) to the number 100 additional flood villages of non-consolidation village Original PAD: 1,400 villages to Number of villages N/A 364 cyclone villages organizations that have formed benefit from project interventions 1,407 total villages are covered functional disaster management by the project committees under the flood (100) to the number of cyclone villages in which SDF started implementation (364). 1 Unless otherwise specified, achievement data come from the SDF Final Results Framework Achievement Table 30 Original PAD Indicator/Project SDF Results Framework Category Paper Indicator Indicator with Target Achievement1 Notes Note that the original target was set prior to additional financings I, II and III. Consolidation: Number of Gram Samitys covering at least 80% of target households that have accessed the Village 822 GSs (87% of villages) Development Fund and (108% of target) managed it according to the project rules and guidelines Target: 760 GSs (80% of villages) Consolidation: Number of Gram Samitys having at least 50% of decision making The original PAD indicator refers to 943 GSs (100% of GSs) Original PAD: At least 50 percent positions occupied by women VDCs, however the institutional (124% of target) VDC formed continue to manage (poor or HCP) approach evolved and no longer includes Inclusiveness activities in inclusive manner by Target: 760 GSs (80% of VDCs. Therefore the ICRR reports on EOP villages) Gram Samitys, part of the new Flood: Number of villages community-level institutional model. accessed FRF/VDRRF for flood risk reduction fund and 297 villages utilized fund as per COM (99% of target) guideline. Target: 300 (100% of villages) Cyclone: Number of GS having at least 50% of 353 GSs decision making positions (74% of target) occupied by target women. Target: 475 GSs 31 Sustainability of Institutions Original PAD Indicator/Project SDF Results Framework Paper Indicator Indicator with Target Achievement1 Notes Original PAD: At least 50 percent Consolidation: Number of of communities continue to villages having regular 830 (88% of total villages) The project did not report directly on the original PAD prioritize needs using quarterly Gram Parishad villages indicator. However, the indicator from the SDF results participatory processes at least meetings and attended by at (109% of target) framework has been taken as a proxy here. one year beyond sub-project least 80% of target members. completion. Target: 760 (80% of villages) Original PAD: At least 10 percent No. of Community Due to a lack of information that did not allow the ICRR team of the community groups Professionals (CPs) developed 975 CPs developed and to report directly on the original PAD indicator, information mobilized under the project are and providing service to other providing services to other about Community Professionals has been used as a very rough able to leverage external resources communities. communities. proxy. to support additional needs by Target: 3800 CPs ( 5 CPs in (26% of target) EOP each 80% villages) There was no clear parameter set against which to measure OTR. However, the standard satisfactory OTR rate in the microfinance sector is generally agreed to be about 95%, with On Time Repayment (OTR) consideration given to the relative financial capacities of Rate of Shabalombi Fund 92% communities. As this project was the first time communities Loans themselves were given the responsibility to interact directly with the banking sector, the rate of 92% can be considered N/A satisfactory. SOURCE: PCR There was no clear parameter set against which to measure OTR. However, the standard satisfactory OTR in the On Time Repayment Rate of microfinance sector is generally agreed to be about 95%, with 93% Internal Lending consideration given to the relative financial capacities of communities. As this project was the first time communities themselves were given the responsibility to interact directly 1 Unless otherwise specified, achievement data come from the SDF Final Results Framework Achievement Table 32 Original PAD Indicator/Project SDF Results Framework Paper Indicator Indicator with Target Achievement1 Notes with the banking sector, the rate of 93% can be considered satisfactory. SOURCE: PCR This figure comes from the draft PKSF Impact Assessment On Time Repayment Rate for 73.5% (p.3-9). However, as the draft was not finalized, some findings, PKSF Loans including this one, are still under discussion. Flood: Number of village organizations that have Flood Project Paper: ―better formed functional disaster 300 village organizations The SDF Results Framework indicator is a proxy for the capacity to cope with future management committees and (100% of target) outcome from the flood project paper, as the wording in the disasters‖ are implementing disaster risk project paper is inconclusive. mitigation plan Target: 300 Original PAD: At least 50 percent Cyclone: Number of villages of communities continue to having quarterly Gram The project did not report directly on the original PAD prioritize needs using Parishad meetings and 353 (71% of villages) villages indicator. However, the indicator from the SDF results participatory processes at least attended by at least 70% of (88% of target) framework has been taken as a proxy here. one year beyond sub-project target members completion. Target: 400 (80% of villages) Access to Services through Infrastructure Work Original PAD Indicator/Project SDF Results Framework Paper Indicator Indicator with Target Achievement1 Notes Original PAD: About 1,800 1,376 community infrastructures The original target of 1,800 sub-projects was set prior to community sub-projects built by the community in additional financings I, II and III. Therefore although the total N/A successfully completed, in terms consolidation phase; 358 number of sub-projects (1,734) is higher than the original of participation of the poor and subprojects under FRF/CISF target, it should be understood that achievement should have 1 Unless otherwise specified, achievement data come from the SDF Final Results Framework Achievement Table 33 Original PAD Indicator/Project SDF Results Framework Paper Indicator Indicator with Target Achievement1 Notes women, beneficiary satisfaction, (flood and cyclone phases): been even higher. technical quality, cost- TOTAL: 1,734 SOURCE: PCR effectiveness and operation and maintenance. Original PAD: Minimum 50 Consolidation: Number of 736 GSs (77% of total percent of community GSs that have mobilized consolidation villages) have The project did not report directly on the original PAD infrastructure sub-projects O&M funds/resources to mobilized O&M indicator. However, the indicator from the SDF results effectively managed and cover their costs, if necessary. funds/resources framework has been taken as a proxy here. maintained by community groups Target: 760 GSs (80% of (97% of target) by EOP consolidation villages) Livelihoods Original PAD Indicator/Project Paper SDF Results Framework Indicator Category Indicator with Target Achievement1 Notes Consolidation: percentage of target 85% of target beneficiaries are The SDF Results Framework indicator is a proxy beneficiaries are members of members of JGs and engaged for the outcome from the consolidation project Jibikayan Groups (JGs) and engaged in savings (106% of target) paper, as the wording in the project paper is Consolidation Project in savings inconclusive. Savings Paper: ―Savings Target: 80% mobilized‖ Consolidation: Total amount of 92 million taka saved by savings accumulated by Jibikayan SOURCE: ―Overall project progress as on June Jibikayan Groups Groups 30, 2011‖ document (65% of target) Target: 141 million taka2 1 Unless otherwise specified, achievement data come from the SDF Final Results Framework Achievement Table 2 On 9 November 2011, US$ 1 equalled 76.47 taka: 34 Original PAD Indicator/Project Paper SDF Results Framework Indicator Category Indicator with Target Achievement1 Notes Consolidation: percentage of target 35% of target beneficiaries Note that this data comes from field visits on a beneficiaries that have increased have increased their quarterly basis and not the village matrix/MIS their incremental income by at least incremental income by at least system, but is still part of the SDF Results 50% 50% (70% of target) Framework Table N/A Target: 50% SOURCE: ICRR analysis based on financial Consolidation: Increase in monthly 1,314 taka increase in monthly models developed in 2009 by SDF on the basis of income between project formation income related to income field investigations with a representative sample of and project closing generating activities loan recipients. Flood: Number of JG members Flood Project Paper: 2,739 members Income accessing Shabalombi Fund for The SDF Results Framework indicator is a proxy Livelihood of very poor (approximately 29% of livelihood and income generating for the outcome from the flood project paper, as the people affected by floods targeted members) activities wording in the project paper is rather vague. is restored Target: 9,570 members Cyclone Project Paper: Cyclone: Number of affected Evidence of incremental unemployed youth (HCP, poor) that employment and have accessed loans/funds from skill 1,514 youth (34% of target) increased income of target development training and started families, with at least income generating activities. 70% generating 20% Target: 4,500 (60% of total youth) more income 5.76 million employment days N/A N/A SOURCE: PCR generated Flood: Employment Flood Project Paper: Number of employment days 421,709 employment days The SDF Results Framework indicator is a proxy Livelihood of very poor generated for the flood affected generated (70% of target) for the outcome from the flood project paper, as the people affected by floods community in the target villages wording in the project paper is rather vague. is restored through the provision of community infrastructure works 35 Original PAD Indicator/Project Paper SDF Results Framework Indicator Category Indicator with Target Achievement1 Notes Target: 600,000 days Cyclone Project Paper: Cyclone: Evidence of incremental Number of employment days The project did not report directly on the original employment and generated for the cyclone affected 78,154 days (20% of target) PAD indicator. However, the indicator from the increased income of target communities through CISF SDF results framework has been taken as a proxy families, with at least activities. here. 70% generating 20% Target: 400,000 employment days more income Scaling Up and Policy Level Mainstreaming of Community-Driven Development Original PAD Indicator/Project SDF Results Framework Paper Indicator Indicator with Target Achievement1 Notes The capacity of the project There is no data available with which to report on the original implementing agency in PAD PDO indicator. However, a rough proxy of measuring Original PAD: Community-driven conducting, supporting and 452 GSs (48% of villages) capacity of the project implementing agency has been selected development principles adopted as monitoring field operation has accessed funds within the with the assumption that a strong SDF will contribute towards the a policy, local planning, and been strengthened as measured stipulated time frame (as per longer-term application of community-driven development implementation of small scale through number of Gram agreed service standard). principles at policy level. infrastructure by EOP Samitys having accessed funds (59% of target) Further, in the original PAD, there was no PDO level indicator within the stipulated time directly related to strengthening SDF, however there was one at frame (as per agreed service the output level: ―SDF strengthened and providing high quality 1 Unless otherwise specified, achievement data come from the SDF Final Results Framework Achievement Table 36 Original PAD Indicator/Project SDF Results Framework Paper Indicator Indicator with Target Achievement1 Notes standard) participatory planning, management, M&L and IC services to Target: 760 GSs (80% of support the program.‖ villages) Reduction of Vulnerability Original PAD Indicator/Project SDF Results Framework Paper Indicator Indicator with Target Achievement Notes 65,000 rural poor in 22 villages benefited from pilot health Original PAD: Increased program which included awareness and opportunities to activities in awareness raising, reduce vulnerability capacity building and access to local level health care services. 37 Annex 3 – Outputs by Component This annex provides information on output achievements by project component. The four components of the project remained the same throughout the additional financings, with some changes in approach made at the sub-component level. The original components (from the PAD), followed by sub- components (where applicable), were as follows: Strengthening SDF: (i) information and communication (IC); (ii) capacity building of SDF; (iii) monitoring and learning (M&L); and (iv) project management support. Institutional development at the community-level: (i) information and communication campaign; (ii) formation and strengthening of Village Development Committees (VDCs), Community Groups (CGs), and the project management committees of CGs, and developing a demand-led CAP. Implementation of Community Action Plans Pilot private financing in community utilities A summary of achievements of the component and sub-component level are as follows. Further information on component-related outputs is provided in the tables in the appendix to this annex. Under Component 1 (Strengthening SDF), implementation arrangements were established and development of staff capacities occurred in order to facilitate smooth and timely implementation of the project. Under sub-component (i) information and communication, communication campaigns were conducted at the village level to raise awareness of the project and develop community buy-in. Under sub-component (ii) capacity building of SDF, SDF staff went through a range of trainings, including exposure visits to Sri Lanka and India, as well as training on procurement. Under sub-component (iii) monitoring and learning, a process monitoring mechanism was established, a centralized MIS was developed prior to MTR changes, followed by a decentralized MIS system post MTR (however, as mentioned above, the new MIS was not fully utilized), the village matrix, a data gathering tool developed in collaboration with communities, was implemented, and monthly monitoring workshops were conducted at the cluster and district level, during which concerns were raised and action plans were drawn up to address concerns. Under sub-component (iv) project management support, community level SDF representatives, Cluster Facilitators, facilitated the process of village institution development, including building capacities in financial management, procurement and project management. Further, during implementation of the flood and cyclone additional financings, training and capacity building in disaster risk management (DRM) came under this sub-component. Under Component 2 (Institutional development at the community level), institutions were developed at the community level that have led to many positive outcomes under the project (discussed in the ICRR main text). The original PAD makes reference to Village Development Committees (VDCs), however, as mentioned in the main report, the institutional approach at village level changed after the MTR. The new model developed Jibikayan Groups (JGs), Gram Parishads (GPs) and Gram Samitys (GSs), therefore achievements related to this component are reported in terms of GPs, GSs and JGs, and not the original VDCs. In terms of overall component-level outputs, SDF reports that 830 villages have regular quarterly Gram Parishad meetings, which are attended by at least 80% of target members. 38 Under sub-component (i) information and communication (IC) campaign, partner organizations initially led the IC campaigns at the village level, with SDF taking over after the shift in implementation modality. These included village visits, posters depicting the project through the use of pictures as well as Bangla language, and focus group discussions. Under sub-component (ii) formation and strengthening of VDCs, as mentioned above, due to the change in institutional model, outputs here are measured in terms of GPs, GSs and JGs. Overall, institutions were built in 943 villages, with 830 of them having regular quarterly Gram Parishad meetings, attended by at least 80 percent of target members. In addition to JGs, GPs and GS, Village Credit Organizations (VCOs), Social Audit Committees (SACs), procurement committees, finance committees and operations and maintenance committees were established – each charged with different responsibilities in the context of the overall development of the village. Further, the institutions developed were inclusive, with all 943 of Gram Samitys having at least 50 percent of decision making positions occupied by poor or hardcore poor women. Additionally, under the flood and cyclone additional financings, Village Disaster Management Committees (VDMCs) were developed, that were charged with implementation of disaster prevention activities. The institution building that came under this component contributed strongly to achievement of the PDO and is one of the most successful parts of the project. Under Component 3 (Implementation of Community Action Plans), a variety of outputs were achieved. A total of 1,734 infrastructure sub-projects were completed (mainly roads, culverts, tube wells and rehabilitation of school grounds). About 730 Gram Samity multipurpose offices have been established. JG and GP members gained access to loans for livelihood strengthening, as well as loans for youth skill development. Further, vulnerable community members received seed capital and one time grants under this component. Also, a health program was implemented from October 2004 to June 2007, which reached 65,000 rural poor in 22 villages and led to awareness raising, capacity building and access to local level health care services. This component also included the monga pilot project, which provided (i) skills development training; (ii) seed capital grants to HCP families who didn‘t meet selection criteria for micro-credit; (iii) employment generation through community infrastructure; and (iv) provision of micro-credit. Further, under the flood and cyclone additional financings, rehabilitation of flood/cyclone damaged infrastructure took place, as well as the development of community disaster response plans. Under Component 4 (Pilot private financing in community utilities), project resources were channeled to leverage private financing of piped water supply to communities through matching grants. Overall, 3,600 households were connected to water supplies with 11,000 people benefiting from clean water. Finally, information has been provided about the outputs under additional financing II (flood), which was implemented by PKSF, under which micro finance activities took place. 39 Annex 3 – Attachment 1 This appendix provides quantitative information on output achievements by project component. Achievements are broken down by consolidation phase (original + additional financing I), flood (additional financing II) and cyclone (additional financing III). The main source of this data is the SDF Final Results Framework Achievement Table, however some data derive from the June 2011 World Bank Aide-Memoire and are noted with (AM) following the indicator. Consolidation Component Indicator Target Achievement Number of GSs having accessed funds 453 (48% villages) within the stipulated time frame (as per 760 (80% villages) (60% of target) agreed service standard) 1. Strengthening percentage of issues identified by SDF Process Monitoring Agencies that have 86% 80% been resolved through corrective measure (107% of target) and timely action on a monthly basis Number of GS having at least 50% of 943 (100%) (124% of decision making positions occupied by 760 (80% of villages) target) women (poor or HCP) Number of villages having regular quarterly Gram Parishad (GP) meeting 830 (88%) 760 (80% of villages) and attended by at least 80% of target (109% of target) members (50% women) Number of Social Audit Committees 2. Institutional 822 (87%) (SAC) that are functioning and reporting 760 (80% of villages) Development at (108% of target) to the GP on a quarterly basis the Community Number of GSs with all financial and Level 783 (83%) benefit information displayed and 760 (80% of villages) (103% of target) updated on a monthly basis percentage of target beneficiaries that are 85% members of Jibikayan Groups (JGs) and 80% (106% of target) engaged in savings. Village accessed first, second and third 822 (90% of target), installments of Village Development 943 for each 448 (48% of target), Funds (VDF), respectively (AM) 212 (22% of target) Number of Gram Samity (GS) covering at least 80% of target households that have 822 (87% of Gram 760 (80% of Gram accessed the Village Development Fund Samitys) Samitys) (VDF) and managed it according to the (108% of target) project rules and guidelines Percentage of the members of JGs 3. accessed the Livelihood Assistance Fund 80% (143,500 46% (81,810) Implementation and started income generation activities. members) (58% of target) of Community Action Plans Number of most vulnerable people that 14,194 received grant have received assistance (one time grant) (142% of target, 9,000 9,975 and accessed the Livelihood Assistance accessed fund (90% of Fund target) Number of poor and HCP youth that have 8,092 accessed loans accessed loans for skill development and 14,250 (58% of target), 6,539 started income generating activities or have been employed 40 Component Indicator Target Achievement linked to employment (46% of target) percentage of the target beneficiaries 35% have increased their incremental income 50% (70% of target) by at least 50% percentage of target households that has 80% (143,500 46% (81,800) increased their incremental income at households) (58% of target) least by 20% Number of GS that have mobilize O&M 736 (77% of villages) funds/ resources to cover their cost, if 760 (80% of villages) (97% of target) necessary Number of GS implementing O&M plan 767 (81% of villages) 760 (80% of villages) annually (101% of target) Number of Community Resource Persons (CRPs) developed and providing service 975 3800 to other communities (25% of target) 2250 HHs (63% of target) 4. Pilot Private Number of House level connections 3,600 HHs Source: Water Pilot Financing in made and getting water. Project Completion Community Report Utilities Number of people benefiting from clean 36,000 11,000 (31% of target) water Flood Component Indicator Target Achievement 1. Strengthening Number of village organizations set-up SDF and early warning systems and trained in 203 300 Program providing help to the community (68% of target) Management members during emergencies Number of villages accessed FRF for 297 flood risk reduction and utilized fund as 300 (99% of target) per COM and guideline Number of hard core poor mobilized into N/A 17,139 1,516 JGs, 179 SSCs and 99 VCOs (AM) Number of village organizations have formed disaster management committees 300 300 and are implementing disaster risk (100% of target) 2. Institutional mitigation plan Development at Number of village organizations that have 103 the Community utilized emergency funds and recovered 300 (34% of target) Level the fund Number of villages organized youth 300 volunteer team and provided assistance 300 (100% of target) during the flood Number of villages have O&M plan and 297 300 implemented as per plan (99% of target) Number of villages that received first, 200, 117 and 37 (out second and third instalment of Flood 200 of 200 consolidation Rehabilitation Fund (FRF), respectively villages) 41 Component Indicator Target Achievement (AM) Number of villages received first and 97 and 21 (out of 100 100 Non- second installments of Institution non-consolidation consolidation villages Development Fund, respectively (AM) villages) Number of households directly benefited 91,300 HHs from improved village community 105,000 HHs (87% of target) infrastructures (flood-resistant) Number of employment days generated for the flood affected community in the 600,000 employment 421,709 target villages through the provision of days (70% of target) community infrastructure works Number of villages received first, second and third installments of Community 97, 74 and 2 (out of 3. 100 villages Infrastructure and Services Fund, 100 new villages) Implementation respectively (AM) of Community percentage of affected youth that have 776 youth accessed Action Plan accessed loans from skill development loans (59% of target), 1,318 training and started income generating 450 youth employed activities (34% of target) 1,321 received Number of most vulnerable people that assistance (one time have received assistance (one time grant) grant) funds for 1,327 and accessed the livelihoods assistance livelihood funds development (99% of target) Funds released and disbursed as loans to US$ 15 million 270,317 beneficiary households (from US$ 15 million (100% of target) PKSF Project Report) PKSF Activities Recovery rate of loans provided at PKSF- PO level and PO-beneficiary household 100%, 100% 100% , 99% levels, respectively (from PKSF Project Report) 4. Pilot Private Separate pilot private financing activities Financing in were not initiated under this additional Community financing. Utilities Flood PKSF Indicator Target Achievement On Time Repayment Rate for PKSF Loans 73.5%1 Cyclone Component Indicator Target Achievement 1. Strengthening Number of village organizations set-up 400 250 1 This figure comes from the draft PKSF Impact Assessment (p.3-9). However, as the draft was not finalized, some findings, including this one, are still under discussion. 42 Component Indicator Target Achievement SDF and Program early warning systems and trained in (63% of target) Management providing help to the community members during emergencies Cumulative funds disbursed to US$ 6.23 million N/A communities (AM) (62% of allocation) Number of GS having at least 50% of 353 decision making positions occupied by 475 (74% of target) women (poor or HCP) Number of villages having regular quarterly Gram Parishad (GP) 353 400 meetings and attended by at least 70% (88% of target) of target members (50% women) Number of villages have 70% of target 353 HHs mobilized into livelihood groups 350 2. Institutional (101% of target) and started savings Development at Number of villages with institutions of Community Level 353 the hard core poor and poor (GP, GS, 500 (71% of target) SAC) formed and functioning 267 accessed first Number of village institutions accessed instalment, 12 first and second installments of 400 accessed second Institution Development Fund (AM) installment Number of villages acquired land for construction of disaster proof Gram 400 201 Samity Offices Number of GS covering at least 70% of target households that have accessed 338 the Village Development & Risk 400 (85% of target) Reduction Fund and managed fund according to the agreed rules Number of targeted households 55,000 (60% of accessing employment generation 55,000 (60%) households) schemes through the provision of CISF (100% of target) activities Number of target households benefit from project intervention (SF, 7,243 infrastructure, skill development, 30,000 (24% of target) 3. Implementation savings and credit) and have started of Community income generating activities Action Plan Number of employment days 78,154 generated for the Cyclone affected 400,000 (20% of target) communities through CISF activities Number of affected unemployed youth (HCP, Poor) that have accessed 1,514 loans/funds from skill development 4,500 (34% of target) training and started income generating activities 1,840 received grant, Number of most vulnerable people that 604 are employed or have received assistance (one time 2,250 started self grant) and accessed the livelihood employment assistance fund (82% of target) 43 Component Indicator Target Achievement 248 accessed first Number of villages accessing the first, installment, 47 second and third installments of the 400 (at least 80%) accessed second Community Infrastructure Services installment, 1 accessed Fund (CISF), respectively (AM) third installment Number of JG members qualified and 7,243 (out of 30,000 received Shabalombi Fund loans (AM) total members) 400 (80% of villages, Number of infrastructure sub-projects with at least one sub- 388 sub-projects funded and completed, respectively project completed per funded, 92 completed (AM) village) So far, 22 villages 4. Pilot Private have been covered Financing in No. of Villages mobilized under E- 89 under ICT Pilot Community Upazila ICT pilot program. program. Utilities (25% of target) 44 Annex 4 – Financial and Economic Analysis Actual Project Expenditures The total allocation for SIPP-1 was US$ 64.22 million (after cancellation of US$ 40 million under the third AF) financed by the original credit and the three additional financings. The total disbursement of the project was slightly lower than expected, reaching however 94% of the allocated funds.