World Development Report, 1980 10880 Part I Adjustment and growth in the 1980s Part II Poverty and human development Annex World Development Indicators The World Bank August 1950 World Development Report 1980 The World Bank Washington, D.C. August 1980 © 1980 by the international Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. All rights reserved. ISBN 0-19-502833-3 cloth ISBN 0-19-502834-1 paperback ISSN 0163-8058 The Library of Congress has cataloged this serial publication as follows: HC59 World development report. 1978- .7 [New York] Oxford University Press. .W659 v. 27cm. annual. Published for the World Bank. 1. Underdeveloped areasPeriodicals. 2. Economic development Periodicals. I. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. HC59.7.W659 330.9'172'4 78-67086 11 Foreword This third World Development Report reduce poverty, focusing on hu- the converse is true as welldirect is published at a time of difficulty man development, an important steps to reduce poverty do not and uncertainty for the world eco- complement to the approaches to obviate the need for growth. This nomyparticularly for the devel- poverty alleviation emphasized in Report emphasizes that the direct oping countries. They must adjust the two previous World Develop- attack on poverty, if it is ultimately to external payments imbalances, ment Reports. to be successful, must be com- higher energy prices and slower Human developmenteduca- bined with measures to ensure growth in world trade. That ad- tion and training, better health that the economies of the devel- justment will slow their growth and nutrition, and fertility reduc- oping countries continue to ex- for at least the next few years. tionis shown to be important not pand. The active support of the There is much that they them- only in alleviating poverty directly, richer nations is required to assist selves can do to ease the slow- but also in increasing the incomes this process through the provision down and to speed the expected of the poor, and GNP growth as of capital and technical knowledge subsequent recovery. But the bur- well. The vital message is that some and through the opening of their den of adjustment must be shared: steps we all have long known to markets to developing-country the industrialized and centrally be morally rightprimary educa- exports. There is a real risk that planned countries and the princi- tion, for examplemake good the domestic economic problems pal oil exporters also have a major economic sense as well. of these richer countries will cause role to play. The laudable objectives of hu- them to give inadequate attention The first part of this Report is man development, though, are far to the immense problems of the primarily about the economic pol- from easy to achieve. Nor are they developing world, and to the hard- icy choices facing both developing without cost. The Report draws on ships that narrow or short-sighted and richer countries and about the years of World Bank experience policiesin energy, trade and fi- implications of these choices for in the analysis of projects, sectors nancial assistancecan inflict. growth. The outlook for growth and national economies, and in This Report reflects the work of that it discusses is a cause for deep researchto examine the causes many of my colleagues in the World concernparticularly for low-in- and effects of progress in human Bank. The judgments expressed come countries and, among them, development and what it takes to do not necessarily reflect the views for the countries of Sub-Saharan implement successful programs in of our Board of Directors or the Africa. More generosity and ini- this area. governments they represent. As tiative in the provision of conces- While there is now increasing in previous years, the Report in- sional aid by richer countries is recognition that growth does not cludes the World Development urgently needed. obviate the need for human devel- Indicators, which provides tables It is vital, moreover, that suc- opment and other steps to reduce of social and economic data for cessful adjustment should not un- poverty, it must be stressed that more than 100 countries. duly sacrifice either the current living standards of the poor or the measures needed now to reduce poverty in the future. Growth is vital for poverty reduction, but it is not enough. The second part of the Report reviews other ways to Robert S. McNamara 111 This report was prepared by a team led by Paul Isenman and comprising Nicholas Hope, Timothy King, Peter Knight, Akbar Noman, Rupert Pennant-Rea and Adrian Wood. The Economic Analysis and Projections Department prepared the data and projections used in Chapter 2 and in the World Development Indicators. The authors would like to acknowledge the substantial help received from many contributors, reviewers and support staff. The work was carried out under the general direction of Bevan Waide and Hollis Chenery. iv Contents 1 Introduction 1 Part I Adjustment and growth in the 1980s 3 2 The outlook for developing countries 3 Adjustment and recovery 3 Factors affecting growth 6 Regional growth in the 1980s 11 3 International problems and policies 14 Energy 14 Trade 18 Capital flows 25 Part II Poverty and human development 32 4 Poverty, growth and human development 33 Dimensions of poverty 33 Three decades of poverty reduction 35 Poverty and growth 35 Sources of growth 36 Raising the incomes of the poor 40 5 Human development issues and policies 46 Education 46 Health 53 Nutrition 59 Fertility 64 The seamless web 68 6 Implementing human development programs: some practical lessons 71 Political support 71 Easing the financial constraint 72 Developing administrative strengths 75 Ensuring that services are used 78 International assistance 80 The importance of persistence 81 7 Priorities and progress in regional perspective 83 Issues for planners 83 Sub-Saharan Africa 85 South Asia 88 Middle-income regions 90 Lessons for planning 94 8 Summary and conclusions 95 Statistical appendix to Part I 99 Bibliographical note 102 Annex World Development Indicators 105 V Text tables 2.1 Summary of prospects for growth 6 2.2 Growth of exports and imports, 1970-90 7 2.3 Percentage shares in world exports of goods and nonfactor services 7 2.4 Net imports of oil by oil-importing developing countries, 1975-90 8 2.5 Developing countries' savings and investment rates, 1980-90 9 2.6 Current account deficits of oil-importing developing countries, 1970-90 10 2.7 Debt-service ratios of developing countries, 1977-90 10 2.8 Growth of GNP per person by region, 1960-90 11 2.9 Developing countries' GNP per person, 1980-2000 13 3.1 Shares of net world trade in commercial energy, 1977-90 16 3.2 World merchandise trade, by country group, 1970 and 1977 21 3.3 Product composition of developing countries' merchandise exports to industrialized countries and other developing countries, 1977 24 3.4 Commercial bank claims on developing countries, 1976-79 27 3.5 Average spreads over LIBOR for external borrowing, 1974-79 27 3.6 Aid flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions, 1975-90 29 3.7 Distribution of DAC donors' bilateral official development assistance, 1970-78 30 4.1 Agricultural population in relation to crop area 39 4.2 Irrigation and income, selected projects 43 4.3 Dependency ratios, by income group 43 5.1 Public expenditures on elementary and higher education per student, 1976 46 5.2 Primary school enrollment, by income group 47 5.3 Farmer education and farmer productivity 48 5.4 Rates of return to education 49 5.5 Public education spending per household, by income group 50 5.6 Differences in life expectancy within countries 55 6.1 Taxes as a percentage of GNP 73 7.1 Sub-Saharan Africa: GNP per person 85 Statistical appendix tables SA.1 Growth of population, GNP and GNP per person, 1960-90 99 SA.2 Commercial primary energy production and consumption, by country group, 1977-90 99 SA.3 Composition of world commercial primary energy supply, 1970-2020 99 SA.4 Growth of merchandise exports, by product category and country group, 1960-77 and 1977-90 100 SA.5 Direction of merchandise trade, 1970 and 1977 100 SA.6 Capital flows and debt of the developing countries: oil importers and oil exporters, 1975-90 101 SA.7 Capital flows and debt of the oil-importing developing countries: low-income and middle-income, 1975-90 101 Figures 2.1 Growth of GNP per person: industrialized and oil-importing developing countries, 1965-80 5 2.2 Developing countries' growth of GNP per person, 1970-90 6 2.3 Energy production and consumption growth, by country group, 1980-90 8 2.4 Developing countries' savings and investment rates, 1960, 1980 and 1990 8 2.5 Net flows of medium- and long-term capital to developing countries, 1980 and 1990 9 3.1 Petroleum prices, annual averages, 1972-80 14 3.2 Actual and projected shares in world primary energy supply, 1970-2020 16 3.3 Growth of developing countries' merchandise exports, 1963-73 and 1973-77 19 3.4 Growth of developing countries' merchandise exports, by destination, 1973-77 24 3.5 Developing countries' use of borrowed funds, 1970-90 25 3.6 International bond issues, 1972-79 28 4.1 Three decades against poverty 34 4.2 National income and national poverty 36 4.3 Population distribution by age, 1980 40 vi 4.4 Income of poorest groups 40 5.1 Enrollment ratios, by region, 1960-75 47 5.2 Death by age groups, developing and industrialized countries, 1980 54 5.3 Trends in birth and death rates, 1775-2050 64 5.4 Income and fertility, 1978 66 5.5 Influences on fertility 66 5.6 Policy and poverty 69 6.1 Literacy rates, selected developing countries, 1950 and 1970 81 7.1 GNP per person 1960, 1970 and 1980 85 7.2 Literacy, by region, 1945-75 85 7.3 Life expectancy, 1960 and 1978 85 7.4 Sub-Saharan Africa: life expectancy in relation to income per person, 1978 87 7.5 South Asia: life expectancy in relation to income per person, 1978 89 7.6 Middle East and North Africa: life expectancy in relation to income per person, 1978 92 7.7 Latin America and the Caribbean: life expectancy in relation to income per person, 1978 92 7.8 East Asia and Pacific: life expectancy in relation to income per person, 1978 93 Boxes GNP and trade prices 4 Taxes and energy 15 Fuel from food 17 Stabilizing export earnings 20 Multilateral trade negotiations: the Tokyo round 21 Migration and money 22 Food, farming and foreign exchange 23 Military spending 29 Human resources and growth: macroeconomic evidence 38 Small is productive 42 A strategy that backfired 44 Schooling, screening and productivity 49 The benefits of women's education 50 Unemployment among the educated 51 Big is not necessarily bad 52 Oral rehydration 56 Lessons of experience 58 Food and the poor 61 Alternative population projections 65 Contraceptive technology 69 How much would it cost? 72 China's barefoot doctors 74 Self-help in Sri Lanka 75 Rural poverty unperceived 77 Private costs of using public services 79 The banjars of Bali 80 Tradeoffs in Sri Lanka 90 Sex, length of life and development 91 VI' Definitions Country groups in the analytical members of the Organisation for Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzer- framework of this Report are as Economic Cooperation and De- land, the United Kingdom, the follows: velopment, apart from Greece, United States and the Commission Developing countries are di- Portugal, Spain and Turkey, which of the European Community. vided, on the basis of 1978 gross are included among the middle- national product (GNP) per person, income developing countries. The Organization of Petroleum Ex- into: low-income countries, with a GNP Centrally planned economies porting Countries (OPEC) comprises per person of US$360 and below; comprise Albania, Bulgaria, China, Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, and middle-income countries, with a Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, GNP per person above US$360. Democratic Republic, Hungary, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United The countries in each group are the Democratic Republic of Korea, Arab Emirates and Venezuela. shown in the tables of the World Mongolia, Poland, Romania and Development Indicators beginning the USSR. Economic and demographic terms are on page 105. defined in the technical notes to Oil-exporting developing coun- Organisation for Economic Coo pera- the World Development Indicators tries comprise Algeria, Angola, tion and Development (OECD) mem- on pages 158 through 165. Bahrain, Bolivia, Brunei, Congo, bers are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Ecuador, Egypt, Gabon, Indo- Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Billion is 1,000 million. nesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, the Federal Republic of Germany, Oman, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Tonnes are metric tons (1,000 Tunisia, Venezuela and Zaire. Japan, Luxembourg, the Nether- kilograms). Capital-surplus oil exporters lands, New Zealand, Norway, comprise Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer- Growth rates are in real terms un- Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United land, Turkey, the United King- less otherwise stated. Arab Emirates. dom and the United States. Oil-importing developing coun- The OECD Development As- Symbols used in the text tables are tries comprise developing countries sistance Committee (DAC) com- as follows: not classified as oil-exporting de- prises Australia, Austria, Belgium, Not available. veloping countries or capital- Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, (.) Lessthanhalftheunitshown. surplus oil exporters. the Federal Republic of Germany, n.a. Not applicable. Industrialized countries are the Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New 1 Introduction Developing countries start the intended to illustrate the likely from the importance of the role decade facing two major challenges. outcome of different policies, rather of industrialized countries. Chap- First, they must strive to continue than to provide precise forecasts. ter 3 examines three of the eco- their social and economic devel- Two sets of projections are pre- nomic links that bind the world opment in an international climate sented in Chapter 2, based on togethertrade, energy and capi- that looks less helpful than it differing growth rates in the indus- tal flowsand analyzes the fun- did a decadeor even a yearago. trial world and policy responses damental issues in these areas, is- Second, they must tackle the in developing countries. This year sues that must be resolved chiefly plight of the 800 million people the analysis has been extended to by the industrialized countries. living in absolute poverty, who provide separate estimates for oil- Because they take about 65 per- have benefited much too little from importing and oil-exporting devel- cent of developing country exports, past progress. This Report examines oping countries, as well as by their growth rates and trade poli- some of the difficulties and pros- region and income level. cies largely determine how much pects in both areas, looking as far The analysis indicates that world the developing countries can ex- ahead as 2000, but paying particular economic growth will be sluggish port. Because they account for attention to the next 5 to 10 years. during the next few years, as oil- more than half of world energy One of its central themes is the importing countries reduce their consumption, it is their conserva- importance of people in develop- current account deficits and adapt tion (or lack of it) that has the ment. Adam Smith's observation to higher energy costs. But the biggest impact. And most of the that the prosperity of a nation is policies adopted during the adjust- foreign capital that the developing determined mainly "by the skill, ment period will have some effect countries need must come through dexterity, and judgment with on growth thenand even more the industrial world's banks or which its labor is generally applied" on the recovery expected after 1985. directly from its aid programs. has lost none of its truth. In the International finance will play a difficult economic conditions of the crucial role in the 1980s: unless The role of human development past six years, as in earlier years, the developing (and other oil- most of the fastest-growing devel- importing) countries can fund their The past three decades have seen oping countries without oil have large projected balance-of-payments some impressive changes in the had well-educated populations. deficits, output and growth will be lives of people in the developing Better health and more education seriously affected. The domestic world. Average incomes have can also help the poorest people policies of developing countries doubled. Average life expectancy climb out of their poverty. will also be crucial: the more has increased from 42 to 54 years. efficiently they use their imports, The proportion of adults who are The economic outlook their investments, and their energy literate has risen from about 30 supplies, and the more they increase percent to more than 50 percent. As in the two previous World their saving and investment, the There has been a significant closing Development Reports, economic projec- faster will be their growth. The of the gap between industrialized tions for the developing countries fate of poor people in developing and developing countries in life have been carried out, drawing on countries will likewise be decided expectancy, literacy and primary the World Bank's analysis of what largely by domestic opportunities school enrollment. determines country and regional and policies. But there is still a long way to growth. These projections are None of this, though, detracts go. More than three-quarters of a 1 billion people have barely enough familiar idea that poor people be of central importance. income to keep themselves alive should be helped to help them- Chapters 6 and 7 draw conclu- from week to week. In the low- selves. Better education, health and sions from experience with human income countries people on average nutrition have long been considered development programs. Chapter 6 live 24 years less than they do in important ends of development. shows how common financial, the industrialized countries. Some They can also raise incomes and administrative and political con- 600 million adults in developing reduce fertility. Human devel- straints have been eased, and countries are illiterate; a third of opment alone cannot overcome considers the role of foreign assist- the primary school-age children absolute poverty; but it is an ance. It also looks at ways of (and nearly half of the girls) are essential complement to other steps overcoming the cultural and eco- not going to school. to raise the productivity and nomic barriers that stop poor people This state of affairs is the starting incomes of the poor. and their childrenespecially their point for Part II of the Report. Chapter Chapter 5 provides a detailed daughtersfrom using human 4 provides an overview of the look at education, health, nutrition development services. various ways of attacking absolute and fertility. In each of these areas, Chapter 7 focuses on broader poverty. The sources of growth, it explains why the poor are de- planning issuesincluding the and policies to accelerate it, are prived, and discusses the policies tradeoffs between growth and examined, as are a wide range of needed to overcome their depriva- poverty reduction, and the alloca- measures - employment creation, tion. Special attention is given to tion of resources between human land reform, schooling and so on the practical consensus that has development and other activities. to raise the incomes specifically recently emerged in several areas It examines these and more specific of poorer groups. induding nutrition policy, primary human development issues as The rest of the Report,beginning health care and the role of family they apply to the different regions with Chapter 5, singles out for planning programs in reducing of the developing world. Chapter closer examination one particular fertility. These different areas of S contains a summary of the main approach to povertyhuman de- human development influence arguments and conclusions of velopmeiitwhich epitomizes the each other; education is seen to Parts I and II. 2 Part I Adjustment and growth in the 1980s 2 The outlook for developing countries World economic prospects have parable to 1974-75. But the adjust- tral challenge over the next few deteriorated since last year's World ment must take place at a time yearsto adjust to higher oil prices Development Report was published. when the outlook for capital flows and sluggish world trade while The real price of oil is likely especially aid for the poorest minimizing their loss of growth. to be at least 80 percent higher in nationsis worse than before. This They are subject to a formidable 1980 than in 1978. As a result, adjustment will be spread over constraint: their ability to import capital-surplus oil-exporting na- several years; while it lasts, the more has declined, both because tions will run current account world economy and most devel- imports (particularly of energy) surpluses of around $110 billion oping countries are likely to grow are more expensive and because this year and oil-importing de- more slowly than in the 1970s. the export outlook has deteriorated. veloping countries deficits of more Provided the adjustment is suc- These countries went through a than $60 billion.1 This prospect cessful, a significant recovery should similar adjustment in 1974-78, and revives questions about the inter- be possible from the mid-1980s there is much that can be learned national financial system's ability onward. from this earlier experience. to recyde enough fundsto indus- Higher oil prices have clearly The adjustment process has two trialized and developing countries improved the prospects of those stages. First, when there is a sud- to maintain import levels and developing countries with oil to den increase in the cost of imports economic growth rates. Further- export, where a fifth of the de- relative to export earnings, countries more, the real price of energy can veloping world's population lives. squeeze importsand so growth be expected to rise during the Their GNP per person grew 2.8 slows sharply. Because too sharp 1980s. percent a year in the 1960s, com- a fall is disruptive, both econom- For reasons only partly con- pared with 3.1 percent for the ically and politically, countries nected with higher oil prices, the oil-importing developing countries; accept large current account defi- outlook for growth in the indus- but in the 1970s the oil exporters cits and finance them from bor- trialized countries and in world accelerated to an annual 3.5 per- rowing or aid. During the earlier trade has worsened. The widespread cent growth, while the oil importers adjustment period the current resurgence of inflation in 1979 and slowed to 2.7 percent. (The dis- account deficit of oil-importing 1980 has prompted governments parity was even larger when GNP developing countries rose sharply to take strong deflationary meas- is adjusted for changes in the from 2.3 percent of their GNP ures; the industrial economies are purchasing power of their exports in 1970 to 5.1 percent in 1975; expected to show only sluggish see box overleaf). With much from 1978 to 1980 it went from growth in 1980 and 1981. This increased oil revenues, at least for 2.3 percent to 3.9 percent. Growth inevitably slows their demand for the first half of the 1980s, the oil is falling off in these countries in developing countries' exports. The exporters' growth will be con- 1980, but less sharply than in 1975 1980s are thus off to a slower start strained more by the productivity (see Figure 2.1). than anticipated a year ago. of domestic investment than by The second stage is to reduce Given these two developments, their ability to borrow abroad. these current account deficits to the world faces the need to ad- levels that can be financed over justto payments imbalances and Adjustment for oil-importing the medium term. At the same expensive energyon a scale corn- countries time output and trade must be restructured to meet the new cir- 1. See page viii for definitions of country All oil importers, developing and cumstances. This structural change categories. industrialized alike, face a cen- requires heavy investment. New 3 in official aid and other capital and GNP and trade prices by borrowing a significant part of When a country's terms of trade shift rose. The reason was that commodity the oil producers' recycled sur- substantially, changes in national prod- prices were depressed; two years later pluses. Nonetheless, the result of uct in constant prices do not accurately they were booming, and the correction these efforts was slower growth: reflect changes in its purchasing power. augmented the growth rate. in 1975-78, GNP per person in the The volume of imports that can be oil-importing developing countries bought with a given volume of exports Terms-of-trade effects on will rise if the terms of trade improve, fall growth of GNP per person, grew 2.3 percent a yearabove if they deteriorate. There is no generally 1970SO the 0.8 percent in the 1975 trough, accepted way of measuring these changes (1977 prices) but still well below the 3.7 per- in purchasing power; but a rough mea- Percent cent average for 1965-73. And sure is obtained if export earnings are 20 Oil-exporting developing countries some countries experienced seri- expressed in terms of the imports that they will buyand any gain or loss is 'I ous fiscal and external debt prob- added to GNP. lems. The poorest African countries 15 Among the developing countries, the were the biggest cause for con- oil exporters and oil importers provide a cern; their GNP per person grew - GNP (corrected) vivid example of the difference such an 1.6 percent a year in the 1960s, adjustment can make to the apparent 10 benefits of GNP growth. In 1974, the year but only 0.2 percent in the 1970s. oil prices rose most sharply, the oil On average their people are as exporters' output (as measured by their badly off at the end of the decade GNP per person in constant prices) rose as they were at the beginning. 4.4 percent; but their "corrected" GNP The oil-importing developing rose 18 percent (see figure). That was exceptional: gains and losses from terms- countries that coped best during of-trade changes are typically much the earlier adjustment period were: smaller. But for the 1970s, the adjusted Those that reacted to the de- annual average GNP growth of 11 major cline in their import capacity by oil-exporting developing countries was a temporary slowdown in growth 2.4 percentage points higher than for 25 major oil importers, compared with 0.2 10 Oil-importing developing countries accompanied by a drive to ex- percentage points if the adjustment is pand exports. Import capacity (and / GNP (corrected) not made. hence output growth) was restored Terms-of-trade effects are caused by a GNP quickly. Most of these countries variety of factors: with the correction, / ..-. had grown rapidly and diversified the GNP of oil importers grew signifi- ' / cantly more slowly than without itin their exports during the previous 0 1971, for example, long before oil prices 1970 72 74 76 78 1980 decade; a good example is Singapore. Those that, while maintain- ing import growth by foreign bor- energy sources must be developed imported goods can cause severe rowing, used the borrowed funds and energy conserved, and in indus- hardships for the poor. These con- mainly to sustain high levels trialized and developing countries straints can prolong the adjustment of productive investmentincluding declining or inefficient industries period. And there is a need to strike Brazil and South Korea. have to be replaced by competi- a balance between investments with Those that benefited from tive ones. So growth can pick up a short-term payoff and those, such good harvests resulting from during the second stage, but it is as infrastructure or education, which improved agricultural policies and still slowed by the continuing are vital for longer-term growth. favorable weather (such as India) need for adjustment. Judged against initial pessimism or rising migrant remittances (such Slower growth compounds the about their ability to adjust, the as the Yemen Arab Republic). political difficulties that can arise developing countries generally Several of the developing coun- when governments pass on world confounded expectations in 1974-78. tries that improved their economic price increases to consumers, par- In 1974 and 1975 their growth rates policies and did well during six ticularly to politically powerful fell less than those of industrial- difficult years had previous records urban consumers, or cut back on ized countries (Figure 2.1), helping of slow growth and poor economic public services. No less important, to moderate the slowdown in world management: for them, improved governments are concerned that trade growth. Their adjustment domestic effici,ency went a long rapid increases in the price of basic was helped by substantial increases way toward offsetting the effects 4 try has powerful reasons for wanting may boost imports less rapidly Figure 2.1 Growth of GNP per person: industrialized and to expand exports and restrain than in the 1970s, and because the oil-importing developing imports, they cannot all succeed real price of oil is likely to rise, countries, 1965-80 simultaneously while the oil sur- not fall as it did in 1974-78. (1977 prices) pluses persist. The attempt to do The prospects for capital flows Percent so through uncoordinated domestic are less favorable. Official finance deflationary policies (especially including aidwhich played an if augmented by protectionism) important role in 1974-75 is not will slow world economic growth yet responding to developing even more. Because of their weight countries' needs; commercial bor- in the world economy, the indus- rowing is likely to cost more; and trialized countries in particular both borrowers and lenders are should maintain import growth likely to be more cautious. In recognizing that this may involve addition, more of what is borrowed large payments deficits. will have to be used for repayments On the domestic front, adjust- of principal and interest on old ment in the 1980s should benefit debt (see page 25). from the knowledge gained from The industrialized economies experience. Moreover, it is now face more serious difficulties than apparent that higher real energy in the mid-1970s, when adjustment prices are here to stay; so there is tended to be viewed as a phase more incentive to take the difficult from which they would quickly of a deterioration in the world steps necessary to conserve energy recover. But the growth of the economy. And they are now much and to develop domestic energy 1960s and early 1970s has not been better placed to weather the cur- production. A number of countries regained; and although their slow- rent slowdown and recover in the that were large oil importers in down may not be as marked in 1980s. 1973 are now projected to come 1980-81 as in 1974-75, no quick The 1970s have shown that suc- close to self-sufficiency in the recovery can be expected. cess in adjustment should be 1980s (for example, Pakistan and The current economic malaise measured not just by the volume Colombia) or be major exporters of the industrialized countries re- of recycling, or the share going to (such as Mexico). sults from much more than higher developing countries, or the reduc- Unfortunately, however, there energy prices. Inflation in some of tion of developing-country deficits are several reasons why this ad- them is running several percentage to affordable levels.These are all justment may prove more difficult points above its peak in 1974; they important, but they must be viewed for many countries than the 1974- have plainly decided that it must in the context of the growth that 78 adjustment was. come down and stay down before the developing countries achieve. Some developing countries rapid growth can be resumed, and A key factor in that growth is the did not adapt effectively during that deflationary measures are the performance of the industrialized the 1970s, and ended up with high best way of achieving this. There countries; in the 1970s their erratic debt-service obligations or slower are question marks, too, over their growth and incomplete adjust- growth (and in some cases both). long-term growth potential. Pro- ment had a depressing effect on In addition, many countries now ductivity growth has slowed the oil-importing developing coun- have less room than before to sharply: on average it increased tries (Figure 2.1). squeeze either energy consump- 3.9 percent a year in 1963-73, but tion or imports without reducing only 1.7 percent a year since 1973. Adjustment in the 1980s growth. In some countries (India This stems from a complex of fac- and Tanzania, for example) short- torsamong them, incomplete As in the 1970s, the adjustment ages of fuel have already impeded adjustment to higher energy costs, required can be seen from both the transport of food and other sluggish investment and a mis- global and domestic viewpoints. key commodities. match of skills in the labor market Globally, the oil importers' deficits Oil surpluses could stay at a that cannot be rectified quickly are the counterpart of the surpluses high level for longerboth because or easily. of the capital-surplus oil exporters. more conservative development Overall, even with a well-directed Although each oil-importing coun- programs among the oil producers policy response by all countries, 5 Table 2.1 Summary of prospects for growth (average annual percentage growth, 1977 prices) Growth ofGNP per person Population GNP per Growth of GNP (High case) Low case High case 1980 person, 1980 Country group (millions) (1977 dollars) 1980-85 1985-90 1970-80 1980-85 1985-90 1980-85 1985-90 Low-income oil importers 1,133 168 4.1 4.6 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.7 2.4 Sub-Saharan Africa 141 186 3.1 3.8 0.2 -0.3 0.1 0.1 1.1 Middle-income oil importers 701 1,275 4.9 5.7 3.1 2.0 2.4 2.6 3.5 Oil exporters 456 753 6.3 5.9 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.4 Industrialized countries 671 7,599 3.3 4.0 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.8 3.5 Note: For more detail, see Table 2.8 and Table SA.1 in the statistical appendix to Part I. growth in the oil-importing devel- after 1985. The High case repre- porters; and in the Low case av- oping countries is likely to be sents a much more successful erage incomes would actually be significantly slower in 1980-85 adjustment, with growth slowing lower in 1990 than they were in than in the 1970s-and still further less in 1980-85 and accelerating 1980. below the average in the 1960s. more thereafter (see Figure 2.2). Whether the outcome will be Because of the differences in closer to the High or the Low case Key factors affecting growth: growth rates between oil-importing wifi depend on the policies pursued 1980-85 and 1985-90 and oil-exporting developing coun- by industrialized countries, the tries, estimates for them are shown capital-surplus oil exporters and To help analyze the outlook, two separately (see Table 2.1). The the developing countries them- sets of illustrative projections have projections of this Report are not selves. At this early stage in the been prepared. Designated Low directly comparable to those of last adjustment process, it is unclear and High, they are based on alter- year's, but they represent a sub- how successful their policies will native policy responses to current stantial fall in growth expectations be in restoring growth, for the economic difficulties. Each scenario for the oil importers over the next world as a whole or for developing is internally consistent with respect five years.2 countries. The estimates this year to policies and outcomes. The Low The oil exporters have buoyant should therefore be treated with case shows an unsuccessful adjust- prospects throughout the decade more than usual caution. But there ment in 1980-85; though payments (see Table 2.1). But the oil im- are some disturbing signs that the imbalances are reduced, growth porters will grow more slowly in seeds of the Low case are already remains depressed, and inadequate 1980-85 than in the 1970s, even being sown: on current prospects, foundations are laid for recovery in the High case; with a successful aid for low-income countries is adjustment and a strong revival in far from certain to meet the mod- world trade after 1985, their growth est requirements of the High case, Figure 2.2 Developing countries' should accelerate in 1985-90. By and some middle-income coun- growth of GNP per person, contrast, their recovery would be tries are experiencing both debt 1970-90 (High case) weak in the Low case. Sub-Saharan and political difficulties. overoge annuol percentoge growth, 1977 prices) Africa has the most disturbing out- Thus, without a strong policy All oil importers All oil exporters look. Even in the High case, its response during the adjustment $ ,- growth in 1985-90 would be a period, the Low case is the likelier 1970 -so meager 1 percent per person-far outcome. And a number of factors, below the average for the oil im- induding serious political instability, major problems in capital markets 1950 2. The projections of this Report differ from -55 those of last year's for several reasons. For or a breakdown of world economic example, only two sets of projections have cooperation, could bring about a been prepared-a Low case, which is com- much worse outcome. 1995 parable to last year's Low case, and a High -90 case, which is closer to last year's Base But the High case remains achiev- case than its High case. In addition, Iran able-depending on policies in and Iraq are now included among capital- four key areas: the growth and surplus oil exporters; and improvements 2 3 4 in data have led to revisions of some structure of international trade; historical aggregates. the changing pattern of energy 6 production and consumption; in- Table 2.2 Growth of exports and imports, 1970-90 (High case) vestment and productivity in the (average annual percentage growth rates, 1977 prices) developing countries; and the inflow Exports Imports of capital. (A broader view of the Country grou p 19 70-80 1980-85 1985-90 1970-80 1980-85 1985-90 determinants of economic growth Oil-importing -including the effects of human developing countries 5.6 5.7 6.8 4.6 4.7 6.3 resources-is discussed in Chapter Low-income 2.6 0.9 3.7 0.1 2.1 2.8 4.) In each area, the emphasis is Middle-income 5.9 6.1 7.0 5.2 4.9 6.5 on what is required to increase Oil-exporting developing countries 3.5 4.6 4.5 8.6 7.6 6.3 growth; policy prescriptions are All developing countries 5.1 5.5 6.4 5.4 5.4 6.3 discussed in Chapter 3. Industrialized countries 6.0 5.4 5.8 4.8 4.3 5.3 Capital-surplus International trade oil exporters 2.7 1.8 2.0 21.1 10.9 7.3 Centrally planned economies 6.6 5.1 5.2 8.1 5.8 5.2 With slow growth expected in the World 5.6 5.2 5.7 5.8 5.2 5.7 industrialized countries in 1980- 81 and with much larger current a. Goods and nonfactor services except for centrally planned economies, for which net nonfactor services are included as net exports. account deficits for all the oil- importing countries, world trade growth will slow from the 5.5 per- teriorate markedly in the 1980s, of manufactures growing about cent a year it averaged in the 1970s. exports will still have to grow two and a half times faster than But if, as the High case assumes, faster than imports in 1980-85 to nonfuel primary exports. As a result, the industrialized economies are reduce current account deficits. developing countries' exports of able to average GNP growth of 3.3 But for low-income oil importers, manufactured goods would rise percent a year in 1980-85-see and especially Sub-Saharan Africa, from 24 percent of their total ex- Table 2.1-and if further protec- exports could grow more slowly ports in 1978 to 39 percent in tionism is avoided, world trade in 1980-85 than in the 1970s- 1990 and from 10 percent to 14 could rise by an averge of 5.2 per- underlining their need for foreign percent of world manufacturing cent a year in 1980-85 (see Table assistance to maintain their im- trade. 2.2). Thereafter, with the indus- port capacity. With a strong The biggest gains are likely to trialized countries' GNP projected recovery of world trade in 1985- be in machinery and transport to grow 4.0 percent a year in 90, their export prospects would equipment (from 6 to 16 percent 1985-90, it should accelerate. improve and export growth could of developing country exports), in Exports of developing countries exceed that of imports. which Brazil, India and South Korea, could expand at 6.4 percent a year If the High case is achieved, the for example, have become increas- in 1985-90, compared with 5.5 share of developing countries in ingly competitive in international percent in 1980-85. world trade would increase from markets. The developing countries' As with growth, the trade out- 20.1 percent in 1977 to 21.3 per- importance as markets for the in- look differs sharply between oil cent in 1990 (see Table 2.3). The dustrial world would also increase: exporters and oil importers- structure of their trade could change in 1978 they and the capital-surplus underlining the important effects more dramatically, with exports oil exporters already accounted for of terms-of-trade changes. In the 1970s export volume for oil-ex- porting developing countries grew Table 2.3 Percentage shares in world exports of goods at about two-thirds the rate of that and nonfactor services (High case) (1977 prices) of the oil importers; but because the price of their exports rose so Primary Non factor commodities Fuels Ivianufactures 5ervices Total much faster, their import volume Country groups 1977 1990 1977 1990 1977 1990 1977 1990 1977 1990 was able to grow twice as fast. For Developing the capital-surplus oil exporters, countries 35.0 34.0 24.2 28.2 10.1 14.3 28.8 30.6 20.1 21.3 the terms-of-trade benefits were Industrialized even greater. countries 55.6 56.5 16.0 19.3 79.6 76.3 67.7 65.6 62.9 65.6 Although the terms of trade of Other countries 9.4 9.5 59.8 52.5 10.3 9.4 3.5 3.8 17.0 13.1 the oil-importing developing countries are not projected to de- Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 7 of the developing and centrally Figure 2.3 Energy production and planned economies. As a result, Figure 2.4 Developing countries' consumption growth, by country savings and investment rates, group, 1980-90 (High case) real energy prices can be expected 1960, 1980 and 1990 (uoeruge unroof growth, inritron borrrls of oil equivalent per to rise further-though the rise is (percentage of GOP, current prices) likely to be moderated and the Peroen Industriolized 30 Countries energy constraint on growth eased if Low-income Middle-income Centrally the industrialized countries achieve 25 planned progress in both energy conserva- 20 Capital- tion and production (Figure 2.3 surplus oil exporters and Table SA.2 in the statistical 15 Developing appendix to Part I). The working Investment sung countries: vi ,uhivh assumption is that real oil prices 10 Net oil will on average rise 3 percent a year. exporters For the industrialized countries, Net oil net energy imports (mainly oil, 0 F importers 1960 itO 90 1960 80 90 plus gas and coal) are projected to Total remain at some 20 million barrels a day of oil equivalent (mbdoe) 2 4 6 8 10 Percentage increase throughout the 1980s. Among the imported oil for energy use (that developing countries, the oil ex- is, excluding oil for such things as porters are expected to increase fertilizer production) would rise their energy exports by a third; in nominal terms from $29 billion almost a third of North America's some of today's oil importers either in 1978 to some $107 billion in exports of manufactures, almost will be net energy exporters at 1985 and about $200 billion in a half of Japan's and a fifth of some stage during the decade, or 1990 (Table 2.4). Without a rapid Europe's. will have greatly reduced their expansion of exports and substantial energy imports by 1990. financial support from abroad, they Energy But most developing countries could find their growth severely Although uncertainty inevitably will continue to import much of constrained by the cost of energy surrounds the prospects for new their energy needs. For all oil- imports. Individual country analysis energy discoveries, the supply of importing developing countries, suggests that oil imports as a per- energy is likely to remain tight the "energy gap" under the High centage of export earnings will rise during the 1980s. World produc- case is likely to widen from 5.6 substantially for many countries tion of primary energy from all mbdoe in 1980 to 6.3 mbdoe in 1985 from 1930-85, particularly among (commercial) sources is projected (see Table SA.2). By 1990 the gap the low-income countries. to increase 3.8 percent a year over would have increased to 7.5 mbdoe, the decade (see Figure 2.3)-about even if the countries succeed (as Investment end efficiency the same as the industrialized projected) in more than doubling Developing countries have raised countries' GNP growth in the High production and restraining con- their savings and investment rates case, but considerably below that sumption growth. Their bill for considerably in the past 20 years (see Figure 2.4). Further increases- and, still more important, im- provements in the productivity of Table 2.4 Net imports of oil by oil-importing developing countries, existing and new investment-can 1975-90 make a major contribution to Oil imports for energy use only 1978 1975 1980 1985 1990 adjustment and growth, as the Volume (millions of barrels of oil per day) 4.9 5.8 5.3 5.8 6.9 experience of the 1970s has shown. Low-income countries 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 Middle-income countries 4.5 5.4 Previous World Development Reports 5.0 5.5 6.5 have discussed the importance of Cost (billions of dollars) 22.1 29.2 57.8 107.2 198.0 Low-income countries 1.8 2.1 3.3 6.0 11.1 efficiency and policies for promot- Middle-income countries 20.3 27.1 54.5 101.2 186.9 ing it; Part II of this Report con- Price per barrel c.i.f. siders another important element Current dollars 12.33 13.70 29.80 50.30 78.30 in efficiency-the human factor. Constant 1980 dollars 19.60 17.13 29.80 35.10 40.85 The 1970s have shown which 8 measures can raise efficiency fairly Table 2.5 Developing countries' savings rapidly. In agriculture, examples and investment rates, 1980-90 (High case) include balanced packages of irri- (percentage of GOP, current prices) gation, inputs of fertilizer and Gross domestic Gross domestic selected seeds, extension services investment saving Resource gap and credit, and ensuring adequate Country group 1980 1985 1990 1980 1985 1990 1980 1985 1990 producer prices. Efficient indus- Low-income countries 21.2 23.0 25.0 18.7 19.8 21.2 2.5 3.2 3.8 trialization can be helped by policies Africa 16.3 16.0 18.3 9.1 8.6 11.3 7.2 7.4 7.0 that discourage undue capital Asia 22.0 24.0 25.9 20.2 21.4 22.6 1.8 2.6 3.3 intensity and do not protect domes- Middle-income countries 25.3 25.4 25.7 23.2 23.8 24.5 2.1 1.6 1.2 tic industry excessively. Many All developing countries 24.6 25.0 25.6 22.4 23.1 24.0 2.2 1.9 1.6 countries have learned from painful experience how to improve the efficiency of publicly owned enter- The projected pattern of net By the mid-1980s, however, the prises and how to apply more financing for all developing coun- real value of oil export earnings rigorous economic criteria to tries is shown in Figure 2.5. But is likely to be falling for some project selection. the needs of developing countries countries. If their imports are to But even with greater efficiency, for finance differ widely. Oil- rise to the level required for the more investment would be needed exporting developing countries now High case, the oil exporters would to achieve the High case-especially look to be less dependent on foreign have a current account deficit by in the low-income countries. They capital in the 1980s than was an- 1985 of around $16 billion. To would have to raise their invest- ticipated a year ago. Over the next maintain their growth in the sec- ment to more than 23 percent of five years, they can achieve High- ond half of the 1980s, they would output by 1985, and to 25 percent case growth financed largely from need to borrow more heavily; their by 1990, matching the already their oil revenues. After running net private borrowing could rise high level of the middle-income a current account deficit (before from only $7 billion in 1985 to countries. Some increases in sav- official transfers) of more than $10 around $25 billion in 1990. Private ings rates are possible (see Table billion a year in 1975-77, they capital would meet about two- 2.5), although there are real limits could have a surplus of about $2 thirds of their financing require- to how far consumption in low- billion in 1980. ments in 1990 (see Table SA,6). income countries can be restrained. But substantial increases in invest- ment can be achieved only with more capital from abroad. For low- Figure 2.5 Net flows of medium- and long-term capital to developing countries, 1980 and 1990 (High case) income Africa foreign resources (cii rrrnl prices) will be required to finance about 1990 Total net inflow: 1980 40 percent of investment, and for Total net inflow: $177.9 billion low-income Asia 13 percent. By $74.6 billion Official $billion Private foreign development -direct investment contrast, higher savings rates in Private Private foreign direct invrstment assistance $24.6 billion the middle-income countries could $10.0 billion $billion $35.6 reduce their dependence on for- billioe Grants eign resources by 1990. commercial terms Bilateral Intern ation a! capital flows loans Multilateral The analysis of trade, energy and - loans Multilateral _.J Bilateral domestic investment highlights official loans $5.0 billion official loans $3.3 billion / Bilateral L Multilateral the role that foreign capital must official loans $8.6 billion official loans $12.4 billion play in a successful adjustment by the developing countries. But Nate: Uses of medium- and long-term capital (billions 0f dollars> are: All deoelaping the actual capital inflow will depend Oil importers Oil exporters countries Use 0980 1990 0980 1990 0980 on both the needs of countries 0990 Current account deficit before interest payments 42.7 42.2 -11.1 30.2 31.6 72.4 and on the likely availability and Jnterest payments 18.3 62.0 0.8 17.5 27.2 79.4 Changes irs reserves (net of changes in short-term debt) -4.4 23.5 20.2 2.6 15.8 cost of capital from all sources (see Total finance required 26.1 56.6 127.7 18.0 50.2 74.6 177.9 discussion in Chapter 3). a. Defined as net imports of goods and services (except interest) minus private (but not official) transfers. See tables SA.6 and SA.7 in the statistical appendts to Part I. 9 Table 2.6 Current account deficits of oil-importing institutions at market or near- developing countries, 1970-90 (High case) market terms will depend on Current account deficitS increases in the capital that backs Country group 1970 1973 1975 1978 1980 1985 1990 their bond issues. Billions of dollars, current prices As for private finance, some Low-income 1.2 2.3 5.4 5.7 10.0 18.6 32.0 countries that have borrowed Middle-income 7.1 4.4 34.2 21.4 51.0 59.7 72.2 heavily in the past and already Total 8.3 6.7 39.6 27.1 61.0 78.4 104.2 have high debt-service obligations Billions of dollars, 1977 prices will need to be cautious about Low-income 2.2 3.2 6.1 5.0 7.1 9.2 11.8 further borrowing. Given the High- Middle-income 13.2 6.0 38.3 18.5 36.1 29.5 26.7 case outlook for their current Total 15.4 9.2 44.4 23.5 43.2 38.7 38.5 accounts, the debt-service pay- ments of middle-income oil im- As percentage of GNP Low-income 1.6 2.2 3.8 2.7 3.6 porters will peak at around 29 3.8 3.9 Middle-income 2.5 0.9 5.3 2.2 4.0 2.6 1.8 percent of their exports of goods Total 2.3 1.1 5.1 2.3 3.9 2.8 2.1 and services in 1985 (see Table 2.7). In the High case, private finance a. Excludes official transfers. (including direct investment) provides a slightly larger propor- For oil-importing developing 0.34 percent of their GNP in 1979 tion of the middle-income oil countries the outlook is very differ- to 0.35-0.36 percent of GNP in importers' net financing require- ent Although their current account 1985, then staying at this level. ment in 1985 than in 1990, though deficit in 1980 is smaller as a per- Unfortunately, aid prospects are smaller than in 1980 (see Table centage of GNP than it was in not encouraging (see Chapter 3)- SA.7). If the Low case comes about, 1975, in constant prices it is roughly and this has serious implications developing countries' export the same (see Table 2.6).The low- for low-income countries. For ex- growth would fall more than their income countries in particular ample, the Low-case assumption import growth-and hence they face serious financing problems. for DAC donors-lower GNP would remain about as dependent To achieve High-case growth of growth, aid falling to 0.30 percent on nonconcessional finance as in 1.7 percent per person a year in of GNP by 1982, with 40 percent the High case. If the necessary 1980-85, their current account def- of bilateral aid to low-income finance could not be obtained- icits would have to rise to 3.8 countries-would account for 0.3 because of concern about credit- percent of GNP by 1985 (the same percentage points of the difference worthiness, for example-growth as in 1975) and would rise further in average annual growth for low- could slip even lower than the Low by 1990. Since the low-income oil income countries between the case, and the number of countries importers have only limited access Low and High cases. in serious debt difficulties would to commercial funds (other than For the middle-income oil im- increase. some short-term borrowing and porters, bilateral official finance is The extraordinary expansion of suppliers' credits), deficits of this not likely to be as freely available private commercial lending to size can be financed only if: for funding current account deficits developing countries that took Aid from DAC and OPEC in 1980-81 as it was in 1974-75. place in the 1970s is unlikely to members trebles in current prices And lending by the multilateral be repeated during the current over the decade. Support from the multi- lateral institutions is increased Table 2.7 Debt-service ratios of developing countries, 1977_90a (High case) correspondingly. (percent) The share of the low-income Country group 1977 1980 1985 1990 countries in bilateral aid from the Oil-importing developing countries industrialized countries increases Low-income 10.1 9.2 11.3 11.5 to around 50 percent from about Middle-income 19.8 25.7 28.6 22.1 40 percent at present. Oil-exporting developing countries 16.0 15.4 13.5 12.9 This requires only a marginal a. Interest and amortization payments on debt divided by exports of goods and services. increase in the aid performance of Figures are from individual country analysis of 25 major oil-importing developing coun- the industrialized countries-from tries and 11 major oil-exporting developing countries. 10 adjustment; but the increases pro- plight of these poor Asian and countries too would not repeat jected for the High case are not African countries-particularly the their extraordinary growth of the implausibly high. In nominal latter-deserves special attention 1970s. But they have made contin- terms, net private lending to all from the international community. uing progress in raising savings developing countries would rise As they adjust to less buoyant and investment rates, in expanding only 3.2 percent a year in 1980- export prospects and higher exports and in reducing popula- 85. This would lower debt-service energy costs, middle-income oil tion growth. As a result, they are ratios for oil exporters and slow importers can also expect slower likely to continue to achieve faster their increase for oil importers. growth-from 3.1 percent per per- growth per person than any other The 11 percent (nominal) annual son a year in the 1970s to a range region. rise projected for net private lend- of 2.0-2.5 percent during the first Growth in the comparatively ing in 1985-90 would stem largely half of the 1980s. It would take high-income countries of Southern from increased borrowing by the the favorable international envi- Europe has been slowing, and the oil exporters. Indeed, if major ronment and successful adjustment trend could continue in the 1980s, borrowers do adjust successfully of the High case for growth in the since these countries are very in 1980-85, by building up their second half of the 1980s to exceed dependent on oil imports and on export base and earning good re- the average of the 1970s (and trade with Western Europe. Some turns on capital invested, private match that of the 19605). will join the European Community lending may well rise more than The slowdown in 1980-85 would during the 1980s; the terms of is projected. be most marked in Latin America their entry and how rapidly they Regional growth in the 1980s and the Caribbean-from 3.5 adapt to membership will have a percent in the 1970s to 2.2-2.6 marked effect on their growth. Whether the Low or the High case percent in 1980-85. Even with a Finally, for the middle-income is achieved, most of the past dec- strong recovery after 1985, growth oil importers of Sub-Saharan Africa ade's disparities in growth rates for the 1980s could still fall below and the Middle East and North between different groups of develop- that of the 1970s. In East Asia Africa, the slow growth of the ing countries can be expected to and the Pacific there would also be past two decades seems likely to continue in both halves of the a slowdown in 1980-85, and these continue into the 1980s. 1980s (see Table 2.8). There are too few oil exporters to identify systematic differences by region Table 2.8 Growth of GNP per person by region, 1960-90 and income group in their pros- GNP Average annual percentage growth per pects; but the aggregate figures person, Low case High case for the oil importers hide wide Population, 1980 1980 (current 1960 1970 1980 1985 1980 1985 differences. Country group (millions) dollars) -70 -80 -85 -90 -85 -90 With strong economic manage- Low-income oil importers 1,133 216 1.6 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.7 2.4 ment, continuing agricultural Africa (Sub-Saharan) 141 239 1.6 0.2 -0.3 0.1 0.1 1.1 progress and more aid, growth per Asia 992 212 1.6 1.1 1.1 1.5 2.0 2.6 person in low-income Asian coun- Middle-income oil importers 701 1,638 3.6 3.1 2.0 2.4 2.6 3.5 tries could be substantially higher East Asia and Pacific 162 1,175 4.9 5.6 4.1 4.1 4.7 5.2 in the 1980s than in the 1970s. But Latin America and Caribbean 256 1,775 2.7 3.5 2.2 2.4 2.6 3.8 North Africa and Middle East 30 667 -0.2 0.4 0.0 oi 0.6 0.8 it would still be well below that of Africa (Sub-Saharan) 125 867 2.4 0.9 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.4 middle-income oil importers, and Southern Europe 128 2,950 5.4 3.2 2.2 2.2 2.5 3.4 in the Low case it would not be Oil importers 1,834 751 3.1 2.7 1.8 2.2 2.4 3.2 much more than 1 percent a year Oil exporters 456 968 2.8 3.5 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.4 for the decade. The situation for All developing countries 2,290 791 3.1 2.9 2.0 2.3 2.6 3.3 low-income Africa is worse. These All low-income 1,310 245 1.7 1.7 1.2 1.8 2.1 2.5 countries face a desperately hard All middle-income 980 1,521 3.4 3.1 2.1 2.4 2.7 3.4 adjustment period-coming on top Capital-surplus oil exporters 69 4,614 7.3 5.0 2.3 2.3 2.8 2.8 of the economic stagnation of the Industrialized countries 671 9,684 3.9 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.8 3.5 1970s. Even under the compara- Centrally planned economies 1,386 1,720 na. 3.8 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 tively optimistic assumptions of Note: More detailed information, including GNP and population growth rates, is in the High case, their growth would Table SA. 1 of the statistical appendix to Part I. be negligible in 1980-85. The a. Calculated in 1977 dollars. 11 Compared with the industrialized maintain strong growth after 1985. developing countries, the poten- countries, growth per person in The capital-surplus oil ex- tial exists for substantially faster developing countries will be slightly porters can contribute to efficient growth. While the chances of ex- lower. The resultant widening in recycling by expanding their ceeding the High case seem slim, income disparities occurs primarily holdings of real and financial it is important that all countries because of slow growth in the foreign assets, by avoiding disrup- recognize the advantagesand the low-income countries and in the tions in oil supplies or sharp price feasibilityof higher growth. two slowest-growing middle-in- fluctuations, and by extending more What would it require? One come groups. Research for this Report direct financial supportconces- important element is more effec- suggests that average growth per sional and nonconcessionalto tive adjustment by the industrial- person of about 1.5 percent a year developing countries. And they can ized countries, particularly to higher in low-income countries and about help the developing countries to energy costs. Another is a liberal 2 percent in middle-income coun- expand foreign earnings by buy- trade environment, with less tries is needed to prevent the ing more from them and by con- protection for products in which number of people in absolute pov- tinuing to provide employment developing countries have an erty from rising. Thus, for these for their migrant workers. actual or potential cost advantage slow-growing groups (except South The industrialized countries (this would help to reduce infla- Asia in the High case) the extent can help by avoiding excessive tionary pressures). A third is more of absolute poverty is likely to in- deflation and by promoting tech- progress by all countries in pro- crease during the decade. nical and policy innovations to ducing and conserving energy, and overcome structural constraints, some reasonable assurance that Policy implications by country thus encouraging a rapid resump- supplies would not be suddenly categories tion of sustained growth. They will disrupted. Improvements in effi- assist developing countries (and ciency and some further increases Given current policies, growth in themselves) by importing more in domestic savings in developing oil-importing developing countries, from them; this requires trade countries would also be valuable. with their total population of 1.8 liberalization as well as economic Finally, capital flows to developing billion, is likely to be unacceptably growth. The industrialized coun- countries would need to increase low. The steps needed to move tries should reverse the tendency substantially. Given increases in toward, or beyond, the High case for their aid to fall as a share developing-country exports (and can be summarized by country of GNP and should encourage thus in debt-servicing capacity) group. prudent expansion in lending and in the efficiency with which For the oil-importing devel- from their commercial capital capital is used, developing coun- oping countries, faster growth markets to developing countries. tries would become increasingly depends heavily on economic The low-income countries in par- attractive customers to commercial management. This requires efforts ticular need more external finan- lenders. If the industrialized coun- to increase exports and invest- cial support than is currently tries grew more rapidly, they would ment, and to improve the efficiency in prospect. The richer centrally find it easier to provide more aid. with which existing and new in- planned economies also have the With good progress in all these vestment is used. But increasing capacity to extend considerably areas, GNP per person in the their import capacity and their more aid to developing countries developing countries perhaps ability to service debt will require and to expand trade with them. could grow 4.3 percent a year in buoyant export markets, and more the second half of the 1980s (com- capital from abroad. What would be required for even pared with 3.3 percent in the High The oil-exporting developing faster growth? case). This would mean growth countries can grow rapidly; but of 3.9 percent a year in the oil- they must invest their oil revenues It will take the kind of strong efforts exporting developing countries, productively in the early part of discussed above to reach the High 3.6 percent in the low-income oil the decade, and ensure that effi- case. But that growth is itself low importers and 4.6 percent in the cient production is encouraged in measured against that of the 1960s middle-income oil importers. the nonoil as well as oil sectors of and the first part of the 1970s, and Achieving these results would the economy. This will enhance by any reasonable expectations for require much more international their creditworthiness for the development. Both for the world cooperation than now seems likely. expanded borrowing needed to economy and especially for the Aid of at least 0.5 percent of in- 12 dustrialized countries' GNP would Table 2.9 Developing countries' GNP per person, 1980-2000 be essential; still higher aid flows (:1977 dollars) approaching the 0.7 percent UN 1985 1990 2000 targetwould raise growth further Low High Low High Faster Low High Faster and help to reduce disparities be- Country group 1980 case case case case growth case case growth tween low- and middle-income Low-income countries. In addition, economic oil importers 168 177 183 188 206 218 215 261 311 Middle-income management would have to improve oil importers 1,275 1,408 1,448 1,585 1,719 1,813 2,009 2,423 2,843 considerably. International efforts Oil exporters 753 873 896 1,012 1,058 1,085 1,360 1,475 1,591 to encourage the steps required to All developing countries 615 679 702 761 825 866 955 1,139 1,320 increase growthincluding those now being considered as part of the International Development 2.9 shows what would happen to million. The differencereducing Strategy of the United Nations GNP per person if the faster (than the number of people in poverty are therefore very much to be High-case) growth mentioned above by between 60 million and 190 welcomed. could be achieved. Developing- million during the next 10 years country growth of about 1.9 per- is a powerful reminder of the ben- Broader implications of the cent above the Low case (and efits of higher growth. And as dis- projections 0.9 percent above the High case) cussed in Chapters 4 and 5, growth would start in 1935 and be main- in incomes is also vital for better Since World Development Report, tained until the end of the century. nutrition, health and education, as 1979 was published, there have The difference in growth may not well as for lower fertility. been major attempts to advance seem large, but by 1990 for all thinking and policies on develop- developing countries it makes a The challenge of the decade ment. The OECD study Facing the difference of more than a seventh. Future (Interfutures) was a result By the end of the century, average The world will reap great benefits of three years' research on pros- real incomes with the faster growth from rapid growth. Without it, pects for the global economy. The would be almost two-fifths above hundreds of millions of very poor Independent Commission on Inter- those in the Low case and one- people will live and die with little national Development Issues (the sixth above those in the High. or no improvement in their lot. Brandt Commission) published its And it is only with this sharp Many developing countries will findings in North-South: A Program acceleration that growth of in- find it hard to maintain political for Survival, which called for bold come per person in developing stability. reforms to avoid an otherwise countries would match that of the The developing countries face grave future for intemational eco- industrial countries. formidable obstacles on the way nomic and political relations. The What does this growth mean to rapid growthmany of which analysis of the present Report for people's lives? The same they will have to overcome them- strongly endorses the Commis- method for estimating the link selves. But through their policies sion's emphasis on the interdepen- between income growth and poverty on trade, aid and other capital flows, dencethrough trade, energy and reduction used in the previous two the industrialized countries and capital flowsof all countries, as World Development Reports suggests the capital-surplus oil exporters well as its emphasis on the impor- the following effects. In 1980 the have a striking impact on how tance of renewed efforts to reduce number of people with incomes much the developing countries can worldwide poverty. below the absolute poverty line is accomplish. Much will depend on There has been continuing, in- approximately 780 million. With the degree of international coopera- tense debate over an appropriate the Low case this number would tionwhich at present threatens strategy for the Third Develop- actually increase over the next to fall short of what is needed. ment Decade. But all agree on the decade to 800 million; in the High For poverty, growth and political need to raise the growth of the case it would fall slightly, to 720 stability, the implications of the developing countries million. If it were possible to achieve Low caseitself not the worst pos- The advantages of higher growth the faster growth mentioned, the sible outcomeshow that the are striking. To illustrate, Table number could fall sharplyto 590 world can ill afford such failures. 13 3 International problems and policies The analysis in Chapter 2 has rise for the foreseeable future. Tem- This represents considerable emphasized that the international porary fluctuations aside, what progress, but it is still inadequate. economic outlook poses particularly happens to prices will be determined The evidence of the past six years difficult choices for policymakers by trends in energy conservation shows that pricing policies (includ- in the 1980s. A sustained recovery and production: this section con- ing taxes) have a major role to play of the world economy from the siders each in turn, paying particular in curbing energy demand (and, slowdown expected in the next few attention to the position of devel- no less important, in encouraging years will depend largely on the oping countries. domestic production). But political policies pursued in the three areas difficulties have often inhibited of international concern discussed Conservation governments from passing higher in this chapterenergy, trade and Industrialized countries. The energy prices through to final capital flows. Particular attention greatest scope for conservation lies consumers. These difficulties have is paid to policies aimed at ensuring with the industrialized countries; been most acute in the United that current account deficits are they account for more than half of States and Canada, less so in financedand over time reduced world energy consumption (and Europe and Japan. with minimal loss in the growth more than a third of production).1 Solutions need to be found that of developing countries. Where On average the industrialized convey the right price signals to projections are given, they are countries use about eight times usersand here taxation can help consistent with the High case as much commercial energy (see box)and provide incentives described in Chapter 2, but the per person as the middle-income to producers. If higher prices mean specific policy issues discussed developing countries and more that existing producers reap large here are not related to any particular than 40 times as much as the set of projections. low-income countries. This is partly because they are more Energy industrialized; but their agricul- Figure 3.1 Petroleum prices, ture and households are also more annual averages, 1972-30 Recent increases in petroleum prices energy-intensive. They have been (dollars per barrel) (Figure 3.1) have ensured that the reducing the ratio of energy use 30 economic impact of energy will to GNP: between 1973 and 1977 remain a central concern of policy- this ratio fell 16 percent in Japan, 25 makers everywhere. Their past 13 percent in France, 12 percent in concern, however, has achieved the Federal Republic of Germany, 20 only limited success in producing 10 percent in both the United coordinated energy policiesin States and Italy, 9 percent in 15 part because of the emphasis given Canada and 7 percent in the United to managing immediate balance- Kingdom. Moreover, Japan and 10 of-payments difficulties. While Western Europe have held their this issue is again important, all economies will also have to adapt absolute volume of petroleum use constant since 1973, and the United -5 Constant 1972 prices to higher energy prices. The long- States has done so since 1973. 01 I I I I I term outlook is uncertain, but 1972 73 74 75 76 77 75 79 80 prudent energy policy should 1. The word "energy" means commercial Prices weighted by production shares. Deflated by manufactured export prices. assume that real energy prices will energy unless otherwise specified. 14 windfalls, some of their extra contrast, energy consumption in to grow much faster since 1973 in profits can be appropriated directly the industrialized countries is energy exporters than in energy for example, by a "windfall profits projected to rise by just over 30 importers like Brazil and South tax" (the US solution) or by a percent and GNP by about 40 Korea. Some countries (Brazil, India "petroleum revenue tax" (as in the percent.) By 1990 the developing and Pakistan, for example) have United Kingdom). countries' commercial energy tended to pass on higher prices to Developing countries. Ex- requirements are likely to rise to domestic users relatively quickly; cluding the capital-surplus oil around 17 percent of world use and others are now moving in the exporters, they account for only (See Table SA.2 in the statistical same direction. The alternative about 13 percent of the world's appendix to Part I). subsidizes energy usethus drain- use of commercial energy (and In curbing demand growth, ing budgets and discouraging about 15 percent of production). developing countries have experi- conservation. About half of all the energy pro- enced many of the same diffi- While there is a natural reluc- duced by low-income oil-importing culties as industrialized countries tance to inflict hardship on lower- countries is noncommercialfrom and usually more acutely. and middle-income groups by wood and dung, for example. As Domestic pricesparticularly of raising energy prices, energy their economies develop, much of domestically produced energy - subsidies (if essential) should be this will have to be replaced by often have not been raised in line reserved for products consumed commercial energy. Even with with world prices. Until recently, primarily by poorer people. Even appropriate pricing and other domestic petroleum prices in then, care is needed to prevent those conservation measures, the con- Indonesia, for example, were less products from being diverted to sumption of commercial energy than 40 percent of the world price; other uses. On grounds of equity in developing countries is pro- Egypt, Ecuador and Venezuela or efficiency, there is little justifi- jected to rise more than 80 percent have also underpriced their oil. cation for subsidizing gasoline in the 1980s, compared with GNP This is a major reason why energy and domestic electricity (which in growth of about 70 percent. (By use in relation to GNP has tended most developing countries are consumed primarily by richer groups), industrial fuels and the energy used by public sector Taxes and energy agencies. Taxation policy has played only a small tages. First, the revenues can be used to part in conserving energy in the past six mitigate the overall effects on the cost of Production years. Although higher base prices for living (through subsidies, for example, or The oil exporters. For most major energy have encouraged more econom- increased transfer payments). Second, oil exporters, oil is the one reliable ical use, their effects have been muted taxes can be varied so as to cushion the because energy taxes have not risen shock of sudden increases in oil prices. source of finance for their devel- as much. Gasoline provides a good Higher prices can be passed on in full opment over the medium term (at example: while crude oil prices rose three over a periodbut smoothly, with taxes least 10-20 years). Accordingly, and a half times in real terms between sometimes rising more than oil prices, how much oil they produce depends the beginning of 1970 and mid-1979, real sometimes less. This could reduce un- gasoline prices in the seven largest on a variety of factorssuch as certainty and assist energy planning by industrialized countries rose between households and firms. how much investment their econ- 3 percent (Canada) and 37 percent (Italy). omies can absorb productively and As a proportion of the final price, taxes without social disruption; the actual fell in all seven countries (see table). Effective rates of gasoline taxation, 1970 and 1979 and prospective price of oil; and The sharp rise in oil prices in 1973-74 the (expected) yields on the foreign reduced the relative importance of taxa- Gasoline tax tion in every kind of petroleum product; as percentage assets that can be bought with little has been done since to restore it. In of pretax price oil revenues. the early and mid-1970s, the reluctance Country 1970 1979 For the capital-surplus oil ex- of governments to add to inflation often Canada 82 48 porters, current revenues far exceed took precedence over conserving energy France 290 180 immediate investment needs; their by raising its price. There is now greater Germany, Federal emphasis on conservation (an emphasis Republic of 264 126 oil exports are not expected to strongly endorsed by the major oil pro- Italy 364 209 expand rapidly. The other oil- ducers), with higher prices having a key Japan 142 72 exporting developing countries are role to play. United Kingdom 257 47 therefore projected to increase their Energy taxation has two other advan- United States 44 18 share of energy trade (see Table 15 Table 3.1 Shares of net world trade in commercial energy, 1977-90 othersnotably nuclear power (High case) face opposition on environmental (percent) grounds. This is an important Estimated Projected source of uncertainty about pro- Country group 1977 1980 1985 1990 duction prospects, particularly Share of exports over the long-term; but in the next Capital-surplus oil exporters 70 64 63 65 5-10 years production will be de- Oil-exporting developing countries 23 28 31 33 Centrally planned economies 7 8 6 2 termined mainly by projects now Total 100 100 100 100 in the pipeline. For technological Share of imports and financial reasons, the devel- Industrialized countries 79 78 77 73 opment of supplies of new energy Oil-importing developing countries 21 22 23 27 to the stage of commercial pro- Total 100 100 100 100 duction is mainly a task for the Memo item industrialized countries. How it Volume of total net trade 33.9 30.2 32.8 34.0 is achieved will also influence the (millions of barrels per day) prospects for energy production Of which bunkers and othera 4.6 4.6 5.8 6.5 in developing countries, considered a. These imports are not allocated to country groups. in the rest of this section. Developing countries' energy production. Since 1973 several 3.1). This will require increased of what can be achieved; With countries (including Cameroon, investment in exploration and strong efforts to develop these Ghana, Guatemala, Ivory Coast exploitation; yet spending on alternatives, the share of petroleum and the Philippines) have started exploration and the ratio of proven in the world supply of primary producing petroleum; existing reserves to production are declin- commercial energy could fall from producers (such as India, Malaysia ing in some countries, while the 46 percent in 1930 to 38 percent andstrikingly soMexico) have domestic consumption of oil is in 1990; by contrast, its share fell expanded capacity. Although rising in all. by only two percentage points exploration generally has been Both oil exporters and importers between 1970 and 1980. inadequate, discoveries of exploit- share a common interest in ensuring In addition to raising the profita- able oil and gas deposits have been that oil price rises and supplies do bility of developing domestic made (for example, in Chad, Pakistan, not change sharply or unpredict- petroleum and other conventional Tanzania and Thailand). Several ably. Steady changes would help sources of energy, higher oil prices developing countries (including investment planning and financial stimulate research into new ways India, Turkey, South Korea and management in the importing coun- of producing, converting and using the Philippines) have expanded tries; and all countries stand to energy of all kinds. Many alterna- coal and lignite production; others gain from a stronger, more stable tive sources are still in their tech- (among them Argentina, Brazil, world economy. nical and economic infancy, while Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Uruguay New supplies of energy. In and Sri Lanka) have taken meas- 1974 producers and governments ures to increase hydroelectricity may have doubted that real oil I -- - Figure 3.2 Actual & projected shares output; a few (most notably Indo- prices would be maintained, so in world primary energy supply, nesia and the Philippines) are -- there was less pressure to commit 1970-2020 100% tapping significant geothermal the funds needed to develop alter- 90 sources; and Brazil leads the world native energy supplies. Today such 80 her in producing alcohol fuel for doubts have disappeared. But 70 automobiles. considerable uncertainty remains 80 Hydro In the 1980s progress should - about the returns from developing 50 Nuclear acceleratebut will require large some potential alternatives to oil; 40 increases in investment. The main and energy projects take many - - -- -I gains are likely to be in petroleum 30 years to come on stream, and re- 20 and natural gas, coal, and primary quire large capital outlays. The 10 (other than thermal) electricity projections in Figure 3.2 (and 0 1970 980 1990 2000 2010 2020 generationmainly hydro and Table SA.3) take a positive view nuclear. But much also needs to 16 be done to increase the supplies Latin America. Despite consider- to make much of a contribution of the kinds of energy that are able geothermal potential in up to over the next 10 years; shale oil particularly important for poor 30 developing countriesamong and methanol have rather more people. them Kenya, Mexico, El Salvador, potential. Alcohol produced from Petroleum and natural gas. Nicaragua and the Philippines biomass (cereals, sugarcane, beets While the oil-importing developing geothermal capacity will produce and so on) is now used as a partial countries have only about 2 percent relatively little electricity in the substitute for gasoline. The tech- of the world's proven oil reserves, 1980s. But nuclear power could nology for producing it is well their share of ultimately recover- produce 11 percent of the total by established. A key question is the able oil reserves may be 15 percent. 1990 (2 percent in 1980)mainly extent to which agricultural land One study (undertaken for the in the major existing producers should be diverted from food to World Bank) estimated that 23 of (Argentina, Brazil, India, South fuel production (see box). 70 countries surveyed each might Korea and Pakistan) but in other Energy for the poor. The poor, have ultimately recoverable re- countries as well (for example, especially those in rural areas, rely serves of at least 750 million bar- Romania, Thailand, Yugoslavia and on noncommercial energy for rels. (For comparison, net imports the Philippines). cooking and heating; these forms of oil for energy use by develop- Other sources. Any significant of energy provide more than 85 ing countries will amount to about increase in the production of oil percent of rural requirements in 110 million barrels in 1980.) To from tar sands in developing coun- many countries. Yet their supplies realize their full potential, most tries depends on a major tech- are dwindling, thus inflicting sev- countries must step up exploration nological breakthrough. Solar and eral sorts of hardship. Much time activities; the same study judged windpower are also unlikely is spent just in gathering fuel (for that exploration was inadequate in 51 of 58 countries that were not producers. Gas is widely spread; many Fuel from food countries can significantly expand Alcohol produced from sugarcane or or have the potential for large "gasohol" productionboth for domestic grains is becoming competitive with programs. energy use and for petrochemicals gasoline as real petroleum prices rise. This development could indirectly during the decade. A lot of gas Conventional automobiles and trucks affect the availability and price of food associated with oil production is can run on "gasohol," a mixture of alco- for developing countries that either im- now wasted by venting or flaring; hol and (at least 80 percent) gasoline. port grain on commercial terms or depend With engine modifications, they could on international food aid to meet their much of it could be recovered. run on pure alcohol; such engines are deficits. Current plans in Brazil and the Coal. For most developing already being produced in Brazil. By United States envisage that the area of countries, coal is still a minor fuel 1977 the estimated national ratio of alco- cultivated land would be expanded to used mainly in electricity genera- hol to gasoline use in Brazil was 4.3 per- grow fuel crops, so that food production tion andin larger coal producers cent; in 1979 it had risen to 19 percent, (and therefore price) is not significantly and will rise further as more cars run on affected. In practice these goals may not (such as India, Turkey, South Korea pure alcohol. be fully achievable. and Yugoslavia)in industrial ap- Brazil's alcohol is still derived almost Whether ethanol proves economic in plications. Coal can substitute for exclusively from sugarcane, but alcohol other countries will depend on land oil in electricity generation, but can be produced from a variety of crops. availability, markets and prices for food the potential for increased use is Ethanol, the cheapest alternative to gaso- exports, and the development of such line in the 1980s, comes from fermenting alternative sources as wood, sorghum limited largely to new capacity sugar crops, principally sugarcane; root and agricultural waste. In the next five since converting existing plants is crops, mainly cassava; and cereals, years or so, the quantity of agricultural often uneconomic. especially corn and potentially sorghum. production diverted into alcohol is likely Primaiy electricity. Two-thirds The United States also has ambitious to be small (with the exception of Brazil of the electricity generated in devel- plans for producing alcohol fuel, pri- and the United States). But as more marily from corn. The US target of 2 countries consider ways of reducing oping countries is used in industry billion gallons of ethanol by 1985 would petroleum import costs, the "food or (compared with 40 percent in the require 20 million tons of corn or its fuel" issue may become more serious. industrialized countries). Hydro- equivalent, one fifth of the current US A satisfactory solution will require a power, currently accounting for exportable grain surplus. And other food major effort to develop alternative bio- 44 percent of electricity output, can exporters (including Argentina, Austra- mass sources of energy, including crops be greatly expanded in many devel- lia, New Zealand, the Philippines and that can be grown economically on South Africa) either have already launched marginal land. oping countriesparticularly in 17 example, 5 to 19 work days a formal energy strategies and ade- are discussed first. The second month for each family in upland quate sector plans. Planning con- question is largely a matter for Nepal); often the gatherers are tinues to be hampered by lack of developing countries: their poli- children who might otherwise be essential data on fuel deposits, on cies are considered in the second in school. In many countries (in- consumption patterns and on how part of this section. cluding the entire Sahelian belt energy demand and supply are from Senegal to Somalia) forest likely to respond to income and Trade policy for industrialized land is being turned into desert. price changes. Geological and countries This pernicious process would geophysical surveys and detailed Most industrialized countries will be (at least partially) arrested if market studies are still required run current account deficits in affordable energy were made before effective planning can take 1980. How they respond to these available. As well as this, burning place. Many countries also lack deficits will largely determine the dung and vegetation carries health some of the technical and mana- climate for world trade. If they all risks, and every year deprives the gerial skills required to undertake simultaneously attempt to restrain soil of enough fertilizer to produce the preliminary studies, draw up imports while boosting exports, 20 million tons of grainenough an energy plan and oversee the shrinking markets for each others' to feed 100 million people. exploitation of domestic energy exports will defeat their purpose, Although there are no easy so- resources. and world trade and output will lutions to these energy problems, Countries facing these constraints sufferas happened in acute form the essential policy initiatives can benefit from external capital in the 1930s. remain as described in last year's and technical assistance. Although After the 1973-74 oil price rises, World Development Report. Existing some assistance has been provided some of the major trading nations forests must be husbanded, new already (for example, by the UNDP (especially Japan and the Federal ones planted. Roughly 50 million and the World Bank), there is Republic of Germany) acted quickly hectares (125 million acres) of scope for considerable expansion to reverse the deterioration in their fuelwood planting may be required of these activities. trade accounts. They were able to by the year 2000 to meet domestic do so because some industrialized needs for cooking and heating in International trade countries (notably the United developing countries. Their pres- States) and most developing coun- ent rate of afforestation is less International trade has been tries financed much larger current than a tenth of what is needed to emphasized in previous World account deficits, and because sur- ensure self-sufficiency in fuel- Development Reports for two rea- pluses of the major oil-exporting wood by then. More efficient ways sons: first, trade is a principal countries were quickly reduced. of burning wood (for example, im- means of promoting economic Avoiding an excessive slowdown proved stoves) can help; but new, efficiency and growth; second, a in world trade and output in the technologies need to be devised to strong trade base tends to be a early 1980s requires that industri- use the sun, the wind and other prerequisite for attracting foreign alized countries, as a group, run renewable energy sources. And capital. Given the world economic larger deficitsand for longer. better use should be made of outlook, these benefits acquire The countries best placed to run other traditional fuels (for ex- added significance; but two policy large deficits and thereby support ample, through biogas generation, questions stand out. growth are those with the capacity which does not destroy the fertilizer What developments in world to borrow heavily (or run down value of animal wastes). trade (and the resulting effects on reserves)and those with the low- the distribution of payments defi- est inflation, since deflationary The need for energy strategies cits) will contribute most to rapid policies aimed at curbing inflation In the developing countries, national growth? will tend to moderate demand for and regional planning is urgently With a less buoyant outlook imports. Industrialized countries needed to evaluate fuel minerals for world trade, do developing that restrain domestic growth to and other energy sources, to examine countries face a changed tradeoff control inflation should minimize conventional and new technologies, between producing for the foreign the effect on world trade by main- and to assess the likely trends in or for the domestic market? taining their demand for imports demand for commercial and non- The first question turns mainly and avoiding beggar-thy-neighbor commercial energy. on the policies of the industrial support for exports. They can do But many countries do not have and oil-exporting countries: they this by refraining from deliberate 18 exchange-rate depreciation, by percent of the merchandise exports have the manufacturing and market- avoiding subsidies to exporters of developing countries and they ing skills required either to export a and by opening their markets to have grown roughly in line with wide range of manufactures or to imports. the industrialized countries' GNP. adapt quickly to changes in market Each of these policies will also There is no reason to expect conditions. serve to dampen inflation. With- this relation to change, especially While no new major restrictions out them, the industrialized coun- as exports of some agricultural prod- were imposed in the past year, tries will find that the developing ucts remain constrained by heavy some measures were consolidated. world cannot maintain its growth protection in Japan and Western In some sectors (particularly or its demand for their exports. Europe. Even if demand were to textiles and clothing) elaborate The outlook for exports. The grow rapidly, the developing coun- mechanisms to control imports sluggish demand from the indus- tries may not be able to expand the have become more entrenched, trialized countries expected in the volume of their agricultural exports reducing the chances of their early early 1980s will harm developing very much (because of supply removal. In some industrialized countries' exportsparticularly of constraints), though they would countries, imports of footwear and primary commoditiesas it did dur- benefit considerably from higher some consumer electronic goods ing 1973-77. The growth of develop- prices. In the short-term, most are still subject to fairly stringent ing countries' exports decelerated primary producers would be quotas. In shipbuilding, although sharply in that period; their exports assisted by improved schemes to substantial subsidies remain, of primary commodities fell after stabilize revenues or prices (see there has been progress recently growing at around 4 percent a year box overleaf). If the industrialized in cutting capacity in uncompeti- in 1963-73 (see Figure 3.3). Even economies begin to pick up, there tive countries. France and the excluding fuels, primary com- would be a recovery in demand United Kingdom, in particular, modities account for about 55 for primary products. have taken steps to reduce general The outlook for manufactured subsidies to industry. exports is much brighter; as in The Tokyo round. The latest 1973-77, their growth is likely to (Tokyo) round of multilateral trade Figure 3.3 Growth of developing negotiations (MTN) was largely countries' merchandise exports, be comparatively robust. At pres- 1963-73 and 1973_77a ent, they account for only about completed in April 1979; it made (average annual percentage change, 1970 prices) 10 percent of the imports (and less valuable progress in some areas than 2 percent of the consumption) (see box on page 21); in some others, Nonfi primary Martufac- Total of manufactured goods in the the results were a disappointment tures for the developing countries. None- 14 products industrialized countries. But they are concentrated heavily in some theless, the MTN agreements 12 products, and therefore have at- have considerable potential to tracted protectionist attention. The liberalize trade. 10 developing countries most directly The extent to which this potential affected by protection have been the is realized, especially by develop- IL1- S more successful exporters (particu- ing countries, will depend on how larly the major East Asian exporters the agreements are implemented 6 of manufactures and Brazil); but they and on the outcome of continuing have continued to expand their ex- negotiationsthe most important 4 ports rapidly by diversifying into of which pertain to the safeguard new product lines. Current restrk- clause. This attempts to limit the tions on items other than textiles and emergency protection that can be clothing are not (with some minor adopted on the grounds of serious + exceptions) an insuperable barrier to injury to domestic industry. Safe- 0 rapid export growth. guard measures have been invoked 2 1973-77 Harder to assess (but clearly im- frequently against imports from portant) is the longer-term disincen- developing countries (often out- a. Excludes exports to centrally planned econ- omies (about 7 percent of developing-country tivefrom both current restrictions side the legal framework of the exports in 1977(. Country groups correspond to UN classification. Developing countries include and risks of their expansionto General Agreement on Tariffs and capital-surplus oil exporters and exclude South Africa and most of southern Europe. countries at earlier stages of export TradeGATT). The main dis- development. Generally, they do not pute holding up agreement is 19 conduct. But most developing Stabilizing export earnings countries so far have refused to compared with $575 for Lomé 1. Two international facilities already exist There are some minor reforms in the signpartly because of dissatis- to help stabilize the export earnings of new agreement but the principles re- faction with the progress made developing countries. main the same. To qualify for support, and partly because they maintain The IMF's compensatory financing a commodity must have accounted for that they should benefit from the facility. A country in balance-of-pay- at least 6.5 percent (7.5 percent under ments difficulty is eligible to draw up to the old agreement) of a country's total codes without being bound by 100 percent of its quota, if exports fall exports to all destinations in the pre- their provisions. below a defined trend for reasons gen- ceding year, or 2.0 percent (2.5 percent The reciprocal obligations of erally beyond its control. After the facil- previously) for the 44 ACP members developing countries are a sensi- ity was liberalized in December 1975, that are least developed, landlocked or tive issue that will be increasingly drawings by members rose sharply. islands. A Stabex transfer can be made Compared with 57 drawings totaling if export earnings of a qualifying prod- important in future negotiations. SDR 1.2 billion (about $1.3 billion) in uct fall below its average earnings over in particular, the status of those 1963-75, 107 drawings totaling SDR 4 bil- the four preceding years by 6.5 percent developing countries that are major lion ($4.9 billion) were made from Janu- or more (2.0 percent for the 44 special exporters of manufactures and are ary 1976 to March 1980accounting for cases)down from 7.5 and 2.5 percent reaching a more advanced stage of nearly a third of the total credit ex- under the old agreement. tended by the IMF to all its members. Stabex transfers to the 35 least-devel- development ("the graduates") is The scheme has several advantages: oped countries are grants; to other unresolved. If their eligibility for (a) it applies to exports in generaleven countries they are interest-free loans, special treatment were reduced, receipts from tourism and workers' re- to be repaid over seven years with two there would be more scope for the mittances qualify for support if data are years' grace. Under Lomé 2 a related lower-income countries to benefit. available; (b) drawings are not at the but different facility for minerals will expense of other rights to draw on IMP also be introduced. A major advantage The extent of the gains from the resources; and (c) potential access is for ACP countries receiving payments MTN nevertheless depends mainly now largeabout $16 billion for oil- is that Stabex offers "untied" foreign on the industrialized countries. importing developing countries once the exchange on concessionary terms. But Stagnation or slow growth of their seventh general review of quotas takes it is small, does not fully cover earnings economies reduces alternative effect. But there are disadvantages too: losses resulting from inflation, and is not because the amount a country can bor- as automatic as its (complex) rules employment opportunities for row is determined by its quota, it may suggest. displaced workers, and aggravates be relatively little for countries (such In addition, there is the UNCTAD protectionist sentiment. (There is as Zambia) that are heavily dependent Common Fundagreed upon in princi- in fact no evidence that compe- on a single commodity export with ple, but with legal and technical ques- tition from developing countries sharply fluctuating prices. And it pro- tions still to be resolved. The original vides no compensation for a sharp in- proposal was for a fund of $6 billion is a major cause of unemployment. crease in import requirements (for ex- $4.5 billion to stabilize 10 "core" com- Several studies have shown that ample, if a harvest fails)which can modities, with a "second window" of a balanced increase in trade with be equally unpredictable and outside a $1.5 billion for other measures (product developing countries has insig- member's control. (The IMF is studying diversification, research and process- nificant effects on employment in the possibility of giving assistance to ing). The idea is that a central fund members adversely affected by higher industrialized countries, especially as would finance buffer stocks under sep- costs for food imports.) arate international commodity agree- compared with the job losses due The European Community's Stabex ments (ICA5), and would thereby stabi- to technological change; other scheme. It covers the 58 African, Carib- lize commodities prices. The current studies show employment gains bean and Pacific (ACP) countries that proposal is for $400 million for buffer- for some countries.) are members of the Lomé agreement; stock financing (from member govern- 12 primary products were covered at the ments and deposits by ICAs) and a In turn, protection impedes outset, 44 are eligible for support under second window of $350 million from economic recovery by slowing the Lomé 2. Proposed funding for Stabex in voluntary contributions (by April 1980, movement of resources from Lomé 2 is $775 million for 1980-85, $170 million had been pledged). low- to high-productivity sectors, thus exacerbating inflation. And imports can reduce inflation directly, whether safeguard measures can actively participate in) the Tokyo restraining the price rises that be invoked selectively against agreements, they are likely to add domestic producers seek and specific countriesan approach significantly to the benefits they increasing the pressure on them favored by some industrialized obtain from it. Under its terms, to improve efficiency. A 1978 survey countries but opposed by devel- only signatories can participate in in the United States of all consumer oping countries. the implementation and surveil- goods (except food and automo- If developing countries sign (and lance of the governing codes of biles) found that imports from 20 Table 3.2 World merchandise trade, by country group, 1970 and 1977 rights. These measures complement (percent) efforts to raise employment and Destination growth and to reduce inflation. Oilim porting Oil_exporting But if adjustment policies are not developing developing Capital-surplus Industrialized properly designed and implemented, countries countries oil exporters countries Worlds they can delay rather than assist Origin 1970 1977 :1970 1977 1970 1977 1970 1977 1970snd1977 restructuring. Oil-importing developing Trade issues for capital-surplus countries 17.4 20.5 3.5 8.4 1.5 3.1 69.0 61.8 100,0 Oil-exporting oil exporters developing After the 1973-74 oil price increases countries 21.8 21.5 3.9 2.2 0.5 0.8 66.6 72.6 100.0 Capital-surplus the oil-exporting countries rapidly oil exporters 20.2 20.6 1.7 4.3 0.8 1.2 74.4 69.6 100.0 expanded their imports-thereby Industrialized moderating the world economic countries 18.2 16.4 4.7 6.7 1.5 5.6 71.0 65.7 100.0 slowdown. The imports of the Worlds 18.0 16.9 4.1 6.1 1.3 4.3 65.4 62.2 100.0 capital-surplus countries are un- a. Includes centrally planned economies and unallocated trade (usually about 1 percent). likely to grow in the 1980s at the extraordinary rate (more than 20 percent a year) of the 1970s; but Asia and Latin America were on tries. Policies to improve mobility they are expected to grow almost average 16 percent cheaper than were discussed at length in last twice as fast as the imports of the domestic products of similar year's World Development Report. industrialized countries (9 percent quality. These include quick and adequate a year compared with 5 percent). Pressures for protection can be compensation for affected individ- This will offer buoyant opportuni- offset by policies to improve uals, retraining schemes and the ties for exporters in developing productivity within particular creation of new industries, and countries-but within limits, since industries and to ease the move- removing obstacles to labor mobility, the oil-exporters' market is still ment of resources between indus- such as nontransferable pension relatively small (see Table 3.2). Multilateral trade negotiations: the Tokyo round but also for modifying their production Several novel features are contained in To reduce discrimination against structure; revising GATT procedures for the MTN agreements, including the in- foreign suppliers for government con- supervising adherence to international corporation of preferential treatment for tracts valued at SDR15O,000 (about rules. developing countries into the legal $200,000) or more. Others, Antidumping measures and framework governing trade and codes on To regulate export subsidies and, restrictions on trade in dairy and certain nontariff barriers. But they largely ex- for countervailing duties, to require meat products were amended. clude existing quantitative restrictions on proof that subsidized imports caused Provisions for developing countries. Aside textiles, clothing and agriculture. material injury to the domestic industry from the framework agreement, special Tariffs. Industrialized countries are to in question. provisions include: reduce tariffs 35 percent (simple average) To ensure that technical regulations A five-year delay in implementing over eight years, affecting trade worth adopted for such reasons as health or the customs code, and longer exemp- about $125 billion (1976 values). The environmental protection do not create tions for certain goods. simple-average tariff cut on developing unnecessary obstacles to trade. Fewer entities to be covered by the countries' traditional exports would To prevent procedures for import government procurement code; and amount to 25 percent for industrial and licensing from constituting barriers to technical assistance for tendering bids. 7 percent for agricultural products. The trade. Delays of up to two years in apply- tariff reductions are less than average on Framework for conduct of trade. This ing the import-licensing code. products eligible for the generalized sys- reforms several aspects of the GATT Export subsidies to nonagricultural tem of preferences; they are larger on system. Its main features are: providing a products are not flatly prohibited; but finished manufactures than on semi- legal basis within GATT for preferential developing countries should avoid using manufactures. treatment of developing countries, and subsidies to harm the interest of trading Nontariff barriers. The aims are as special treatment of the least-developed partners, and phase them out gradually. follows: countries; increasing the regulation of Aside from the safeguards clause, the S To prevent increases in protection trade measures adopted for balance-of- areas of continuing negotiations are com- arising from use of arbitrarily deter- payments purposes; recognizing the mercial counterfeiting, adequate access mined customs values as a base for developing countries' need to take safe- to vital imports and restrictions on tariffs. guard action not only for new industries agricultural trade. 21 slowdown in trade poses markedly Migration and money other countries of the region, most of the different policy problems for oil- Emigration once played a crucial role in other 1 million from South Asia. exporting and oil-importing devel- reducing poverty in Western Europe: Remittances to developing countries oping countries. As discussed in about 50 million people are estimated to have grown rapidly, from about $3 bil- have left for the "new world" in the World Development Report, 1979, the lion in 1970 to an estimated $17.5 billion second half of the 19th century. Whole in 1930, with more than $3 billion going main trade issue for oil exporters families moved then, for good. Today to South Asia, about $5 billion to the is to prevent their sharply increased many of the migrants are male workers Middle East and North Africa and close foreign earnings from discouraging who go abroad for a period and send to $7 billion to Southern Europe. Remit- growth of other exports and im- much of their earnings home. Many tances are about a fifth as large as mer- of them are illegal; some of their remit- port substitutes. chandise exports in South Asia, and in tances go unrecorded or enter official the Middle East and North Africa (ex- For oil-importing developing balance-of-payments accounts in ways cluding the capital-surplus countries). countries, the likelihood of a diffi- that make it hard to disentangle them The proportion is especially high in cult external environmentrising from other flows. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Jordan, Egypt, oil prices and slower growth in While estimates are imprecise, the Morocco and the two Yemens. Other broad picture is clear. There were roughly world trade and capital flowsin- countries where remittances are particu- 20 million migrant workers in the world larly important include India, Turkey, creases the urgency of taking steps in the late 1970s, of whom 12 million Greece and Yugoslavia. to earn and save foreign exchange were from developing countries. Some There has been controversy over the through export promotion and 6 million were in the United States net benefits to developing countries when import substitution. The unfavor- (mostly Mexicans); 5 million in Western skilled people emigrate. The "brain able environment makes it harder Europe; and 3 million in the Middle East drain" represents a serious loss of man- (other main destinations include the power for some countries, and there are for the developing countries to West African coast and the mines of social costs as well. But governments can achieve rapid export growth but South Africa). The number in Western often take steps to encourage vocational makes it more important to do so. Europe increased from 2 million in the education and training to meet a demand Also of great importance are early 19605 to 6 million in the early 1970s for skillsin order to increase remit- efforts to reduce the import require- and then declined, but this was more tances while retaining enough trained than offset by an upsurge in migration people within their countries. In any ments of their overall growth to the oil-rich countries of the Middle event, most of the objections apply less strategiesby some combination East. More than 2 million of the migrant strongly to the unskilled or semiskilled, of curbing nonessential imports, workers in Europe are from developing the majority of migrant workers; for shifting production toward less countries (mainly Algeria, Morocco, them, migration offers a chance of import-intensive items and re- Tunisia, Turkey and Yugoslavia); in the dramatic improvement in their often Middle East about 2 million come from meager incomes. placing more imports by domestic production. BALANcE BETWEEN EXPORT PROMO- TION AND IMPORT SUBSTITUTION. Sev- The share of the oil-importing a significant constraint on growth eral factors indicate caution in em- developing countries' exports go- for several oil-exporting countries. phasizing import substitution. ing to both the capital-surplus and But migration raises sensitive Most developing countries other oil-exporting developing social and political issues for now have trade policies that are countries increased sharply be- countries of origin and destination; heavily biased toward import sub- tween 1970 and 1977 (Table 3.2) if investment programs in the stitution at the expense of exports. exports to each group grew at capital-surplus oil exporters are These biases commonly result from annual rates exceeding 20 per- more conservative and slow growth excessive reliance on quotas and cent. Some developing countries persists ir the industrialized coun- administrative controls, and indis- (including South Korea and India) tries, migration is likely to grow criminate use of tariffs. Frequently have won major contracts for "turn- less rapidly in the 1980s. such policies have been intro- key" plants and for construction duced in response to temporary and consultancy services; these areas Trude policy for developing countries balance-of-payments crises but offer many export opportunities. Slower growth in world trade does then maintained for long periods. Remittances from migrant not change the principles that should They result in misallocated re- workers in the oil-rich states have govern the trade policies of devel- sources and create a constituency boosted the foreign exchange oping countries. Generally, the for retaining protection. Reducing earnings of some developing policies that maximize benefits from the general bias toward import countries considerably (see box trade in good times will also maxi- substitution should therefore con- above). Labor shortages remain mize them in bad. But the likely tinue to be of high priority. 22 Inward-looking policies may experience (particularly in the substitution can, however, help prevent developing countries from 1950s) illustrates the costs of ex- growth. Many countries have un- taking advantage of the consider- cessive export pessimism, both in exploited opporhmities for import able export opportunities that will terms of lower import capacity and substitution through the produc- exist in the industrialized countries inefficiency in highly protected tion of energy (see pages 16-17) even if their growth slows, and industries. and food (see box). And in may also retard the growth of Pricing and other policies most countries-including South developing countries' trade with that encourage efficient export Korea, for example-it played an each other. growth encourage efficient import important role in initiating in- World trade could recover substitution as well. dustrialiation. But South Korea, strongly by the mid-1980s-and Emphasis on selective import unlike many countries, eliminated food, farming and foreign exchange brought into production in developing 80, when the country experienced one of countries (more than the acreage devoted its worst droughts, output fell 8 to 9 Before 1939 only Western Europe among to cereals in the United States, Canada, percent-but the crop was still the third the world's regions was a net importer of the EEC and Japan combined). But this largest ever (some 20 percent bigger grains. Today only North America and expansion has slowed since the mid- than in 1973-74, when there was a com- Oceania are not. Trade in grains has 1960s, and it can be expected to account parable drought). risen from 25 million tons in the late for no more than a quarter of incremental Water may become a critical con- 1930s to 181 million tons in 1979-from food production in the 1980s. straint in agriculture in the next 25 years. 4 percent of global production to 14 per- Hence the importance of increasing Over the past 50 years the area under cent. North America now accounts for yields. Typical constraints include: un- irrigation has trebled. Costs of irrigation 20 percent of world grain production and due emphasis on large-scale irrigation at have risen far more rapidly than water 80 percent of world grain trade. the expense of smaller projects; wasteful charges generally; the result is inefficient The largest rise in net imports since use of water; inadequate support for re- use and a lack of funds for maintaining the early 1960s has been in the middle- search and extension; and pricing policies and operating irrigation systems. Water income developing countries-from 13 that discriminate against agriculture. wastage is immense: in many parts of the percent to 23 percent of their consump- Several countries went a long way to world only 25 percent of water released tion (see table). Of the low-income removing these constraints during the from dams is used to grow crops. Im- countries, there has also been a sharp 1970s. India is a good example. In the proved management of water systems rise in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 1980 food early 1970s prices to farmers were raised, would result in major increases in grain and beverage imports are estimated to be and there was increased emphasis on production. But for large parts of the $7.7 billion in low-income countries (17 small-scale irrigation and agricultural ex- world and many of the world's poorest percent of their merchandise imports) tension. Helped by good weather, these people, the key to greater food produc- and more than $36 billion in middle- policies contributed to record grain tion lies in a breakthrough in dryland income countries (9 percent). Historically, crops in 1977-78 and 1978-79; in 1979- farming (see Chapter 4, page 37). a 10 percent increase in average incomes has led to a 7 percent increase in grain Grain consumption and trade imports in developing countries. (millions of tonnes) The growth of imports has placed severe pressure on the grain handling and dis- Average annual Average annual consumption' not trade balance' tribution systems of developing coun- Country tries (when domestic production is or country group 1960-63 1977-79 1960-63 1977-79 included, their marketing and distribu- United States 139.8 173.5 32.7 94.9 tion capacity is today handling roughly Canada 15.1 22.5 10.2 17.7 four times the tonnage of only 20 years EEC 92.0 118.3 -21.5 -8.0 ago). In times of food shortfalls, dis- Other 50.3 83.6 -3.0 -18.5 tributional bottlenecks are often a more Eastern Europe 64.3 106.5 -6.4 -12.4 important constraint than the ability to USSR 119.0 217.6 7.3 -17.9 procure ithports. Both these constraints China 112.3 225.2 -4.0 -8.7 argue for a measure of self-sufficiency in Developing countries5 254.1 427.3 -11.1 -36.0 food but within limits: the earnings for- Low-income 139.3 214.0 -5.6 -8.7 gone as a result of diversion of resources India 73.1 109.4 -4.1 -1.3 from other agricultural (or nonagricul- Middle-income 101.3 191.8 -12.7 -44.7 tural) investment can be substantial. In- Major exporters' 13.5 21.5 7.2 17.4 creased food production should be part Excludes Albania, Cuba, Mongolia and Southern Africa (South Africa, of a broad-based effort to stimulate agri- Lesotho and Zimbabwe). culture. Includes capital-surplus oil exporters and excludes Southern Europe (Greece, From 1955 to 1975 more than 150 mil- Portugal, Yugoslavia, Romania and Israel). lion hectares of new farmland were Thailand and Argentina. 23 Figure 3.4 Growth of developing earnings. For some primary prod- counted for barely more than a countries' merchandise exports, ucts, the potential gains from quarter of the increase in their by destination, 197377' increased processing can be ex- manufactured exports during 1963- (average annual percentage change, 1970 prices) aggerated: some stages of processing 73, but almost half in 1973-77. Nonfuel certain commodities (for example, Most of such trade in manufac- Manufac- primary Fuel tures Total nickel and bauxite) are highly tures is from more- to less-indus- products 14 capital- or energy-intensive; others trialized developing countries, or (for example, some edible oils) between adjacent countries that 12 To developing countries can cost less to transport in their are not otherwise major exporters unprocessed form. This does not of manufactures. In the compo- 10 necessarily mean that such pro- sition and characteristics of the cessing activities are unsuitable for products, south-south trade differs 8 a developing country, but in these significantly from developing coun- cases a more careful evaluation of tries' manufactured exports to 6 the costs and benefits is required. industrialized countries; in par- To industrialized countries The decision to do more pro- ticular, it is more skill- and capital- 4 cessing, however, is seldom in the intensive, with a higher proportion hands of developing countries alone. made up of engineering and them- 2 The tariff structures of industrial- ical items (see Table 3.3). Trade in ized countries typically impose low capital goods, including turnkey + 0 (or no) duties for unprocessed pri- plants, is expanding very rapidly; mary products; but in many cases but its value is still small. 2 these rise progressively with the Regional integration schemes a. Country groups correspond to UN classifi- degree of processing (often to high offer a means for expanding south- cation. Developing countries include capital- surplus oil exporters; industrialized countries levels). Unfortunately, this pro- south trade, but experience has include South Africa and most of Southern Europe. tects advanced stages of pro- been mixed. They often lead to cessing in the importing countries and inhibits exports of processed products from developing coun- Table 3.3 Product composition the bias in favor of producing for tries. Another brake on processing of developing countries' mer- the domestic market at an early is that transport charges for pro- chandise exports to industrialized stage of industrialization. That cessed products, where set by countries and other developing resulted both in a surge of export- "conferences" of shipping firms, countries, 1977" (percent) led growth and in rapid and efficient may not reflect genuine differences growth in production for the do- in the costs of carrying processed S hare of product mestic marketillustrating the rather than raw materials. The lo- group strong underlying complementari- cation of processing activities is To indus- To going to indus- ties between the two. also influenced by the policies of trialized developing trialized Product group countries countries countries transnational corporations. SOME PO55ISILITIE5 FOR EXPANDING Trade between developing Machinery and EXPORTS. The industrialized coun- countries. Recent growth in"south- transport tries' market for finished manufac- south" trade has been robust, and equipment 19.9 30.2 53.5' tures offers developing countries the outlook is promising. Devel- Textiles 10.2 16.3 48.4 Clothing 23.1 6.2 85.3 the biggest scope for expanding oping countries' exports of both Chemicals 7.4 11.6 50.3 exports. But they have opportuni- manufactures and nonfuel primary Iron ties for raising exports in other products to each other have been and steel 3.0 5.1 49.6 Other manu- areas as well. growing faster than they have to factures 36.4 30.6 67.2 Processed primary products. industrialized countries (see Figure Total 100.0 100.0 62.4 Primary producers face more seri- 3.4). UN data (in which develop- UN classification (South Africa and ous export constraints than coun- ing countries include capital-sur- most of Southern Europe are included in tries exporting manufactures. For plus oil exporters but exclude the industrialized countries). many of them, processing their semi-industrialized nations of Includes capital-surplus oil exporters. About 80 percent for electronics and primary products offers a way of Southern Europe) show that trade electrical machinery; much lower shares increasing the value of export between developing countries ac- for other products. 24 inward-looking policies, with high of about 0.5 percent of GNPthe protection and low overall trade Figure 3.5 Developing countries' counterpart of their current account use of borrowed funds, 1970-90 growth. But they could play a big- deficit. Moreover, by 1990 much (High case) ger role if properly designed and of the projected net capital inflow (percenhigr shares) Gross medium- implemented. One promising to developing countries would be Availabir for nd Ioog imports and avenue for improving the bene- needed to meet interest payments Amortization Interest reserves (9 billion) fits from regional cooperation is on loans. The share of gross lending 1970 to coordinate large-scale invest- that is available for buying imports 1975 ments to avoid excess capacity (as and adding to reserves would fall members of ASEANthe Asso- sharply during the 1980s (see 1980 ciation of South-East Asian Nations Figure 3.5). have begun to do). But the main Clearly, the uncertainties in 1985 vehicle for expanding south-south these projections are high. Consid- trade is more likely to be those erably more resources could be 1990 general policies that liberalize de- available to developing countries 25 50 75 100 veloping countries' import regimes over the decade, and the result and strengthen their export capa- could be more growth. But it looks bilities (for example, by expanding as though their capital inflow will export credit and insurance facilities). be relatively modest in the 1980s, billion; in 1980 the same amount because of constraints both on of imports would cost them about Capital flows their capacity to borrow and on the $65 billion. Their potential financing supply of funds. gap is widened further by slow The links between the growth growth in the industrialized projected for developing countries Fcctors cifjecting borrowing decisions countries, as a result of which their and the capital flows required to In general, the oil exporters face exports in 1980 could be about $6 sustain it received close attention few financial constraints on their billion lower than they might in Chapter 2. The projected capital growth. Their major challenge otherwise have been. In the short- inflow to developing countries (especially if the real price of oil term this means they will run reflects judgments both about the continues to rise throughout the higher current account deficits than availability of finance and the 1980s) is to use their oil revenues in earlier years for any given rate amounts the countries will want efficiently and not to exceed their of growth. to borrow. But the flows that in capacity for absorbing investment. In these circumstances the fact materialize will be determined If they succeed, they will not need policy options of the low-income by savings and investment behavior much foreign capital over the oil importers are limited. They can- in the industrialized countries and next five years or so. For major not borrow much capital on com- the capital-surplus oil exporters borrowers (such as Algeria or mercial terms, nor would it be and specifically on how much of Mexico) this means that debt- prudent to do so. Their growth their saving they choose to invest service ratios will tend to decline rates depend essentially on three in the developing world. despite strong economic growth. factors: their own efforts to raise This choice cannot be forecast Later in the decade, however, investment and saving; the avail- with precision. The High case their position will change. The ability of concessional finance; and described in Chapter 2 requires initial surge of revenues from the how efficiently they use domestic aid and commercial capital from oil price rises of 1979-30 will have and foreign resources. Without industrialized countries totaling been digested; their ability to absorb much more aid (beyond the about 0.5 percent of their GNP in more foreign investment produc- increases currently projected), 1990. By historical standards, this tively will have risen. With oil GNP per person in these countries is not a large amount: it was 0.3 providing them with a strong credit is unlikely to grow faster than percent of their GNP in 1970 and standing, the oil exporters could 1.7 percent a year in the first half still about 0.5 percent in 1975. choose to finance further rapid of the 1980s. It implies, however, a substantial growth by more foreign borrowing. The hardest decisions lie with turnaround from 1930, when the The position of the oil-importing the middle-income oil importers, industrialized countries themselves developing countries is altogether for whom prudence will have to are likely to have a net inflow of different. In 1978 net oil imports remain the watchword. In the capital (before official transfers) (for energy uses) cost them $30 short-term (perhaps until the end 25 of 1981), they can resort to the from the 1970s is that foreign the capital surplus oil exporters temporary expedients of com- capitalespecially on commercial than in previous years. In addition, pressing imports and running termscannot substitute for struc- the European centrally planned down inventoriesand in some tural adjustment but can ease it. economies are likely to increase cases using foreign exchange their demands on the capital mar- reserves (which were boosted by The outlook for capital vilability ket. They have been substantial heavy borrowing in 1977-78). To meet their needs in the 1980s, borrowers in the past and (apart These measures will not prevent developing countries will seek from the USSR) are net importers external deficits from rising, so finance from private sources of energy with large debts to service. more finance will be needed to (mainly commercial banks, but also Finally, China seems poised to enter maintain growth, even at the bonds and direct investment) and the market to finance ambitious comparatively low rates of 1977-80. from official sources, both on modernization; over the decade But these countries may find concessional and on market terms. China could become a sizable their options increasingly restricted borrower. by a key constrainttheir credit- OUTLOOK FOR CAPITAL FROM COM- While developing countries will worthiness for larger and larger MERcIAL BANKS. Despite the in- therefore face more competition amounts of borrowing on com- creased liquidity of the international for loans in the 1980s, this does mercial terms. This means not only banking system, arising from the not mean that net lending to them creditworthiness as perceived by surpluses of the capital-surplus oil will not increase. But the pace will lenders, who may be willing to exporters, developing countries wifi be slower than in the past, and they continue to lend to countries that find it harder to maintain rapid will probably pay higher spreads have demonstrated an ability to growth in borrowing in the 1980s (the margin over interbank deposit manage their debt. Developing than they did in the 1970s. Apart rates) than they have done in recent countries themselves must deter- from the considerations of credit- years. Interest rates themselves are mine how much they will benefit worthiness already discussed, they likely to be higher as wellbecause from continued heavy commercial can expect greater competition for of competing demands for funds, borrowingallowing for their funds and direct constraints on and because of restrictive monetary existing levels of debt and debt- bank lending. These factors are policies (in the next few years, at servicing obligations, their uncer- likely to affect borrowing more in least) in industrialized countries. tain export prospects and the likely the next few years than over the From 1976 to 1978 the relative return on additional investment. whole of the decade. ease of monetary policy (especially Some countries have already run Increased competition. in the United States) helped to into debt-servicing difficulties. Developments in the 1970s have boost international liquidity and In the absence of more official highlighted the need for heavy thus facilitate the rapid expansion of finance, the wise policy for some investment in the industrial econ- commercial lending. The current oil importers may be to borrow omies, to overcome structural stance of monetary authorities less and accept slower growth weaknesses. The increased cost of suggests that the 1980s will see in the near term, while current energy provides a strong incentive tighter monetary policy to combat account deficits are reduced and for governments to stimulate both domestic inflation. But the dramatic debt-servicing capacity and credit- public and private investment in fluctuations in interest rates over worthiness are strengthened. energy programs. Investment is the past year underline the potential Countries that can finance higher thus unlikely to be compressed much for error in this kind of prediction. deficits and more rapid growth will further, even in the short-term Constraints on banks. The also have to take steps to restruc- when demand will be depressed. two previous World Development ture their domestic economies and Unless savings rates rise sharply, Reports have noted the potential their external payments. They, too, the industrialized countries are not constraints on commercial bank will be faced with the need to raise likely to eliminate their current lending to developing countries exports rapidly, to use imports account deficits as rapidly as they that arise from portfolio concen- efficiently, to control domestic did in 1974-78especially as the tration, higher debt-equity ratios expenditure and inflation and to real price of oil is expected to rise and the associated concern of bank invest productively so that their further in the 1980s. regulators. The danger to devel- debt-servicing ability and credit- Borrowing by industrialized oping countries is not that banks worthiness will not be impaired. nations is therefore likely to take will stop lending to them; rather A lesson that has been learned a larger share of the surpluses of that lending growth will slow be- 26 cause individual banks or bank- Table 3.4 Commercial bank claims on developing countries, 1976-79 ing groups may have to restrain Percentage composition their lending-and it will take time Country' of amounts outstanding' or group 1976 1977 for new lenders to expand their 1978 June 1979 activities. Brazil 16.7 16.6 16.2 16.1 The main factors behind these Mexico 16.2 13.4 11.4 11.7 Venezuela 6.2 6.0 6.9 7.5 constraints still exist and may have Spain 6.6 7.6 6.5 6.5 become more acute. The rapid Argentina 3.0 3.2 3.4 4.8 growth in lending by the main Subtotal, 5 largest borrowers 48.7 46.8 44.4 46.6 money center banks in the United Next 5 borrowers 17.4 18.7 18.8 18.0 States, the Federal Republic of Next 10 borrowers 20.4 19.6 19.9 19.2 Germany and Japan has meant that All others 13.5 14.9 16.9 16.2 their capital base (shareholders' All developing countries 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 equity plus retained earnings) has failed to keep pace with lending. Amount (billions of dollars) 110.5 151.1 203.9 221.5 For the major US banks at least, Source: Bank for International Settlements and US Federal Reserve Board. how much they can lend in the Rankings according to outstanding claims on June 30, 1979. Excludes offshore banking centers-Bahamas, Barbados, Bahrain, Bermuda, Cayman future will be affected by how fast Islands, Hong Kong, Lebanon, Liberia, Netherlands Overseas Territories, New Hebrides, they can expand their capital. But Panama, Singapore and West Indies. this is difficult in a world of low spreads, high inflation (which in- creases loans and deposits relative ities of many countries as well of borrowing; at current levels of to capital) and low prices for bank as the Bank for International both spreads and interest rates, stocks. Second-tier banks that are Settlements are concerned to avoid the latter should have more effect comparatively underlent relative undue constraints. on the developing countries' will- to their capital will probably ex- While these factors may cause ingness to borrow. pand their international lending. lending to developing countries But because these banks are smaller, to grow more slowly, banks could OUTLOOK FOR OTHER FORMS OF less experienced and probably more be encouraged to lend more if PRIVATE FINANCE. Both bonds risk-averse than the large inter- spreads (between deposit and lend- and private direct investment national lenders, developing ing rates) widen. These spreads offer some alternative to bank countries are likely to pay more have a major influence on the lending, though their main impact for their services. profitability of lending; they have will be felt in the longer term. narrowed considerably since 1976 The bond market. Develop- In addition, some banks may (see Table 3.5), but this trend ing countries made few inter- wish to limit their exposure in some seems to have been arrested in national bond issues before the countries, since lending has been 1950. Since 1977 spreads have not end of 1975, when outstanding very concentrated (see Table 3.4). been a major element in the cost external bonds of 96 developing Regulatory agencies reinforce this caution: they have become increas- ingly concerned that foreign lending Table 3.5 Average spreads over LIBOR for external should not pose a threat to domes- borrowing, 1974_79a tic banking systems. The effect of (percentage points) regulatory constraints on lending Item 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 is not certain; it depends on the All developing countries 1.13 1.65 1.72 1.55 1.20 0.87 attitudes of regulators. In the past, Typical industrialized banks have been free to interpret country (France)b 0.58 1.42 1.09 0.92 0.63 0.36 quite liberally the guidelines Difference 0.55 0.26 0.63 0.63 0.57 0.51 within which they operate. There Memo item have been moves to tighten con- LIBOR rate' 11.32 7.74 6.26 6.54 9.48 12.12 trol of international lending (for LIBOR is the London interbank offered rate, the rate charged by banks in London for example, banks are increasingly dealings with each other. having to report foreign and do- Spreads reflect the credit standing of the borrower as well as market costs. This explains the very low difference in 1975. mestic operations on a consolidated Calculated as an annual average from monthly averages for the Eurodollar bid (deposit) basis); but the monetary author- rate plus one-eighth of a percent. 27 countries totaled an estimated OUTLOOK FOR OFFICIAL CAPITAL. $5.5 billion. (By comparison, the Figure 3.6 International Given this relatively uncertain out- World Bank alone then had out- bond issues, 1972-79 look for private capital flows, official standing bond issues of $12 bil- Bill,,,, ,f agencies will have to help secure lion.) And only a handful of d,lh,r, the financing needs of the develop- (mafrily higher-income) develop- ing countries (especially the low- ing countries had tapped the bond income oil importers), as they did market: Israel accounted for 40 in 1974. Finance from the cen- percent of outstanding bonds, trally planned economies is mod- while Argentina, Mexico and est and probably will remain so. Spain together contributed a fur- Official capital from the indus- ther 35 percent. trialized countries and the capital- Issues by developing countries surplus oil exporterstogether with increased rapidly after 1975 (see 1972 74 76 78 79 the international financial institu- Figure 3.6). They totaled $6.0 bil- tions they supportwill effectively lion in 1978, of which $5.9 billion determine the capital inflow to low- was the debt of middle-income income countries and will supple- countries. But their share of a most European countries restrict ment the middle-income countries' slow-growing (if turbulent) market the foreign bond portfolios of some private borrowing. for international issues turned down types of institutional investor. Prospects for concessional sharply in 1979, to $3.9 billion And in practice a foreign borrower assistance. The aid projections (compared with issues by the in- must make a successful public that underlie the High case are ternational organizations of $8.3 offering in another foreign bond shown in Table 3.6. They show billion). market before it can enter the aid from DAC donors reaching no Over time, bond issues should Japanese market. Governments and more than 0.36 percent of projected become more important as a source regulatory agencies could help de- GNP in 1985 and 1990. Measured of funds for developing countries. veloping countries by improving against the target (0.7 percent of But the bond market is a con- their access to bond markets, but GNP) established by the United servative one in which investor quick results cannot be expected. Nations for the Second Develop- acceptance is acquired only slowly; Direct foreign investment. ment Decade, the performance of borrowers must approach the Direct investment could provide DAC donors has been most dis- market cautiously until they es- more capital to developing coun- appointing. Real growth from 1965 tablish sound reputations. This tries, with the capital-surplus oil to 1979 averaged only 1.5 percent a suggests that in the foreseeable exporters playing an increasingly year. Excluding countries that have future bonds will not substitute important role. But in the short- already reached the UN target to any great extent for commercial term its potential is limited (Denmark, Netherlands, Norway bank lending. partly because many projects take and Sweden), the aid performance This conclusion is reinforced by so long to come on stream, but of most of the remaining 13 DAC the regulations imposed on bond also because developing countries members deteriorated from 1975 transactions in many countries. are often concerned about foreign to 1979. There is little assurance These regulations do not dis- ownership and influence in their of significant progress in response criminate among borrowers; they economies. Because the risks are to the Brandt Commission's call for are intended to protect national high, the foreign investor typical- rapid growth in aid, and the evident investors and currencies. But their ly requires high returns on capital needs of developing countries. effect is to favor established (and in some cases substantial Recent actions give cause for borrowers and to make markets control of the enterprise). Any concern. The aid cuts announced inaccessible for inexperienced major increase in direct invest- by the British Government could borrowers. For example, the Se- ment is likely to need greater .cause their aid to fall to 0.38 per- curities and Exchange Commis- agreement between governments cent of GNP by 1985, from the sion imposes strict disclosure about the role of transnational cor- 0.48 percent average for 1977-79. requirements on public offerings porations. Barring that, direct Aid bills continue to face difficulties in the US bond market that new investment over the next 5 to 10 in the US Congress, suggesting that borrowers often find difficult to years would probably grow at only support from the biggest donor is satisfy. The United States and about 3 percent a year in real terms. likely to remain the lowest, relative 28 to GNP, of all large industrial na- higher-income aid recipients. None- tions. Some countries, such as theless, there is an extremely strong Military spending Japan and the Federal Republic of case for donors to provide at least Although data are imprecise and esti- Germany, have indicated their 50 percent of their aid to low- mates vary widely, one estimate puts intent to continue their recent im- income countries; this redistribu- global military expenditure at more provements in aid flows. Never- tion is built into the capital-flow than $400 billion in 1977. The propor- tions of GNP that industrialized and theless, achievement of the projected projections underlying the High developing countries devoted to it were overall increase (a tripling of aid case in Chapter 2. If it fails to rather similar (see table). For indus- in nominal terms, or 4 percent real take place, total aid flows from trialized countries, the outlay on arms growth throughout the decade) is DAC members will have to be was 17 times higher than that on aid. far from certain; it depends on very much higher ($85-90 billion And for developing countries, it was one-and-a-half times more than on strong growth in industrialized in 1990 rather than the projected education and health combined. countries as well as on main- $69 billion) to achieve the pro- tenance of their aid shares. jected bilateral flow to the low- Economic difficulties in the income nations. Public expenditures on defense, industrialized countries are an Official capital on market aid, health and education, 1977 (percentage of GNP) importantbut not a sufficient terms. The other major source of Educa- reason to explain their lack of sup- funds for developing countries is Country group Defense Aid Health lion port for aid. Most governments official capital on nonconces- Industrialized simply have not found it expedient sional terms (that is, with a grant countriesa 5.6 0.33 3.0 5.9 to expand foreign assistance while element of less than 25 percent); Developing restricting domestic spending. The this is provided principally through countrie&' 5.9 n.a. 1.0 2.7 failure even to maintain the share official export credits, government- a. Include centrally planned economies. of aid in GNP will have serious to-government lending, the World b. Include centrally planned economies and capital-surplus oil-exporters. long-term economic and political Bank and the regional banks and Source: World Military Expenditures and consequences for the developing the International Monetary Fund. Arms Transfers 1968-77 (US ACDA) countriesparticularly for the poor- While it offers limited support for est among them. The inadequate the low-income countries, for provision for development aid middle-income countries it has 1975, the oil producers together contrasts starkly with the sums been and could remain a very gave 2.7 percent of their GNP as devoted by all countries to mili- important supplement to private aid, while the major Arab donors tary expenditures (see box). capital. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar Close examination suggests, Prospective aid from OPEC and the United Arab Emirates however, that political factors will members is also uncertain. The gave proportionately much more inhibit a rapid redistribution of Arab countries that are the major (a range of 5 to 15 percent of their concessional aid. France and the donors have been generous in GNP). By 1978, however, aid in United States, in particular, main- their support of developing coun- real terms was only about 60 per- tain strong political ties with some tries in the past. In the peak year, cent of what it had been in 1975; estimates for 1979 indicate a further real decline. Table 3.6 Aid flows to developing countries and The increase in oil revenues multilateral institutions, 1975-90 (High case) should permit a substantial in- (billions of dollars) crease in the oil producers' aid in Country group 7979a 1975 1978 1980 1985 1990 1980 and beyond. OPEC donors DACh 13.8 20.0 22.3 25 44 69 have not yet agreed to boost sub- (As percentage of GNP) (.36) (.35) (.34) (.36) (.36) (.35) stantially their aid through multi- OPEC 5.5 4.3 4.7 5 10 15 (As percentage of GNP) (2.71) (1.35) (1.28) (n.a.) (n.a.) (na.) lateral channels; much therefore Centrally planned economies depends on the expansion of the and otherc 0.6 1.1 1.0 2 1 2 national programs of the major Total 19.9 25.4 28.0 31 56 86 bilateral donorsthe four men- Preliminary figures. tioned above, plus Iraq and Libya. Reporting by DAC members has changed to a uniform system (see the technical notes Iraq has become the third largest for Table 16 of the World Development Indicators). Under the old system of reporting, the 1975 figure was $13.6 billion, the 1978 figure $18.3 billion. OPEC donor in absolute terms, Includes OECD countries that are not members of DAC. partly because of its interest-free 29 loans to poorer countries to com- Table 3.7 Distribution of DAC donors' bilateral official development pensate them for higher oil prices. assistance, 1970-78 Improving aid to benefit the Percentage shares poorest. To maintain energy im- Country group 1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 ports at their 1978 levels, the Low-income countries 47 44 38 35 38 poorest oil-importing countries Middle-income countries 44 46 51 56 52 need extra aid of about $2.2 bil- Unallocated by country 9 10 11 9 10 lion in 1980 (for 36 low-income Total 100 100 100 100 100 countries). This could be provided by increasing aid from DAC and OPEC donors by only 8 percent. siderably above private direct expected to grow 12 percent a year. Yet even this additional aid will investment of $11 billion). Con- The African Development Bank, not be made available without tinuing growth is likely, but the despite the expansion of resources strong efforts; and it would not limitations on what is financed by resulting from the admission of compensate for the losses in trade official export credits (usually, nonregional members in 1980, will and aid from the slowdown in only specified capital goods) re- be similarly constrained. The aid world growth. strict their ability to compensate program of the European Com- Besides expanding aid, donors for slow growth of other capital. munity under the Second Lomé should redistribute it toward the Government - to - government Convention, and the United poorest nations. Some donors lending affords a more direct means Nations Development Program send a comparatively high pro- of assisting developing countries. will increase at a somewhat slower portion of their aid to the middle- The greatest potential seems to lie rate. income countries. In 1978 DAC with OPEC governments, which Higher inflation will erode the donors distributed 38 percent of provided $2.5 billion a year in real value of capital increases their bilateral aid to low-income 1975-76 (mainly on market terms and replenishments. The capital countries (see Table 3.7) and 52 to low-income countries) compared increase for the World Bank was percent to middle-income coun- with their aid of $5.5 billion a year. intended to support 5-6 years of tries (data on the country distri- Current and projected surpluses lending growing at a nominal bution of the remaining 10 percent of the capital-surplus oil exporters rate of 12 percent a year with an are unavailable). Although only could support a much larger volume implied inflation of 7 percent a seven DAC donors currently give of such lending. year (at present, that inflation rate less than 55 percent of their bi- The role of multilateral insti- looks a distinct underestimate). lateral aid to low-income countries, tutions. While the machinery The sixth replenishment of IDA (a this group includes the four largest exists to assist developing proposed $12 billion) was planned donorsFrance, the Federal Re- countries in the difficult times to provide for an annual real public of Germany, Japan and the ahead, the international agencies increase in loan commitments of United States. Bilateral aid to the are hampered by a shortage of 5 percent for fiscal years 1981-83 low-income countries from OPEC resources, especially to finance (July-June). Again, however, the donors has fallen since 1976 and longer-term adjustment. Most of real resource flow will be eroded there is scope for redistribution. their proposed major capital by inflation. Flows from multilateral institu- increases and replenishments Against this backdrop, the Board tions, by contrast, are concentrated have run into authorization or of the World Bank has accepted a more on the poorest countries. appropriation delays. proposal that will provide loans to Official export credits are diffi- The Inter-American Develop- support developing countries' cult to separate statistically from ment Bank's capital increase structural adjustment programs. associated officially supported (agreed to in 1979) was to sustain But agreement has not yet been private flows. Together, however, nominal lending growth of about reached that these loans will they have grown rapidly over the 14 percent a year, but legislative be in addition to the previously past two decades; in 1978 net ratification has been delayed. The planned lending programs. Over disbursements from DAC members Asian Development Bank's cur- the decade, unless the international to developing countries were more rent replenishment period extends agencies get more funds, they will than $13 billion (exceeding net to 1982, during which time both only be able to reallocate funds bilateral aid from the DAC coun- concessional and nonconcessional already earmarked (and allowed tries for the first time, and con- lending in nominal terms are for in the High-case projections 30 in Chapter 2). Ways of increasing and to emphasize its role as a percent). On present plans, they their lending capacity should be supplier of finance. The maturity are likely to grow at less than considered, within the constraints of loans under an extended arrange- half these rates between now and of the capital available to them ment has already been lengthened 1990. But there remains a dear need from the industrialized countries. from S to 10 years to encourage a for additional resources to allow The IMF. The seventh quota smooth transition to lower deficits. the developing countries to adjust increase is expected to become For countries that have severe to changed external conditions and effective in 1950, raising the quotas deficits the IMF has been willing, at the same time maintain acceptable of the oil-importing developing in some instances, to provide growth. Without such resources, countries to around $16 billion. financial support amounting to six the chances of successful adjustment And in response to members' times their quotas. in 1980-85 will be much reduced; needs for financial assistance to consequently, the recovery pro- ease their current adjustment Iviore multilateral finance is needed jected for 1955 -90 would be weak- problems, the Fund is studying From 1970 to 1978 multilateral ened and longer-term develop- initiatives designed to raise the flows on nonconcessional terms ment goals jeopardized. amount of finance it offers; to grew 11 percent a year in real extend credit for longer periods; terms (concessional flows grew 12 31 Part II Poverty and human development An unfavorable world economic ing, better health and nutrition, eliminate, absolute poverty. environment casts shadows over and fertility reduction. The role of human development the lives of people in developing The focus is on absolute poverty in alleviating poverty has been countries; the poorest in particular a condition of life so character- debated for several hundred years. face acute hardships. Part I of this ized by malnutrition, illiteracy In Europe in the 16th to 18th Report has stressed the steps that and disease as to be beneath any centuries, there was a vigorous developed and oil-producing reasonable definition of human dispute between those who believed countries in particular must take decency. Yet within a particular that education would make the poor to improve the international en- society at a particular time, poverty more productive and better citizens, vironment for growthwithout is often (and for many purposes and those who believed that it which, efforts to help the poor will should be) defined relative to would make them challenge the be of limited avail. Part II concen- average living standards. It would established order. (With hindsight, trates on certain other measures be wrong, for example, to use the both were clearly right.) Political to reduce absolute poverty. same poverty line in appraising as much as economic considera- In the 1970s it was increasingly policy, say, in Argentina and tions impelled the United States recognized that economic growth Bangladesh. Relative poverty is and Japan toward universal primary alone would not reduce absolute also important because the dis- education in the 19th century. poverty at an acceptable speed. tribution of assets, incomes and Economists, meanwhile, have So those involved with develop- power has a profound impact on seldom given prominence to the mentincluding the ILO and the prospects for reducing absolute quality of the labor force, especially World Bankgave attention to poverty. And reducing relative in their formal models. In the 1950s four different, though largely poverty is regarded as important and early 1960s, there was a wave complementary, strategies: increas- in itself in most countries. of optimism about the contribution ing employment, meeting basic Despite these links between of education to economic devel- needs, reducing inequalities in absolute and relative poverty, there opment. Partly for want of quick income and wealth, and raising are fundamental differences. Equal and obvious results, enthusiasm the productivity of the poor. sharing of poverty or of low life then waned. But research continued This part of the Report draws expectancy is not the purpose of and the chapters that follow draw on all these approaches to over- development. Conversely, some together its results. coming poverty. But it combines policies that benefit large num- The case for human development them with a strong concern for bers of poor people have an am- is not only, or even primarily, an growth. And it integrates them biguous effect on the overall economic one. Less hunger, fewer with a related strand of thinking distribujion of income and may child deaths and a better chance of human resource development, even make it more unequal. primary education are almost here called human development And while countries differ consid- universally accepted as important to emphasize that it is an end as erably in the priority they attach ends in themselves. But in a world well as a means of economic pro- to distributional objectives, there of tight budgetary and manpower gress.1 Human development appears to be unanimity on the constraints, the governments of encompasses education and train- need to reduce, and at some point developing countries must ask what these gains would costand 1. Earlier World Development Reports have what the best balance is between covered other aspects of development Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. In 1979 policy. In 1978 the central topic was the industrialization, employment and urbani- direct and indirect ways of achieving problems and prospects of low-income zation were the main issues addressed. them. 32 4 Poverty, growth and human development The poor are a mixed group. Some of them are malnourished to the where to draw the line between cope reasonably well; others are point where their ability to work the poor and the rest, and about on the margin of survival. Their hard is reduced, the physical and the correct way to calculate and well-being can fluctuate widely: the mental development of their chil- compare incomes and living marriages and ceremonies after the dren is impaired, and their resis- standards at different times and harvest are in stark contrast to the tance to infections is low. They in different places. hunger and illness that often pre- are often sickwith tropical To compound these difficulties, cede it. A good crop with a new diseases, measles and diarrhea, the data are inadequate. House- seed, or the chance to work on a and cuts and scratches that will hold surveys, if they exist, some- nearby road project, may push a not heal. Complications of child- times underrepresent the poor. Very poor farm family's income to the birth are a common cause of death. few follow the fortunes of indi- point where they can buy a plow Of every 10 children born to poor viduals and families through time, with a metal blade or some clothing parents, two die within a year; or disaggregate the household to for their children. But two years another dies before the age of five; examine the well-being of women, of inadequate rain, or a bout of only five survive to the age of 40. children and the elderly. Nor is illness, may cost them their land The great majority of poor adults direct observation necessarily or their livestocka degree of vul- are illiterate; their children, though a reliable basis for generalization, nerability that understandably having a much better chance of especially in the countryside, makes for caution and aversion attending school than in the past, where many of the poor are to risk. usually do not complete more than beyond the gaze of the casual The poor have other things in a year or two. Unable to read a visitor to villages and rural devel- common, apart from their extremely road sign, let alone a newspaper, opment projectsaway from the low incomes. A disproportionate their knowledge and understand- roads, away from the markets and number of themperhaps two in ing remain severely circumscribed. project sites, or on the outskirts fiveare children under 10, mainly Yet they learn about the possibility of the villages. in large families. More than three- of a better life from direct observa- Despite all this, no one seriously quarters of them live in (often very tion, from friends and relatives, doubts that a very large number remote) rural areas, the rest in ur- and perhaps from small improve- of people are extremely poor. ban slumsbut almost all in very ments in their own circumstances; Taking as the cutoff a level of in- crowded conditions. Many poor and they hope that their children come based on detailed studies of families own a small piece of land, will somehow be able to climb poverty in India, the number of some animals or some tools. But out of poverty. people in absolute poverty in both they and other poor people developing countries (excluding live mainly by working long hours Dimensions of poverty China and other centrally planned men, women and children alike economies) is estimated at around as farmers, vendors and artisans, It is difficult to measure the extent 780 million. In 1975 about 600 or hired workers. of poverty. To begin with, abso- million adults in developing coun- As much as four-fifths of their lute poverty means more than low tries were illiterate; and only two- income is consumed as food. The income. It also means malnutrition, fifths of the children in these result is a monotonous, limited poor health and lack of education countries currently complete more diet of cereals, yams or cassava and not all of the poor are equally than three years of primary school. with a few vegetables and in some badly off in all respects. There is In 1978, 550 million people lived places a little fish or meat. Many also room for disagreement about in countries where the average life 33 Figure 4.1 Three decades against poverty Income GNP per person (1980 dollars) GNP per person" (198O dollars) 1950 1960 0 1,000 2,000 1980 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 9,000 Industrialized countries 3,841 5,197 9,684 1950 Industrial i,ed countries Middle-income countries 625 802 1,521 1980 Low-income countries 164 174 245 Middle-income Average annual 1,rowth, 1950-80 percent) 1950 Countries Average annual growth (percent) 1950-60 1960-80 4 lodutrol,zed Middle. income 1980 Industrialized countries 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.0 3 Middle-income countries 2.5 3.3 Low-income 2 1950 1 Low-income countries Countrie - Low-income countries 0.6 1.7 1.3 a. Excludes all centrally planned economies 1980 I 0 Health Life expectancy at birth (years) 50 ruittion people Life expectancy at birth (years) Developed Increase, countries 1950 1960 1978 1950-78 1950 Industrialized countries 66.0 69.4 73.5 7.5 1978 Middle-income Middle-income countries countries 51.9 54.0 61.0 9.1 1950 Low-income countries 35.2 41.9 49.9 14.7 1978 Low-income Centrally planned countries economies' 62.3 67.1 69.9 7.6 1950 Includes Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German DR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR 1978 Includes Albania, Cuba, North Korea, Mongolia Excludes China 0 to 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Education Adults in all developing countries (percent) -50 million people Adult literacy rate (percent) 1950 1960 1975 1950 Industrialized Literate TtI countries 95 97 99 Illiterate Middle-income countries 48 54 71 1975 Low-income countries 22 29 38 Lite rate ftIIIIiiIIiii Illiterate Centrally planned ftIft1PfiIII economies 97 98 99 a. Excludes centrally planned economies 0 20 40 60 80 too Population Total population (billions) - tOO m,ll,on people Average annual percentage growth 1980 Developed coUflte,es 1950-60 1960-70 1970-80 Industrialized countries Middle-income countries 1.2 2.4 1.0 2.5 0.7 2.5 2000 1980 ,,,,,,,, ,I Middle-income countries' Low-income countries 1.9 2.5 2.3 Centrally planned 2000 ,,, ,,,,, ,,,,, I ,,, ,,,,,,,, ,,I I??' economies 1.9 1.7 1.3 1950 a. Includes Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German DR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, USSR b. Includes Albania, Cuba, North Korea, Mongolia 2000 ,",, ,,, ,,,,,,,, ,,,,, ,",I " c. Includes China 0 2 3 4 34 expectancy was less than 50 years, income countries the incomes of them has widened, even in pro- 400 million in countries where the the poor have grown more slowly portional terms (though in the case average annual death rate of chil- than the average. The proportion of the middle-income countries dren aged one to four was more of people in absolute poverty in only slightly). But the gaps in edu- than 20 per 1,000-20 times that developing countries as a group cation and health have narrowed in the industrialized countries. is estimated to have fallen during by 15 percentage points in adult Nor is there any serious dis- the past two decades (though literacy and five years in life agreement about who the poor are. probably not in Sub-Saharan expectancy. Half of the people in absolute Africa in the 1970ssee Chapter poverty live in South Asia, mainly 2). But because population has Poverty and growth in India and Bangladesh. A sixth grown, the number of people in live in East and Southeast Asia, absolute poverty has increased. Most poor people live in poor mainly in Indonesia. Another sixth There has also been progress countries. Whether absolute pov- are in Sub-Saharan Africa. The in education. The proportion of erty is measured by low income, restabout 100 million people adults in developing countries who low life expectancy or illiteracy, are divided among Latin America, are literate is estimated to have there is a strong correlation between North Africa and the Middle East. increased over the past three the extent of poverty in a country With the partial exception of Latin decades from about 30 percent to and its GNP per person (see Fig- America (where about 40 percent more than 50 percent; the propor- ure 4.2 overleaf). This suggests are in the towns) the poor are tion of children of primary-school that the solution to poverty is eco- primarily rural dwellers, over- age enrolled in school rose from 47 nomic growth. There is a great deal whelmingly dependent on agri- percent in 1960 to 64 percent in of truth in this proposition, but culturethe majority of them 1977. These advances have been it needs to be carefully qualified. landless (or nearly landless) labor- shared by most countries and re- First, comparing countries, the ers. Some minority groupsfor gions, including those that initially relation beween the extent of their example, the Indians in Latin were furthest behind, such as absolute poverty and the level of America and the scheduled castes Sub-Saharan Africa. But the qual- GNP per person is (as the disper- in Indiaare also overrepresented ity of schooling remains low in sion of points in Figure 4.2 shows) among the poor. And there is a many countries; and because of far from perfect. Because of tendency for absolute poverty in population growth, there has been differences in income distribution, particular places, families and an increase of about 100 million the proportion of the population social groups to persist from gen- in the absolute number of illiterate below the poverty line in 1975 was eration to generation. adults since 1950. more than twice as high in Colom- The most striking advances bia as in South Korea, even though Three decades of poverty against poverty have been in the average incomes of the two reduction health. Average life expectancy in countries were close. Sri Lanka is middle-income developing coun- a low-income country, yet the life In aggregate, however, consider- tries has risen nine years over the expectancy of its people approaches able progress has been made in past three decades. In low-income that of the industrialized countries. reducing the incidence of poverty countries, the increase has been Some middle-income countries, over the past 30 years (see Figure even greater-15 years. But even such as Morocco and the Ivory 4.1). Progress would have been though infant mortality rates Coast, have literacy rates below greater still but for the dramatic (which are a major determinant of those of the average low-income growth of population, which has life expectancy) have fallen sub- country. doubled the number of people in stantially in developing countries Second, looking at changes over the developing world since 1950 since 1950, there now are so many time within particular countries, and has begun to slow down more children born that the abso- the connection between growth though as yet slightlyonly since lute number of infant deaths and poverty reduction over periods the mid-1960s. probably has not declined. of a decade or two appears inexact. Since 1950 income per person Another way of viewing the There is general agreement that in the developing world has doubled. progress of the past three decades growth, in the very long term, But in low-income countries, the is to compare the developing with eliminates most absolute poverty; average increase has been half the industrialized countries. The but also that some people may that, and in both low- and middle- gap in income per person between (at least temporarily) be impover- 35 the absolute poverty line apparently their tremendous importance as Figure 4.2 National income and has not fallen in some slow-grow- ends in themselves. national poverty ing countries (induding rural India 100 between 1956 and 1974) or in Sources of growth Venezuela 90 \Ie,iico some periods in faster-growing Argentina South Korea countries. But it appears to have Economic growth comes about in Ito Colombia fallen markedly over the past 25 two ways, both of which can be 70 Senegal years in several fast-growing coun- powerfully influenced by govern- 00 tries (including Thailand and ment policy. One is building up Proportion of Yugoslavia) and in some slower- a larger stock of productive assets Kenya 50 population above absolute income growing ones (including Costa and human skills. The other is 40 poverty line, 1975 Rica and Sri Lanka). The associ- increasing the productivity of ation between economic growth these assets, skills, and the coun- 0 I I and improvements in education try's natural resources. This in- I Ycor 80 - 75 - China and health has also been imperfect. volves moving capital and labor ,_Cuba Third, the connection between between sectors, developing new 7° Sri Lanka economic growth and poverty re- institutions, inventing and intro- 65 - Viet Nam Brazil Venezuela / duction goes both ways. Few would ducing new techniques of produc- Singapore 60 dispute that the health, education tion and new products, making higeria and well-being of the mass of better choices among existing 50 people in industrialized countries techniques, and taking steps to Ivory Coast 45 Life are a cause, as well as a result, of cut costs and eliminate waste. expectancy, 1978 40 Yemen AR national prosperity. Similarly, Growth thus involves continuous 0 Percent people who are unskilled and sick changeit has aptly been de- Burma make little contribution to a coun- scribed as a process of perpetual -Sri Lanka - Chile 100 Thailand Uruguay Trinidad & Tobago try's economic growth. Develop- disequilibrium. 90 ment strategies that bypass large so numbers of people may not be the NcUural resources 70 South Korea Singapore most effective way for developing The natural resources of countries 60 50 Tanzania countries to raise their long-run are not consistently correlated with 40 Somalia growth rates. either income levels or income 30 -- . Morocco Adult literacy The rest of this chapter looks growth. Some of the richest and 20 Ivory Coast rate, 1975 more closely at some of the ele- most rapidly growing economies 10 Yemen AR 0 ments of absolute poverty and at Austria, Japan and South Korea, 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 GNP per person (dollars) 2,500 3,000 policies to deal with it. Since for examplehave few natural re- a Absolute income poverty line is income of 45th economic growth (despite the sources; some well-endowed ones percentile in India, qualifications) is crucial to reducing 7tire, for instancehave remained b Refers to year specified in each section of figure, expressed in the prices of that year poverty, its causes will be con- poor. sidered. The focus then shifts to Nonetheless, no account of the factors and policies that particu- causes of national prosperity and ished by developmentas when a larly affect the incomes of the poverty should overlook land, water, tenant farmer is displaced by his poor. Under both headings the minerals, energy and climate. landlord's tractor or a shoemaker potential contribution of human Many countriesamong them by mass-produced shoes. Because development is examined. Argentina, Australia, Saudi Arabia relevant data are sparse and Economic considerations and and the Soviet Unionowe a good unreliable, however, it remains a policies will predominate. But it part of their affluence to natural matter of dispute how consistently is importantto stress the contri- resources. Nor is it coincidental growth over comparatively short bution (over long periods) of that most poor countries are in periods has reduced the propor- social, political and cultural factors the tropics and, more particularly, tion of the population in absolute to the poverty of particular coun- that many of the poorest people poverty. tries and particular groups. Nor in the world live in the arid and What is clear is that different should this chapter's emphasis on semiarid regions of Asia and Africa. countries have had different ex- better education and health as a But the link between natural re- periences. The proportion below means to raise incomes detract from sources and income is affected by 36 population density (see page 39). efficiency with which productive What governs the quality of It also depends on the availability investment has been allocated and human resources, and how can it of capital and skills and on the used. This efficiency has in turn be improved? There is no simple development strategy adopted. depended on the availability of answer, no simple best policy. One And it is very much a function of natural resources and skified labor important ingredient is practical world demand and the state of and on government policies toward experience. Another consists of the technology. Malaysia's early prog- agriculture, industry and foreign knowledge and attitudes that ress was founded on tin for plat- trade (discussed at length in the children acquire from their parents ing and rubber for automobile past two World Development Reports). and from society at large. Then tires. Bangladesh's jute industry It has sometimes been suggested there are the many different kinds suffered from the invention of syn- that income inequality is conducive of formal education and training: thetic fibres (especially because, to higher investment (since the general primary and secondary in contrast to Malaysia, little rele- rich save a larger proportion of schooling, technical and vocational vant research was undertaken). A their incomes than the poor). But schooling, general and specialized technical breakthrough in "dry" in practice this relation is muffled higher educationall of which farming wouldperhaps more than by government and corporate saving impart specific skills, enhance the any other feasible technical ad- and by variation across countries ability to learn further and mold vancetransform the prospects of in incentives and attitudes to saving. attitudes toward work and change. a large proportion of the world's High investment rates are observed Partly because measurement is poor. both in countries with relatively difficult, the evidence is not com- unequal income distributions, such pleteeither on the contribution of Investment in physiccd capital as Brazil and Kenya, and in countries human resources to production and The accumulation of physical capital with relatively equal distributions, growth, or on what determines their is a necessary and very important such as China and South Korea. quality. But a lot of research has part of economic growth. The Low investment rates also appear been done on the economic contri- productivity of workers in compatible with income distribu- bution of formal education. In all industrialized countries is greater tions that are both more unequal, countries more educated people than in developing countries partly as in Senegal, and less unequal, tend to earn moreto a degree because they have more capital to as in Burma. that makes educational spending assist them. Similarly, most of the (especially for primary education Human resources innovations and structural changes and especially in developing that generate growth dearly require It has long been recognized that countries) often appear an attrac- substantial physical investment the qualities of a nation's people tive investment (see pages 48-49). in roads, machines, inventories, have an important influence on its Studies have also shown that irrigation systems and so on. prosperity and growth. This is not primary schooling can contribute Developing countries that have simply because better labor adds to the productivity of farmers (see invested a higher proportion of to output in the passive way that, page 48) and to industrial pro- their output have on average grown say, more fertilizer or better ductivity. In addition, there is evi- faster, but the contribution of machinery does. It is also because dence that basic education can investment to growth has varied human beings are the source of contribute to national growth (see widely. Some, including the fast- ideas, decisions and actions on box overleaf). Developing coun- growing East Asian countries, have investment, innovation and other tries with higher literacy rates have managed to squeeze as much as opportunities. tended to grow faster, even after half an extra unit of annual output Technical, scientific and profes- allowances are made for differ- from each extra unit of capital. sional skills are clearly essential ences in incomes and physical Others, such as Ghana and until to producing many modern goods investment, and they have had recently Uruguay, have invested and services. Entrepreneurial and higher physical investment rates. to much less effect. administrative abilities are vital The results of this research re- Part of the discrepancy is attrib- in both public and private sectors. inforce a body of less systematic utable to differences in the share Less immediately obvious, but observations, and some historical of investment devoted to activities equally fundamental, are the skills, evidence, that formal education (such as housing) that do not knowledge and attitudes of the can aid economic development. contribute directly to production, great mass of ordinary workers, The outstanding growth records but more to variations in the including small farmers and traders. of Japan and South Korea prob- 37 Human resources and growth: macroeconomic evidence How can the effect of human resources tion. Even if it were possible to control with growth over the period 1960-77. on growth be assessed? The microeco- for all other influences, the existence of a It shows that the 10 fastest-growing devel- nomic studies of the effects of education, correlation between human resources and oping countries started the period with nutrition and health on the incomes and economic performance does not answer literacy rates that were on average, despite productivity of particular people and the question of which is causing which- substantial variation, 16 percentage points enterprises provide important evidence. especially pertinent, since there are reasons higher than would have been expected So do the "growth accounting" exercises, for believing that the causation flows in at their income levels. It also shows that which have in effect added up the results both directions. the 10 developing countries with the of microeconomic studies to measure One way of addressing this question highest life expectancy in relation to the contribution of human resources to is to look at the sequence of events. The their income levels in 1960 subsequently aggregate growth. table in this box, for example, compares attained growth rates that on average were But microeconomic evidence is not literacy rates and life expectancy in 1960 1.6 percentage points above those of all enough. For example, it has sometimes the developing countries for which data been suggested that the higher earnings are available. of more educated people are partly offset Another (complementary) approach is by indirect reductions in the earnings Literacy, life expectancy and growth to use "simultaneous equations" tech- of less educated people-and thus that Top 10 niques to estimate the relations in both the microeconomic evidence overstates countries Growth rate Literacy: directions at once, thus trying to identify the effects of education on total (or ranked by of GNP deviation the strength and characteristics of each growth per person, from norm, average) income. Conversely, though, it of GNP 1960-77 while allowing for the existence of the 1960' has been suggested that the earnings of per person (percent) (percent) other. more educated people may understate As part of the background work for their contribution to total production, Singapore 7.7 this Report, the methods outlined above innovation and growth. South Korea 7.6 43.6 have been applied to the recently enlarged It is thus important to complement Hong Kong 6.3 6.4 and improved data base from which the the microeconomic evidence with studies Greece 6.1 7.5 World Development Indicators are that look directly at the relation between Portugal 5.7 1.7 drawn (see the studies by Hicks and human development and aggregate growth. Spain 5.3 1.2 Wheeler mentioned in the bibliograph- One way of doing this is through historical Yugoslavia 5.2 16.7 ical note). The purpose of these studies case studies. Another is by cross-country Brazil 4.9 8.6 is primarily to double-check at the macro- comparisons-looking at a large sample Israel 4.6 economic level the results derived from of countries to see whether those with Thailand 4.5 43.5 the microeconomic and experimental better, or more rapidly improving, human Average': work discussed in Chapter 5. Thus they resources have grown faster. Cross-country top 10 attempt to measure not only the effects studies, however, must tackle two basic countries 5.8 16.2 of human development on growth, and problems-in addition to shortages and Average': of growth on human development, but inaccuracies of data, which are particularly 83 developing also the effects of the various human severe for developing countries. countries 2.4 0.0 development indicators-education, Disentangling other influences. A health, nutrition and fertility-on each correlation across countries between Top 10 Life Growth other. human resource indicators and growth countries expectancy: rate of The results, and especially the estimated ranked by life deviation GNP may be generated-or obscured-by other expectancy from norm, per person, magnitudes of the effects, are not beyond factors (such as income) that influence in relation 1960' 1960-7 7 dispute. But in general they reinforce the one or more of the variables. Many of to income (years) (percent) other evidence. Among the most clear- these other factors-such as income levels, Sri Lanka 22.5 1.9 cut results are these: (1) increases in investment rates and even some aspects South Korea 11.1 7.6 literacy contribute both to increased of natural resources and climate-can be Thailand 9.5 4.5 investment and (given the level of invest- measured; their influence can be controlled Malaysia 7.3 4.0 ment) to increases in output per worker; for by multivariate statistical methods. Paraguay 6.9 2.4 as well as nutrition and income, (2) literary, Other relevant factors-culture and eco- Philippines 6.8 2.1 affects life expectancy; and (3) variations nomic policies, for instance-cannot be Hong Kong 6.5 6.3 in life expectancy, literacy, income and so readily measured, and hence are diffi- Panama 6.1 3.7 the strength of family planning programs cult to control for. Burma 6.0 0.9 explain between them most of the varia- This problem, however, can be sub- Greece 5.7 6.1 tion in fertility rates across countries. stantially overcome by focusing on changes The impact of health (measured by over time within countries, rather than Averageb: life expectancy) and nutrition on economic on levels at a particular time. That elimi- top 10 growth is less clear-cut. Although life nates the influence of factors (politics and countries 8.8 4.0 expectancy on its own, controlling for institutions, say) that affect both the Average': income, appears to have a positive effect level of income and the level of human 83 developing on both investment and output per worker, development in particular countries. Even countries 0.0 2.4 these effects largely disappear when other then, though, the possibility remains that variables that influence life expectancy Deviation from expected value derived from such unmeasured factors are influencing equations relating adult literacy and life expec- are introduced. Increases in average the rates of change in all the variables tancy to GNP per person for all developing calorie supply appear to have a clear, of interest. To reduce this risk, additional countries. For example, in the top part of the positive effect on growth; but the possi- variables can be used to allow for, say, table, South Korea's literacy rate in 1960 was bility cannot yet be ruled out that this 43.6 percentage points higher than expected for regional or cultural differences. a country at its income level. may reflect the effect not of nutrition but Establishing the direction of causa- Unweighted mean. of agricultural output. 35 ably could not have been achieved cation and healthand are often efficient exploitation of natural without their distinctively early measured inaccurately as well. resources. But in many countries mass literacy and numeracy, which But the main reason is that growth high and growing densities are (together with land reform, more also depends on other factors likely to be a continuing source advanced education and good eco- the availability of natural resources of poverty. In 1975 the agricultural nomic management) contributed and physical capital and the effi- population per hectare of cropland to increased agricultural produc- ciency with which all resources in Egypt, Bangladesh and prob- tivity, to the expansion of labor- are used. ably China was already more than intensive manufacturing and Without modern inputs, the five times that in the Netherlands exports, and to their remarkable right technology and ready access (see Table 4.1). The scope for ability to adapt to changes in tech- to markets, even educated farmers compensating by higher yields nology and world demand. At the find it hard to innovate (see page per hectare is limitedin Egypt other end of the spectrum, the 48); and they can be discouraged because yields are already close poor economic performance of the from increasing production by low to those in developed countries, countries of Sub-Saharan Africa prices. Without rapid accumulation and in Bangladesh (where yields is at least partly attributable to of physical capital, and policies are much lower) by the high cost extremely low literacy and the to ensure that this is associated of improving water management. scarcity of highly educated and with rapid growth of productive Population growth can affect experienced people. employment opportunities, the economic growth in other ways, Knowledge, skills and attitudes earnings of even a healthy and too. In some circumstances, faster are not the only aspects of human educated labor force will stagnate. labor force growth can permit resources that affect economic Without the right mixture of faster growth of income per performance. A healthy and well- education and training, shortages person. That may have happened fed labor force is more physi- of specific skills will hold back with the flow of foreign workers cally and mentally energetic than growth, while chronic surpluses into Switzerland and the Federal one that is sick and hungry, and of other sorts of manpower may Republic of Germany in the 1960s therefore gets more work done emerge. and early 1970s. But in the great and is more innovative. This is majority of developing countries, Popu1ction confirmed by a number of experi- including most of those whose cur- ments and project-level studies Another important influence on rent population density is low, the see pages 55 and 60. The aggre- the growth of income per person growth of income per person could gate evidence is less clear-cut. is population growth. One way be accelerated by slower popula- At the same time, however, there it has an effect is by increasing tion growthfor three reasons. are examples that refute any population density. In some sparsely Lower fertility would reduce suggestion that education, health populated countries, this in itself the proportion of people who are and nutrition are in themselves might (within limits) have a bene- young and not productive. At sufficient to induce rapid growth. ficial effect on average incomes present, two-fifths of the people Burma and Jamaica, for example, as it has done in Argentinaby in developing countries are under with high levels of literacy and life permitting and stimulating more the age of 15; in developed expectancy for their income levels, achieved annual growth rates of on'y 1.0 and 2.0 percent per person Table 4.1 Agricultural population in relation to crop area over the period 1960-78. It is also Agricultural Projected agricultural possible (though difficult if Crop area, 1975 population per 100 hectares population in 1990 per 100 hectares of economies heavily dependent on Country (100,000 hectares) of crop area, 1975 crop area in 1975 petroleum, other minerals or ex- Bangladesh 951 660 980 patriate skilled labor are exduded) Burundi 126 256 380 to find cases of fairly rapid growth Dominican Republic 100 302 430 Egypt 286 687 890 even with low levels of literacy India 16,720 244 310 and life expectancyPakistan in Indonesia 1,860 458 540 the 1960s is an example. Pakistan 1,945 204 280 South Korea 242 641 520 The linkage is imperfect partly because literacy and life expec- Japan 557 289 130 tancy are crude indicators of edu- Netherlands 84 107 60 39 number in this group in Colombia, and quality of attention received Figure 4.3 Population distribution by age, 1980 for example, doubled between from parents and other adults in 1950 and 1970; but because of a the first few yearsand that is Age f 80+ fertility decline that began in generally less in large families. r iT 70-74 the mid-1960s, it then increased III 65-69 Developing I 60-64 only slightly in the 1970sand Raising the incomes of the poor countries 55-59 50-54 45-49 fell as a proportion of the total 40-44 35-39 population. In South Korea, where Faster growth of average incomes 30-34 25-29 fertility has fallen steadily, the is essential to reducing absolute 20-24 15-19 number of school-age children has poverty, especially in low-income 10-14 5-9 0-4 stopped growing. countries, where half or more of I III II II There are other effects apart from 14121086 420 I I 02 6 8101214 the people may be poor. But growth Percent reducing pressure on the formal alone is not enough. This is partly a. Include ndustnalized countries, the USSR and Eastern Europe. education system. Studies in because rising population is developed countries (even those tending to swell the numbers in controlling for socioeconomic absolute poverty even where they class) have shown that children are a diminishing share of the countries the ratio is about a in smaller families tend to be population, and partly because in quarter (see Figure 4.3). In the larger, more intelligent, and to many developing countries there Federal Republic of Germany and have a longer life expectancy. is a large gap between average the Soviet Union, for example, When high fertility is associated incomes and the incomes of poorer there are two people of working with repeated and closely spaced groups. It is also because (except age for every one who is too young pregnancies, the mother's health at fairly high average incomes) or old to work; in Mexico and can suffer; the resultslow birth growth tends to widen this gap. Nigeria, there is only one. weight and early weaningthen This pattern is described by the Slower growth of the labor damage the child's health. In the Kuznets curve, which shows that force would mean that less invest- Colombian town of Candelaria, the incomes of the poorest 40 ment, hence a smaller sacrifice of for example, the likelihood of percent of the population normally consumption, would be needed to malnutrition among preschool grow more slowly than the average maintain or increase the amount children in low-income families until income per person reaches of capital per worker. In most de- was directly related to how many a range of $700 to $900 (see Figure veloping countries the working- brothers and sisters they had. 4.4). Beyond this range, the incomes age population has roughly doubled Furthermore, a child's capacity to of poorer groups tend to grow faster in the past 25 years. At its current learn is affected by the amount than the average. Thus the distri- growth rate it will double again in the iext 25 years. In Japan and France, by contrast, the working- age population would at its present Figure 4.4 Income of poorest groups growth rate take about 90 years to Shore of buttons 40 procesS so GNP Percent double. 24 2 Human resources could be 22 developed more effectively. About 20 Sri Lanka Yugoslavia 25 percent of the population of a 18 Spain typical developing country is of India South Korea 16 primary-school age, compared with Argentina 15 percent in developed countries. 14 Philippines Rise in As a result, for any given amount 12 Costa Rica average incomes Turkey of bottom 40 percent of spending on education, a devel- 10 Malaysia sMexico o Venezuela for each 1 percent rise in oping country has to have either Honduras Peru GNP per person a lower enrollment rate or lower t/ Brazil I I I spending per child enrolled. One 0 1000 2000 3000 100 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 of the earliest economic effects of GNP per parson (1978 dollars) GNP per person (1978 dollars) declining fertility is a (relatively) a. Dates as in Table 24, World Development Indicators. smaller school-age group. The 40 bution of income typically is less The rest of this section looks replace existing tenants, or if unequal in developed countries more closely at the range of things landlords (in their alternate roles than in developing countries. that can be donein the context as moneylenders and employers) The initial rise in inequality of strategies aimed at increasing have been able to compensate for occurs chiefly because the impulses average incomesto raise the loss of rent by extracting more and opportunities for harnessing incomes of those in absolute poverty. favorable terms from their tenants modern technology in a backward in other transactions. economy are unevenly spread. Land and land tenure Despite the difficulties, land and Those who perceive (and can take Land reform - the redistribution tenure reform (in urban as well as advantage of) these opportunities of land ownership in favor of the rural areas) remains a vital ele- forge ahead of those who stay in poorhas been tried in many ment of poverty reduction in traditional lines of activitywho countries, with mixed results. In many countries, and it merits in some cases may be undercut some (South Korea, for example) it strong support. and impoverished. As develop- has raised the incomes of the rural ment proceeds, though, the modem poor considerablythough better Capital and credit sectors in industry, commerce and access to credit and extension The poor conspicuously lack agriculture become increasingly services for small farmers has every kind of physical capital, but dominant, drawing most of the proved an essential adjunct. In their poverty limits their demon- labor out of the traditional sectors most developing countries there strated ability to respond to good and pulling up the earnings of those is scope for further land reform. investment opportunities (such who remain in them. Because small farms tend to as new seed varieties) by saving The Kuznets curve is not an iron apply more labor per hectare and more. The alternative is to borrow, law. As Figure 4.4 shows, some to use land and capital at least as which can enable the poor not only countries lie well above it, others productively as large farms, land to buy pumps and fertilizers for below. (Information on changes reform will usually increase their farms, and tools and materials in income inequality in particular agricultural output after a period for their workshops, but also to developing countries confirms that of adjustment (see box overleaf). get their children educated, to pay they do not all follow a path of the But it faces social and political for transport to better jobs in urban same shape.) Much depends on oppositionfrom landlords and areas, and to tide themselves over pe- government policy, which can re- from urban groups that benefit riods of illness and unemployment. duce the unevenness of the mod- from the bigger marketed sur- But government efforts to help ernization processand accelerate pluses of large farms. the poor by supplementing tradi- growthby promoting productiv- As an alternative to distributing tional informal sources of credit ity gains in traditional small-scale individual parcels of landwhich have had only limited success. For agriculture, increasing the rate at is easier where resettlement on long-term credit especially, lenders which labor is absorbed into the uncultivated land is possible, as in want collateralso those with few modern industrial sector, and not Brazil, Indonesia and Upper Volta assets, or who want to acquire in- concentrating public investment some countries (Algeria, China tangible assets (such as education) and services on a few places and and Peru, for example) have estab- are at a substantial disadvantage. social groups. lished cooperatives and communes. In addition, governments and In addition, governments can But these have tended to encounter, public agencies usually have not take measures to reduce the in- in varying degree, serious prob- charged an interest rate high enough equality of incomes by improving lems of incentives and management. to make credit programs self-sup- the distribution of productive assets Other countries have revised land porting. And the limited amounts (land, capital, labor skills); avoiding tenure rules: greater security of of subsidized credit available have price and wage policies that bene- tenure gives tenant farmers more often been channeled away from fit the urban middle classes at the incentive to invest. Schemes that the poor toward more influential expense of small farmers; discour- encourage landlords of share- groups. aging the exploitation of public croppers to share the cost of seeds For the poor to benefit from position for private gain; and mak- and fertilizers have also tended physical investment, however, ing taxes more progressive. They to increase efficiency. But rent con- they do not necessarily have to can also take measures to improve trol has proved hard to enforce own or control the assets them- the lot of the dependent poor especially if there have been plenty selves. Public investment (and children, the aged and many women. of landless laborers willing to private investment by people who 41 Nor, as Chinese experience shows, Small is productive need schemes of this kind be only Although most farms in developing used declined sharply and consistently temporary. With good organization, countries are small, the small minority as farm size increased. Depending on the of large farms account for most of the subregion, small farms applied 5 to 22 investment in rural infrastructure area. Yet there is wide-ranging evidence times as much labor per hectare as large can continue indefinitely. In this that (comparing similar types of agricul- farms, although the proportion of high- as in all areas, governments should ture) smaller farms outperform larger or medium-yielding soils did not vary not encourage excessive capital farms in value added per acre. For significantly with the size of the farm. intensity and thus discourage example: Small farms tended to employ more India. The Farm Management Studies labor than profit maximization would employment creation. The policies of the 1950s, covering about 3,000 farms warrant, probably in part because family required, which were discussed at in six states, found that the larger the members have difficulty in obtaining length in Chapter 4 of last year's farm, the smaller its output per acre. Nor employment elsewhere, while large farms Report, are partly a matter of has the green revolutionhigh-yielding employed less. avoiding subsidies for capital and varieties of seedchanged this conclusion. Such studies suggest that redistribution The National Council of Applied Economic of land in larger farms into smaller ones taxes on labor, but also involve Research surveyed 4,000 households in many cases would increase output and general development strategy throughout the country in 1965-69, 1969- employment (and of course equity) (including that for foreign trade). 70 and 1970-71; more than 2,500 of them significantly. But there are important were farming throughout the period. qualifications. Forexample,whereliteracy Education, health, nutrition and fertility Although the productivity gap between rates are low among small farmers, large and small farms tended to narrow middle-size farms tend to be quicker to The employment opportunities as the green revolution spread, it remained adopt innovations. After a certain point and earning power of many of the significanteven after controlling for fragmentation inhibits productivity poor are also limited (in ways to differences in land quality and irrigation. growth, and significant land is lost be discussed further in Chapter 5) The proportion of land under high- through field boundaries (for example, by sickness, insufficient food and yielding varieties did not vary by farm in parts of Asia a holding of one hectare size. Tests relating capital and labor use may comprise 15 or 20 tiny parcels). For lack of education. Their standard to farm size showed that as farms became some combinations of crops and soils, of living is also depressed by their larger, they used proportionately less mechanizationand thus large fields high fertility and large family size capital and laborand particularly the may increase output: research in South each adult's earnings have to latter, which costs less on small farms Asia provides little support for the yield- support more dependents than in making use of family labor than on large increasing effect of tractor cultivation, farms relying mainly on hired labor. which may simply cause agricultural richer families (see Table 4.3). Brazil. The World Bank and SIJDENE, laborers, to get fewer days of work. But Better health and nutrition can the official regional development authority, where labor is in relatively short supply, permit poor people to work more carried out a detailed study of 8,000 farms and timely cultivation and harvesting days in each year (which among in the poor northeastern region in late are critical to increasing yields, large other things increases their eligibility 1973 and early 1974. It revealed that the mechanized farms may be economi- intensity with which land and labor were for employment in modem industry) cally rational. and can increase their effectiveness at work. Studies of construction projects in India and Indonesia are not poor) can have a powerful places where they can earn more. showed that poor health and effect on their earnings. Irrigation The construction phase of infra- nutrition were among the factors schemes, which can double the structural investments can also which tended to make the use of amount of labor required per provide employment and higher capital-intensive techniques more hectare of land, raise the incomes wages for the poor. The record of economical, even where labor was of landless laborers, even though employment through public works cheap and abundant. farmers (especially those who own is a checkered onethere have been Even a primary education can their land) derive even greater too many cases where for one reason raise the productivity of small benefitssee Table 4.2. Similarly, or another local labor has not farmers (see page 48) and, though roads that reach remote villages received much benefit or where this has been studied much less, and provinces where some of the the road or dam concerned has make the poor better entrepreneurs poorest people live have (in Liberia been of little economic value. in other lines of business. More- and Thailand, for example) increased But there are enough examples of over, basic education is usually their incomes by giving them access successful schemes (as in Morocco a precondition of employment to new seeds, insecticides and and the Indian state of Maharashtra) in modern manufacturing and markets, as well as by enabling to suggest that the approach is services. In Brazil, for example, them to move more readily to worth pursuing, albeit with care. the growth of modern industrial 42 Table 4.2 Irrigation and income, selected projects While others may benefit from Household income (current dollars) the poor being educated, the Country Without With Absolute Percentage converse is also true. More and and beneficiary irrigation irrigation' increase increase better extension workers are Cameroon (northern: rice) needed to reach poor farmers. 1978 Technicians and accountants are Farmers 178 1,013 835 469 needed to run factories. More South Korea (Pyongtaek- managerial and administrative kumgang: rice) 1976k 500 training and experience could Farmers 286 214 75 increase the rate of industrial and Malaysia (Muda: rice) 1974 190 361 171 90 agricultural expansion, create Large-scale farmers 237 448 211 89 more jobs and raise the incomes Small-scale farmers 131 247 116 89 of everyone. Landless laborers 73 166 93 127 India (Uttar Pradesh: rice, Resecirch nd technology wheat, sugarcane) 1978 181 359 178 98 Nor should specialized scientific Large-scale farmers 384 738 354 92 Medium-scale farmers 218 464 246 113 and technological education be Small-scale farmers 148 264 116 78 overlooked. Their role in reducing All studies control for changes in other influences on incomes. poverty is particularly apparent in Household income per person. agriculture. The introduction of high-yielding rice and wheat varietiesthe green revolution employment is slowest among but they do not detract from the has substantially improved the lives uneducated people. Literacy and fundamental point that poor health of poor consumers and (on bal- numeracy are necessary not just and lack of education are likely ance, with many exceptions) small in clerical work, but also in the to aggravate the exclusion of the farmers in the wetter parts of Asia. many manual jobs that involve poor from modern development. But more research is urgently needed following written instructions or If the innovations of richer and on dry farming (the economic rate keeping simple records. Schooling better educated farmers increase of return to this sort of research has also been shown to increase agricultural output and reduce has typicJly been as high as 20-30 the capacity to learn from subse- its price, the .incomes of the poor percent) and on the cultivation of quent formal training and practical farmers who do not innovate will poor soils and subsistence crops experience. fall. on which many low-income farmers It should be emphasized that depend. And in countries where better education, health and nutri- climate and soil conditions vary tionwhile they may be necessary Table 4.3 Dependency ratios, widely from place to place, much to increase the earning power of by income group more research is needed to deter- the poorare not sufficient. Com- Average mine the best farming methods household plementary measures are also income for each placein Tanzania this needed to expand the demand for (percentage is being held back by a shortage of national Dependency labor and to furnish the incentives Income group' average) ratio" of scientists at local research and material resources required Peninsular Malaysia, stations. for innovation. :1973 Industrial research also has a Nor will all the gains in income Richest 10 percent 332 0.4 part to play in reducing poverty Poorest 10 percent 18 1.2 that can result from better educa- Sri Lanka, 1969-70 (as does research in such fields as tion, health and nutrition among Richest 10 percent 240 0.5 education and health). Many tech- the poor necessarily accrue to the Poorest 10 percent 46 1.3 nical advances stem from work poor. In some circumstances, the Nepal (seven done by large firms in industrialized towns), 1974-75 increased productivity of a farmer Richest 10 percent 167 0.4 countries. The resulting innova- will partly benefit his landlord Poorest 10 percent 51 1.2 lions, which tend to be concentrated or consumers, for that matter, who Households ranked by income or expen- on capital-intensive methods of may be able to buy food more diture per person. large-scale production, often bene- cheaply. These distributive issues Children (0-14) and the aged (over 65 fit the pooras in the case of fertil- for Peninsular Malaysia; over 60 for the are difficult and poorly understood, others) as percentage of the rest. izer. But small enterprises are 43 disadvantaged, job creation is also been important in reducing the detriment of the poor. And in limited, and some of the goods povertyparticularly in Northern a few cases the exodus of bright bought by the poor are not im- Europe in the 19th century, but young people may have held back proved or made cheaper as rapidly also more recently in Mediterranean agricultural progress. The impact as those bought by the rich. More and other developing countries of rural development programs on research, especially if undertaken where a significant proportion of migration is not clear-cut, either; in developing countries, could the relatively unskilled labor force land redistribution, expansion of reduce these biases. Progress has has migrated to the Middle East the cultivated area, and lower already been made, for example, or elsewhere (see box on page 22). fertility reduce emigration; but in small-scale food processing and The relation between rural-urban improved communications and the labor-intensive construction. migration and poverty remains commercialization of agriculture somewhat controversial; but views appear to increase it. Migrcition on this subject have evolved over The extent to which the poor Technology is one way of making the past decade (see Chapter 6 of benefit from migration depends progress in places where poverty the World Development Report, 1979). partly on the extent to which they stems from poor land or poor It now is increasingly recognized have had access to at least a pri- climate. Another is for people to that those who move generally mary education (see box). Illiterate move to places where opportuni- make themselves better off. Their people do migrate, and often gain ties are better. Expansion of rural incomes go up, and they and their substantially by it (though some- employment, both on and off farms, dependents have better access to times they become destitute will reduce the need for migration; health and education services. wanderers). But Indian evidence but it is clear that the industrial- Studies in India show that the suggests that they move mainly ization of poor countries (like that chances of girls from poor fam- to other rural areas. If they try to of the now-developed countries) ilies going to school are more than move to urban areas, where earn- will in the long term require large- twice as high in large cities as in ings prospects are generally better, scale migration from rural to urban rural areas. the uneducated are much more areas. International migration has On the other hand, there is still likely (as a study of Bombay showed) widespread concern about the to fail to get jobs and to be forced fiscal, social and political costs of to leave. rapid rural-urban migration, which, The same is true of international A strategy that backfired by holding down urban wages and migration. The poor and unedu- The experience of two subclans in west- adding to pressure on government cated are less likely to find out ern Kenya illustrates some of the inter- actions between education, migration services, retards the rate of im- about opportunities for working and agricultural development. provement in the living standards abroad. More important, they In the 1930s the head of the more of the urban poor. But these living have less chance of being accepted powerful subclan, anxious to conserve standards, low as they often are, by prospective employers. It has his people's land, caused the colonial tend to be above those of the rural been estimated that more than administration's schools to be built on the land of the other subclan. This had poor. Where they are not, as in three-quarters of the foreigners unexpected consequences. Calcutta, migration usually ceases now working in the Middle East The education received by members or goes into reverse. Indeed, re- are literate, and almost all of them of the less powerful subclan enabled verse and repeated migration in have some skills. Even if no formal some of them to get jobs in the local response to changing job opportuni- training is needed, good health town. The money they remitted was used to purchase improved livestock, ties has been found to be common. is invariably a prerequisite of foreign to switch into cash crops (especially The effects on those who remain employment, and one which many coffee) and to establish more schools. in the countrysideother than the poor people are unable to fulfill. In addition, the movement of people families of migrants that benefit Migration of all kinds can have to the town slowed the rate at which from remittancesappear to vary harmful social and economic effeds. land was subdivided, making the intro- from case to case. In some, non- But on balance the evidence suggests duction of improved livestock (which required a minimum grazing area) more migrants gain because the labor that, by enabling labor to be used profitable. market tightens when people leave, where it is most productive, migra- By 1974, although the division of and because there is less pressure tion aids both growth and poverty political power was still the same, the on agricultural land. In others, reductionand would do so even less powerful subclan had become the richer of the two. remittances have been spent on more if the poor were better concentrating land ownershipto equipped to migrate. Develop- 44 ment strategies that assume that income countries have fairly The next three chapters examine the productivity of the poor must extensive social security programs. in more detail one aspect of antipov- necessarily be raised in the places But the scope for such programs erty policyhuman development. where they now live may be both in low-income countries is neces- Chapter 5 looks at the consequences inefficient and inequitable. Not sarily limited. and determinants of education, least, the children of the landless An alternative approach, used health, nutrition and fertility; at in stagnant rural areas may be best in both industrialized and devel- policies that affect them; and at served by a primary education that oping countries, is to subsidize the way in which they (and incomes) will increase their geographic, as (and sometimes also ration) items interact. Chapter 6 considers some well as economic, mobility. that are particularly important for of the common practical problems poor people. Such subsidies can political, financial, administrative Transfers and subsidies raise the real incomes of the poor of human development programs. In industrialized countries the considerablywitness the increase Chapter 7, in the context of a mainstay of antipoverty policy is in Peru's infant mortality when discussion of the several regions income transfers aimed at offset- subsidies were reduced and unem- of the developing world, addresses ting life-cycle poverty among the ployment rose in 1976. Indeed, some practical questions of priorities old and the very young, and at the three low-income countries and tradeoffs: How do the benefits compensating for loss of earnings with life expectancy above 60 years and costs of human development through sickness, unemployment all provide guaranteed or subsidized programs compare with those of and so on. In developing countries, food. But programs of this sort the other approaches to poverty too, these are important causes of (discussed further on page 62) reduction discussed in the present extreme poverty (though they tend have to steer a tricky course be- chapter? How does the best alloca- to be mitigated more through the tween the financial rocks of general tion of resources vary according extended family); and they are not subsidization and the administra- to the circumstances of particular touched directly by measures to tive and political rocks of effectively countries and the specific objectives raise earning power. Brazil, Turkey reaching the poor. being pursued? and a number of other middle- 0 0 0 45 5 Human development issues and policies This chapter looks at the four main family sizethat receives most views, and its implications for areas of human development attention. development strategy. education, health, nutrition and A decade or two ago, there was Recent progress fertilityand at the links between a widespread view that trained them. In each, it considers the people were the key to develop- The major educational progress causes and effects of poverty and ment. Universal literacy was a of the past two decades reflects various ways of breaking its grip political objective in many coun- heavy investment by developing on the poor and their children. tries, but money spent on primary countries. Their total public Ten years ago this chapter would schooling was often regarded as expenditure on education rose in have been written very different- diverted from activities that would real terms (in 1976 dollars) from ly. In certain areas thinking has have contributed more to economic about $9 billion in 1960 (2.4 per- changed substantiallyfor instance, growth. Planners favored the kinds cent of their collective GNP) to about the nature of malnutrition of secondary and higher education $38 billion in 1976 (4.0 percent of and its causes. Good progress has that directly met the "manpower GNP). Costs vary widely by been made in unraveling some requirements" of the modern regionand by type of education complex and highly controversial sector. People who worked with (see Table 5.1). The potential for issuesfor example, the respec- their hands were thought not continued enrollment growth at tive roles of family planning and to have much need of formal different levels will, of course, be social development in reducing education. strongly affected by these costs. fertility. And in all areas, research Over the past decade, views But school attendance in some and practical experience have im- have changed substantially. Ade- parts of the world remains low, proved understanding of the na- quate provision of secondary and especially among the poor, in rural ture of poverty and what can be higher education and training areas and by girls (see Figure 5.1 done about it. remains an important priority. But and Table 5.2). This is not simply the value of general education at because schools are unavailable Education the primary level is now more not everyone who has an oppor- widely recognized. This section tunity for education accepts it. Every individual is born with a discusses more of the evidence Among those who do enroll, more- collection of abilities and talents. that lies behind this change in over, in developing countries on Education, in its many forms, has the potential to help fulfill and apply them. Table 5.1 Public expenditures on elementary and higher education In some societies the economic per student, 1976 function of schooling is regarded Higher (post- as minorsince the cultivation of secondary) Elementary Ratio of higher to Region education education elementary education the mind and the spirit, curiosity, contemplation and reasoning have Sub-Saharan Africa 3,819 38 100.5 South Asia 117 13 9.0 more than economic purposes and East Asia 471 54 8.7 justifications. But in the context Middle East and North Africa 3,106 181 17.2 of this Report, it is the role of edu- Latin America and Caribbean 733 91 8.1 Industrialized 2,278 1,157 2.0 cation in overcoming poverty USSR and Eastern Europe 957 539 1.8 increasing incomes, improving Note: Figures shown are averages (weighted by enrollment) of costs (in 1976 dollars) in the health and nutrition, reducing countries in each region for which data were available. 46 average 40 percent drop out before percent (less than half the national that at most 4 percent completed the fourth year. In Brazil's poor urban average), nearly two-thirds four years. Even the completion rural Northeast region in 1974, of the students dropped out before statistics conceal the very low despite an enrollment rate of 46 the second year-and it is estimated quality of some of the schooling provided (see pages 52-53). Nonetheless, the very substantial Figure 5.1 Enrollment ratios, by region, 1960-75 growth in enrollment (Figure 5.1) (percent) is a sign of great educational advance. Middle East and North Africa South Asia East Asia Latin America Sub-Saharan Africa There are several mechanisms 80 through which this has contributed Female (6-11) Male (6-11) Male (6-11) to growth in incomes. 70 Male (6-11) Male (6_Il) Effects of education on earning power Female (6-11) 60 Male (12-17) Schooling imparts specific knowl- Female (6-11) Male (6-11) edge and develops general reasoning 50 - Female (6-11) Male (12-17) skills (its "cognitive" effects); it also induces changes in beliefs and 40 /ZMale (12-17) Male (12-17) Female (12-17) values, and in attitudes toward 30 Female (12-17) Female (12-17) Female (6-11) work and society ("noncognitive" effects). The relative importance Ml (1823) Ml (1217) of these effects is much debated, 20 Female (12-17) M 1 (18 23) M Ic (28 23) Female (12-17) but poorly understood; both are 10 Male (18-23) Female (18-23) extremely important. F m I (18 23) 823) In the cognitive area, developing 0 a generalized capacity for thinking I '60 65 70 75 60 65 70 75 60 65 70 75 60 65 70 75 60 65 70 75 and learning has to be found to be UNESCO. more important than the specific subjects learned. On-the-job training, informal education and Table 5.2 Primary school enrollment, by income group vocational training all build on (percent) learning abilities acquired earlier. Boys (aged 5-9) Girls (aged 5-9) And although literacy and num- Poorest Richest Poorest Richest eracy deteriorate if left unused, the Country households households households households educational experience still gen- Sri Lanka, 1969-70 70.3 89.8 65.8 81.9 erally provides an improved foun- Nepal, 1973-74 dation for subsequent learning. 11 towns 29.5 77.8 15.3 71.2 Many of the noncognitive effects India: Gujarat of schooling-receptivity to new state, 1972-73 ideas, competitiveness, and will- Rural 22.7 53.9 8.6 50.9 ingness to accept discipline-are Urban 42.1 77.7 30.8 69.5 directly relevant to productive India: Maharashtra economic activity. Others-toler- state, 1972-73 ance, self-confidence, social and Rural 24.6 54.6 16.6 52.9 Urban 40.4 86.3 42.1 87.0 civic responsibility - are more Both sexes (aged 6-71) personal or political in nature, Poorest Richest but may also affect economic households households performance. Colombia, 1974 Some of the evidence on the Large cities 69.6 94.6 effects of education rests on at- All urban 62.0 89.5 tempts to measure attitudes directly. Rural 51.2 60.0 Studies in several countries have Note: Enrollments are expressed as a percentage of the number in the age group. Poorest shown that "modernity" of outlook and richest refer (in the case of India, Nepal and Sri Lanka) to the bottom and top 10 percent of households ranked by expenditure per person, and (in the case of Colombia) to the top toward activities ranging from vot- and bottom 20 percent of households ranked by income per person. ing to family planning, saving and 47 working, is more influenced by the Table 5.3 Farmer education it would be short-sighted to leave level of the individual's schooling and farmer productivity a large part of the next generation than by any other factor. But there Estimated percentage of farmers illiterate. are also many studies of the direct increase in annual farm output effect of schooling on individual due to four years EMPLOYEES. The second type of productivity and earnings, which Study of primary education study relates the educational levels rather than none are examined here under two heads of individuals to their wages and With complementary inputs' those relating to the self-employed salaries. If education affects the Brazil (Garibaldi), 1970 18.4 and those relating to employees. Brazil (Resende), 1969 4.0 capacity to learn, innovate and Brazil (Taquari), 1970 22.1 adapt, its effects should be par- Brazil (Vicosa), 1969 9.3 THE SELF-EMPLOYED. The hy- Colombia (Chinchina), ticularly important for employees potheses are straightforward: that 1969 0.8 doing nonroutine or changing Colombia (Espinal), 1969 24.4 tasks. For employees in modern primary education helps people to Kenya, 1971-72 6.9 obtain and evaluate information Malaysia, 1973 20.4 enterprises, primary education also Nepal (wheat), 1968-69 20.4 promotes disciplined work habits about improved techniques and South Korea, 1973 9.1 new opportunities, to keep records and responsiveness to further Average (unweighted) 13.2 and estimate the returns of past training, as well as offering the ad- activities and the risks of future Without complementary inputs vantages of literacy and numeracy. ones. More generally, primary Brazil (Candelaria), 1970 10.8 Studies of the rate of return to Brazil (Conceicao de schooling is a training in how to Castelo), 1969 3.6 education for wage earners deal learn, an experience in self- Brazil (Guarani), 1970 6.0 mainly with relatively large urban Brazil (Paracatu), 1969 7.2 enterprises; but a few have in- discipline and in working for Colombia (Malaga), 1969 12.4 longer-term goals. Colombia (Moniquira), cluded small businesses and agri- Most of the empirical evidence 1969 12.5 cultural workers. All find that Greece, 1963 25.9 comes from agriculture - studies more schooling leads to higher Average (unweighted) 8.1 comparing the productivity, yields earnings. And when the extra earn- and innovative activity of schooled No information on availability ings resulting from primary educa- of complementary inputs tion are weighed against its costs, and unschooled farmers. Not all Average of eight high rates of return are consistently these studies controlled adequately studies (unweighted) 6.3 for other influences, particularly found. Similar studies for secondary a. Improved seeds, irrigation, transport and higher education find lower, wealth; but many did (for example, to markets and so on. by including farm size as a proxy though nonetheless substantial, for wealth). returns (see Table 5.4 and box). The general weight of the evi- pends on the cost of achieving dence (see Table 5.3) lends strong them. It is thus significant that Investment priorities in education and consistent support to the studies that went on to compare Primary education is of particular hypothesesand is particularly the increase in production result- importance in overcoming absolute compelling because the studies ing from education with the costs poverty. But secondary, higher, measure productivity directly, not of that education (for example, in vocational and adult education through wages. Where the com- Korea, Malaysia and Thailand) and training also have major roles plementary inputs required for found rates of return comparing to play. improved farming techniques were very favorably with investment in available, the annual output of a other sectors. It is, of course, im- PRIMARY EDUCATION. In coun- farmer who had completed four possible to predict which places tries where it is far from universal, years of primary schooling was will offer scope for improved farm- the case for increasing the propor- on average 13.2 percent more than ing techniques in 10 years' time, tion of children who complete pri- one who had not been to school. when children leave school. In mary education is strong. While As expected, where complementary some, effects on farm productivity there have been high economic inputs were not available, the in- may be low. But given past progress returns in the past, it has been crease in output resulting from in agricultural research, it is prob- suggested that the rate of return to additional schooling was on aver- able that some places with stagnant primary schooling (especially in age smallerbut still substantial. technology now will offer greatly certain jobs) may decline as the Whether these increases should improved possibilities. Thus, on proportion of the labor force with be regarded as large or small de- growth as well as equity grounds, primary education increases. But 48 this may be offset by shifts in the And in the few countries where rural areas, girls, and the poorest pattern of production toward more studies have been done at differ- urban boys. In general, primary skill-intensive goods. In Table 5.4 ent periods, rates of return have education tends to be redistribu- the rates of return to primary usually declined, but only mildly. tive toward the poor (see Table education in countries with adult There are also favorable effects 5.5). In contrast, public expendi- literacy rates above 50 percent, on equity. As primary education ture on secondary and higher while somewhat below those in becomes more widespread, addi- education tends to redistribute countries with adult literacy below tional spending will be increas- income from poor to rich, since 50 percent, are still strikingly high. ingly concentrated on backward children of poor parents have comparatively little opportunity Table 5.4 Rates of return to education to benefit from it. (percent) Primary education, especially of Number of girls, has favorable effects on the Country group Prim ary Secondary Higher countries next generation's health, fertility All developing countries 24.2 15.4 12.3 30 and education (see box overleaf). Low income/adult literacy Finally, it enriches peoples' lives. rate under 50 percent' 27.3 17.2 12.1 11 Middle income/adult literacy Many would regard this as suffici- rate over 50 percent 22.2 14.3 12.4 19 ent justification for universal pri- Industrialized countries 10.0 9.1 14 mary education, independent of Note: In all cases, the figures are "social" rates of return: the costs include forgone earnings its other benefits. (what the students could have earned had they not been in school) as well as both public and private outlays; the benefits are measured by income before tax. (The "private" returns to individuals exclude public costs and taxes, and are usually larger.) The studies sEcoNDARy AND HIGHER EDucATIoN. refer to various years between 1957 and 1978, mainly in the latter half of the period. Renewed emphasis on the impor- a. In this sample of 30 developing countries, those countries with low incomes also had tance of primary education, and literacy rates below 50 percent (at the time the studies were done). All the middle-income countries had literacy rates above 50 percent. its high returns relative to sec- ondary and higher education, should not start the pendulum swinging too far in the other di- Schooling, screening and productivity rection. High levels of knowledge are necessary for many people who The interpretation of rates of return thus that relative wages are not such serve the poor, both directly as to educationespecially secondary and imperfect indicators of productivity, as teachers, health workers and agri- higher educationis still controversial. It those who have concentrated on their has often been argued that educational institutional characteristics and determi- cultural extension workers, and qualifications are simply a "screening" nants have supposed. In developed indirectly as researchers, techni- device, signaling an individual's produc- countries the relative wages of different cians, managers and administrators. tive qualities to an employer without occupations have gradually but steadily While their skills must be developed actually enhancing them. In some changed in response to increases in the to a considerable extent through developing countries, moreover, the supply of educated labor. That the same practical experience and in other public sectorand some heavily protected process operates even in the public sector parts of the private sectorare the main in developing countries is suggested, for ways, there is for some purposes employers of university and even second- example, by the fact that the relative no better or cheaper substitute for ary-school graduates: it has been sug- salaries of teachers and civil servants the formal disciplines of conven- gested that the salaries they pay are often ace much higher in Africa, where edu- tional schooling. Even allowing for artificially inflated and bear little relation cated manpower is much scarcer, than doubts about the estimated rates to relative productivity; and that educa- in Asia, where it is more abundant. tional requirements serve merely to ration The conventional economic interpre- of return to secondary and higher access to these inflated salaries. In both tation of the association between school- education, and for the existence cases, earnings differences associated ing and wages is further strengthened by of some educated unemployment with different levels of education would a few studies showing that more educated (see box on next page), there are overstate the effect of education on workers have increased output in specific unquestionably severe shortages productivity. manufacturing industries, by evidence On the other side, it is argued that of substantial returns to education even of skilled people in many developing school "screening" is by no means all in agriculture and other traditional small- countries. wasteful and is preferable to such other scale activities, where one would expect More economical ways of pro- screening methods as caste or family educational credentials to be much less ducing skilled people need to be connections. It is also argued that labor important, and by the macroeconomic found. First, greater use of in-career markets are not so monopolistic, and evidence discussed in the box on page 38. and on-the-job training should be 49 Table 5.5 Public education spending per household, education at about a fifth the cost by income group of traditional schools, and allows (dollars) would-be students who have to Malaysia, 1974b Colombia, 1974' earn a living to continue their edu- Income groap Primary Postsecondary Primary University cation at the same time. Recent Poorest 20 percent 135 4 48 1 studies (in Brazil, Kenya and the Richest 20 percent 45 63 9 46 Dominican Republic) have also Households ranked by income per person. concluded that correspondence Federal costs per household. Subsidies per household. courses have effectively taught people in remote areas. In most countries the families of postprimary students pay too The benefits of women's education little for education. They are gen- Educating girls may be one of the best erally much better off than the of Sub-Saharan Africa; but it exists to investments a countiy can make in future some extent in every region. national average: in Tunisia, for economic growth and welfareeven if Why? From the parents' point of view, example, the proportion of chil- girls never enter the labor force. Most education for their daughters may seem dren from higher income groups girls become mothers, and their influence less attractive than for their Sons. They is nine times larger in universities much more than the father'son their may fear that education will harm their than in elementary school. Since children is crucial: daughters' marriage prospects, subsequent In health. Studies in Bangladesh, domestic life and even spiritual qualities. the rewards from higher educa- Kenya and Colombia show that children A girl's education brings fewer economic tion are large, it is highly desirable are less likely to die, the more educated benefits if there is discrimination against (though often politically difficult) their mothers, even allowing for differ- her in the labor market, if she marries to charge tuition and other fees to ences in family income. early and stops working or if she ceases In nutrition. Among households cover costs. Scholarships can be after marriage to have any economic surveyed in Sao Paulo, Brazil, for any obligations toward her parents. given to students whose families given income level, families were better But parents md their daughters do cannot afford to pay. fed the higher the mother's education. respond rapidly to changing opportunities. The cost of secondary and higher In fertility. Education delays mar- When women took on key roles in the education makes it inevitable that riage for women, partly by increasing Anand Dairy Cooperative in Gujarat, in most courthies demand for places their chances of employment; and edu- India, education for girls became more cated women are more likely to know valued. When a nutrition project in will exceed supply for the fore- about, and use, contraceptives. Guatemala offered employment to edu- seeable future, although some Yet in most parts of the developing cated girls, the test scores of younger countries, such as South Korea, world, there are many more boys than girls improved. already have very high enrollment girls enrolled at school (see Figure 5.1). More generally, education does increase rates. But economic considerations True, female enrollment grew faster than the chance of paid employment for girls. male between 1960 and 1977; but when In Brazil married women with secondary are not the only relevant ones: boys' enrollments were where female education are three to four times more secondary education often helps in enrollments are today, they were grow- likely to be employed than those with lowering fertility and reducing ing even faster. The educational bias is primary education onlywho in turn are child mortality (over and above most pronounced in South Asia, the twice as likely to work as women with Middle East and North Africa, and parts the effects of primary education). no education at all. All developed countries have found universal free secondary education to be desirable in its explored. Second, steps should be costs per student. Care must be own right. The question for devel- taken to reduce the high unit costs taken to encourage repatriation oping countries is less "whether" of secondary and higher education and to prevent foreign training than "when." Higher education (shown in Table 5.1). from becoming exclusively the clearly also has scientific, cultural For example, the number of privilege of the children of the and intellectual objectives, as well university specializations can be rich and influential. as economic ones. reduced, relying on foreign uni- Correspondence courses can versities (not necessarily in devel- dramatically reduce the cost of VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND TRAIN- oped countries) for specialized secondary and higher education ING. Experience shows that it is training in areas in which small and teacher training. The Korean often inefficient to rely heavily on numbers of students lead to ex- Air-Correspondence High School, schools (as opposed to the work- cessive teaching and equipment for example, provides secondary place and short-term training 50 UNESCO concluded that the poor Unemployment among the educated results of most adult literacy programs were due to lack of Unemployment statistics in developing paid job is sufficiently large, a period of demand. Where there is an explicit countries are sparse and often hard to job-seeking or unemployment will yield need, results have been better. For interpret. Evidence on open unemploy- a higher expected "lifetime" income. ment (persons without a job and actively The educational pattern of unemploy- example, a recent review found seeking employment) indicates that it is ment is consistent with this explanation. that agricultural extensionwhich primarily an urban phenomenon heavily It is not worthwhile for uneducated is essentially an applied form of concentrated among workers in their workers to remain unemployed as they adult educationgenerally helped teens and early twenties. Since these are search for a well-paid job. At the other the ages at which individuals typically extreme, highly trained people are scarce to raise productivity; and the leave school or university, there has been in many countriesso college graduates World Bank's experience with concern that educational expansion in can get well-paid jobs immediately. But the "training and visit" (T & V) developing countries will produce a grow- those in betweenthe secondary-school approach to agricultural exten- ing problem of "educated unemploy- leaversare neither assured of high-wage sion, which puts great weight on ment." But despite the increased outflow jobs nor completely out of the running; careful training and supervision of students over the past decade, partic- for them, there may be high returns to ularly secondary-school graduates, there a full-time search for a job. Since the of field workers, is consistent with is no evidence of rising trends in open unemployed are young, with few depen- this. In West Bengal, for example, unemployment rates. Unemployment dents and often supported by their families, T & V was introduced in 1975 and statistics from a number of countries do, and since most of them eventually find helped to raise the proportion of however, suggest that secondary-school jobs, neither the social nor the private land area planted with high- leavers experience higher rates of unem- costs associated with this unemployment ployment than the uneducated or those are as serious as might appear. yielding wheat and paddy varieties with postsecondary education. Moreover, the fact that some primary- from less than 2 percent to 40 By and large, educated unemployment and secondary-school leavers are unem- percent, in a single year. While appears to be associated with the processes ployed does not imply that the economy T & V is effective even with illit- through which the labor market adjusts is unable to make productive use of more erates, literate farmers tend to be to an increased supply of school leavers. of them. Various studies have shown First, the earnings expectations or job that the social rate of return to investment more responsive to suggested preferences of school leavers may not in education may be high despite the changes. keep pace with changes in labor market number of educated unemployed. But conditions brought about by increased in the eyes of governments, frustrated Implementing investment priorities numbers of workers with educational school leavers or college graduates can The education received by poor credentials. Second, the structure of wages form a politically volatile group. Some may be slow to adjustespecially if the governments have therefore virtually children depends on three things. public sector is a major employer of guaranteed public-sector jobs for post- The first is accessibilityare there educated workers. School leavers may secondary leavers whether or not there school places for them within a then be encouraged to wait for jobs in has been socially productive work for reasonable distance from home? well-paid occupations rather than imme- them to do. This can result in a major The second is usedo their par- diately accept a job that pays significantly drain on government revenues and impede less; if the wage difference is high enough the diffusion of educated manpower into ents send them to school, and are and the probability of obtaining a higher- more productive uses as well. they allowed or encouraged to drop out? The third concerns the quality of the education that institutions) to develop vocational later on-the-job training or short- schools provide. skills. Vocational and technical term courses (which may be needed schools often find it difficult to more than once in a lifetime) are ACCESSIBILITY. Financing con- strike the right balance between more likely to be successful, espe- straints will often be compounded general preemployment training cially if, as in Brazil, Chile and by difficulties in reaching the poor and the provision of specialized Singapore, there is coordination distance, low-density popula- skills, and are often slow to adjust with potential employers. tions and poor communications to the economy's changing needs. so that building schools and In many school systems where ADULT EDUCATION. Certain supplying books, equipment and competition for higher education types of adult education play a qualified teachers is a difficult and is strong, they also suffer from low useful role. To be effective, adult expensive task. For example, the prestige. education must be conducted by Nepalese government estimates By contrast, institutions that dedicated and responsible teachers, that it costs more than twice as provide training in skills with wide and must address specific, felt much to build and equip a school applicability as a foundation for needs; after a major review, in mountainous regions as it does 51 in the plains; and attracting quali- less education than boys (see box fied teachers to remote areas has on page 50). Since the mere exis- proved to be extremely difficult. Big is not necessarily bad tence of a school does not auto- There is often much that can be Class sizes vary widely in the developing matically mean it is used by all accomplished by administrative worldat elementary schools, from more than 60 in four countries (Chad, those eligible to attend, special action with relatively little capital Malawi, Congo-Brazzaville and Central measures may be needed to en- investment. Repetition of classes African Republic) to less than 25 in sure that the education offered is and early dropout may be the seven (Iraq, Barbados, Bolivia, Uruguay, attractive to the families for whom result of excessively high promo- Romania, Mauritania and Mauritius). it is intended (see pages 78-79). Yet once classes have more than 40 tion standards. In these circum- students, varying their size has almost stances, the flow of students can no effect on student learning (though QUALITY OF EDUCATION. This is be accelerated by more automatic larger classes may weaken discipline generally low in developing coun- promotionwhile maintaining and teacher morale). Between 15 and tries, and has been found (for quality by correcting some of the 40, students learn more in smaller example, in studies undertaken in classes (and still more in even smaller causes of repetition or dropout. classes), but the benefits are slight. For Thailand, Malaysia and the Philip- In many situations, resources can example, reducing an elementary-school pines) to be lower still for poor be freed for extending education class from 40 pupils to 15 can be and rural pupils. Poor quality by raising student-teacher ratios, expected to improve average achieve- public schools may lead the well- which are the main determinant ment (in a standard test) by only about to-do to choose private schools 5 percentage points. By the same token, of unit costs (given teacher salaries) a modest increasefrom 35 to 40 pupils, for their children, reinforcing and are largely determined by saymight reduce achievement by only social and economic inequality. class size. Extensive research shows a single percentage point. While there Casual observation and small- that class size has surprisingly little are obvious practical limits to increasing scale studies have long suggested effect on learning (see box). It is classes much above 50, the research that poor training of teachers, lack does suggest that, for classes initially important to maximize the use of of textbooks, and inadequate school below 50, little will be lost if they are available facilitiesby rotating increased. facilities lead to poor educational classes, with staggered scheduling In sparsely populated areas, larger results and provide a weak basis and double shifts in areas of high classesif that means fewer schools for subsequent training. But broad- population density. If there are may increase the time it takes children based evidence to demonstrate to get to school. That could be a genuine not enough pupils within an discouragement, though in most places the extent of the resulting learning acceptable distance from school to population density is high enough not losses has only recently become fill individual classes, student- to make it so availablefrom a large research teacher ratios and the use of space project, the International Evaluation can be significantly improved by of Educational Achievement. But taking new students only in alter- only four developing countries nate years (as has been done suc- to their traditional way of life; or (Chile, India, Iran and Thailand) cessfully in a project financed by the they may simply believe that social were among the 19 countries World Bank in Malaysia) and by or ethnic barriers are too great, or covered. teaching more than one grade in a the quality of the available school- While international compar- class, as in another World Bank- ing too low, to make education isons of student achievement must financed project in El Salvador. worth its costs. For poor families, be approached gingerly, particu- the help of children at homein larly when different languages or USE. Since most poor parents animal care, fetching fuel and testing styles can affect the results, believe that education would water, taking care of young chil- a clear pattern nonetheless emerges benefit their childrenin terms of dren while adults work, and in from the study. Differences in status and the ability to stand up agricultural work during busy average performance of students to officials and merchants, as well seasonsmay conflict with a fixed from the 15 developed countries as in a more narrowly economic school schedule. For some families, varied somewhat from subject to sensethey must have strong rea- malnutrition and poor health of subject and country to country; sons for not sending their children children may lead to poor atten- but the differences by and large to school if they have the chance. dance, inattention while in school, were small. The developing coun- They may question whether they repetition of grades and, even- tries, however, did far less well will benefit themselves; they may tually, dropping out. And there are in all subjects tested, and at each even regard the school as a threat particular reasons that girls receive of the three age levels examined. 52 A typical finding showed the mean or defer spending on learning resources to improve health. By score for students in a developing materials. But this is a costly the end of the 1960s it was increas- country to be in the bottom 5 to alternative if costs are considered ingly plain that health care systems 10 percent of students from a in terms of the education provided modeled on those in the developed developed country. Some of the rather than simply per student world were not the quickest, handicaps of children in develop- in school. cheapest or most effective way to ing countries may be due to lower Properly designed and sup- improve the health of the majority levels of parental education (which ported radio projects have poten- of people in developing countries. has a substantial impact, particu- tial for improving learning (and in The 1970s have thus witnessed larly in the preschool years) or certain cases reducing costs). To the evolution of a much broader in some cases to prolonged mal- take a well-documented example, approach to health policy, induding nutrition. But the evidence suggests in Nicaragua regular radio broad- an emphasis on universal low-cost that they are mainly a reflection of casts achieved dramatic improve- basic health care. But despite some low-quality schooling. ments in mathematics for primary successful experiments, "primary There are a number of promising students. Although new tech- health care" is still more of a approaches to improving education- nologies and growing experience slogan than a nationwide reality al quality in developing countries. are increasing the educational in most developing countries. To The curriculum should take potential of television, lack of rural change this is the greatest health into account the linguistic and electricity and the high costs of challenge of the 1980s. home backgrounds of students. capital, maintenance and operation Frequently curricula are too de- put it out of reach for most countries. Life expectancy and mortality manding, which only exacerbates Research into these approaches There is considerable variation tendencies to repeat classes or has indicated important potential, among developing countries. In drop out, particularly for those but it remains to be seen how 11 of the richer ones, life expectancy from poor homes. Whenever much they can improve quality is 70 years or moreclose to the possible, subjects should be within the constraints of politically average level (74 years) in indus- illustrated with examples that feasible budgets. This underlines trialized countries. But in low- draw on the child's experience. the importance of finding cheap income countries, life expectancy The selection and training of ways to improve quality if the averages only 50 years, and several teachers should be improved educational gaps between devel- countries are under 45. Thus through more training facilities, oping and developed countries, and despite the health improvements greater use of in-service training, between rich and poor in develop- that have occurred throughout the and more resourcesteachers' ing countries, are to be narrowed. developing world over the past guides, advisory services, mass- three decades, the gap between media programs and bulletins. This Health developed and developing coun- takes time, however; for many tries remains wide. countries, better teaching will be In general terms, the determinants Babies born in a developing as much a consequence as a source of health have long been well known. country will on average live 20 of improved quality in schools. One is people's purchasing power years less than those born in the The design, production and (which depends on their incomes industrialized world. About half distribution of learning materials and on prices) over certain goods of this difference can be explained should be upgraded. This applies and services, including food, by what happens in the first five particularly to textbooks, because housing, fuel, soap, water and years of life. Some 17 percent of research indicates that increasing medical services. Another is children in developing countries their availability is the most con- the health environmentclimate, (and more than 30 percent in sistently effective way of raising standards of public sanitation and several of the poorest) die before educational standards. A nation- the prevalence of communicable their fifth birthday; in industriali7ed wide textbook project supported diseases. A third is people's countries, only about 2 percent by the World Bank in the Philip- understanding of nutrition, health do. Mortality rates among children pines significantly increased stu- and hygiene. aged one to four in low-income dent learning while increasing Knowledge is still evolving, countries are frequently 20-30 costs per student by only 1 per- however, on the relative importance times those in industrialized coun- cent. When school budgets are of these different factors, and on tries, and sometimes even more. squeezed, it is all too easy to cut the best ways to deploy government Although the gap tends to narrow 53 as average incomes rise, in a 1 percent. The main causes of child similarity to those in developed number of countries with 1978 deaths in developing countries are countries. There is also less differ- incomes of more than $900 (in- diarrheal diseases and respiratory ence between urban areas in cluding Jordan, Turkey, Algeria infections, especially influenza and developed and developing countries and Guatemala) the chances of a pneumonia. (It has been estimated than between rural areas, since child dying between its first and that diarrheal diseases cause 5-10 people who live in urban areas fifth birthdays were still at least million deaths a year and respira- have higher incomes, are better 10 times as great as in industrialized tory diseases 4-5 million, making educated and have better access countries. On average, for children them by far the biggest killers for to health care. About 60-70 percent in developing countries who reach the population as a whole.) of physicians in Africa work in the age of five, further life expect- Other diseases that make adults urban areas, where about 20 per- ancy is still eight to nine years ill may be fatal in young children. cent of the population lives. Latin Malaria, for example, has been America is relatively well endowed estimated to kill 1 million African with physicians, but two-thirds of children a year. Common childhood them serve the large cities where diseases, such as measles, diphtheria, only a third of the population lives. Figure 5.2 Death by age groups: developing and industrialized whooping cough and polio, which This gap is much wider than can countries, 1980 have either been virtually eliminated be justified on the grounds that from developed countries or else specialized referral services must Percentage dead by the age of: reduced to minor nuisances, can be located in towns. 5 15 50 65 over 65 be fatal or crippling in developing Some of the health problems ones. A case of measles is often of developed countries, however, more than 200 times more likely are magnified in developing ones. Developing to kill a child in a developing country The need to achieve competitive than in an industrialized one. All costs has led industries in some of these diseases can be prevented developing countries to adopt lower Industrialized by vaccination, yet fewer than 10 standards of job safety than prevail I. Deaths by age group as percent of the children born each in advanced countries, and accident percentage of total deaths: under 5 5-14 15-49 50-64 65 and over year in the developing countries rates are high. Similarly, the number are being protected. of deaths per automobile is much A major reason that these greater than in advanced countries; Developing infections so often lead to death for example, it is more than 100 in preschool children in developing times higher in Nigeria than in the countries is their interaction with United States and 16 times higher malnutrition, especially among per vehicle-mile. The joint use of Industrialized children between six months and roads by pedestrians, animals, three years old. As a result, malnu- bicycles and motor vehicles is a 0 20 40 60 80 100 trition appears to contribute to major reason for this. Percent between one-third and two-thirds Even though many of the diseases a. At current mortality rates. of all child deaths, and perhaps and much of the death in develop- even more in the poorest countries. ing countries reflects an unhealthy A comprehensive study of 35,000 environment, there are significant less than in developed countries deaths in 14 communities in Latin differences between rich and poor and they are much more likely to America found that 34 percent of (see Table 5.6). The poor, whether suffer from disease (see next page). deaths of children under five had urban or rural, are more likely The very high death rates among serious malnutrition as an under- than the rich to live where diseases young children, combined with lying or associated cause. An are endemic, and less likely to take high birth rates, mean that a additional 23 percent of deaths preventive measures or to seek tragically large proportion of the were associated with premature prompt medical care even when deaths in a developing country births, which themselves partially it is available. A poor family is occur among children under five reflected maternal malnutrition. much less able to tide itself over (see Figure 5.2). For example, in Compared with children, adult while a breadwinner is ill; even a Brazil in 1975 they were 48 percent mortality patterns in developing relatively minor illness may plunge of all deaths. In Sweden they were countries show a much greater it from poverty into destitution. 54 Table 5.6 Differences in life tend to be geographically more Some studies have shown that expectancy within countries concentratedalthough in 1976 malaria control sharply reduced Income it was estimated that 850 million absenteeismfrom about 35 percent (national Life people lived in areas where malaria to about 3 percent in one program Country average expectancy and region = 100) (years) persisted despite efforts to control in the Philippines in 1947. Anthro- Brazil, 1960-70 it, and another 345 million in areas pological research suggests that Northeast region 54 47.9 with little or no control. Schisto- settlement on fertile lands has Southeast region 122 62.8 somiasis (bilharzia) is carried by often been prevented by major Tanzania, 1973 snails, which flourish in slow- diseases. There have been surpris- Kigoma region 46 43.0 moving water. It is severe in East ingly few detailed studies of the Kilimanjaro region 215 55.0 Asia, East Africa and in irrigated effects of illness on productivity Thailand, 1969-70 areas of Latin America; an estimated of individual workers; more North region 78 55.6 Bangkok region 248 63.7 180-250 million people are infected. research is needed in this area. Trypanosomiasis (sleeping sick- It is also likely that disease dis- ness) is found in a wide band in courages innovation, by making the middle of Africa. It is generally people more reluctant to take risks Illness fatal if untreated in the early stages. or to commit themselves to activ- Nonfatal diseases are more common Carried by the tsetse fly, it was ities where precise timing is crucial. and more serious in developing largely under control in the 1950s, A study of Paraguayan farmers than developed countries. But the but has revived because control suffering in varying degrees from relatively small proportion of people measures have slackened. It malaria found that severely affect- over the age of 65 in most developing constitutes a serious risk to the ed families obtained lower yields, countries considerably reduces the life and health of at least 35 million cleared less land and avoided cul- significance of chronic, degenerative people and has imposed great losses tivating crops that required labor diseaseswhich affect about a third on animal herds. Chagas' disease, at specific times. In industry, of the elderly in the United States, the Latin American form of trypa- capital may be substituted for labor for example. nosomiasis, remains endemic in where workers are frequently The most widespread diseases many rural areas. absent because of endemic disease. in developing countries are those Onchocerciasis (river blindness), transmitted by human fecesthe carried by the simulium fly that Difficulties of improving health intestinal parasitic and infectious breeds in swift-running water, is In its early stages, slowly declining diseases, but also poliomyelitis, hyperendemic in parts of West mortality in Europe largely reflected typhoid and cholera. These spread Africa and Central America. In improved nutrition, housing and easily in areas without safe com- some areas it has led to the de- hygiene brought about by rising munity water supplies and good population of fertile river valleys. incomes. The spread of education hygiene practices. While they are Attempts have been made to also helped. The initial stages of leading causes of death in young control these diseases by eliminating declining mortality in developing children, they are frequently disease carriers through chemical countries have been based on an chronic and debilitating rather than and environmental mechanisms, additional factornew technologies causes of acute illness or death. but with only limited and in some that affect masses of people, such Their incidence is high. For example, instances temporary success. In as pesticides and vaccinations. It the WHO estimated that in 1971 some cases effective drugs exist. is estimated that life expectancy in about 650 million people had Control requires a well-developed developing countries in 1970 would ascariasis (roundworms). A World health service to monitor outbreaks have been eight years less than Bank study of construction workers of the disease and take remedial what it was without the contribu- at three sites in West Java, Indonesia, measures. tion of these changes in public found 85 percent infected with For children, illness obviously health technologies. hookworm. disrupts their attendance at school But some diseases, including Of the other diseases that usually and reduces their ability to con- most causes of diarrhea and many cause debilitation in adults rather centrate and learn. As for adults, respiratory infections, cannot be than death, tuberculosis in particular research on the consequences of prevented by currently available remains extremely widespread. their diseases has been very limited immunization or pesticides. Their Most debilitating diseases trans- and has not produced consistent reduction comes through improve- mitted by insects or other carriers or generally applicable conclusions. ments in sanitary conditions and 55 nutrition, and changes in individual example, rose nearly threefold sleeping sicknessnow exist in health habits. These diseases have between 1972 and 1976; other most of the affected areas. They declined least in developing coun- diseases have also spread, though can be operated effectively without tries and contribute most to not so sharply. people changing their behavior mortality in those countries today. These reversals have happened (though this is less true of schisto- There has been considerable partly because authorities became somiasis, since people as well as concern that developing countries, overconfident and allowed control snails play a role in its transmission). particularly in the high mortality programs to run down. In addition, Pesticides can often be used more areas of Sub-Saharan Africa and control became much more expen- efficiently. South Asia, have not maintained sive in the early 1970s. Pesticide There is also room for better the momentum of the 1950s in prices escalated and disease carriers coverage by immunization pro- reducing disease. This is largely developed a tolerance for common, grams, even in areas not otherwise because countries have moved inexpensive pesticides (especially provided with government health beyond the "technological" phase DDT). Economic development has services. Sierra Leone, for example, of improving health: the closer sometimes made matters worse: employs recruitment teams; they they come to developed-country small-scale irrigated agriculture enlist the help of local leaders in levels, the harder it is to progress has expanded agricultural produc- gathering together everyone who at the same rate. It also reflects tionbut also the habitat of snails needs to be immunized imme- the fact that some communicable that carry schistosomiasis. diately before the vaccinators diseases have increased. The Programs to control endemic arrive in the village. number of cases of malaria, for diseasesespecially malaria and Apart from these efforts, major progress in family health behavior and in the provision of health Oral rehydration services is needed. Simple treatment oral rehydration mixture consisting of: can frequently be effective: for A simple innovation has revolutionized table salt (sodium chloride), 3.5 grams; example, the lives of children with the treatment of a major killer in devel- bicarbonate of soda, 2.5 grams; potassium acute diarrhea can often be saved oping countries. Diarrhea normally stops chloride, 1.5 grams; and glucose, 20 grams. on its own accord after three to five days, These ingredients are usually mixed and by feeding them a solution of but it occasionally causes a severe loss packaged beforehand; the health worker water, salt and sugar (see box). of body fluid; the resulting dehydration (or a child's mother) simply dissolves Education, especially of mothers, is often fatal, particularly to young chil- the mixture in one liter of water. Pre- is important. Studies in 29 devel- dren. Replacing that fluid can prevent packaged mixes range in cost from $0.07 oping countries have shown that most deaths. to $0.10, and one to three packets might For more than a century, fluid has been be needed while the diarrhea lasts. infant and child mortality were intravenously "dripped" into sufferers There now is considerable interest in consistently lower the better a method with obvious drawbacks in the possibility that mothers could mix a educated the mothers; each extra countries where there are few medical dose from the two ingredients that are year of schooling on average meant facilities. In the past 12 years it has available in most homessugar and table nine per 1,000 fewer infant and gradually been established that an oral salt. But the recipe lacks potassium and dose has just the same effect. Even dur- bicarbonate (both of which are lost child deaths. Cross-country studies ing diarrhea, the intestine continues to during diarrhea), and using too much salt (see box on page 38) confirm that absorb glucoseand glucose will carry could be dangerous for the child. literacy has a strong, favorable water and essential salts with it. Home-mixing and the standard WHO effect on life expectancy. And as Oral rehydration had its most impres- formula are not, of course, mutually discussed below (see pages 66 and sive initial success in 1971, in camps for exclusive. One report (based on a field refugees from the Bangladesh war. More experiment in Narangwal, India) recom- 67) family planning services can than 3,700 patients were treated in two mended home-mixing for relatively mild contribute directly to better health months under extraordinarily difficult cases of diarrhea, with a variant of the of mothers and children. circumstances, with a case fatality rate WHO formula used only for more Improved water supplies and of 3.6 percent instead of the 30 percent severe ones. This experiment placed waste disposal are important in before the treatment began. Oral rehydra- principal responsibility for treatment in tion has since been used to prevent or the hands of auxiliary nurse-midwives the long run in reducing disease. treat dehydration due both to cholera (who live in the villages) and the mothers But they must be accompanied by and to other diarrheas in many countries of affected children. While the incidence better hygienic practices if they of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Prop- of diarrhea changed little after the new are to be fully effective. Where erly delivered, it could save millions of treatment was introduced, the case funds are short, water supply lives a year. fatality rate declined by almost half The WHO currently recommends an from 2.7 per 1,000 to 1.5 per 1,000. networks in urban areas usually deserve priority over sewers, which 56 are more expensive and less critical compared with 490 per physician, reliance and partnership between to health. (Latrines, septic tanks 80 per hospital bed, and 260 per communities and government. and other lower-cost alternatives nurse in the Federal Republic of The concept has achieved wide- to conventional sewerage are less Germany. (Some of the middle- spread intergovernmental support, likely to contaminate water sup- income countries, though, have especially from the 1978 Interna- plies if the water is centrally treated almost as many physicians per tional Conference on Primary Health and distributed under pressure in person as the developed countries Care. This has been no mean political pipes.) But water supply systems do.) achievement; but in most countries must be maintainedsomething For many necessary but simple the rhetoric still must be translated that is frequently neglected. A medical tasks, paramedical workers into more money and reorganized World Bank review of village are likely to do a better job than health systems. water supplies found two coun- physicians, who may be dissatis- A key element of primary health tries in which systems were fail- fied with their work in rural areas care, or of any health care system ing faster than they were being and so turn to private practice. that attempts wide coverage at constructed. In many countries, however, there relatively low cost, is the use of Although heavy investment in are even fewer nurses than there are community health workers (CHWs) water supplies is often warranted doctors. with limited training both to pro- as a means of raising living stan- In many developing countries, vide front-line services and to refer dards, it is unlikely to produce people typically live in scattered, seriously ill patients or special quick or dramatic improvements often small villages and cannot cases to larger dispensaries and in healthand is expensive for travel far. They are therefore hospitals (see box overleaf). The low-income countries. Even public unwilling or unable to seek out potential duties among which standpipes and yard taps, while modern health facilities in urban their time must be allocated are much cheaper than conventional areas, except in extraordinary maternal and child health care, house connections with internal emergencies. Moreover, where midwifery, family planning, treat- plumbing, can cost more than $40 rural health facilities are available, ment of injuries and helping to per person (in 1978 prices). In they are usually far too small to move seriously injured people to contrast, immunization against all employ a physician full timeand referral facilities. In addition, they common childhood diseases costs certainly too small to make efficient may organize immunization and at most $5 per child. use of equipment and auxiliary mass treatment programs, provide staff. Although occasional visits guidance on nutrition, family plan- Availability of health care by traveling doctors and nurses ning and hygiene, and monitor epi- The amount spent on health care can help, they are obviously unable demics, water quality and sanitation. varies widely throughout the to provide services at short notice. Although several examples (in- developing world, though it is They may also not develop suffi- cluding Chinasee box on page typically very low. Government cient individual rapport with 74) have shown that effective pri- health budgets in low-income Africa patients. mary health care is feasible even and Asia are usually less than $5 for low-income countries, it makes per person a year (and frequently Primary health care fairly heavy administrative de- much less). Private outlays are often The widespread provision of basic mands. An effective coordinated largerin Bangladesh, for example, preventive and curative medical approach is neededinvolving individuals spent an estimated $1.50 services is essential. But in an careful selection and training of each in 1976, or three times what attempt to tackle both the broader CHWs, thorough supervision, the government was spending. But causes of health problems and referral of serious cases to better the combined total of $2 compares administrative, political and other trained and equipped people, and with about $700 in the Federal implementation problems (see adequate (but controlled) availa- Republic of Germany. This gap Chapter 6), the WHO and UNICEF bility of drugs and other supplies. would remain huge even if allow- have recently sponsored a concept Without this, CHWs are likely to ance were made for differences called "primary health care" that become demoralized, discredited in prices. It is thus not surprising goes far beyond these services. It and inefficientand their recom- that in the mid-1970s in Bangla- is an integrated approach to health mendations for curative and pre- desh there were 9,260 people per that also spans food production, ventive care disregarded. physician, 5,600 per hospital bed, education, water and sanitation; Moreover, the emphasis that and 42,080 per nurse or midwife, in addition, it emphasizes self- this Report (and others) gives to 57 Lessons of experience degree to which the local political system confident of his or her skills and often National experience with primary health reflects these interests. China has suc- encounters difficulties that instructors care systems is still very limited. The ceeded in making the community entirely did not anticipate. Experience in Tan- Chinese barefoot doctors date from the responsible for compensating the CHW. zania underlines the need for sound, con- mid-1960s (see box on page 74). During But overreliance on local finance may tinuous supervision. Supervisors should the 19705 countries a', diverse as Iran, mean that the poorest communities get both provide in-service training and en- Brazil, Sudan, India, Jamaica, Botswana the worst attention, sure that performance meets minimum and Tanzania began large-scale systems. Recruitment and training. The CHW standards. Iran, Sudan and Botswana Their experience has shown which are should be mature enough to enjoy the have found that it is better to overesti- the key requirements of success. respect of the community. Early programs mate the amount of supervision needed Political support and finance, It is stressed formal education as a qualification than to risk undermining the confidence vital to secure the support of a substantial for the CHW, and thus recruited young and credibility of the CHW. Workers share of the country's "health establish- people. Reviews of experience in Sudan should be visited regularly by staff from ment"; without this, sound medical clearly indicate that such people are not neighboring dispensaries, health centers supervision and adequate finance will not easily accepted by communities. Ideally and hospitals as well as from the office of be possible, and primary health care will the CHW should have children and the regional medical officer. This compen- be little more than an empty gesture personal experience with health crises, sates for frequent transport difficulties toward the poor. It is also important to Programs now recruit highly motivated, or competing demands on the supervi- ensure that this type of medicine is not older people even if younger applicants sor's time. In addition, it ensures that mislabeled as "second ate." are better educated, The CHW also should a broad range of issues (from clinical The Community Health Worker live in the community; this has been care to drug management) are consid- (CHW) should work cooperatively with found to reduce turnover as well as ensure ered, and that visits from the outside are the community, if possible through such familiarity with local culture. In some regarded as routine, not part of a crisis. recognized organizations as the local countries, such as Iran and Yemen, it has Providing facilities for telephone or council or village development committee been necessary to train both a male and radio contact between CHWs and super- (as they do in Botswana and Sudan). This a female CHW because of objections to visors has provided backup and helped - builds community support and increases treatment by members of the opposite sex, avoid unnecessary referrals in Honduras, chances of improving family health Community health workers must be for example. Physicians or highly trained practices; hours of service, use of drugs given enough training, equipment and health personnel often give curative work and materials, and patient satisfaction supplies to ensure that only one patient priority over supervision of CHWsso can also be monitored. The community in four or five is referred to higher levels. nontechnical personnel should also play organization should have access to the High referral rates undermine the com- a part in the supervision and monitoring supervisor of the CHW. munity's confidence in the CHW and of CHWs. At least part of the Cl-lW's salary should also increase the probability of patients A standard, simple set of drugs should be paid by government so that health bypassing him or her, This conclusion be provided to CHWs; if budget cuts are officials can retain some on Ira I. But some has been confirmed by studies in Mexico necessary, they should not fall on medi- local finance or voluntar',' efforts also and Thailand. Moreover, several countries cines and supplies for the CHW (as has make the CHW responsive to local feel that CHWs should have the chance sometimes been the case). Standards are concernsand in turn can make the to develop their careers, by competing required for the use of drugs and community more aware of the services for entry into higher grades. Sudan, for supplies; and the drugs provided to offered, The government of India is example, is planning to confine its "medical individual CHWs should be monitored providing a stipend of 600 rupees a year assistant" training programs to CHWs. to identify misuse or misappropriation. ($76) to "volunteer" health workers. Supervision and supplies. Frequent Kenya has developed a model program Whether local pressures work in the supervision of the CHW is essential. The for managing drug use, based upon care- interests of the poor depends on the isolated, modestly trained CHW is rarely fully devised treatment standards. primary health care should not time physician). These should come more clinics and about 50 CHWs. detract from the importanceor under the umbrella of a referral The balance struck between the understate the difficultyof strik- hospital with laboratory, x-ray various levels of the health care ing the right balance between facilities, an operating theatre and system wifi depend on many factors, community level activities and the beds. (China, interestingly, has including financial and political back-up system that provides given much more emphasis to the support for the objectives of pri- referral services and supervision. referral system than is generally mary health care, administrative Rural health centers, urban clinics recognized.) Depending on popu- capabilities, the receptivity of those or district hospitals should deal lation densities, transport, and to be served, the extent of urbani- with various illnesses that are incomes, the hospital could serve zation, and national income. Higher- beyond the scope of a CHW (though 100,000 to 250,000 people and income countries can afford to even they may not need a full- oversee the activities of three or reduce the ratio of persons covered 58 per hospital and clinic, and to staff often thought to reflect primarily vitamins to salt and other processed and equip them better. But even a shortage of protein (and in some foods, and increasing emphasis on in industrialized countries, there cases, vitamins or minerals). Most producing foods typically consumed is a strong trend toward more nutrition programs concentrated by the poor. emphasis on paramedical workers on providing high-protein food to These points will be amplified to improve the spread and effec- children, usually in schools. The in the following discussion. tiveness of basic health care and emphasis today is different. There to help keep costs down. is now a wide measure of agreement Prevalence of malnutrition In many countries it is also on several broad propositions. Evidence of serious malnutrition desirable to make use of, and Serious and extensive nutri- in almost all developing countries provide some training for, tradi- tional deficiencies occur in virtually comes from three main sources: tional health practitioners, such as all developing countries, though estimates of food consumption, "ayurveds" in South Asia and the they are worst in low-income anthropometric and clinical studies, traditional birth attendants found countries. They are usually caused and data on child mortality. in almost every country. This is by undernourishmenta shortage The estimates of food consump- partly because they often have the of foodnot by an imbalance tion by different income groups trust of their patients and because between calories and protein. normally show that in all but patients pay for their services There may often be shortages of the richest developing countries, (enabling government funds to be specific micronutrients and of consumption by large sections of spread farther); but it is primarily protein, especially among young the population is well below what because in many countries, includ- children. But given the typical is needed for a minimally satisfac- ing some of those where the world's composition of the diets of the tory diet. Undernutrition is most poor are concentrated, these prac- poor, to the extent that calorie widespread in Africa (where in titioners provide near-universal requirements (as estimated by the many countries food supplies have coverage of people who, realistically, FAQ and the WHO) are met, it is not even kept up with population will not be reached by effective likely that other nutritional needs growth) and in South Asia. It is government health programs for will also be satisfied. also common in Latin America and some time to come. Training can Malnutrition affects old and the Middle East. Estimates of the help them to improve their treat- young, male and female, urban total number of malnourished people ment, dispense some modern and rural dwellers; particularly are surrounded by controversy: medicines and participate in health prevalent among children under there is dispute about what calorie or family planning education. five, it reduces their resistance to and protein requirements are on In addition, there is stifi an urgent diseases and is a major cause of average "adequate"; individuals need for research to develop meas- their death. In many societies, girls may have requirements very dif- ures to prevent or treat common suffer more than boys. ferent from the average; and within disabling diseasesfor example, Malnutrition is largely a reflec- households food often is not malaria, schistosomiasis and the tion of poverty: people do not have distributed in proportion to indi- main causes of diarrhea in children enough income for food. Given vidual needs. Nevertheless, allowing that are simple and cheap enough the slow income growth that is a wide margin for uncertainties, to be applied within the frame- likely for the poorest people in the the evidence is strong enough to work of a primary health care foreseeable future, large numbers conclude that several hundred system. will remain malnourished for mfflion people are undemourished. decades to come. Anthropometric and clinical Poor nutritional practices and studies (based on measures of Nutrition the inequitable distribution of food height, weight for height, arm Systematic efforts at national within families also are causes of circumference, skin-fold thickness, nutrition planning in developing malnutrition. blood tests and so on) show, for countries go back barely a decade. The most effective long-term example, that children from During that brief time there has policies are those that raise the wealthier families, or from families been considerable progress in incomes of the poor, and those that have migrated to developed establishing the extent and causes that raise food production per countries, tend to grow substan- of malnutrition and what can be person. Other relevant policies tially taller than do children of done to reduce it. include food subsidies, nutrition the poor. Ten years ago, malnutrition was education, adding minerals or The data on child mortality 59 reflect the combined effects of and mental development, and reduce countries have shown that better- sickness and malnutrition. Infec- energy and motivation. In com- nourished children (as measured tions can reduce appetite and food munities that have an exceptionally by height for age) do better in intake in several different ways, high incidence of goiter, 4 percent mental tests. It is not always pos- including the action of intestinal or more of children may be sible to isolate nutrition from parasites; and they can reduce the deaf-mutes or cretins. other factors affecting intelligence, proportion of nutrients that the Vitamin A deficiency is also but there is some evidence of its body absorbs. Undernutrition in extensiveaffecting, it has been independent effects. turn weakens the body's immuniz- suggested, half the children in Malnutrition also affects earnings. ing mechanismsand so lowers its many developing countries. In an In part, this reflects the consequences defenses against the initial infection, extreme form it can lead to blind- of childhood malnutrition on while making it more susceptible ness. But in less serious forms mental development and educational to further infections. As previously it can still lead to poor eyesight, achievement; but there are also noted, malnutrition is estimated undermining educational per- links between nutrition and physical to be a contributory cause of a formance and adult earning power. productivity. In the long run, adults third or more of infant and child It can also affect growth, skin can only be as energetic as their deaths in developing countries (see condition and the severity of other diets will allowotherwise they page 54). nutritionally related illnesses. would gradually become emaciated and ill. For example, farmers who Kinds of malnutrition Victims of malnutrition are badly malnourished put in fewer Most malnutrition reflects a short- Young children suffer most from hours per hectare than those who age of calories, protein, or both. undernourishment, followed by are better nourished. Research on But some diets are inadequate pregnant and nursing mothers. In the relation between nutrition and because they lack specific nutrients. many countries, there is considerable productivity has not been extensive, Anemia, resulting primarily from evidence that girls are less well but a few studies have suggested blood loss and too little iron, is nourished than boys. This is that greater height or weight leads the most prevalent example of this. especially true of South Asia, to greater physical productivity. A recent estimate is that at least where newborn girls have signifi- In contrast to most other indicators 500 million people are anemic. The cantly smaller chances of surviving of well-being, malnutrition in many consequent fatigue, the apparent to age five; in a number of countries, countries appears to be at least as lethargy and apathy, and the adverse induding some in the Middlle East, serious in urban as in rural areas. effects on productivity and school girls are weaned substantially earlier Surveys in India, Brazil, Thailand performance can be so common than boys (see box on page 91). and Indonesia have shown that in poorer societies as to appear Most childhood malnutrition the proportion of the population normal. It is estimated that more does not result in early death. But with very low calorie consumption than half the victims of anemia it means severe hardship beginning is substantially greater in urban are adult women in developing at birth, which may prevent children areas. This is partly because of the countries. Anemia due to iron and from ever escaping the poverty higher cost of food in many urban folic acid deficiency is common into which they were born. Mal- areas (although not in those with among pregnant womenand nutrition stunts growth; in severe food subsidies) and higher expen- harmful, because it can lead to cases it may retard mental devel- ditures for such things as house premature birth and a much lower opment even after its physical rents and public transport. chance of survival for the newborn effects have been shaken off. Several But to some extent it is a sign child. The more children a woman studies have shown that children that living and working in cities has, the greater the probability of who have recovered from severe is less physically demanding than severe anemiaso adding to the clinical malnutrition during their in rural areas, rather than an indi- cycle of poverty, high fertility and preschool years continue to do cator of greater malnutrition. low rates of child survival. significantly worse in intelligence In any event, because the poor Goiter is another common dis- and other tests than their unaffected are primarily rural, malnutrition order (affecting perhaps 200 miffion classmates. remains primarily a rural problem. people) caused by a micronutrient There is also some evidence, Rural populations are also more deficiencyin this case, iodine. less conclusive, of the harmful likely to suffer seasonal variations Available evidence suggests that effects of mild long-term malnu- in food consumption; they are most iodine deficiency can stunt physical trition; some studies in developing affected in the wet season, when twin 60 peaks in farm work and widespread infection often coincide with the pe- Food and the poor dod when food is in shortest supply. As people get higher incomes, they eat Composition of expenditure, by betterand spend proportionately less income group, Indonesia, 1976 Causes of malnutrition on food. The chart shows household Poorest Richest To what degree is malnutrition, spending patterns in Indonesia, but its decile decile Median essence applies to every developing especially among young children country. The richest households spend a 100 Other and pregnant and nursing mothers, higher proportion of their total budget caused by (a) inadequate family on housing, fuel, light and water than so Durable goods incomes, (b) ignorance of good the poorest do on all nonfood items. The composition of diets varies, too Clothing nutritional practices and (c) the 5° (a fact whose implications for policy are inequitable distribution of food explored on page 62). The poorest 30 Housing, fuel, etc. within families? There is some percent of people in Indonesia obtain 40 evidence that all three factors are about 40 percent of their calories from Other food important, but that low incomes cassava and corn and 46 percent from 20 vegetables & fruits are the central cause. rice, while the richest 30 percent obtain Meat, fish, only about 14 percent of their calories eggs & milk The famines in Ethiopia in from cassava and corn and 59 percent 01 Cereals 1000 2000 5000 10000 20000 1973-74 and Bangladesh in 1974 from rice. Monthly total expenditore were not caused by a fall in the Not only is food the main element in (rupiah per person) average amount of food available poor people's budgets; but preparing it per person. Rather, droughts caused takes up a lot of their time. Rice must be One study in a Java village found that threshed, winnowed and hand-milled to on average a woman works 11 hours a local declines in farm incomes, so remove the husk and bran; wheat and day. Roughly six hours are spent on that people in affected areas could maize must be threshed, winnowed and income-earning activities (wage work, not afford to buy food from the ground to produce flour; cassava must handicrafts, producing food for sale). unaffected areas. be skinned, boiled, pounded, strained The other five hours are spent around the At the global level, if income and dried to get rid of its deadly prussic home (collecting firewood, looking after acid; spices must be ground by hand; and children, sweeping and so on)and pre- were distributed differently, present so onall before any actual cooking is paring food, which takes three hours output of grain alone could supply done. a day. every man, woman and child with more than 3,000 calories and 65 grams of protein per dayfar more not only of farmers, but also of period is particularly critical. than the highest estimates of agricultural laborers, petty traders While it is desirable to continue requirements. Eliminating malnu- and workers in food-processing breastfeeding for the first year of trition would require redirecting industries. life, milk should be supplemented only about 2 percent of the world's Poor people spend the bulk of by solid food by six months of grain output to the mouths that their income on food. In India in age; this is often delayed. It is also need it. 1973-74 the poorest 20 percent likely that the poor nutrition of Major crop failures, which simul- were devoting 33 percent of their pregnant and nursing mothers taneously reduce rural incomes and total spending to foodyet on may at least partly reflect a lack national food supplies, can have average ate fewer than 1,500 cal- of knowledge. Several studies have even more catastrophic effects on ories a day each. At these very found that better-educated parents nutrition. While improved trans- low levels, the consumption of have better-nourished children: port and international movement calories (usually derived from the that this reflects more than the of food will reduce the impact on cheapest kind of food) changes higher incomes of educated parents prices, events such as the two almost proportionately with changes is suggested by the fact that the monsoon failures in India in 1965 in income. As incomes rise, a little mother's education is more impor- and 1966 can have a terrible impact margin enters the budget (see box). tant than the father's. on the poor: supplies of basic A lack of money is frequently Educationespecially girls' edu- food grains fell 12 percent and compounded by poor nutritional cationmay also help remedy one prices rose sharply. Relative to the practices, Several common beliefs of the most serious and intractable prices of manufactured goods, about nutrition have harmful nutritional problems: the way food they were 37 percent higher in effects and must be attributed pri- is distributed within the family. 1967 than in 1963-65, In addition, marily to ignorance rather than A variety of evidence indicates that the crop failures cut the incomes poverty. For children, the weaning in most developing countries adult 61 women receive a lower proportion tion and drainage than other crops; to a remarkably low level for such of their food requirements than and, in the case of root crops, many a poor country. Because of this, adult men; girls are likewise gen- can be grown throughout the year and Sri Lanka's health and educa- erally less well-fed than boys. As and some are drought-resistant. tion services, life expectancy has between adults and children, the In addition, both root crops and reached 69 years. When subsidized picture is less clear: in many coun- coarse grains tend to be produced food rations were sharply reduced tries children under five (and partic- by small farmers, who would bene- in 1974, largely because of a steep ularly up to age three, when they are fit if encouraged to produce more. increase in the price of imported less able to take food themselves) Coarse grains can often be food, Sri Lanka's death rate rose do much worse than adults; in grown together with low-cost noticeably (even after allowances some countries, though, this is not vegetable sources of protein. for other plausible influences); it the case. Although cassava is very low in declined again in 1976 and 1977, These sorts of discrimination protein, studies show that its price when food became more plentiful. sometimes reflect difficult choices is so low that most of the people Large-scale food subsidies are also made under severe economic duress, who meet most of their caloric common in the Middle East and including a justifiable concern for needs by eating a lot of it are able North Africa; they have played a the breadwinner. But they also to buy enough protein-rich food significant part in improving the reflect ignorance of nutritional to balance their diets. But there nutrition of the poor. priorities and deep-rooted cultural has not been enough emphasis on But general food subsidies have biases. (Concern for this problem the production of cheap sources of a major drawbackthey are very appears to have been one of the protein, such as the cheaper varieties expensive. They have cost as much reasons for the Chinese experiment of beans and lentils. as 10-20 percent of government with communal feeding during the Despite long-standing neglect spending in some countries, includ- Great Leap Forward in 1953-59. in research, extension services, ing Egypt, South Korea (tempo- It encountered massive social access to credit and so on, in recent rarily in 1974-75) and Sri Lanka. resistance and was abandoned.) years there has been greater aware- Much of the cost is for imports, ness of the importance of foods which use up scarce foreign ex- Nutrition policies and programs eaten by the poor. The international change or aid. And some of this The causes and consequences of agricultural research centers (in goes to people who do not really malnutrition suggest various particular those in India, Colombia, need to be subsidized. cures. Boosting food production and Nigeria) have increasingly Countries with strong adminis- (especially of food that poor people extended their research to these tration can organize income tests eat and grow) and raising the in- crops and have given more atten- not perfectly, but well enough comes of the poor are the two tion to nutritional issues. to cut costs. Sri Lanka, for example, central requirements in most Food marketing and storage could have done more for the countries. They can be reinforced programs can also have a major nutrition of the poor in 1974 if it by other effortsfood subsidies nutritional impact by reducing had concentrated the available of various kinds, fortifying food, regional, seasonal and annual vari- rations on them. In 1978 it intro- and educating people to know ations in food supplies and prices duced an income test to restrict what a good diet is. which contribute significantly to subsidies to the poorer half of the malnutrition. Market stability can population. But for many countries AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION. In- also be helped by better transport this would not be administratively creased food consumption by the and roads. or politically feasible. poor is in most countries unlikely Alternative ways of restricting to be sustained unless production FOOD suBsIDIEs. Few low-income subsidies to poor people include is raised as well. For nutritional countries have come near to nutri- subsidizing cheap foods that other purposes, much can be achieved tional adequacy without some groups tend to neglect. Sorghum, by producing more of what the form of food subsidies. Sri Lanka's a low-status food, was introduced poor traditionally eatsuch as ration-and-subsidy program in 1970 into ration shops in Bangladesh in millet and other coarse grains and provided about 20 percent of the 1978and in some rural areas was root crops. These are, in general, calories and 15 percent of the in- bought by nearly 70 percent of the cheapest source of calories. comes of the poorest quintile of low-income households, but only They have other advantages, too. the population. Largely as a result, 2 percent of high-income house- Some of them require less irriga- severe malnutrition was reduced holds. Subsidized foods may be 62 confined to particular places. In And only a small minority were anemia is not due solely to iron Colombia the nutrition program in the most vulnerable group of deficiencies, nor is it easily cured; assisted by the World Bank pro- allunder two years old. Such effective programs that can be vides nutritionally enriched foods schemes tend to be relatively universally applied are still some to specific age groups living in the expensive: in a number of these way off. poorest geographical areas, with- projects, annual food costs aver- It may sometimes be more out a specific family income test. aged $10-17 per child, with effectiveto administer extra The high cost of subsidies raises administrative costs adding a nutrients directly (orally or by another difficultykeeping the price further $3-7. injections). India and Bangladesh received by farmers high enough have done this with Vitamin A (at to encourage food production. FOOD FORTIFICATION. Adding six-month intervals). But reaching Governments may attempt to push specific micronutrients to food at those at major risk every six months down domestic food prices to cut the processing stage is common is usually impracticable. Many the cost of subsidy programs; and in both developed and develop- countries have provided iron plus farm prices may decline if too much ing countries. But there are two folic acid pills for pregnant women; food is imported for the subsidy general difficulties. First, those who others have reduced goiter by programmore, that is, than the do not need the supplement still injecting people with iodized oil net increase in food consumption. get it, so that the cost per person (a single injection provides protec- But countries (and food-aid donors) needing assistance may be high, tion for three to five years). can aniicipate and avoid adverse even if the cost per person receiving effects on incentives. Well-designed the supplement is low. Second, the NUTRITION EDUCATION. There have subsidies should be able to reduce poor may buy little processed food, been few, if any, striking successes, food prices for consumers and also and even that may be from small, but the potential effect of nutrition (since this increases the effective scattered processorsso that for- education is so vast that the demand for food) to maintain prices tification is hard or uneconomic attempt to increase knowledge for farmers. And proceeds from to arrange. about nutrition requires continuing food aid sold through subsidy The best results have come strong support. Clearly, education programs can, for example, be used from adding iodine to salt to pre- must be realistic: urging poor directly or indirectly to support vent goiter; almost all high-income families to buy milk might be agricultural programs. Introducing countries and some developing harmful if they can afford it only subsidies requires care, however, countries have succeeded with by eating fewer calories. since the political cost of abandon- this. Annual costs are much less Recent research on breastfeeding ing them is likely to be high. than one cent per person. Such has confirmed the value of breast programs are not yet universal milk, not only for nutrition but SUPPLEMENTARY FEEDING PROGRAMS. (but may not be effective if people also for transferring to babies Some countries have gone further get much of their salt from non- some of their mothers' immunity and have tried to target assistance commercial sources or very small against infections. In contrast, on the nutritionally most vulner- producers). bottle feeding in unhygienic con- ableyoung children and pregnant Vitamin A has been added to a ditions tends to increase the risk and nursing mothers. In some cases variety of foods (including tea, of infection, and is expensive. The food supplements have been given sugar, margarine, monosodium role of advertising in promoting for home consumption; in others glutamate and cereal products) infant milk formulas in develop- children have been fed directly. in several developing countries. ing countries at the expense of In both cases, however, benefits It is both effective and cheap breastfeeding has been questioned. have been shared with the whole for example, three cents a person In 1979, at a meeting sponsored familysince if children get food a year could provide 80 percent of by the WHO and UNICEF, several outside the home, parents tend to Guatemalans with 75 percent of major multinational food firms give them less from the family pot. their daily requirements. Much agreed to curtail direct advertising Studies of some preschool feed- more could be done. of infant formulas in developing ing programs in the mid-1970s Since anemia is so widespread, countries. An international code showed that schemes providing adding iron to food has been tried of marketing is now under consid- children directly with 300 calories several times. There have been eration by the WHO. a day gave them a net increase in technical difficulties, but these may Nutrition education will be consumption of about 100 calories. now have been overcome. But cheaper the more it can be made 63 part of education in general, com- ing to assess relative priorities with rates has been greatly narrowed if bined with information on family the help of national food and nutri- not wholly settled. The evidence planning and health, or tied to tion plans. These should ideally overwhelmingly suggests that both community organizations or other be supported by successive sample social and economic conditions and credible and influential communi- surveys of nutrition status, food family planning are important in cations channels. In addition, several consumption and production pat- determining birth rates, and that countries have experimented with terns by income group and region they are mutually reinforcing. rehabilitation centers for the severely which can show, for example, Accumulating evidence dearly malnourished, which not only save the likely nutritional impact of contradicts the fear that health the child but show mothers how to alternative subsidy or production programs, by lowering death rates, feed their children at home. Others programs. Such plans, especially will boost population growth in have experimented with mass if effectively followed up, also offer the long term. Although fertility media; relatively simple messages a way to focus the attention of, seemed unresponsive to falling that do not risk being misinterpreted say, agricultural ministries on the death rates during the 1950s and seem to have made people more implications of nutritional priori- 1960s, it has since declined in many poor countriespartly in response to lower death ratesand popula- Figure 5.3 Trends in birth and death rates, 1775-2050 tion growth is slowing down. (births and deaths per 1,000 population)" Demogrciphic trends und projections 50 Per 1,000 population Figure 5.3 compares past and pro- Brrth rate Death rate jected trends in birth rates and Developing countries death rates in developed and de- veloping countries. Two points need to be emphasized. One is the 20 Deat(rate"U Birth rate . rapid population growth in the developing world, after death rates plummeted in the postwar years, 10 and the continued rapid growth Developed countrtes projected for the rest of this cen- 0 tury. The second is the drop in 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050 birth rates, which began in the Rate of population increase = birth rate - death rate 1960s in the developing world, Crude birth and death rates, The projected increases in death rates after about 1980 reflect and the resulting gradual slow- the rising proportion of older people in the population, Include industrialized countries, the USSR and Eastern Europe, down in the population growth rate since thenfrom a peak of about 2.4 percent in 1965 to 2.2 percent now. aware of good practices, though ties for agricultural research, pric- Since 1965, birth rate declines they have not always been put ing, extension and other policies. of at least 10 percent have occurred into effect. The enormous amount in the world's two most populous of commercial advertising sug- Fertility countries, China and India, and in gests that the value of mass media a number of other major devel- in promoting social programs has In the past 10 years striking progress oping countriesIndonesia, the nowhere been adequately exploited. has been made in understanding Philippines, Thailand, Turkey and the causes and consequences of South Korea. Moreover, the recent PRIORITIEs AND PLANNING. As in high birth rates, and in helping rate of decline has been faster in other areas, difficult choices must to resolve two controversial and today's developing world than it be made in tackling malnutrition. important issues. was in the 19th century in Europe There are simply not enough fi- The dispute between those and the United States. England and nancial, political or administrative alleging that family planning the Netherlands took about 50 resources to implement all the programs had little effect on birth years to reduce their birth rates policies and programs outlined rates and those alleging that family from 35 to 20 per thousandor above. Some countries are attempt- planning alone could reduce birth about one point every three years; 64 Indonesia, Colombia and Chile have recently cut about one point Alternative population projections every year from their crude birth How sensitive are population projections Alternative population ratesthough generally from higher to changes in fertility and mortality rates? projections, Brazil initial starting points. To illustrate, compare two projections for Thus the comparison of current Brazil. The current World Bank projection Population (o:illior,) assumes that the total fertility rate (TFR) 300 birth rates between the rich and a measure of births per woman, stan- Age 266.4 poor worlds should not obscure dardized for age distributionwill decline 250 65-4- 238.4 the progress some developing from 4.9 today to replacement level (a 15-64 countries are now making in lower- TFR of 2.2) by 2015. The Brazilian government has not officially recognized 200 - 0-14 ing fertility. Higher incomes, more rapid population growth to be a problem, widespread education and the but it does permit family planning for 150 126.3 growing acceptability of family health purposesand the use of contra- 100 planning programs have begun to ceptives (mainly privately bought) is reduce birth rates in most middle- increasing. p What would happen if fertility reached 50 income countries in Latin America replacement level a decade earlier, in and East Asia, and in some countries 2005? This is what the Bank projections 0 and regions of South and South- assume for Colombia, a country with 1980 2020 I 2020 II east Asia. With continued socio- lower average incomes and roughly similar of 32 million will increase by 10 million economic progress the fertility levels of literacy and life expectancy, but under Case I, only 4 million under Case II decline is projected to spread to which already has a government-supported compared with an increase of 14 million family planning program and significantly in the past 20 years, and 21 million in the rest of South Asia and, with lower fertility (TFR = 3.7). For Brazil to the past 40. In 2020 under Case II, children some delay, to Africa, during the match Colombia would require a sharp under 15 would constitute only 15 percent 1980s and 1990s. but not unprecedented fertility decline. of the population, compared with 26 today. Even with these fertility declines, Birth rates would need to fall from 36 Even in Case II, the working-age however, world population will per 1,000 people in 1978 to just below population would more than double, from 20 in 2000less than the fall of one point 70 million today to 163 million in 2020. continue to grow. By 2000, World a year achieved in the past two decades On the other hand, the number of new Bank projections (which are by South Korea. entrants to the labor force would be broadly consistent with other pro- The figure illustrates the differences in considerably smaller. In 2020 Brazil will jections, such as those of the United the size and composition of the Brazilian need to find about 4.5 million new jobs Nations) indicate it will have risen population in 2020, under the alternative under Case I, but only 3.3 million under assumptions of replacement fertility in Case II. from the current estimate of 4.4 2015 (Case I) or in 2005 (Case II). Two Reaching replacement fertility in 2005, billion to about 6 billion; the pop- things to notice: not 2015, would make a big difference ulation of the developing coun- Under either projection, the propor- in the eventual size of Brazil's stationary tries (including China) is projected tion of children in the population will population (reached about 70 years later): to increase from 3.3 to 4.9 billion. decline substantially between 1980 and it would be 287 million rather than 345 2020. The current school-age (5-14) group million. India will grow from 672 to 974 million people; Brazil from 126 to 201 million; Nigeria from 85 to stationary populations would be circumstances prevailing in most 153 million. These projections are reduced by, for example, 200 mil- of the developing countries, rapid based on the assumption that cur- lion in India, 50 million in Nigeria population growth impedes eco- rent rates of social and economic and 36 million in Mexico. nomic growth by reducing invest- progress, including the spread of ment per person in physical capital family planning and health and Poverty nd high fertility and human skills. For individual education services, will continue; Poverty and high fertility are families the number of children if they change, so will population mutually reinforcing (see Figures affects how much parents can in- growth (see box). 5.4 and 5.5). As discussed in Chap- vest in each one's health and edu- It is instructive to consider the ter 4 (page 39), rapid population cationand thus in their future consequences of an acceleration growth is not always harmful. Re- earning power. of fertility decline such as to cause duction of population growth is Quantitative analysis suggests the rate of population growth in not an end in itself; nor does it for that social and economic factors particular countries to fall to zero every country or for every point in (such as incomes, literacy and life 10 years earlier than currently time increase the potential growth expectancy) accounted for as much projected. The size of the resulting of income per person. But in the as 60 percent of the variation in 65 suggest, however, is that programs become more attractive. This is Figure 5.4 Income and fertility, tend to flourish where their services particularly true for women, who 1978 are in demand. Nonetheless, gov- are primarily responsible for Total fertility ernment efforts are vital. bringing up children; as their opportunities for education and 7.0 Socioeconomic determinants Sub-Saharan Africa employment improve and their 6.0 of fertility horizons expand, they often want Mid. East & N. Africa 5.0 South - Asia Latin America & Caribbean Fertility is an area of human be- a smaller family. Second, with East Asia havior where individual tastes, increasing income, parents appar- 4.0 religion, culture and social norms ently prefer healthier and better- 3.0 Worldwide norm' all play a major role. Yet evidence educated, but fewer children. 2,0 S. Europe from large groups of people sug- They are more likely to want gests that differences in fertility more education for their children 1.0 can be largely explained by differ- when they believe that future job 0 ences in their social and economic opportunities will be governed 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 GNP per person (current dollars) environment. What are the mech- less by class origin or family See technical notes for Table 16 of the World anisms by which low education, background than by education and Development Indicators. Derived from cross-country equation relating total poor living conditions, high death associated skills. Since this tends fertility rate to GNP per person. rates and lack of health and to be a consequence of develop- family planning services lead to ment, it can help to explain falling large families? fertility over time. Third, the fertility changes among develop- Consider the issue from the children of the poor work at home ing countries from 1960 to 1977. point of view of parents and poten- and outside the home at an early The strength of family planning tial parents. They receive pleasure age: for richer parents, children's programs explained an additional from their children but have to work is not so vital to family 15 percent. spend time and money bringing welfare. The strength of family planning them up. Children are also a form If children help to support their programs is influenced substan- of investmentshort-term if they parents in old age, the (low) current tially by socioeconomic factors work during childhood, and long- costs of raising children are a (which account for about three- term if they support parents in small price to pay. Where mothers quarters of its variation). This helps disability or old age. Since chil- command only low wages, the explain why family planning pro- dren are a source of satisfaction, differences between children's and grams in countries with high fer- one might expect richer parents mothers' earnings may be small; tility, such as Pakistan, often to want more of them. Yet the op- work lost by the mother during appear weak even after years in posite is true, for several reasons. a child's infancy may be easily operation. This weakness is often The first is that the alternative recouped by the child later on. written off as simply lack of gov- uses of timeearning money, de- Finally, in poor countries much ernment effort. What the results veloping and using skills, leisure of women's traditional workin agriculture, crafts and petty retail- ingcan be combined with looking after children. Figure 5.5 Influences on fertility The link between household poverty and high fertility is further Government commitment Family planning reinforced by high rates of infant to poverty alleviation and child mortality; in poor families and fertility reduction many births and the high proba- Smaller desired bility of infant deaths go hand in Lower ertility family size hand. In the first place a mother Reduction in poverty: who stops breastfeeding because Higher female literacy Longer life expectancy t her baby dies is biologically more Higher incomes Higher age at marriage likely to conceive another. Parents Other cultural and social factors whose children die often try to t / replace them; and where high mortality is common, social norms 66 (which respond only gradually to cultural or religious differences. program to reduce population changes in mortality) tend to en- But culture never seems to have growth. courage "insurance" against the been an impenetrable barrier to In Latin America, later marriage expected loss of children. On the fertility change. Once a high enough has been a less important ingredient other hand, high fertility contrib- level of development has been of declining fertility.This has been utes to high infant and child mor- reached, fertility has fallen without partly because average age at mar- tality: many births, especially if exception. Where there was a strong riage was already high compared they are close together, can weaken religious or cultural resistance to with Asia, partly because much both mother and children. contraception, as in Ireland, fertility of the fertility decline in such fell through delays in the age at countries as Chile, Colombia and FAMILY PLANNING. The link be- marriage and an increase in life- Costa Rica has been among older tween household poverty and high long celibacy, rather than through women, and partly because child- rates of childbearing is further family planning. bearing outside wedlock is more cemented by the fact that the poor common. Fertility is generally still have very limited access to AGE AT MARRIAGE. Recent de- high and age at marriage low modern and simple means of clines in birth rates partly reflect throughout Africa and the Middle contraception. The contraceptives rising age of marriage among East. available are often expensive, par- women. This has lowered the rate ticularly in relation to the incomes of population growth by lengthening Population policy and family of the poorand especially if they the interval between generations, planning programs must be bought from private by shortening the period during Lower fertility is not an end in doctors. For a poor family, limiting which women are likely to have itself, but one among several ways the number of children may there- babies, and perhaps by giving of improving human welfare. Nor fore mean sexual abstinence, women other interests beyond are the benefits of family planning illegal abortion, infanticideor, family and childbearing to take simply economic. Relatively few at best, ineffective and difficult with them into married life. couples, even among the poor, want traditional contraception. In some Like marital fertility, age at as many children as their natural circumstances, the psychological marriage is strongly affected by fertility would allowwitness the or financial costs of avoiding social and economic conditions, hospitalization rates due to self- pregnancy may exceed the costs including women's education and induced abortion in Latin America, of having another child. employment opportunities. The and scattered evidence that some Family planning programs that average age at marriage (corrected parents do not always do all they are well designed and implemented for the proportion of women who might to avoid infant deaths, may legitimize what relatives, never marry) is 22 in the middle- particularly of daughters. Poor friends, the community, the clan income countries of Latin America women are particularly helped by or village might otherwise have and in Malaysia, Singapore and family planning services; so are frowned upon. These social norms South Korea; but it is less than children, who can benefit from a are often influential. Recent evi- 20 (sometimes much less) in many smaller family. dence indicates that declining Sub-Saharan African countries The case for the public provision fertility in 19th century Europe and in Nepal, India, Pakistan and of family planning services, and was not associated with economic Bangladesh. ensuring that the poor have access factors in any consistent way. But Later marriage as a mechanism to them, is gradually becoming less it did follow a similar pattern across of fertility reduction has been most controversial. Some 35 developing regions defined by a common important in Asia. In the 1960s countries, with 78 percent of the language or cultureimplying that in South Korea and Peninsular developing world's people, have the idea of limiting family size Malaysia, changes in the proportion an official policy to reduce popula- can affect fertility independently of women married accounted for tion growth. An additional 14 of specific economic change. about half as much of the decline percent of the developing world's The same tendency can be seen in the crude birth rate as did changes population lives in countries where today: even taking income and in marital fertilityand were more family planning is supported for education differences into account, important than marital fertility reasons of health and welfare there are national and regional declines in Sri Lanka and the including the health benefits that differences in fertility (Figure 5.4) Philippines. China has placed great come from fewer children. that appear largely the product of stress on delaying marriage in its Some countries have had striking 67 successes. In Thailand contraceptive and well-trained practitioners, be referred for further help. use increased from 11 to 35 percent making programs heavily depend- Several countries have greatly of rural married women between ent on the health system. increased the number of places 1968 and 1975, and from 33 to 49 This has caused difficulties for where pills and condoms can be percent of urban married women. many countries where medical bought, often at subsidized rates. In Indonesia the government facilities and personnel are too But simple and safe barrier methods expanded its service in 1974 from limited to provide adequate family (condoms, diaphragms and spermi- a clinic-based approach, to one planning coverage. But if they cides) are still neglected in many based in villages. It currently has operate within the framework of developing countries despite their 3,500 clinics, 25,000 village depots the health service, middle-level renewed popularity in developed and 40,000 village family planning health staff and people specially countries. Their use could sensibly groups. The proportion of married trained in family planning have be encouraged; research into ways women using modem contraceptives proved effective substitutes for of making them more practical in increased from 7.4 percent in 1974 medical specialists. In Thailand developing country settings is to 18 percent in 1977; it was 0.2 and South Korea the use of para- needed (see box). percent in 1970. medical personnel for screening Nor need a population policy patients and supplying contracep- FUTURE PRIORITIES. Progress in be confined to the support of tive pills led to increased acceptance reducing fertility will partly depend family planning programs. A few of these pills. Family planning aides on increasing the demand for con- countriesmost notably Singapore in Pakistan and Bangladesh have traceptionprimarily through social have used tax and housing policies learned to insert IUDs, and in India and economic development that to discourage large families. Direct to carry out menstrual regulation successfully reaches the poor, but payments for sterilization have been (inducing abortion of possible but also through the growing under- an important part of the Indian unconfirmed pregnancies at an standing that fertility is a matter program. China, which for several early stage). On a trial basis, they of individual choice. It will also years has emphasized that later have been trained to perform depend on providing effective marriage and small families are sterilization. family planning services. Both will patriotic, recently announced Separate family planning services be facilitated if contraceptives can bonuses and preferences for one- have not been so successful. The be made more convenient and less child families, and tax and housing ad hoc systems (in Pakistan, for prone to complications that need penalties for families with more example) have at times involved medical attention. And the impor- than two children. Raising the ambitious programs of regular tance of political commitment to legal minimum age at marriage home visits to persuade people a population policy should not be (the median among all countries to plan their families, and to supply underestimated. Countries with a is still only 15) might also help, contraceptives. But without a sat- dual concern for social and economic although efforts to date have not isfactory health network, it may advance and for family planning been particularly successful (with be difficult to supervise the staff will be able to cut fertility rates the possible exception of China). and provide more specialized substantially in the rest of this advice or assistance to the few century, and beyond. IMPROVING ACCESS TO coNTRAcEP- people who develop complications. TION. Before 1960 family planning A promising alternative approach The seamless web services were provided largely by is to use other administrative net- voluntary associations. Most works. From time to time, India Chapter 4 stressed that education, programs were small and offered has had government personnel, health, nutrition and fertility sig- services through health centers such as teachers and tax collectors, nificantly affect the incomes of the and private clinics, promoting recruiting people for sterilization poor. This chapter has considered simple barrier methods (foam, although this became unpopular separately each of these main areas condoms and diaphragms) and through abuse. The successful of human development, with spe- rhythm. In the 1960s oral contra- family planning program in Indo- cial emphasis on the causes of ceptives and the intrauterine nesia (see box on page 80) has change and the policies that can device (IUD) became available taken advantage of strong com- bring it about. But it is worth reit- and sterilization and legal induced munity organizations and made erating that the different elements abortions became more common. extensive use of village workers, of human development are key These required clinical support with clinics to which people can determinants of each other. 68 Contraceptive technology research in the mid-1970s. And public in both 1977 and 1978. In contrast, spending spending on applied contraceptive on the simpler barrier methods was less Of the people who use some form of research has fallen as much as 50 percent than $500,000despite their potential for birth control (about two-thirds of them since then. The (smaller) amount spent improvement (a biodegradable condom in developed and one-third in developing by pharmaceutical firms has probably or a standardized plastic-based diaphragm, nations), roughly one-third are sterilized, also fallen, apparently because new for example). about 20 percent use the pill, 15 percent methods are not expected to be profit- Present barrier methods are generally the intrauterine device (IUD) and 13 able. Unless more is spent, new tech- viewed as too ineffective and inconvenient percent the condom. Most of the remain- nologiesvaccines, menses-inducing for widespread use in developing countries ing 19 percent use rhythm, abstinence, drugs, pharmacologic methods for men, where sanitary conditions are poor, the diaphragm, contraceptive injections and much improved barrier contraceptives privacy is less, husband-wife communi- (which last one to three months), various though technically within reach, are cations are more formal and abortion types of spermicide and such traditional unlikely to be developed or tested for as a backup is more difficult to obtain. methods as withdrawal, postcoital douch- many years. In the United States, however, use of the ing and deliberate reliance on the anti- Applied contraceptive research is still pill is falling, that of the diaphragm fertility action of breastfeeding. Though largely directed at female contraceptives increasing; consumer concern over the there is evidence of widespread illegal (about nine times more was spent on side-effects of both the pill and IUD has and self-induced abortion, safe and legal female than on male methods in 1978), increased. Whether such concerns are abortion is available in only a few countries, partly because basic research on the well-foundedand on this there is no and publicly provided in even fewer. female reproductive system has been more consensusthey are bound to spread to The amounts spent on research in successful. It is also geared almost exclu- developing countries. In the 1980s the reproductive sciences and contraception sively to the search for new hormonal, efforts to extend services to more people have been smallless than 2 percent of drug-based and surgical procedures: may have to be complemented by a wider total government spending on medical more than $10 million was spent on these choice of methods. The seamless web of interrela- Figure 5.6 Policy and poverty tions constitutes the core of Figure Land ownership and tenure 5.6; feeding into this core are the Technology and research various areas in which policy affects Domestic saving External capital poverty. The diagram is illustrative, Investment allocation Agriculture and the policies shown are not the External trade Taxation and transfers only determinants of poverty or of human development. As has been stressed, climate, culture, religion and natural resources all shape the environment in which development takes place and influence the choice of policies. So do political realities, adminis- trative constraints and the world economy. Some of the links are simply common sense: it is not surprising that the incomes of the poor Public health care Food production significantly affect their health, Water supply, sanitation Subsidies/rations and housing Food fortification education, nutrition and fertility. Poor people cannot afford decent food and health care; they are more likely to need their children's meager earnings (or help in the Family planning household and fields) so that the Public education Incentives children cannot go to school. And they feel more need to have large families to support them during 69 old age and disability. Average important than the father's. incidence of malnutritionthere is national income is obviously also Health and nutrition both affect simply less food, money and time significant, especially since it af- whether children can attend school for each child. feds the tax base and hence the regularly enough to finish the pri- It is also important to take a government's ability to finance mary years, and whether they have long view. Although a certain human development programs. the mental and physical energy amount can be done with crash Some influences are less familiar. to learn. Malnutrition and disease programs such as vaccination The effects of primary education have been found to be closely campaigns and adult literacy have been stressed above in numer- connected, each increasing the programs, sustained human devel- ous contexts. For example, parents likelihood and severity of the opment is usually a slow process. with a primary education are more otherwith death often the end In general, a country's level of likely to learn about (and be willing result. Better health plays a key health, education, nutrition or to try) improved health, hygiene role in the demographic transition fertility at any given time largely and nutrition practices, thus to lower fertility: when the odds reflects its level 10, 20 or even 50 reducing the chances that their are greater that children will survive years earlier. At any given level of children will become ill or mal- to support their parents in old age family income, children are more nourished. Educated people are or disability, parents tend to have likely to go to primary school if more likely to have lower fertility: fewer children. Although it is their parents have also done so; they more readily see the dis- possible (though not firmly estab- and because the home environment advantages of having too many lished) that better nutrition may encourages learning, particularly children to feed and educate; they increase natural fecundity, its effects in the preschool years, they are have more alternative sources of on the health, education and incomes likely to do better in school as well. interest and satisfaction that of the poor all contribute indirectly Human development is thus compete with children for time to reduced fertility. transmitted from generation to and money; they are generally more Lower fertility itself affects the generation in a virtuous circle; but willing to accept new ideas, such other aspects of poverty. The spread equally, there is a vicious circle as the use of modern contracep- and quality of education increases that sentences the children of tives, and to seek family planning because both the state and parents deprived parents to deprivation advice. Because of the mother's can afford to spend more on each themselves. Breaking out of the vi- preeminent role in bearing and child when there are fewer of them. cious circle into the virtuous one is raising children, it is not surprising Large families have higher infant the essence of human development. that her level of education is more and child death rates and a higher 70 6 Implementing human development programs: some practical lessons This chapter concentrates on four for them. The links, though, are available to the middle class in rich key questions that invariably affect not all complementary: for example, countries. A major political chal- the way human development pro- paramedical workers have lower lenge of the 1980s will be to adapt grams are organized, and how salaries than doctors, but they need and extend programs to the poor, effective they are. more supervision. particularly those in rural areas. Political support. This has been Despite the difficulties, it has critical to the considerable success Human development usually been easier to obtain political of human development programs needs political support support for health and education in reaching the poor. Its absence programs that benefit the poor also helps to explain some of the Political support for human devel- witness the large increases in school failures. opment cannot be taken for granted. enrollment and life expectancy Finance. Money alone will not The poor frequently are politically than for policies of, say, land or produce human development. But weak. They are often too sick, tax reform. Why? Largely because, a shortage of funds is a com- uneducated, geographically dis- unlike land reform or increased mon, often binding constraint. So persed and busy to be politically taxation, more knowledge, health methods that reduce unit costs active. Influential elites, particularly and vitality for the poor are not or raise new revenues have a large landowners, may oppose obtained by reducing them for considerable role to play in human development programs if someone else. Of course, such expanding services. they feel that their power and status programs must be financed. The Administration. For many might be undermined. They might rich may have to pay more in taxes programs, administrative and feel, for example, that educated than they get in direct benefits. institutional capacities may be children are less likely to settle for But they are often prepared to even scarcer than finance. Yet working in serf-like conditions on support human development, in project experience shows that their haciendas or plantations. part because it has a legitimacy importance is frequently overlooked. Even if there is no direct oppo- that transcends culture, religion, Demand. The way families sition, the extent and form of human ideology and class. This is particu- and individuals respond to services development programs will generally larly true if poor children are is crucial to improving health, be influenced by keen political involved. The idea that all children hygiene and nutrition; to whether competition for limited tax revenues. should have a fair startwithout children from poor families go to Because policymakers generally the handicaps of disease, illiteracy school or have to work instead; live in urban areas, as do the most and malnutritionis widespread. and to reducing fertility. politically active of the people who In some circumstances, more- These four factors like education, benefit from public services, these over, everyone gains. Those who health, nutrition and fertilityare programs tend to suffer from urban are not poor will benefit if endemic closely interlinked. For instance, bias (though reductions in urban diseases are eradicatedprevention financial and administrative con- social expenditures do not neces- usually being cheaper than cure. straints can be eased by political sarily lead to increases in rural Malaria control is an obvious support, which in turn will be expenditures). But the health and example: the main beneficiaries stronger if programs can be made education facilities available even are the rural poor, who are most less costly or administered more to urban elites in poor countries likely to be infected. But mosquitoes readily, or if there is a heavy demand are generally inferior to those that bite the infected poor may 71 fly on to bite the rich as well. In Brazil in 1974, an epidemic of spinal How much would it cost? meningitis aroused public concern Take an illustrative list of human develop- cost 4 percent of GNP. Eliminating food in response, 30 million people were ment needs: five years at school; adequate deficits in Brazilwith its much higher vaccinated within 10 months, nutrition; primary health care no more incomecould cost from 1 to 2 percent than an hour away; family planning of GNP in 1980, depending on the type stopping the epidemic. services; at least 20 liters a day of pure of food provided. Human development programs water within 100 yards of home; and a Health and family planning. Malay- are also seen almost everywhere pit latrine. How much would it cost a sia's system of public health care covered as contributing to national unity. government in a developing country to more than 75 percent of the population Universal primary education in provide this for everyone? in 1974. It relied heavily on low-cost The answer varies from country to paramedical staffand its operating costs particular can provide all citizens country, depending first (and most were nearly 2 percent of GNP. Sri Lanka's with a common intellectual heritage importantly) on the standard of service; government spent about 1.7 percent in and help overcome the potentially second on such factors as climate, the mid-1970s. China's central govern- divisive effects of regionalism, communications and population disper- ment spent less than 1 percent on health sion; and third on the balance between in 1978, but much of the primary care tribalism, race and caste and class capital and operating costs (most budgets system was financed locally; Brazil's spent distinctions. In addition, govern- do not provide enough for the operating about 2.5 percent of GNP in 1975, but ments often see human development costs that an effective service would public health insurance was biased toward as helping to build broad-based need). But there are also two general hospitals and urban areascovering almost political support among potentially rules that affect cost: one, for any given 80 percent of urban dwellers but much antagonistic groups. standard the proportion of GNP required less of the 40 percent of people in rural falls as GNP rises, partly because higher- areas. The appeal of and political com- income countries have more educated Water. A recent World Bank estimate mitment to human development peoplewhose wages are therefore rela- suggests that it would cost the Tanzanian cut across ideological boundaries: tively lowerto implement the programs, government about 1.8 percent of GNP China, Cuba and North Korea have and partly because nonlabor costs rise a year over a 10-year period to supply more slowly than GNP. And two, mar- every village with pure and reliable water, placed great emphasis on such ginal unit costs usually fall as coverage plus 0.8 percent for operating costs once programs, but so have South Korea rises, but only up to a point: the costs of the system is fully established. In Brazil and Costa Rica. Their appeal is reaching the last 10-20 percent of the the investment needed to cover the whole reinforced by international and population may be several times the population by 2000 has been estimated ethical support. The Universal average costs for the first 30-90 percent at less than 0.1 percent a year of a much Declaration of Human Rights of because of physical inaccessibility or larger and faster-growing GNP in rural inadequate demand. areas (allowing for higher costs to reach 1943 included the rights to food, Some examples from different countries: the last 10 percent of the rural population) health and education. The United Education. The average gross enroll- and perhaps 0.1 to 0.2 percent a year in Nations and its specialized agencies ment ratio for primary school in developing urban areas depending on GNP growth. have played an important role in countries in the early 1970s was about Coverage of the rural and urban popula- focusing international attention 70 percent; central governments were tions was 62 and 14 percent, respectively, then spending an average of 1.7 percent in 1976. Operating costs are borne by on human development and on of GNP on primary education. Few the users. population issues. All the major governments have provided universal Sanitation. In Brazil, where 37 percent religions also provide strong back- elementary education for less than 3 of urban houses had sewers or septic ing for efforts to improve the health, percent of GNP. Peninsular Malaysia tanks in 1976, extending the sewer network nutrition and education of the poor. spent 2.7 percent in the mid-1970s and to cover them all by 2000 would require had a gross enrollment rate of 93 percent. annual investments of about 0.2 to 0.3 Nutrition. In 1979, when subsidized percent of GNP. Providing latrines in Easing the financial constraint rations were restricted to the poorer half rural areas would cost only between 0.01 of the population in Sri Lanka, they still and 0.02 percent of GNP. Finance ministers everywhere (with the exception of some mineral-rich countries) find that available funds cannot meet the many competing ture, debt service, defense and so of GNP (and often a good deal demands placed on them. In the on) commonly exceed 12 percent more) on doing so. poorer countries, public revenue of GNP. Yet governments that have The costs involved depend on (taxes, other domestic revenue and assuredvirtually everyone primary many factors (see box), among the foreign assistance) usually is less education, health care, family most important of which are the than 20 percent of GNP, while planning services, adequate food, range and standard of services. expenditures other than on social pure water and sanitation have Thus governments in some poor programs (agriculture, infrastruc- generally spent more than 10 percent countriesnotably Sri Lanka and 72 probably Chinahave managed Table 6.1 Taxes as a percentage wasteful showcase projects, sub- to provide the essential services of GNP sidizing inefficient enterprises and, (primary education, food supple- Group of Percentage so far as security considerations countries 1953-55 1972-76 increase ments and basic health and family permit, military spending (which planning facilities) to almost every- 7 low-income on average in East Asia, South developing one for less than 10 percent of countries 11.2 16.0 43 Asia and the Middle East exceeds GNP. Typically, though, govern- 17 middle- public outlays on education and ments are spending from 3 to 10 income health combined). And within percent of GNP for human devel- developing countries 12.1 16.4 36 human development programs opment programs that are far from Total (24 there is often room to reallocate comprehensiveand whose effec- developing budget shares away from high-cost tiveness is often reduced by lack countries) 11.8 16.3 38 and less-urgent projects (such as of money for operating costs (wages 15 developed urban hospitals and universities for health workers and teachers, countries 26.2 36.2 38 largely serving the relatively well- maintenance of water supply Note: Taxes include social security taxes. off) and toward more basic pro- systems, gasoline for transporta- grams (such as primary health care tion of doctors in rural areas, and education). textbooks in schools). in the distribution of income). On How can financial constraints this basis, India's taxable surplus Keeping costs down on human development programs in 1975 was 41 percent of aggregate By modesty in standards and effi- be eased? There are four ways: income; the ratio of taxes to taxable cient choice of technology, govern- increasing taxes, reallocating surplus therefore was 34 percent ments can provide services relatively revenues, reducing costs and using comparable with the tax-to-GNP cheaplyand without precluding resources other than those obtained ratios of industrialized nations. future improvement. (For exam- from national taxes and duties. Earmarking taxes for programs ple, public standpipes can supply with strong ethical or political safe water at some sacrifice in con- Increcsing tcx revenues appeal can raise extra money when venience but at less than half the Many developing countries have further general taxation is not cost of individual house connec- already made impressive progress feasible. In Colombia a share of tions.) This general approach will in improving their tax-gathering the beer tax is reserved for public often be opposed by teachers, (see Table 6.1). Since 1975, how- hospitals. Many Latin American doctors, architects, engineers and ever, tax ratios in developing countries finance their health and other professionals who insist on countries have not increased; social security budgets by a pay- high standardsand correspond- although some obvious steps can roll tax. (But payroll taxes cover ingly high costs. Not surprisingly, be taken (making taxes more only formal employment, and they the financial constraint is then said progressive and reducing evasion tend to reduce growth in jobs by to prevent the extension of ser- and arrears), the scope for raising raising the cost of labor relative vices to poor rural areas. Political taxation is less now than it was to capital.) Motor fuel taxes are leaders have sometimes felt that 20 years ago. good for earmarking, for several it was better to accept unaffordably This is especially true of the reasons. They are easy to collect, expensive standards than to risk poorer countrieseven where are progressive, help curb oil con- the charge that they were backing foreign trade is a substantial share sumption, and have high revenue "second rate" projects. But the of output. Their tax administration potentialin some cases exceeding World Bank's experience in health, is generally weaker, there is usually 1 percent of GNP. But like all education and urban development substantial unmarketed output, earmarked taxes, they should be projects suggests that many govern- and their taxable surplus accounts used only sparingly, because they ments now see political as well as for a smaller share of their GNP. increase the rigidity of the way economic benefits from being able Even a tax-to-GNP ratio of 15 per- government revenues are spent. to reach the poor by accepting cent in such countries implies a lower standards initially. heavy tax burden. Take India as Reallocsting existing revenues Chapter 5 discussed a number an example: its taxable surplus may Public spending on human de- of specific ways of economizing be defined as all income beyond velopment can be increased by in health, education and nutrition the poverty line (defined there as reallocating government revenue programs. China's barefoot doc- the income of the fortieth percentile from less productive uses, including tors (see box overleaf) are an excel- 73 education and medical treatment. China's barefoot doctors Where the expansion of private Best known for its use of "barefoot financed from four sources: an annual education and health care is not doctors" at the grass roots, China's rural premium paid by members; charges for inconsistent with national policy, health care system has several other faces the service; appropriations from the this would allow scarce govern- specialized urban hospitals serving the brigade's social welfare fund (collected ment funds to be concentrated on surrounding areas, well-equipped county through a tax on each production team's income); and, sometimes, subsidies from the poor. But if the middle classes hospitals, and health clinics at commune centers. These facilities provide indis- the county government. invariably send their children to pensable support for the extensive coverage The annual premium, 1-2 yuan ($0.60- private schools, much of the nec- provided at the "brigade" levelcatering 1.20) per person or 5-10 yuan ($3-6) per essary political support for high- to a large village or several small ones. family, depending on the locality, is a quality public education may be Each brigade sets up a program with considerable sum for peasants whose lost. financial support from the government; incomes average only about 100 yuan but once established, it must be self- ($60) a year (only a small proportion One way of mobilizing private financing (though the government may of which is cash income). The brigade's funds for education is by restricting help in exceptional circumstances). A social welfare fund is a fixed percentage the number of places in public majority decision of the brigade members of its total income, so the contribution universities, maintaining high is enough to start or end a program; indi- from the fund to the health program standards there, and then allowing viduals can choose to joinand leaveit. depends on the brigade's income. Mem- China's 1.6 million barefoot doctors bers pay for each visit to the brigade the private sector to cater to those (roughly one per 600 people) operate at health station. In complicated cases, they who can afford it but do not succeed the brigade level in rural areas. Many may have to go to the commune health in the stiff competition for the are women, selected by the brigade center or the county hospital. Charges places in public universities. Scholar- members for training, and supported by at the commune health center are nor- ships to public universities can be them during training (which usually takes mally paid out of the brigade's health place in the slack agricultural season). fund; but patients attending the county provided for those who cannot After completing training, the barefoot or specialized hospitals must pay at least afford tuition fees. This has been doctors return to their brigade, continuing part of the fees themselves. done in South Korea, where 72 to devote part of their time to farm work. Like other primary health care systems percent of higher education enroll- Barefoot doctors are trained to use relying on community health workers, ments are in private institutions, both modern techniques and traditional China's has faced problems of credibility Chinese medicineacupuncture and and training, and of uneven levels of while in primary education (which herbal cures, for example. By combining service. Steps are now being taken to is virtually universal) 99 percent the two, they increase acceptance of address these problems, including more of the enrollments are in public modem treatment and reduce costssince emphasis on initial and in-service training schools. they prepare herbal medicines from locally of barefoot doctors. The intention is to upgrade the services as funding and staff In some cases it is even possible grown ingredients. As a rule, the brigade program is skills permit. to charge the better-off enough to subsidize services for the poor. In many countries, for example, lent example both of keeping costs of the educational systemwere fees for private and semiprivate down and of upgrading services also discussed earlier (see page hospital rooms are set well above as the economy growsthe Chinese 50). costs and the surplus used to sub- are now providing their primary sidize poorer ward patients. There health workers with additional Using resources other than are even better opportunities for training and better support. Restrict- national tax revenue this type of cross-subsidy in urban ing subsidies to those who cannot The state invariably plays a central water and sanitation systems, afford to pay for services can also role in education, health and nu- where the subsidy can be virtually help keep costs down (see pages trition programs. But it is by no automatic. The well-off are gen- 62-63 for examples of how this means the only source of finance erally willing to pay more than the can be done in nutrition pro- for human development. With the actual cost of the service because grams). But overly narrow targeting proper incentives, individuals, pri- the alternative to being connected may sacrifice some political support vate firms and other nongovern- to the public system is a private from middle- and upper-income mental organizations can play an well or septic tank, at much higher groupssupport that may be critical important role. cost. in establishing a program to reach Most food consumption, of Local resources can also reduce the poor, too. Various ways of cut- course, is privately financed. the financial burden on the center. ting unit costs in higher education Moreover, the relatively well-off In Tanzania in the mid-1970s, self- by far the most expensive part are often willing to pay for private help labor was equal to about 10 74 percent of the development bud- developing world involve build- As people become more mobile get. The Tanzanian government ing such things as wells, schools and the cash economy more wide- typically provides construction and health clinics. But they do not spread, the strength of traditional materials for projects, and the stop there: in many countries local self-help efforts may wane. But local communities provide the people provide food and housing instead of providing resources in labor. Self-help organizations exist for primary school teachers. It is kind, local communities can raise in many developing countries: one more difficult, however, to mobilize money (through local taxes or example is Sri Lanka's Sarvodaya sustained support for recurrent charges) to support their efforts. Shramadana Movement (see box.) costs than for one-time efforts, such Like other forms of self-help, this Most self-help projects in the as construction projects. can be stimulated by matching grants from the central government in support of locally initiated and Self-help in Sri Lanka managed activities. In Kenya, for From small beginnings in 1958, the week leadership training course, On their example, the government assists Sarvodaya Shramadana Movement now return they began forming what Sarvodaya htrsmbee (self-help) projects that employs some 6,000 full-time workers calls the "social infrastructure"groups meet official guidelines. But slug- and reaches more than 10 percent of the for mothers, farmers and so on. Repre- country's rural population. It has full- sentatives from each group made up the gish administration in central scale programs in some 300 villages, but Village Reawakening Council, which has agencies can suffocate local partici- is active in another 2,500. It has organized initiated various productive activities, pation and self-helpenthusiasm education, health, nutrition, sanitation such as growing bananas and passion and initiative may wane if deci- and housing; set up agricultural and fruit as cash and food crops, and set up sions take too long or promised handicraft programs; and is starting to a cooperative store. promote other small-scale rural industries. assistance does not arrive on time. In the community center built dur- The village of Panakura, in the poor ing the Shramadana camp, one of the Self-help is not always the right hilly district of Kegalle, provides a good Sarvodaya trainees has helped the mothers answer. In education, for example, example of the Movement's work. Simon organize a community kitchen and day- local financing can lead to such an Jayawickrama had graduated from care center. Here young children are uneven distribution of qualified Panakura's primary school and was doing taught about health and hygiene, and well in the secondary school two miles are vaccinated by a visiting government teachers, books and equipment away; then he had to drop out in the health worker (who received part of her as to intensify the inequities the tenth grade to help support his family. training from Sarvodaya). The school- country is trying to reduce. North- Through his former teacher and the local age children's group is responsible for a eastern Brazil and northern Nigeria Buddhist monk, he made contact with garden that helps to supply the community provide two cases in point. In both the Movement; with the help of the local kitchen, and for keeping the community Sarvodaya workers in nearby Atulugama, regions, low incomes partly explain center clean. The local Buddhist monk Simon began working amongst Panakura's took a four-month course on village why the wages and quality of 81 families. After intermittent visits over development at the special Sarvodaya teachers fall below the national a two-week period, a first Shramadana training school for monks. average; they also partly explain workcamp was organizedto build a As well as extending its coverage, the the low enrollment rates in these road to the village. A second camp began Movement is improving the follow up to building a community centerboth proj- regions. If local economic and the initial Shramadana workcamp phase, ects chosen by the villagers themselves. to prevent backsliding. Although the social progress lags well behind The Sarvodaya Movement provided long-term effect of Sarvodaya's work the national average, financial and cement, reinforcing rods and skilled remains to be properly evaluated, most technical assistance from the cen- labor. For 15 weekends, 80 percent of the observers have been strongly impressed tral government will be crucial. villagers put in 6-8 hours of manual labor by the way it has involved people in a day. With the help of 100 young workers development. It has attracted widespread from Sarvodaya groups in other villages, international support. Developing administrative they established a community kitchen How much has all this cost? The strengths where everyone pooled and prepared Sarvodaya budget for 1979-80 was $2.3 their food; took part in community medi- million, an average of less than $1,000 Institutional constraints are in many tation, singing, dancing and other cultural per village assisted. Voluntary labor and activities; and held two daily community other payments in kind contributed many cases at least as serious a barrier meetings (called "family gatherings") times that amount. Of the cash budget, to human development as short- where everyone, young and old, had an some 80 percent came from international age of funds or lack of political opportunity to discuss their problems assistance (both private and official), 10 support. Effective administration and ways of solving them. percent from Sri Lankan donations and Following the workcamps, Simon and usually requires more than the 10 percent from the sale of commodities 10 others went to the Sarvodaya regional efficient working of official bureau- produced in Sarvodaya's training farms training institute at Kegalle for a two- and schools. cracies; it depends on such factors as the availability of middle-level 75 manpower, the complementary barriers that separate them from medicine, family planning and activities of local governments and the poor. Supply lines for text- nutrition education. voluntary agencies, the receptivity books or medicine may be con- Most developing country gov- of intended beneficiaries to public tinually breaking down, and the ernments are well aware of the services, and the persistence necessary technical support may need to improve administrative of effort. be lacking. But these and similar performance, and have under- Unlike many aspects of agricul- difficulties must be overcome to taken some form of public sector tural, industrial and infrastructural reach the poor; that usually means reorganization. A common objec- development, human develop- improving organization at the tive is to decentralize; planning ment programs can rarely be put grass roots. units are being created at the out to contract. Improvements can- state or provincial level in the not be effected by changes in Strengthening government Philippines and Sudan, for example, policy or legislation alone. Funds, mcchinery as a first step toward greater equipment and advanced technol- No matter how resourceful indi- devolution of power (though ogies can seldom substitute for viduals or local communities premature decentralization, as in trained field personnel or admin- may be, sustained progress in Tanzania, can complicate program istrators. human development inevitably implementation). Administration is a vital ingre- requires national governments With the help of multilateral dient in primary health care: with- to mobilize and apply the much and bilateral agencies, many out adequate training, supervision greater resources, both domestic countries are trying to improve and supplies, locally recruited and international, at their disposal. the performance and skifis of public paramedical staff cannot be effec- Reviews of World Bank projects sector employees through training; tive. This is one of the important reveal a number of common insti- through better job classification, lessons of Brazil's early experience tutional problemsamong them, which facilitates recruitment, train- with rural primary health care in weak planning agencies and an ing and evaluation; and through its poor northeast region, one con- inability (or failure) to relate changes in civil service regulations firmed in countries as diverse as annual budgets to long-term for example, to specify promotion China, Jamaica and Botswana. development priorities. Some of requirements more clearly and to In education, too, there are the existing deficiencies are due to tighten discipline. Thailand is obvious administrative difficulties, inappropriate administrative struc- introducing special procurement because of the number and geo- tures and procedures, which still procedures to prevent slippage in graphic spread of primary schools. tend to reflect the metropolitan project implementation. Malaysia But most countries have wide models on which they were is implementing a more systematic experience of operating an educa- patterned. They plate undue approach to the preparation and tional system, although major emphasis on central control and appraisal of agricultural projects. changes in curricula or teaching take inadequate account of Several Asian and African coun- methods may be administratively prevailing cultural or social tries have begun to streamline demanding. For nutrition, general attitudes. cumbersome budgetary practices. food subsidies are simpler to or- Other weaknesses arise be- These and other efforts to make ganize than targeted programs cause the administration is not government machinery more effi- but subsidizing food consumed properly geared to identifying cient will take many years to mainly by poor people (see pages the people to be served, increasing produce discernible results. The 62-63) is a form of targeting that their access to services, adapting continuous expansion of public eases administrative problems. services until they are appro- sector activities in most developing Improving administration at the priate, delivering them efficiently countries has produced its own periphery is far more complex and and observing (and reacting set of constraints: many bureau- difficult than administrative reform to) the public's response. This cracies have become large, powerful at the center, a task that has itself sequence requires people who can and protective of their own interests. often proved intractable. Many of learn from the intended benefi- Frequent changes of political the poor are hard to reach through ciaries and gain their confidence leadership have insulated some conventional public programs, and (see box). This is critically impor- bureaucracies from pressures for the end-of-the-line workers may tant when the poor are cautious reform; in other countries radical not be motivated to break the (or even hostile)as they often are attempts to restructure or purge social, linguistic and physical in their reactions to preventive public services have greatly 76 members, too, as no bureaucratic Rural poverty unperceived agency can. When local health Poor people are often the most difficult centers in northern Senegal were Getting poor people to talk about to reach. Many live on the edges of significant incidents in their life and work, unable to reach the people directly villages, far from main roads. They are particularly about those they see as being in a child-feeding program, the illiterate, have no radios and know little responsible for their poverty. religious leaders took over part of about events beyond their neighborhood. Exploring practices and attitudes the food distribution: recent re- They rarely go to public meetings and that affect, for instance, diets and fertility. travel little except in search of work. Seeking out those who do not use search indicates that this is an Those whose legal position is weak (such services or adopt new practices, and trying effective way of getting food to as refugees or squatters) may even try to understand the reasons for this. poor families. Local groups can to hide, to be invisible to the official Relatively simple but systematic surveys also provide reliable feedback on eye. Out of sight, they hope to be out can sometimes help those who carry them project experiments, and can in- of mind. out. To take one example: in a densely As for the professionals who work in populated part of western Kenya, junior fluence bureaucracies to improve rural development programs, many of agricultural extension staff and home services in ways that unorganized, them are caught in an urban trap. Young, economics workers were each given a poor individuals could not. unmarried officials are sent to remote random sample of 100 households to Research in both developed and rural areas; but age, marriage and their survey, in the area where they worked. developing countries shows that careers draw them back to the towns After the survey, many at first thought and cities. And those who do live in the when the beneficiaries are involved that the sample had been biased heavily countryside often direct their attention against the better educated households. through their own organizations, toward people they have most in common One of the agricultural staff complained they respond more effectively to withthe not-so-poor. that only one of his 100 households had services. That has happened, for What can be done to correct this bias? an improved breed of cow: he was example, in 4,500 village coopera- Changing career patterns and incentives surprised to learn that he had, without to reward rural work is fundamental; recognizing it, been concentrating on tives organized by the Indian training can also play a role. better-off households; in fact the area National Dairy Development Board; Without the need for complicated average was only one of these cows for in 200 local development associa- research, in-service training can help more than 200 households. A home tions in the Yemen Arab Republic; people to understand more about poverty. economics worker was appalled at the in more than 9,000 Mothers' Clubs For example: poverty she had found. "These people Family case studies: a day in the life do not come to my meetings," she said. in South Korea, where family of a landless household, or how a poor Perceiving reality is the first step to planning and other community family survives the hungry season. changing it. functions have been assumed by traditional credit associations (called kaes); and in special radio reduced the ability of governments ment rather than supplant the listening and discussion groups in to maintain essential human services available through health which about 2 million rural development programs. ministries or other official family Tanzanians participated during planning agencies. The cost to users the "Man is Health" campaign in Choosing appropriate administrative has been kept low by providing Tanzania in 1973. strategies the private distributors with free There is of course a danger that To help make programs fully or highly subsidized contraceptives poor people's organizations may effective, administrators may need and controlling the retail price. And come to be dominated by local to use a variety of institutions in Singapore, contraceptive infor- elites, with an associated risk of national bureaucracies, public mation was at one time distributed corruption. One of the main prob- enterprises, private businesses, with public utility bills. lems of agricultural cooperatives, voluntary agencies, local govern- Organizations of intended for instance, has been to resist ments and organizations of intended beneficiaries are not conven- this type of domination. Unlike beneficiariesand strike the right tionally regarded as administrative subsidized agricultural credit or balance between them. agencies, but they can play a fertilizer, however, primary educa- In family planning, for example, valuable role. Farmers' organiza- tion cannot be stolen, hoarded or traditional channels of private tions, rotating credit associations, resold. And though medicines can marketing, which reach even remote women's clubs, religious groups be, even the richest person would villages, have proved effective in and marketing cooperatives are in not want a hundred vaccinations. many countries (including India, principle accountable to, and can Another problem is infighting Indonesia, Jamaica and Sri Lanka). reflect the interests of, their mem- between rival local groups. But These private distributors supple- bers. They can involve their the suspicions that established 77 bureaucracies may have about be simply a matter of providing have little idea what their use organized beneficiaries or local information; but it commonly re- entails. They may assume that a governments should not blind quires changes in long-standing newly established clinic will charge them to their potential for effective attitudes and habits. fees or require membership. action. Education and organization of When administrative abilities Changing the way services beneficiaries can help. So can are weak, it is sensible to concen- are delivered direct information campaigns, trate on projects that do not need A school calendar may compete making use not only of mass media much organization. Food fortification unnecessarily with the crop cycle, like radio or billboards, but also (see page 63) involves minimal with important exams held at entertainers. Research on the administrative effort. And in times when students are most diffusion of new ideas suggests that Cameroon a state corporation has needed by their parents in the direct contact between people is effectively distributed low-cost fields. The staff of a health center the most effective form of com- pharmaceuticals through commer- may not keep a regular schedule, munication. It has also been found cial channels. But this approach forcing people who have traveled that mass media are more influential does not work for every kind of for several hours to return home if they are heard (or read) in a service, and it often fails to reach without treatment. The local clinic group. Radio forums, for example, the most deprived people. may be short of drugs or so incon- in which a radio program is Where countries have a relatively veniently located that a patient followed by a discussion, are a strong administrative system but with a minor complaint may promising way of changing social the poor are badly organized (a prefer to go straight to an urban attitudes and behavior. Since it is fairly common combination), hospitalor to the traditional difficult to form such groups on an governments can provide services healer, who may live in the village. ad hoc basis, religious and other that do not require joint action Often the changes required to social groups may be useful. such as primary education, basic make a service more attractive to health services, mass vaccination potential users are self-evident, Overcoming sociocultural obstacles campaigns and subsidized food. such as providing them in a Deciding to use a service may Sri Lanka and the Indian state of language that the beneficiaries require a more fundamental change Kerala, for example, have man- understand. This does not mean in attitudes and practices. The idea aged to achieve striking progress that they are necessarily easy to may be controversial; for example, without relying much on local implement. women may have heard unfavorable development groups. But even rumors about modem medicine or there, programs tend to be more Reducing costs to users family planning methods. The active and effective if the intended The benefits of services for health, poor may not appreciate the beneficiaries are involved through education, nutrition and family benefits, say, of different hygiene local organizations. planning often may be (or at least and sanitation arrangements appear to people to be) less than because they do not understand Demand: ensuring that services their direct and indirect costs (see how diseases are caused. Or the are used box). The latter can sometimes be lack of demand may have roots reduced. For example, providing deep in traditional taboos, beliefs As has been shown, the poor free textbooks (and uniforms, if or preferences. In many countries, sometimes fail to take advantage required) and locating schools men often refuse to allow women of services even if they are avail- within walking distance will reduce and girls to go to male doctors or able (see page 52). The reasons the direct costs of school attendance. community health workers. The for this "reluctant demand" vary Providing free transport to health same beliefs mean that girls are across countries and sectors; but clinics is another possibility. frequently not sent to schooland the more accurately they can be hence there are few female medical identified in particular cases, the Providing information workers. In Africa and Southeast better they can be tackled. Some- The reason people do not take up Asia certain types of food rich in times this can be done by changing a service may simply be that they vitamin A (such as dark green, leafy the way a service is provided or lack information about it, or they vegetables) are cheap and abundant. reducing the costs of using it Often may not know what to do: people Yet many cases of blindness among it means changing the perceptions may claim to be "aware" that children are caused by vitamin A of intended beneficiaries. This may family planning services exist, but deficiencybecause eating these 78 gone beyond information and Private costs of using public services persuasion to use various forms distribution bought piped and treated of coercion. Laws establishing Data on the private costs of using public water (nearly all of which is supplied on compulsory primary education are human development services are scarce. a metered basis in Peninsular Malaysia). perhaps the most widespread A recent study of Peninsular Malaysia, Of these, 14 percent spent more than example. Using laws is sometimes however, estimated them for education, 5 percent of their incomes on it. The regarded as more unfairly coercive water and health care. average burden for the poorest quintile Education. Malaysian families had was 4.1 percent. There may again be than, say, manipulating costs, since to coverin addition to examination fees some bending of the truth involved. But it allows no parental choice at all. and purchases of texts and suppliesthe the burden of water charges was high But because children usually suffer costs of shoes, uniforms, snacks, trans- enough to deter at least a third of the more than their parents, such port and special fees. In 1974 these aver- poorest 40 percent who had ready access measures as compulsory schooling aged $47 a year for a student in primary to piped water from purchasing it. school, $123 for a student in secondary Health care. The Malaysian study should be seen more as protecting school. showed a strong relation between the rights of children than as The table shows that families in the household income and expenditure on restricting those of parents. lowest income quintile spent about a private health carebut almost no relation Just how much coercion is con- fifth of their incomes on out-of-pocket between income and consumption of sidered to be acceptable will vary school costs. Even allowing for some public health care. Most patients paid bending of the truth by respondents, this no fees for public inpatient or outpatient according to a country's culture is impressiveand it understates the treatment. Nor were expenditures on and political values. In some burden. A fifth of the income of a poor transport to the place of treatment places, traditional social struc- family represents a far greater sacrifice related to income, although there was a tures have been enlisted to exert than a fifth of the income of a wealthy weak inverse association between travel pressure on their members. This family. And the cost of forgone earnings time and frequency of treatment. Thus what students could earn by working if the need for medical care of the poor has been a characteristic of the they were not in schoolis excluded. and most of the rest of the population Indonesian family planning pro- Water. Fewer than a third of the fami- was met through the public system at gram. Among the Hausa in north- lies in the lowest 40 percent of the income little private cost. ern Nigeria, a program to eradicate sleeping sickness has been suc- Out-of-pocket costs, Peninsular Malaysia, 1974 cessfully sustained through strong Percentage of their income Percentage of households Percentage leadership. Every year the villagers Family Percentage spent on with piped of their income clear the undergrowth along the income of households out-of-pocket and treated spent on quintile with students school costs water water banks of rivers and streams. They Lowest 73 18 20 4.1 do not fully understand the Second 67 10 37 2.6 reasons, but they are willing to do Third 71 10 43 2.0 what their traditional leaders ask. Fourth 66 8 62 1.5 Highest 50 6 76 0.8 Nevertheless, programs of educa- Source: Jacob Meerman, Public Expenditure in Malaysia (Oxford, 1979). tion, health, nutrition and family planning have more chance of success if the beneficiaries come foods is regarded as a sign of low (the pattern of distributing food to see the programs as serving social status. within families), threaten estab- their interests. Higher incomes and better lished norms (family planning), education will clearly help to challenge vested interests (profes- Affecting behavior within the family overcome many of these obstacles. sional associations) or offer few Especially in poor households, the Traditional social and cultural immediately obvious benefits interests of parents, children and structures can sometimes also be (sanitation), the more patiently old people can diverge, causing adapted to new uses rather than they must be introduced. Public maldistribution of food, education ignored or swept aside. The education and persuasion are and medical care within the Indonesian family planning needed, and it will take a long family (see pages 61-62). Raising program has been notably suc- time to reap the economic and family incomes can reduce or cessful in this respect, as well as in political benefits. eliminate the economic reasons decentralizing responsibility for for unfair shares; more education implementation (see box overleaf). Coercion of parents, especially of mothers, The more that programs require In attempting to spread human can mitigate the cultural reasons people to change their behavior development, many countries have (see box on page 50). in addition, 79 successes. It has played a major The banjars of Bali role, for instance, in helping to submit ideas for new campaigns, and spread education; in eradicating Indonesia's family planning program funds are quickly provided for the ones smallpox and sharply reducing combines central direction with decen- approved. The program has also made several major diseases (including tralized implementation. The program use of the private sectortraditional yaws, malaria, leprosy and African has strong political support from the traveling herb vendors (called taken jemus) president, to whom its chairman reports have been enlisted to supply contraceptives sleeping sickness); and, perhaps directly. Family planning is an integral to remote villages as well as urban areas. most significantly, in increasing part of national and provincial develop- In the province of Bali, the traditional the production of basic foods. ment plansministers and provincial community council (called benjer) has On the other hand, some aid governors are responsible to the president been harnessed to promote family plan- for their execution. And the program programs have failedor have ning. For centuries banjars have been maintains a central data system to monitor the hub of village life. There are more succeeded while indirectly con- performance and ensure that no region than 3,700 of them today; adult men in tributing to inappropriate policies. or even village runs short of contracep- Bali belong to their village banjar and Until the early 1970s, there was tives. But the task of implementing specific attend monthly meetings. In 1974 the an emphasis on showcase univer- goals rests largely with provincial and government in Bali started to work through sities, large urban hospitals and local staff, and political and community banjar leaders to create an awareness leaders in the villages. of family planning, to identify people large-scale agricultureconsistent The program offers strong (but non- who might be keen on planning their with development thinking at that monetary) incentives for managers and families, and to help them do so. Typically, time. Not surprisingly, such inter- staff at all levels, because it was designed the monthly banjar meeting now begins national assistance involved trans- to give credit for success to local managers. with a roll call; each man responds by ferring some technologies or Most of the contact with families is by saying whether he and his wife are using village volunteers. The program rewards contraceptives. Replies are plotted on a institutions from developed coun- them, tooouter-island midwives can village mapprominently displayed. tries without adequate recognition earn trips to Bali for training, while The results have been striking. An of how the circumstances of de- Balinese chiefs whose villages have estimated 49 percent of eligible couples veloping countries differed. made the most progress in family plan- have adopted family planning in Bali, Since the benefits of human de- fling are taken to see the successful East compared with 29 percent for the country Java program. as a whole. The World Fertility Survey velopment are received partly by The approach is tailored to specific showed that the average number of today's children but even more by local needs; it fosters local initiative and children a Balinese woman could expect their children and grandchildren, experiments with unconventional projects. to have had fallen from 5.8 in mid-1969 governments that are hard pressed People at provincial and village levels to 3.8 in 1976. financially may find it difficult to justify spending as muth on human improved earning opportunities and goats, selling the milk and development as is desirable for for educated women, lower infant controlling the proceeds them- long-run economic growth, let mortality rates and a rising age selves. By selling cooperatively, the alone for alleviating poverty. This at marriage will help parents to members get higher profits than dilemmawhich will be acute provide more for all their children they otherwise would. Families are during the next few years of finan- and to have fewer of them. fed better. More of the children cial stringencyis one for which Without these sorts of change, are now attending school. And as external assistance can be particu- it is difficult to affect the way food, the younger educated women are larly helpful. Many other measures education and medical care are seen to be taking a greater part in from small-farmer programs to shared within families. But it is running the cooperative, education power generation and industrial- not impossible. Door-to-door in- for girls is becoming more highly izationare also needed to reduce oculation campaigns can reach all valued. In dairy development poverty and raise average incomes; children. This has been done projects in three other Indian these merit strong international recently in Mozambique and statesall based on this model support as well. Sierra Leone. And the way work similar results are being obtained. If donors providing assistance is organized will also affect inequal- to a country are unwilling to ities within families. For example, International assistance finance human development pro- the Anand Dairy Cooperative in grams, these programs in most India increased the income re- International aid for human de- cases will be smaller than they ceived directly by Indian women velopment programs has been otherwise would have been. Simi- since they have traditionally been provided for decades and has larly, if donors are willing to responsible for looking after cows contributed to several notable finance only "bricks and mortar" 80 but not teachers or health workers, With increasing recognition of or program relies for long periods the net effect will be excessive cap- the importance of antipoverty on outside aid and that implemen- ital intensityshowing up in overly programs, and of the investment tation difficulties in one project expensive and underused build- component of many of these pro- or region do not interfere with ings and insufficient staff. Yet in grams, practices have begun to continued financing for others. developing countries a high pro- change. Several donors, including portion of spending on primary the World Bank, have been financ- The importance of persistence education and health care, for ex- ing the salaries of agricultural ample, isand should befor extension workers, and in some Programs that cost the least often operating (recurrent) costs. In cases the operating costs required require the most organization. many countries, such as Tanzania to cany out education and training Moreover, whether in state bureau- and Upper Volta, money for oper- projectsteachers' salaries and cracies at one extreme or among ating costs is already very short teaching materials, for example. the intended poor beneficiaries at with the result that schools In May 1979 the OECD's Devel- the other, an organization's strength without books or even paper, opment Assistance Committee generally depends on the education health posts without medicines or adopted new guidelines on thern and resourcefulness of its members. supervision (due to inadequate financing of local and recurrent That cannot be developed overnight. travel budgets or gasoline short- costs, which recognized that basic One key lesson from 30 years ages) are increasingly common. human development programs were of development experience is that These shortages will get worse as particularly suitable for these it takes a long time to build up growth slows and countries kinds of financing. effective institutions. Neither struggle to keep up their physical Donors should of course be governments nor donors should investment rates. concerned to avoid waste in oper- expect quick results, or give up Most aid agencies have preferred ating costs, just as in construction too easily. For example, evaluation to limit their funding to physical costs. And they need to ensure of family planning programs shows investment, being reluctant to that programs develop adequate a close relation between their finance operating costs partly financial support for operating costs effectiveness and the number of because of concern that projects from national and local governments years they have been in existence. in which a developing country lest they wither away when As Chapter 5 explained, and as lacked a substantial financial stake international aid is withdrawn. Figure 6.1 confirms with respect might not develop enduring roots, Thus the share of operating costs but also from fear of encouraging covered by external assistance consumption at the expense of in- should be reduced gradually, which Figure 6.1 Literacy rates, selected vestment. As this Report stresses, will encourage steady increases developing countries, 1950 & 1970° (p,rrrst) however, human development rather than quantum jumps in the 1950 increases productivity, reduces amounts to be financed from local Greece 1970 100 fertility and thus promotes long- funds. Spam term growth in average incomes. Donors should also consider ii: 90 A significant part of spending providing sectoral or subsectoral, Puerto Ri:o 80 operating as well as capitalon as well as project, financing. This human development therefore is enables governments to focus on 70 investment. This is most evident the institutional, planning and 60 in primary education, which in policy issues that have a strong many countries has economic re- influence on the success of individual 50 turns well above average: the projects; it also provides a useful 40 salaries of teachers should no more framework for striking the appro- be regarded as consumption than priate balance between capital El Salvador 30 the wages of workers on irrigation and operating costs. In practice, Nicaragua 20 Guatemala projects. There is a large element subsectoral financinglimited by Haiti of investment in family planning activity or regionis often preferable 10 programs as well (indeed the esti- to sectorwide financing. Through mated returns often are even higher) subsectoral financing, donors can a. The rates are or the 20-24 age group and and to a lesser extent in health and determined by data availability. Dates are close to assist a continuing series of activities, 1950 and 1970. nutrition programs. while ensuring that no one project 81 to education, the level of human programs are necessary (as will world economy or economic mis- development at one time is strongly be the case for a number of coun- management cause cutbacks in influenced by its level decades tries over the next few years), human development programs, earlier. Thus, human development attention should be given to the children pay heavilyin loss of is not something that can be need for investment in the human future income or health, and in deferred: what is done nowor not development of the next genera- some cases with their lives. donewill have an influence for a tion. When economic difficulties long time to come. When austerity originating in the workings of the 82 7 Priorities and progress in regional perspective The past three chapters have from household surveysthough from some more than others; poli- examined the potential role of informal study and patching to- cies should correspondingly vary human development in attacking gether evidence from other sources in their focus. absolute poverty, and some of the can help. It is also a matter of problems and policies in the main analysisexperience has shown TrtdeofJs between different objectives human development areas. This how important it is to distinguish In the past the severity of the chapter addresses some broader household income from income tradeoff between poverty reduction human development planning per household member, to find the and growth has sometimes been issuesincluding the tradeoffs relevant price index to calculate exaggeratedespecially from a between growth and poverty changes in the real incomes of the narrowly economic point of view. reduction, and the allocation of poor and to take account of seasonal As the past two World Development resources between human develop- variations. For example, since the Reports have emphasized, more ment and other activities. After a poor spend the bulk of their incomes support for agriculture, land reform, general review, these and other on the cheapest foods, a price index expansion of industrial employment, issues are examined in the context based on national average con- and a more even distribution of of a regional typology of developing sumption patterns may seriously public services can all help to reduce countries. Since the needs and the distort what has been happening absolute poverty and accelerate difficulties are greatest in the two to absolute poverty. growth. This Report similarly poorest regionsSub-Saharan To be effective, policies must stresses not only what greater Africa and South Asiathey receive also distinguish the causes of pov- national income can do for the most attention. The other three ertywhich vary widely within as education, health and nutrition of regionsthe Middle East and North well as between countries. There the poor, but also how human Africa, Latin America, and East are common elements and impor- development policies for the poor Asiaare discussed collectively in tant linkages. But different measures can contribute to raising national a single section. will be needed to benefit, say, income. subsistence farmers on poor soils, It would be wrong, however, to Issues for planners landless laborers in fertile but suggest that there are no tradeoffs. crowded areas, and female-headed Although it is highly desirable, for Much absolute poverty, and some households in large cities. Poverty example, to help the aged and the of the ways to attack it, are obvious. programs have sometimes focused incurably sickamong the poorest Yet lack of information about the almost exclusively on small famiers of the poor in most societiesthis numbers and characteristics of the even when the majority in absolute. will contribute little or nothing to poor, and the causes of their poverty, poverty were in fact landless growth. Similarly, in expanding handicaps the design and imple- laborers. rural primary education, countries mentation of effective antipoverty As important as differentiating will have to choose between the policies. Even in countries where the causes of poverty is differen- places that are poorest, and those much work has been doneBrazil, tiating its characteristics. Absolute (the rapidly modernizing ones) India, Indonesiacontroversy per- poverty is a bundle of thingslow where more education would have sists about such basic facts as trends income, malnutrition, ill health, the largest effect on farm output. in the incomes of the poor. This lack of education. Different groups The severity of tradeoffs, more- is partly for lack of relevant data of poor people may initially suffer over, is (as Chapter 6 has shown) 83 in most cases amplified by political, investment, agriculture, foreign Balcince between different human fiscal, administrative and even trade, land reform, credit and re- development policies cultural considerations. If, for searchmust do most of the job, As the analysis in Chapter 5 bears political reasons, more services for even though many of them com- out, there are also difficult choices the poor must be matched by more plement human development in to be made within the general area services for the rich, the cost of important ways. of human development. The diffi- providing for the poor is multiplied. Even at the margin, the key culty is partly a technical one But economic factors underlie question is not whether the re- more research is needed to quan- many tradeoffs, especially since turns to human development are tify the returns to different sorts money can sometimes ease even high, but whether they are higher of programs in varying circum- political and administrative prob- than returns to alternative uses of stances. But it is again partly a lems. A country that is already the resources concerned. Much will matter of objectivesthe relative comparatively wealthy, or whose depend on the circumstances of weights attached to nutrition and growth prospects are excellent, the country concerned, including education, for example. And it is generally has more latitude than its past balance between human agravated by economic con- one that is poor, or whose growth development and other policies. straints: even with identical pref- prospects are grim. The severity Some countries have devoted too erences, a poor country might of tradeoffs is thus also affected little of their development budgets make a different choice from a by the international environment. to human resources, and too much richer one when confronted with Higher oil prices absorb resources to physical investment; for them, the option of providing rural that could have been used either a switch at the margin toward primary health care or expanding for growth or for reducing poverty. human development would be some form of urban secondary So do cuts in aid, obstacles to com- the best use of scarce resources. education with a higher economic mercial borrowing, and sluggish Others, by contrast, may have rate of return. Choices are also exports (and hence imports and overinvested in some aspects of affected by the availability of production) caused by slow world human developmentas suggested, finance (foreign and local, as well growth. Agricultural and industrial for example, by the low rates of as national) for different programs. protection in developed countries return to higher education in cer- The difficulty of the choice is undermine the efforts of developing tain countries. In other cases, eased somewhat by the fact that countries to foster agriculture and human development programs have the various aspects of human de- labor-intensive industrialization. had low returns simply because velopment are causally interrelated In the next few years, especially, they were hard to implement (see (see Chapter 5): an attack on any the harshness of the choices that Chapters 5 and 6). one front is likely to produce re- poor countries will have to make Overinvestment and underin- sults also on others. These can hardly be exaggerated. Nor vestment, of course, cannot be de- spillovers appear greatest in basic can the degree to which these could fined without reference to the ob- educationwhich usually also be eased by enlightened policies jectives of governmentshow has the biggest payoff in terms on the part of other countries. much weight they attach to growth, of increased income. There is thus redistribution and human devel- a strong case for considering in- Btlance between humcrn development opment, or to short- versus long- creasing (or in times of stringency, nd other policies term goals. Much of the payoff maintaining) expenditure on pri- The returns to human develop- from better education and lower mary schooling. This should not ment programs can be high in fertility, for example, would accrue mean neglecting secondary and economic termsboth directly to this generation's children and higher education, nutrition, health (especially for education) and in- grandchildren. But peopleespe- and family planning programs directly (especially through re- cially poor peoplelegitimately which in all circumstances are im- duced population growth). Their want improvements during their portant, and in many may have a impact on the education, health, own lifetimes. This and other better claim on marginal funds nutrition and fertility of the poor sources of economic or political than primary education. Nor is also valuable in itself. But hu- pressure to concentrate on the should governments overlook the man development programs alone short or medium term are bound practical difficulties of translating cannot reduce poverty and pro- to reduce the attractiveness of higher enrollment targets into mote growth. A whole range of somethough by no means all adequate education and reduced other policiesfor infrastructural human development programs. dropout rates, or the length of 84 literacy and life expectancy); and Figure 7.1 GNP per person, regional analysis provides a more Figure 7.3 Life expectancy, 1.960, 1970 and 1980 1960 and 1978a general, if less concrete, perspec- Years (1977 dollurC tive than would a set of country 70- ' e case studies. 65- Sub-Saharan Africa 60- Most of the countries in the region became independent in the 1960s. 55- They inherited acute deficiencies in skills, institutions and general 50- education; overcoming these has 1978 h been a major concern of most of 45- their governments. Progress has been considerable, yet severe 40- 1960 shortcomings remain. The region's experience illustrates that human 35 and institutional development are 4.. 47' 4. .s. long, slow processestheir neglect today is not easily overcome to- a. Weighted by population. Excludes S. Africa, morrow. And while they are Cambodia and Israel. costly, so is their neglect: as the analysis of Chapters 4 and 5 would predict, educational and institu- efficient investment and slow agri- tional deficiencies coexist with low cultural progress. life expectancy, high fertility, in- Growth The growth of incomes has been 1960 1970 1980 disappointing, both in the middle- Figure 7.2 Literacy, by region, income and in the low-income Excludes Afghanistan Israel and Turkey. 1945-75 Excludes Cuba. countries (see Table 7.1). The two Adult literacy rule (percenl(" Excludes centrally planned economies (China, Laos, Cambodia, North Korea and Virtnam(, groups are distinguished mainly Excludes South Africa and Nigeria. 90 by differences in natural resources E. Asia- middle-income rather than in economic structure, institutional development or hu- time that must elapse before the man skills. GNP per person (which, full benefits of even good primary in the absence of reliable infor- schooling are felt. mation on the large subsistence E. Asia- Country circumstunces lOW-income sector, can be measured only ap- proximately) either fell or grew Appropriate policies in the field of Mid. East & poverty and human development N. Africa Sub-Saharan will vary widely according to the Africa- Table 7.1 Sub-Saharan Africa: middle-income circumstances of the country con- GNP per person cerned. The rest of the chapter Average annual Level, illustrates this point by comparing S. Asia percentage growth 1980' the different regions of the devel- Countries 1980-70 1970-80 1980-80 (dollarsi oping world. Regions, of course, Sub-Saharan Low- Africa- income 1.6 0.2 0.9 186 are not decisionmaking units. Nor low- income Middle- are they homogeneous. But there income 17 2.1' 1.9 493 are important differences between 1940 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 Note; Excludes South Africa. them (Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 con- 1977 prices. a. Trends before 1960 are approximate. If oil-exporting Nigeria is excluded, this trast their progress on incomes, figure falls to 1.5 percent. 85 less than 1 percent a year in 11 of new farming methods (see page avoid such false economies (while countries during 1960-75; it rose 48) has obvious implications for maintaining the already very low more than 3 percent a year in four that improvement. But the prob- consumption levels of most of countries. (Some of these meager lem is clearly much wider. Modern their people). gains have been wiped out by agricultural "packages" (of seeds, deteriorating terms of trade.) fertilizers and cultivation tech- Poverty Agriculture has been almost uni- niques) have yet to be developed Given the trend in average incomes formly sluggish; food output per for many African localities and (particularly in agriculture), the person appears to have declined subsistence crops. Agricultural proportion of the population living in 25 countries (mainly in the programs generally have not re- in absolute poverty has probably Sahel) between 1969-71 and flected the considerable role that increased in many countries since 1976-78. African women play in agriculture. the early 1960s; in 1975 an esti- The constraints that hampered And there are basic deficiencies mated half of the people in the growth in the past have not eased in credit, infrastructure, agricultural region were absolutely poor. Most much. The discouraging prospects incentives, extension services and are subsistence and small-scale for growth in both low- and middle- market integration (the World farmers, but in some countries income African countriesand Development Report, 1978 consid- (such as Somalia) a sizable pro- the resulting likelihood of an in- ered in more detail the require- portion are nomads. As compared crease in the proportion of people ments for faster growth in Africa). with the low-income countries of in absolute povertywere de- In large measure these deficien- Asia, poor agricultural conditions scribed in Chapter 2 (page 11). cies reflect institutional weak- and farming methods are a more How the international economy nesses and the related scarcity of important cause of low agricul- affects African countries will de- experienced, trained people. Nor tural incomes than unfavorable pend on aid levels and on primary are their effects confined to agri- land-man ratios. commodity prices, but importantly culture. In several countries a sig- on their own actions as well. The nificant industrial sector is already Humun development issues potential gains from processing emerging, but the scarcity and high Despite substantial gains since primary products for export remain cost of suitably skilled labor and 1960, life expectancy remains be- largely untapped. Primary products management remain major im- low 50 and adult literacy rates typically account for 80-100 percent pediments to African industriali- below 25 percent in most coun- of merchandise exports (though zation. tries. Both are generally below not all are suitable for processing; While administrative weaknesses expected values for countries at see page 23). In some countries will take time to overcome, the their income levels. For example, exports have stagnated because of effectiveness of many programs the norm for life expectancy poor domestic agricultural perform- is also hampered by difficulties in (Figure 7.4) is about 50 years for ance; many more have had to financing operating costs, espe- countries with average incomes of increase their food imports. Grain cially for materials and supplies. about $350; but Senegal, with that imports into Sub-Saharan Africa Progress could be more rapid if income level, has a life expectancy rose from about 1.6 to 2.6 million aid donors were to relax their of only 42 years. Africa is the only tonnes between 1965 and 1975 (and traditional preference for funding region where fertility still shows the US Department of Agriculture capital rather than operating costs. no sign of declinewomen surviving projects a rise to 4.5 million tonnes In addition, there is a serious to the end of their child-bearing by 1985). danger that economic stringency years average 6 to S children. And The importance of agriculture in the next few years will lead to it is the only region where nutrition goes far beyond its effect on trade. cutbacks in human development has steadily worsened. As the region most dependent on programs, despite the importance agriculturethe main activity of of their contributionoften ex- FERTILITY. The contribution more than 70 percent of its 360 ceeding that of additional physical that slower population growth can million peopleaccelerating growth investmentto Africa's long-term make to raising incomes is par- and reducing poverty and malnu- development potential. it is essential ticularly marked in Africa. The trition in Africa depend more than that aid donors, especially in the region's high infant mortality and anywhere else on improved agri- first half of the 1980s, should low adult literacy are major cultural performance. Evidence that substantially increase their efforts reasons that population growth farmer literacy affects the adoption to help African governments remains high. 86 to establish the necessary admin- Figure 7.4 Sub-Saharan Africa: life expectancy in relation to income istrative structure. Village health per person, 1978 workers can be trained cheaply, Life expectancy (years) as has been demonstrated in 60 - Niger; but a study of Mali's health system noted that "at the village level, the most serious manpower 55 constraint is the near total lack Kenya of literate people who can be Worldwide norm' Tanzania trained as village health workers." Lesotho 50 - Sierra Leone Liberia EDUCATION, Typically, educa- Mozambique Ghana Nigeria Rwanda Zaire tion accounts for 15-25 percent of Zambia ' CAR Sudan Ivory Coast the budget and 3-6 percent of 45 - : Togo Bfl1fl Madagascar Cameroon Congo GNP; less than half the total is for Burundi Malawi primary education. Recent growth Mauritania Chad \Niger .negal Angola in school enrollment has been impressive, particularly in Benin, 40 Ma\ Guinea S Congo, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, ,Somalia Ethiopia Upper Volta Somalia and Zambia. These coun- tries spend more than 5 percent oL I I I I of their GNP on education and 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 are in the top 25 percent of all GNP per person (current dollars) developing countries on this count. a. Derived from cross-country equation relating life expectancy to GNP per person. For them, the key issue is not increasing education's share of the budget but (as in other African Studies in Nigeria and Tanzania in many parts of Africa, so that (in countries) using funds more ef- found that education among wives contrast to other regions) desired fectively, improving educational reduced fertility and infant mortality family size often exceeds its actual quality and tackling serious prob- though some studies in Africa size. lems of dropout and wastage. have suggested that the initial im- Partly for this reason, and partly Costs are a major obstacle to pact of schooling (by increasing because of the virtual absence in raising enrollment and school health and fecundity sooner than most countries of a primary health quality in Africa: costs per pupil it reduces desired family size) may care network onto which family as a percentage of GNP per person be to increase fertility. The con- planning programs could be grafted, are the highest of all regions. Com- trast between Kenya and Lesotho such programs in Africa have been pared with Asia, this ratio in West is also suggestive: among African few and feeble. Extending and Africa is more than twice as high countries, they both have better- strengthening family planning for primary, five times for second- than-average records of literacy, efforts, however, would cause an ary and seven times for tertiary life expectancy and child death earlier and faster dedine in fertility. education. The high cost largely ratesyet Kenya has the highest reflects the fact that teacher salaries fertility rate in Africa and Lesotho HEALTH. Primary health care (which typically account for 75 the lowest. Data from the early can be provided inexpensively percent of educational costs) are 1960s show that in Kenya many (about $2-3 a person) in some of high in relation to average incomes. more men than women were lit- the low-income countries (and In Upper Volta (which has the erate, while in Lesotho it was the could be financed to some degree lowest literacy rate in AfricaS other way round. by a reallocation of government percent) teachers' salaries are 24 That is unlikely to be the whole expenditure away from urban hos- times larger than GNP per person, explanation, of course; other pos- pitals); but since it is administra- compared with less than four sible reasons include the migration tively demanding, progress is likely times in Liberia. High salaries for of men from Lesotho to South to be slow. all educated people are partly a Africa, and differences in cultural A few countries such as Mali, colonial legacy; but the main cause valueswhich are strongly pronatal Kenya and Tanzania have begun has been a shortage of qualified 87 teachers, which is now starting to education is thus a doubly serious 1974. South Asia has substantially ease. Salaries have fallen in real drain on budgets; and its social better growth prospects than Sub- terms in several countries, includ- returns have been pushed well Saharan Africa; but it too will face ing Benin, Tanzania and Sierra below the private returns to indi- difficult choices in the adjustment Leone. viduals and below what they might period. Growth will depend heavily There are various other ways of be with better economic policies, on domestic economic manage- making education less expensive since Sub-Saharan Africa badly ment, particularly in agriculture; without making it worse, as dis- needs more people with professional, but exports, migrants' remittances cussed in Chapters 5 and 6. In scientific and administrative skills. and aid are important international some countries, such as Nigeria Their shortage has been one of influences (no country borrows and Sierra Leone, average class the biggest brakes on development much commercial capital). Remit- sizes are small enough (about 30 projectsas reviews of World tances, mainly from the Middle pupils) to be raised without much Bank project experience amply East, have grown dramatically in adverse effect on quality (see box testify. But African countries also recent years; in 1979 they amounted on page 52). In Togo local com- need to train them more econom- to about $1.4 billion in Pakistan munities pay part of teachers' ically (see page 50) in order both (almost three-quarters the value salaries; in Somalia and Tanzania to increase their supply and to of its merchandise exports) and they contribute to construction release resources for primary school- roughly $1 billion in India. They costs. ing and other human development are also substantial in Bangladesh. While school enrollments have programs. The region has also had some risen markedly, few countries have Despite the conspicuous scarcities, success in increasing exports to tried to deal with the large backlog there is concern about incipient the Middle Eastparticularly India, of illiterate adults. Literacy cam- unemployment among secondary- which has won major contracts for paigns that relied on students, school graduates in some countries. turnkey plants, construction and volunteers and government ser- This reflects the fact that job require- consiltancy services. Nonetheless, vants were mounted in Somalia ments and expectations tend to no country has fully exploited its and Tanzania, with spectacular change more slowly than the supply potential for manufactured exports. success: literacy rates are estimated of qualified people (see box on The large industrial sectors of India to have risen from 2 percent and page 51). But as graduates find and Pakistan can respond strongly 10 percent to 60 percent and 66 it harder to get jobs, they will be to incentives for exports, as Pakistan's percent, respectively, between likelier to respond to the needs of did in the 1960s and India's has 1960 and 1975. Such programs, the economy for more people to done more recently. Sri Lanka is however, lack the socializing work in rural areas as extension launching a major drive for export- effects of school attendance. There agents, teachers and administrators. led industrialization, which should is also a risk that literacy skills be helped by its highly educated may decay if they are acquired in South Asia labor force. circumstances that do not require Recent agricultural performance their frequent use. This argues for South Asia has much in common in India augurs well for the 1980s programs that are not too brief with Sub-Saharan Africain (and is the main reason faster GNP and have an emphasis on such particular, pervasive poverty and growth is projected). When an practical subjects as numeracy, low average incomes. But it has identifiable package involving hygiene, nutrition, family planning relatively many more highly trained water, fertilizer, high-yielding and agriculture. people (there are almost as many varieties and credit is readily There are politically difficult university students in India as in available, as it is in much of South choices to be made in higher edu- the European Community) and Asia, the economic returns to cation. Governments often give greater administrative capacity. more rapid and successful adop- stipends as well as free education tionfacilitated by the spread of to university (and sometimes even Growth educationcan be high. Given the secondary) students. Many govern- Economic growth has been generally pressure of population on land, ments have also felt obliged to slow: South Asia's GNP per person future agricultural expansion will guarantee jobs to all university grew at an annual rate of 1.6 percent have to rely almost exclusively on graduatesin activities whose in 1960-70 and 1.1 percent in increasing cropping-intensity and productivity does not always match 1970-80stagnating in the early the spread of high-yielding varieties their salaries. Secondary and higher 1970s and then accelerating after of crops. 88 Poverty is lower than in Africa, the density Figure 7.5 South Asia: life About half of the region's people expectancy in relation to income of population makes it at least live in absolute poverty, accounting per person, 1978 as urgent an issue. The three most for half of the world's poor. Land- 75 Lfr cop cc populous countries of the region lessness is a much more important 70 Sri Lweka all share the nexus of low female cause of poverty than in Africa. 65 literacy and high child mortality The landless and those with less 60 and fertility (female literacy rates than 0.5 hectares make up about 55 are a third to a half of male rates), Burma Pakistan 53 percent of the rural households 50 with Pakistan and Bangladesh the - Bangladesh India in Bangladesh, 40 percent in India the worst affected. In India higher 45 - Nepal and 37 percent in Pakistan. And Worldwide norm literacy, lower sex differences in 40 those with 0.5 to 1 hectare are OL education and a stronger family still very poor, and must earn much 100 125 150 175 GNP per prros (ret dolor,) 200 225 250 planning program have been of their income as wage-laborers. a. Drrived from cross-country equation relating associated with a dedine in fertility. Although only about 20 percent life expectancy to GNP per person. As a result, by 2000, the primary- of the population lives in cities, school age group is projected to South Asia contains much of the estate laborers remain an under- have increased by about 40 per- world's worst urban poverty. privileged group), and extraordi- cent in Bangladesh, 60 percent in Life expectancy in South Asia narily low population growth. It Pakistan and a more manageable is above the norm for countries achieved this primarily through 20 percent in India. with similar average incomes (Fig- subsidies to food and education, Outside Sri Lanka and Burma, ure 7.5); but for literacy the picture which accounted respectively for the status of women is a major bar is more mixed, with Nepal and 4.5 percent and 3 percent of GNP to human development. Malnutri- Pakistan below the norm. More in the early 1970s (17 percent and tion is considerably higher among generally, progress in human 12 percent of the central budget). females, and newborn girls have development varies widely, both These were combined with fairly a significantly smaller chance of between and within countries. Sri broad-based access to health care surviving to the age of five (see Lanka and the Indian state of Kerala and a moderately effective family box on page 91). The school enroll- have achieved literacy and life planning program. Relatively low ment rate among boys is nearly expectancy that are usually reached defense spendingin 1977 Sri Lanka twice as high as among girls; the at incomes per person near the devoted just 0.7 percent of its GNP gap has closed signicantly, how- top of the middle-income range. to defense, compared with the South ever, even in the Muslim countries (In 1971 the literacy rate in Kerala Asian average of 3.4 percentmade where the cultural reasons for low was 69 percent; Tamil Nadu and it easier to finance these programs. female enrollment are strongest. Maharashtra were next in India Good literacy and nutrition con- The eventual impact this could with 45 percent and Rajasthan was tributed to high life expectancy have on population growth is con- last with 21 percent.) At the other and low infant mortality, fertility siderable. A study in Bangladesh extreme, Nepal's human develop- and population growth. (The found that, as in other countries, ment indicators are more like those essential ingredients and results schooling reduced fertility even in of the typical African country. were similar in Kerala.) But Sri the absence of a strong family Lanka's experience also highlights planning program. But without a Human development issues the importance of concentrating strong program, a large and early The successes of Sri Lanka and spending on those who need it decline in fertility is unlikely. Kerala demonstrate the potential most. The provision of coverage as well as the difficulties of human to all income groups and educational NUTRITION. Food production development and poverty reduction levels resulted in a fiscal burden has roughly kept pace with popu- in South Asia. They also confirm which could not be sustained (page lation growth, but malnutrition the potency of an early start: Sri 62). More generally, Sri Lanka's remains widespread. It is due more Lanka's literacy rate in 1900 exceed- economic performance has not yet to people not being able to afford ed that of Pakistan and Bangladesh matched its progress on human food than to any overall shortage: in 1975. development (see box overleaf). bumper harvests in India in 1976-78 In relation to its income, Sri Lanka resulted in a large increase in food has extraordinarily high life PERTILITY AND WOMEN. While stocks, but malnutrition (while expectancy and literacy (although population growth in South Asia reduced) remained widespread. 89 tion than on individual disease Tradeoffs in Sri Lanka control programs. While the But pricing policies discouraged new region's ratio of physicians to Sri Lanka's record on life expectancy, investment in tea and other export crops. population is high by the standards literacy and fertility (in relation to its low And there was too much emphasis on income level) is one of the best in the of low-income countries, they tend industrial import substitution and too world. But to achieve this the govern- little on export promotionin part because to be clustered in urban areas. ment has spent on average over the past of an increasingly overvalued exchange The relative abundance of highly two decades nearly 10 percent of GNP on rate. After 1970 the economy was hit by educated people in South Asia education, health and nutrition pro- bad weather, which affected agricultural (especially India), and the improved grams. To what extent, then, were these production, and by a steeper fall in the achievements in human development at world price of its exports relative to its outlook for economic growth, the expense of economic growth? imports. These problems were aggravated should allow the larger countries Growth of GDP in the 1960s was 0.7 until 1977 by poor economic management in the region to tackle the challeng- percentage points above the low-income including an unresolved conflict with ing tasks of (a) increasing the share average, in part reflecting one of the highest the private sector (which depressed its of spending on primary education growth rates of rice production in the investment and expansion), excessive use world. In the 1970s, though, slower growth and expanding enrollment, espe- of public investment for highly inefficient in agriculture and especially manufac- industrial projects, and expansion of the cially among girls and the poor; turing caused Sri Lanka's GDP growth public payroll in an expensive and unsuc- improving the efficiency of the rate to be somewhat below the low-income cessful attempt to curb unemployment. educational systembetter quality, average. But because Sri Lanka's pop- The tradeoff between expenditures on fewer dropouts and repeaters; and ulation growth rate was well below the human development and growth in Sri low income average (it fell to 1 7 percent Lanka has thus not been so sharp as is expanding the network of a year in the 1970s), the growth of GNP sometimes suggested. In the 1960s fairly primary health centers (India is per person over the period 1960-77, at rapid growth permitted expansion of social already devoting renewed attention 2 0 percent was above the low income expenditures. In the 1970s growth deteri- to this). average of 1.4 percent. orated for reasons generally independent Sri Lanka has thus done no worse in of the human development spending terms of growth than other countries at and indeed caused a decline in real Primarily middle-income regions its income level, while greatly out-perform- expenditures per person on health and ing them in human development. But it education, as well as in food distribution With some injustice to their could have done even betterrealizing per person. The election of 1977 led to considerable diversity, the three more of the economic potential of its a change of government and to sub- primarily middle-income regions human resourceshad better economic stantial alterations in policies. From 1977 policies been pursued. can be characterized as follows. to 1980 annual GDP growth is estimated In the 1960s Sri Lanka's economic to have spurted to 6.5 percent, or about Middle East and North Africa: management was better than in the 1970s. 5 percent per person. income growth has been extremely rapid in recent years, reflecting the direct and indirect effects of oil revenues; but human develop- Calorie consumption per person in ultimately on raising the incomes ment still lags behind. Sri Ianka has not been higher than of the poor. Latin America and the Carib- in the rest of South Asia, but there bean: the most urbanized and has been much less malnutrition EDucATIoN AND HEALTH. Spend- industrialized region, with high simply because food has been ing on education has been relatively average levels of human develop- relatively evenly distributed. lowabout 1.5 percent of GNP in ment; economic and social progress India, Pakistan and Bangladesh Bangladesh, 2.5 to 3 percent in has been rapid, despite fast popula- respectively spent 0.6 percent, 1.9 Burma, India and Sri Lankamainly tion growth; yet one in seven people percent and 0.1 percent of their because educational costs are the still live in absolute poverty. GNPs on limited food subsidies in lowest in the world, which in turn East Asia and Pacific: best per- the early 1970sbut with relatively reflects the large supply of educated formance on growth of incomes little nutritional effect (outside people. Except in Burma and Sri and human development in relation Kerala), since rural areas and urban Lanka, however, policies have to income; rapid growth has been squatters were largely bypassed. tended to favor higher education: based on efficient use of labor, Greater attention to nutritional most poor children still fail to capital and technology rather than considerations in food production complete primary school. on natural resources. and subsidy programs could have In health, future gains will de- a major impact; but sustained nu- pend more on improvements in Growth tritional improvement will depend nutrition, health care and educa- The countries of the Middle East 90 and North Africa cover the spec- growth during the 1970s should regions account for the bulk of trum of average incomesfrom ensure fairly rapid expansion in commercial borrowing by devel- Kuwait, among the richest coun- the 1980s. oping countries, with Mexico, tries in the world, to Afghanistan, Growth in East Asia and Latin Argentina, Brazil, South Korea one of the poorest. Growth has America has in general been excel- and Venezuela alone accounting been rapid even in the non-oil lent. Strong economic management for 44 percent of the total in 1979. countries, which benefited from meant that these were the only Another crucial international in- the oil boom through migrants' regions in which oil importers grew fluence on their growth prospects, remittances and inflows of official faster in the 1970s than in the both directly and through its ef- and private capital. (About 10 1960s. The adjustment period will fect on credit-worthiness, is world percent of the people in the region see a slowdown in their growth, demand for their manufactured are directly dependent on remit- but by the mid-1980s their pros- export. tances, which are often largean pects look quite goodso long as The major East Asian exporters average of $4,000 a year per good management and political alone accounted for more than 40 Moroccan migrant, for example.) stability are maintained, and so percent of developing-country In the 1970s GNP per person in long as growth in world trade and manufactured exports in 1977; the region rose 4.9 percent a year; capital flows to developing coun- despite some protectionism in higher real oil prices meant that tries also pick up by then. industrial countries, they have growth in purchasing power was Growth in both Latin America sustained rapid export growth by higher still (see box on page 4). and East Asia depends heavily on diversifying their product lines. The same factors that spurred commercial finance. The two This flexibility allowed them to maintain growth in the 1970s despite slower growth in the world Sex, length of life and development as a whole. It also means they In developed countries, women live longer with the extent of education, especially have more freedom than other than menon average by more than six for women. non-oil developing countries to years. This is not so in all developing choose whether to respond to higher countries, especially the poorest ones oil prices by greater borrowing or (see table). In most of South Asia, women Excess of female over male life expectancy, selected countries, 1970s by increasing their exports (and on average die two to three years sooner than men. In low-income Indonesia, Region Difference intensifying import substitution). though, women live longer than men. and coun fry in years In most middle-income countries, Human development: regional issues South Asia apart from those in the Middle East and Bangladesh -2.0 Some countries in East Asia and North Africa (where incomes have risen India 2.5 Latin America have achieved levels considerably since the time of some of Sri Lanka 3.0 these estimates), women live substantially of literacy and life expectancy East Asia comparable to those in the indus- longer than men. In East Asia and Latin Indonesia 2.0 America, moreover, this has been so for Peninsular Malaysia 4.5 trialized countries. In all the three as long as statistics are available. But South Korea 6.0 regions absolute poverty has been the female advantage has increasedfor Thailand 6.0 reduced significantly but remains example, in Argentina from around one year in 1900 to more than six years in Latin America substantial, the 1970s. Argentina 6.0 Brazil 3.0 In some countries there has been a Costa Rica MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRIcA. 4.0 reversal. In Sri Lanka, for instance, women Mexico 4.0 The rapid economic growth of on average in 1953 lived one year less recent years has probably cut than men; by 1962 they had pulled level; Middle East and by the early 1970s they were ahead by a North Africa considerably the proportion of margin of about three years. A similar Algeriaa 1.0 absolutely poor people in the switch occurred in Turkey between the Iraq 0.5 region. Nonetheless, there is still 1930s and the 1970s. Iran 0.5 serious poverty in the countries Tunisia' 0.0 Economic development thus tends to not rich in oil, and to a lesser de- raise women's life expectancy more than Industrialized countries men's. But regional differences in the size Italy 6.0 gree also in Iran, Iraq and Algeria. and evolution of the gap, and the excep- Norway 6.0 As in Sub-Saharan Africa, tional cases of Sri Lanka and Turkey United States 8.0 income differences between coun- (see next page), suggest an association a. Late 1960s. tries are related more to their natural resources than to institu- 91 tions, human skills or economic Figure 7.7 Latin America and the relation with income. There is also structure. In most countries life Caribbean: life expectancy in scope for reallocation of human expectancy is well below what relation to income per person, 1978 development expenditures. For b[aroprotoory (yoars) would be expected at their income 75 cuba Argentina Trinidad example, some of the heavy sub- Uruguay levels (see Figure 7.6); the same 70 - amalca-_;. and Tobago sidies on urban food and university 'Costa Rica is true of literacy. Birth rates re- El chile education that are common in the Salvador Mexico. main very high; of the 11 countries 65 .Paraguay :.Brazit -\ Venezuela region could be diverted to ne- Worldwide norm with the highest fertility rates in 60 Ecuadoe.-eorColombia glected rural areas and other uses. Hondu /Ooruiniran Rep. the world, eight are in the Middle -Guatemala 55 - ,,/ \ Nicaragua East and North Africa. Death rates LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIB- have come down very sharply in 50 BEAN. The countries of the "south- the recent past, but infant mor- 01_ H I ern cone"Argentina, Chile and tality rates remain highone in 0 1,000 1,500 2,000 GNP pro porno (,arrrrl dollar,) 2,500 3,000 Uruguayas well as Cuba, Panama, four in Afghanistan, for example. a. Derived from cross-country equation relating life Jamaica, Costa Rica and Trinidad expectancy to GNP per person. Part of the reason is that the and Tobago, have achieved life gap between male and female expectancy (see Figure 7.7) and education is larger in this region educational levels approaching than in any of the others. But it overnight. Tremendous amounts those in the developed countries. is closing rapidly: the primary- of money are indeed being chan- The southern part of Brazil re- school enrollment rate for girls neled into physical investments sembles these countries; but the rose from 40 percent around 1960 and improving social conditions in northeastern part lags behind and to 60 percent in the mid-1970s; the oil-producing countries. In accounts for the largest concen- progress was particularly impres- most cases, though, the manpower tration of absolute poverty in the sive in some countriesup from needed to complement this effort region. The other countries fall 58 percent to 90 percent in Turkey, is not available domestically; and into two groups. The first consists for example, and from 43 percent it takes time and organization to of the smaller, poorer countries to 81 percent in Tunisia. It is sig- make effective use even of trained of Central America and the Carib- nificant that these two countries people from abroad. bean plus Bolivia, Ecuador and have the lowest fertility rates in Similarly, even when virtually Paraguay; more than half their the region. all school-age children are enrolled people live in rural areas where The challenge for many countries at school (as they are in some of health and education services are is to use the rapid increases in these countries), it will take more usually sparse. The second group income from nonrenewable re- than three decadeswithout adult Peru, Mexico, Colombia and sources for productive investments literacy campaignsto raise the Venezuelaare larger and more and better health, education and overall literacy rate above 90 per- than 65 percent urbanized. nutrition. But this cannot happen cent. It may take even longer Throughout the region, there is before life expectancy approaches no significant difference in primary- the levels of the industrialized school attendance between boys countries. and girls, but there is between Figure 7.6 Middle East and North Africa: life expectancy in relation For the richer countries in the urban and rural areas. Primary en- to income per person, 1978 region, then, money is not the rollment rates tend to be high; but Lfr nperhoory (ye,rsI main obstacle. But for the others, only a small proportion (often less 70 Kuwait the financial constraint on human than 10 percent) of children in 65 Harm development programs is likely to rural areas complete primary 60 remain serious, especially in Mo- school. In many Latin American 55 Iraq Libya rocco, Afghanistan, the two countries, higher education has 50 \ -. Morocco Algeria Egypt lran Saudi Arabia Yemens and to a lesser extent in expanded very fast, accounting for Egypt, Syria, Turkey and Tunisia. the bulk of education budget in- 45 .Yemeo PDR Fairly rapid growth in most of creases. Spending on primary 40 Yemen AR these countries, however, should education could be increased permit the increases in human dramatically if higher education 0 500 1000 1,500 2,000 6,000 10,000 14,000 GNP par prrres (r,oxi d,liar) development expenditures that were financed to a much larger a. Derived from cross-country equation relating life are needed to bring social indica- extent from tuition fees, with expectancy to GNP per person. tors gradually into a more normal assistance for those not able to pay. 92 The high level of urbanization well-educated populations, rela- flecting substantial numbers of in the region means that water tively equal income distributions underage and overage pupils, as supply and sanitation systems and rapid income growth, South well as near-universal enrollment would do more to improve health Korea and the city states of Hong of children in the primary school- than in other regionswater pollu- Kong and Singapore have made age group). tion and poor sanitation are more tremendous strides in human de- The most serious poverty is in serious in congested cities than in velopment and reducing poverty. Cambodia. Indonesia is a special villages. Experience in Brazil, They have combined extensive case; in many respects it is similar Colombia and Mexico has shown human development programs to a South Asian countryJava is that there is considerable potential with excellent economic policies. one of the most densely populated for rich users to subsidize the Rapid economic growth has in regions of the world, and has poor in urban water and sewerage turn allowed further human de- serious malnutrition and poverty. systems. But there must be com- velopment. To a lesser extent this At the same time, oil and the (rel- plementary efforts to provide pri- has also been the case in Malaysia, atively untapped) agricultural mary health care in both rural Thailand and the Philippines; but resources of the outer islands areas and urban slums. Some their records on income distribu- distinguish it from any of the countries, including Mexico, tion and poverty are more mixed. South Asian economies. Recent Jamaica and Panama, have begun Though lack of information economic growth has been rapid, to include family planning services lends a certain haziness to what but there has been controversy in primary health care systems; for is known about China and North over the extent to which it has other countries to do so would be Korea, it seems that with a very led to less poverty. a major advance. different development strategy One notable feature of East Though average food consump- they too have enjoyed consider- Asia's success has been the will- tion is adequate in most countries, able success (though there is some ingness of most governments to many poor people are malnour- controversy over what their growth set initially low standards in order ished. In the longer term, measures would be at international prices). to achieve comprehensive cover- to increase employment and the North Korea seems to have ex- age. Another has been the variety incomes of the poor will help panded output rapidly, made of approaches adopted, despite the overcome this, as will measures to extensive improvements in health active involvement of all govern- stimulate food production. But and education, and as a result ments in promoting economic and recent direct nutrition programs, lowered fertility. China has prob- human development. including subsidies and nutrition ably done even better on human Education. Fee-paying schools education for the poorest groups, development in relation to its in- have traditionally played a major appear to have been effective in come levelthe gross primary- role in this region, and still do in Chile and Colombia. school enrollment rate has risen higher educationfor example, in Reaching some of the more from about 25 percent in 1949 to the Philippines and South Korea isolated and ethnically distinct well over 100 percent today (re- (page 74). At the primary level, rural poor is more expensive and the emphasis has been on achiev- administratively more demanding ing universal enrollment. To do than serving urban dwellers. More Figure 7.8 East Asia and so, South Korea has accepted class fundamentally, mustering the Pacific: life expectancy in re- sizes that are large by international lation to income per person, 1978 financial and administrative re- Ljo rap tony (yraro) standards (averaging about 60 but 75- sources needed to reduce absolute China Hong Kong. rising to more than 80 in many 70 - poverty faster will require a public Malaysia Singapore metropolitan schools). 65 - Viet Nam S. Korea commitmentthus far lacking in Worldwide norm Health. The world's best many countriesto the goal of 60 - Thailand N. Korea Philippines examples of universal primary making basic human development 55 health care at low cost are in China services available to all. 50 .Papua New Guinea (see box on page 74) and the north- Indonesia 45 em provinces of Viet Nam. Other Laos EAST ASIA AND PAcIFIc. In most 40- countries have also emphasized countries of the region, literacy 0 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 primary health carethough there and life expectancy (Figure 7.8) GNP pro porno (OOreosl dollaoo) are important exceptions to the are well above the norm for their a. Derived from cross_country equation relating life expectancy to GNP pee person. rule. For example, medical care in income level. With skilled and South Korea has depended mainly 93 on doctors in private practice. exhaust the national income twice tions of interest to planners, and Partly as a result, maternal and over. There are always acute thoices on the principles and information child health care is often inade- between the well-being of the needed to answer them. quate, and life expectancy is not current generation and of its heirs; From the point of view of as high, relative to income, as and between the well-being of the accelerating growth and reducing literacy. poor and of the less poor. It is absolute poverty (in both its income Nutrition. Substantial increases very hard to forecast the conse- and its nonincome aspects), is the in the incomes of the poor have quences of particular policies, or right balance being struck between allowed them to buy more food; to choose the best mix of policies physical investment and human good agricultural performance to achieve particular objectives. development? has ensured that supplies are ade- The nature of the best strategy In human development, is the quate. In the centrally planned also varies between (and within) right balance being struck between economies, there has been greater countries, not simply because of education, health, nutrition and resort to rationing and subsidies. broad differences in their economic family planning? While average nutrition levels in and social structures and prospects, Within each of these areas, is the region are satisfactory, serious but also because of differences in the right balance being struck malnutrition still exists in lower- the feasibility and likely outcome between basic and more advanced income groups in Indonesia, of specific policies and programs. programs? Would different pro- Malaysia and the Philippines as It would be a serious mistake, grams be more effective or more well as in Cambodia. though, to suppose that there are economical? no lessons at all. Effective planning In addressing all these ques- Lessons for planning is largely a matter of identifying tions, it is necessary to remember the important issues and linkages, that there are no laws, only circum- One familiar conclusion from this and of bringing the light of evidence stancesbut also that applying review of regional issues is that and experience to bear on them. general principles to specific cir- there are no simple lessons, no This regional review and the chap- cumstances is the springboard of easy prescriptions. There are always ters that preceded it have thus successful action. enough desirable uses of money to focused on a particular set of ques- 94 Chapter 8 Summary and conclusions Impaled on the trident of inflation it need not. In the High case the cent) and faster than in the 1970s. and recession in the developed oil-importing developing coun- Without it, the growth of the oil countries and much more expen- tries would grow at about 2.4 per- exporters would be almost half a sive oil, world growth prospects cent per person a year in 1980-85, percentage point lower, and that have deteriorated in the past year. and by 1990 there would be 80 of the oil-importing countries a Higher oil prices have improved million fewer people in absolute full percentage point lower. Much the outlook for the fifth of the poverty than in the Low case. This of the first part of this Report has developing world's population would require that developing been about the policy decisions that lives in oil-exporting coun- countries adjust successfully that will determine the actual out- tries; their average GNP per per- cutting their external deficits by comes, in both the near term and son could grow at around 3.0 to raising exports rather than lower- the longer term. 3.5 percent a year in the first half ing imports, while increasing both of the 1980s. But for the four- investment and efficiency in re- External factors fifths that live in oil-importing source use. What the industrial- countries, the first half of the ized countries and capital-surplus Trade. The ability of devel- decade will involve slower growth. oil exporters do is also vitalin oping countries to afford the For developing countries as a whole, stimulating demand for develop- imports they need for growth de- growth will be substantially below ing-country exports, in recycling pends crucially on their exports to that forecast in last year's Report. oil surpluses and in providing aid. the industrialized countries, which Governments of oil-importing But even in the High case, the currently constitute two-thirds of developing countries must take growth of income per person in their market. The industrialized steps to reduce current account the developing countries will not countries, even those determined deficits and adapt to more expen- match that in the industrialized to combat inflation by restraining sive energyand at a time when countries. Taking the steps needed growth, must minimize the effects demand for their exports from in- not just to attain, but to exceed, their deceleration will have on the dustrialized countries has slowed, the High case is thus the major developing world. This means ex- not just because of the rise in development challenge of the panding the volume of imports, energy prices, but because of next five years. maintaining the relatively free cyclical and structural problems The success of the adjustment trading opportunities that now as well. The GNP growth of oil- by developing and other countries exist for most products, and start- importing developing countries to the economic circumstances of ing to lower the barriers against could thus fall to about 1.8 per- the early 1980s will not only other goods of particular impor- cent per person a year (the Low largely determine their growth tance to developing countries, such case). Prospects for the low-income during that period but will also as textiles, clothing, leather goods, oil importers would be particu- affect the chances of an accelera- electronics, steel and some agri- larly bleak in this scenario: income tion of growth in the second half cultural commodities. To do so per person in low-income Sub- of the decade. With recovery in would increase the localized pains Saharan Africa would decline; and the industrialized countries and in of structural change in the devel- the number of people in absolute world trade and with continued oped countries. But there are poverty in the developing world sound domestic economic policies, internal remedies for these pains, as a whole would increase. the oil-importing countries could and liberalization of trade will pay This Low case (or an even worse grow almost as rapidly (3.2 per- off in faster productivity growth outcome) could come aboutbut cent) as the oil exporters (3.4 per- and lower inflation. The oil- 95 exporting nations can also help by donors should make every effort borrowing from commercial and rapidly expanding their imports to expand their aid relative to bilateral lenders and multilateral from developing countries. GNP, even in periods of domestic institutions. Energy. The developing coun- stringency. And they should con- Investment and production tries that import oil have been centrate their aid even more on efficiency. In attracting (especially hard hit by the price explosion of low-income countries. commercial) finance, and in speed- the past 12 months and can expect Commercial capital, mainly from ing development more generally, their energy costs to rise further banks but also from the bond trade and energy strategies play in real terms. At the same time, market, private direct investment an important role. So do other modernization of their economies and official sources, will be avail- policies that increase investment, will spur demand for energy; so able to help the middle-income improve administration, raise agri- they face a continuing need to countries. But not all countries cultural productivity and make adapt to the rising cost of imported will be well placed to borrow better use of capital, labor, natural oil. They will find this easier if oil- much more from private commer- resources and imports. exporting countries can avoid cial sources; without additional Human development. The supply disruptions and sharp price financial assistance from other internal factor on which this changes. More generally, the world sources, their growth will slow Report has focused is the human economy will perform better if oil down. In particular, there is not one: the role not only of education prices follow a smooth path; vio- enough long-term program (non- and training, but also of health lent fluctuations play havoc with project) finance to support the and nutrition. In addition to the internal resource allocation and structural changes required in important direct benefits that pro- the external payments system. many countries. Some will bene- grams in these areas confer, the Reliable supplies and smooth price fit from the structural adjustment Report stresses another aspect, changes will be more likely if de- lending of the World Bank and long-standing but often neglected veloped countries improve their assistance from the IMF; enlarged the role of human development energy conservation and develop official flows of this sort, particu- as investment, contributing to alternative sources. larly from multilateral agencies, growth. The importance of tech- Capital flows. Current ac- could and should play a larger role. nical, professional and managerial count imbalances will be large in skills is well known. Less well the next few years, again requir- Internal factors known but firmly established by ing special efforts to recyde finance research is the importance of to oil-importing countries, especi- While powerfully influenced primary education, which affects ally in the developing world. There by the international environment, the knowledge and attitudes of is a serious risk that reluctance or the progress of developing coun- farmers and other workers. inability to finance large external tries depends even more on their Investment in human resources, deficits will lead to levels of trade, own policies and initiatives. like other kinds of investment, investment and economic effici- Trade, energy and capital can be ineffectual unless comple- encyhence, of growthlower flows. In trade, the developing mented by other productive inputs than anyone would wish. Even in countries can use pricing and and by policies to ensure that the later years of the 1980s, when other policies to stimulate pro- resources are efficiently used. the severity of payments imbal- duction of internationally traded Human development programs ances is expected to diminish, the goodsboth exports and import must also be carefully chosen and growth of developing countries substitutes; but they should avoid efficiently carried out. Despite these will continue to depend on inflows bias toward import substitution, qualifications, there is strong evi- of foreign capital. since this reduces efficiency and dence to support the common- For the low-income countries, discourages exports. With regard sense proposition that human de- which can borrow little commer- to energy, they, like the industri- velopment can make a valuable cially, this means more aid. There alized countries, can minimize the contribution to growth. is a real danger that the modest loss of real income caused by Studies at the firm, farm and aid increases projected in this higher oil prices through conser- project level have shown that bet- Report will not be achieved. In vation and greater domestic energy ter education, health and nutrition their own long-term interests, as production. As to capital flows, can raise incomes and productiv- well as those of the developing they can take full advantage of ity, and that the economic rate of countries, both OECD and OPEC their opportunities for prudent return to investment in schooling 96 is high, frequently well above that tion. Growth is vital to reducing all according to circumstances and of physical investment. For pri- aspects of absolute povertymal- policies. And it has its own mo- mary schooling, the rates of return nutrition, ill health and illiteracy, mentum: what is done (or not in a large group of countries aver- as well as low incomeespecially done) today powerfully influences age more than 20 percent. At the in the poorest countries. But growth what can be done a decade or aggregate level, cross-country unaccompanied by other mea- more ahead. comparisons show that develop- sures may neither boost the in- Practical aspects of human ing nations with higher literacy comes of the poor much, nor lead development. Human development rates have grown faster, even to much progress on nonincome is easier said than done. But much when allowances are made for aspects of poverty. On both counts, has been learned about the com- other influences on growth and human development programs have parative efficacy of different poli- for reverse causationthe effect a part to play. cies and programs. In nutrition, of growth on literacy. This finding Raising the incomes of the for example, there is growing is reinforced by case studies and poor. The Report has discussed a agreement that the central issue is historical evidence. wide range of policies, many of not improving the balance be- Population. One important which positively reinforce growth, tween calories and protein but way in which human develop- that can help raise the incomes of increasing the amount of staple ment contributes to raising aver- the poor. Support of agriculture, foods the poor can afford; this in- age incomes, as well as to other land and tenure reform, policies to volves raising their incomes, stim- social goals, is by reducing popu- raise the demand for labor and ulating production of these foods lation growth. Reducing fertility various kinds of research are four and, in some cases, targeted sub- is not an end in itself; but lower important areas considered. Human sidies. In health the vital role of population growth in most devel- development is an essential com- primary care, together with edu- oping countries tends to result in plement. It accelerates the spread cation and control of mass diseases, greater investment per person in of new techniques to small farms is now generally acknowledged. In physical capital and human skills and increases the opportunities of fertility there is better under- and thus in faster growth. Better the poor for employment in the standing both of how to imple- nutrition and health, by lowering modern sector. And because fertil- ment family planning programs infant mortality, are essential in- ity and family size are reduced, and of how such programs inter- gredients of fertility decline. So is the earnings of adults do not have act with socioeconomic and cultural education, especially of women, to be spread so thinly among chil- conditions. In education more since it delays marriage, alters atti- dren and other dependents. importance is now attached to its tudes about family size and makes Nonincome aspects of pov- behavioral effects; and in raising modern contraception more ac- erty. The worst aspects of absolute educational standards, the signif- ceptable. Increases in income poverty include not only low in- icance of dass size has been shown themselves are a cause, as well as come, but also malnutrition, fre- to be much less, and that of teach- a consequence, of reduced fertil- quent child death, disease and ing materials much more, than ity: people who are less poor have ignorance. All can be helped by was formerly believed. good reasons for wanting fewer human development programs. Hard experience has also shown children (including less need for Less obviously, there is a complex the difficulties of implementing their labor and for support in old interdependence between the dif- human development and how to age). And research has confirmed ferent facets of human develop- tackle them. Political obstacles that family planning programs also mentas there is between human such as urban bias, competition are important in bringing about development and increases in for resources, and the weak posi- slower population growth. income. Health, nutrition, educa- tion of the poor often have to be tion and fertility all affect each overcome; but efforts to improve Human development and poverty other. Most striking, partly be- basic education, nutrition and health cause least expected, are the have a universal political appeal. Human development can thus powerful effects that education, The financial constraint on pro- assist growth. But the Report has especially female education, has grams often appears binding; but stressed even more its potential on fertility, child health and nutri- frequently there are unexploited contribution to reducing absolute tion. As this suggests, human de- ways of cutting costs and harness- poverty. velopment is a circular process, ing additional resources. Human Growth and poverty reduc- one that can be vicious or virtuous, development programs can also 97 encounter serious administrative The economic payoff to human ities are important. So are income constraints; here it is important development eases the tradeoffs levels and growth prospects, and not only to improve administra- between growth and poverty re- past progress in human develop- tion but also to choose the most duction. But it does not eliminate ment. In considering human de- manageable mix of programs and them, which means that policy velopment and other steps to to encourage local participation. decisions will be affected by the reduce poverty, the low-income More paradoxical, but equally relative emphasis attached to countries of Africa and Asia, for vexing, is the gap between need increasing growth, raising the in- example, must perforce put strong and demand that can sometimes comes of the poor and attacking emphasis on economic returns. lead to underused schools and the nonincome aspects of poverty. Nothing can make widespread clinics or the underrepresentation And whatever the balance of absolute poverty melt away over- of girls and women in human de- objectives, the difficulty of quan- night. And human development velopment programs. Experience tifying costs and benefits often at best can do only part of the job. suggests ways in which this gap compounds the problems of de- Without effective policies on other can be narrowed, and in some ciding how large the human fronts, and without active and en- cases bridged. development budget should be, lightened support from the rest of Tradeoffs and choices. Plan- and how it should be divided the world, progress will be agon- ners have to choose at the margin among education, health, nutri- izingly slow. But these other poi- between human development and tion and family planning, as well icies will not be sufficient. The other activities, and between dif- as within each of these areas. most valuable resource any coun- ferent human development activi- The way in which these dilem- try has is its people, the means ties. The choices are not easy, nor mas are resolved must vary accord- and the end of economic advance. should they be the same in all ing to the circumstances of each countries. country. Political and social prior- 98 Statistical appendix to Part I Table SA.i Growth of population, GNP and GNP per person, 1960-90 (average annual percentage growth rates) Population GNP' GNP per person' Country group 1960-70 1970-80 1980-85 1985-90 1960-70 1970-80 1980-85 1985-90 1960-70 1970-80 1980-85 1985-90 Low-income countries 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 4.2 4.0 4.5 4.7 1.8 1.7 2.1 2.5 Sub-Saharan Africa 2.5 2.8 3.0 2.7 4.2 3.0 3.1 3.8 1.7 0.2 0.1 1.1 Asia 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.1 4.2 4.2 4.7 4.9 1.8 2.0 2.4 2.7 Middle-income countries 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 6.0 5.6 5.2 5.8 3.5 3.1 2.7 3.4 East Asia and Pacific 2.8 2.3 2.1 2.0 7.7 8.0 7.0 7.3 4.9 5.7 4.8 5.2 Latin America and Caribbean 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.4 5.7 5.8 5.5 6.3 2.9 3.2 2.9 3.8 Middle East and North Africa 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.5 3.6 6.4 5.1 5.3 1.1 3.8 2.4 2.7 Sub-Saharan Africa 2.5 2.9 3.2 2.8 4.8 4.5 4.9 4.3 2.3 1.6 1.7 1.4 Southern Europe 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 7.0 4.6 3.8 3.7 5.6 3.2 2.5 3.4 Oil-importing developing countries 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 5.6 5.1 4.7 5.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 3.2 Low-income countries 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.2 4.1 3.3 4.1 4.6 1.6 0.9 1.7 2.4 Sub-Saharan Africa 2.5 2.8 3.0 2.7 4.2 3.0 3.1 3.8 1.6 0.2 0.1 1.1 Asia 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.1 4.1 3.4 4.3 4.8 1.6 1.1 2.0 2.6 Middle-income countries 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.1 6.1 5.5 4.9 5.7 3.6 3.1 2.6 3.5 East Asia and Pacific 2.8 2.3 2.1 2.0 7.8 8.0 6.9 7.3 4.9 5.6 4.7 5.2 Latin America and Caribbean 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 5.4 6.0 5.0 6.2 2.7 3.5 2.6 3.8 Middle East and North Africa 2.4 2.6 3.1 3.1 2.3 3.0 3.7 3.9 -0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 Sub-Saharan Africa 2.5 2.9 3.0 2.7 4.9 3.9 4.6 4.2 2.4 0.9 1.6 1.4 Southern Europe 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.2 7.0 4.6 3.8 4.7 5.4 3.2 2.5 3.4 Oil-exporting developing countries 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.5 5.5 6.1 6.3 5.9 2.8 3.5 3.5 3.4 All developing countries 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.2 5.6 5.3 5.1 5.6 3.1 2.8 2.6 3.3 Industrialized countries 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.4 5.0 3.1 3.3 4.0 3.9 2.4 2.9 3.5 Capital-surplus oil exporters 3.0 3.1 2.8 3.0 10.5 8.4 5.3 5.8 7.3 5.0 2.8 2.8 Centrally planned economies 1.7 1.3 1.2 1.1 5.2 4.6 4.5 3.8 3.4 3.3 Sources: World Bank estimates; High-case projections of World Development Report, 1980. 1977 prices. Estimates for oil-exporting developing countries are based on analysis of 11 major oil exporters. Table SA.2 Commercial primary energy pmduction and consumption, Table SA.3 Composition of world commercial by country group, 1977-90 primary energy supply, 1970-2020 (million barrels of oil equivalent per day) (percent) 1977 1980 1985 1990 Energy source 1970 1980 1990 2000 2020 Produc- Consump- Produc- Consump- Produc- Consump- Produc- Consump. Petroleum 47.6 45.8 38 30 17 Country group hon hon hon hon hon hon hon hon (OPEC) (23.0) (20.4) ( 16) ( 12) (6) Industrialized countries 47.5 70.6 50.1 70.1 Coal 32.3 30.0 31 31 32 60.0 80.7 72.5 92.5 Centrally Nuclear 0.1 1.0 2 7 16 planned Hydro 2.0 2.7 4 5 5 economies 42.6 40.3 44.8 42.5 54.0 51.8 65.0 64.3 Gas and other 18.0 20.5 25 27 30 Capital-surplus oil exporters 25.2 1.6 21.4 23.2 2.7 Total 100.0 100.0 100 100 100 1.9 26.1 3.9 Developing Memo item countries 18.9 17.1 21.5 18.7 28.8 25.0 37.9 34.3 Total world Net oil primary exporters 11.9 3.9 13.0 4.6 16.1 6.0 19.4 8.3 commercial Net oil energy importers 7.0 13.2 8.5 14.1 12.7 19.0 18.5 26.0 supply' 100.9 137.8 201.5 270 390 Bunkers and other na. 4.6 n.a. 4.6 n.a. 5.8 Sources: UN, World Energy Supplies 1973-78 (Series J, no. 22); n.a. 6.5 World Bank projections. Total 134.2 134.2 137.8 137.8 166.0 166.0 201.5 201.5 a. Million barrels per day of oil equivalent. Sources: UN, World Energy Supplies 19 73-78 (Series I, no. 22); World Bank estimates; High-case projections of World Development Report, 1980. a. Includes nonenergy uses. 99 Table SA. 4 Growth of merchandise exports, by product category and country group, 1960-77 and 1977-90 (average annual percentage growth rates, 1977 prices) 1960-77 1977-90' Industrialized Developing Industrialized Developing Product categonj World countries countries World countries countries Fuels and energy 6.4 4.4 6.6 1.8 3.3 3.0 Other primary products 4.5 5.6 3.3 3.8 4.0 3.6 Food and beverages 4.6 6.3 2.8 4.1 4.3 3.9 Nonfood agricultural products 4.7 6.0 3.2 2.8 2.9 2.2 Minerals and nonferrous metals 4,1 3.6 5.2 4.1 4.0 3.8 Manufactures 8.9 8.8 12.3 6.8 6.5 9.7 Machinery and transport equipment 9.6 9.6 16.8 7.2 6.8 14.2 Other manufactures 8.3 8.0 11.3 6.5 6.2 7.7 Total merchandise" 7.2 7.7 6.0 5.4 5.9 6.0 Sources: World Bank; UN, Yearbook of Internstional Trade Statistics, various issues; UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, various issues. High-case projections. Excludes gold. Table SA.5 Direction of merchandise trade, 1970 and 1977 Destination Oil-importing World developing countries Oil_exporting All Indus- Capital- Centrally (millions developing Low- Middle- developing trial ized surplus oil planned Unallo- of current Origin countries Total income income countries countries exporters economies cated World dollars) Percentage composition, 1970' Oil-exporting developing countries 3.9 21.8 1.0 20.8 25.7 66.6 0.5 6.1 1.1 100.0 12,961 Oil-importing developing countries 3.5 17.4 2.5 14.9 20.9 69.0 1.5 7.5 1.1 100.0 39,122 Low-income 4.6 21.7 8.2 13.5 26.3 53.7 4.3 14.6 1.1 100.0 5,779 Middle-income 3.4 16.6 1.5 15.1 20.0 71.7 1.0 6.2 1.1 100.0 33,343 All developing countries 3.6 18.5 2.1 16.3 22.1 68.4 1.2 7.1 1.1 100.0 52,083 Industrialized countries 4.7 18.2 2.1 16.1 22.9 71.0 1.5 3.5 1.1 100.0 215,896 Capital-surplus oil exporters 1.7 20.2 2.9 17.4 21.9 744 0.8 1.5 1.5 100.0 11,151 Centrally planned economies 1.7 14.5 1.7 12.9 16.2 21.3 1.0 60.4 1.1 100.0 32,940 World 4.1 18.0 2.1 15.8 22.0 65.4 1.3 10.1 1.1 100.0 312,070 World (millions of current dollars) 12,710 56,019 6,604 49,415 68,729 204,160 4,211 31,400 3,570 312,070 312,070 Percentage composition, 1977' Oil-exporting developing countries 2.2 21.5 1.1 20.4 23.7 72.6 0.8 2.8 0.1 100.0 58,391 Oil-importing developing countries 8.4 20.5 2.5 18.1 28.9 61.8 3.1 6.1 0.1 100.0 149,854 Low-income 5.4 21.9 9.4 12.4 27.3 53.6 7.7 11.5 (.) 100.0 13,495 Middle-income 8.7 20.4 1.8 18.6 29.1 62.6 2.7 5.6 0.1 100.0 136,359 All developing countries 6.6 20.8 2.1 18.7 27.4 64.8 2.5 5.2 0.1 100.0 208,245 Industrialized countries 6.7 16.4 1.4 15.0 23.1 65.7 5.6 5.2 0.5 100.0 697,568 Capital-surplus oil exporters 4.3 20.6 1.5 19.1 24.9 69.6 1.2 2.9 1.5 100.0 110,289 Centrally planned economies 2.9 8.8 1.0 7.8 11.7 27.2 3.2 54.5 3.4 100.0 107,523 World 6.1 16.9 1.5 15.4 23.0 62.2 4.3 9.7 0.8 100.0 1,123,625 World (millions of current dollars) 68,149 189,918 16,578 173,340 258,067 699,036 48,665 108,930 8,927 1,123,625 1,123,625 Sources: UN, International Statistical Yearbook, various issues; UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, 1979; GATT, trade system data file; World Bank. a. Totals may not reconcile because of rounding. 100 Table SA.6 Capital flows and debt of the developing countries: oil importers and oil exporters, 1975-90 (billions of current dollars) Oil importers Oil exporters Item 1975 1977 1980 1985 1990 1975 1977 1980 1985 1990 Current account deficit before interest payments 32.9 16.8 42.7 43.4 42.2 6.8 7.8 -11.1 4.0 30.2 Interest payments 6.7 &1 18.3 35.0 62.0 2.0 4.1 8.8 11.8 17.5 Changes in reserves and short-term debt -9.1 9.9 -4.4 6.8 23.5 6.2 5.8 20.2 8.4 2.6 Total to be financed 30.6 34.8 56.6 85.2 127.7 15.0 17.7 18.0 24.2 50.2 Financed by medium- and long-term capital From public sources 12.5 13.2 21.7 41.1 66.6 5.4 6.0 7.3 11.2 16.6 From private sources 18.1 21.7 34.9 44.0 61.2 9.6 11.7 10.7 13.0 33.6 Private direct investment 4.2 3.9 6.5 9.6 16.4 2.7 2.1 3.5 5.8 8.2 Private loans 13.9 17.7 28.4 34.4 44.7 6.9 9.6 7.2 7.2 25.4 Total net capital flows Current dollars 30.6 34.8 56.6 85.2 127.7 15.0 17.7 18.0 24.2 50.2 Constant 1977 dollars 34.2 34.8 40.0 42.1 47.2 16.8 17.7 12.7 12.0 18.5 Outstanding medium- and long-term debt Public sources 57.7 77.5 100.4 212.9 397.1 16.2 24.3 48.8 79.6 130.0 Private sources 72.6 108.9 187.1 343.4 558.5 24.7 43.9 66.5 97.5 175.4 Total debt Current dollars 130.3 186.4 257.5 556.3 955.6 40.9 68.2 115.3 177.1 305.4 Constant 1977 dollars 146.4 186.4 203.5 275.0 352.9 46.0 65.2 81.6 87.5 112.8 Debt service Interest payments 6.7 8.1 18.3 35.0 62.0 2.0 4.1 8.8 11.8 17.5 Debt amortization 12.7 18.9 28.6 65.0 114.2 3.6 6.5 12.2 23.6 40.1 Interest payments as percentage of GNP 0.9 0.8 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.6 2.7 1.3 1.1 Price deflator 89.3 100.0 141.3 202.3 270.8 89.3 100.0 141.3 202.3 270.8 Source: High-case projections of World Development Report. a. Excludes official transfers. Table SA.7 Capital flows and debt of the oil-importing developing countries: low-income and middle-income, 1975-90 (billions of current dollars) Low-income Middle-income Item 1975 1977 1980 1985 1990 1975 1977 1980 1985 1990 Current account deficit before interest payments 4.8 1.4 8.8 16.0 26.8 28.1 15.3 33.9 27.4 25.5 Interest payments 0.6 0.7 1.2 2.6 5.3 6.1 7.4 17.1 32.3 56.7 Changes in reserves and short-term debt 0.4 3.0 -0.9 0.7 1.0 -9.5 7.0 -3.5 6.1 22.5 Total to be financed 5.9 5.1 9.1 19.4 33.0 24.7 29.7 47.4 65.8 94.7 Financed by medium- and long-term capital From public sources 5.4 4.7 8.3 18.5 31.4 7.1 8.5 13.4 22.6 35.2 From private sources 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.9 1.7 17.6 21.2 34.0 43.2 59.5 Private direct investment 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.6 1.0 4.0 3.7 6.2 9.0 15.4 Private loans 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.7 13.6 17.5 27.9 34.2 44.1 Total net capital flows Current dollars 5.9 5.1 9.1 19.4 33.0 24.7 29.7 47.4 65.8 94.7 Constant 1977 dollars 6.6 5.1 6.5 9.6 12.2 27.7 29.7 33.6 32.5 35.0 Outstanding medium- and long-term debt Public sources 24.4 32.0 44.5 89.4 172.2 33.3 45.5 55.6 123.5 224.9 Private sources 3.1 3.3 0.8 3.6 9.3 69.5 105.6 186.3 339.8 549.2 Total debt Current dollars 27.5 35.3 45.6 93.0 181.5 102.8 151.1 241.9 463.3 774.1 Constant 1977 dollars 30.9 35.3 32.3 46.0 67.0 115.5 151.1 171.2 229.0 285.9 Debt service Interest payments 0.6 0.7 1.2 2.6 5.3 6.1 7.4 17.1 32.3 56.7 Debt amortization 1.2 1.3 2.2 3.7 6.0 11.5 17.6 26.4 61.3 108.3 Interest payments as percentage of GNP 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.0 0.9 1.3 1.3 1.4 Price deflator 89.3 100.0 141.3 202.3 270.8 89.3 100.0 141.3 202.3 270.8 Source: High-case projections of World Development Report, 1980. a. Excludes official transfers. 101 Bibliographical note This Report has drawn on a wide and their energy policy issues are Chapter 5. The evidence on edu- range of World Bank work, as well reviewed in Fallen-Bailey and cation and farmer productivity is as on external research. Selected Byer. In the area of international surveyed in Lockheed, Jamison and sources used in each chapter are trade, Keesing considers a wide Lau; that on the rates of return to briefly annotated below, and then range of trade issues for develop- schooling in Psacharopoulos. listed alphabetically. The World ing countries; Balassa analyzes (Psacharopoulos, along with Berry Bank sources include sector policy trends in trade in manufactured and with Bowman, also discusses papers, ongoing economic analysis goods; Morawetz provides a the debate on methodological and research, and project, sector country case study of the effects issues in applying rate-of-return and economic work on individual of developing-country policies on analysis.) The connections between countries. In addition, a set of growth in manufactured exports; education, poverty and income dis- background papers is commis- Wolf analyzes the adjustment by tribution are further analyzed in sioned for each Report; their pri- industrialized countries to imports Berry and in Fields. On practical mary purpose is to synthesize the from developing countries; Sapir issues of educational reform, see relevant literature and Bank work. and Lutz survey trends and issues Haddad and others; on cross- (Thus the sources cited in these relating to trade in nonfactor ser- country comparisons of educational papers are not listed separately.) vices; Kemper assesses the likely quality, see Inkeles. The evidence Many of the background papers impact of the "Tokyo Round"; and on the effects of education on are issued as World Bank Staff Frank analyzes the "graduation" health and nutrition is surveyed Working Papers, which are avail- issues in trade policy. On export in Cochrane, O'Hara and Leslie. able at no charge from the Bank's credit finance, see Cizauskas. The Health problems and policies in Publications Unit. The views they method for deriving estimates of developing countries are reviewed express are not, however, neces- the number of people in absolute in Golladay and Liese and in Gol- sarily those of the World Bank or poverty is presented in Ahiuwalia, laday; nutrition issues in Berg and of this Report. Carter and Chenery. in Reutlinger; fertility and other Chapter 4. On absolute poverty population issues in Birdsall. For Selected sources, by chapter and policies to overcome it, see a quantitative analysis of the de- Chenery and others, Sen, and terminants of fertility and its effects Chapters 2 and 3. The global model Ahluwalia, Carter and Chenery. on income growth, see Wheeler. used in the projections is described On urban poverty and rural-urban The connection between education in Cheetham, Gupta and Schwartz. migration, see Nelson. The litera- and fertility is discussed in Cochrane, The data base for the global model ture on the contribution of human O'Hara and Leslie. Kanagaratnam and for country projections is con- resources to growth is surveyed in and Pierce examine trends in tinually updated, by drawing on Bowman, and its main condusions population policy and in the im- published sources and other data are summarized in Schultz. The plementation of family planning collected by the World Bank; some recent cross-country analyses re- programs. of these data are presented in the ferred to in the box on human Chapter 6. Factors affecting political World Development Indicators resources and growth (page 38) are support for and obstades to human (and in the World Bank Atlas, pub- presented in Wheeler and in Hicks. development programs are dis- lished annually, as well as the World Parts of this chapter (and Chapter cussed in Uphoff. Sources of Tables, published occasionally). 5) also draw on the World Bank's financing and means of reducing Energy prospects of developing work on basic needs, which is costs for these programs are dis- countries are reviewed in Hughart, summarized in Haq and Burki. cussed in Meerman. Esman and 102 Montgomery survey administra- publication, Recognizing the "Invisible" Africa) and Pfeffermann (Latin tive aspects of implementing the Woman in Development. America). For a wide-ranging dis- programs. A range of factors that Chapter 7. This chapter draws cussion of development issues in result in misperception of the heavily on the World Bank's country Sub-Saharan Africa, see Acharya problems of poverty is considered economic work, as well as on many and Johnston. See Selowsky on in Chambers. Social and cultural of the sources listed for preceding antipoverty policies in Latin aspects of human development are chapters. In addition, various America, and Singh on assisting surveyed in Rogers, Coletta and aspects of human development small farmers and the landless in Mbindyo. And the role of the family, and its role in poverty reduction South Asia. Detailed country case including the particular problems for different regions are discussed studies of human development faced by women and young in Bussink (East Asia), Davies (Sub- issues include Knight (Brazil) and children, is considered in Safilios- Saharan Africa), Grawe (South Asia), Isenman (Sri Lanka). Rothschild and in the World Bank's Kavaisky (Middle East and North Selected sources, by author Acharya, Shankar, and Bruce Johnston. "Two Studies of Development in Sub-Saharan Africa." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 300. October 1978. Ahiuwalia, Montek, Nicholas Carter and Hollis Chenery. "Growth and Poverty in Developing Countries." Journal of Development Economics, 6:3 (September 1979), 299-341. Balassa, Bela. "The Changing International Division of Labor in Manufactured Goods." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 329. May 1979. Berg, Alan D. Nutrition. Poverty and Basic Needs Series. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, forthcoming. Berry, S. Albert. "Education, Income, Productivity and Urban Poverty." In King, ed.* Birdsall, Nancy. "Population and Poverty in the Developing World." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 404. July 1980.* Bowman, Mary Jean. "Education and Economic Growth: An Overview." In King, ed.* Bussink, Willem, and others. "Poverty and the Development of Human Resources: Regional Perspectives." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 406. July 1980.* Bussink, Willem. "Reflections on Socioeconomic Development and Poverty in Southeast Asia." In Bussink and others.* Chambers, Robert. "Rural Poverty Unperceived: Problems and Remedies." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 400. July 1980.* Cheetham, R. I., S. Gupta and A. Schwartz. "The Global Framework." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 355. September 1979. Chenery, Hollis, Montek S. Ahiuwalia, C. L. G. Bell, John H. Duloy and Richard Jolly. Redistribution with Growth. New York: Oxford University Press, 1974. Cizauskas, Albert C. "The Changing Nature of Export Credit Finance and Its Implications for Developing Countries." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 409. July 1980.* Cochrane, Susan H., Donald O'Hara and Joanne Leslie, "The Effects of Education on Health." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 405. July 1980.* Davies, David. "Human Development in South Asia." In Bussink and others.* Esman, Milton, and John Montgomery. "The Administration of Human Development." In Knight, ed.* Fallen-Bailey, Darrel, and T. Byer. "Energy Options and Policy Issues in Developing Countries." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 350. August 1979. Fields, Gary S. "Education and Income Distribution in Developing Countries: A Review of the Literature." In King, ed.* Frank, Isaiah. "The 'Graduation' Issue in Trade Policy toward LDCs." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 334. June 1979. Golladay, Fredrick. Health Sector Policy Paper. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1980. Golladay, Fredrick, and Bernhard Liese. "Health Problems and Conditions in the Developing Countries." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 412. August 1980.* Grawe, Roger. "Human Development in South Asia." In Bussink and others.* 103 Haddad, Wadi D., and others. Education Sector Policy Paper. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1980. Haq, Mahbub ul, and Shahid Javed Burki. Meeting Basic Needs: An Overview. Poverty and Basic Needs Series. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, forthcoming. Hicks, Norman. "Economic Growth and Human Resources." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 408. July 1980.* Hughart, David. "Prospects for Traditional and Non-Conventional Energy Sources in Developing Countries." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 346. July 1979. Independent Commission on International Development Issues (Under the Chairmanship of Willy Brandt). North-South: A Program for Survival. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980. Inkeles, Alex. Review of the International Evaluation of Educational Achievement, Proceedings of the National Academy of Education, 4 (1977), 139-200. Isenman, Paul. "Basic Needs: The Case of Sri Lanka," World Development, 8:3 (March 1980) 237-58. Kanagaratnam, Kandiah, and Catherine S. Pierce. "Population Policy and Family Planning Programs: Trends in Policy and Administration." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 411. August 1980.* Kavalsky, Basil G. "Poverty and Human Development in the Middle East and North Africa." In Bussink and others.* Keesing, Donald B. "Trade Policy for Developing Countries." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no, 353. August 1979. Kemper, R. "The Tokyo Round: Results and Implications for Developing Countries." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 372. February 1980. King, Timothy, ed. "Education and Income." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 402. July 1980.* Knight, Peter T., and others. "Brazil: Human Resources Special Report." A World Bank Country Study. 1979. Knight, Peter T., ed. "Implementing Programs of Human Development." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 403. July 1980.* Lockheed, Marlaine E., Dean T. Jamison and Laurence J. Lau. "Farmer Education and Farm Efficiency: A Survey." In King, ed. Meerman, Jacob. "Paying for Human Development." In Knight, ed.* Morawetz, David. "Why the Emperor's New Clothes are not Made in Colombia: A Case Study in Latin American and East Asian Manufactured Exports." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 368. January 1980. Nelson, Joan. Access to Power, Princeton: at the University Press, 1980. OECD, Interfutures. Facing the Future: Mastering the probable and managing the unpredictable. Paris: OECD, 1979. Pfeffermann, Guy P. "Some Economic Aspects of Human Development in Latin America (with Special Emphasis on Education)." In Bussink and others.* Psacharopoulos, George. "Returns to Education: An Updated International Comparison." In King, ed.* Reutlinger, Shlomo, and Harold Alderman. "The Prevalence of Calorie Deficient Diets in Developing Countries." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 374. March 1980.* Rogers, Everett M., Nat J. Colletta and Joseph Mbindyo. "Social and Cultural Influences on Human Development Policies and Programs." In Knight, ed.* Safilios-Rothschild, Constantina. "The Role of the Family: A Neglected Aspect of Poverty." In Knight, ed.* Sapir, Andre, and Ernst Lutz. "Trade in Non-Factor Services: Past Trends and Current Issues." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 410. August 1980.* Schultz, Theodore W. "Nobel Lecture: The Economics of Being Poor," Journal of Political Economy, 88:4 (August 1980) 639-52. Selowsky, Marcelo. "Balancing Trickle Down and Basic Needs Strategies: Income Distribution Issues in Large Middle- Income Countries with Special Reference to Latin America." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 335. June 1979. Sen, Amartya. "Levels of Poverty: Policy and Change." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 401. July 1979.* Singh, Inderjit. "Small Farmers and the Landless in South Asia." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 320. February 1979. Uphoff, Norman. "Political Considerations in Human Development." In Knight, ed,* Wheeler, David. "Human Resource Development and Economic Growth in Developing Countries: A Simultaneous Model." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 407. July 1980.* Wolf, Martin. "Adjustment Policies and Problems in Developed Countries." World Bank Staff Working Paper, no. 349. August 1979. World Bank. Recognizing the 'Invisible' Woman in Development: The World Bank's Experience. Washington, D.C., 1979. An asterisk (*) after a citation indicates papers prepared as part of the background work for this report. 104 Annex orld Development Indicators Contents Key 108 Introduction 109 Table 1. Basic Indicators 110 Population E Area GNP per capita Inflation fl Adult literacy 0 Life expectancy 0 Food production per capita Table 2. Growth of Production 112 GDP o Agriculture 0 Industry 0 Manufacturing 0 Services Table 3. Structure of Production 114 Agriculture 0 Industry 0 Manufacturing 0 Services Table 4. Growth of Consumption and Investment 116 Public consumption 0 Private consumption 0 Gross domestic investment Table 5. Structure of Demand 118 Public consumption 0 Private consumption D Gross domestic investment 0 Gross domestic saving 0 Exports of goods and nonfactor services 0 Resource balance Table 6. Industrialization 120 Share of value added in food and agriculture 0 in textiles and clothing 0 in machinery and transport equipment 0 in chemicals Li in other manufacturing 0 Value added in manufacturing 0 Gross manufacturing output per capita Table 7. Energy 122 Growth of energy production Growth of energy consumption 0 Energy consumption per capita 0 Energy consumption per dollar of GDP n Energy imports as percentage of merchandise exports Table 8. Growth of Merchandise Trade 124 Export values 0 Import values u Growth of exports 0 Growth of imports 0 Terms of trade Table 9. Structure of Merchandise Exports 126 Fuels, minerals and metals U Other primary commodities U Textiles and clothing Li Machinery and transport equipment U Other manufactures Table 10. Structure of Merchandise Imports 128 Food 0 Fuels U Other primary commodities U Machinery and transport equipment U Other manufactures Table 11. Destination of Merchandise Exports 130 Industrialized countries U Developing countries U Centrally planned economies U Capital-surplus oil exporters Table 12. Trade in Manufactured Goods 132 To industrialized countries U To developing countries U To centrally planned economies U To capital-surplus oil exporters U Value of manufactured exports 106 Table 13. Balance of Payments and Debt Service Ratios 134 Current account balance before interest payments on external public debt D Interest payments on external public debt D Debt service as percentage of GNP E as percentage of exports of goods and services Table 14. Flow of External Capital 136 Gross inflow of public and publicly guaranteed medium- and long-term loans Repayment of principal n Net inflow of public and publicly guaranteed medium- and long-term loans 0 Net direct private investment Table 15. External Public Debt and International Reserves 135 External public debt outstanding and disbursed E as percentage of GNP 0 Gross international reserves n in months of import coverage Table 16. Official Development Assistance from OECD and OPEC Members 140 Amount in dollars 0 as percentage of donor GNP E in national currencies D Net bilateral flow to low-income countries Table 17. Population Growth, Past and Projected, and Hypothetical Stationary Population 142 Past growth of population E Projected population 0 Hypothetical size of stationary population o Assumed year of reaching net reproduction rate of 1 E Year of reaching stationary population Table 18. Demographic and Fertility-related Indicators 144 Crude birth rate 0 Crude death rate 0 Total fertility rate U Percentage of women in reproductive age group 0 Percentage of married women using contraceptives Table 19. Labor Force 146 Population of working age U Labor force in agriculture U in industry 0 in services 0 Growth of labor force, past and projected Table 20. Urbanization 148 Urban population as percentage of total population 0 Growth of urban population 0 Percentage in largest city U in cities of over 500,000 persons U Number of cities of over 500,000 persons Table 21. Indicators Related to Life Expectancy 150 Life expectancy U Infant mortality rate U Child death rate Table 22. Health-related Indicators 152 Population per physician U per nursing person 0 Percentage of population with access to safe water U Daily calorie supply per capita Table 23. Education 154 Number enrolled in primary school as percentage of age group U in secondary school U in higher education U Adult literacy Table 24. Income Distribution 156 Percentage share of household income, by percentile groups of households Technical Notes 158 Bibliography of Data Sources 166 107 Key Figures in the colored bands are summary . Not available. In each table, countries are listed in their measures for groups of countries. The (.)Less than half the unit shown. group in ascending order of income per letter w after a summary measure indicates capita. The reference numbers indicating that it is a weighted average; the letter m, All growth rates are in real terms. that order are shown in the alphabetical that it is a median value; the letter f, that Figures in italics are for years or periods list of countries below. it is a total. other than those specified. Afghanistan 26 Hong Kong 86 Peru 56 Albania 116 Hungary 121 Philippines 49 Algeria 72 India 15 Poland 122 Angola 33 Indonesia 38 Portugal 82 Argentina 81 Iran 110 Romania 119 Australia 98 Iraq 109 Rwanda 17 Austria 96 Ireland 91 Saudi Arabia 112 Bangladesh 2 Israel 90 Senegal 37 Belgium 101 Italy 92 Sierra Leone 20 Benin 23 Ivory Coast 57 Singapore 88 Bhutan 4 Jamaica 68 Somalia 8 Bolivia 48 Japan 97 South Africa 77 Brazil 79 Jordan 66 Spain 89 Bulgaria 120 Kampuchea, Democratic 1 Sri Lanka 18 Burma 12 Kenya 36 Sudan 34 Burundi 9 Korea, Republic of 70 Sweden 107 Cameroon 42 Korea, Democratic Republic of 115 Switzerland 108 Canada 102 Kuwait 113 Syrian Arab Republic 64 Central African Republic 27 Lao People's Democratic Republic 3 Taiwan' 75 Chad 10 Lebanon 69 Tanzania 25 Chile 76 Lesotho 31 Thailand 47 China 114 Liberia 43 Togo 35 Colombia 59 Libya 111 Trinidad and Tobago 84 Congo, People's Republic of 51 Madagascar 28 Tunisia 65 Costa Rica 78 Malawi 16 Turkey 71 Cuba 117 Malaysia 67 Uganda 32 Czechoslovakia 124 Mali 6 United Kingdom 94 Denmark 106 Mauritania 30 United States 105 Dominican Republic 62 Mexico 73 Upper Volta 13 Ecuador 61 Mongolia 118 Uruguay 80 Egypt, Arab Republic of 39 Morocco 55 Union of Soviet Socialist El Salvador 54 Mozambique 11 Republics 123 Ethiopia 5 Nepal 7 Venezuela 85 Finland 95 Netherlands 100 Viet Nam, Socialist France 99 New Zealand 93 Republic of 14 German Democratic Republic 125 Nicaragua 58 Yemen Arab Republic 50 Germany, Federal Republic of 104 Niger 22 Yemen, People's Democratic Ghana 40 Nigeria 52 Republic of 41 Greece 87 Norway 103 Yugoslavia 83 Guatemala 63 Pakistan 24 Zaire 21 Guinea 19 Panama 74 Zambia 45 Haiti 29 Papua New Guinea 53 Zimbabwe 46 Honduras 44 Paraguay 60 1. The references to Taiwan in these tables should not be interpreted as having any significance as to its legal status. 108 Introduction The World Development Indicators They also reflect revisions to the an indicator. The letter w after are designed to provide information estimates of population on the a summary measure indicates that about the main features of social basis of new information from it is a weighted average; the letter and economic development. The surveys and censuses. m, that it is a median value; the format this year generally follows The country groups used in the letter t, that it is a total. The median that of previous years. The indica- tables are: 38 low-income develop- is the middle value of a set ar- tors in Table 1 give a summary ing countries with a per capita ranged in order of magnitude. profile of countries. The data in income of $360 or less in 1978; 52 Because the coverage of countries other tables fall into the following middle-income developing coun- is not uniform for all indicators broad areas: national accounts, tries with a per capita income of and because the variation around industrialization, energy, external more than $360; 18 industrialized central tendencies can be large, accounts, aid flows, demography, countries; 5 capital-surplus oil- readers should exercise caution in labor force, urbanization, social exporting countries; and 12 cen- comparing the summary measures indicators and income distribu- trally planned economies. As in for different indicators, country tion. Most of the information was previous years, Democratic Kam- groups and years or periods. drawn from the data files and publi- puchea, Lao People's Democratic Readers should also exercise cations of the World Bank, the Republic, Socialist Republic of caution in comparing indicators International Monetary Fund and Viet Nam, and Yugoslavia are across countries. Although the the United Nations and the spe- grouped with developing countries. statistics presented are drawn cialized agencies. Iran and Iraq are now grouped from sources generally considered For ease of reference, ratios and with capital-surplus oil-exporting the most authoritative and reliable, rates of growth are shown; abso- countries. some of them, particularly those lute values are reported only in a Within each group, countries describing social features and in- few instances. Most growth rates are listed in ascending order of come distribution, are subject to were calculated for two periods: income per capita, and that order considerable margins of error. In 1960-70 and 1970-78, or 1970-77 is used in all tables. The alpha- addition, variations in national if data for 1978 were not available. betical list on the opposite page practices mean that the data in All growth rates are in real terms shows the reference number of certain instances are not strictly and were computed, unless noted each country. Countries with comparable. The data should thus otherwise, by using the least- populations of less than a million be construed only as indicating squares method. Because this are not reported in the tables, trends and characterizing major method takes all observations largely for lack of comprehensive differences between countries. within a period into account, the data. The technical notes for Table The technical notes should be resulting growth rates reflect 1 show some basic indicators for referred to in any use of the data. general trends that are not unduly 29 small countries that are mem- These notes outline the concepts, influenced by exceptional values bers of the United Nations, the definitions, methods and data for a particular year. Table entries World Bank, or both. sources. The bibliography gives in italics indicate that they are for Summary measures - weighted details of the data sources, which years or periods other than those averages, median values, or totals contain comprehensive definitions specified. All dollar figures are US were calculated for the country and descriptions of concepts used. dollars. groups only if data were adequate The World Development In- Some of the differences between and meaningful statistics could be dicators are prepared under the figures shown this year and last obtained. The weights used in com- direction of Ramesh Chander. year reflect revisions to historical puting the measures are described series by the reporting countries. in the technical notes relating to 109 Table 1. Basic Indicators GNP per capita Average index Average of food Area annual Average annual Adult Life ex- production Popula- (thousands growth literacy pectancy per capita (per- rate of inflation rate at birth tion of square (percent) (1969-71 (millions) kilo- Dollars cent) (percent) (years) 100) Mid_1978a meters) 1978a 1960_78b 1960_bc 1970_78d 1975° 1978 1976-78 Low-income countries 1293.9 t 26,313 t 200w 1.6 w 3.0 m 10.6 rn 38 w SOw 97 w 1 Kampuchea, Dem. 8.4 181 .. .. 3.8 .. .. .. 57 2 Bangladesh 84.7 144 90 -0.4 3.7 17.9 26 47 90 3 Lao PDR 3.3 237 90 .. .. 42 96 4 Bhutan 1.2 47 100 -0.3 .. .. .. 41 100 5 Ethiopia 31.0 1,222 120 1.5 2.1 4.0 10 39 84 6 Mali 6.3 1,240 120 1.0 5.0 7.8 10 42 90 7 Nepal 13.6 141 120 0.8 7.7 9.1 19 43 92 8 Somalia 3.7 638 130 -0.5 4.5 10.7 60 43 87 9 Burundi 4.5 28 140 2.2 2.8 10.1 25 45 107 10 Chad 4.3 1,284 140 -1.0 4.6 7.4 15 43 89 11 Mozambique 9.9 783 140 0.4 2.8 10.9 .. 46 81 12 Burma 32.2 677 150 1.0 2.7 13.7 67 53 96 13 Upper Volta 5.6 274 160 1.3 1.3 9.6 5 42 95 14 Viet Nam 51.7 330 170 .. .. .. 87 62 102 15 India 643.9 3288 180 1.4 7.1 8.2 36 51 100 16 Malawi 5.7 118 180 2.9 2.4 9.1 25 46 99 17 Rwanda 4.5 26 180 1.4 13.1 14.7 23 46 103 18 Sri Lanka 14.3 66 190 2.0 1.8 11.8 78 69 114 19 Guinea 5.1 246 210 0.6 1.7 6.4 .. 43 86 20 Sierra Leone 3.3 72 210 0.5 2.9 10.8 15 46 93 21 Zaire 26.8 2,345 210 1.1 29.9 26.2 15 46 94 22 Niger 5.0 1,267 220 -1.4 2.1 10.7 8 42 87 23 Benin 3.3 113 230 0.4 1.9 7.4 11 46 92 24 Pakistan 77.3 804 230 2.8 3.3 14.6 21 52 101 25 Tanzania 16.9 945 230 2.7 1.8 12.3 66 51 93 26 Afghanistan 14.6 647 240 0.4 11.9 4.4 12 42 100 27 Central African Rep. 1.9 623 250 0.7 4.1 9.0 .. 46 102 28 Madagascar 8.3 587 250 -0.3 3.2 9.6 50 46 95 29 Haiti 4.8 28 260 0.2 4.1 12.2 23 51 91 30 Mauritania 1.5 1,031 270 3.6 1.6 10.4 17 42 71 31 Lesotho 1.3 30 280 5.9 2.5 11.2 55 50 90 32 Uganda 12.4 236 280 0.7 3.0 27.3 53 90 33 Angola 6.7 1,247 300 1.2 3.3 22.0 .. 41 88 34 Sudan 17.4 2,506 320 0.1 3.7 7.4 20 46 108 35 Togo 2.4 56 320 5.0 1.7 7.4 18 46 80 36 Kenya 14.7 583 330 2.2 1.5 - 12.0 40 53 91 33 Senegal 5.4 196 340 -0.4 1.7 8.0 10 42 96 38 Indonesia 136.0 2,027 360 4.1 20.0 62 47 100 Middle-income countries 872.8 32,998 1,250w 3.7 w 3.1 ni 13.1 tn 71 w 61 w lO6w 39 Egypt 39.9 1,001 390 3.3 2.7 7.0 44 54 93 40 Ghana 11.0 239 390 -0.5 7.6 35.9 30 48 79 41 Yemen, PDR 1.8 333 420 .. .. .. 27 44 108 42 Cameroon 8.1 475 460 2.9 3.7 9.8 .. 46 112 43 Liberia 1.7 111 460 2.0 1.9 9.7 30 48 96 44 Honduras 3.4 112 480 1.1 3.0 8.0 57 57 84 45 Zambia 5.3 753 480 1.2 7.6 5.7 39 48 109 46 Zimbabwe 6.9 391 480 1.2 1.3 7.6 .. 54 102 47 Thailand 44.5 514 490 4.6 1.9 9.1 84 61 122 48 Bolivia 5.3 1,099 510 2.2 3.5 22.7 63 52 111 49 Philippines 45.6 300 510 2.6 5.8 13.4 87 60 115 50 Yemen Arab Rep. 5.6 195 520 .. -, . - 13 39 98 51 Congo, People's Rep. 1.5 342 540 1.0 5.4 10.6 50 46 82 52 Nigeria 80.6 924 560 3.6 2.6 18.2 .. 48 89 53 Papua New Guinea 2.9 462 560 3.6 3.6 8.8 32 50 106 54 El Salvador 4.3 21 660 1.8 0.5 10.3 62 63 111 55 Morocco 18.9 447 670 2.5 2.0 7.1 28 55 80 56 Peru 16.8 1,285 740 2.0 9.9 22.2 72 56 90 57 Ivory Coast 7.8 322 840 2.5 2.8 13.9 20 46 104 58 Nicaragua 2.5 130 840 2.3 1.9 11.0 57 55 102 59 Colombia 25.6 1,139 850 3.0 11.9 21.7 81 62 114 60 Paraguay 2.9 407 850 2.6 3.0 12.3 81 63 103 61 Ecuador 3.8 284 880 4.3 .. 14.8 74 60 103 62 Dominican Rep. 5.1 49 910 3.5 2.1 8.6 67 60 93 63 Guatemala 6.6 109 910 2.9 0.1 10.8 47 57 108 64 Syrian Arab Rep. 8.1 185 930 3.8 1.9 12.7 53 57 150 65 Tunisia 6.0 164 950 4.8 3.7 7.1 55 57 128 66 Jordan 3.0 98 1,050 ,. 70 56 77 110 GNP per capita Average index Average of food Area annual Adult Life ex- production Popula- (thousands growth Average annual rate of inflation literacy pectancy per capita tion of square (per- rate at birth (1969-71 (millions) kilo- Dollars cent) (percent) (percent) (years) 100) Mid_1978a meters) 1978a 1960-78b 1960_bc 1970_78d 1975e 1978 1976-78 67 Malaysia 13.3 330 1,090 3.9 -0.3 7.2 60 67 110 68 Jamaica 2.1 11 1110 2.0 3.8 16.9 86 70 98 69 Lebanon 3.0 10 .. .. 1.4 .. .. 65 85 70 Korea, Rep. of 36.6 99 1,160 6.9 17.5 19.3 93 63 116 31 Turkey 43.1 781 1,200 4.0 5.6 21.5 60 61 110 72 Algeria 17.6 2,382 1,260 2.3 2.3 13.4 37 56 82 73 Mexico 65.4 1,973 1,290 2.7 3.5 17.5 76 65 99 74 Panama 1.8 76 1,290 2.9 1.6 7,5 78 70 103 75 Taiwan 17.1 36 1,400 6.6 4.1 10.3 82 72 105 76 Chile 10.7 757 1,410 1.0 32.9 242.6 88 67 94 77 South Africa 27.7 1,221 1,480 2.5 3.0 11.7 .. 60 100 78 Costa Rica 2.1 51 1,540 3.3 1.9 15.7 90 70 114 39 Brazil 119.5 8,512 1,570 4.9 46.1 30.3 76 62 117 80 Uruguay 2.9 176 1,610 0.7 51.1 65.6 94 71 105 81 Argentina 26.4 2,767 1,910 2.6 21.8 120.4 94 71 114 82 Portugal 9.8 92 1,990 5.9 3.0 15.2 70 69 82 83 Yugoslavia 22.0 256 2,380 5.4 12.6 17.3 85 69 117 84 Trinidad and Tobago 1.1 5 2,910 2.2 3.2 21,3 95 70 94 85 Venezuela 14.0 912 2,910 2.7 1.3 11.1 82 66 97 86 Hong Kong 4.6 1 3,040 6.5 2.3 7.7 90 72 30 87 Greece 9.4 132 3,250 6.0 3.2 13.8 .. 73 120 88 Singapore 2.3 1 3,290 7.4 1.1 6.1 75 70 112 89 Spain 37.1 505 3,470 5.0 6.3 15.0 .. 73 122 90 Israel 3.7 21 3,500 4.2 6.2 31.0 88 72 113 Industrialized countries 667.8 t 30,429 8,070 3.7 ' 4.2 ni 9.4 rn 99 w 74 tv 108 . .. 91 Ireland 3.2 70 3,470 3.3 5.2 14.7 98 73 128 92 Italy 56.] 301 3,850 3.6 4.4 14.0 98 73 100 93 New Zealand 3.2 269 4,790 1.7 3.3 11.0 99 73 107 94 United Kingdom 55.8 244 5,030 2.1 4.1 14.1 99 73 111 95 Finland 4.8 337 6820 4.1 5.6 13.2 100 72 107 96 Austria 7.5 84 7,030 4.2 3.6 7.6 99 72 109 97 Japan 114.9 372 7,280 7.6 4.8 9.6 99 76 97 98 Australia 14.2 7,687 7,990 2.9 3.1 12.8 100 73 121 99 France 53.3 547 8,260 4.0 4.1 9.3 99 73 106 100 Netherlands 13.9 41 8,410 3.4 5.3 8.8 99 74 118 101 Belgium 9.8 31 9,090 4.1 3.6 8.6 99 32 105 102 Canada 23.5 9,976 9,180 3.5 3.1 9.4 98 74 112 103 Norway 4.1 324 9,510 4.0 4.2 8.6 99 75 108 104 Germany, Fed. Rep. 61.3 249 9,580 3.3 3.2 5.9 99 72 104 105 United States 221.9 9,363 9,590 2.4 2.8 6.8 99 33 114 106 Denmark 5.1 43 9,920 3.2 6.0 9.8 99 74 102 107 Sweden 8.3 450 10,210 2.5 4.3 9.3 99 75 113 108 Switzerland 6.3 41 12,100 2.2 4.6 6.6 99 34 113 Capital-surplus oil exporters 60.1 6,011 3,340 to 7.1 U) 1.2 to 22.2 to 50 to 53w 111 w 7 109 Iraq 12.2 435 1,860 4.1 1.7 55 84 110 Iran 35.8 1,648 2,160 7.9 -0.5 23.7 52 113 111 Libya 2.7 1,760 6,910 6.2 5.2 20.7 50 55 123 112 Saudi Arabia 8.2 2,150 7,690 9.7 28.4 53 135 113 Kuwait 1.2 18 14,890 -2.3 0: 19.8 60 69 Centrally planned economies 1,352.4t 34,826 t 1,190w 4.Ow 70 w 112 w 114 China 952.2 9,59] 230 3.] 70 111 115 Korea, Dem. Rep. 17.1 121 330 4.5 63 130 116 Albania 2.6 29 740 4.1 69 10] 117 Cuba 9.7 115 810 -1.2 96 72 96 118 Mongolia 1.6 1,565 940 1.5 63 94 119 Romania 21.9 238 1,750 8.6 98 70 148 120 Bulgaria 8.8 111 3,230 5.7 .. .. .. 72 113 121 Hungary 10.7 93 3,450 5.0 98 70 122 122 Poland 35.0 313 3,670 5.9 .. 98 71 104 123 USSR 261.0 22,402 3,700 4.3 99 70 111 124 Czechoslovakia 15.1 128 4,720 4.3 70 118 125 German Dem. Rep. 16.7 108 5,710 4.8 72 127 F9ures in italics are for 1977, not 1978. Figures in italics are for 1970-77, not 1970-78. Figures in italics are for 1960-77, not 1960-78. Figures in italics are for years other than 1975. See the technical notes. Figures in italics are for 1961 -70, not 1960-70. Preliminary estimate based on partial official information. See the technical notes. 111 Table 2. Growth of Production Average annual growth rate (percent) GDP Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services 1960_70a 1970-78b 1960_70a1970_78b 1960_70a 1970-78b 1960-70 1970-78b 1960_lOa 197o-78b Low-income countries 3.9 w 3.6 w 2.5 in 2.0 in 6.1 in 4.5 m 6.6m 4.2in 4.4in 4.3m 1 Kampuchea, Dem. 3.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 2 Bangladesh 3.6 2.9 2.7 1.6 7.9 5.9 6.6 5.3 3,8 4.7 3LaoPDR 4 Bhutan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5 Ethiopia 4.4 1.8 2.2 0.5 7.4 0.4 8.0 1.3 7.8 4.5 6 Mali 3.3 4.6 2.0 9.2 5.2 7 Nepal 2.5 2.7 8 Somalia 1.0 3.1 -1.5 2.] 3.3 -2.6 14.3 2.5 6.8 9 Burundi 4.4 2.9 1.7 7.6 5.3 4.0 10 Chad 0.5 1.7 -0.1 8.5 5.7 2.6 11 Mozambique 4.6 -3.2 2.1 -1.8 9.5 -5.1 6.6 -6.1 6.4 -3,] 12 Burma 2.6 4.0 4.1 3.6 2.8 4.5 3.3 4.2 1.5 4.2 13 Upper Volta 3.0 -0.2 -3.6 1.4 1.6 2.7 14 Viet Nam 15 India 3.6 3.7 1.9 2.6 5.5 4.5 4.8 4.6 5.2 4.6 16 Malawi 4.9 6.5 4.2 6.8 6.7 9.6 17 Rwanda 2.7 4.8 .. .. .. .. .. 18 Sri Lanka 4.6 3.4 3.0 2.3 6.6 3.0 6.3 1.2 4.6 4.3 19 Guinea 3.2 5.4 2.1 3.0 2.3 14.1 .. 9.4 7.2 0.7 20 Sierra Leone 4.2 1.3 2.8 -3.5 4.6 3.6 21 Zaire 3.6 1.3 .. 1.9 .. 0.7 -0.6 .. 1.6 22 Niger 2.9 2.4 3.3 -0.2 13.9 8.6 .. (.) 4.2 23 Benin 2.6 3.8 .. .. .. .. .. 24 Pakistan 6.7 4.4 4.9 1.9 10.0 4.8 9.4 3.5 7.0 6.2 25 Tanzania 6.0 5.0 4.5 2.3 4.5 6.4 26 Afghanistan 2.0 4.6 .. 3.5 .. 5.3 4.0 .. 6.1 27 Central African Rep. 1.9 3.2 0.8 2.3 5.4 5.2 .. .. 1.8 3.1 28 Madagascar 2.9 -0.7 .. -0.3 .. (.) .. -0.4 .. -1.4 29 Haiti 0.1 3.9 -0.6 2.6 0.4 8.0 -0.1 6.6 0.9 3.3 30 Mauritania 8.1 2.3 2.4 -2.3 12.8 2.1 18.0 2.9 17.0 7.6 31 Lesotho 4.6 6.5 0.3 3.8 .. 8.7 15.7 32 Uganda 5.9 -0.2 .. 1.1 .. -7.8 .. -5.0 .. 0.2 33 Angola 4.8 -10.0 4.0 -11.0 11.0 -4.1 7.2 -12.8 4.2 -11.8 34 Sudan 1.3 2.7 35 Togo 8.5 4.2 1.7 7.4 .. 4.6 36 Kenya 6.0 6.7 .. 5.5 .. 10.4 .. 11.7 .. 6.0 3] Senegal 2.5 2.2 2.9 3.3 4.4 3.9 6.2 4.1 1.7 1.0 38 Indonesia 3.5 7.8 2.5 4.0 5.0 11.2 3.3 12.4 8.0 8.] Middle-income countries 6.0 w 5.7 w 3.4 rn 3.1 n 7.8 ni 7.1 7.6 in 6.8 in 5.7 m 5.8 m 39 Egypt 4.5 7.8 2.9 3.1 5.4 7.2 4.7 7.6 5.1 12.0 40 Ghana 2.1 0.4 -1.2 -2.3 -6.0 3.5 41 Yemen, PDR 42 Cameroon 4.7 5.1 3.. 6.2 5.2 6.0 43 Liberia 5.1 1.5 5.3 -1.2 8.7 1.5 44 Honduras 5.1 3.3 5.7 0.8 5.2 5.9 4.0 5.8 4.5 3.9 45 Zambia 5.0 2.3 3.1 4.3 0.6 1.4 46 Zimbabwe 4.2 3.4 47 Thailand 8.2 7.6 5.5 5.6 11.6 11_.o 90 7.4 48 Bolivia 5.2 5.6 3.0 3.6 6.2 5.1 5.4 6.8 5.5 6.5 49 Philippines 5.1 6.3 4.3 4.9 6.0 8.6 6.7 6.8 5.2 5.4 50 Yemen Arab Rep. ., 7.9 .. 5.1 11.7 . - 12.2 9.8 51 Congo, People's Rep. 2.7 3.5 1.0 (.) 7.0 11.4 6.8 2.3 2.1 0.7 52 Nigeria 3.1 6.2 -0.4 -1.5 16.0 10.3 9.3 13.4 0.2 8.6 53 Papua New Guinea 6.5 2.6 54 El Salvador 5.9 5.2 3.0 2.7 8.5 7.0 8.8 6.1 6.5 5.5 55 Morocco 4.2 6.4 4.] 0.1 4.0 7.9 3.8 6.6 4.0 7.6 56 Peru 5.4 3.1 1.9 0.7 5.5 4.3 7.2 4.3 6.8 3.2 57 Ivory Coast 8.0 6.8 4.2 3.9 11.5 10.0 11.6 7.5 9.7 7.2 58 Nicaragua 7.2 5.8 6.7 5.4 11.0 7.3 11.1 6.3 5,7 5.0 59 Colombia 5.1 6.0 3.5 4.9 6.0 5.1 5.7 6.] 5.7 7.0 60 Paraguay 4.3 7.5 6.2 9.5 .. 6.8 .. 7.4 61 Ecuador .. 9.1 ,. 4.6 .. 14.4 .. 10.0 ,, 7.8 62 Dominican Rep. 4.5 7.4 2.1 3.3 6.0 10.1 5.0 7.4 5.0 7.5 63 Guatemala 5.6 6.0 4.3 5.3 7.8 7.6 8.2 6.1 5.5 5.8 64 Syrian Arab Rep. 5.7 9.6 4.4 7.2 6.3 11.6 5.6 13.6 6.2 9.5 65 Tunisia 4.6 7.9 2.0 5.6 8.7 8.1 7.6 11.0 4.2 8.] 66 Jordan 7.0 112 Average annual growth rate (percent) GDP Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Services 1 960_lOa 1 glo-78b 1 960_70a 1 970-78b 1 96O70 1 970-78b 1 960_702 1 970-78b 1 960_lOa 1 970-78b 67 Malaysia 6.5 7.8 .. 5.0 .. 9.6 .. 12.3 .. 8.4 68 Jamaica 4.6 -0.8 1.5 1.4 5.6 -2.7 5.6 -0.9 4.3 0.3 69 Lebanon 4.9 .. 6.3 .. 4.5 .. 5,0 .. 4.8 70 Korea, Rep. of 8.5 9.7 4.5 4.0 17.2 16.5 17.2 18.3 8.4 8.7 71 Turkey 6.0 7.1 2.5 3.9 9.6 8.8 10.9 8.7 6.9 7.9 72 Algeria 4.6 5.3 0.4 0.2 12.9 5,9 7.7 6.9 -3.0 5.5 73 Mexico 7.2 5.0 3.8 2.1 9.1 6.2 9.4 6.2 7.0 4,8 74 Panama 7.8 3.4 5.7 2.4 10.1 0.7 10.5 -0.5 7.6 4.8 75 Taiwan 9.2 8.0 3.4 1.6 16.4 12.9 17.3 13.2 7.8 4.1 76 Chile 4.5 0.8 2.6 2.7 5.0 -0.8 5.5 -2.4 4.5 1.7 77 South Africa 6.4 3.6 .. .. . . .. .. . 78 Costa Rica 6.5 6.0 5.] 2.5 9.4 9.1 10.6 8.8 5.7 5.7 79 Brazil 5.3 9.2 . . 5.3 .. 10.1 . . 9.5 .. 9.2 80 Uruguay 1.2 1.9 1.9 0.1 1.1 3.5 1.5 3.2 1.0 1.5 81 Argentina 4.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 6.0 2.2 5.7 2.0 3.3 2.5 82 Portugal 6.2 4.8 1.3 -1.9 8.8 4.6 8.9 4.6 5.9 7.1 83 Yugoslavia 5.8 5.6 3.3 3.3 6.3 8.0 5.7 9.3 6.9 4.0 84 Trinidad and Tobago 3.9 3.4 .. -0.1 .. 2.8 .. -1.1 .. 4.0 85 Venezuela 5.9 5.6 5.7 3.5 4.5 2.7 6.2 6.4 7.2 7.9 86 Hong Kong 10.0 8.2 .. -0.2 .. 6.2 .. 5.6 .. 10.1 87 Greece 6.9 5.0 3.5 1.9 9.4 5.3 10.2 6.6 7.1 5.7 88 Singapore 8.8 8.5 5.0 1.5 12.5 8.5 13.0 9.2 7.7 8.6 89 Spain 7.3 4.4 2.5 1.9 9.4 4.9 9.] 7.8 7.2 4.6 90 Israel 8.1 4.5 6.6 5.3 6.1 .. 5.4 Industrialized countries 5.1 w 3.2 w 1.2 m 1.0 rn 6.1 m 3.4 m 6.2 m 3.3 in 4.8 iii 3.7 m 91 Ireland 4.2 3.4 0.9 .. 6.1 .. .. .. 4.3 92 Italy 5.3 2.8 2.8 0.5 6.2 2.7 7.2 3.3 5.1 3.3 93 New Zealand 3.9 2.2 .. .. .. .. .. 94 United Kingdom 2.9 2.1 2.3 0.8 3.1 1.3 3.4 0.6 2.7 2.4 95 Finland 4.6 2.8 0.6 -1.9 6.3 3.2 6.2 2.8 5.3 3.9 96 Austria 4,5 3.8 1.2 2.1 4.9 3.4 4.8 3.6 4.5 4.3 97 Japan 10.5 5.0 4.0 1.1 10.9 6.0 11.0 6.2 11.7 5.1 98 Australia 4.1 3.8 2.7 1.7 4.6 3.9 5.6 3.9 4.0 3.9 99 France 5,7 3.7 1.8 -0.4 6.4 3.5 6.6 3.9 5.7 4.3 100 Netherlands 5.5 3.2 2.9 3.6 6.8 3.3 6.6 3.6 5.1 3.3 101 Belgium 4.8 3.3 -0.5 -1.1 6.0 3.4 6.2 3.3 4.6 3.3 102 Canada 5.6 4.4 2.5 2.7 6.8 3,7 6.7 3.8 5.5 4.8 103 Norway 4.9 4.7 0.1 2.3 5.5 5.2 5.3 1.9 5.0 4.7 104 Germany, Fed. Rep. 4.4 2.4 1.5 1.6 5.2 2.1 5.4 2.0 4.2 1.] 105 United States 4.3 3.0 0.3 0.9 5.2 2.7 5.3 2.9 4.3 3.4 106 Denmark 4.7 2.7 0.2 .. 5.5 .. 5.4 .. 4.9 107 Sweden 4.4 1.6 0.6 -1.6 6.2 1.0 6.2 0.8 3.9 2.3 108 Switzerland 4.3 0.1 Capital-surplus oil exporters 13.0 w 6.0 w 5.2m 4Mm 16.1 ni 16.1 m 109 Iraq 6.2 .. 5.7 .. 4.7 .. 5.9 .. 8.3 110 Iran 11.3 7.4 4.4 5.2 13.4 4.0 12.0 16.1 10.0 16.1 111 Libya 24.4 0.9 12.7 .. -2.7 18.4 16.7 112 Saudi Arabia .. 11.5 4.0 12.0 5.4 11.6 113 Kuwait 5.7 0.7 .. .. Centrally planned economies 4.9 w 5.6 w 114 China 5.0 6.0 115 Korea, Dem. Rep. 7.8 7.2 116 Albania 7.3 6.7 117 Cuba 1.1 0.4 118 Mongolia 2.8 4.5 119 Romania 9.0 10.6 120 Bulgaria 5.9 6.3 121 Hungary 3.8 5.4 122 Poland 4.3 7.0 123 USSR 5.2 5,3 124 Czechoslovakia 3.1 4.9 125 German Dem. Rep. 3.1 4.7 a. Figures in italics are for 1961-70, not 1960-70. b. Figures in italics are for 1970-77, not 1970-78. 113 Table 3. Structure of Production Distribution of gross domestic product (percent) Agriculture Industry (Manufacturinga) Services 1960b 1978c 1960b 1978c (1960b 1978c) 1960b 1978c Low-income countries 50w 38w 17w 24w 11 ZL) 13w 33w 38w 1 Kampuchea, Dem. 2 Bangladesh 8 6 8 31 30 3 Lao PDR 60 14 4 26 4 Bhutan 5 Ethiopia 2 3 6 9 23 33 6 Mali 55 37 10 18 5 12 35 45 7 Nepal 62 .. 12 10 26 8 Somalia 67 60 13 11 3 7 20 29 9 Burundi 56 15 9 29 10 Chad 55 52 12 13 5 8 33 35 11 Mozambique 55 45 9 16 8 9 36 39 12 Burma 33 46 12 13 8 10 55 41 13 Upper Volta 62 38 14 20 8 13 24 42 14 Viet Nam 15 India 50 40 20 26 14 17 30 34 16 Malawi 58 43 11 19 6 12 31 38 17 Rwanda 81 46 7 22 1 15 12 32 18 Sri Lanka 34 35 22 31 17 23 44 34 19 Guinea 56 32 36 41 4 8 27 20 Sierra Leone 39 22 6 .. 39 21 Zaire 30 27 27 20 13 7 43 53 22 Niger 69 43 9 27 4 10 22 30 23 Benin 55 31 8 13 3 9 37 56 24 Pakistan 46 32 16 24 12 16 38 44 25 Tanzania 57 51 11 13 5 9 32 36 26 Afghanistan .. .. .. .. .. 27 Central African Rep. 51 36 10 18 4 9 39 46 28 Madagascar 37 38 10 19 4 14 53 43 29 Haiti .. .. . .. .. 30 Mauritania 59 26 24 37 3 11 17 37 31 Lesotho .. 36 . 15 .. 2 .. 49 32 Uganda 52 57 13 7 9 6 35 36 33 Angola 50 50 8 21 4 3 42 29 34 Sudan 58 43 15 12 5 6 27 45 35 Togo 55 26 16 20 8 9 29 54 36 Kenya 38 41 18 19 9 12 44 40 37 Senegal 24 26 17 25 12 19 59 49 38 Indonesia 54 31 14 33 8 9 32 36 Middle-income countries 22w l6w 31w 34w 22w 25w 4]w 5Ow 39 Egypt 30 29 24 30 20 25 46 41 40 Ghana 41 38 19 18 10 9 40 44 41 Yemen, PDR .. .. .. 42 Cameroon .. 32 .. 16 9 .. 52 43 Liberia 40 35 37 28 6 23 37 44 Honduras 37 32 19 26 13 17 44 42 45 Zambia 11 17 63 39 4 17 26 44 46 Zimbabwe 18 20 35 35 17 20 47 45 47 Thailand 40 27 19 27 13 18 41 46 48 Bolivia 26 17 25 28 15 13 49 55 49 Philippines 26 27 28 35 20 25 46 38 50 Yemen Arab Rep. .. 35 .. 14 .. 6 .. 51 51 Congo, People's Rep. 23 13 17 33 10 16 60 54 52 Nigeria 63 34 11 43 5 9 26 23 53 Papua New Guinea 49 33 13 26 3 8 38 41 54 El Salvador 32 29 19 21 15 15 49 50 55 Morocco 23 18 27 32 16 17 50 50 56 Peru 26 14 29 36 17 45 50 57 Ivory Coast 43 21 14 23 7 13 43 56 58 Nicaragua 24 23 21 26 16 20 55 51 59 Colombia 34 31 26 27 17 20 40 42 60 Paraguay 36 32 20 24 17 17 44 44 61 Ecuador 33 21 19 35 14 17 48 44 62 Dominican Rep, 27 21 23 29 17 19 50 50 63 Guatemala 64 Syrian Arab Rep. 20 28 21 52 65 Tunisia 24 18 18 30 8 12 58 52 66 Jordan .. 11 29 16 60 114 Distribution of gross domestic product (percent) Agriculture Industry (Manufacturi flga) Services 1960b 1978c 1960b 1978c (1960b 1978c) 1960b 1978c 67 Malaysia 37 25 18 32 9 17 45 43 68 Jamaica 10 9 36 39 15 17 54 52 69 Lebanon 12 .. 20 .. 13 .. 68 70 Korea, Rep. of 40 24 19 36 12 24 41 40 71 Turkey 41 27 21 28 13 18 38 45 72 Algeria 21 8 33 56 10 12 46 36 73 Mexico 16 11 29 37 23 28 55 52 74 Panama 23 .. 21 .. 13 .. 56 75 Taiwan 28 10 29 48 22 38 43 42 36 Chile 11 10 38 29 23 20 51 61 77 South Africa 12 8 40 45 21 22 48 43 78 Costa Rica 26 22 20 27 14 20 54 51 79 Brazil 16 11 35 37 26 28 49 52 80 Uruguay 19 14 28 32 21 26 53 54 81 Argentina 17 13 38 45 31 37 45 42 82 Portugal 25 13 36 46 29 36 39 41 83 Yugoslavia 24 16 45 45 36 .. 31 39 84 Trinidad and Tobago 8 3 46 62 24 14 46 35 85 Venezuela 6 6 22 46 .. 16 72 48 86 Hong Kong 4 2 34 31 25 25 62 67 87 Greece 23 17 26 31 16 19 51 52 88 Singapore 4 2 18 35 12 26 78 63 89 Spain 21 9 39 38 27 30 40 53 90 Israel 11 7 32 37 23 26 57 56 Industrialized countries 6w 4w 4Ow 37w 3Ow 27w 54w 59w 91 Ireland 22 .. 26 .. .. 52 92 Italy 13 7 41 42 31 . 46 51 93 New Zealand .. 10 .. 31 .. 21 .. 59 94 United Kingdom 4 2 43 36 32 25 53 62 95 Finland 18 8 35 35 24 25 47 57 96 Austria 11 5 49 42 38 29 40 53 97 Japan 13 5 45 40 34 29 42 55 98 Australia 12 5 37 32 26 19 51 63 99 France 10 5 38 37 29 27 52 58 100 Netherlands 9 4 46 34 34 .. 45 62 101 Belgium 6 2 41 37 30 26 53 61 102 Canada 6 4 34 31 23 19 60 65 103 Norway 9 5 33 36 21 17 58 59 104 Germany, Fed. Rep. 6 3 53 48 40 38 41 49 105 United States 4 3 38 34 29 24 58 63 106 Denmark 11 .. 32 .. 22 .. 53 107 Sweden 7 4 40 33 27 24 53 63 108 Switzerland S Capital-surplus oil exporters 5w 65w .. 8w 30w 109 Iraq 17 .. 52 .. 10 .. 31 110 Iran 29 9 33 54 11 12 38 37 111 Libya 2 .. 71 3 27 112 Saudi Arabia 1 76 5 23 113 Kuwait (.) 72 .. 3 28 Centrally planned economies 114 China 115 Korea, Oem. Rep. 116 Albania 117 Cuba 118 Mongolia 119 Romania 120 Bulgaria 121 Hungary 24 15 69 59 59 7 26 122 Poland 26 16 57 64 47 17 20 123 USSR 21 17 62 62 52 17 21 124 Czechoslovakia 16 9 73 72 63 11 19 125 German Oem. Rep. 10 .. 69 21 a. Manufacturing isa part of the industrial sector, but its share in GDP is shown separately b. Figures in italics are for 1961, not 1960. because it typically is the most dynamic part of the industrial sector. c, Figures in italics are for 1977, not 1978. 115 Table 4. Growth of Consumption and Investment Average annual growth rate (percent) Public Private Gross consumption consumption domestic investment 1 960_70a 1 970-78b 1 960-ba 1 970-78b 1 960-ba 1 970_78b Low-income countries 4.5m 3.7m 3.9 in 3.1 in 4.6 in 3.6 m 1 Kampuchea, Gem. 2.6 3.2 .. 0.3 2 Bangladesh C 3.4 3.1 11.1 -1.4 3LaoPDR 4 Bhutan ,. .. .. 5 Ethiopia 4.7 3.7 4.7 3.7 5.7 -1.6 6 Mali 6.2 3.6 2.8 6.0 3.5 1.8 7 Nepal .. .. 8 Somalia 3.7 11.7 -0.5 2.7 4.3 8 9 Burundi 19.2 5.1 3.2 3.1 4.3 16.9 10 Chad 4.4 0.1 -0.7 1.8 2.3 3.1 11 Mozambique 6.8 -4.6 4.4 -2.7 8.3 -9.6 12 Burma C 2.8 3.7 3.6 4.2 13 Upper Volta .. 3.8 0.8 1.8 14 Viet Nam .. .. .. 15 India -1.7 4.2 4.2 3.0 5.6 6.1 16 Malawi 4.6 1.5 4.1 6.4 15.4 1.1 17 Rwanda 1.1 2.8 4.2 3.9 3.5 17.1 18 Sri Lanka C C 1.9 2.5 6.6 3.6 19 Guinea 1.7 2.9 2.0 20 Sierra Leone 13.4 0.5 5.6 21 Zaire 8.5 -0.2 3.9 -0.7 9.6 0.6 22 Niger 2.0 4.2 3.9 1.6 3.0 5.2 23 Benin 1.7 0.6 4.9 3.9 4.2 8.4 24 Pakistan 7.3 3.9 7.1 3.8 6.9 4.8 25 Tanzania 5.2 5.8 9.8 1.9 26 Afghanistan C 9.8 2.5 3.8 -1.0 12.4 27 Central African Rep. 2.2 0.7 3.0 4.3 1.3 0.7 28 Madagascar -1.4 .. -2.2 .. -2.5 29 Haiti -0.1 1.0 4.5 1.7 11.9 30 Mauritania 1.0 17.7 17.2 4.4 -2.1 5.1 31 Lesotho 0.3 13.9 6.0 12.7 18.5 29.3 32 Uganda 5.9 1.6 5.6 1.6 9.8 -13.8 33 Angola 9.1 2.9 4.0 -8.8 9.7 -10.9 34 Sudan 12.1 -1.2 4.3 -1.3 9.8 35 Togo 6.7 14.6 7.6 1.9 11.1 16.0 36 Kenya 10.0 8.7 4.6 6.2 7.0 2.3 37 Senegal -0.2 2.3 3.2 2.1 1.1 2.5 38 Indonesia 1.0 10.9 3.4 7.6 4.8 15.3 Middle-income countries 6.4 m 7.4 m 5.3 in 4.9 in 7.6 in 7.2 in 39 Egypt 10.3 5.0 5.4 6.1 3.1 23.3 40 Ghana 6.1 -0.3 2.0 1.7 -3.2 -8.3 41 Yemen, PDR .. .. .. .. 42 Cameroon 8.9 5.8 3.4 4.8 8.4 7.0 43 Liberia 5.6 8.3 1.8 3.3 -4.6 6.1 44 Honduras 4.6 8.1 4.6 4.2 11.0 4.9 45 Zambia 11.0 2.3 6.9 -2.7 10.6 -2.9 46 Zimbabwe .. 2.9 .. 3,5 ,, -0.8 47 Thailand 9.6 8.3 7.0 6.7 15.4 7.8 48 Bolivia 8.9 8.5 4.1 7.4 9.6 6.4 49 Philippines 5.0 9.4 4.7 4.3 8.2 11.1 50 Yemen Arab Rep. .. .. .. .. 51 Congo, People's Rep. 5.4 7.0 -0.3 4.3 2.9 -0.1 52 Nigeria 10.0 26.9 (.) 4.0 7.4 23.3 53 Papua New Guinea 6.5 -1.1 6.9 2.0 21,2 -10.4 54 El Salvador 6.4 6.9 6.1 5.7 3.5 11.1 55 Morocco 4.5 13.8 4.0 4.4 8.0 17.4 56 Peru 8.8 5.8 6.7 4.1 2.4 4.2 57 Ivory Coast 11.8 7.5 8.0 8.2 12.7 14.0 58 Nicaragua 3.6 12.7 6.8 4.9 10.7 8.6 59 Colombia 5.5 4.8 5.5 5.9 4.5 6.3 60 Paraguay 6.9 3.8 4.5 6.9 5.8 20.6 61 Ecuador . , 12.4 . . 8.4 .. 10.2 62 Dominican Rep. 1.9 -0.9 6.3 7.6 11.4 13.2 63 Guatemala 4.7 5.2 4,7 5.4 7.9 11.3 64 Syrian Arab Rep. 13.0 .. 10.4 .. 18.2 65 Tunisia 5.5 8,8 3.0 8.8 4.5 11.9 66 Jordan 116 Average annual growth rate (percent) Public Private Gross consumption consumption domestic investment 1 960_70a 1 970_78b 1 96O.7Oa 1 970-78b 1 960_70a 1 970_78b 67 Malaysia 7.4 9.6 4.2 6.4 7.2 10.2 68 Jamaica 8.6 6.0 3.2 0,5 7.8 -10.4 69 Lebanon 5.9 . 4.4 .. 6.2 70 Korea, Rep. of 5.5 8.7 7.0 7.5 23.6 13.7 71 Turkey 6.7 8.8 5.1 6.6 8.8 10.2 72 Algeria 1.7 8.2 4.6 11.3 1.9 11.7 73 Mexico 9.4 10.2 6.6 3.8 9.6 7.1 74 Panama 7.8 6.9 6.7 1.4 12.4 0.9 75 Taiwan 4.5 5.4 8.3 6.8 16.2 8.2 76 Chile 4,7 2.9 4.8 -0.4 3.7 -2.7 77 South Africa 7.1 . . 6.2 . . 9.5 78 Costa Rica 8.0 7.4 6.0 4.9 7.1 9.3 79 Brazil 3.5 8.6 5.1 9.0 7.0 10.7 80 Uruguay 4.4 3.2 0.7 -1.2 -1.8 4.8 81 Argentina 1.0 -3.1 4.1 2.4 4.1 1.2 82 Portugal 7.7 9.0 5.5 4.8 7.7 0.7 83 Yugoslavia 0.6 4.5 9,5 6.1 4.7 7.2 84 Trinidad and Tobago 6.2 10.4 4.3 -0.3 -2.8 5.3 85 Venezuela 6.3 9.1 4.9 7.1 7.3 11.8 86 Hong Kong 8.7 9.2 8.9 8.8 7.4 10.2 87 Greece 6.6 7.7 7.1 4.6 10.4 1.9 88 Singapore 12.6 6.4 5.4 7.1 20.5 5.5 89 Spain 5.5 6.2 7.0 4.2 10.5 3.0 90 Israel 13.8 5.3 7.4 5.7 5.7 0.7 Industrialized countries 4.8 rn 3.8 r 4.3 'U 3.5 fl 5.6 ii 1.5 91 Ireland 3.9 6.3 3.7 2.7 8.8 1.7 92 Italy 3.9 6.1 2.7 3.8 -0.4 93 New Zealand .. .. .. .. 94 United Kingdom 2.2 2.9 2.3 1.3 5.0 1.5 95 Finland 5.7 5.9 4.3 2.9 4.3 -1.5 96 Austria 2.9 4.0 4.4 4.2 5.6 4.1 97 Japan 6.4 5.0 9.0 5.3 14.0 2.5 98 Australia 6.8 5.8 2.7 3.8 6.2 0.7 99 France 3.4 3.4 5,5 4.5 7.3 1.7 100 Netherlands 3.1 2.7 6.1 3.8 6.8 -0.1 101 Belgium 5.7 4.7 3.8 4.0 6.0 1.9 102 Canada 6.2 3.3 4.9 5.6 5.8 4.7 103 Norway 6.4 5.6 4.1 4.0 5.1 4.1 104 Germany, Fed. Rep. 4.1 3.9 4.6 2.9 4.1 -0.2 105 United States 4.1 1.7 4.4 3.5 4.8 1.6 106 Denmark 6.0 3.6 4.3 3.0 6.7 0.2 107 Sweden 5,4 3.1 3.8 2.0 5.0 -1.3 108 Switzerland 4.8 2.0 4.3 1.4 4.1 -4.6 Capital-surplus oil exporters 109 Iraq 8.1 .. 4.9 .. 3.0 110 Iran 16.0 20.4 10.0 10.0 12.2 22.0 111 Libya 22.6 21.2 .. 10.9 112 Saudi Arabia C 16.5 51.0 113 Kuwait Centrally planned economies 114 China 115 Korea, Dem, Rep. 116 Albania 117 Cuba 118 Mongolia 119 Romania 120 Bulgaria 121 Hungary 122 Poland 123 USSR 124 Czechoslovakia 125 German Dem. Rep. Figures in italics are for 1961 -70, not 1960-70. c. Separate figures are not available for public consumption, Figures in italics are for 1970-77, not 1970-78. which is therefore included in private consumption. 117 Table 5. Structure of Demand Distribution of gross domestic product (percent) Exports of Gross Gross goods and Public Private domestic domestic nonfactor Resource consumption consumption investment saving services balance 1960a 1978b 1960a 1978b 1960a 1978b 1960a 1978b 1960a 1978b 1960a 1978b Low-income countries 9w 12w 80w 73w l4.w 21w liw l5w lOw l2w 3w Gw 1 Kampuchea, Dem. 2 Bangladesh 19 6 .. C 69 86 .. 100 20 7 .. 12 12 8 .. (.) 14 10 .. 8 8 1 12 3 Lao PDR .. 21 .. 58 .. 40 .. 21 2 .. 19 4 Bhutan 5 Ethiopia 6 Mali 8 13 81 81 12 9 11 6 9 12 1 5 12 3 7 Nepal 12 19 C 79 .. 76 98 14 .. 17 9 9 .. 5 2 12 21 5 7.. 7 14 8 Somalia 9 Burundi 10 Chad 8 3 13 19 14 18 89 92 82 79 81 89 10 6 11 16 14 17 3 57 5 2 5 11 13 23 12 11 27 1 6 249 11 Mozambique 11 15 81 86 10 10 81 14 13 2 1 11 7 12 Burma 13 Upper Volta C 10 C 13 89 94 87 90 12 10 20 25 43 11 13 20 9 7 15 14 28 14 Viet Nam 15 India 16 Malawi 7 10 79 70 17 24 14 48 16 20 5 .. 34 14 16 17 Rwanda 18 Sri Lanka 16 10 13 13 9 10 88 82 76 71 87 73 10 6 15 32 10 22 11 4 17 21 12 46 21 20 38 452 6 19 Guinea 20 Sierra Leone 14 .. 16 19 80 .. 68 72 5 .. 15 17 6 .. 16 9 23 .. 28 22 1 8 1 21 Zaire 22 Niger 18 21 61 67 12 19 21 12 55 26 1 9 7 7 23 Benin 24 Pakistan 9 16 11 11 14 11 79 75 84 77 91 82 13 15 12 19 22 18 12 95 5 12 7 9 12 8 23 22 10 6 27 7 11 25 Tanzania 26 Afghanistan 27 Central African Rep. 9 14 72 87 79 90 14 16 20 13 20 19 13 7 10 31 4 15 10 335 13 12 28 Madagascar 29 Haiti 19 20 ° 20 16 8 72 75 93 72 63 83 20 11 16 9 5 8 21 9 23 12 18 .. 6 2 459 5 30 Mauritania 24 38 79 55 9 37 18 52 37 7 20 18 22 41 40 31 Lesotho 25 71 27 101 32 Uganda 33 Angola 17 9 9 17 c 26 108 75 77 154 98 56 2 11 12 30 4 9 16 14 2 18 12 26 20 22 41 4 5 2 2 9 14 34 Sudan 35 Togo 6 8 14 13 85 88 84 73 9 16 37 9 4 2 14 12 19 15 34 7 (.) 23 3 10 11 36 Kenya 37 Senegal 38 Indonesia 11 17 12 19 17 11 72 68 80 63 72 67 20 16 8 28 23 20 17 15 8 18 11 22 31 40 13 27 32 21 1(.) 12 2 Middle-income countries 11 w 13 w 69 w 65 w 2lw 25w 20w 22w l5w2lw lw 3w 39 Egypt 17 21 71 65 13 28 12 14 20 21 1 7 14 40 Ghana 41 Yemen, PDR 42 Cameroon 10 .. 13 29 73 .. 81 80 24 .. 5 47 .. 9 1] 6 28 10 .. 56 3 1 14 10 72 69 11 24 14 21 29 26 3 4 43 Liberia 44 Honduras 45 Zambia 7 11 15 13 25 58 77 48 67 67 44 28 14 25 22 27 35 12 18 20 39 22 56 55 38 32 273 16 (.) 11 31 41 31 1 2 75 46 Zimbabwe 11 13 67 63 23 19 22 24 5 47 Thailand 48 Bolivia 49 Philippines 10 7 11 13 76 86 67 74 16 14 27 21 14 7 22 13 17 13 21 1] 8 6 50 Yemen Arab Rep. 8 .. 10 12 76 .. 66 96 16 .. 30 35 .. 8 16 24 11 .. 19 3 (.) .. 66 43 51 Congo, People's Rep. 52 Nigeria 23 6 31 15 98 87 61 57 45 13 20 30 21 7 8 28 21 15 .. 31 6 12 2 3 53 Papua New Guinea 54 l Salvador 55 Morocco 28 10 12 28 13 21 70 79 77 56 75 68 13 16 10 19 20 24 2 11 11 16 12 11 17 20 24 45 30 18 58113 56 Peru 8 13 68 70 22 15 24 24 22 57 Ivory Coast 58 Nicaragua 10 9 14 8 73 79 56 73 15 15 31 25 17 12 17 30 19 33 24 38 33 36 2 21 2 59 Colombia 60 Paraguay 61 Ecuador 6 8 7 7 73 76 68 73 21 17 24 27 21 16 25 20 16 18 16 13 17 (.) 1 62 Dominican Rep. 63 Guatemala 10 13 8 14 5 7 74 68 84 60 77 76 14 12 10 26 23 22 16 19 8 26 18 17 17 24 13 24 21 22 25 2 75 (.) 64 Syrian Arab Rep. .. 65 .. 32 14 18 18 65 Tunisia 66 Jordan 17 21 16 32 76 .. 64 8] 17 .. 30 40 7 20 19 20 31 47 10 10 . . 59 118 Distribution of gross domestic product (percent) Exports of Gross Gross goods and Public Private domestic domestic nonfactor Resource consumption consumption investment saving services balance 1960a 1978b 1960a 1978b 1960a 1978b 1960a 1978b 1960a 1978b 1960a 1978b 67 Malaysia 62 68 Jamaica 11 7 16 20 67 53 64 14 30 25 15 27 26 31 16 54 34 51 40 4 13 11 6 1 69 Lebanon 70 Korea, Rep. of 71 Turkey 10 15 11 .. 12 13 85 84 76 .. 60 70 16 11 16 .. 32 21 5 13 1 .. 28 17 27 3 3 .. 34 6 10 34 4 72 Algeria 16 15 50 48 42 51 34 37 28 27 8 2 14 73 Mexico 74 Panama 6 11 11 18 76 78 64 60 20 16 25 28 18 11 25 22 10 31 11 40 5 7 6 (.) 75 Taiwan 76 Chile 77 South Africa 19 11 17 12 68 75 50 81 20 17 26 11 13 14 33 7 11 14 59 21 34 7 78 Costa Rica 79 Brazil 9 10 14 64 77 56 85 22 18 24 25 27 13 30 15 30 21 33 29 5 1 10 5 2 6 80 Uruguay 81 Argentina 12 9 9 10 29 3 67 79 71 69 73 41 22 18 22 23 14 25 21 12 20 21 14 30 5 14 10 20 7 14 6 2 (.) 7 511 5 82 Portugal 83 Yugoslavia 84 Trinidad and Tobago 11 19 9 14 17 77 49 74 55 53 19 37 28 23 33 12 32 12 28 17 14 20 17 5 85 Venezuela 14 14 15 61 53 51 21 26 40 30 33 33 34 37 32 47 29 2 12 6 18 11 7 8 87 86 Hong Kong 7 7 92 78 19 26 1 15 79 98 87 Greece 88 Singapore 89 Spain 12 8 7 16 11 77 89 70 64 62 68 19 11 2] 36 20 11 3 23 20 27 9 163 10 17 164 16 9 13 18 11 21 21 2 1 90 Israel 18 36 68 58 2] 24 14 6 14 44 Industrialized countries 15 w 18 w 63 w 60 w 21w 22w 22w 22w l2w l8w Iw (.) w 91 Ireland 92 Italy 12 12 19 16 7] 64 64 16 24 27 11 17 31 54 5 10 93 New Zealand 94 United Kingdom 13 16 20 65 66 63 61 59 24 19 20 22 19 24 22 21 23 15 23 25 27 2 (.) 2 1 1 95 Finland 17 13 19 58 56 30 21 17 29 21 25 21 23 30 31 1 4 2 96 Austria 97 Japan 13 18 59 55 28 28 28 27 24 35 (.) 1 98 Australia 99 France 9 10 13 10 16 15 57 65 61 58 60 61 34 29 24 31 23 23 34 25 26 32 24 24 11 15 15 11 16 21 4 (.) 2 1 1 1 100 Netherlands 14 18 57 59 27 22 29 23 50 47 2 1 101 Belgium 13 18 69 62 19 21 18 20 33 51 1 2 1 102 Canada 103 Norway 104 Germany, Fed. Rep. 14 14 14 20 18 20 65 58 57 57 54 55 23 30 27 23 29 22 21 28 29 23 28 25 18 41 19 26 42 25 212 (.) 3 1 105 United States 106 Denmark 10] Sweden 17 12 16 18 24 29 64 66 60 64 55 53 18 23 25 19 23 18 19 22 24 18 21 18 5 34 23 8 28 29 1 1 2 1 (.) 108 Switzerland 9 13 62 63 29 22 29 24 29 35 (.) 2 Capital-surplus oil exporters 21w .. 32w 3lw 48w .. l6w 109 Iraq 18 .. 48 .. 20 .. 34 .. 42 .. 14 110 Iran 10 20 69 41 13 33 21 39 19 34 4 6 111 Libya .. 27 .. 28 .. 25 -. 45 .. 56 .. 20 112 Saudi Arabia .. 21 .. 23 .. 30 .. 56 .. 62 .. 26 113 Kuwait .. 21 .. 24 18 .. 55 .. 71 .. 3] Centrally planned economies 114 China 115 Korea, Dem. Rep. 116 Albania 117 Cuba 118 Mongolia 119 Romania 39 . - 120 Bulgaria 121 Hungary 122 Poland 123 USSR 7 8 2 12 8 C 72 68 70 64 59 73 24 24 26 37 32 26 21 24 28 28 29 27 .- 3 (.) 2 1 124 Czechoslovakia 6 7 35 68 17 25 19 25 .. 2 (.) 125 German Dem. Rep. Figures in italics are for 1961, not 1960. c. Separate figures are not available for public consumption Figures in italics are for 1977, not 1978. which is therefore included in private consumtion. 119 Table 6. Industrialization Distribution of value added (percent) Gross Machinery Value added manufacturing Textiles and in manufacturing output Food and and transport Other (millions of per capita (1970 dollars) agriculture clothing equipment Chemicals manufacturing 1970 dollars) 1976a 1976a 1976a 1976a 1976a 1970 1976a 1970 1976 Low-income countries 1 Kampuchea, Oem. 2 Bangladesh 324 32Ô ii 13 3 Lao PDR 4 Bhutan 5 Ethiopia i4 6Mali .. 26 7 Nepal 8 Somalia .. 11 1] e 9 Burundi .. 19 24 10 Chad .. .. 18 27 11 Mozambique 68 13 4 15 104 82 28 12 Burma 40 20 .. .. 40 225 271 13 Upper Volta .. .. .. 31 37 14 Viet Nam .. 15 India 15 29 13 12 31 7,093 8,973 51 62 16 Malawi 77 7 .. 16 38 53 29 50 l7Rwanda .. .. .. 6 3 4 18 Sri Lanka 17 23 9 51 321 346 19 Guinea .. .. .. .. 12 18 20 Sierra Leone 22 27 21 Zaire 59 10 5 4 22 155 170 22 Niger .. .. .. .. .. 40 23 Benin 44 38 .. 18 19 45 24 Pakistan 46 35 9 10 1462 1,757 25 Tanzania .. .. 116 156 27 26 Afghanistan 27 Central African Rep. 31 i :: 28 Madagascar 95 5 118 112 40 44 29 Haiti 65 15 1 19 30 Mauritania .. .. 18 228 31 Lesotho .. . 2 2 32 Uganda 53 .. .. .. 47 109 86 33 Angola 67 .. .. .. 33 80 38 34 Sudan 41 36 3 11 9 252 368 51 35 Togo .. .. .. 24 .. 28 36 Kenya 18 13 19 8 42 174 357 55 116 37 Senegal 58 15 .. 13 14 141 190 .. 98 38 Indonesia 41 16 .. 43 854 1,671 28 40 Middle-income countries 39 Egypt 17 34 11 13 25 1326 1,882 146 40 Ghana 75 .. .. .. 25 253 186 58 41 Yemen, PDR .. .. 42 Cameroon 65 35 119 170 43 Liberia 15 27 44 Honduras 51 16 1 3 29 91 126 .. 130 45 Zambia 55 9 6 5 25 181 213 107 46 Zimbabwe 26 14 11 11 38 297 .. 142 47 Thailand 45 17 8 15 15 1048 2,101 134 48 Bolivia 35 22 5 4 34 151 222 94 134 49 Philippines 44 13 6 13 24 1,579 2,334 108 50 Yemen Arab Rep. .. .. 12 23 51 Congo, Peoples Rep. 68 32 32 40 60 52 Nigeria 92 .. 8 529 1,122 17 42 53 Papua New Guinea 54 El Salvador 45 31 .. 10 14 194 280 .. 155 55 Morocco 41 14 6 7 32 599 879 56 Peru 31 10 12 16 31 982 1,448 177 198 57 Ivory Coast .. .. .. .. .. 200 292 .. 140 58 Nicaragua 61 29 .. .. 10 159 226 59 Colombia 33 18 10 12 27 1143 1,746 127 172 60 Paraguay 48 16 4 4 28 99 136 .. 61 Ecuador 33 16 9 4 38 271 452 119 176 62 Dominican Rep. 68 5 (.) 4 23 275 455 133 192 63 Guatemala 50 37 4 9 .. .. .. 64 Syrian Arab Rep. 50 33 3 14 238 458 117 100 65 Tunisia 65 10 22 3 115 234 90 163 66 Jordan 120 Distribution of value added (percent) Gross Machinery Value added manufacturing Textiles and in manufacturing output Food and and transport Other (millions of per capita agriculture clothing equipment Chemicals manufacturing 1970 dollars) (1970 dollars) 1 976a 1976a 1976a 1976° 1976a 1970 1976° 1970 1976a 67 Malaysia 35 8 11 12 34 543 1,103 178 68 Jamaica 87 13 221 239 348 69 Lebanon 202 70 Korea, Rep, of 15 25 24 8 28 1,431 3,934 111 320 71 Turkey 55 23 22 1,930 3,294 106 217 72 Algeria 29 18 11 6 36 735 1,117 73 Mexico 21 13 19 14 33 8636 12,174 74 Panama 44 7 3 3 43 166 186 276 386 75 Taiwan .. .. .. .. 1,873 4,278 76 Chile 18 8 7 4 63 2,175 1,828 388 293 77 South Africa 17 13 16 12 42 3,959 .. 432 78 Costa Rica 42 12 6 10 30 180 292 79 Brazil 15 10 30 12 33 9,972 19,147 229 80 Uruguay 42 19 4 9 26 515 578 .. 489 81 Argentina 17 13 24 13 33 6,777 8,248 82 Portugal 17 19 23 9 32 1,847 2,481 .. 721 83 Yugoslavia 9 14 24 10 43 3,235 5,423 411 846 84 Trinidad and Tobago 54 . .. 3 43 184 169 .. 218 85 Venezuela 29 12 11 6 42 1,827 2,719 .. 423 86 Hong Kong .. 98 .. .. 2 899 1,314 .. 844 87 Greece 16 29 10 7 38 1,642 2,601 498 832 88 Singapore 7 5 49 7 32 388 707 764 1,247 89 Spain 27 10 20 11 32 9,339 15,739 868 1,523 90 Israel 11 17 26 7 39 1,101 833 Industrialized countries 91 Ireland 31 16 12 11 30 1,186 92 Italy 13 14 27 11 35 29,059 35,586 1,251 1,578 93 New Zealand 26 15 12 5 42 .. 94 United Kingdom 14 9 30 12 35 34,317 35,381 1,493 1,640 95 Finland 13 10 25 6 46 2,788 3,467 1,731 2,039 96 Austria 15 12 22 8 43 4,873 6,188 1,706 2,339 97 Japan 8 7 36 11 38 73,167 103,478 1,816 2,561 98 Australia 17 8 24 9 42 8,498 .. 1,712 99 France 13 6 35 8 38 40,510 53,113 .. 2,429 100 Netherlands 20 6 22 19 33 9,192 11,708 2,137 2,391 101 Belgium 18 10 29 9 34 8,226 10,636 102 Canada 14 8 26 8 44 16,802 21,341 1,947 2,496 103 Norway 14 5 25 6 50 2,442 2,882 1,606 2,312 104 Germany, Fed. Rep. 9 7 33 11 40 75,765 85,792 2,184 2,636 105 United States 12 8 31 12 37 252,100 292,900 2,586 3,126 106 Denmark 23 8 26 7 36 3,100 .. 1,485 2,149 107 Sweden 9 5 33 6 4] 8,516 9,530 2,319 2,538 108 Switzerland 11 8 38 15 28 Capital-surplus oil exporters 109 Iraq 37 23 .. 2 38 325 652 77 144 110 Iran 14 34 34 5 13 1,501 3,720 140 111 Libya .. .. .. .. 82 198 88 142 112 Saudi Arabia 372 486 113 Kuwait 106 .. 199 Centrally planned economies 114 China 115 Korea, Dem. Rep. 116 Albania .. 117 Cuba 72 28 118 Mongolia 119 Romania 15 18 32 9 26 120 Bulgaria 25 15 27 5 28 121 Hungary 12 11 32 5 40 122 Poland 17 15 27 10 31 123 USSR 10 6 7 77 124 Czechoslovakia 7 11 3] 7 38 125 German Dem. Rep. 11 12 36 11 30 a. Figures in italics are for 1975, not 1976. 121 Table 7. Energy Energy Energy consumption consumption per dollar Energy imports Average annual per capita of GDP as growth rate (percent) (kilograms (kilograms percentage of Energy Energy of coal of coal merchandise production consumption equivalent) equivalent) exports 1960_74a 1974-78 1960-74 1974-78 1960 1978 1960 1978b 1960C1977d Low-income countries 6.8 w 8.2 w 5.7 w 6.8 w 98 w 161 w 0.8w lOw 9wl6w 1 Kampuchea, Dem. - -0.1 5.9 31 4 .. 9 - 2 Bangladesh - - 12.8 -. 16.5 . - 43 - - 0.3 . - 48 3 Lao PDR -. -0.6 13.4 1.5 18 60 4 Bhutan 5 Ethiopia 14.1 1.8 14.7 -i.8 8 20 0.1 0.2 11 27 6 Mali .. 10.8 5.5 5.9 15 30 0.2 0.3 13 25 7 Nepal 27.2 4.6 12.3 0.9 5 11 (.) 0.1 8 Somalia .. 7.4 27.4 19 55 0.2 0.6 4 13 9 Burundi 23.4 .. 3.1 . 12 . . 0,1 . . 7 10 Chad .. 7.2 5.0 10 22 0.1 0.2 23 27 11 Mozambique 3,2 29.9 5.7 4.4 114 151 0.4 0.5 11 28 12 Burma 4.8 11.2 3.6 4.9 55 64 0.5 0.5 4 12 13 Upper Volta .. 6.5 10.9 5 25 0.1 0.3 38 19 14 Viet Nam .. 12.3 .. -9.0 .. 125 .. 15 India 4.4 5.5 4.9 5.1 108 176 1.0 1.2 11 26 16 Malawi .. 9.4 2.8 52 .. 0.3 .. 15 17 Rwanda .. 2.8 . - 11.2 . . 17 .. 0.1 . . 11 18 Sri Lanka 10.4 3.5 6.2 0.8 107 109 0.7 0.5 8 22 19 Guinea 16.1 (.) 3.2 1.8 65 91 0.3 0.4 7 20 Sierra Leone .. .. 10.3 -0.6 31 100 0.3 0.5 11 10 21 Zaire 3.0 53.5 4.3 2.0 87 69 0.9 1.0 3 16 22 Niger .. 14.3 7.5 5 38 (.) 0.2 6 23 Benin .. .. 8.8 -4.5 39 56 0.2 0.3 16 43 24 Pakistan 10.0 2.4 5.9 1.0 61 172 1.3 1.0 17 33 25 Tanzania 10.6 13.4 10.4 0.5 41 65 0.3 0,4 .. 22 26 Afghanistan 39.7 -4.2 9.4 1.3 15 47 0.2 0.4 12 12 27 Central African Rep. 14.2 4.7 7.4 8.7 37 44 0.1 0.2 12 1 28 Madagascar 6.8 3.5 8.9 2.3 38 78 0.2 0.4 9 22 29 Haiti ,. 17.4 2.8 11.1 36 5] 0.2 0.3 .. 17 30 Mauritania ,. 16.8 4.3 18 203 0.1 0.7 39 6 31 Lesotho . - .. .. .. .. .. .. . - -. - - 32 Uganda 5.2 -4.1 9.5 -0.3 30 48 0.1 0.2 5 4 33 Angola 35.8 0.2 8.8 1.9 86 192 0.2 0.5 6 2 34 Sudan .. 16.8 13.2 1.4 52 172 0.2 0.7 8 26 35 Togo -. - . 12.5 12.3 23 96 0.1 0.3 10 1 36 Kenya 9.3 10.5 4.2 -0.6 143 139 0.8 0.5 18 24 37 Senegal . - .. 4.6 4.] 121 181 0.3 0.5 8 15 38 Indonesia 8.5 11.3 4.2 21.4 129 278 0.8 1.1 3 7 Middle-income countries 6.0 w 1.7 w 7.9 u 6.2 395 w 903 w 0.7w 1.1 w 11 w 20w 39 Egypt 9.8 31.6 2.7 11.] 298 463 1.7 1.4 12 6 40 Ghana .. 2.7 6.6 0.6 106 165 0.2 0.4 7 18 41 Yemen, PDR -. .. -13.6 11.2 299 523 . - 2.6 . - . - 42 Cameroon 1.1 3.1 4.0 10.2 55 119 0.2 0.3 7 10 43 Liberia 31.8 -1.3 19.3 -0.6 86 395 0.2 0.9 3 12 44 Honduras 29.5 5.6 8.9 8.9 155 284 0.5 0.7 10 14 45 Zambia -. 4.4 1.8 474 - - 1.2 .. 5 46 Zimbabwe 1.9 39 -. (-) - 579 . - t2 47 Thailand 28.0 11.4 16.9 7.6 64 327 0.3 0.8 12 29 48 Bolivia 17.2 -2.0 7.0 11.3 147 368 0.5 0.8 4 1 49 Philippines 5.6 12.4 9.6 6.3 147 339 0.6 0.8 9 33 50 Yemen Arab Rep. - - . - 12.7 20.1 7 53 -. 0.3 . - - - 51 Congo, People's Rep. 15.] -9.3 5.2 -0.7 119 175 0.3 0.3 25 2 52 Nigeria 37.4 -2.9 10.2 8.1 34 106 0.1 0.2 7 2 53 Papua New Guinea - - 16.2 3.0 51 292 0.2 0.6 7 13 54 El Salvador 5.1 20.9 7.7 6.3 127 265 0.4 0.6 6 10 55 Morocco 1.9 4.4 7.7 6.6 148 285 0.4 0.5 9 28 56 Peru 3.5 13.4 6.2 2.4 445 649 0.8 0.8 4 23 57 Ivory Coast 9.7 -3.8 15.5 7.3 76 357 0.2 0.4 5 9 58 Nicaragua 26.6 -9.5 10.0 8.5 174 517 0.4 0.7 12 17 59 Colombia 3,4 -1.8 6.3 4.3 491 700 1.3 1.2 3 6 60 Paraguay .. 7.0 8.5 8.8 87 200 0.2 0.3 - 30 61 Ecuador 19.0 3.1 8.3 10.2 201 505 .. 0.8 2 1 62 Dominican Rep. 4.4 8.4 14.6 -7.0 157 464 0.3 0.6 - 22 63 Guatemala 9.9 20.9 6.1 4,9 174 260 0.4 0.4 12 15 64 Syrian Arab Rep. 86.2 11.8 9.0 18.3 321 968 0.7 1.2 16 42 65 Tunisia 73.4 0.1 9.5 8.7 190 543 - - 0.6 15 22 66 Jordan .. ,. 6.5 15.2 197 535 0.7 1.3 79 53 122 Energy Energy consumption consumption per dollar Energy imports Average annual per capita of GDP as growth rate (percent) (kilograms (kilograms percentage of Energy Energy of coal of coal merchandise production consumption equivalent) equivalent) exports 1 960_74a 1974-78 1960-74 1974-78 1960 1978 1960 1978b 1960c 1977d 67 Malaysia 37.4 27.1 11.1 4.7 242 716 0.6 0.8 2 10 68 Jamaica -0.7 -2.8 11.2 0.3 426 1823 0.2 1.5 11 32 69 Lebanon 12.7 -0.6 6.3 -3.4 548 936 .. .. 68 4 30 Korea, Rep. of 6.3 3.2 13.2 9.6 258 1,359 1.2 1,8 70 22 71 Turkey 7.6 -0.8 9.9 9.4 245 793 0.5 0.8 16 79 72 Algeria 11.7 6.7 12.2 13.7 252 687 0.3 0.7 14 2 73 Mexico 6.0 12.6 7.7 6.7 770 1,384 0.9 1.0 3 4 74 Panama 14.8 4.4 10.5 7.1 448 991 0.7 0.9 75 Taiwan 2.3 1.4 8.6 14.5 583 2,202 1.5 1.9 . . 15 76 Chile 4.0 -1.5 6.1 -0.8 845 997 1.2 1.1 10 25 77 South Africa 3.8 8.1 . . . .. . . . 1 78 Costa Rica 9.5 4.7 10.4 5.6 233 564 0.4 0.5 7 13 79 Brazil 8.1 5.6 8.6 7.0 332 794 0.6 0.6 21 37 80 Uruguay 3.7 7.3 3.1 1.9 825 1,054 0.] 0.8 35 27 81 Argentina 6.5 2.2 5.7 2.2 1,129 1,873 0.9 1.4 14 12 82 Portugal 4.4 -5.9 8.3 2.3 382 1,030 0.5 0.6 17 36 83 Yugoslavia 4.7 3.2 7.1 4.8 872 2,035 1.3 1,2 8 23 84 Trinidad and Tobago 2.8 5.9 4.8 5,5 1,775 4,965 1.0 1.9 35 39 85 Venezuela 1.2 -6.3 6.6 5.3 1694 2,989 1.1 1.2 1 86 Hong Kong .. .. 6.8 12.2 468 1,657 0.7 0.7 5 7 87 Greece 14.3 10.8 13.2 4.1 460 1,925 0.5 0.7 26 38 88 Singapore .. .. 16.8 9.3 372 2,461 0.4 0.8 17 32 89 Spain 2.5 4.3 8.5 3.9 756 2,405 0.6 0.8 22 49 90 Israel 41.9 -71.2 9.6 2.8 1270 2,362 0.7 0.6 17 25 Industrialized countries 3.2 zz' 0.8 w 4.9 w 1.5 w 4,462 w 7,060 tO 1,2 w 1.1 w 11 w 23 w 91 Ireland 0.1 3.8 4.7 2.6 1,838 3,292 1.2 1.1 17 15 92 Italy 2.2 -1.6 8.3 1.8 1,086 3,230 0.6 0.9 18 27 93 New Zealand 5.2 11.4 5.7 3.8 2,277 3,790 0.7 0,9 7 16 94 United Kingdom -1.2 13.5 1.7 0.3 4861 5,212 1.6 1.2 14 16 95 Finland 3.3 9.0 9.1 2.7 1,529 5,205 0.5 0.9 11 23 96 Austria 1.5 -1.5 5.1 1.1 2,129 4,048 0.8 0.] 12 15 97 Japan -1.7 -0.8 10.7 1.5 1,171 3,825 0.8 0.7 18 39 98 Australia 11.1 5.3 5.6 3.6 3,857 6,622 0.8 0.7 12 9 99 France -1.3 0.6 5.8 1.6 2,474 4,368 0.7 0.6 16 24 100 Netherlands 16.2 -1.6 8.7 -1.5 2504 5,327 0.7 0.8 15 19 101 Belgium -7.2 (.) 4.9 0.2 3,851 6,078 1.1 0.9 11 15 102 Canada 8.9 -1.3 6.0 1.7 5,750 9,930 1.3 1.3 9 9 103 Norway 6.8 37.5 5.9 4.0 2,702 5,571 0.7 0.7 15 16 104 Germany, Fed. Rep. -0.7 -0.7 4.5 1.5 3,695 6,015 0.9 0.8 7 15 105 United States 3.5 -0.5 4.1 1.6 8,172 11,374 1.6 1.4 8 37 106 Denmark -20,1 49.9 5.5 3.7 2,830 5,423 0.6 0.7 15 22 107 Sweden 3.6 4.6 4.9 2.5 3572 5,954 0.] 0.7 16 19 108 Switzerland 4.2 4.0 5.9 1.4 1,873 3,690 0.3 0.4 10 10 Capital-surplus oil exporters 11.5 w 1.4 w 9.2 w 11.7 w 404 w 1,620 w 0.4 0.5w .. (.) tO 109 Iraq 4.9 6.9 5.9 1.0 48] 633 0.7 0.5 (.) (.) 110 Iran 14.5 -1.5 15.6 11.9 270 1,808 0.4 0.9 1 (.) 111 Libya 29.1 8.9 17.9 21.8 251 1,889 0.1 0.3 83 (.) 112 Saudi Arabia 14.1 2.3 14.4 16.1 267 1,306 . 0.2 .. () 113 Kuwait 4.6 -4.2 6.7 12.2 10,396 6,771 0.4 0.6 .. (.) Centrally planned economies 4.8 iv 6.5w 4.8w 5.4w l,347w 2,ll7w 1.9 w 2.1 w 114 China 4.5 9.1 3.6 9.0 637 805 .. 4.2 115 Korea, Dem. Rep. 9.1 4.3 9.1 4.3 989 2,702 3.8 4.4 116 Albania 10.1 6.3 12.5 12.8 302 998 1.1 1.7 117 Cuba 20.6 -19.4 4.4 2.] 912 1,168 1.0 1.8 39 118 Mongolia 10.4 9.3 7.3 8.1 540 1,240 0.8 1.6 119 Romania 5.8 1.6 8.0 4.5 1,342 4,042 3.8 2.7 120 Bulgaria 3.3 0.8 9.8 3.8 1,303 5,020 1.2 1.9 7 121 Hungary 1.8 2.0 3.9 3.0 2,072 3,451 1.5 1.2 13 14 122 Poland 3.9 4.2 4.1 5.8 3,10] 5,596 2.1 1.8 .. 123 USSR 5.6 5.5 5.3 4.2 2,839 5,500 1.9 1.8 4 4 124 Czechoslovakia 1.3 2.6 3.1 4.0 4,741 7,531 1.9 1.9 15 125 German Dem. Rep, 0.5 1.2 2.1 2.1 4,950 7,121 1.8 1.5 Figures in italics are for 1961-74, not 1960-74. c. Figures in italics are for 1961, not 1960. Figures in italics are for 1977, not 1978. d. Figures in italics are for 1976, not 1977. 123 Table 8. Growth of Merchandise Trade Merchandise trade Average annual growth ratea (millions of dollars) (percent) Terms of trade Exports Imports Exports Imports (1970 = 100) 1978b 1978b 1960-70 1970-78 1960-70 1970-78 1960 1978 Low-income countries 28,749 t 32,073 5.0 m -0.8 ni 5.0 n 3.2 n! 98nz 98m 1 Kampuchea, Dem. -3.3 . . -3.0 . . 102 136 2 Bangladesh 576 1,294 6.6 -4.7 7.0 -2.9 155 74 3 Lao PDR 9 64 4 Bhutan .. .. .. .. .. 5 Ethiopia 310 522 3.7 -5.4 6.2 -0.2 75 126 6 Mali 107 219 3.1 7.7 -0,4 5,0 91 93 7 Nepal 87 227 . . . . . . . . 8 Somalia 107 241 2.3 7.8 2.6 13.7 107 72 9 Burundi 67 98 .. .. .. 10 Chad 102 192 5.9 -3.0 5.0 1.7 106 122 11 Mozambique 129 278 6.0 -15.9 7.8 -13.4 103 96 12 Burma 243 309 -11.6 0.5 -5.7 -4.6 101 83 13 Upper Volta 57 210 14.4 8.5 7.8 9.4 75 89 14 Viet Nam .. .. .. ., .. 15 India 6,614 7,954 3.1 6.0 -0.9 3.2 104 80 16 Malawi 187 339 11.6 2.4 7.7 4.2 116 112 17 Rwanda 70 179 15.7 3.6 8.0 11.7 89 123 18 Sri Lanka 846 939 4.6 -3.8 -0.3 -2.7 175 124 19 Guinea 314 273 .. .. . . 20 Sierra Leone 161 278 0.3 -3.1 1.9 -4.0 89 77 21 Zaire 925 589 -1.8 -4.1 5.5 -10.4 61 61 22 Niger 158 346 6.0 13.2 11.9 5.5 90 78 23 Benin 26 267 5.0 -13.6 7.5 6.8 89 79 24 Pakistan 1,471 3,275 8.2 -1.3 4.2 5.9 93 82 25 Tanzania 457 1,117 3.5 -6.0 6.0 -1.0 96 104 26 Afghanistan 322 681 2.4 2.4 0.8 8.1 99 133 27 Central African Rep. 72 57 8.1 1.8 4.5 -0.9 93 103 28 Madagascar 387 443 5.4 -0.9 4.0 -4.0 118 87 29 Haiti 152 140 .. .. .. 30 Mauritania 119 181 55.2 -0.8 4.6 6.3 112 68 31 Lesotho . , . . .. .. . . . 32 Uganda 350 255 5.0 -5.3 6.2 -7.6 95 106 33 Angola 500 340 9.0 -8.9 11.6 -4.7 89 145 34 Sudan 533 1,198 2.1 -3.2 1.1 6.4 100 92 35 Togo 235 381 10.5 0.3 8.4 12.4 95 105 36 Kenya 1,022 1,709 7.2 0.8 6.3 (.) 112 104 37 Senegal 391 788 1.2 4.4 2.7 4.7 91 100 38 Indonesia 11,643 6,690 3.5 7.2 1.9 15.8 138 225 Middle-income countries 179,935 231,663 t 5.5 in 5.2 in 6.8 in 5.8 in 93 in 90 in 39 Egypt - - 1,901 6,480 3.2 -2.3 -0.9 16.6 104 92 40 Ghana 1,304 1,266 0.1 -0.1 -1.6 2.7 92 80 41 Yemen, PDR 105 590 .. .. .. .. 42 Cameroon 803 1,057 6.9 2.4 9.3 6.7 90 97 43 Liberia 486 481 18.3 1.5 2.8 2.0 194 85 44 Honduras 596 693 11.1 2.9 11.7 2.6 91 77 45 Zambia 832 611 2.2 -4.7 9.8 -6.9 50 56 46 Zimbabwe .. 47 Thailand 4,085 5,256 5.2 12.2 11.2 5.6 118 82 48 Bolivia 627 768 9.7 1.7 8.1 12.2 69 130 49 Philippines 3,425 5,143 2.2 5.4 7.2 4.7 73 69 50 Yemen Arab Rep. 34 1,043 .. .. .. .. 0 51 Congo, People's Rep. 138 334 4.9 14.7 --1.0 6.7 98 114 52 Nigeria 9,483 12,857 6.1 0.5 1.7 25.0 97 290 53 Papua New Guinea 780 676 .. .. 54 El Salvador 629 1,025 5.6 0.6 6.4 8.4 94 106 55 Morocco 1,511 2,970 2.5 2.6 3.3 13.7 103 86 56 Peru 1,949 1,960 1.9 -3.8 3.6 3.1 63 77 57 Ivory Coast 2322 2,325 8.8 8.5 9.7 10.6 89 94 58 Nicaragua 594 645 9.7 5.6 10.3 4.2 88 90 59 Colombia 3,018 3,060 2.2 1.2 2.4 -0.7 90 107 60 Paraguay 257 319 5.4 7.6 7.5 8.0 92 107 61 Ecuador 1,494 1,627 3.7 9.5 11.6 12.7 110 129 62 Dominican Rep. 604 860 -2.3 6.7 10.0 4.5 77 62 63 Guatemala 1,090 1,286 9.0 3,4 7.1 7.1 97 100 64 Syrian Arab Rep. 1,053 2,437 3.2 7.1 4.2 15.5 94 139 65 Tunisia 1,126 2,162 4.1 21.1 2.2 30.3 104 133 66 Jordan 297 1,499 10.1 21.5 3.6 16.3 99 84 124 Merchandise trade Average annual growth ratea (millions of dollars) (percent) Terms of trade Exports Imports Exports Imports (1970 = 100) 1978b 1978b 1960-70 1970-78 1960-70 1970-78 1960 1978 67 Malaysia 1,413 5,929 6.1 5.2 2.7 6.8 139 119 68 Jamaica 710 872 4.7 -2.7 8,2 -5.9 100 90 69 Lebanon 625 1,696 14,1 5.7 5.1 (.) 78 87 70 Korea, Rep. of 12,711 14,972 35,2 28.8 20.1 13.5 78 81 71 Turkey 2,288 4,597 1.6 2.5 5.5 8.1 71 72 Algeria 5,866 8,531 4.1 -0.8 -1.0 16.6 115 281 13 Mexico 5,739 7,744 3,3 5.2 6.4 4.0 87 108 74 Panama 244 942 10,4 2.2 10.4 -3.4 89 61 75 Taiwan 12,682 11,033 23.7 9.3 17.9 9.1 79 75 16 Chile 2,481 2,595 0.6 6.5 4.7 -0.9 53 50 77 South Africa 7,182 7,193 5.5 6.7 8.2 -1.8 100 75 78 Costa Rica 816 1,184 9.4 5.9 10.0 4.7 103 81 79 Brazil 12,527 14,538 5.0 6.0 4.9 6.6 88 90 80 Uruguay 686 774 2.1 -5.0 -2.8 2.3 99 82 81 Argentina 6,400 3,834 3,5 6.8 0.3 -0.1 101 95 82 Portugal 2,393 4,791 9.6 -5.9 14.1 4.7 83 86 83 Yugoslavia 5,659 9,987 7.8 4.8 9.0 4.9 96 98 84 Trinidad and Tobago 2,039 1,967 5.0 -1.3 3.2 -4.4 115 109 85 Venezuela 9,126 10,614 2.0 -10.1 4.3 14.9 112 292 86 Hong Kong 11,499 13452 12.7 4.8 9.2 3.2 97 87 Greece 3,341 7,648 10.7 13.1 10.9 5.9 92 93 88 Singapore 10,134 13,049 4,2 9.8 5.9 8.1 89 Spain 13,115 18,708 11.6 11.0 18.4 3.3 93 68 90 Israel 3,716 5,582 10.9 10.6 8.7 4.5 91 83 Industrialized countries 837,596 t 862,455 t 8.7 m 5.7 m 9.4m 5.1 m 99?n 95m 91 Ireland 5,678 7097 7.2 8.4 8.2 6.3 94 108 92 Italy 56,047 56,446 13.5 7.2 9.7 2.7 104 80 93 New Zealand 3,752 3,500 4.6 2.4 3.0 3.3 115 94 94 United Kingdom 71,691 78,557 4.8 5.5 5.0 4.6 95 94 95 Finland 8,618 7,864 6.7 3.0 7.1 1.6 98 97 96 Austria 12,205 16,013 9.6 6.8 9.7 7.2 100 97 97 Japan 97,501 78,731 17,5 9.7 13.7 5.0 102 e8 98 Australia 14,127 13,885 6.5 4.0 7.2 5,1 116 98 99 France 76,609 81,805 8.3 7.3 10.9 6.7 93 96 100 Netherlands 50,188 53,082 9.9 5.7 9.4 4.4 100 92 101 Belgium 44,853 48,376 10.8 5.7 10.3 6.0 110 92 102 Canada 46,065 43,434 9.9 4.3 9,3 7.1 98 102 103 Norway 10,011 11,473 9.1 6.3 9.5 5.1 91 102 104 Germany, Fed. Rep. 142,090 120,668 10.2 6.9 10.0 6.3 90 104 105 United States 141,154 182,787 6.0 6.5 9.8 5.4 93 77 106 Denmark 11,886 14,810 7.1 4.2 8.1 3.4 108 94 107 Sweden 21,560 20,123 7.] 2.3 7.3 2.3 109 94 108 Switzerland 23,561 23,804 9.0 5.1 8.5 2.3 91 112 Capital-surplus oil exporters 94,107 t 49,866 t 9.5 m -1.2 tn 11.1 n-i 21.1 in 101in 393rn 109 Iraq 11,008 4,213 7.3 0.6 1.3 21.1 112 403 110 Iran 22,430 16,019 12,7 -1.2 11.3 22.9 108 373 111 Libya 9,503 4,603 61.0 -7.0 15.4 18.7 98 280 112 Saudi Arabia 40,716 20,424 9.5 6.2 11.1 41.5 107 396 113 Kuwait 10,450 4,607 6.9 -9.7 10.4 19.2 105 393 Centrally planned economies 128,821 t 136,420 114 China 10,680 11,950 115 Korea, Dem. Rep. 950 116 Albania .. .. .. .. .. .. 117 Cuba 4,456 4,687 3.9 13.5 5.5 4.5 112 66 118 Mongolia 281 41] .. 119 Romania 8,237 9,087 9.9 .. 10.5 120 Bulgaria 7,478 7,651 14.5 10.7 12.8 10.8 121 Hungary 6,345 7,902 9.7 13.0 9.1 12.2 83 122 Poland 14,114 16,089 10.0 9.3 8.9 11.4 103 123 USSR 52,216 50,550 .. 7.8 . . 10.2 124 Czechoslovakia 11,747 12,565 6.6 6.0 6.9 6.5 . 125 German Dem. Rep. 13,267 14,572 8.3 7.9 8.6 8.0 See the technical notes. Figures in italics are for 1977, not 1978. 125 Table 9. Structure of Merchandise Exports Percentage share of merchandise exports Machinery Fuels, Other and minerals primary Textiles transport Other and metals commodities and clothing equipment manufactures 1960a 1977 1960a 1977 1960a 1977 1960a 1977 1960a 1977 Low-income countries 13 w 37 w 70w 44w 12w 7w (.)w 2i 5w lOw 1 Kampuchea, Dem. 0 0 100 80 0 6 0 (.) 0 14 2 Bangladesh 2 42 45 1 10 3LaoPDR 20 65 1 0 14 4 Bhutan .. .. .. 5 Ethiopia 0 0 100 97 0 (.) 1 1 0 2 6 Mali 0 () 96 98 1 (.) 1 1 2 1 7 Nepal .. (.) 82 1 1 16 8 Somalia 0 0 88 97 0 0 8 3 4 0 9 Burundi 8 91 0 0 1 10 Chad 65 0 32 96 0 1 0 0 3 3 11 Mozambique 0 11 100 86 0 2 0 0 0 1 12 Burma 4 6 95 88 0 0 0 1 1 5 13 Upper Volta 0 (.) 100 95 0 (.) 0 1 (.) 4 14 Viet Nam .. 12 32 33 (.) 23 15 India 10 9 45 35 35 20 1 6 9 30 16 Malawi () 96 2 (.) 2 17 Rwanda 10 90 0 0 (.) 18 Sri Lanka (.) 6 99 82 0 2 0 (.) 1 10 19 Guinea .. 65 15 .. 0 (.) 20 20 Sierra Leone 15 8 20 48 0 0 0 0 65 44 21 Zaire 42 71 57 21 0 0 0 1 1 7 22 Niger 31 100 35 0 1 0 0 0 33 23 Benin 0 6 100 85 0 2 (.) 0 0 7 24 Pakistan 0 5 73 36 23 44 1 2 3 13 25 Tanzania (.) 4 87 90 0 1 0 (.) 13 5 26 Afghanistan (.) 13 82 74 14 12 3 0 1 1 27 Central African Rep. 12 (.) 86 76 (.) (.) 1 (.) 1 24 28 Madagascar 4 14 90 78 1 4 1 0 4 4 29 Haiti 0 12 100 53 0 7 0 3 0 25 30 Mauritania 4 87 69 9 1 (.) 20 (.) 6 4 31 Lesotho .. .. 0 32 Uganda 8 1 92 99 0 (.) 0 (.) (.) (.) 33 Angola 64 28 0 1 7 34 Sudan 0 5 100 95 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 35 Togo 0 49 96 45 0 3 0 2 4 1 36 Kenya 1 18 87 72 0 (.) 0 1 12 9 37 Senegal 3 13 94 80 1 1 1 (.) 1 6 38 Indonesia 33 71 67 27 0 (.) (.) 1 (.) 1 Middle-income countries 25 w 33 w 61 w 30 w 4w 10 w 2w 9w 8w 18 w 39 Egypt 4 26 84 49 9 18 (.) (.) 3 7 40 Ghana 7 16 83 80 0 0 0 0 10 4 41 Yemen, PDR 82 17 (.) () 1 42 Cameroon 19 5 77 91 0 1 2 1 2 2 43 Liberia 45 64 55 34 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 2 44 Honduras 5 6 93 84 0 2 0 0 2 8 45 Zambia 94 2 0 (.) 4 46 Zimbabwe 71 25 1 .. (.) 3 47 Thailand 7 9 91 72 0 8 0 2 2 9 48 Bolivia 79 17 1 .. (.) 3 49 Philippines 10 17 86 58 1 5 0 2 3 18 50 Yemen Arab Rep. .. (.) 90 3 1 .. 6 51 Congo, People's Rep. 7 60 84 24 (.) 0 5 2 4 14 52 Nigeria 8 93 89 6 0 0 0 (.) 3 1 53 Papua New Guinea 0 35 92 63 0 0 0 0 8 2 54 El Salvador 0 2 94 78 3 7 (.) 2 3 11 55 Morocco 38 46 54 33 1 10 1 01 6 10 56 Peru 49 47 50 45 0 2 0 1 1 5 57 Ivory Coast 1 4 98 89 0 2 (.) 2 1 3 58 Nicaragua 3 1 95 82 0 3 0 1 2 13 59 Colombia 19 4 79 77 0 5 (.) 3 2 11 60 Paraguay 0 0 100 91 0 0 0 0 0 9 61 Ecuador 0 50 99 48 0 1 0 (.) 1 1 62 Dominican Rep. 6 3 92 79 0 (.) 0 1 2 17 63 Guatemala 2 1 95 82 1 4 0 1 2 12 64 Syrian Arab Rep. 0 62 81 28 2 4 0 3 17 3 65 Tunisia 24 49 66 17 1 19 1 1 8 14 66 Jordan 0 31 96 38 0 4 0 1 4 26 126 Percentage share of merchandise exports Machinery Fuels, Other and minerals primary Textiles transport Other and metals commodities and clothing equipment manufactures 1960a 1977 1960a 1977 1960a 1977 1960a 1977 1960a 1977 67 Malaysia 20 27 74 56 (.) 2 (.) 7 6 8 68 Jamaica 50 24 45 21 2 1 0 0 3 54 69 Lebanon 3 .. 27 .. 11 .. 26 . . 33 70 Korea, Rep. of 30 2 56 13 8 32 (.) 17 6 36 71 Turkey 8 8 89 67 0 18 0 1 3 6 72 Algeria 12 97 81 2 0 (.) 1 (.) 6 1 73 Mexico 24 32 64 39 4 4 1 6 7 19 74 Panama 28 63 3 .. 1 .. 5 75 Taiwan 14 37 23 .. 3 .. 23 76 Chile 92 83 4 10 0 (.) 0 (.) 4 7 77 South Africa 29 29 42 29 2 1 4 6 23 35 78 Costa Rica 0 (.) 95 76 0 3 0 3 5 18 79 Brazil 8 10 89 64 0 4 (.) 11 3 11 80 Uruguay .. 1 60 .. 18 .. 2 .. 19 81 Argentina 1 1 95 75 0 2 (.) 9 4 13 82 Portugal 8 4 37 26 18 26 3 15 34 29 83 Yugoslavia 18 11 45 20 4 8 15 32 18 29 84 Trinidad and Tobago 82 92 14 3 0 (.) 0 1 4 4 85 Venezuela 74 97 26 1 0 (.) 0 (.) (.) 2 86 Hong Kong 5 1 15 3 45 46 4 16 31 34 87 Greece 9 14 81 36 1 18 1 5 8 27 88 Singapore 1 32 73 24 5 5. 7 24 14 15 89 Spain 21 6 57 23 7 6 2 26 13 39 90 Israel 4 1 35 19 8 7 2 10 51 63 Industrialized countries 11 w 9w 23 w 15 w 7w 5w 30w 39 w 29 w $2 w 91 Ireland 5 3 67 42 6 9 4 15 18 31 92 Italy 8 7 19 10 17 11 29 34 27 38 93 New Zealand (.) 6 97 77 0 3 (.) 3 3 11 94 United Kingdom 7 10 9 9 8 5 44 37 32 39 95 Finland 3 6 50 20 1 6 13 26 33 42 96 Austria 26 5 22 11 10 10 16 28 26 46 97 Japan 11 1 10 2 28 5 23 56 28 36 98 Australia 13 34 79 45 (.) (.) 3 4 5 17 99 France 9 6 18 17 10 6 25 38 38 33 100 Netherlands 15 22 34 25 8 5 18 19 25 29 101 Belgium 15 11 9 12 12 8 13 24 51 45 102 Canada 33 26 37 23 1 1 8 33 21 17 103 Norway 22 32 34 15 2 1 10 29 32 23 104 Germany, Fed. Rep, 9 5 4 6 4 5 44 48 39 36 105 United States 10 6 27 24 3 2 35 43 25 25 106 Denmark 2 5 63 39 3 5 19 27 13 24 107 Sweden 10 6 29 14 1 2 31 44 29 34 108 Switzerland 2 3 8 5 12 7 30 33 48 52 Capital-surplus oil exporters 95w 99w 4w (.)w Ow (.)w Uw (.) w 1w Iw 109 Iraq 97 99 3 1 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 110 Iran 88 99 9 1 0 (.) 0 (.) 3 (.) 111 Libya 100 100 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 0 (.) 112 Saudi Arabia 6 100 84 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 113 Kuwait 88 .. 1 .. 1 3 7 Centrally planned economies 24 w 16 w 4w 31 w .. 25 w 114 China 14 37 .. 23 .. 3 23 115 Korea, Dem. Rep. 51 31 6 1 11 116 Albania .. 33 26 6 4 .. 31 117 Cuba 7 80 . . 8 (.) . 5 118 Mongolia 2 7 93 93 1 0 (.) (.) 4 (.) 119 Romania .. 12 .. 20 .. 9 .. 24 .. 35 120 Bulgaria 3 2 75 34 12 5 6 39 4 20 121 Hungary 6 7 28 25 7 8 38 33 21 27 122 Poland 24 43 28 11 1 (.) 21 19 26 27 123 USSR .. 21 . . 11 .. 7 39 .. 22 124 Czechoslovakia 20 7 11 6 (.) 6 45 51 24 30 125 German Dem. Rep. .. 3 3 5 57 32 a. Figures in italics are for 1961, not 1960. 127 Table 10. Structure of Merchandise Imports Percentage share of merchandise imports Machinery Other and primary transport Other Food Fuels commodities equipment manufactures 1960a j977b 1960a 1977b 1960a 1977b 1960a 1977b 1960a 1977b Low-income countries 22w 16w 7w l9w 16w 9w 25w 26w 3Ow 30w 1 Kampuchea, Oem. 2 Bangladesh 18 24 6 13 39 3 Lao PDR 4 Bhutan 5 Ethiopia 6 15 3 12 6 Mali 20 19 5 14 4 2 18 30 53 35 7 Nepal .. 8 Somalia 27 4 0 18 51 9 Burundi 23 11 8 27 31 10 Chad 19 12 4 19 46 11 Mozambique 12 Burma 14 4 9 17 56 13 Upper Volta 21 4 1 24 50 14 Viet Nam 15 India 21 16 6 26 28 15 30 19 15 24 16 Malawi 8 .. 13 2 30 .. 47 17 Rwanda 18 Sri Lanka 39 40 7 24 5 3 15 12 34 21 19 Guinea 20 Sierra Leone 23 23 12 7 5 1 15 19 45 50 21 Zaire 22Niger 24 5 4 18 49 23 Benin 17 17 10 8 1 0 18 30 54 45 24 Pakistan 22 17 10 16 2 7 27 28 39 32 25 Tanzania 10 18 5 35 32 26 Afghanistan 14 14 7 8 4 0 14 7 61 71 27 Central African Rep. 15 16 9 1 2 2 26 36 48 45 28 Madagascar 17 6 3 23 51 29 Haiti 28 11 4 20 37 30 Mauritania 5 3 3 39 50 31 Lesotho 32 Uganda 6 11 8 1 8 3 25 44 53 41 33 Angola .. 34 Sudan 17 .. 8 .. 3 14 58 35 Togo 16 19 6 7 3 1 32 31 43 42 36 Kenya 12 6 11 22 8 4 27 34 42 34 37 Senegal 30 5 2 19 44 38 Indonesia 23 16 5 12 10 5 17 37 45 30 Middle-income countries 15 w 12 w 9w 17 w 14 w 8w 29 w 32 to 33 w 31 w 39 Egypt 23 23 11 2 16 10 25 35 25 30 40 Ghana 19 14 5 15 4 4 26 27 46 40 41 Yemen, FOR .. 42 Cameroon 20 12 8 9 3 1 17 38 52 40 43 Liberia 16 4 7 34 39 44 Honduras 13 9 9 12 3 2 24 31 51 46 45 Zambia 46 Zimbabwe .. 47 Thailand 10 5 11 22 11 10 25 30 43 33 48 Bolivia 49 Philippines 15 10 10 24 5 7 36 26 34 33 50 Yemen Arab Rep. .. 41 3 1 26 29 51 Congo, People's Rep. 18 21 6 5 1 1 31 35 44 38 52 Nigeria 14 13 5 2 6 2 24 47 51 36 53 Papua New Guinea 30 23 5 14 4 1 23 32 38 30 54 El Salvador 17 6 6 26 45 55 Morocco 27 17 8 12 7 7 19 38 39 26 56 Peru 16 14 5 19 5 4 37 35 37 28 57 Ivory Coast 18 14 6 11 2 2 27 38 47 35 58 Nicaragua 9 8 10 14 5 2 22 31 54 45 59 Colombia 8 12 3 7 15 7 43 38 31 36 60 Paraguay 15 .. 25 1 34 25 6t Ecuador 13 7 3 1 9 3 33 50 42 39 62 Dominican Rep. 17 .. 21 .. 4 25 33 63 Guatemala 12 10 7 26 45 64 Syrian Arab Rep. 24 12 8 17 5 5 15 34 48 32 65 Tunisia 20 13 9 11 4 7 23 34 44 35 66Jordan 18 9 3 35 128 Percentage share of merchandise imports Machinery Other and primary transport Other Food Fuels commodities equipment manufactures 1960a 1977b 1960a 1977b 1960a 1977b 1960a 1977b 1960a 1977b 67 Malaysia 29 17 16 13 13 7 14 33 28 30 68 Jamaica 22 20 8 29 9 6 24 12 37 33 69 Lebanon .. .. .. .. .. - 70 Korea, Rep. of 10 8 7 20 25 19 12 27 46 26 71 Turkey 7 1 11 26 16 6 42 34 24 33 72 Algeria 26 1] 4 1 2 4 14 46 54 32 73 Mexico 4 13 2 3 10 8 52 45 32 31 74 Panama 15 10 10 33 1 1 22 19 52 37 75 Taiwan 11 19 14 2] 29 76 Chile 77 South Africa 6 6 7 1 9 7 37 52 41 34 78 Costa Rica 13 8 6 10 6 3 26 30 49 49 79 Brazil 14 7 19 34 13 7 36 26 18 26 80 Uruguay .. 7 .. 25 11 .. 29 .. 28 81 Argentina 3 5 13 16 11 10 44 36 29 33 82 Portugal 15 18 10 15 28 13 26 26 21 28 83 Yugoslavia 11 9 5 13 25 12 37 35 22 31 84 Trinidad and Tobago 16 10 34 48 7 2 18 18 25 22 85 Venezuela 18 12 1 1 10 4 36 50 35 33 86 Hong Kong 27 17 3 6 16 8 10 19 44 50 87 Greece 11 8 8 15 16 8 44 46 21 23 88 Singapore 21 12 15 26 38 9 7 26 19 27 89 Spain 16 15 22 29 25 13 22 20 15 23 90 Israel 20 13 7 15 18 6 28 21 27 45 Industrialized countries 22 w 13 w 11w 22w 24w lOw 16w 24w 27w 31w 91 Ireland 18 13 12 13 11 5 21 27 38 42 92 Italy 20 17 14 26 31 14 13 19 22 24 93 New Zealand 8 7 8 15 16 6 29 32 39 40 94 United Kingdom 36 18 11 14 27 11 8 23 18 34 95 Finland 13 9 10 24 20 7 33 30 24 30 96 Austria 16 8 10 10 20 9 29 34 25 39 97 Japan 17 17 17 44 49 20 9 6 8 13 98 Australia 6 6 10 10 16 5 31 38 37 41 99 France 25 14 17 21 25 10 14 23 19 32 100 Netherlands 18 16 13 19 14 7 22 23 33 35 101 Belgium 15 13 10 14 26 10 21 26 28 37 102 Canada 12 8 9 10 12 5 36 50 31 27 103 Norway 12 7 9 11 13 6 36 42 30 34 104 Germany, Fed. Rep. 26 16 8 17 28 11 10 19 28 37 105 United States 24 10 10 30 25 8 10 25 31 27 106 Denmark 18 13 12 17 11 6 23 27 36 37 107 Sweden 13 9 14 18 13 6 26 31 34 36 108 Switzerland 18 11 8 10 13 7 21 24 40 48 CapitaIsurplus oil exporters 13 w 1w 2w 43w 41w 109 Iraq 15 .. (.) .. 3 .. 54 .. 28 110 Iran 14 11 1 (.) 1 3 23 45 61 41 111 Libya 13 19 5 10 3 40 37 32 40 . 1 112 Saudi Arabia .. 11 1 .. 2 .. 41 . . 46 113 Kuwait 12 1 2 45 40 Centrally planned economies 114 China 115 Korea, Oem. Rep. 116 Albania 117 Cuba 118 Mongolia 119 Romania .. .. 120 Bulgaria .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 121 Hungary 8 11 12 13 28 12 28 31 24 33 122 Poland .. .. .. .. 123 USSR 12 .. 4 .. 18 .. 30 .. 36 124 Czechoslovakia 12 14 15 36 .. 23 125 German Dem. Rep. a. Figures in italics are for 1961, not 1960. b. Figures in italics are for 1976, not 1977. 129 Table 11. Destination of Merchandise Exports Destination of merchandise exports (percentage of total) Centrally Capital- Industrialized Developing planned surplus countries countries economies oil exporters Origin 1960 1978a 1960 1978a 1960 1978a 1960 1978a Low-income countries 65w 66w 27 to 23 zo 7w 1w 1 Kampuchea, Dem. 00 2 Bangladesh 0 3 Lao PDR 20 77 0 () 3 4 Bhutan 5 Ethiopia 64 26 4 6 6 Mali 93 50 7 20 0 30 (.) () 7 Nepal .. 34 .. 66 0 (.) 8 Somalia 85 .. 22 15 14 0 .. 13 () 51 9 Burundi 84 6 10 ü 10 Chad 73 34 27 63 0 0 0 3 11 Mozambique 29 71 71 29 (.) (.) (.) (.) 12 Burma 23 37 71 62 6 (,) () 1 13 Upper Volta 4 50 96 48 0 2 0 0 14 Viet Nam .. .. ., 15 India 66 55 23 20 8 13 3 12 16 Malawi 75 25 (0) 0 17 Rwanda 90 10 (.) (.) 18 Sri Lanka 75 42 14 30 11 10 0 18 19 Guinea 63 .. 19 . 18 () 20 Sierra Leone 99 96 1 4 0 0 0 (.) 21 Zaire 89 65 11 34 (.) 1 (.) (.) 22 Niger 74 84 26 15 0 0 0 1 23 Benin 52 . . 17 31 . (.) 24 Pakistan 56 41 33 30 8 5 3 24 25 Tanzania 74 65 25 28 1 6 0 1 26 Afghanistan 48 34 24 23 28 43 0 (.) 27 Central African Rep. 83 79 17 21 0 (.) 0 (.) 28 Madagascar 79 75 20 21 1 4 (.) (.) 29 Haiti 98 98 2 2 (.) (.) 0 (.) 30 Mauritania 89 85 11 15 0 0 0 (.) 31 Lesotho .. .. .. .. 32 Uganda 62 70 34 26 4 2 0 2 33 Angola 64 38 34 62 2 0 0 0 34 Sudan 59 50 23 27 14 18 4 5 35 Togo 74 77 26 14 0 9 0 0 36 Kenya 77 62 22 35 1 2 (.) 1 37 Senegal 89 69 11 31 0 0 0 (.) 38 Indonesia 54 79 38 21 8 (.) (.) (.) Middle-income countries 70 w 67 w 24w 25w 5w 5w 1w 3w 39 Egypt 26 54 29 12 43 30 2 4 40 Ghana 88 69 5 11 7 20 (.) (.) 41 Yemen, PDR 42 35 56 51 (.) 10 2 4 42 Cameroon 93 85 6 13 1 2 (.) 0 43 Liberia 100 89 (.) 10 0 1 0 0 44 Honduras 77 86 23 14 0 0 0 0 45 Zambia 82 .. 13 5 0 46 Zimbabwe .. .. .. . .. 47 Thailand 47 61 48 32 2 2 3 5 48 Bolivia 88 54 12 37 0 9 0 0 49 Philippines 94 81 5 14 1 4 (.) 1 50 Yemen Arab Rep. 46 65 36 13 18 18 (.) 4 51 Congo, Peoples Rep, 93 66 7 33 0 1 0 0 52 Nigeria 95 78 4 22 1 (.) 0 0 53 Papua New Guinea 87 .. 12 1 0 54 El Salvador 88 74 12 26 0 0 0 (.) 55 Morocco 74 61 22 27 4 11 (.) 1 56 Peru 84 71 16 18 (.) 11 0 (.) 57 Ivory Coast 84 83 16 15 0 2 0 (.) 58 Nicaragua 91 69 9 31 (.) 0 0 0 59 Colombia 94 79 5 16 1 5 0 (.) 60 Paraguay 61 66 39 34 0 0 0 0 61 Ecuador 91 69 8 28 1 3 0 (.) 62 Dominican Rep. 92 84 7 14 0 2 1 0 63 Guatemala 94 71 6 27 0 1 0 1 64 Syrian Arab Rep. 34 57 28 18 24 19 14 6 65 Tunisia 76 68 19 23 3 3 2 6 66 Jordan 1 8 62 39 11 9 26 44 130 Destination of merchandise exports (percentage of total) Centrally Capital- Industrialized Developing planned surplus countries countries economies oil exporters Origin 1960 1978a 1960 1978a 1960 1978a 1960 1978a 67 Malaysia 58 62 35 32 7 5 0 1 68 Jamaica 96 84 4 15 0 1 0 (.) 69 Lebanon 24 8 28 26 6 10 42 56 70 Korea, Rep. of 89 73 11 17 0 (.) 0 10 71 Turkey 71 64 16 12 12 15 1 9 72 Algeria 93 94 6 4 1 2 (.) U 73 Mexico 93 81 7 18 (.) 1 0 (.) 74 Panama 99 71 1 28 0 (.) 0 1 75 Taiwan 56 70 33 26 0 0 11 4 76 Chile 91 67 9 30 (.) 1 (.) 2 77 South Africa 71 82 27 18 2 (.) (.) 0 78 Costa Rica 93 68 7 28 (.) 3 (.) 1 79 Brazil 81 64 13 26 6 7 (.) 3 80 Uruguay 82 54 8 38 10 7 0 1 81 Argentina 75 52 19 38 6 9 (.) 1 82 Portugal 56 80 42 17 2 3 (.) (.) 83 Yugoslavia 48 35 18 16 33 43 1 6 84 Trinidad and Tobago 80 80 20 20 0 (.) (.) (.) 85 Venezuela 62 58 38 42 0 (.) U (.) 86 Hong Kong 54 70 42 26 3 1 1 3 87 Greece 65 60 12 16 22 12 1 12 88 Singapore 38 45 54 47 7 3 1 5 89 Spain 80 64 17 27 3 3 (.) 6 90 Israel 76 75 22 21 2 1 0 3 Industrialized countries 67 w 67 w 28 iv 23 iv 3w 4w 2 tV 6 iv 91 Ireland 96 90 4 7 (.) 1 (.) 3 92 Italy 65 66 27 20 6 5 2 9 93 New Zealand 95 73 4 19 1 5 (.) 3 94 United Kingdom 57 65 37 24 3 3 3 8 95 Finland 69 67 11 10 20 21 (.) 2 96 Austria 69 69 15 14 15 14 1 3 97 Japan 45 45 51 38 2 7 2 10 98 Australia 75 64 18 25 5 7 2 4 99 France 53 67 42 25 4 4 1 4 100 Netherlands 78 83 19 12 2 2 1 3 101 Belgium 79 83 16 12 4 2 1 3 102 Canada 90 87 9 9 1 3 (.) 1 103 Norway 80 82 15 13 5 4 (.) 1 104 Germany, Fed. Rep. 70 71 23 17 5 6 2 6 105 United States 61 56 36 34 1 3 2 7 106 Denmark 83 82 12 12 4 3 1 3 107 Sweden 79 77 15 14 5 5 1 4 108 Switzerland 72 67 23 22 4 5 1 6 Capital-surplus oil exporters 78w 70w 21 w 29w 1w (.) w (.) w 1w 109 Iraq 85 61 14 37 1 2 (.) (.) 110 Iran 62 71 34 28 3 1 1 (.) 111 Libya 67 82 26 17 7 1 0 0 112 Saudi Arabia 74 72 26 28 0 0 0 (.) 113 Kuwait 91 60 9 33 0 (.) 0 7 Centrally planned economies 21w 70w 1w 114 China 14 24 62 (.) 115 Korea, Dem. Rep. .. 116 Albania 1 1 98 .. 0 117 Cuba 72 9 19 (.) 118 Mongolia 119 Romania 20 27 9 15 71 50 (.) 8 120 Bulgaria 13 4 83 .. C.) 121 Hungary 22 8 .. 69 1 122 Poland 29 10 60 1 123 USSR 18 10 71 1 124 Czechoslovakia 16 6 78 0 125 German Dem. Rep. 19 7 74 (.) a. Fiçjures in italics are for 1977, not 1978. 131 Table 12. Trade in Manufactured Goods Destination of manufactured exports (percentage of total) Value of manufactured Centrally Capital- exports Industrialized Developing planned surplus (millions countries CO U ntri es economies oil exporters of dollars) Origin 1963 1977a 1963 1977a 1963 1977a 1963 1977a 1963 1977a Low-income countries 51 w i2w lOw 1 Kampuchea, Dem 58 15 42 85 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 Bangladesh 47 41 6 6 .. 251 3 Lao PDR 83 17 0 0 (.) 2 4 Bhutan 5 Ethiopia 28 68 2 .. 2 (.) 12 6 Mali 14 29 66 71 20 0 0 0 (.) 2 7 Nepal .. 8 Somalia 9 Burundi 60 20 100 40 67 0 0 13 0 . .. 0 0 0 2 .. 14 2 1 10 Chad 12 31 77 69 11 0 (.) 0 1 3 11 Mozambique 67 27 0 6 .. 3 12 Burma 79 21 0 .. 0 1 15 13 Upper Volta 12 50 88 50 0 0 0 0 1 3 14 Viet Nam 2 2 95 .. 1 .. 216 15 India 56 52 35 24 7 12 2 12 677 3356 16 Malawi 34 66 0 0 .. 7 17 Rwanda 0 100 0 .. 0 (.) (.) 18 Sri Lanka 70 65 28 24 2 1 (.) 10 4 96 19 Guinea 27 73 0 .. 0 .. 53 20 Sierra Leone 100 100 (.) 0 0 0 0 0 23 59 21 Zaire 88 11 1 .. 0 1 75 22 Niger 23 89 77 11 0 0 0 0 1 56 23 Benin 18 28 82 72 0 0 0 0 1 3 24 Pakistan 49 45 48 26 1 8 2 21 109 681 25 Tanzania 85 15 0 .. 0 16 35 26 Afghanistan 98 88 2 1 0 1 0 10 7 42 27 Central African Rep 50 83 50 17 0 0 0 0 11 19 28 Madagascar 82 83 18 17 0 0 0 0 4 26 29 Haiti 93 7 0 0 .. 51 30 Mauritania 95 84 5 16 0 0 0 0 3 6 31 Lesotho .. 32 Uganda 100 0 0 .. 0 (.) 2 33 Angola 80 18 0 .. 2 55 34 Sudan 35 90 54 10 0 0 11 0 (.) 5 35 Togo 45 42 55 58 0 (.) 0 0 1 9 36 Kenya . - 11 86 1 . . 2 12 116 37 Senegal 74 50 26 50 (.) 0 0 0 9 36 38 Indonesia .. 44 56 .. (.) .. (.) 2 191 Middle-income countries .. 58 w 30 w 6w 6w 39 Egypt .. 13 .. 11 .. 65 .. 11 88 429 40 Ghana 82 56 17 44 0 0 1 0 3 4-4 41 Yemen, PDR .. 48 .. 52 .. 0 .. 0 .. 1 42 Cameroon 23 69 77 31 0 0 0 0 4 30 43 Liberia 100 78 0 22 0 0 0 0 3 9 44 Honduras 3 22 97 78 0 0 0 0 2 49 45 Zambia .. 66 .. 34 .. 0 .. 0 37 46 Zimbabwe 47 Thailand 41 65 59 32 0 (.) 0 3 16 647 48 Bolivia 91 93 9 7 0 0 0 0 6 22 49 Philippines 8 50 Yemen Arab Rep. 51 Congo, People's Rep. 92 93 82 10 62 .. 7 16 25 38 .0 0 (.) 0 0 (.) .. 0 2 65 (.) 34 .. 22 764 29 1 52 Nigeria 81 85 17 15 1 (.) 1 0 16 72 53 Papua New Guinea .. 100 .. 0 .. 0 .. 0 2 15 54 El Salvador 27 99 73 0 0 0 18 209 55 Morocco 56 Peru . 45 1 0 74 43 .. 19 . 2 . 0 . 5 .. 272 115 55 37 (.) 14 (.) 6 6 57 Ivory Coast 40 35 60 65 0 161 58 Nicaragua . 8 .. 92 0 .. 0 0 .. 0 0 7 3 105 59 Colombia 45 42 55 57 0 1 0 (.) 17 466 60 Paraguay 85 52 15 48 0 0 0 0 4 25 61 Ecuador 52 16 48 84 0 0 0 0 3 30 62 Dominican Rep. 97 .. 3 0 0 1 128 63 Guatemala 9 91 0 0 15 218 64 Syrian Arab Rep. 65 Tunisia 42 11 86 if; 42 2 . 5 31 2 21 12 100 311 66 Jordan C.) 26 0 .. 74 1 57 132 Destination of manufactured exports (percentage of total) Value of manufactu red Centrally Capital- exports Industrialized Developing planned surplus (millions countries countries economies oil exporters of dollars) Origin 1963 1977a 1963 1977a 1963 1977a 1963 1977a 1963 1977a 67 Malaysia 64 35 (0) 63 1,121 68 Jamaica 83 68 17 29 0 3 0 13 345 69 Lebanon 19 35 00 3 43 8 452 70 Korea, Rep, of 57 74 43 14 0 (.) 0 12 39 8,480 71 Turkey 73 74 14 9 13 5 ( .) 12 6 431 32 Algeria 76 19 3 2 38 73 Mexico 69 61 31 39 (. ) (0) (0) 0 1,182 74 Panama 75 Taiwan 5 10 30 95 90 52 0 0 13 0 0 () 23 5 129 7,925 76 Chile 38 57 62 43 (0) 0 () (.) 22 145 77 South Africa 67 29 0 4 318 2,576 78 Costa Rica 12 88 (.) 0 5 203 79 Brazil 59 53 40 43 1 2 (.) 2 45 3,141 80 Uruguay 56 41 3 (0) 31 235 81 Argentina 52 31 46 63 2 6 () (.) 79 1,349 82 Portugal 53 79 46 16 () 4 1 1 246 1,420 83 Yugoslavia 37 29 29 17 33 45 1 9 468 3,415 84 Trinidad and Tobago 40 86 60 14 0 (.) 0 (.) 10 105 85 Venezuela 79 52 21 48 (0) 0 (.) 0 43 153 86 Hong Kong 71 83 28 14 0 (.) 1 3 617 7,267 87 Greece 60 58 34 18 2 6 4 18 27 1,373 88 Singapore 5 54 95 43 (0) (0) (.) 3 352 3,626 89 Spain 62 60 35 32 2 3 1 5 227 7,214 90 Israel 72 75 26 21 2 1 0 3 203 2,453 Industrialized countries 65 w 65w 31 w 25 w 3w 4w lw 6w 91 Ireland 94 92 6 6 (.) 1 (.) 1 133 2,420 92 Italy 64 64 29 21 5 6 2 9 3842 37,630 93 New Zealand 85 14 (.) 40 520 94 United Kingdom 57 65 39 25 3 3 1 7 9,412 46,884 95 Finland 59 63 13 8 28 27 (.) 2 634 5,686 96 Austria 66 66 17 15 17 16 0 3 985 8,241 97 Japan 44 47 50 40 5 4 9 4,812 77,514 98 Australia 59 68 40 28 1 1 (0) 3 332 2,808 99 France 58 63 39 28 2 5 4 5,744 48,585 100 Netherlands 79 79 18 15 2 3 3 2,693 23,123 101 Belgium 85 83 13 12 1 2 1 3 3,572 28,991 102 Canada 87 91 13 8 (.) (0) (.) 1 2,165 21,046 103 Norway 78 69 19 26 3 4 (.) 1 529 4,654 104 Germany, Fed. Rep. 75 69 22 19 2 6 1 6 12,812 104,361 105 United States 56 58 42 33 (.) 1 2 8 12,453 82,521 106 Denmark 73 78 19 15 8 4 0 3 752 5,580 107 Sweden 78 76 19 15 3 5 (0) 4 2,143 15,284 108 Switzerland 72 66 25 23 2 6 5 2,163 15,821 Capital-surplus oil exporters 31 w 24 w 3w 42w 109 Iraq () 9 21 79 (.) 0 79 12 5 18 110 Iran 64 39 28 13 1 31 7 17 33 158 111 Libya 22 45 0 (0) 112 Saudi Arabia 22 70 7 0 121 113 Kuwait 31 19 (.) 50 1,059 Centrally planned economies 14w l8w 64w 4w 114 China 31 50 14 5 3,684 115 Korea, Oem. Rep. 5 13 73 9 197 116 Albania 35 37 28 0 42 117 Cuba 72 4 24 0 10 118 Mongolia 2 0 98 0 32 119 Romania 26 17 52 5 4,763 120 Bulgaria 6 11 81 2 4,025 121 Hungary 20 14 62 4 3,939 122 Poland 19 9 70 2 8,351 123 USSR 10 25 59 6 21,020 124 Czechoslovakia 14 11 73 2 9,045 125 German Dem. Rep. 10 10 79 10,242 a. Figures in italics are for 1976, not 1977. 133 Table 13. Balance of Payments and Debt Service Ratios Current account balance before Interest payments on Debt service as percentage of: interest payments on external public external public Exports of debt debt goods and (millions of dollars) (millions of dollars) GNP services 1970 1978a 1970 1978 1970 1978a 1970 1978a Low-income countries 1.2 w 1.7 l2.3w 11.7 u.' 1 Kampuchea, Dem. 2 Bangladesh -302 1.3 II 3 Lao PDR 4 Bhutan 5 Ethiopia -26 -98 1 0. 11.zi 7.5 6 Mali -2 -72 (.) 3 0.2 1.1 1.2 7.1 7 Nepal .. -25 (.) 1 0.3 0.2 10.9 1,4 8 Somalia -5 -63 (.) 2 0.5 1.2 2.1 3.7 9 Burundi -. -22 (.) 1 0.3 0.4 2.5 3.2 10 Chad 2 -188 (.) 3 1.0 2.3 3.7 13.0 11 Mozambique .. .. . . . . . . . . . 12 Burma -62 -137 3 17 1.0 1.2 16.1 18.0 13 Upper Volta 9 -79 (.) 3 0.6 0.9 4.0 3.8 14 Viet Nam .. .. .. .. .. 15 India -205 915 189 342 0.9 0.8 20.9 9.4 16 Malawi -32 -116 3 9 1.8 2.0 7.0 8.7 17 Rwanda 6 -46 (.) 1 0.2 0.2 1.4 1.4 18 Sri Lanka -45 -33 12 25 2.1 3.6 10.3 9.2 19 Guinea - - -16 4 17 3.4 5.7 21.3 17.4 20 Sierra Leone -14 -96 2 7 2.9 4.5 9.8 16.0 21 Zaire -55 88 9 160 2.0 6.5 4.4 31.3 22 Niger 1 -81 1 4 0.6 0.8 3.8 2.9 23 Benin -1 -70 (.) 3 0.7 1.5 2.2 6.4 24 Pakistan -591 -550 76 179 1.9 2.1 21.6 12.2 25 Tanzania -29 -442 6 18 2.1 1.1 8.2 7.4 26 Afghanistan .. 38 9 15 2.5 1.3 25.6 13.7 27 Central African Rep. -11 -23 (.) 1 1.1 0.7 3.2 2.5 28 Madagascar 12 -51 2 6 0.8 0.6 3.5 3.2 29 Haiti 2 -39 (.) 3 1.0 1.0 7.7 5.8 30 Mauritania -5 -65 (.) 10 2.0 6.6 3.2 17.0 31 Lesotho .. -110 (.) (.) 0.5 0.3 8.8 1.9 32 Uganda 24 -129 4 1 0.8 0.1 3.4 2.2 33 Angola - - - - - - - - . - - - - - 34 Sudan -29 -54 13 36 1.3 1.4 10.7 9.4 35 Togo 4 -234 1 13 0.9 5.9 2.9 15.2 36 Kenya -38 -474 11 45 2.6 2.4 7.9 8.3 37 Senegal -14 - -114 2 31 0.8 5.4 2.8 14.9 38 Indonesia -286 -773 24 492 0.9 3.1 6.9 13.0 Middle-income countries 1.5w 2.9w 9.3w 13.8w 39 Egypt -116 -540 38 386 4.1 8.7 28.7 22.2 40 Ghana -56 32 12 23 1.1 0.3 5.0 4.4 41 Yemen, PDR -9 -20 - - 1 .. 0.2 - - 1.7 42 Cameroon -26 -112 4 46 0.9 2.0 3.1 7.7 43 Liberia - - -122 6 13 5.5 3.5 - - 5.4 44 Honduras -61 -126 3 31 0.8 3,5 2.8 8.4 45 Zambia 131 -191 23 46 3.2 7.1 5.5 20.8 46 Zimbabwe . - - - - - -. - - - - . - -. 47 Thailand -234 -1,098 16 96 0.6 0.9 3.3 3.7 48 Bolivia -16 -301 6 83 2.2 8.5 10.9 48.7 49 Philippines -23 -991 25 167 1.4 2.8 7.5 13.4 50 Yemen Arab Rep. 80 (.) 3 0.2 0.5 1.1 51 Congo, People's Rep. . - -156 3 11 3.2 3.3 .. 7.2 52 Nigeria -348 -3,696 20 75 0.7 0.3 4.1 1.2 53 Papua New Guinea -12 1 23 0.1 1.8 .. 4.0 54 El Salvador 12 -230 4 13 0.9 0.8 3.6 2.6 55 Morocco -101 -1,040 23 252 1.5 4.3 7.7 18.7 56 Peru 245 119 43 317 2.4 7.4 11.6 31.1 57 Ivory Coast -26 -533 11 199 2.8 5.9 6.7 14.1 58 Nicaragua -32 23 7 48 3.2 4.6 11.0 12.5 59 Colombia -249 305 44 172 1.7 1.7 11.6 9.8 60 Paraguay -13 -109 3 15 1.7 1.4 11.1 7.3 61 Ecuador -106 -54 7 96 1.5 2.8 9.1 11.7 62 Dominican Rep. -98 -334 4 39 0.8 1.7 4.5 9.4 63 Guatemala -2 -192 6 15 1.4 0.4 7.4 1.7 64 Syrian Arab Rep. -64 -406 6 58 2.1 2.9 10.8 15.1 65 Tunisia -35 -411 18 95 4.5 3,5 17.5 12.3 66 Jordan -15 -256 2 24 0.7 2.5 3.6 4.0 134 Current account balance before Interest interest payments payments on Debt service as percentage of: on external public external public Exports of debt debt goods and (millions of dollars) (millions of dollars) GNP services 1970 1978a 1970 1978 1970 1978 1970 1978a 67 Malaysia 29 284 21 146 1.7 4.6 3.6 8.8 68 Jamaica -145 -72 8 30 1.1 7.0 2.5 17.9 69 Lebanon -. -494 1 4 0.2 .. .. 0.8 70 Korea, Rep, of -553 -455 70 653 3.1 3.9 19.4 10.5 71 Turkey -28 -1121 42 182 1.3 0.9 16.3 11.0 72 Algeria -116 -2977 10 561 0.8 5.9 3.2 20.9 73 Mexico -850 -896 218 1,823 2.1 6.9 23.6 59.6 74 Panama -57 -91 7 130 3.0 25.2 7.3 39.2 75 Taiwan 27 1979 23 239 1.4 2.6 4.5 4.4 76 Chile -13 -659 78 290 3.1 7.3 18.9 38.2 77 South Africa -1,156 2010 59 366 1.2 4.2 5.1 11.7 78 Costa Rica -67 -309 7 63 2.9 7.2 9.7 23.0 79 Brazil -701 -5310 136 1,725 0.9 2.2 13.5 28.4 80 Uruguay -29 -66 16 60 2.6 8.7 21.5 45.7 81 Argentina -36 2,512 121 513 1.9 3.5 21.5 26.8 82 Portugal - - -337 28 105 1.3 1.1 4.4 3,7 83 Yugoslavia -276 -834 72 183 1.7 0.7 8.2 3.2 84 Trinidad and Tobago -74 61 6 22 1.9 0.9 2.6 1.1 85 Venezuela -64 -4,973 40 394 0.8 1.9 2.9 6.9 86 Hong Kong . - 317 . - 15 (.) 0.7 - . . - 87 Greece -364 -1,056 41 206 1.0 1.7 7.2 8.5 88 Singapore -565 -669 6 38 0.6 4.0 0.6 2.3 89 Spain 151 321 72 600 0.5 1.8 3.6 11.0 90 Israel -572 -732 41 248 3.1 3.8 12.3 8.1 Industrialized countriesb 91 Ireland -189 -178 92 Italy 902 6,355 93 New Zealand -29 -387 94 United Kingdom 1,865 1,932 95 Finland -239 606 96 Austria -23 -1,410 97 Japan 1,980 17,528 98 Australia -832 -3,845 99 France 67 3,766 100 Netherlands -487 -1,449 101 Belgium 533 -556 102 Canada 1,078 -4,617 103 Norway -242 -2,145 104 Germany, Fed. Rep. 850 8,852 105 United States 6,200 -4,432 106 Denmark -544 -1,469 107 Sweden -266 -954 108 Switzerland 70 4,403 Capital-surplus oil exporters 109 Iraq 110 1,209 9 37 0.9 1.1 2.2 1.1 110 Iran -422 5,370 85 391 3.0 1.2 12.2 3.2 111 Libya 645 1,024 - - . . 112 Saudi Arabia 71 12,793 . - . - . . . . .. 113 Kuwait - - 6,166 . . . . . . . - Centrally planned economiesb 114 China 115 Korea, Dem. Rep. 116 Albania 117 Cuba 118 Mongolia 119 Romania 120 Bulgaria 121 Hungary 122 Poland 123 USSR 124 Czechoslovakia 125 German Dem. Rep. Figures in italics are for 1977, rot 1978. See the technical notes. 135 Table 14. Flow of External Capital Public and publicly guaranteed medium- and long-term loans Net direct private (millions of dollars) investment Repayment (millions Gross inflow of principal Net inflow of dollars) 1970 1978 1970 1978 1970 1978 1970 1978a Low-income countries 1 Kampuchea, Dem. 2 Bangladesh 488 51 437 3LaoPDR .. 4 Bhutan 5 Ethiopia 2] 97 15 1] 12 80 6 Mali 7 Nepal 21 1 68 2] (.) 2 6 2 21 14 62 25 5 8 Somalia 4 114 (.) 3 111 5 (5) 9 Burundi 1 23 (.) 2 1 21 10 Chad 6 43 2 12 4 31 21 11 Mozambique 12 Burma 13 Upper Volta 16 S 315 44 18 38 S 2 2]] 39 2 2 5 (.) (.) 14 Viet Nam .. 15 India 890 1150 307 595 583 555 6 16 Malawi 38 90 3 12 35 78 9 10 17 Rwanda (.) 19 (.) 1 (.) 18 (.) 5 18 Sri Lanka 61 239 27 64 34 175 (.) 2 4] 19 Guinea 20 Sierra Leone 90 8 112 83 10 10 28 280 65 55 10 8 19 21 Zaire 31 348 28 342 3 6 42 15 22 Niger 12 69 1 6 11 63 1 23 Benin 2 38 1 9 1 29 7 24 Pakistan 484 748 114 204 370 544 23 36 25 Tanzania 50 171 10 20 40 151 26 Afghanistan 34 171 15 3] 19 134 27 Central African Rep. 2 22 2 3 (.) 19 1 8 28 Madagascar 11 50 5 9 6 41 10 1 29 Haiti 4 43 4 8 (.) 35 3 10 30 Mauritania 4 111 3 18 1 93 1 1] 31 Lesotho (.) 5 (.) 1 (.) 4 32 Uganda 26 25 4 3 22 22 33 Angola 34 Sudan 54 290 22 40 32 250 35 Togo 5 200 2 32 3 168 36 Kenya 30 234 15 69 15 165 14 6] 3] Senegal 18 196 5 75 13 121 5 S 38 Indonesia 441 1,616 59 9]] 382 639 83 272 Middle-income countries 39 Egypt 302 2464 247 822 55 1,642 .. 297 40 Ghana 40 82 12 24 28 58 68 12 41 Yemen, PDR .. 42 Cameroon 43 Liberia 1 28 7 89 28] 74 4 12 58 14 1 5 1 24 88 229 60 16 7 44 Honduras 29 163 3 28 26 135 8 13 45 Zambia 351 104 32 145 319 41 29] 19 46 Zimbabwe 4] Thailand 55 740 23 91 32 649 43 53 48 Bolivia 54 531 17 266 37 265 76 12 49 Philippines 132 1,416 73 484 59 932 29 163 50 Yemen Arab Rep. 2 101 (.) 12 2 89 51 Congo, People's Rep. 35 222 6 1] 29 205 7 52 Nigeria 62 1,305 36 53 26 1,252 205 189 53 Papua New Guinea 25 29 (.) 10 25 19 34 54 El Salvador 8 80 6 12 2 68 4 23 55 Morocco 163 1,191 36 296 12] 895 20 46 56 Peru 148 842 100 431 48 411 70 25 57 Ivory Coast 7] 948 2] 223 50 725 31 10 58 Nicaragua 44 142 17 49 2] 93 15 7 59 Colombia 235 341 75 231 160 110 39 60 60 Paraguay 15 139 7 20 8 119 4 22 61 Ecuador 42 503 16 108 26 395 89 40 62 Dominican Rep. 36 164 7 39 29 125 72 40 63 Guatemala 3] 107 20 9 1] 98 29 118 64 Syrian Arab Rep. 59 683 30 169 29 514 65 Tunisia 89 576 45 106 44 470 16 89 66 Jordan 14 221 3 34 11 187 22 136 Public and publicly guaranteed medium- and long-term loans Net direct (millions of dollars) private investment Repayment (millions Gross inflow of principal Net inflow of dollars) 1970 1978 1970 1978 1970 1978 1970 1978a 67 Malaysia 43 1,044 45 558 -2 486 94 596 68 Jamaica 15 221 6 114 9 10] 161 -11 69 Lebanon 12 91 2 6 10 85] 17 70 Korea, Rep. of 440 3,919 198 1,142 242 2,777 66 61 71 Turkey 328 798 128 262 200 536 58 95 72 Algeria 292 5,103 33 927 259 4,176 45 135 73 Mexico 797 8,606 476 4,416 321 4,190 323 530 74 Panama 67 986 24 442 43 544 33 9 75 Taiwan 154 621 54 394 100 227 62 110 76 Chile 397 1,491 163 926 234 565 -79 178 77 South Africa 519 1,173 146 1,422 373 -249 318 -189 78 Costa Rica 30 396 21 174 9 222 26 66 79 Brazil 1,063 10,055 333 2,406 730 7,649 407 1,886 80 Uruguay 37 416 47 366 -10 50 129 81 Argentina 489 3,203 342 1,578 147 1,625 11 298 82 Portugal 20 1,157 62 98 -42 1,059 50 83 Yugoslavia 180 445 168 196 12 249 84 Trinidad and Tobago 8 161 10 10 -2 151 83 140 85 Venezuela 224 2,70] 42 356 182 2,351 -23 68 86 Hong Kong (.) 117 (.) 79 (.) 38 8] Greece 164 754 61 354 103 400 50 18 88 Singapore 58 266 6 226 52 40 93 422 89 Spain 268 2,003 122 1,822 146 211 179 428 90 Israel 663 1,365 131 290 532 1,075 40 129 Industrialized countriesb 91 Ireland 32 250 92 Italy 496 342 93 New Zealand 22 9 94 United Kingdom -440 -1,515 95 Finland -34 -29 96 Austria 85 74 97 Japan -261 -2,341 98 Australia 787 1,266 99 France 248 660 100 Netherlands -14 -1,231 101 Belgium 162 776 102 Canada 566 -1,721 103 Norway 32 407 104 Germany, Fed. Rep. -280 -1,953 105 United States -6,120 -10,404 106 Denmark 75 101 107 Sweden -105 -334 108 Switzerland Capital-surplus oil exporters 109 Iraq 63 308 18 195 45 113 24 110 Iran 940 2,901 235 960 705 1,941 25 802 111 Libya S .. 139 -950 112 Saudi Arabia .. .. .. .. 20 822 113 Kuwait .. .. .. .. .. -131 Centrally planned economie&' 114 China 115 Korea, Dem. Rep. 116 Albania 117 Cuba 118 Mongolia 119 Romania 120 Bulgaria 121 Hungary 122 Poland 123 USSR 124 Czechoslovakia 125 German Dem. Rep. a. Figures in italics are for 1977, not 197a. b. See the technical notes for Table 13. 137 Table 15. External Public Debt and International Reserves External public debt Gross international reserves outstanding and disbursed Millions In months Millions As percentage of import of dollars of GNP of dollars coverage 1970 1978 1970 1978a 1970 1978a 1978a Low-income countries 18.1 w 21.7 w 3.5 w 1 Kampuchea, Dem. 2 Bangladesh 2,798 38.2 322 2.3 3 Lao PDR 4 Bhutan 5 Ethiopia 169 551 9.5 15.4 218 4.4 6 Mali 238 539 88.1 65.3 1 11 0.5 7 Nepal 3 88 0.3 5.4 95 181 7.8 8 Somalia 77 496 41,1 101.7 21 131 4.9 9 Burundi 7 64 3.1 10.6 15 83 12.8 10 Chad 32 156 11.8 23.4 2 14 0.9 11 Mozambique .. .. . . . . . . 12 Burma 102 818 4.] 18.1 98 151 3.7 13 Upper Volta 21 191 6.4 21.6 36 39 2.1 14 Viet Nam .. .. . .. .. 15 India 7,936 15,326 14.8 13.1 1,023 8,316 10.2 16 Malawi 121 390 38.7 36.8 29 77 2.2 17 Rwanda 2 95 0.9 11.1 8 87 3.7 18 Sri Lanka 317 1,013 17.1 41.0 43 406 4,4 19 Guinea 314 916 72.5 81.] . 20 Sierra Leone 59 275 14.3 36.1 39 35 1.3 21 Zaire 311 2,566 17.1 33.4 189 196 1.3 22 Niger 32 194 8.7 16.2 19 131 3.4 23 Benin 41 146 16.0 19.5 16 18 0.9 24 Pakistan 3,059 7,568 30.5 40.8 194 795 2.3 25 Tanzania 248 1,095 19.4 25.1 65 96 0.9 26 Afghanistan 54] 1216 58.1 30.8 50 606 10.4 27 Central African Rep. 19 138 11.2 26.5 1 27 1.5 28 Madagascar 94 259 10.9 11.7 37 59 1.2 29 Haiti 40 163 10.3 13.8 4 41 1.6 30 Mauritania 27 574 16.8 138.1 3 82 2.5 31 Lesotho 8 28 9.2 7.5 32 Uganda 128 252 9.8 3.0 57 33 Angola .. .. .. .. 34 Sudan 309 2,076 11.6 38.6 22 29 0.4 35 Togo 40 494 15.4 65.4 35 73 1.5 36 Kenya 313 953 20.3 17.9 220 369 2.1 37 Senegal 103 58] 12.2 29.8 22 23 0.5 38 Indonesia 2,443 13,089 27.1 27.6 160 2,676 2.6 Middle-income countries 10.8w 17.Sw 2.5w 39 Egypt 1,639 9,879 23.] 71.5 165 1,049 1.9 40 Ghana 489 843 22.6 5,3 58 330 3.6 41 Yemen, PDR 1 349 0.3 47.5 60 194 5.6 42 Cameroon 131 1,167 13.0 30.2 81 57 0.5 43 Liberia 158 334 49.6 42.3 18 0.5 44 Honduras 90 591 12.9 34.9 20 18] 2.6 45 Zambia 596 1,396 34.5 51.6 515 96 1.0 46 Zimbabwe .. .. .. .. 47 Thailand 322 1,777 4.9 8.2 911 2,559 4.9 48 Bolivia 47] 1,666 46.4 40.] 46 314 3.3 49 Philippines 633 4,188 9.2 18.0 255 2,104 4.0 50 Yemen Arab Rep. 147 464 49.9 14.3 .. 1,461 15.3 51 Congo, People's Rep. 129 726 49.4 85.5 9 11 0.2 52 Nigeria 478 2,180 6.4 4.5 223 2,037 1.7 53 Papua New Guinea 36 370 6.2 21.2 .. 431 5.1 54 El Salvador 88 333 8.6 11.0 63 381 3.5 55 Morocco 711 5,139 18.6 40.1 141 773 2.2 56 Peru 848 5,36] 14.0 53.1 338 738 3.3 57 Ivory Coast 256 2,818 18.3 39.5 119 455 1.5 58 Nicaragua 155 964 20.6 45.8 50 58 0.9 59 Colombia 1,249 2,833 18.1 12.2 20] 2810 8.3 60 Paraguay 98 447 16.] 17.4 18 46] 9.2 61 Ecuador 213 1,563 13.3 21.5 85 762 4.7 62 Dominican Rep. 212 724 14.6 16.1 32 176 1.7 63 Guatemala 106 374 5.7 6.0 80 857 6.0 64 Syrian Arab Rep. 232 2,091 13.6 26.6 5] 622 2.6 65 Tunisia 545 2,359 38.8 40.5 60 479 2.4 66 Jordan 118 840 19.0 36.1 258 1,069 6.2 138 External public debt Gross international reserves outstanding and disbursed Millions As percentage Millions In months of dollars of GNP of dollars of import coverage 1970 1978 1970 1978a 1970 1978a 1978a 67 Malaysia 390 2671 10.0 17.6 667 3,670 5.5 68 Jamaica 154 1,036 11.5 39.4 139 53 0.5 69 Lebanon 64 125 4.2 .. 405 3,918 25,4 70 Korea, Rep, of 1,797 11,992 20.9 26.1 610 2,828 1.8 71 Turkey 1,854 6,188 14.4 12.2 440 1,662 3.6 72 Algeria 93] 13,168 18.5 52,6 352 3,230 3.6 73 Mexico 3,238 25,775 9.8 28.7 756 2,269 2.0 74 Panama 194 1,910 19.0 84.1 16 151 1.1 75 Taiwan 601 2,903 10.6 12.1 627 1,950 1.8 76 Chile 2,066 4,359 26.2 26.2 392 1,405 4.0 77 South Africa 1,089 5,704 6.3 13.3 1,057 2,636 2.3 78 Costa Rica 134 963 13.8 29.3 16 212 1.8 79 Brazil 3,589 28,821 8.0 15.6 1,190 12,191 6.7 80 Uruguay 267 766 11.0 15.7 186 1,111 12.5 81 Argentina 1,880 6801 7.6 11.4 682 5,934 12.2 82 Portugal 473 2,642 7.0 14.0 1,565 5,873 11.7 83 Yugoslavia 1,198 3,454 8.5 6.4 144 2,756 2.6 84 Trinidad and Tobago 101 417 12.5 12.2 43 1,813 8.0 85 Venezuela 728 6,921 6.7 17.1 1,047 8,571 6.6 86 Hong Kong 2 223 0.1 1.6 87 Greece 905 3,123 8.9 9.7 318 1,851 2.8 88 Singapore 152 1,134 7.9 14.8 1,012 5,302 4.6 89 Spain 1,209 7,631 3.3 5.5 1,851 13,394 7.2 90 Israel 2,274 9,209 41.3 65.7 451 2,890 3.5 Industrialized countriesb 4.2 w 91 Ireland 698 2,770 4.4 92 Italy 5,547 29,831 5.4 93 New Zealand 258 46] 1.2 94 United Kingdom 2,918 21,184 2.7 95 Finland 458 1,438 1.8 96 Austria 1,806 9,804 5.6 97 Japan 4,876 37,824 4.7 98 Australia 1,709 3,823 2.2 99 France 5,199 32,328 3.8 100 Netherlands 3,362 17,469 3.4 101 Belgium 2,947 13,591 2.9 102 Canada 4,732 8,562 1.7 103 Norway 813 3,116 2.0 104 Germany, Fed. Rep. 13,879 75,287 5.8 105 United States 15,237 69,448 3.8 106 Denmark 488 3,5]] 2.3 107 Sweden 775 5,479 2.5 108 Switzerland 5,317 36,584 15.1 Capital-surplus oil exporters 7.9 w 109 Iraq 274 878 8.8 4.0 472 7,237 9.2 110 Iran 2,193 8,251 20.8 8.2 217 12,840 6.4 111 Libya 1,596 4,659 6.0 112 Saudi Arabia .. .. 670 20,227 12.1 113 Kuwait .. .. 209 3,072 5.7 Centrally planned economiesb 114 China 115 Korea, Dem. Rep. 116 Albania 117 Cuba 118 Mongolia 119 Romania 120 Bulgaria 121 Hungary 122 Poland 123 USSR 124 Czechoslovakia 125 German Dem. Rep. a, Figures in italics are for 1977, not 1978. b. See the technical notes for Table 13. 139 Table 16. Official Development Assistance from OECD and OPEC Members Amount 1960 1965 1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980a OECD Millions of US dollars 92 Italy 77 60 147 182 226 186 375 279 320 93 New Zealand 14 66 53 52 55 62 65 94 United Kingdom 407 472 500 910 885 1120 1456 2067 2,453 95 Finland 2 7 48 51 49 55 86 104 96 Austria 10 11 79 48 108 166 127 174 97 Japan 105 244 458 1,148 1,105 1,424 2,215 2638 3071 98 Australia 59 119 212 552 377 400 588 620 690 99 France 823 752 971 2,093 2,146 2,267 2,705 3,358 3,836 100 Netherlands 35 70 196 608 728 908 1,074 1,404 1,54] 101 Belgium 101 102 120 378 340 371 536 631 714 102 Canada 75 96 337 848 763 945 1,060 1,042 1,151 103 Norway 5 11 37 184 218 295 355 428 491 104 Germany, Fed, Rep. 223 456 599 1,689 1,592 1,717 2347 3,350 3,581 105 United States 2,702 4,023 3,153 4,161 4,360 4,682 5.664 4,567 4,567 106 Denmark 5 13 59 205 214 258 388 448 488 107 Sweden 7 38 117 566 608 779 783 956 1,124 108 Switzerland 4 12 30 104 112 119 173 205 218 Total 4,628 6,478 6,967 13,820 13,829 15,680 19,994 22,267 24,594 OECD As percentage of donor GNP 92 Italy .22 .10 .16 .11 .13 .10 .14 .09 .09 93 New Zealand .. . .23 .52 .41 .39 .34 .30 .30 94 United Kingdom .56 .47 .41 .39 .40 .46 .48 .52 .52 95 Finland .. .02 .06 .18 .17 .16 .17 .21 .22 96 Austria .11 .07 .21 .12 .22 .29 .19 .23 97 Japan .24 .27 .23 .23 .20 .21 .23 .26 .27 98 Australia .37 .53 .59 .59 .41 .42 .54 .52 .51 99 France 1.35 .76 .66 .62 .62 .60 .57 .59 .59 100 Netherlands .31 .36 .61 .75 .83 .86 .82 .93 .94 101 Belgium .88 .60 .46 .59 .51 .46 .55 .56 .59 102 Canada .19 .19 .41 .52 .39 .48 .52 .47 .46 103 Norway .11 .16 .32 .66 .70 .83 .90 .93 .95 104 Germany, Fed. Rep. .31 .40 .32 .40 .36 .33 .37 .44 .44 105 United States .53 .58 .32 .2] .26 .25 .27 .19 .18 106 Denmark .09 .13 .38 .58 .56 .60 .75 .75 .67 107 Sweden .05 .19 .38 .82 .82 .99 .90 .94 .95 108 Switzerland .04 .09 .15 .19 .19 .19 .20 .21 .22 OECD National currencies 92 Italy (billions of lire) 48 38 92 119 188 148 318 233 262 93 New Zealand (millions of dollars) . . . 13 55 53 54 53 61 64 94 United Kingdom (millions of pounds) 145 168 208 411 490 642 759 974 1,096 95 Finland (millions of markkaa) .. 6 29 177 195 196 226 335 400 96 Austria (millions of schillings) .. 260 286 1,376 861 1,785 2,411 1,698 2,327 97 Japan (billions of yen) 38 88 165 341 328 383 466 578 669 98 Australia (millions of dollars) 53 106 189 422 308 361 514 555 611 99 France (millions of francs) 4,063 3,713 5,393 8,975 10,255 11,762 12,207 14,287 16,334 100 Netherlands (millions of guilders) 133 253 710 1,538 1,925 2,229 2,323 2,817 3,106 101 Belgium (millions of francs) 5,050 5,100 6,000 13,903 13,129 13,234 16,836 18,500 20,913 102 Canada (millions of dollars) 73 104 353 863 752 1,005 1,209 1,221 1,347 103 Norway (millions of kroner) 36 78 264 962 1,190 1,570 1,861 2,167 2,470 104 Germany, Fed. Rep. (millions of deutsche marks) 93] 1,824 2,192 4,156 4,009 3,987 4,715 6,140 6,550 105 United States (millions of dollars) 2,702 4,023 3,153 4,161 4,360 4,682 5,664 4,567 4,567 106 Denmark (millions of kroner) 35 90 443 1,178 1,294 1,549 2,140 2,357 2,573 107 Sweden (millions of kroner) 36 196 605 2,350 2,647 3,504 3,538 4,098 4,743 108 Switzerland (millions of francs) 1] 52 131 260 281 284 309 341 361 OECD Summary ODA (billions of US dollars, nominal prices) 4.6 6.5 7.0 13.8 13.8 15.7 20.0 22.3 24.6 ODA as percentage of GNP .51 .49 .34 .36 .33 .33 .35 .34 .34 ODA (billions of US dollars, constant 1978 prices) 13.1 16.7 14.9 17.9 17.3 18.0 20.0 20.1 20.2 GNP (trillions of US dollars, nominal prices) .9 1.3 2.0 3.8 4.2 4.7 5.6 6.5 7.2 ODA deflatore .35 .39 .47 .77 .80 .87 1.00 1.11 1.22 140 Amount 19818 19828 19838 19848 19858 1975 1976 1977 1978b 197gb OPEC Millions of US dollars 385 461 554 605 668 52 Nigeria 14 83 64 38 28 73 81 90 99 108 72 Algeria 41 54 48 44 45 2,573 2674 2,765 2,903 3041 85 Venezuela 31 103 52 109 83 121 141 164 191 223 109 Iraq 218 232 61 172 861 212 256 294 336 384 110 Iran 593 753 224 278 21 3,532 4,061 4,671 5,371 6,177 111 Libya 261 94 115 169 146 768 854 943 1,062 1,172 112 Saudi Arabia 1,997 2,407 2,410 1,470 1,970 4,282 4,786 5,369 5,932 6,546 113 Kuwait 976 615 1,518 1,268 1,099 1,749 1,976 2,213 2,457 2,745 Qatar 339 195 197 106 251 814 928 1,057 1,205 1,374 United Arab 1,279 1,420 1,552 1,701 1,863 Emirates 1,046 1,060 1,177 690 20] 558 631 707 790 882 Total OAPECd 4,879 4,656 5,526 3,919 4,579 4,029 4,533 5,100 5,73] 6,336 Total OPEC 5,516 5,596 5,866 4,344 4,711 6,250 6,966 7,662 8,416 9,421 571 638 707 781 861 OPEC As percentage of donor GNP 1,259 1,400 1,545 1,702 1,872 276 318 350 400 455 52 Nigeria .05 .25 .16 .08 .05 28,731 32,124 35,743 39,688 44,128 Vezuela . 109 Iraq 1.65 1.44 .32 .76 2.94 110 Iran 1.13 1.13 .27 .33 .03 .10 ;o .11 .11 .11 111 Libya 2.31 .63 .65 .93 .58 .30 .30 .30 .30 .30 112 Saudi Arabia 5.40 5,73 4.32 2.76 3.15 .49 .45 .42 .40 .38 113 Kuwait 8.12 4.36 10.61 6.35 5.14 .23 .24 .26 .27 .28 Qatar 15.62 7.95 7.93 3.65 5.60 .25 .27 .28 .29 .30 United Arab .27 .28 .28 .29 .30 Emirates 14.12 11.02 10.22 5.60 1.58 .50 .50 .50 .51 .51 Total OAPECd 4.99 4.03 3.95 2.55 2.43 .59 .59 .60 .60 .60 Total OPEC 2.71 2.27 1.96 1.35 1.28 .94 .96 .97 .98 .99 .60 .61 .63 .65 .67 .45 .45 .45 .44 .44 .96 .97 .98 .99 1.00 .44 .44 .45 .46 .46 .22 .22 .22 .22 .22 .70 .70 .70 .70 .70 .95 .95 .95 .95 .95 .25 .26 .26 .27 .28 Net bilateral flow to low-income countries 1960 1965 1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 315 377 453 495 547 OECD As percentage of donor GNP 72 80 89 98 106 1,150 1,195 1,235 1,297 1,359 92 Italy .03 .04 .06 .01 .01 .02 .01 465 542 631 734 857 93 New Zealand ,. .. .. .14 .06 .04 .03 2,835 3,423 3,931 4,493 5,134 94 United Kingdom .22 .23 .15 .11 .14 .11 .15 770 885 1,018 1,170 1,346 95 Finland .. .. .06 .07 .06 .04 681 757 836 941 1,039 96 Austria .. .06 .05 .02 .02 .01 .01 18,233 20379 22,861 25,258 27,873 9] Japan .12 .13 .11 .08 .08 .06 .07 3,512 3,968 4,444 4,934 5,512 98 Australia .. .08 .09 .10 .07 .07 .08 23,842 27,181 30,960 35,294 40,244 99 France .01 .12 .10 .12 .12 .10 .10 1,49] 1,662 1,816 1,991 2,180 100 Netherlands .19 .08 .24 .24 .26 .33 .34 2,807 3,174 3,556 3,974 4437 101 Belgium .27 .56 .30 .31 .26 .24 .23 102 Canada .11 .10 .22 .24 .14 .13 .17 7,369 8291 9,328 10,494 11,589 103 Norway .02 .04 .12 .25 .22 .30 .39 6,250 6,966 7,662 8,416 9,241 104 Germany, Fed. Rep. .13 .14 .10 .12 .09 .07 .10 3,010 3,363 3,727 4,117 4,539 105 United States .22 .26 .14 .08 .05 .03 .04 5,313 5,908 6,520 7,182 7,899 106 Denmark .. .02 .10 .20 .21 .24 .21 457 526 579 662 753 107 Sweden .01 .07 .12 .41 .40 .44 .37 108 Switzerland .. .02 .05 .10 .07 .05 .08 Total .18 .20 .13 .11 .09 .07 .09 28.7 32.1 35,7 39.7 44.1 .36 .36 .36 .36 .36 Estimated. 21.6 22.3 23.2 24.1 25.2 Provisional. See the technical notes. 8.0 9.0 9.9 11.0 12.1 Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries. 1.33 1.44 1.54 1.65 1.75 141 Table 17. Population Growth, Past and Projected, and Hypothetical Stationary Populationa Average annual Hypothetical growth of Projected Assumed year population population size of Year of stationary of reaching net reaching (percent) (millions) population reproduction stationary 1960-70 1970-78 1980 2000 (millions) rate of 1 population Low-income countries 2.5 w 2.2 w 1,348 2050 4,034 1 Kampuchea, Dem. .. .. .. .. 2 Bangladesh 2.5 2.7 89 143 314 2035 2160 3 Lao PDR 2.2 1.3 3 5 11 2035 2175 4 Bhutan 2.0 2.1 1 2 4 2035 2165 5 Ethiopia 2.4 2.5 33 52 139 2045 2175 6 Mali 2.4 2.5 3 11 28 2040 2170 7 Nepal 2.0 2.2 14 21 46 2035 2160 8 Somalia 2,4 2.3 4 6 17 2045 2170 9 Burundi 2.4 2.0 5 8 21 2045 2160 10 Chad 1.8 2.2 5 7 18 2045 2165 11 Mozambique 2.2 2.5 10 17 44 2040 2135 12 Burma 2.2 2.2 34 51 92 2020 2145 13 Upper Volta 1.6 1.6 6 9 24 2040 2170 14 Viet Nam 3.1 2.9 55 87 149 2015 2105 15 India 2.5 2.0 672 974 1,645 2020 2150 16 Malawi 2.8 2.9 6 11 32 2045 2165 17 Rwanda 2.6 2.9 5 8 24 2045 2160 18 Sri Lanka 2.4 1.7 15 21 31 2010 2070 19 Guinea 2.8 2.9 5 9 23 2045 2170 20 Sierra Leone 2.2 2.5 3 6 14 2035 2160 21 Zaire 2.0 2.7 28 47 125 2045 2160 22 Niger 3.3 2.8 5 9 24 2040 2170 23 Benin 2.6 2.8 4 6 15 2035 2160 24 Pakistan 2.8 3.1 82 139 332 2035 2150 25 Tanzania 2.7 3.0 18 32 92 2045 2145 26 Afghanistan 2.2 2.2 15 25 65 2045 2175 27 Central African Rep. 2.2 2.2 2 3 8 2045 2165 28 Madagascar 2.2 2.5 9 14 38 2045 2160 29 Haiti 1.5 1.7 5 8 17 2030 2145 30 Mauritania 2.5 2.7 2 3 7 2040 2150 31 Lesotho 2.0 2.3 1 2 5 2045 2155 32 Uganda 3.7 2.9 13 23 58 2035 2130 33 Angola 1.5 2.3 7 11 29 2040 2155 34 Sudan 2.2 2.6 18 31 88 2045 2135 35 Togo 2.7 2.7 3 4 12 2040 2135 36 Kenya 3.4 3.3 16 32 109 2045 2140 37 Senegal 2.4 2.6 6 9 24 2040 2150 38 Indonesia 2.2 1.8 142 204 350 2020 2155 Middle-income countries 2.5 w 2.4 w 916 t 1,409 t 2,599 39 Egypt 2.5 2.2 42 62 101 2015 2105 40 Ghana 2.4 3.0 12 21 56 2040 2130 41 Yemen, PDR 1.9 1.9 2 3 6 2030 2125 42 Cameroon 1.8 2.2 8 13 31 2040 2135 43 Liberia 3.1 3.3 2 3 9 2040 2130 44 Honduras 3.1 3.3 4 7 15 2030 2090 45 Zambia 2.8 3.0 6 10 28 2040 2130 46 Zimbabwe 3.9 3.3 7 13 37 2040 2105 47 Thailand 3.0 2.7 46 68 103 2005 2095 48 Bolivia 2.5 2.6 6 9 20 2030 2120 49 Philippines 3.0 2.7 48 75 126 2015 2075 50 Yemen Arab Rep. 1.8 1.9 6 9 19 2030 2170 51 Congo, People's Rep. 2.1 2.5 2 3 7 2045 2115 52 Nigeria 2.5 2.5 85 153 425 2040 2135 53 Papua New Guinea 2.3 2.4 3 5 9 2025 2120 54 El Salvador 2.9 2.9 5 8 14 2015 2075 55 Morocco 2.5 2.9 20 34 70 2025 2090 56 Peru 2.8 2.7 18 29 57 2025 2090 57 Ivory Coast 3.7 5.6 8 14 37 2040 2130 58 Nicaragua 2.9 3.3 3 5 9 2020 2090 59 Colombia 3.0 2.3 27 39 57 2005 2070 60 Paraguay 2.6 2.8 3 5 9 2015 2075 61 Ecuador 3.1 3.3 8 14 26 2020 2080 62 Dominican Rep. 2.9 2.9 5 9 16 2015 2075 63 Guatemala 2.8 2.9 7 12 23 2025 2085 64 Syrian Arab Rep. 3.2 3.2 9 15 33 2025 2085 65 Tunisia 1.9 2.0 6 9 14 2010 2075 66 Jordan 3.0 3.3 3 5 12 2025 2090 142 Average annual growth of Projected Hypothetical population size of Assumed year Year of population stationary (percent) (millions) of reaching net reaching population reproduction stationary 1960-70 1970-78 1980 2000 (millions) rate of 1 population 6] Malaysia 2.9 2.7 14 20 30 2005 2010 68 Jamaica 1.4 1.7 2 3 5 2005 2065 69 Lebanon 2.8 2.5 3 5 8 2010 2070 70 Korea, Rep. of 2.4 1.9 38 50 66 2005 2070 71 Turkey 2.5 2.5 45 65 100 2010 2075 72 Algeria 2.4 3.2 19 34 94 2040 2100 73 Mexico 3.3 3.3 70 116 205 2015 2075 74 Panama 2.9 2.6 2 3 4 2005 2065 75 Taiwan 2.6 2.0 18 24 30 2005 2065 76 Chile 2.1 1.7 11 15 19 2005 2070 77 South Africa 2.6 2.7 29 49 10] 2030 2090 78 Costa Rica 3.4 2.5 2 3 5 2005 2065 79 Brazil 2.9 2.8 126 201 345 2015 2075 80 Uruguay 1.1 0.3 3 4 4 2005 2070 81 Argentina 1.4 1.3 27 33 41 2005 2065 82 Portugal 0.0 1.0 10 12 14 2005 2100 83 Yugoslavia 1.0 0.9 22 26 29 2005 2095 84 Trinidad and Tobago 2.0 1.2 1 2 2 2005 2065 85 Venezuela 3.4 3.3 15 24 40 2010 2070 86 Hong Kong 2.5 1.9 5 6 8 2005 2065 8] Greece 0,5 0.7 9 10 11 2005 2065 88 Singapore 2.4 1.5 2 3 4 2005 2065 89 Spain 1.1 1.2 38 44 51 2005 2065 90 Israel 3.4 2.7 4 5 8 2020 2080 Industrialized countries 1.00) O.7w 673 736t 774t 91 Ireland 0.4 1.2 3 4 5 2005 2065 92 Italy 0.] 0.7 57 61 63 2005 2035 93 New Zealand 1.] 1.6 3 4 5 2005 2075 94 United Kingdom 0.5 0.1 56 58 59 2005 2025 95 Finland 0.4 0.4 5 5 5 2005 2020 96 Austria 0.5 0.2 7 8 8 2005 2025 9] Japan 1.0 1.2 117 131 134 2005 2015 98 Australia 2.0 1.6 14 17 19 2005 2075 99 France 1.0 0.6 54 58 61 2005 2030 100 Netherlands 1.3 0.8 14 15 16 2005 2025 101 Belgium 0.5 0.3 10 10 10 2005 2025 102 Canada 1.8 1.2 24 28 30 2005 2030 103 Norway 0.8 0.6 4 4 5 2005 2030 104 Germany, Fed, Rep, 0.9 0.1 61 61 61 2005 2005 105 United States 1.3 0.8 225 252 273 2005 2030 106 Denmark 0.] 0,4 5 5 5 2005 2020 107 Sweden 0.7 0.4 8 8 8 2005 2005 108 Switzerland 1.6 0.1 6 7 7 2005 2005 Capital-surplus oil exporters 2.9 w 3.2 w 64 t 104 203 109 Iraq 3.1 3.3 13 23 48 2025 2085 110 Iran 2.7 2.9 38 59 102 2015 2105 111 Libya 3.8 4.1 3 5 12 2030 2090 112 Saudi Arabia 2.6 3.5 9 15 35 2030 2090 113 Kuwait 9.8 6.1 1 2 6 2030 2085 Centrally planned economies 1.7 w 1.4 w 1,386 t 1,730 2,121 114 China 2.1 1.6 977 1,251 1,555 2005 2065 115 Korea, Dem. Rep. 2.8 2.6 18 27 43 2010 2070 116 Albania 2.8 2.5 3 4 6 2005 2060 117 Cuba 2.0 1.6 10 13 1] 2005 2070 118 Mongolia 2.9 2.9 2 3 4 2005 2090 119 Romania 1.0 0.9 22 26 30 2005 2090 120 Bulgaria 0.8 0.5 9 10 10 2005 2080 121 Hungary 0.4 0.4 11 11 12 2005 2085 122 Poland 1.0 0.9 36 41 47 2005 2090 123 USSR 1.2 0.9 266 310 360 2005 2095 124 Czechoslovakia 0.5 0,] 15 1] 19 2005 2090 125 German Dem. Rep. -0.1 -0.2 1] 17 18 2005 2015 Totaib 4387 6,029 9,771 a. For the assumptions used in the projections, see the technical notes. b. Excludes countries with populations of less than one million. 143 Table 18. Demographic and Fertility-related Indicators Percentage Crude Crude Percentage of married birth death change in: Percentage women rate per rate per of women in Crude Crude Total reproductive using thousand thousand contra- population population birth death fertility age group ceptivesa rate rate rate (aged 15-44) 1960 1978 1960 1978 1960-78 1960-78 1978 1978 1970 1977 Low-income countries 48 w 39 w 24 w 15 w -14.4 w -31.5 w 5.4 w 44 w 1 Kampuchea, Dem. 2 Bangladesh 51 46 25 18 -9.8 -28.0 3 Lao POR 44 45 23 22 2.3 -4.3 6.4 40 4 Bhutan 46 44 28 23 -4.3 -17.9 6.2 43 5 Ethiopia 51 49 28 25 -3.9 -10.7 6.7 42 6 Mali 50 49 27 22 -2.0 -18.5 6.7 41 7 Nepal 46 45 29 21 -2.2 -27.6 6.5 42 8 Somalia 57 48 29 20 -15.8 -31.0 6.1 44 9 Burundi 48 47 27 20 -2.1 -25.9 6.3 42 10 Chad 46 44 29 21 -4.3 -27.6 5.9 42 11 Mozambique 46 46 26 19 0.0 -26.9 6.1 41 12 Burma 43 39 22 14 -9.3 -36.4 5.5 42 13 Upper Volta 49 48 27 22 -2.0 -18.5 6.5 42 14 Viet Nam 47 37 21 9 -21.3 -57.1 5.5 41 15 India 43 35 21 14 -18.6 -33.3 5.0 44 16 Malawi 53 52 27 20 -1.9 -25.9 7.0 39 17 Rwanda 51 51 27 19 0.0 -29.6 6.9 40 18 Sri Lanka 36 26 9 6 -27.8 -33.3 3.6 46 19 Guinea 47 46 30 21 -2.1 -30.0 6.2 42 20 Sierra Leone 47 46 27 19 -2.1 -29.6 6.1 41 21 Zaire 48 46 24 19 -4.2 -20.8 6.1 42 .. (.) 22 Niger 52 51 2] 22 -1.9 -18.5 7.1 41 23 Benin 51 49 27 19 -3.9 -29.6 6.7 41 . - 24 Pakistan 48 45 23 15 -6.3 -34.8 6.7 40 4 6 25 Tanzania 47 48 22 16 2.1 -27.3 6.5 40 26 Afghanistan 48 48 30 22 0.0 -26.7 6.9 41 1 27 Central African Rep. 42 42 26 19 0.0 -26.9 5.5 42 28 Madagascar 47 45 2] 19 -4.3 -29.6 6.1 41 - - 29 Haiti 45 43 23 17 -4.4 -26.1 5.9 42 5 30 Mauritania 51 50 27 22 -2.0 -18.5 6.9 41 31 Lesotho 40 40 23 16 0.0 -30.4 5.4 42 32 Uganda 45 45 21 14 0.0 -33.3 6.1 41 33 Angola 50 48 31 23 -4.0 -25.8 6.4 42 34 Sudan 47 45 25 18 -4.3 -28.0 6.6 42 35 Togo 51 50 27 19 -2.0 -29.6 6.7 41 36 Kenya 51 51 19 14 0.0 -26.3 7.8 39 2 4 37 Senegal 48 49 27 22 2.1 -18.5 6.5 41 38 Indonesia 47 37 23 1] -21.3 -26.1 4.9 44 (.) 1_ Middle-income countries 40 w 35 w 14 w 11 w -17.4 w -29.9 w 4.9 w 43 w 39 Egypt 45 37 19 13 -17.8 -31.6 5.0 44 9 21 40 Ghana 49 48 24 17 -2.0 -29.2 6.] 41 2 4 41 Yemen, PDR 54 48 30 21 -11.1 -30.0 7.0 41 42 Cameroon 43 42 27 19 -2.3 -29.6 5.7 41 43 Liberia 51 51 25 18 0.0 -28.0 6.9 40 -. 44 Honduras 51 47 19 12 -7.8 -36.8 6.9 39 9 45 Zambia 51 49 24 17 -3.9 -29.2 6.9 40 .. . - 46 Zimbabwe 47 48 19 14 2.1 -26.3 6.6 40 .. 5 47 Thailand 46 32 17 8 -30.4 -52.9 4.5 42 27 40 48 Bolivia 48 44 23 15 -8.3 -34.8 6.5 41 - - -. 49 Philippines 45 35 15 9 -22.2 -40.0 5.0 42 2 22 50 Yemen Arab Rep. 49 48 29 25 -2.0 -13.8 6.8 41 51 Congo, People's Rep. 46 45 2] 19 -2.2 -29.6 6.0 42 52 Nigeria 52 50 25 18 -3.8 -28.0 6.9 41 53 Papua New Guinea 44 41 23 16 -6.8 -30.4 6.0 42 3 54 El Salvador 48 39 17 9 -18.8 -47.1 5.5 41 -. 22 55 Morocco 52 45 23 13 -13.5 -43.5 6.5 41 1 5 56 Peru 47 39 19 12 -17.0 -36.8 5.6 43 . . 1 57 Ivory Coast 50 50 27 19 0.0 -29.6 6.7 42 58 Nicaragua 51 45 19 13 -11.8 -31.6 6.2 41 - - 19 59 Colombia 46 31 14 8 -32.6 -42.9 4.0 45 - - 36 60 Paraguay 43 39 13 9 -9.3 -30.8 5.8 41 -. 16 61 Ecuador 47 44 14 10 -6.4 -28.6 6.5 41 6 62 Dominican Rep. 50 37 16 9 -26.0 -43.8 5.3 42 . - 31 63 Guatemala 48 41 18 12 -14.6 -33.3 5.7 43 .. 3 64 Syrian Arab Rep. 47 45 26 13 -4.3 -50.0 7.4 38 (.) 65 Tunisia 49 32 21 12 -34.7 -42.9 4.6 42 a 18 66 Jordan 48 46 20 13 -4.2 -35.0 7.0 41 144 Percentage Crude Crude Percentage of married birth death change in: Percentage of women in women rate per rate per using thousand thousand Crude Crude Total reproductive birth death fertility age group contra- population population ceptivesa rate rate rate (aged 15-44) 1960 1978 1960 1978 1960-78 1960-78 1978 1978 1970 1977 67 Malaysia 39 29 9 6 -25.6 -33.3 3.9 44 7 36 68 Jamaica 39 29 9 6 -25.6 -33.3 4,2 39 ., 40 69 Lebanon 43 33 14 8 -23.3 -42.9 4.7 42 14 70 Korea, Rep. of 41 21 13 8 -48.8 -38.5 2.8 47 32 44 71 Turkey 44 32 17 10 -27.3 -41.2 4.4 43 8 38 72 Algeria 50 48 23 14 -4.0 -39.1 7.3 39 73 Mexico 45 38 12 8 -15.6 -33.3 5.7 41 ,. 21 74 Panama 41 31 10 6 -24.4 -40.0 4.1 43 ,, 44 75 Taiwan 39 21 7 5 -46.2 -28.6 2.5 49 44 65 76 Chile 37 22 12 7 -40.5 -41.7 2.7 46 77 South Africa 39 38 15 10 -2.6 -33.3 5.1 42 78 Costa Rica 47 28 10 5 -40.4 -50.0 3.6 46 67 79 Brazil 40 36 11 9 -10.0 -18.2 4.9 43 2 80 Uruguay 22 20 9 9 -9.1 0.0 2.9 41 81 Argentina 24 21 9 8 -12.5 -11.1 2.9 43 82 Portugal 24 18 8 10 -25.0 25.0 2.5 42 83 Yugoslavia 23 18 10 8 -21.7 -20.0 2.2 45 59 84 Trinidad and Tobago 37 22 7 6 -40.5 -14.3 2.6 46 44 85 Venezuela 45 36 10 7 -20.0 -30.0 4.9 43 86 Hong Kong 35 19 7 6 -45.7 -14.3 2.6 45 51 77 8] Greece 19 15 8 9 -21.1 12.5 2.3 40 88 Singapore 38 17 8 6 -55.3 -25.0 2.1 51 45 71 89 Spain 21 18 9 8 -14.3 -11.1 2.6 41 90 Israel 26 26 8 7 0.0 -12.5 3.5 42 Industrialized countries 20 w 14 w 10 w 9w -31.3 w -6.0 w 1.8 w 43 w 91 Ireland 21 21 12 11 0.0 -8.3 3.5 39 92 Italy 18 13 10 9 -27,8 -10.0 1.9 41 93 New Zealand 26 17 9 8 -34.6 -11.1 2.2 44 94 United Kingdom 17 12 12 12 -29.4 0.0 1.7 39 72 95 Finland 19 14 9 9 -26.3 0.0 1.7 44 77 96 Austria 18 11 13 12 -38.9 -7.7 1.7 39 97 Japan 18 15 8 6 -16.7 -25.0 1.8 46 .. 61 98 Australia 22 16 9 8 -27.3 -11.1 2.1 44 66 99 France 18 14 12 10 -22.2 -16.7 1.9 41 64 100 Netherlands 21 13 8 8 -38.1 0.0 1.6 44 59 71 101 Belgium 17 12 12 11 -29.4 -8.3 1.8 41 87 102 Canada 27 16 8 8 -40.7 0.0 1.9 47 103 Norway 18 13 9 10 -27.8 11.1 1.8 39 104 Germany, Fed. Rep. 17 9 11 12 -47.1 9.1 1.4 40 105 United States 24 15 9 9 -37.5 0.0 1.8 44 65 106 Denmark 17 12 9 10 -29.4 11.1 1.7 41 67 107 Sweden 15 12 10 11 -20.0 10.0 1.7 40 108 Switzerland 18 11 10 9 -38.9 -10.0 1.5 43 Capital-surplus oil exporters 48 w 43 w 21 w 14 w -10.5 w -35.0 w 6.5 w 41 w 109 Iraq 51 47 19 13 -7.8 -31.6 7.0 41 .. 23 110 Iran 47 40 21 14 -14.9 -33.3 5.9 41 3 24 111 Libya 49 47 19 13 -4.1 -31.6 7.4 40 112 Saudi Arabia 51 51 28 15 0.0 -46.4 8.0 39 113 Kuwait 44 47 10 5 6.8 -50.0 7.0 42 Centrally planned economies 32 w 18 w 13w 7w -41.5 w -40.1 w 2.4 w 45 w 114 China 36 18 15 6 -50.0 -60.0 2.3 46 115 Korea, Dem. Rep. 41 33 13 8 -19.5 -38.5 4.5 44 116 Albania 41 30 11 6 -26.8 -45.5 4.2 44 117 Cuba 32 19 9 6 -40.6 -33.3 2.5 44 118 Mongolia 41 37 15 8 -9.8 -46.7 5.4 42 119 Romania 20 19 9 9 -5.0 0.0 2.6 42 120 Bulgaria 18 16 9 11 -11.1 22.2 2.3 42 121 Hungary 16 16 10 12 0.0 20.0 2.2 41 122 Poland 24 19 8 9 -20.8 12.5 2.3 45 123 USSR 24 18 7 10 -25.0 42.9 2.4 43 124 Czechoslovakia 17 18 10 11 5.9 10.0 2.4 41 66 125 German Dem. Rep. 17 13 13 13 -23.5 0.0 1.8 40 a. Fipures in italics are for years other than those specified. See the technical notes. 145 Table 19. Labor Force Percentage of population of Percentage of labor force in: Average annual growth working age of labor force (15-64 years) Agriculture Industry Services (percent) 1960 1978 1960 1978 1960 1978 1960 1978 1960-70 1970-80 1980-2000 Low-income countries 56w 55w 77w72w 9wllw l4wl7w l.7w 1.9w 2.2w 1 Kampuchea, Dem. 2 Bangladesh 53 54 87 74 3 ii 10 15 2.5 2.4 2.5 3 Lao PDR 56 51 83 75 4 7 13 18 1.4 0.3 2.0 4 Bhutan 56 55 95 93 2 2 3 5 1.7 2.0 1.9 5 Ethiopia 54 52 88 81 5 7 7 12 2.2 1.8 2.2 6 Mali 54 52 94 88 3 6 3 6 2.0 2.2 2.5 7 Nepal 57 55 95 93 2 2 3 5 1.5 2.0 2.1 8 Somalia 54 54 88 82 4 7 8 11 1.7 2.3 2.4 9 Burundi 55 53 90 85 3 5 7 10 1.9 1.6 2.3 10 Chad 57 54 95 86 2 6 3 8 1.5 2.0 2.3 11 Mozambique 56 53 81 67 8 18 11 15 1.9 1.7 2.2 12 Burma 59 55 68 53 11 20 21 27 1.1 1.5 2.0 13 Upper Volta 54 53 92 83 5 12 3 5 1.2 1.4 2.3 14 Viet Nam .. 52 81 73 5 8 14 19 1.0 1,9 2.6 15 India 57 56 74 74 11 11 15 15 1.5 1.7 2.0 16 Malawi 52 50 92 86 3 5 5 9 2.3 2.4 2.8 17 Rwanda 53 51 95 91 1 2 4 7 2.2 2.5 2.8 18 Sri Lanka 54 58 56 54 14 15 30 31 2.1 2.1 2.1 19 Guinea 55 54 88 82 6 11 6 7 2.4 2.2 2.1 20 Sierra Leone 55 53 78 67 12 18 10 15 1.5 1.8 2.3 21 Zaire 53 53 83 76 9 13 8 11 1.4 2.1 2.4 22 Niger 53 51 95 91 1 3 4 6 3.0 2.6 2.9 23 Beriin 53 51 54 46 9 15 37 39 2.0 2.2 2.1 24 Pakistan 52 51 61 58 18 19 21 23 1.8 2.5 2.9 25 Tanzania 54 51 89 83 4 6 7 11 2.1 2.3 2.7 26 Afghanistan 55 53 85 79 6 9 9 12 1.9 1.8 2.5 27 Central African Rep. 58 56 94 89 2 3 4 8 1.7 1.6 2.3 28 Madagascar 55 53 93 86 2 4 5 10 1.8 2.0 2.3 29 Haiti 55 53 80 70 6 8 14 22 0.7 1.4 2.4 30 Mauritania 53 52 91 85 3 5 6 10 2.2 2.3 2.7 31 Lesotho 57 55 93 87 2 4 5 9 1.6 1.9 2,1 32 Uganda 54 52 89 83 4 6 7 11 3.2 2.5 2.5 33 Angola 55 53 69 60 12 16 19 24 1.0 1.9 2.4 34 Sudan 53 53 86 79 6 9 8 12 2.1 2.3 2.7 35 Togo 53 51 80 69 8 14 12 17 2.2 2.1 2.6 36 Kenya 50 48 86 79 5 8 9 13 2.9 2.8 3.3 37 Senegal 54 53 84 77 5 8 11 15 1.8 1.9 2.2 38 Indonesia 56 56 75 60 8 11 17 29 1.8 2.1 1.8 Middle-income countries 55 w 55 w 58w45w llw23w 25 w 32 w 2.0 w 2.4 w 2.5 w 39 Egypt 55 56 58 51 12 26 30 23 2.2 2.2 2.3 40 Ghana 53 51 6454 14 19 22 27 1.6 2.4 2.9 41 Yemen, PDR 52 51 70 60 15 21 15 19 1.4 1.3 2.8 42 Cameroon 57 55 87 82 5 7 8 11 1.3 1.3 1.7 43 Liberia 52 50 80 71 10 13 10 16 2.3 2.6 2.9 44 Honduras 52 49 70 64 11 14 19 22 2.5 3.0 3.3 45 Zambia 53 51 79 68 7 11 14 21 2.4 2.4 2.8 46 Zimbabwe 52 50 69 60 11 15 20 25 3.1 2.6 3.0 47 Thailand 53 53 84 77 4 8 12 15 2.1 2.9 2.3 48 Bolivia 55 53 61 51 18 24 21 25 1.9 2.4 2.9 49 Philippines 52 52 61 48 15 16 24 36 2.1 2.4 2.7 50 Yemen Arab Rep. 54 51 83 36 7 11 10 13 1.5 1.4 2.3 51 Congo, Peoples Rep. 56 54 52 35 17 26 31 39 1.5 2.0 2.7 52 Nigeria 52 54 71 56 10 17 19 27 1.8 2.0 2.9 53 Papua New Guinea 57 55 89 82 4 7 3 11 1.8 1.9 2.0 54 El Salvador 52 51 62 52 17 22 21 26 2.5 2.8 3.3 55 Morocco 53 50 62 53 14 20 24 27 1.6 2.9 3.3 56 Peru 52 53 53 39 19 21 28 40 2.0 3.0 3.1 57 Ivory Coast 54 54 89 81 2 3 9 16 3.6 4.5 2.4 58 Nicaragua 50 49 62 44 16 15 22 41 2.6 3.3 3.6 59 Colombia 50 56 52 30 19 23 29 47 3.0 3.2 2.6 60 Paraguay 51 52 56 50 19 19 25 31 2,3 3.1 3.4 61 Ecuador 52 52 58 46 19 25 23 29 2.9 3.2 3.2 62 Dominican Rep. 49 51 67 57 12 16 21 27 2.3 3,4 3,3 63 Guatemala 51 54 67 57 14 20 19 23 2.5 3.0 2.8 64 Syrian Arab Rep. 52 48 54 49 19 22 27 29 2.1 2.9 3.5 65 Tunisia 53 54 56 45 18 24 26 31 0.7 2.9 2.6 66 Jordan 52 51 44 27 26 39 30 34 2.8 2.9 3.2 146 Percentage of population of Percentage of labor force in: Average annual growth working age of labor force (15-64 years) Agriculture Industry Services (percent) 1960 1978 1960 1978 1960 1978 1960 1978 1960-70 1970-SO 1980-2000 67 Malaysia 51 54 63 50 12 16 25 34 2.8 3.0 2.8 68 Jamaica 54 51 39 28 25 17 36 55 0.4 2.4 3.3 69 Lebanon 53 55 38 12 23 27 39 61 2.1 3.0 2.8 70 Korea, Rep, of 54 60 66 41 9 37 25 22 2.9 2.8 2.0 71 Turkey 55 56 78 60 11 14 11 26 1.4 2.2 2.1 72 Algeria 52 49 6] 30 12 25 21 45 0.2 3.5 3.5 73 Mexico 51 51 55 39 20 26 25 35 2.8 3.3 3.5 74 Panama 52 55 51 35 14 18 35 47 3.3 2.8 2.6 75 Taiwan 52 63 56 3] 11 37 33 26 2.4 1.9 1.6 76 Chile 57 61 30 20 30 26 40 54 1.4 2.6 2.1 77 South Africa 55 54 32 30 30 29 38 41 3.2 2.6 3.0 78 Costa Rica 50 57 51 29 19 23 30 48 3.4 3.6 2.7 79 Brazil 54 55 52 41 15 22 33 3] 2.7 2.8 2.9 80 Uruguay 64 63 21 12 29 33 50 55 0.9 0.2 1.1 81 Argentina 64 63 20 14 36 29 44 57 1.3 1.2 1.2 82 Portugal 63 63 44 27 29 37 27 36 0.2 0.8 0.9 83 Yugoslavia 63 66 63 33 18 32 19 35 1.0 1.1 0.7 84 Trinidad and Tobago 53 60 22 16 34 36 44 48 2.4 2.6 2.2 85 Venezuela 51 54 35 20 22 27 43 53 2.7 3.9 3.2 86 Hong Kong 56 65 8 3 52 57 40 40 3.1 3.0 1.3 8] Greece 65 64 56 39 20 28 24 33 (.) 0.6 0.5 88 Singapore 55 65 8 2 23 38 69 60 2.7 2.7 1.4 89 Spain 64 63 42 18 31 43 27 39 0.2 1.2 0.9 90 Israel 59 59 14 7 35 36 51 57 3.5 2.4 2.1 Industrialized countries 63w 65w l?w 6w 38w 39 w '45w 55 w 1.2 w 1.1 w - O.6w 91 Ireland 58 58 36 20 25 3] 39 43 (.) 1.0 1.6 92 Italy 66 64 31 13 40 48 29 39 -0.1 0.7 0.4 93 New Zealand 59 63 15 10 37 35 48 55 2.2 2.1 1.2 94 United Kingdom 65 64 4 2 48 43 48 55 0.6 0.3 0.4 95 Finland 62 68 36 14 31 37 33 49 0.5 1.0 0.4 96 Austria 66 63 24 10 46 40 30 50 -0.7 0.8 0.4 97 Japan 64 68 33 13 30 39 37 48 1.8 1.3 0.7 98 Australia 61 64 11 6 40 34 49 60 2.6 1.8 0.9 99 France 62 63 22 9 39 40 39 51 0.6 1.1 0.6 100 Netherlands 61 65 11 6 42 45 47 49 1.6 1.3 0.5 101 Belgium 65 65 8 3 48 43 44 54 0.3 0.7 0.3 102 Canada 59 66 13 6 35 30 52 64 2.5 2.0 0.9 103 Norway 63 63 20 8 3] 38 43 54 0.5 0.7 0.6 104 Germany, Fed. Rep. 68 65 14 4 48 48 38 48 0.2 0.7 (.) 105 United States 60 65 7 2 36 33 57 65 1.7 1.5 0.9 106 Denmark 64 64 18 8 3] 3] 45 55 1.1 0.6 0.4 107 Sweden 66 64 14 5 45 37 41 58 1.0 0.3 0.2 108 Switzerland 66 66 12 6 50 47 38 47 1.9 0.4 0.2 Capital-surplus oil exporters 51 w 51 zo 5lw 42w 2Ow 29w 23 w 29 w 2.6 w 2.8 w 2.9 w 109 Iraq 51 51 53 42 18 25 29 33 2.8 2.9 3.2 110 Iran 51 51 54 40 23 33 23 27 2.5 2.6 2.9 111 Libya 53 51 53 21 17 27 30 52 5.2 3.5 3.0 112 Saudi Arabia 54 52 71 62 10 13 19 25 2.3 3.5 2.7 113 Kuwait 63 53 1 2 34 35 65 63 7.3 4.1 3.1 Centrally planned economies 58 w 62 w 64 w 49 w 20 w 31 w 16 w 20 w 1.4 w 1.7 w 1.2 w 114 China 56 61 75 62 15 25 10 13 1.7 1.9 1.4 115 Korea, Dem. Rep. 53 56 62 49 23 32 15 19 2.3 2.9 2.7 116 Albania 54 57 71 62 18 24 11 14 2.3 2.7 2.4 117 Cuba 61 59 39 25 22 31 39 44 0.8 2.0 2.0 118 Mongolia 54 53 70 56 13 21 17 23 2.1 2.4 2.7 119 Romania 65 64 64 50 21 31 15 19 0.8 0.6 0.7 120 Bulgaria 66 66 56 40 25 38 19 22 0.7 0.3 0.3 121 Hungary 66 66 38 18 35 55 27 27 0.5 0.4 0.2 122 Poland 61 66 48 33 29 39 23 28 1.8 1.4 0.8 123 USSR 63 65 42 17 29 47 29 36 0.7 1.2 0.] 124 Czechoslovakia 64 64 26 12 46 50 28 38 0.9 0.8 0.7 125 German Dem. Rep. 65 63 18 10 48 51 34 39 -0.2 0.5 0.3 147 Table 20. Urbanization Percentage of urban population Number of Urban population In cities cities As percentage Average annual In of over of over of total growth rate largest 500,000 500,000 population (percent) city persons persons 1960 1980 1960-70 1970-80 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960 1980 Low-income countries 17 w 21 zv 3.'?w 4.Ow l4w l6w 24w 45w 20t 76t 1 Kampuchea, Dem. . .. .. .. .. .. .. . - 2 Bangladesh 5 11 6.5 6.6 20 30 20 51 1 3 3 Lao PDR 8 13 4.1 4.8 69 48 0 0 0 0 4 Bhutan 3 4 4.2 4.5 .. 0 0 0 0 5 Ethiopia 6 15 6.1 6.9 30 37 0 37 0 1 6 Mali 11 20 5.4 5.5 32 34 0 0 0 0 7 Nepal 3 5 4.3 4.7 41 27 0 0 0 0 8 Somalia 17 30 5.3 5.1 34 0 0 0 0 9 Burundi 2 2 2.4 2.6 0 0 0 0 10 Chad 7 18 6.8 6.7 .. 39 0 0 0 0 11 Mozambique 4 9 6.6 6.8 75 83 0 83 0 1 12 Burma 19 2] 3.9 4.0 23 23 23 29 1 1 13 Upper Volta 5 9 5.3 4.1 .. 41 0 0 0 0 14 Viet Nam 15 23 5.3 5.1 32 21 32 50 1 4 15 India 18 22 3.3 3.3 7 6 26 47 11 36 16 Malawi 4 9 6.6 6.2 19 0 0 0 0 17 Rwanda 2 4 5.3 5,9 .. .. 0 0 0 0 18 Sri Lanka 18 27 4.3 3.7 28 16 0 16 0 1 19 Guinea 10 19 6.1 6.1 37 80 0 80 0 1 20 Sierra Leone 13 25 5.5 5.6 37 47 0 0 0 0 21 Zaire 16 34 5.2 7.2 14 28 14 38 1 2 22 Niger 6 13 7.0 6.8 31 0 0 0 0 23 Benin 10 14 5.3 3.9 .. 63 0 63 0 1 24 Pakistan 22 28 4.0 4.3 20 21 33 52 2 7 25 Tanzania 5 12 6.3 8.3 34 50 0 50 0 1 26 Afghanistan 8 15 5.4 5.6 33 17 0 17 0 1 27 Central African Rep. 23 41 5.3 4.9 40 36 0 0 0 0 28 Madagascar 11 18 5.1 5.2 44 36 0 36 0 1 29 Haiti 16 35 3.9 4.2 42 56 0 56 0 1 30 Mauritania 3 23 15.8 8.6 39 0 0 0 0 31 Lesotho 2 5 7.5 7.8 .. .. 0 0 0 0 32 Uganda 5 12 6.3 7.0 38 52 0 52 0 1 33 Angola 10 21 5.1 5.8 44 64 0 64 0 1 34 Sudan 10 25 6.9 6.8 30 31 0 31 0 1 35 Togo 10 17 5.6 5.6 .. 60 0 0 0 0 36 Kenya 7 14 6.6 6.8 40 57 0 57 0 1 3] Senegal 23 25 2.9 3.3 53 65 0 65 0 1 38 Indonesia 15 20 3.8 3.6 20 23 34 49 3 9 Middle-income countries 37 w 51 w 4.2 w 3.8 w 29 w 30 w 36w 49w 52t liSt 39 Egypt 38 45 3.6 3.0 38 39 53 53 2 2 40 Ghana 23 36 4.6 5.2 25 35 0 48 0 2 41 Yemen, PDR 28 37 3.2 3.5 61 50 0 0 0 0 42 Cameroon 14 35 5.6 7.5 26 21 0 21 0 1 43 Liberia 21 33 5.6 5.6 .. .. 0 0 0 0 44 Honduras 23 36 5.5 5.5 31 33 0 0 0 0 45 Zambia 23 38 5.4 5.4 ,, 35 0 35 0 1 46 Zimbabwe 13 23 6.8 6.4 40 50 0 50 0 1 47 Thailand 13 14 3.7 3.5 65 69 65 68 1 1 48 Bolivia 24 33 4.1 4.3 47 44 0 44 0 1 49 Philippines 30 36 3.9 3.6 2] 30 2] 36 1 3 50 Yemen Arab Rep. 3 10 7.5 7.3 25 0 0 0 0 51 Congo, People's Rep. 33 37 2.6 3.2 77 56 0 0 0 0 52 Nigeria 13 20 4.7 4.9 13 17 22 57 2 9 53 Papua New Guinea 3 17 15.3 8.5 25 0 0 0 0 54 El Salvador 38 41 3.2 3.4 26 22 0 0 0 0 55 Morocco 29 41 4.2 4.5 16 13 16 29 1 5 56 Peru 46 67 5.0 4.4 38 39 38 44 1 2 57 Ivory Coast 19 38 7.3 8.2 27 33 0 33 0 1 58 Nicaragua 41 53 4.2 4.5 41 47 0 47 0 1 59 Colombia 48 70 5.2 3.9 17 26 28 53 3 5 60 Paraguay 36 39 3.0 3.5 44 44 0 44 0 1 61 Ecuador 34 45 4.5 4.5 31 29 0 52 0 2 62 Dominican Rep. 30 51 5.8 5.3 50 54 0 70 0 2 63 Guatemala 33 39 3.6 3.7 41 36 41 36 1 1 64 Syrian Arab Rep. 33 50 4.8 4.] 35 33 35 55 1 2 65 Tunisia 36 52 3.8 3.8 40 31 40 31 1 66 Jordan 43 56 4,5 4.5 31 37 0 37 0 1 148 Percentage of urban population Number of Urban population In cities cities As percentage Average annual In of over of over of total growth rate largest 500,000 500,000 population (percent) city persons persons 1960 1980 1960-70 1970-80 1960 1980 1960 1980 1960 1980 67 Malaysia 25 29 3.6 3.5 19 27 0 27 0 1 68 Jamaica 34 50 3.5 3.6 77 65 0 65 0 1 69 Lebanon 44 76 6.2 4.5 64 79 64 79 1 1 70 Korea, Rep. of 28 55 6.2 4.8 35 41 61 77 3 7 71 Turkey 30 47 5.1 4.6 18 24 32 42 3 4 72 Algeria 30 61 6.1 6.4 27 12 27 12 1 1 73 Mexico 51 67 4.8 4.5 28 32 36 48 3 7 74 Panama 41 54 4.4 3.9 30 33 0 33 0 1 75 Taiwan 58 77 3.3 4.1 .. .. .. S 76 Chile 68 81 3.1 2.4 38 44 38 44 1 1 77 South Africa 47 50 2.8 3.1 16 13 44 53 4 7 78 Costa Rica 37 43 4.2 3.4 67 64 0 64 0 1 79 Brazil 46 65 4.8 4.3 14 16 35 52 6 14 80 Uruguay 80 84 1.3 0.] 56 52 56 52 1 1 81 Argentina 74 82 2.0 1.8 46 45 54 60 3 5 82 Portugal 23 31 1.5 2.5 47 42 47 42 1 1 83 Yugoslavia 28 42 3.2 2.9 11 10 11 23 1 3 84 Trinidad and Tobago 22 22 1.7 1.4 . . .. 0 0 0 0 85 Venezuela 67 83 4.8 4.2 26 26 26 39 1 3 86 Hong Kong 89 90 2.6 1.9 100 100 100 100 1 1 87 Greece 43 62 2.6 2.4 51 57 51 70 1 2 88 Singapore 100 100 2.4 1.5 100 100 100 100 1 1 89 Spain 57 74 2.6 2.3 13 16 37 44 5 6 90 Israel 77 89 4,3 3.1 46 35 46 35 1 1 Industrialized countries 67 w 77 w 1.8 w 1.2 w 19 w 18 w 48w SSw 99t 152f 91 Ireland 46 58 1.6 2.2 51 48 51 48 1 1 92 Italy 59 69 1.5 1.3 13 17 46 55 7 9 93 New Zealand 76 85 2.4 1.9 25 30 0 30 0 1 94 United Kingdom 86 91 0.8 0.3 24 20 61 52 15 18 95 Finland 38 62 3.2 2.5 28 27 0 27 0 1 96 Austria 50 54 0.9 0.5 51 39 51 39 1 1 97 Japan 62 78 2.4 2.0 18 22 35 41 5 9 98 Australia 81 89 2.5 1.8 26 24 62 68 4 5 99 France 62 78 2.4 1.4 25 23 34 35 4 7 100 Netherlands 80 76 1.0 0.5 9 9 27 24 3 3 101 Belgium 66 72 1.2 0.5 17 14 28 24 2 2 102 Canada 69 80 2.7 1.7 14 17 31 66 2 10 103 Norway 32 53 3.5 2.7 50 32 50 32 1 1 104 Germany, Fed. Rep. 77 85 1.4 0.5 20 18 48 45 11 12 105 United States 67 73 1.7 1.2 13 12 61 77 40 67 106 Denmark 74 84 1.5 0.9 40 32 40 32 1 1 107 Sweden 73 87 1.8 1.0 15 15 15 15 1 3 108 Switzerland 51 58 2.2 0.7 19 22 19 22 1 1 Capital-surplus oil exporters 35 w 58 w 5.8 w 5.5 w 28 w 36 w 23w 51w 2 13t 109 Iraq 43 72 6.2 5.4 35 55 35 70 1 3 110 Iran 34 50 4.7 4.9 26 28 26 47 1 6 111 Libya 23 52 8.0 8.2 57 64 0 64 0 1 112 Saudi Arabia 30 67 7.8 6.5 15 18 0 41 0 3 113 Kuwait 72 88 10.4 7.2 75 32 0 0 0 0 Centrally planned economies 29 w 36 w 3.0 w 2.6 w 9w 7w 31 w 37 w 76 133 114 China 19 25 3.6 3.1 6 6 42 44 38 65 115 Korea, Dem. Rep. 40 60 5.0 4,3 15 12 15 19 1 2 116 Albania 31 37 3.8 3.4 27 25 0 0 0 0 117 Cuba 55 65 2.9 2.4 38 31 38 31 1 1 118 Mongolia 36 50 5.2 4.1 53 52 0 0 0 0 119 Romania 34 48 2.8 2.5 22 17 22 17 1 1 120 Bulgaria 39 64 3.8 2.5 23 18 23 18 1 1 121 Hungary 40 54 1.7 2.2 45 38 45 38 1 1 122 Poland 48 57 1.8 1.7 17 15 41 43 5 8 123 USSR 49 65 2.7 2.2 6 4 21 33 25 50 124 Czechoslovakia 47 63 2.1 2.0 17 12 17 12 1 1 125 German Oem, Rep. 72 77 0.1 0.2 9 9 . 14 17 2 3 149 Table 21. Indicators Related to Life Expectancy Life Infant Child expectancy mortality death at birth rate rate (years) (aged 0_1)a (aged 1_4)a 1960 1978 1960 1978 1960 1978 Low-income countries '12w 50w 3Ow 20w 1 Kampuchea, Dem, .. .. .. 2 Bangladesh 40 47 .. 139 29 23 3 Lao PDR 40 42 .. .. 29 27 4 Bhutan 36 41 .. 41 28 5 Ethiopia 36 39 126 43 37 6 Mali 37 42 210 41 32 7 Nepal 36 43 .. .. 35 23 8 Somalia 36 43 .. 43 31 9 Burundi 37 45 .. .. 41 28 10 Chad 35 43 45 30 11 Mozambique 37 46 .. 41 27 12 Burma 44 53 25 15 13 Upper Volta 37 42 263 41 32 14 Viet Nam 41 62 . .. 28 6 15 India 43 51 28 18 16 Malawi 37 46 41 27 17 Rwanda 37 46 ikz 41 27 18 Sri Lanka 62 69 7 2 19 Guinea 35 43 45 30 20 Sierra Leone 37 46 41 27 21 Zaire 40 46 37 27 22 Niger 37 42 212 .. 41 32 23 Benin 37 46 206 .. 41 27 24 Pakistan 44 52 .. .. 27 17 25 Tanzania 42 51 185 32 20 26 Afghanistan 34 42 237 42 2] 27 Central African Rep. 3] 46 40 27 28 Madagascar 37 46 41 2] 29 Haiti 42 51 39 23 30 Mauritania 37 42 41 32 31 Lesotho 42 50 34 21 32 Uganda 44 53 thb 30 17 33 Angola 33 41 49 34 34 Sudan 39 46 46 31 35 logo 37 46 41 27 36 Kenya 47 53 126 25 14 37 Senegal 37 42 93 41 32 38 Indonesia 41 47 125 .. 31 20 Middle-income countries 54w 61w 18w lOw 39 Egypt 46 54 108 31 18 40 Ghana 40 48 36 23 41 Yemen, PDR 36 44 54 36 42 Cameroon 37 46 40 27 43 Liberia 40 48 36 23 44 Honduras 46 57 130 118 30 14 45 Zambia 40 48 36 23 46 Zimbabwe 45 54 .. .. 28 16 47 Thailand 51 61 68 15 6 48 Bolivia 43 52 158 36 22 49 Philippines 51 60 98 65 16 7 50 Yemen Arab. Rep. 36 39 55 31 51 Congo, People's Rep. 37 46 180 .. 40 27 52 Nigeria 39 48 .. 38 24 53 Papua New Guinea 41 50 159 32 19 54 El Salvador 50 63 60 24 8 55 Morocco 47 55 30 1] 56 Peru 48 56 28 16 57 Ivory Coast 37 46 41 27 58 Nicaragua 47 55 37 30 17 59 Colombia 53 62 98 17 9 60 Paraguay 56 63 .. 16 8 61 Ecuador 51 60 140 66 23 10 62 Dominican Rep. 51 60 37 23 10 63 Guatemala 47 57 77 31 15 64 Syrian Arab Rep. 48 57 29 14 65 Tunisia 48 5] 148 123 29 15 66 Jordan 47 56 30 16 150 Life Infant Child expectancy mortality death at birth rate rate (years) (aged 0-1)a (aged 1-4)a 1960 1978 1960 1978 1960 1978 67 Malaysia 57 67 31 9 3 68 Jamaica 64 70 63 20 7 3 69 Lebanon 58 65 .. 14 6 70 Korea, Rep. of 54 63 62 37 13 5 71 Turkey 51 61 118 24 10 72 Algeria 47 56 30 16 73 Mexico 58 65 78 60 14 6 74 Panama 62 70 90 47 10 3 75 Taiwan 64 72 56 25 8 1 76 Chile 57 67 108 55 14 5 77 South Africa 53 60 .. 17 10 78 Costa Rica 62 70 80 28 10 3 79 Brazil 57 62 128 92 13 9 80 Uruguay 68 71 .. 46 4 3 81 Argentina 65 71 55 6 3 82 Portugal 63 69 78 39 7 2 83 Yugoslavia 62 69 88 34 4 2 84 Trinidad and Tobago 63 70 45 29 8 3 85 Venezuela 59 66 72 40 12 5 86 Hong Kong 65 72 42 12 3 1 87 Greece 68 73 40 19 2 1 88 Singapore 64 70 31 12 4 1 89 Spain 68 73 44 16 2 1 90 Israel 69 72 31 15 2 1 Industrialized countries 69w ]4w 29w l3w iw 1w 91 Ireland 69 73 29 16 1 1 92 Italy 69 73 44 18 2 1 93 New Zealand 71 73 21 14 1 1 94 United Kingdom 70 73 22 14 1 1 95 Finland 68 72 21 9 1 1 96 Austria 68 72 38 15 1 1 97 Japan 68 76 31 10 3 1 98 Australia 70 73 20 13 1 1 99 France 70 73 27 11 1 1 100 Netherlands 73 74 18 10 1 1 101 Belgium 70 72 31 12 1 1 102 Canada 71 74 27 12 1 1 103 Norway 73 75 19 9 1 1 104 Germany, Fed. Rep. 69 72 34 15 1 1 105 United States 70 73 26 14 1 1 106 Denmark 72 74 22 9 1 1 107 Sweden 72 75 17 8 1 1 108 Switzerland 71 74 21 10 1 1 Capital-surplus oil exporters 45 w 53 w 94w 29w lSw 109 Iraq 46 55 92 31 17 110 Iran 46 52 .. 24 14 111 Libya 47 55 .. 53 30 17 112 Saudi Arabia 38 53 118 48 28 113 Kuwait 60 69 39 12 2 Centrally planned economies 58 w 70 w 10 w 1w 114 China 53 70 14 1 115 Korea, Dem. Rep. 54 63 .. 13 5 116 Albania 62 69 .. .. 6 2 117 Cuba 64 72 35 25 8 1 118 Mongolia 52 63 . S 14 5 119 Romania 66 70 76 31 3 1 120 Bulgaria 67 72 45 22 3 1 121 Hungary 67 70 48 24 2 1 122 Poland 66 71 57 22 2 1 123 USSR 68 70 41 1 1 124 Czechoslovakia 69 70 24 19 1 1 125 German Dem. Rep. 68 72 39 13 2 1 a. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. See the technical notes. 151 Table 22. Health-related Indicators Percentage Daily calorie supply Population per: of population per capita Physiciana Nursing persona with access As percentage to safe water Total of requirement 1960 1977 1960 1977 1975 1977 1977 Low.income countries 18,020 w 9,900 w 9,050 w 8,790 w 28 w 2,052 w 91 w 1 Kampuchea, Dem. 1,926 78 2 Bangladesh 9260 42,080 53 1,812 78 3 Lao PDR 38,000 21600 2,440 2,082 94 4 Bhutan 2,028 88 5 Ethiopia 89,360 76,320 20,310 6 1,754 75 6 Mali 38,640 24,100 4,980 3,080 9 2,117 90 7 Nepal 72,000 35,210 51,220 9 2,002 91 8 Somalia 36,570 6,220 .. 33 2,033 88 9 Burundi 77,160 50,840 6,850 6,980 2,254 97 10 Chad 70,930 42,150 8,040 4,220 26 1,762 74 11 Mozambique 20,000 4,660 1,906 81 12 Burma 9,900 5,120 5,190 17 2,286 106 13 Upper Volta 59,850 55,770 1,280 10 1,875 79 14 Viet Nam 5,620 .. .. 1,801 83 15 India 5,800 3,620 9,630 5,680 33 2,021 91 16 Malawi 42,400 48,200 12,920 3,890 33 2,066 90 17 Rwanda 138,100 36,440 11,200 9,830 35 2,264 98 18 Sri Lanka 4,500 6,270 4,150 2,260 20 2,126 96 19 Guinea 48,000 16,630 3,890 2,450 10 1,943 84 20 Sierra Leone 19,960 5,900 .. 2,150 93 21 Zaire 36,850 15,540 3,440 1,940 16 2,271 104 22 Niger 74,050 42,610 8,450 5,160 27 2,139 91 23 Benin 47,000 26,910 3,010 20 2,249 98 24 Pakistan 11,000 3,780 10,040 29 2,281 99 25 Tanzania 21,020 15,450 10,440 2,760 39 2,063 89 26 Afghanistan 22,460 19,890 23,210 25,100 6 2,695 110 27 Central African Rep. 35,600 17,610 2,760 1,560 16 2,242 99 28 Madagascar 9,620 10,300 3,110 3,540 26 2,486 115 29 Haiti 10,600 5,940 11,880 3,510 14 2,100 93 30 Mauritania 39,150 15,160 7,320 3,430 .. 1,976 86 31 Lesotho 22,530 18,640 4,340 17 2,245 99 32 Uganda 12,960 27,600 9,420 4,300 35 2,110 91 33 Angola 14,000 2,133 91 34 Sudan 27,880 8,700 3,040 1,340 46 2,184 93 35 Togo 35,130 18,360 5,340 2,040 16 2,069 90 36 Kenya 10,560 11,950 2,230 1,120 17 2,032 88 37 Senegal 22,380 15,700 1,610 37 2,261 95 38 Indonesia 41,000 14,580 .. 2,820 12 2,272 105 Middle-income countries 8,960 w 4,310 w l,86Ow 60w 2,59Ow 108w 39 Egypt 2,600 1,070 2,730 1,150 66 2,760 109 40 Ghana 12,160 9,930 5,430 840 35 1,983 86 41 Yemen, PDR 7,510 1,570 24 1,945 81 42 Cameroon 40,190 16,510 6,150 2,230 26 2,069 89 43 Liberia 12,270 9,260 5,810 2,900 20 2,404 104 44 Honduras 12,610 3,420 1,240 46 2,015 89 45 Zambia 11,990 10,190 9,920 1,930 42 2,002 87 46 Zimbabwe .. 7,110 1,390 2,576 108 47 Thailand 7,800 8,170 4,900 3,540 22 1,929 105 48 Bolivia 3,660 1,850 3,070 34 1,974 83 49 Philippines 2,760 3,060 39 2,189 97 50 Yemen Arab Rep. 13,830 4,930 4 2,192 91 51 Congo, People's Rep. 16,260 6,350 1,510 660 38 2,284 103 52 Nigeria 56,900 15,800 6,020 4,030 1,951 83 53 Papua New Guinea 11,800 1,930 20 2,268 85 54 El Salvador 5,660 3,600 900 53 2,051 90 55 Morocco 9,400 10,140 1,830 55 2,534 105 56 Peru 2,250 1,560 2,210 750 47 2,274 97 57 Ivory Coast 23,280 15,220 2,920 2,370 19 2,517 105 58 Nicaragua 2,740 1,670 70 2,446 109 59 Colombia 2,400 1,970 3,740 1,250 64 2,364 102 60 Paraguay 2,300 2,160 2,260 13 2,824 122 61 Ecuador 2,600 1,570 2,280 .. 42 2,104 92 62 Dominican Rep. 55 2,094 93 63 Guatemala 4,410 2,490 9,040 40 2,156 98 64 Syrian Arab Rep. 4,600 2,510 6,660 3,810 75 2,684 108 65 Tunisia 10,000 4,800 1,070 70 2,674 112 66 Jordan 5,900 1,940 1,650 950 56 2,107 62 152 Percentage Daily calorie supply Population per: of population per capita Nursing persona with access As percentage Physiciana to safe water Total of requirement 1960 1977 1960 1977 1975 1977 1977 67 Malaysia 6,940 4,350 1,780 1,080 62 2,610 11] 68 Jamaica 2,600 3,520 550 86 2,660 119 69 Lebanon ,, ., 2,495 101 70 Korea, Rep. of 3,000 1,960 510 62 2,785 119 71 Turkey 3,000 1,770 1,400 75 2,907 115 72 Algeria 5,360 1,490 77 2,372 99 73 Mexico 1,700 1,820 1,400 62 2,654 114 74 Panama 2,700 1,260 1,450 79 2,341 101 75 Taiwan 2,330 1,570 7,550 1,760 2,805 120 76 Chile 1,810 1,620 650 450 84 2,656 109 77 South Africa 2,090 540 .. 2,831 116 78 Costa Rica 2,600 1,390 1,700 450 77 2,550 114 79 Brazil 3,600 1,700 77 2,562 107 80 Uruguay 960 710 98 3,036 114 81 Argentina 660 530 66 3,347 126 82 Portugal 1,200 710 1,430 500 65 3,076 126 83 Yugoslavia 1,620 760 1,350 410 3,445 136 84 Trinidad and Tobago 2,570 1,970 .. 580 2,694 111 85 Venezuela 1,430 930 1,890 380 2,435 99 86 Hong Kong 2,990 1,280 2,950 970 2,883 126 87 Greece 790 450 2,080 600 3,400 136 88 Singapore 2,400 1,260 650 340 iôô 3,074 134 89 Spain 820 560 900 3,149 128 90 Israel 410 360 3,141 122 Industrialized countries 820w 630w 22Ow 3,377 w 131 w 91 Ireland 950 830 180 200 3,541 141 92 Italy 640 490 920 330 3,428 136 93 New Zealand 690 740 .. 200 3,345 127 94 United Kingdom 1,100 750 420 300 3,336 132 95 Finland 1,570 620 220 110 3,100 114 96 Austria 550 430 400 260 3,535 134 97 Japan 920 850 460 290 2,949 126 98 Australia 860 650 .. 120 3,428 129 99 France 930 610 530 170 3,434 136 100 Netherlands 900 580 270 .. 3,338 124 101 Belgium 780 470 .. 250 3,583 136 102 Canada 910 560 300 130 3,374 127 103 Norway 850 540 330 100 3,175 118 104 Germany, Fed, Rep. 670 490 450 260 .. 3,381 127 105 United States 760 580 340 150 3,576 135 106 Denmark 810 510 270 170 .. 3,418 127 107 Sweden 1,150 560 .. 130 3,221 120 108 Switzerland 740 500 390 220 .. 3,485 130 Capital-surplus oil exporters 5,470 w 1,830 w l,?7Ow 2,963w ll5w 109 Iraq 5,600 2,230 6,680 2,860 62 2,134 89 110 Iran 3,800 .. 51 3,138 130 111 Libya 5,800 900 2,390 290 100 2,985 126 112 Saudi Arabia 13,000 1,690 .. 860 64 2,624 88 113 Kuwait 760 790 190 270 89 Centrally planned economies 64Ow 390w 4lOw 240w 2,752w ll4w 114 China 2,467 105 115 Korea, Dem. Rep. ., ,, .. 2,837 121 116 Albania 2,860 960 540 370 2,730 113 117 Cuba 1,200 1,100 910 .. ,. 2,720 118 118 Mongolia 1,010 480 290 250 2,523 104 119 Romania 780 730 620 640 3,444 130 120 Bulgaria 640 440 550 220 3,611 144 121 Hungary 640 430 440 200 3,521 134 122 Poland 940 610 490 260 .. 3,656 140 123 USSR 520 300 340 210 .. 3,460 135 124 Czechoslovakia 590 390 280 160 .. 3,340 139 125 German Dem. Rep. 950 520 3,641 139 a. Figures in italics are for years other than those specified. See the technical notes. 153 Table 23. Educationa Number Number enrolled in enrolled in Number enrolled in primary school secondary higher education Adult as percentage of age group school as as percentage literacy percentage of of population rate Total Male Female age group aged 20-24 (percent) 1960 1977 1960 1977 1960 1977 1960 1977 1960 1976 1960 1975 Low-income countries 54w 77w l2w 90w 37w 64w 14w 24w 2w 4W 29w 38w 1 Kampuchea, Dem. R4 82 .. 46 3 .. (.) .. 36 2 Bangladesh 47 81 66 103 26 58 8 23 1 2 22 26 3 Lao PDR 25 92 34 99 16 84 1 14 (.) (.) 28 4 Bhutan 3 11 5 16 (.) 7 1 5 Ethiopia 7 26 11 3 .. (.) 8 (.) (.) .. 10 6 Mali 10 28 14 36 6 20 1 7 .. 1 3 10 7 Nepal 10 71 19 108 1 32 6 14 1 2 9 19 8 Somalia 9 44 13 57 5 32 1 4 (.) 1 2 60 9 Burundi 18 23 27 28 9 18 1 3 (.) (.) 14 25 10 Chad 16 41 29 61 4 21 (.) 3 .. (.) .. 15 11 Mozambique 48 .. 60 36 2 .. .. (.) 8 12 Burma 56 80 61 83 52 78 10 22 1 2 60 67 13 Upper Volta 8 16 12 20 5 12 (.) 2 .. (.) 2 5 14 Viet Nam .. 141 .. 140 .. 142 .. 51 .. 3 .. 87 15 India 61 80 80 95 40 64 20 28 3 6 28 36 16 Malawi 63 62 81 75 45 50 1 4 .. (.) .. 25 17 Rwanda 49 61 68 66 30 57 2 2 .. (.) 16 23 18 Sri Lanka .. 86 .. 89 .. 82 27 47 1 1 75 78 19 Guinea 30 .. 44 .. 16 .. 2 .. .. .. 7 20 Sierra Leone 23 37 30 45 15 29 2 11 (.) 1 .. 15 21 Zaire 60 93 88 109 32 78 3 19 (.) 1 31 15 22 Niger 5 23 7 29 3 16 (.) 3 .. (.) 1 8 23 Berdn 26 58 38 80 15 37 2 11 .. 1 8 11 24 Pakistan 30 51 46 69 13 32 11 17 1 2 15 21 25 Tanzania 25 70 33 79 18 60 2 3 . (.) 10 66 26 Afghanistan 9 20 15 33 2 6 1 7 (.) 1 8 12 27 Central African Rep. 32 81 53 106 12 57 1 9 .. 1 7 28 Madagascar 52 92 58 98 45 86 4 12 (.) 2 50 29 Haiti 46 71 50 .. 42 .. 4 .. (.) 1 15 23 30 Mauritania 8 31 14 40 3 21 (.) 4 .. (.) 5 17 31 Lesotho 83 119 63 98 102 139 3 15 (.) 1 .. 55 32 Uganda 49 53 65 63 32 44 3 7 (.) 1 35 33 Angola 21 .. 28 .. 13 .. 2 .. (.) .. 5 34 Sudan 25 41 35 47 14 34 3 13 (.) 1 13 20 35 Togo 44 106 63 135 24 78 2 27 .. 1 10 18 36 Kenya 47 104 64 110 30 98 2 17 (.) 1 20 40 37 Senegal 27 47 36 57 17 37 3 11 1 2 6 10 38 Indonesia 71 86 86 91 58 81 6 21 1 2 39 62 Middle-income countries 8lw 97w 87 w 100 w 74w 93w l7w 40w 4w llw 54w 7lw 39 Egypt 66 72 80 87 52 56 16 46 5 14 26 44 40 Ghana 38 74 52 84 25 64 5 29 (.) 1 27 30 41 Yemen, PDR 13 77 20 99 5 54 5 26 1 .. 27 42 Cameroon 65 119 87 132 43 106 2 17 .. 1 19 43 Liberia 31 57 45 74 18 40 2 14 (.) 2 9 30 44 Honduras 67 89 68 90 67 88 8 13 1 6 45 57 45 Zambia 42 95 51 104 34 87 2 16 .. 2 .. 39 46 Zimbabwe 96 98 107 106 86 90 6 9 (.) .. 39 47 Thailand 83 83 88 86 79 79 13 27 2 5 68 84 48 Bolivia 64 80 78 88 50 72 12 26 4 10 39 63 49 Philippines 95 105 98 103 93 108 26 56 13 24 72 87 50 Yemen Arab Rep. 8 25 14 43 (.) 6 (.) 3 .. 1 3 13 51 Congo, People's Rep. 78 155 103 166 53 143 4 52 1 3 16 50 52 Nigeria 36 .. 46 .. 27 .. 4 .. (.) 1 15 53 Papua New Guinea 32 60 59 70 7 49 1 12 .. 3 29 32 54 El Salvador 80 77 82 79 77 75 13 22 1 8 49 62 55 Morocco 47 68 67 86 27 50 5 17 1 4 14 28 56 Peru 83 110 95 115 71 106 15 52 4 16 61 72 57 Ivory Coast 46 92 68 115 24 69 2 17 (.) 2 5 20 58 Nicaragua 66 92 65 66 . 7 29 1 10 .. 57 59 Colombia 77 103 77 100 77 105 12 39 2 9 63 81 60 Paraguay 98 102 105 106 90 98 11 25 2 6 75 81 61 Ecuador 83 101 87 101 79 100 12 44 3 28 68 74 62 Dominican Rep. 98 102 99 101 98 103 7 27 1 9 65 67 63 Guatemala 45 65 50 71 39 60 7 16 2 5 32 47 64 Syrian Arab Rep. 65 103 89 120 39 85 16 51 4 12 30 53 65 Tunis 66 100 88 118 43 81 12 22 1 5 16 55 66 Jordan 77 83 94 87 59 79 25 53 1 7 32 70 154 Number Number enrolled in enrolled in Number enrolled in primary school secondary higher education Adult school as as percentage literacy as percentage of age group percentage of of population rate Total Male Female age group aged 20-24 (percent) 1960 1977 1960 1977 1960 1977 1960 1977 1960 1976 1960 1975 67 Malaysia 96 93 108 94 83 91 19 43 1 3 53 60 68 Jamaica 92 97 92 96 93 98 45 58 2 7 82 86 69 Lebanon 102 105 99 19 6 70 Korea, Rep. of 94 111 99 111 89 111 27 88 5 11 71 93 71 Turkey 75 98 90 106 58 90 14 43 3 8 38 60 72 Algeria 46 90 55 105 37 75 8 25 (.) 4 10 37 73 Mexico 80 116 82 120 77 114 11 39 3 10 65 76 74 Panama 96 86 98 88 94 84 29 115 5 22 73 78 75 Taiwan 95 100 33 76 4 12 54 82 76 Chile 109 117 111 119 107 116 24 50 4 13 84 88 77 South Africa 89 94 85 .. 15 3 57 78 Costa Rica 96 111 97 111 95 110 21 44 5 18 90 79 Brazil 95 90 97 89 93 90 11 24 2 12 61 76 80 Uruguay 111 95 111 95 111 94 37 60 8 13 .. 94 81 Argentina 98 110 98 110 99 111 23 41 11 29 91 94 82 Portugal .. 130 134 127 59 4 14 62 70 83 Yugoslavia 111 100 113 101 108 99 58 79 9 21 77 85 84 Trinidad and Tobago 88 81 89 81 87 81 24 38 1 5 93 95 85 Venezuela 100 104 100 105 100 103 21 38 4 21 63 82 86 Hong Kong 87 119 93 121 79 117 20 59 4 10 70 90 87 Greece 102 105 104 107 101 103 37 82 4 18 81 88Singapore 111 110 121 114 101 107 32 55 6 9 .. 75 89 Spain 110 114 106 114 116 115 23 76 4 22 87 90 Israel 98 9] 99 97 97 98 48 68 10 24 84 88 Industrialized countries 114 to 98 w 109 w 102 w 108 to 102 w 68 w 87 to 17 w 36 to 99 w 91 Ireland 110 109 107 110 112 109 35 92 9 18 .. 98 92 Italy 111 105 112 106 109 105 34 73 7 27 91 98 93 New Zealand 108 111 110 112 106 110 73 85 13 28 .. 99 94 United Kingdom 92 105 92 105 92 105 66 82 9 19 99 95 Finland 97 88 100 89 95 88 74 95 7 20 99 100 96 Austria 105 100 106 100 104 100 50 73 8 21 .. 99 97 Japan 103 100 103 100 102 99 74 93 10 29 98 99 98 Australia 103 92 103 92 103 92 51 73 13 24 .. 100 99 France 144 108 144 105 143 110 46 83 10 24 .. 99 100 Netherlands 105 102 105 101 104 102 58 94 13 29 99 101 Belgium 109 105 111 105 108 104 69 88 9 23 99 102 Canada 107 102 108 102 105 102 46 91 16 37 98 103 Norway 100 101 100 101 101 101 57 91 7 24 99 104 Germany, Fed. Rep. 133 90 84 6 25 .. 99 105 United States 118 94 .. .. 86 93 32 56 98 99 106 Denmark 103 103 103 103 103 103 65 77 10 30 99 107 Sweden 96 96 95 96 96 97 55 69 9 30 99 108 Switzerland 118 85 118 85 118 86 26 55 7 16 99 Capital-surplus oil exporters 43 to 94 w 61 to 113 w 26 w 74 12 o 45 w 1w 6w 15 to 50 w 109 Iraq 65 100 94 123 36 76 19 44 2 9 18 110 Iran 41 98 56 119 27 77 12 48 1 5 16 50 111 Libya 59 148 92 156 24 140 9 70 1 7 .. 50 112 Saudi Arabia 12 47 22 59 2 35 2 19 (.) 4 3 113 Kuwait 117 93 131 99 102 87 37 68 .. 13 47 60 Centrally planned economies 101 w 119 to 101 to 118 to 101 w 120 w 45 to 72 w 11 to 20 to 114 China .. 127 .. 125 129 115 Korea, Dem. Rep. .. 113 .. 115 112 116 Albania 94 102 .. 86 20 .. 5 117 Cuba 109 122 109 125 109 119 14 50 3 11 96 118 Mongolia 79 108 79 111 78 105 51 81 8 8 119 Romania 98 102 101 102 95 101 24 77 5 10 .. 98 120 Bulgaria 93 96 94 97 92 96 55 88 11 21 121 Hungary 101 98 103 98 100 98 46 68 7 12 97 98 122 Poland 109 101 110 102 107 99 50 67 9 18 95 98 123 USSR 100 97 100 98 100 97 49 73 11 22 98 99 124 Czechoslovakia 93 96 93 96 93 97 25 38 11 15 95 125 German Dem. Rep. 112 94 111 92 113 95 39 93 16 29 .. a. Figures in itahcs are for years other than those specified. See the technical notes. 155 Table 24. Income Distribution Percentage share of household income, by percentile groups of householdsa Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest Highest Year 20 percent quintile quintile quintile 20 percent 10 percent Low-income countries 1 Kampuchea, Dem. 2 Bangladesh 3 Lao PDR 4 Bhutan 5 Ethiopia 6 Mali 7 Nepal 8 Somalia 9 Burundi 10 Chad 11 Mozambique 12 Burma 13 Upper Volta 14 Viet Nam 15 India 1964-65 6.7 10.5 14.3 19.6 4&9 35.2 16 Malawi 17 Rwanda .. .. .. 18 Sri Lanka 1969-70 7.5 11.7 15.7 21.7 43.4 28.2 19 Guinea 20 Sierra Leone 0 21 Zaire 22 Niger 23 Benin 24 Pakistan 25 Tanzania 26 Afghanistan 27 Central African Rep. 28 Madagascar 29 Haiti 30 Mauritania 31 Lesotho 32 Uganda 33 Angola 34 Sudan 35 Togo 36 Kenya 37 Senegal 38 Indonesia Middle-income countries 39 Egypt 40 Ghana 41 Yemen, PDR 42 Cameroon 43 Liberia 44 Honduras 1967 2.3 5.0 8.0 16.9 67.8 50.0 45 Zambia 46 Zimbabwe 47 Thailand 48 Bolivia 49 Philippines 1970-71 3.7 8.2 13.2 21.0 53.9 50 Yemen Arab Rep. 51 Congo, Peoples Rep. 52 Nigeria 53 Papua New Guinea 54 El Salvador 55 Morocco 56 Peru 1972 11.5 21.0 61.0 42.9 57 Ivory Coast 58 Nicaragua 59 Colombia 60 Paraguay 61 Ecuador 62 Dominican Rep. 63 Guatemala 64 Syrian Arab Rep. 65 Tunisia 66 Jordan 156 Percentage share of household income, by percentile groups of househoidsa Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest Highest Year 20 percent quintile quintile quintile 20 percent 10 percent 67 Malaysia 1970 3.3 7.3 12.2 20.7 56.6 39.6 68 Jamaica 69 Lebanon 70 Korea, Rep. of 1976 5.7 11.2 15.4 22.4 45.3 27.5 71 Turkey 1973 3.4 8.0 12.5 19.5 56.5 40.7 72 Algeria 73 Mexico 1977 2.9 7.0 12.0 20.4 57.7 4a6 74 Panama 75 Taiwan 1971 8.7 13.2 16.6 22.3 39.2 24.7 76 Chile 1968 4.4 9.0 13.8 21.4 51.4 34.8 77 South Africa 78 Costa Rica 1971 3.3 8.7 13.3 19.9 54.8 39.5 79 Brazil 1972 2.0 5.0 9.4 17.0 66.6 50.6 80 Uruguay 81 Argentina 1970 4.4 9.7 14.1 21.5 50.3 35.2 82 Portugal 83 Yugoslavia 1973 6.5 11.9 17.6 24.0 40.0 22.5 84 Trinidad and Tobago 85 Venezuela 1970 3.0 7.3 12.9 22.8 54.0 35.7 86 Hong Kong 87 Greece 88 Singapore 89 Spain 1974 6.0 11.8 16.9 23.1 42.2 26.7 90 Israel Industrialized countries 91 Ireland .. .. .. 92 Italy 1969 5.1 10.5 16.2 21.7 46.5 30.9 93 New Zealand . .. .. 94 United Kingdom 1973 6.3 12.6 18.4 23.9 38.8 23.5 95 Finland 96 Austria 97 Japan 1969 7.9 131 16.8 21.2 41.0 27.2 98 Australia 1966-67 6.6 13.5 17.8 23.4 38.8 23.7 99 France 1970 4,3 9.8 16.3 22.7 46.9 30.4 100 Netherlands 1967 6.5 11.6 16.4 22.7 42.9 27.7 101 Belgium 102 Canada 1969 5.o 17 24.3 41.0 25.1 103 Norway 1970 6.3 12.9 18.8 24.7 37.3 22.2 104 Germany, Fed. Rep. 1973 6.5 10.3 15.0 22.0 46.2 30.3 105 United States 1972 4.5 10.7 17.3 24.7 42.8 26.6 106 Denmark .. .. .. .. 107 Sweden 1972 6.6 13.1 18.5 24.8 37.0 21.3 108 Switzerland .. .. .. Capital-surplus oil exporters 109 Iraq 110 Iran 111 Libya 112 Saudi Arabia 113 Kuwait Centrally planned economies 114 China 115 Korea, Dem. Rep. 116 Albania 117 Cuba 118 Mongolia 119 Romania 120 Bulgaria 121 Hungary 122 Poland 123 USSR 124 Czechoslovakia 125 German Dem. Rep. a. These estimates should be treated with caution. See the technical notes. 157 Technical Notes Table 1. Basic Indicators particular currency and generally the number of years newborn assures greater comparability of children would live if subject to The estimates of population for the estimates of GNP per capita the mortality risks prevailing for mid-1978 are primarily from the among countries. the cross-section of population at UN Population Division. In some The GNP per capita figure of the time of their birth. Data are cases the UN population data were $230 reported for China is based from the UN Population Division, adjusted by using more recent data on the official estimate of "net supplemented by World Bank from the World Bank and the US material product" released by the estimates. Bureau of the Census. Government, plus an allowance for The index of food production per The data on area are from the depreciation and for services not capita shows the average annual UN Demographic Yearbook, 1977. covered by that concept. These quantity of food produced per Gross national product (GNP) data were received only recently, capita in 1976-78 in relation to measures the total domestic and and analysis to assure that the data that in 1969-71. The estimates foreign output claimed by resi- are reasonably comparable to those were derived from those of the dents of a country.' It comprises of other countries has not yet been Food and Agriculture Organiza- gross domestic product (see the possible. tion (FAO), which are calculated technical notes for Table 2) and The average annual rate of inflation by dividing indices of the quantity factor incomes (such as investment was calculated from the "implicit of food production by indices of receipts and workers' remittances) gross domestic product (GDP) total population. Food is considered accruing to residents from abroad, deflator," which is calculated by to comprise cereals, starchy roots, less the income earned in the dividing, for each year of the period, sugar cane, sugar beet, pulses, domestic economy accruing to the value of GDP in current market edible oils, nuts, fruits, vegetables, persons abroad. It is calculated prices by the value of GDP in livestock and livestock products. without making deductions for constant market prices, both in Quantities of food production are depreciation. national currency. This measure measured net of animal feed, The GNP per capita figures were of inflation has limitations, seeds for use in agriculture, and calculated according to the World especially for the oil-producing food lost in processing and dis- Bank Atlas method: GNP in national countries in the light of the sharp tribution. currency units was expressed first increase in oil prices in late 1973. The country-group averages in in weighted-average prices for the The adult literacy rate is the per- this table are weighted by country base period 1976-78, converted centage of persons aged 15 and population. into dollars at the GNP-weighted over who can read and write. These The accompanying table shows average exchange rate for this rates are based primarily on infor- basic indicators for 29 countries period, and adjusted for US infla- mation from the UN Educational, that have a population of less than tion. The resulting estimate of GNP Scientific and Cultural Organiza- a million and are members of the was then divided by the population tion (UNESCO), supplemented United Nations, the World Bank, in mid-1978. This method reduces by World Bank data. For some or both. the effect of temporary underval- countries the estimates are for uations or overvaluations of a years other than, but generally not Tables 2 and 3. Growth and more than two years distant from, Structure of Production 1. GNP figures generally are for 1978. those specified. Thus the series are Exceptions are Iran, for which 1977 estimates not strictly comparable for all Most of the definitions used are those are the most recent, and Democratic Kam- puchea and Lebanon, for which 1974 esti- countries. of the UN System of National Accounts. mates are the most recent. Life expectancy at birth indicates Gross domestic product (GDP) 158 Average index Tables 4 and 5. Growth of Life ex- of food Consumption and Investment; Area GNP per pectancy production UN/World Bank members Population (thousands capita at birth per capita Structure of Demand with a population (millions) of square (dollars) (years) (1969-71 = 100) of less than I million Mid-1978 kilometers) 1978 1978 1976-78 Maldives Ri 150 47 GDP is defined in the technical (. ) Cape Verde 0.3 4 160 60 notes for Table 2. Comoros 0.4 2 180 46 Public consumption (or general gov- Gambia, The 0.6 11 230 41 82 ernment consumption) includes all Guinea-Bissau 0.6 36 290 41 105 current expenditure for purchases Equatorial Guinea 0.3 28 46 of goods and services by all levels Western Samoa 0.2 3 68 of government. In addition, capital Solomon Islands 0.2 28 430 112 Djibouti 0.3 22 450 45 expenditure on national defense Sao Tome and Principe 0.1 1 490 and security is regarded as con- Grenada 0.1 (. ) 530 69 sumption expenditure. Guyana 0.8 215 560 67 95 Private consumption is the market Swaziland 0.5 17 590 46 109 value of all goods and services Botswana 0.8 600 620 48 100 purchased or received as income Mauritius 0.9 2 830 67 103 in kind by households and non- Seychelles 0.1 1,130 Fiji 0.6 (. ) 18 1,420 71 90 profit institutions. It includes Barbados 0.3 1,960 71 76 imputed rent for owner-occupied (. ) Suriname 0.4 163 2,110 68 108 dwellings. Cyprus 0.7 9 2,120 72 98 Gross domestic investment consists Malta 0.3 (. ) 2,170 71 121 of the outlays for additions to the Bahamas 0.2 14 2,520 69 fixed assets of the economy, plus Oman 0.8 212 2,570 47 the net value of inventory changes. Gabon 0.5 268 3,580 44 88 Bahrain 0.4 1 4,100 65 Gross domestic saving shows the Iceland amount of gross domestic invest- 0.2 103 8,390 75 114 Luxembourg 0.4 3 10,540 72 105 ment financed from domestic out- Qatar 0.2 11 12,740 48 put. Comprising public and private United Arab Emirates 0.8 84 14,230 48 saving, it is the difference between Note: Recent data on the adult literacy rate were available for only five of these countries: gross domestic investment and the The Gambia, 10 percent in 1976; Botswana, 35 percent in 1978; Swaziland, 65 percent in deficit on the current account of 1978; Mauritius, 80 percent in 1972; and Barbados, 99 percent in 1976. goods and nonfactor services, excluding net current transfers. Exports of goods and nonfactor ser- measures the total final output of fishing. The industrial sector com- vices represent the value of all goods and services produced by prises mining, manufacturing, con- goods and nonfactor services sold an economy-that is, within a struction, and electricity, water to the rest of the world; they country's territory by residents and gas. All other branches of include merchandise, freight, in- and nonresidents, regardless of its economic activity are categorized surance, travel and other nonfactor allocation to domestic and foreign as services. services. The value of factor services, claims. It is calculated without National accounts series in such as investment receipts and making deductions for deprecia- national currency units were used workers' remittances from abroad, tion. For most countries, GDP by to compute the indicators in these is excluded. industrial origin is measured at tables. The growth rates in Table 2 The resource balance is the differ- factor cost, but for some countries were calculated from constant price ence between exports and imports without complete national accounts series, the shares of GDP in Table of goods and nonfactor services. series at factor cost, market price 3 from current price series. National accounts series in series were used. GDP at factor The average growth rates for national currency units were used cost is equal to GDP at market the country groups in Table 2 are to compute the indicators in these prices, less indirect taxes net of weighted by country GDP in 1970 tables. The growth rates in Table 4 subsidies. in dollars. The average sectoral were calculated from constant The agriculture! sector comprises shares in Table 3 are weighted price series, the shares of GDP in agriculture, forestry, hunting and by country GDP in current dollars. Table 5 from current price series. 159 The country-group averages in not taken into account because countries. Exports are valued f.o.b. Table 5 are weighted by country reliable and comprehensive data (free on board), imports c.i.f. (cost, GDP in current dollars. are not available. insurance and freight). These The country-group averages of values are in current dollars. Table 6. Industrialization growth rates of energy production The growth rates of merchandise are weighted by volumes of coun- exports and imports are in real terms The percentage distribution of value try production in 1974; those of and calculated from quantum added among manufacturing in- growth rates of energy consumption, (volume) indices of exports and dustries was calculated from data by volumes of country consump- imports. For the majority of devel- obtained from the UN Indus- tion in 1974; those of energy con- oping countries these indices are trial Development Organization sumption per capita, by country from the UNCTAD Handbook of (UNIDO), with the base values population. International Trade and Development expressed in 1970 dollars. Energy consumption per dollar of Statistics and supplementary data The classification of manufac- GDP refers to the ratio of total that show revisions. For industrial- turing industries is in accord with energy consumption to GDP in ized countries the indices are from the UN International Standard 1975 dollars. This indicator shows the UN Yearbook of International Industrial Classification of All the intensity of energy use in an Trade Statistics and UN Monthly Economic Activities (ISIC). Food economy. The country-group aver- Bulletin of Statistics. and agriculture comprise ISIC ages are weighted by country GDP The terms of trade, or the "net Major Groups 311, 313 and 314; in 1975 dollars. barter terms of trade," are calcu- Textiles and clothing 321-24; Ma- Energy imports refer to the dollar lated as the ratio of a country's chinery and transport equipment 382-84; value of energy importsStandard index of export unit values to that and Chemicals 351 and 352. Other International Trade Classification of import unit values. The terms- manufacturing comprises ISIC Major (SITC) Revised Section 3and are of-trade index numbers shown for Division 3, less all of the above. expressed as a percentage of earn- 1960 and 1978, with 1970 = 100, The figures for value added in ings from merchandise exports. thus indicate changes in export manufacturing are from the World The country-group averages are prices in relation to import prices. Bank's national accounts series in weighted by country merchandise The unit value indices are from national currencies, converted in- exports in current dollars. the same sources cited above for to 1970 dollars. Because data on energy imports the growth rates of exports and To calculate gross manufacturing do not permit a distinction between imports. output per capita, ratios of gross petroleum imports for fuel and for output to value added in manu- use in the petrochemicals industry, Tables 9 and 10. Structure of facturing, derived from various these percentages may be over- Merchandise Trade issues of the UN Yearbook of Indus- estimates of the dependence on trial Statistics, were applied to the imported energy. The shares in these tables are derived World Bank's data on value added from trade values in current dollars in manufacturing. Per capita reported in UN trade tapes and the Table 8. Growth of values were then calculated by us- UN Yearbookof International Trade Merchandise Trade ing mid-year estimates of country Statistics. population. The statistics on merchandise trade Merchandise exports and imports are from UN publications and the are defined in the technical notes Table 7. Energy UN trade data system, supplemented for Table 8. by statistics from the UN Confer- In the categorization of exports All data on energy are from UN ence on Trade and Development in Table 9, fuels, minerals and metals sources. They refer to commercial (UNCTAD) and from International are the commodities in SITC forms of primary energy: coal and Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Revised Section 3, Divisions 27 lignite, petroleum, natural gas and Trade and International Financial and 28, and the nonferrous metals natural gas liquids, and hydro- Statistics. of Division 68. Other primary electricity and nuclear powerall Merchandise exports and imports commodities comprise SITC Sec- converted into coal equivalents. cover, with some exceptions, all tions 0, 1, 2 and 4 (food and live The use of firewood and other international changes in ownership animals, beverages and tobacco, traditional fuels, though substantial of merchandise passing across the inedible crude materials, oils, fats in some developing countries, is customs borders of the reporting and waxes) less Divisions 27 and 160 28 (minerals, crude fertilizers and Gibraltar, Iceland and Luxembourg; Debt service is the sum of interest metalliferous ores). Textiles and developing countries also include payments and repayments of clothing represent SITC Divisions 65 Cuba, which in other tables is principal on external public and and 84 (textiles, yarns, fabrics and grouped with centrally planned publicly guaranteed debt. Debt- clothing). Machinery and transport economies; capital-surplus oil exporters service data are from the World equipment are the commodities in also include Oman, Qatar and Bank Debt Reporting System. The SITC Section 7. Other manufactures, United Arab Emirates. ratio of debt service to exports calculated as the residual from the The country-group averages are of goods and services is one of total value of manufactured ex- weighted by country merchandise several rules of thumb commonly ports, represent SITC Sections 5 to exports in current dollars. used to assess the ability to ser- 9 less Section 7 and Divisions 65, vice debt. The debt-service ratios 68 and 84. Table 12. Trade in in the table do not cover unguar- In the categorization of imports Manufactured Goods anteed private debt, which for some in Table 10, food commodities are countries is substantial; the debt those in SITC Revised Sections 0, The data in this table are from contracted for purchases of military 1 and 4 and in Division 22 (food the United Nations and are among equipment usually is not reported. and live animals, beverages and those used to compute Special The average ratios of debt service tobacco, oils and fats). Fuels are the Table B in the UN Yearbook of to GNP for the country groups are commodities in SITC Section 3. International Trade Statistics. Manu- weighted by country GNP in cur- Other primary commodities comprise factured goods are the commodities rent dollars. The average ratios of SITC Section 2 (crude materials, in SITC Revised Sections 5 through debt service to exports of goods less Division 22 (oilseeds and 9 (chemicals and related productsfr and services are weighted by nuts) plus Division 68 (nonferrous manufactured articles, machinery country exports of goods and metals). Machinery and transport and transport equipment) exclud- services in current dollars. equipment are the commodities in ing Division 68 (nonferrous metals). The World Bank Debt Report- SITC Section 7. Other manufactures, The country groups are the same ing System is concerned solely calculated as the residual from the as those in Table 11. The country- with developing countries and total value of manufactured im- group averages are weighted by does not collect data on external ports, represent SITC Sections 5 country manufactured exports in debt for other groups of countries. to 9 less Section 7 and Division 68. current dollars. Nor are comparable data for those The country-group averages in countries available from other Table 9 are weighted by country Table 13. Balance of Payments sources. merchandise exports in current and Debt Service Ratios dollars; those in Table 10, by Table 14. Flow of External country merchandise imports in The current account balance is the Capital current dollars. difference between (i) exports of goods and services plus inflows of Data on the gross inflow and repay- Table 11. Destination of unrequited official and private ment of principal (amortization) of Merchandise Exports transfers and (ii) imports of goods public and publicly guaranteed and services plus unrequited medium- and long-term loans are Merchandise exports are defined transfers to the rest of the world. from the World Bank Debt in the technical notes for Table 8. Excluded from this figure are all Reporting System. The net inflow All trade shares in this table are interest payments on external public is the gross inflow less the repay- based on statistics on the value of and publicly guaranteed debt, which ment of principal. trade in current dollars in IMF, are shown separately. These in- Net direct private investment is the Direction of Trade. Unallocated terest payments represent those net amount invested or reinvested exports are distributed among the on the disbursed portion of out- by nonresidents of the country in country groups in proportion to standing public and publicly enterprises in which they or other their respective shares of allocable guaranteed debt plus commitment nonresidents exercise significant trade. The country groups in this charges on undisbursed debt. The managerial control; these net fig- table follow those in the data current account estimates are ures also take into account the source and differ somewhat from from IMF data files; estimates of value of direct investment abroad those used elsewhere in the volume: interest payments are from the by residents. IMF data files were industrialized countries also include World Bank Debt Reporting System. used in compiling these estimates. 161 Table 15. External Public at concessional financial terms by The table this year, in addition Debt and International Reserves official agencies of the members to showing totals for OPEC, shows of the Development Assistance totals for the Organization of Arab External public debt outstanding rep- Committee (DAC) of the Organ- Petroleum Exporting Countries resents the amount of public and isation for Economic Co-operation (OAPEC). The donor members of publicly guaranteed loans that has and Development (OECD) and OAPEC are Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, been disbursed, net of canceled members of the Organization of Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and loan comritments and repay- Petroleum Exporting Countries United Arab Emirates. ments of principal. The data refer (OPEC) with the objective of pro- to the end of the year indicated moting economic development and Table 17. Population Growth, and are from the World Bank welfare. It includes the value of Past and Projected, and Debt Reporting System. In esti- technical cooperation and assistance. Hypothetical Stationary mating external public debt as a Amounts shown are net disburse- Population percentage of GNP, GNP was con- ments to developing countries and verted from national currencies to multilateral institutions. The dis- The growth rates of population are dollars at the average official ex- bursements to multilateral insti- period averages calculated from change rate for the year in question. tutions are now reported for all mid-year country populations. The country-group averages are DAC members on the basis of the The country-group averages are weighted by country GNP in cur- date of issue of notes; some DAC weighted by country population rent dollars. members previously reported on in 1970. Gross interncitional reserves the basis of the date of encash- The projections of population for comprise the sum of a country's ment. Net bilateral flows to low-income 1980 and 2000, and to the year in holdings of gold, special drawing countries exclude unallocated bilateral which it will eventually become rights (SDRs), the reserve position flows and all disbursements to stationary, were made for each of IMF members in the Fund, and multilateral institutions. country separately. Starting with holdings of foreign exchange under Figures for 1978 and earlier years information on total population, the control of monetary authorities. are actual figures published by the fertility rates, and mortality rates The gold component of these re- OECD; those for 1979 are pre- in the base year 1978, these param- serves is valued throughout at liminary estimates. All others are eters were projected to 1980 and year-end London prices: that is, projections by World Bank staff, thereafter for five-year intervals $37.37 an ounce in 1970 and $226.00 based on OECD and World Bank on the basis of generalized assump- an ounce in 1978. The data for estimates of GNP growth, infor- tions until the population became holdings of international reserves mation on budget appropriations stationary. The base-year esti- are from IMF data files. The reserve for aid, and statements on aid policy mates are from UN, World Popula- levels for 1970 and 1978 refer to by governments. They are projec- tion Trends and Prospects by Country, the end of the year indicated and tions based on present plans rather 1950-2000, and from the World are in current dollars. The reserve than predictions of what will occur. Bank, the Population Council and holdings at the end of 1978 are The nominal values shown in the US Bureau of the Census. also expressed in the number of the summary for ODA from OECD The net reproduction rate (NRR) months of imports of goods and countries were converted into indicates the number of daughters services they could pay for, with 1978 prices using the dollar GNP that a newborn girl will bear dur- imports at the average level for deflator. This deflator is based on ing her lifetime, assuming fixed 1977 or 1978. The country-group price increases in OECD countries age-specific fertility rates and a averages are weighted by couhtry (excluding Greece, Portugal, Spain fixed set of mortality rates. imports of goods and services in and Turkey) measured in dollars. The NRR thus measures the current dollars. It takes into account the parity extent to which a cohort of new- changes between the dollar and born girls will reproduce themselves Table 16. Official Development national currencies. For example, under given schedules of fertility and Assistance from OECD and when the dollar depreciates, price mortality. An NRR of 1 indicates OPEC Members increases measured in national that fertility is at replacement level: currencies have to be adjusted at this rate child-bearing women, Official development assistance upward by the amount of the on the average, bear only enough (ODA) consists of net disburse- depreciation to obtain price in- daughters to replace themselves ments of loans and grants made creases in dollars. in the population. A population 162 continues to grow after replacement- be born per woman, if she were to ployed, but excluding housewives, level fertility has been reached live to the end of her child-bearing students and economically inactive because its past higher birth rates years and bear children at each groups. Agriculture, industry and will have produced an age dis- age in accord with prevailing age- services are defined in the same tribution with a relatively high specific fertility rates. The rates manner as in Table 2. The estimates proportion of women in, or still to given are from the same sources of the sectoral distribution of the enter, the reproductive ages. The mentioned in the technical notes labor force in 1960 are from time taken for a country's popu- for Table 17. International Labour Office (ILO), lation to become stationary after The percentage of women in the re- Labour Force Estimates and Projections, reaching replacement-level fertility productive age group refers to women 1950-2000; most of those for 1978 thus depends on its age structure of child-bearing age (15-44 years) are geometric extrapolations of and previous fertility patterns. as a percentage of the total female ILO estimates for 1960 and 1970 A stationary population is one in population. The estimates were in the same source. The country- which age- and sex-specific mor- derived from the population esti- group averages are weighted by tality rates have not changed over mates in Table 1. country labor force. a long period, while age-specific The percentage of married women The labor force growth rates were fertility rates have simultaneously using contraceptives refers only to derived from the Bank's popula- remained at replacement level married women of child-bearing tion projections and ILO data on (NRR = 1). In such a population, age (15-44 years). These data are activity rates, again from the source the birth rate is constant and equal mainly derived from Dorothy cited above. The country-group to the death rate, the age structure Nortman and Ellen Hofstatter, averages for 1960-70 and 1970-80 also is constant, and the growth Population and Family Planning Pro- are weighted by country labor rate is zero. grams: A Factbook (New York: force in 1970; those for 1980-2000, For all of the projections, it was Population Council, various issues); by projections of country labor assumed that international migra- Dorothy Nortman, "Changing force in 1980. tion would have no effect. Contraceptive Patterns: A Global The application of ILO activity The estimates of the hypothetical Perspective," Population Bulletin, rates to the Bank's latest pop- size of the stationary population, vol. 32, no. 3 (Washington, D.C.: ulation estimates may be inappro- the assumed year of reaching re- Population Reference Bureau, priate for some countries in which placement-level fertility and the August 1977); and Office of Pop- there have been important changes year of reaching a stationary popu- ulation, Family Planning Service in levels of unemployment and lation are speculative. They should Statistics, Annual Report, 1976 underemployment, in international not be regarded as predictions. They (Washington, D.C.: US Agency and internal migration, or in both. are included to provide a summary for International Development). The labor force projections for indication of the long-run implica- The data refer to a variety of years, 1980-2000 should thus be treated tions of recent trends on the basis generally not more than two years with caution. of highly stylized assumptions. A distant from those specified. fuller description of the methods All country-group averages are Table 20. Urbanization and assumptions used to calculate weighted by country population. the estimates is available from the The data on urban population as a Economic Analysis and Projections Table 19. Labor Force percentage of total population are from Department of the World Bank. unpublished estimates and pro- The population of working age refers jections by the UN Population Table 18. Demographic and to the population between 15 and Division, supplemented by data Fertility-related Indicators 64 years of age. The estimates for from the World Bank and from 1978 are based on the population various issues of the UN Demo- The crude birth and death rates indi- estimates in Table 1; those for graphic Yearbook. cate the number of live births and 1960 are from the UN Population The growth rates of urbun pop- deaths per thousand population Division. The country-group ulation were calculated from the in a year. They are from the same averages are weighted by country World Bank's population esti- sources mentioned in the technical population. mates; the estimates of urban notes for Table 17. The lubor force comprises eco- population shares were calculated The total fertility rate represents nomically active persons, including from the sources cited above. the number of children that would the armed forces and the unem- Data on urban agglomeration 163 are also from the United Nations. Table 22. Health-related Table 23. Education Because the estimates in this Indicators table are based on the national The data in this table refer to a definitions of what is "urban," The estimates of population per variety of years, generally not more cross-country comparisons should physician and nursing person were than two years distant from those be interpreted with caution. derived from World Health specified, and are mostly from The country-group averages for Organization (WHO) data, some UNESCO. urban population as a percentage of which have been revised to reflect The data on number enrolled in of total population are weighted new information supplied by primary school refer to estimates of by country population; the other reporting countries. They also take total, male, and female enrollment country-group averages in this into account revised estimates of of students of all ages in primary table are weighted by country ur- population, which are shown in school; they are expressed as per- ban population. Table 1. Nursing persons include centages of the total, male, or female graduate, practical and assistant populations of primary-school age Table 21. Indicators Related to nurses. Because country definitions to give "gross primary enrollment Life Expectancy of nursing personnel varyand be- ratios." Although primary-school cause the data shown are for a age is generally considered to be Life expectancy at birth is defined in variety of years, generally not 6-11 years, the differences in the technical notes for Table 1. more than two years distant from country practices in the ages and The infant mortality rate is the those specifiedthe data for these duration of schooling are reflected number of infants who die before two indicators are not strictly in the ratios given. For countries reaching 1 year of age, per thousand comparable between countries. with universal primary education, live births in a given year. The The percentage of total population the gross enrollment ratios may data are from a variety of sources, with access to safe water, estimated exceed 100 percent because some including different issues of the by the WHO, is the proportion of pupils may be below or above the UN Demographic Yearbook and the persons with reasonable access to official primary-school age. US Bureau of the Census publica- safe water, which is defined as The data on number enrolled in tion, World Population: 1977; they including treated surface water secondary school were calculated in refer to a variety of years, gener- and such untreated but uncon- the same manner, with secondary- ally not more than two years dis- taminated water as that from school age generally considered tant from those specified. boreholes, springs and sanitary to be 12-17 years. The child death rate is the number wells. The data on number enrolled in of deaths of children aged 1-4 per The daily calorie supply per capita higher education are from UNESCO. thousand children in the same age was calculated by dividing the The adult literacy rate is defined group in a given year. For countries calorie equivalent of the food in the technical notes for Table 1. with reliable death registration, supplies in a country by its popu- The country-group averages in these rates are from different issues lation. Food supplies comprise this table are weighted by country of the UN Demographic Yearbook; domestic production, imports less population. they refer to a variety of years, exports, and changes in stocks; they generally not more than two years exclude animal feed, seeds for use Table 24. Income Distribution distant from those specified. For in agriculture, and food lost in other countries, the rates were processing and distribution. The The data in this table refer to the derived from the appropriate daily calorie requirement per capita distribution of total disposable Coale-Demeny Model life tables refers to the calories needed to household income accruing to to correspond to the expectation sustain a person at normal levels percentile groups of households of life at birth for 1960 and 1978.2 of activity and health, taking into ranked by total household income. The country-group averages in account age and sex distributions, The distributions cover rural and this table are weighted by country average body weights, and environ- urban areas and refer to different population. mental temperatures. Both sets of years between 1965 and 1977. estimates are from the Food and The distributions for the indus- Agriculture Organization. trialized countries are from Malcolm 2. Ansley J. Coale and Paul Demeny, Re- gional Model Life Tables and Stable Popula- The country-group averages in Sawyer, Income Distribution in OECD tions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University this table are weighted by country Countries (OECD Occasional Press, 1966). population. Studies, July 1976); they refer to 164 posttax income and conceptually tical system in many countries, income, not according to their total are roughly comparable with the estimates were typically derived household income, is superior for distributions for developing coun- from surveys designed for other many purposes. The distinction tries. The estimates for Latin purposes, most often consumer is important because households American countries other than expenditure surveys, which also with low per capita incomes Mexico come from the preliminary collect some information on income. frequently are large households, results of a joint project of the These surveys use a variety of whose total income may be rela- World Bank and the UN Economic income concepts and sample de- tively high. For this reason it is Commission for Latin America signs. With few exceptions the best to use the distribution of (ECLA). Those for Mexico are the analysis of data does not take into individuals ranked by per capita results from the 1977 Household account the differences in house- household income when comparing Budget Survey. The estimates for hold size. Furthermore, the cover- two distributions for welfare most developing countries in Asia age of many of these surveys is purposessay, those of two coun- are from the preliminary results too limited to provide reliable tries or those of rural and urban of a joint project of the World nationwide estimates of income areas in a country. Information Bank and the Economic and Social distribution. Thus, although the on the distribution of per capita Commission for Asia and the estimates are considered the best household income exists, however, Pacific (ESCAP). The distributions available, they do not avoid all for only a few countries. The World for other developing countries are these problems and should be Bank recently launched the Living from data gathered by the World interpreted with extreme caution. Standards Measurement Study to Bank from national sources. The scope of the indicator is develop procedures and applica- Because the collection of data similarly limited. Because house- tions that can assist countries in on income distribution has not holds vary in size, a distribution improving their collection and anal- been systematically organized and in which households are ranked ysis of data on income distribution. integrated into the official statis- according to per capita household 165 Bibliography of Data Sources National Production Yearbook. Rome: FAQ, various issues. accounts A System of National Accounts. New York: UN Department of International Economic and and Social Affairs, 1968. economic Statistical Yearbook. New York: UN Department of International Economic and indicators Social Affairs, various issues. World Bank Atlas, 1979. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1979. World Bank data files. National sources. Energy World Energy Supplies, 1950-74, 1972-76 and 1973-78. UN Statistical Papers, Series J, nos. 19, 21 and 22. New York: UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, 1974, 1978 and 1979. Trade Direction of Trade. Washington, D.C.: IMF, various issues. International Financial Statistics. Washington, D.C.: IMF, various issues. Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics. New York: UN Conference on Trade and Development, various issues. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. New York: UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, various issues. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. New York: Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, various issues. United Nations trade tapes. Balance Balance of Payments Manual. 4th ed. Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1977. of payments, International Monetary Fund balance-of-payments data files. capital flows Development Co-operation. Paris: OECD, various annual issues. and debt World Bank Debt Reporting System. Population World Population Trends and Prospects by Country, 1950-2000: Summary Report of the 1978 Assessment. New York: UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, 1979. United Nations population tapes. World Population: 1977. Washington, D.C.: US Bureau of the Census, International Statistical Programs Center, 1978. World Bank Atlas, 1979. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1979. World Bank data files. Labor Labour Force Estimates and Projections, 1950-2000. 2nd ed. Geneva: ILQ, 1977. force International Labour Qifice tapes. World Bank data files. Social Demographic Yearbook. New York: UN Department of International Economic and indicators Social Affairs, varioMs issues. Statistical Yearbook. New York: UN Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, various issues. Statistical Yearbook. Paris: UNESCO, various issues. World Bank data files. World Health Statistics Annual. Geneva: WHO, various issues. World Health Statistics Report. Special Issue on Water and Sanitation, vol. 29, no. 10. Geneva: WHO, 1976. Note: Because the United Nations no longer reports data on Taiwan, most of the indicators for Taiwan come from its statistical publications. 166 The World Bank Headquarters: 1818 H Street, NW. Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A. Telephone: (202) 477-1234 Cable address: INTBAFRAD WASHINGTONDC Europeanffice 66, avenue l'Iéna 75116 Paris, France Tokyo dffice Kokusai Building 1-1 Marunouchi 3-ehome Chiyodku, Tk iOO, Japan LSSN Ô163-5085