BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 5:18 PM Page i WBI LEARNING RESOURCES SERIES Beyond Economic Growth An Introduction to Sustainable Development Second Edition Tatyana P. Soubbotina The World Bank Washington, D.C. BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page ii Copyright © 2004 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/THE WORLD BANK 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A. All rights reserved First printing September 2000 The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this book are entirely those of the author and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility for any consequence of their use. 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For permission to reprint individual articles or chapters, please fax your request with complete information to the Republication Department, Copyright Clearance Center, fax 978-750-4470. All other queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to the Office of the Publisher, World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, fax 202-522-2422, e-mail pubrights@worldbank.org. For more information and classroom materials on issues of sustainable development, visit our web sites at www.worldbank.org/depweb and www.worldbank.org/wbi/developmenteducation. Please send comments to dep@worldbank.org. Tatyana P. Soubbotina is a consultant at the World Bank Institute. Cover and chapter opener design by Patricia Hord Graphic Design. Typesetting by Precision Graphics. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data has been applied for. BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page iii Contents Acknowledgments vi Introduction 1 Difficult Questions, Different Answers 2 Data and Development 2 About This Book 3 How to Use The Book 4 1. What Is Development? 7 Goals and Means of Development 7 Sustainable Development 8 2. Comparing Levels of Development 12 Gross Domestic Product and Gross National Product 12 Grouping Countries by Their Level of Development 15 3. World Population Growth 17 4. Economic Growth Rates 23 5. Income Inequality 28 Cross-country Comparisons of Income Inequality 28 Lorenz Curves and Gini Indexes 29 Costs and Benefits of Income Inequality 31 6. Poverty and Hunger 33 The Nature of Poverty 33 The Geography of Poverty 34 The Vicious Circle of Poverty 35 The Challenge of Hunger 38 7. Education 43 Education and Human Capital 43 Primary Education and Literacy 46 Issues in Secondary and Tertiary Education 48 iii BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page iv 8. Health and Longevity 53 Global Trends 53 Population Age Structures 55 The Burden of Infectious Disease 57 Lifestyle Challenges 61 9. Industrialization and Postindustrialization 63 Major Structural Shifts 63 Knowledge Revolution 65 Implications for Development Sustainability 67 10. Urban Air Pollution 69 Particulate Air Pollution 70 Airborne Lead Pollution 73 11. Public and Private Enterprises: Finding the Right Mix 76 The Dilemma of Public-Private Ownership 77 Is There a Trend toward Privatization? 80 12. Globalization: International Trade and Migration 83 Waves of Modern Globalization 83 Costs and Benefits of Free Trade 85 Geography and Composition of Global Trade 87 International Migration 91 13. Globalization: Foreign Investment and Foreign Aid 95 Private Capital Flows 96 Official Development Assistance 99 14. The Risk of Global Climate Change 102 Whose Responsibility Is It? 103 Will the North-South cooperation work? 107 15. Composite Indicators of Development 110 "Development Diamonds" 110 Human Development Index 111 iv BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 5:18 PM Page v 16. Indicators of Development Sustainability 113 Composition of National Wealth 113 Accumulation of National Wealth As an Indicator of Sustainable Development 114 Material Throughput and Environmental Space 117 Social Capital and Public Officials' Corruption 119 17. Development Goals and Strategies 123 Millennium Development Goals 123 The Role of National Development Policies 127 Difficult Choices 129 Glossary 131 Annex 1: Classification of Economies by Income and Region 145 Annex 2: Data Tables 149 Table 1. Indicators to Chapter 1­5 150 Table 2. Indicators to Chapter 6­7 160 Table 3. Indicators to Chapter 8­9 170 Table 4. Indicators to Chapter 10­13 180 Table 5. Indicators to Chapter 14­16 192 Annex 3: Millennium Development Goals 203 v BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page vi Acknowledgments The preparation of this book benefited Kirk Hamilton, Ksenia Lvovsky, Magda greatly from the support and valuable Lovei, Peter Miovic, Philip Karp, Simon contributions of many colleagues in the Commander, Tatyana Leonova, Thomas World Bank Institute (WBI) and in Merrick, Tim Heleniak, Vinod Thomas, other parts of the World Bank. Vladimir Kreacic, and William Prince. Special thanks go to John Didier for his I am particularly indebted to the head dedicated help with the final editing of of WBI, Frannie Leautier, for her sup- the first edition and unfailing support port of the second edition of this book during the preparation of the second and to two successive managers of the edition. WBI Development Education Program (DEP), Katherine Sheram and Danielle I am also grateful to all of my colleagues Carbonneau, for the inspiration and in Russia, Latvia, and Belarus for their important inputs they provided to this knowledgeable advice during our joint challenging multiyear project. The work work on the respective country adapta- on this book was also greatly facilitated tions of this book, particularly Vladimir by close collaboration with the other Avtonomov, Andrei Mitskevitch, Erika DEP team members, including Evi Sumilo, and Mikhail Kovalev. Vestergaard, Kelly Grable, and Brooke Prater. An important role in pilot-testing and distributing the first edition and its three Next I would like to express my sincere country adaptations was played by DEP appreciation to those World Bank partners in the US National Council on experts who provided extremely useful Economic Education (NCEE), in comments, suggestions, and inputs dur- Russia's State University­Higher School ing the drafting of the first and second of Economics, in the Latvian Association editions of this book: Carl Dahlman, of Teachers of Economics (LATE), and Dusan Vujovic, Gregory Prakas, Joanne in the Belarusian Institute for Post- Epp, John Oxenham, John Middleton, Diploma Teacher Training. vi BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 1 Introduction The underlying premise of this book is from reputable international sources that in order for development to be sus- (like the World Bank and the UN spe- tainable, it has to be comprehensive--it cialized development agencies). has to successfully balance economic goals with social and environmental. This book is designed to introduce read- "Development" is really much more ers to some major challenges in today's than simply economic growth. The sustainable development (from the global understanding of development can differ to the national and perhaps even to the among countries and even among indi- local level) and help them gain a more viduals, but it usually goes far beyond holistic and realistic view of their coun- the objective of increased average try's situation in a global context. income to include things like freedom, Because development is a comprehensive equity, health, education, safe environ- process involving economic as well as ment, and much more. Hence the title social and environmental changes, this of this book: "Beyond Economic book takes an interdisciplinary approach. Growth." It attempts to explain some complex rela- tionships among various aspects of devel- By publishing this book, the opment, including population growth, Development Education Program economic growth, improvements in edu- (DEP) of the World Bank Institute cation and health, industrialization and (WBI) seeks to help more people under- postindustrialization, environmental stand that in the present-day globalized degradation, and globalization. Young world international development should people and learners of all ages, teachers be everyone's concern because it affects and students, are invited to explore these everyone's life. Ordinary people includ- relationships even further--using the sta- ing youth--not just economists and tistical data and theoretical concepts pre- development experts--should be pre- sented in this book--and to engage in pared to discuss and participate in mak- informed discussions of the controversial ing decisions on the most pressing issues development issues closest to their hearts. of sustainable development, proceeding "An Invitation to a Global Discussion" from their own cherished values and could be another appropriate subtitle for based on reliable data and information this book. 1 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 2 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Difficult Questions, sible, the author has based this book on Different Answers one simple ideological principle: devel- opment should be a tool for improving The book starts with three difficult the lives of all people. It is up to people questions: What is development? How (including the readers of this book) to can we compare the levels of develop- define for themselves the meaning of a ment achieved by different countries? better life and to prioritize the goals of And what does it take to make develop- development and the means of their ment sustainable? The author does not achievement. claim to have all the answers to these and other controversial questions posed directly or indirectly in the book. Development Data Instead, readers are encouraged to sug- gest their own answers based on facts-- Perhaps the main attraction of this book necessary for understanding the is that it is based on plentiful statistical constraints of reality--but inevitably data for most countries, presented in data rooted in personal value judgments tables in Annex 2 as well as in figures, determining different relevant weights maps, and references in the text. Statistics attached to certain goals and costs of can be powerful tools for learning about development by different people. For development. They can help paint a example, for some people development more accurate picture of reality, identify means primarily higher incomes, for issues and problems, and suggest possible others, a cleaner environment. Some are explanations and solutions. But statistics most interested in personal security, oth- have their limitations too. They are more ers, in personal freedom. Note that these reliable for some countries than for oth- goals and values are not always easily ers. They often allow very different inter- compatible--faster economic growth pretations, particularly when considered may be more damaging to the natural in isolation from other important statis- environment and a strengthening of per- tics. And because it takes a long time to sonal security may require limiting some collect and verify some statistics (particu- personal freedoms. The abundance of larly on a global scale), they may seem to such tradeoffs in development is one of be or really be out of date before they are the reasons why there are so many open even published. It is also important to questions in this book. remember that many aspects of develop- ment cannot be accurately measured by Acknowledging that many answers statistics. Examples include people's atti- inevitably involve value judgments, tudes, feelings, values, ideas, freedoms, which makes absolute objectivity impos- and cultural achievements. Thus statisti- 2 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 3 INTRODUCTION cal data can tell us only part of the specialized United Nations agencies, story of development--but it is an such as the UN Development Program, important part. World Health Organization, and UN Food and Agriculture Organization (as Note that comparing development data noted in the text). on your country with those on other countries can be extremely revealing for several reasons. First, seeing one's country About This Book in a global context and learning how it is different from or similar to other coun- This book was prepared as part of an tries can improve understanding of the international project under the World country's present-day status and of its Bank Institute's Development Education development prospects and priorities. Program (DEP). The main objective was Second, because the economies of the to create a template text about the global world are becoming increasingly interde- issues of sustainable development-- pendent, development processes in each social, economic, and environmental-- country can usually be better understood that could then be customized for when studied in the context of their various countries by teams of local edu- interaction with related processes in other cators and published in their respective countries. The author hopes that this national languages. It was also expected book will help satisfy popular demand for that students and other readers inter- information about global development ested in development issues could use and at the same time help readers gain this international template without some new insights into their own coun- adaptation as a source of relatively cur- try's recent past, present, and future. rent statistical data and widely accepted development concepts for further The statistics presented here were the research and discussions. most recent available when this book was written. Most of the data in the data The first edition was published in 2000 tables, figures, and maps are from World and simultaneously posted on the DEP Bank publications, including the World website in the original English and in Development Indicators (2000, 2001, French and Spanish translations. The 2003), the World Development Report print copies were distributed in the USA (various years), and other statistical and and internationally, mostly in countries analytical studies. Figures 4.4 and 9.2 where students were prepared to read in have been included with the permission English (in Sri Lanka and India, in of the International Monetary Fund. Ghana and Uganda, in Lithuania and Some data were also borrowed from the Estonia). 3 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 5:20 PM Page 4 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH In addition, the first national adaptation ments were taken into account in the was developed and published in Russia course of preparing this second edition. as The World and Russia student book, officially approved by the Russian As compared with the first edition, the Ministry of General and Professional second one is completely updated and Education for secondary students in the revised. All the data and charts are more 10th and 11th grades studying econom- current by 4­5 years and new materials ics, social studies, geography, and envi- are included on a number of issues such ronmental studies. The three local as Millennium Development Goals, the coauthors of the Russian adaptation rep- nature of poverty, global hunger, the bur- resented three leading research and edu- den of infectious diseases (HIV/AIDS, cational institutions in Moscow. TB, malaria), the knowledge revolution, stages of modern globalization, inter- The Latvian adaptation, The World and national migration, and the costs of Latvia, was prepared in coauthorship government corruption. Additional con- with Erika Sumilo, a professor and troversial questions for further discussion department head at the University of are included as well. The Development Latvia, and published in Latvian. The Education Program hopes that this new book was awarded a national prize as the edition will find its way into classrooms best Latvian book on economics pub- as well as family rooms in many lished in 2002. countries. The latest national adaptation was undertaken in Belarus in coauthorship How to Use The Book with Mikhail Kovalev, a professor and department head at Belarus State Because all development issues are intri- University, and was published as The cately interrelated, there is no single, World and Belarus in 2003. Most of best sequence in which to study them. these Russian-language books were dis- Thus the structure of this book allows tributed among secondary schools spe- the readers to start with almost any cializing in social and humanitarian chapter that they might find the most studies. intriguing. The author, however, would advise not skipping Chapters 1 and 2 Thanks to the rich history of this book, since they serve as a general introduction the author has had many opportunities to to the book and present some important receive feedback from students and edu- basic concepts on which the following cators in many countries, developed as chapters build. Note also that Chapters well as developing. Many of their com- 15, 16, and 17 can be read as a continu- 4 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 5 INTRODUCTION ation of the conceptual discussion ization (Chapters 12 and 13) affect air started in the first two chapters. The pollution in large cities in developed and other chapters, devoted to particular developing countries? Or how does glob- development issues, will then allow you alization help international efforts to to continue considering the same general minimize the risk of global climate issues in a more concrete manner. change? You could then explore the links between privatization and energy effi- As you read this book, you should keep ciency (Chapter 11) or between educa- in mind the multiplicity of interconnec- tion (Chapter 7) and environmental tions among all aspects of sustainable protection. Eventually, it becomes clear development. In some cases, these inter- that development is so comprehensive connections will be explicitly pointed out that understanding any one issue in the text (see cross references to other inevitably requires studying all the rest. chapters), while in others readers may need to identify them on their own. Although teachers of various school sub- Questions in the margins are intended jects can use this book to help their stu- to help readers see the larger and more dents understand specific development complex picture behind the specific data. issues, students should always be made aware that no single issue exists in isola- Suppose you are most interested in envi- tion from the others. Ideally, teachers ronmental issues. Chapters 10 and 14 are would use most or all of the book's con- devoted to two different environmental tent to build one or more learning mod- challenges: local particulate air pollution ules centered around given curricular in large cities and global air pollution topics. For example, an Air Pollution from carbon dioxide emissions. But to module might look like this: gain a better understanding of these issues you will also need to read about Air Pollution population growth and economic growth (Chapters 3 and 4), industrialization and 1. Introduction: Concepts of "develop- postindustrialization (Chapter 9), ment" and "sustainable develop- income inequality and poverty (Chapters ment"--Chapters 1, 2, and 16. 5 and 6), and health and longevity 2. Local and global air pollution-- (Chapter 8). These are the most obvious Chapters 10 and 14. links, and they are relatively easy to iden- 3. What are the major causes of the tify while reading the environmental increasing air pollution? chapters. You could also, however, look · Population growth--Chapter 3 into links with all the other chapters in · Economic growth--Chapter 4 the book. For example, how does global- · Industrialization--Chapter 9 5 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 6 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH · Urbanization--Chapter 10 and looking for correlation among vari- · Income inequality--Chapter 5 ous indicators can often provide more · Poverty--Chapter 6 insights and food for thought than sim- 4. Aggravating factors or new ply reading a text. opportunities? · International trade--Chapter 12 The author hopes that the discussions · Foreign investment--Chapter 13 generated by this book will help readers · Foreign aid--Chapter 13 understand how global and national · Privatization--Chapter 11 development relate to issues in their own 5. Air pollution as a threat to develop- lives, and that this understanding will ment sustainability: lead to practical action at the local level. · Healthy environment as one of Teachers, youth leaders, and other edu- the goals of development-- cators can use this book to inform dis- Chapters 1 and 17 cussion about local development · Natural capital as a component challenges not only among their stu- of national wealth--Chapter 16 dents but also among parents and other · The role of government community members. Students can use policies--Chapter 17. the knowledge gained to make better- informed life choices and to become You will notice that most of a module's more active, involved citizens of their components can be formulated as ques- country as well as global citizens. tions for discussion. It is up to the reader *** to conclude whether, for example, the effects of economic growth are more The World Bank Institute's Development detrimental to the environment than are Education Program encourages young the effects of poverty or whether foreign people and educators around the world investment in developing countries con- to visit its web site and send us their tributes to pollution rather than helps feedback including queries, opinions, reduce it. The book provides helpful and concerns. (although not exhaustive) data and con- cepts but does not provide any easy For more information and learning mate- answers. rials on issues of sustainable development, visit our web sites at www.worldbank.org/ When discussing questions arising from depweb and www.worldbank.org/wbi/ this book, it is important to make full developmenteducation use of the statistics contained in the data tables (at the end of this book). Please send comments to Comparing data on different countries dep@worldbank.org 6 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 7 1 What Is Development? Are you sure that you know what "devel- Goals and Means of Development opment" really means with respect to How do we different countries? And can you deter- Different countries have different priori- determine which mine which countries are more devel- ties in their development policies. But to countries are more oped and which are less? compare their development levels, you would first have to make up your mind developed and It is somewhat easier to say which coun- about what development really means to which less? tries are richer and which are poorer. But you, what it is supposed to achieve. indicators of wealth, which reflect the Indicators measuring this achievement quantity of resources available to a soci- could then be used to judge countries' ety, provide no information about the relative progress in development. allocation of those resources--for instance, about more or less equitable Is the goal merely to increase national distribution of income among social wealth, or is it something more subtle? groups, about the shares of resources Improving the well-being of the majority used to provide free health and education of the population? Ensuring people's free- services, and about the effects of produc- dom? Increasing their economic security?1 tion and consumption on people's envi- ronment. Thus it is no wonder that Recent United Nations documents countries with similar average incomes emphasize "human development," mea- can differ substantially when it comes to sured by life expectancy, adult literacy, people's quality of life: access to educa- access to all three levels of education, as tion and health care, employment oppor- well as people's average income, which is tunities, availability of clean air and safe a necessary condition of their freedom of drinking water, the threat of crime, and choice. In a broader sense the notion of so on. With that in mind, how do we human development incorporates all determine which countries are more aspects of individuals' well-being, from developed and which are less developed? their health status to their economic and 1If you think that the "simple" answer to this question is something like "maximizing people's happiness," think of the different factors that usually make people feel happy or unhappy. Note that a number of special surveys in different countries appear to show that the average level of happiness in a country does not grow along with the increase in average income, at least after a certain rather modest income level is achieved. At the same time, in each country richer people usually reported slightly higher levels of happiness than poorer people, and people in coun- tries with more equal distribution of wealth appeared to be generally happier. 7 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 8 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH political freedom. According to the provided by nature, such as pollution Human Development Report 1996, pub- absorption and resource regeneration. lished by the United Nations Develop- Moreover, economic growth must be ment Program, "human development is constantly nourished by the fruits of the end--economic growth a means." human development, such as higher qualified workers capable of technologi- It is true that economic growth, by cal and managerial innovations along increasing a nation's total wealth, also with opportunities for their efficient use: enhances its potential for reducing more and better jobs, better conditions poverty and solving other social for new businesses to grow, and greater problems. But history offers a number of democracy at all levels of decisionmaking examples where economic growth was (see Fig. 1.1). not followed by similar progress in human development. Instead growth was Conversely, slow human development achieved at the cost of greater inequality, can put an end to fast economic growth. higher unemployment, weakened According to the Human Development democracy, loss of cultural identity, or Report 1996, "during 1960­1992 not a overconsumption of natural resources single country succeeded in moving from needed by future generations. As the lopsided development with slow human links between economic growth and development and rapid growth to a vir- social and environmental issues are better tuous circle in which human develop- understood, experts including econo- ment and growth can become mutually mists tend to agree that this kind of reinforcing." Since slower human devel- growth is inevitably unsustainable--that opment has invariably been followed by is, it cannot continue along the same slower economic growth, this growth lines for long. First, if environmental and pattern was labeled a "dead end." social/human losses resulting from eco- nomic growth turn out to be higher than economic benefits (additional incomes Sustainable Development earned by the majority of the popula- tion), the overall result for people's well- Sustainable development is a term being becomes negative. Thus such widely used by politicians all over the economic growth becomes difficult to world, even though the notion is still sustain politically. Second, economic rather new and lacks a uniform interpre- growth itself inevitably depends on its tation. Important as it is, the concept of natural and social/human conditions. To sustainable development is still being be sustainable, it must rely on a certain developed and the definition of the term amount of natural resources and services is constantly being revised, extended, 8 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 9 1 WHAT IS DEVELOPMENT? Why is equity important for sustainable development? and refined. Using this book, you can ple continue to jeopardize the well-being try to formulate your own definition as of people belonging to other groups or you learn more about the relationships living in other parts of the world. among its main components--the eco- Imagine, for example, that emissions of nomic, social, and environmental factors greenhouse gases, generated mainly by of sustainable development--and as you highly industrialized countries, lead to decide on their relative significance global warming and flooding of certain based on your own system of values. low-lying islands--resulting in the dis- placement and impoverishment of entire According to the classical definition island nations (see Chapter 14). Or con- given by the United Nations World sider the situation when higher profits of Commission on Environment and pharmaceutical companies are earned at Development in 1987, development is the cost of millions of poor people being sustainable if it "meets the needs of the unable to afford medications needed for present without compromising the abil- treating their life-threatening diseases. ity of future generations to meet their own needs." It is usually understood that "Sustainable" development could proba- this "intergenerational" equity would be bly be otherwise called "equitable and impossible to achieve in the absence of balanced," meaning that, in order for present-day social equity , if the eco- development to continue indefinitely, it nomic activities of some groups of peo- should balance the interests of different 9 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 10 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH groups of people, within the same gener- value of greater national security with the ation and among generations, and do so negative value of slower economic growth simultaneously in three major interre- (loss of jobs and income) and some, pos- lated areas­economic, social, and envi- sibly irreversible, environmental damage? ronmental. So sustainable development is There is no strictly scientific method of about equity, defined as equality of performing such valuations and compar- opportunities for well-being, as well as isons. However, governments have to about comprehensiveness of objectives. make these kinds of decisions on a regular Figure 1.2 shows just a few of the many basis. If such decisions are to reflect the objectives, which, if ignored, threaten to interests of the majority, they must be slow down or reverse development in taken in the most democratic and partici- other areas. You are invited to add more patory way possible. But even in this case, objectives and explain how, in your opin- there is a high risk that long-term inter- ion, they are connected to others. In the ests of our children and grandchildren following chapters you will find many end up unaccounted for, because future examples of such interconnections. generations cannot vote for themselves. Thus, to ensure that future generations Obviously, balancing so many diverse inherit the necessary conditions to pro- objectives of development is an enormous vide for their own welfare, our present- challenge for any country. For instance, day values must be educated enough to how would you compare the positive reflect their interests as well. 10 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 11 1 WHAT IS DEVELOPMENT? The challenge is further complicated by also stands in the way of achieving most the fact that in today's interdependent other goals of development, from clean world many aspects of sustainable devel- environment to personal freedom. opment are in fact international or even Another, closely related, global problem global. On the one hand, many deci- is establishing and preserving peace in sions taken at the national or even local all regions and all countries. War, as level actually have international conse- well as poverty, is inherently destructive What are the quences­economic, social, environmen- of all economic as well as social and necessary tal. When these consequences are environmental goals of development conditions for negative, the situation is sometimes (see Fig. 1.2). referred to as "exporting unsustainabil- sustainable ity." On the other hand, national poli- In the final analysis sustainable develop- development? cies are often inadequate to effectively ment is about long-term conditions for deal with many challenges of sustainabil- humanity's multidimensional well-being. ity. Thus international cooperation on For example, the famous Rio the wide range of so-called transbound- Declaration, adopted by the United ary and global problems of sustainable Nations Conference on Environment development becomes indispensable. and Development in 1992 (also called the Earth Summit, held in Rio de Arguably, the most critical problem of Janeiro, Brazil), puts it this way: sustainable development--in each "Human beings are at the center of con- country as well as globally--is eradicat- cern for sustainable development. They ing extreme poverty. That is because are entitled to a healthy and productive poverty is not only an evil in itself. It life in harmony with nature." 11 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 12 2 Comparing Levels of Development Countries are unequally endowed with and human capital. In practice econo- natural resources. For example, some mists use gross national product countries benefit from fertile agricultural (GNP) per capita or gross domestic soils, while others have to put a lot of product (GDP) per capita for the same effort into artificial soil amelioration. purpose. These statistical indicators are Some countries have discovered rich oil easier to calculate, provide a rough mea- and gas deposits within their territories, sure of the relative productivity with while others have to import most "fossil" which different countries use their fuels. In the past a lack or wealth of nat- resources, and measure the relative mate- ural resources made a big difference in rial welfare in different countries, countries' development. But today a whether this welfare results from good wealth of natural resources is not the fortune with respect to land and natural most important determinant of develop- resources or from superior productivity ment success. Consider such high-income in their use. countries as Japan or the Republic of Korea. Their high economic development allows them to use their limited natural Gross Domestic Product wealth much more productively (effi- and Gross National Product ciently) than would be possible in many less developed countries. The productiv- GDP is calculated as the value of the ity with which countries use their pro- total final output of all goods and ser- ductive resources--physical capital, vices produced in a single year within a human capital, and natural capital--is country's boundaries. GNP is GDP plus widely recognized as the main indicator incomes received by residents from of their level of economic development. abroad minus incomes claimed by non- residents. Theoretically, then, economists compar- ing the development of different coun- There are two ways of calculating GDP tries should calculate how productively and GNP: they are using their capital. But such cal- culations are extremely challenging, pri- · By adding together all the incomes marily because of the difficulty of in the economy--wages, interest, putting values on elements of natural profits, and rents. 12 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 13 2 COMPARING LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT · By adding together all the expendi- firms. For example, in 1994 Chile's tures in the economy--consumption, GNP was 5 percent smaller than its investment, government purchases of GDP. If a country's citizens or firms hold goods and services, and net exports large amounts of the stocks and bonds of (exports minus imports). other countries' firms or governments, and receive income from them, GNP In theory, the results of both calculations may be greater than GDP. In Saudi What are the main should be the same. Because one person's Arabia, for instance, GNP exceeded limitations of per expenditure is always another person's GDP by 7 percent in 1994. For most capita income as a income, the sum of expenditures must countries, however, these statistical indi- equal the sum of incomes. When the cal- cators differ insignificantly. measure of culations include expenditures made or development? incomes received by a country's citizens in GDP and GNP can serve as indicators of their transactions with foreign countries, the scale of a country's economy. But to the result is GNP. When the calculations judge a country's level of economic devel- are made exclusive of expenditures or opment, these indicators have to be incomes that originated beyond a coun- divided by the country's population. try's boundaries, the result is GDP. GDP per capita and GNP per capita show the approximate amount of goods GNP may be much less than GDP if and services that each person in a country much of the income from a country's would be able to buy in a year if incomes production flows to foreign persons or were divided equally (Figure 2.1). That is 13 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 14 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH why these measures are also often called comparison of average income or con- "per capita incomes." sumption between economies. In the data tables at the end of this book In developing countries real GNP per GNP per capita is shown not only in capita is usually higher than nominal U.S. dollars but also in PPP dollars-- GNP per capita, while in developed that is, adjusted with the help of a countries it is often lower (Table 2.1). purchasing power parity (PPP) con- Thus the gap between real per capita version factor. The PPP conversion fac- incomes in developed and developing tor shows the number of units of a countries is smaller than the gap country's currency required to buy the between nominal per capita incomes. same amount of goods and services in the domestic market as one dollar would Although they reflect the average buy in the United States. By applying incomes in a country, GNP per capita this conversion factor, one can, for and GDP per capita have numerous lim- example, convert a country's nominal itations when it comes to measuring GNP per capita (expressed in U.S. dol- people's actual well-being. They do not lars in accordance with the market show how equitably a country's income exchange rate of the national currency) is distributed. They do not account for into its real GNP per capita (an indica- pollution, environmental degradation, tor adjusted for the difference in prices and resource depletion. They do not reg- for the same goods and services between ister unpaid work done within the fam- this country and the United States, and ily and community, or work done in the independent of the fluctuations of the shadow (underground and informal) national currency exchange rate). GNP economy. And they attach equal impor- in PPP terms thus provides a better tance to "goods" (such as medicines) and "bads" (cigarettes, chemical weapons) while ignoring the value of leisure and Table 2.1 Nominal and real GNP per capita in various human freedom. Thus, to judge the rela- countries, 1999 tive quality of life in different countries, GNP per capita GNP per capita one should also take into account other Country (U.S. dollars) (PPP dollars) indicators showing, for instance, the dis- India 450 2,149 tribution of income and incidence of China 780 3,290 poverty (see Chapters 5 and 6), people's Russia 2,270 6,339 health and longevity (Chapter 8) and United States 30,600 30,600 access to education (Chapter 7), the Germany 25,350 22,404 quality of the environment (Chapter Japan 32,230 24,041 10), and more. Experts also use compos- 14 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 15 2 COMPARING LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT ite statistical indicators of development income, $766 to $3,035, and upper- (Chapter 15). middle-income, $3,036 to $9,385), or high-income ($9,386 or more; Map 2.1). Grouping Countries by Their Level of Development A more popular, though apparently more disputable, approach involves dividing all What problems are Different organizations use different cri- countries into "developing" and "devel- associated with teria to group countries by their level of oped"--despite the general understand- dividing countries development. The World Bank, for ing that even the most developed instance, uses GNP per capita to classify countries are still undergoing develop- into "developed" countries as low-income (GNP per ment. Dividing countries into "less devel- and "developing"? capita of $765 or less in 1995), middle- oped" and "more developed" does not income (including lower-middle- help much, because it is unclear where to 15 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 16 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH draw the line between the two groups. In ments, although their incomes formally the absence of a single criterion of a place them among developed countries. country's development, such divisions can only be based on convention among Another challenge is presented by many researchers. For example, it is conven- of the countries with "transition" or "for- tional in the World Bank to refer to low- merly planned" economies--that is, income and middle-income countries as countries undergoing a transition from "developing," and to refer to high-income centrally planned to market economies. countries as "industrial" or "developed." On the one hand, none of these coun- tries has achieved the established thresh- The relatively accurate classification of old of high per capita income. But on countries into "developing" and "devel- the other, many of them are highly oped" based on their per capita income industrialized. This is one reason their does not, however, work well in all cases. classification by the World Bank is cur- There is, for instance, a group of "high- rently "under review." Note that in the income developing countries" that World Bank's World Development Report includes Israel, Kuwait, Singapore, and 1982 these same countries were classi- the United Arab Emirates. These coun- fied as "industrial nonmarket," and in tries are considered developing because current United Nations publications of their economic structure or because of most of them are still grouped among the official opinion of their govern- "industrial" countries. 16 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 17 3 World Population Growth Population dynamics are one of the key centuries, with death rates in developing factors to consider when thinking about countries plummeting after World War II Why is world development. In the past 50 years the thanks to the spread of modern medicine population world has experienced an unprecedented that allowed control of infectious diseases. growing faster increase in population (see Fig. 3.1). Do In much of the developing world the you know why? decline in death rates preceded the decline than ever before? in birth rates by 20 years or more (see When will it A "natural population increase" occurs Fig. 3.2), resulting in record-high rates stabilize? when the birth rate is higher than the of population growth of 3 percent or even death rate. While a country's popula- 4 percent a year. Since the 1960s birth tion growth rate depends on the natural rates have also been declining rapidly in increase and on migration, global popu- most developing countries except those in lation growth is determined exclusively Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. by the natural increase. This decrease in birth rates in the devel- oping world is even more rapid than that Around the world, death rates gradually characteristic of Europe and the United decreased in the late 19th and the 20th States in the 19th century. 17 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 18 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Today's low-income countries still have opportunities to work outside the home, the world's highest birth rates (see Map so they are starting their families later and 3.1), although women tend to have fewer having fewer children. On top of all that, children than before. The reasons for access to modern contraceptives for fam- lower fertility are varied, but most are ily planning is improving, making it eas- related to developing countries' eco- ier for parents to control the number and nomic growth and development (see Fig. spacing of their children. 3.3; see also Chapters 4, 7, 8). Parents choose to have smaller families when Lower fertility rate does not immediately health conditions improve because they lead to lower birth rate and lower popula- no longer have to fear that many of their tion growth rate if a country has a larger babies might die, and when they do not proportion of men and women in their have to rely on their children to work on reproductive years than before. Population the family farm or business or to take care growth caused by more women giving of them in their old age. In addition, birth even though each has the same more parents are sending their daughters number of or fewer children is called to school, which is important because "population momentum." Population women with basic education tend to pro- momentum is particularly significant in duce healthier children and smaller fami- developing countries that had the highest lies. More women now have fertility rates 20 to 30 years ago. 18 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 19 3 WORLD POPULATION GROWTH The decline in birth rates over the past The formerly socialist countries of few decades has lowered population Central and Eastern Europe present a growth rates in developing countries major exception to the broad similarity despite a continuing decline in death of demographic trends in developed and rates. Population growth is even slower developing countries. The rapid decline in developed countries (see Fig. 3.4). in death rates that occurred in the 1950s Stabilizing birth rates and increasing and 1960s slowed down in the 1970s death rates (the latter being a result of and 1980s. In the 1990s death rates aging populations, see Chapter 8) have actually increased in Russia and some already led to a natural population other transition countries, including decrease in Italy and Germany. Japan Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and Spain are expected to follow soon. Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, and (see birth rates and death rates in Data Ukraine. In the late 1990s death rates in Table 1). these middle-income countries exceeded 19 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 20 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Why are fertility and population growth rates different in different countries? 20 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 21 3 WORLD POPULATION GROWTH the average death rate for low-income sition countries. For example, in the countries and approached the rates in Czech Republic the death rate has con- Sub-Saharan Africa. tinued to decline (see Fig. 3.5), while in Hungary and Poland it has held steady. This dramatic and historically unprece- dented reversal in mortality trends is pri- Birth rates in the transition countries of marily explained by higher adult male Europe have dropped sharply in the past Why are mortality: among older men mainly 5 to 10 years, just as the death rates were demographic because of the increase in cardiovascular on the increase. The reasons for that changes in disease, among younger men because of drop are different from those in most more accidents, suicides, and murders. developing countries: they are believed transition Many of these factors can be related to to be closely associated with a lower countries of stress and substance abuse (heavy drink- quality of life and the uncertainties Europe different ing and smoking), which in turn can be caused by the social and economic crisis from those linked to the increased unemployment, of transition. As a result fertility rates in worsening living conditions, and greater these countries are now far below the occurring in most economic uncertainty that have accom- "replacement level" (the level at which developing panied the transition. But rapid eco- population size would become stable, countries? nomic reforms have not necessarily been considered to be slightly more than two detrimental to people's health in all tran- children per family) and lower than 21 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 22 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH those in most developed countries (see population base--in 2000 there were Fig. 3.3). about 6 billion people on earth, about twice as many as in 1970. Because of these unusual demographic trends--increasing death rates combined The projected increase of the world's pop- with dropping birth rates--many of the ulation from the current 6 billion to 9-10 transition countries of Europe have billion at the end of the century will be already experienced natural decreases in attributable almost entirely to population population. growth in developing countries. Thus the share of developing countries in the * * * world's population is expected to increase from the current 84 percent to 88 percent On the global scale, falling fertility rates or more. Rapid growth of the developing already have decreased the population countries' population, particularly in the growth rate--from more than 2.0 per- next 50 years, poses many economic, cent to 1.5 percent a year over the past social, and environmental challenges, not 30 years. Experts expect this trend to only for these countries but also for the continue, so that by the end of this cen- entire global community. Whether these tury the world's population will stabilize additional billions of people get access to at 9 to 10 billion people. But in the adequate education and health services, meantime, in absolute numbers it is still are able to find gainful employment, and growing faster than ever before--by manage to avoid poverty and hunger will about 230,000 people a day. This is hap- be critical for the possibility of global sus- pening because of the larger-than-ever tainable development. 22 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 23 4 Economic Growth Rates GDP growth rates in developing countries countries. Much faster population growth are on average higher than those in devel- in most developing countries is offsetting Will the poor oped countries. Over the 1965-99 period, comparatively faster GDP growth, causing countries catch up the average annual growth rate was 4.1 GDP per capita growth rates in these with the rich? percent in low-income countries, 4.2 per- countries to be relatively low or even nega- cent in middle-income countries, and 3.2 tive (see Fig. 4.1; Map 4.1; Data Table 1). percent in high-income countries (see Fig. 4.1). So does this mean that the poor As a result the gulf between the average countries will soon catch up with the rich? GNP per capita in developing and devel- oped countries continues to widen. In the Unfortunately, the growth patterns last 40 years of the 20th century, the gap described above do not mean that the between the average income of the richest world is on its way to "convergence"-- 20 countries and that of the poorest 20 that is, to the gradual elimination of the countries doubled in size, with the wealth- development gap between rich and poor iest group reaching a level more than 30 23 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 24 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH times that of the poorest. By the end of average annual growth rate was negative, the century, of more than $29 trillion in and in the Middle East and North Africa global GDP, only about $6 trillion--less it was less than 1 percent. The biggest than 22 percent--was generated in devel- drop in GDP per capita growth occurred oping countries, even though these coun- in Eastern Europe and Central Asia tries accounted for about 85 percent of because of the economic crisis caused by the world's population. the transition from planned to market economies (see Fig. 4.2). The average growth data for developing countries also mask growing disparities The news is not all bad for developing among these countries. Between 1990 countries, however. The two developing and 1999 East Asia and the Pacific expe- countries with the biggest populations rienced the fastest growth of GDP per did comparatively well during the past capita--more than 6 percent a year. At decade. In India GDP per capita grew the same time in Sub-Saharan Africa the by about 2.4 percent a year, and in 24 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 25 4 ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES China by an unprecedented 6.4 percent growing faster than 2 percent a year (see a year. Rapid growth rates in China and Fig. 4.3). But if India is excluded from India explain why almost two-thirds of the group of low-income countries and the world's population live in economies China is excluded from the group of 25 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 26 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH middle-income countries, average developing countries widened consider- annual growth rates in these groups ably (see Fig. 4.4). Asia was the only become considerably lower than in high- major region to achieve significant con- income countries (see Fig. 4.1). During vergence toward the developed coun- the last decade of the 20th century 54 tries' level of GNP per capita. Per capita developing countries had negative aver- income in the newly industrialized How has the age growth rates, and most of those with economies of Asia--Hong Kong economic gap positive growth rates were growing (China), the Republic of Korea, slower than high-income countries (see Singapore, and Taiwan (China)-- between developed Map 4.1 and Data Table 1). increased from 18 percent of the devel- and developing oped country average in 1965 to 66 countries changed Between 1965 and 1995 the gap percent in 1995. At the same time over the past few between developed countries and most Africa, for instance, became even poorer decades? 26 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 27 4 ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES in relative terms. The average per capita Sustained economic growth in develop- income in African countries equaled 14 ing countries is a critical tool for reduc- percent of the developed country level ing poverty and improving most people's in 1965 and just 7 percent in 1995. standard of living. But economic Even though Figure 4.4 does not cover growth alone is not enough. In some the second half of the 1990s, you can countries poverty worsened in spite of still find the approximate position of overall economic growth, owing to Will further your country in it, using Data Table 1 increased income inequality (see Chapter economic growth in the back of this book (see the PPP 5). Such economic growth can be socially be environmentally estimate of GNP per capita in your unsustainable­leading to social stress and country as of 1999 and use the average conflict, detrimental to further growth. and socially of $24,930 for GNP per capita in devel- In addition, fast economic growth can sustainable? oped countries). lead to fast environmental degradation, lowering people's quality of life and Based on existing trends, only about 10 eventually reducing economic produc- developing countries--those with GNP tivity (see Chapter 10 and Chapter 14). per capita growth rates more than 1 per- Consider the fact that, if the global econ- centage point higher than the average for omy continues to grow by 3 percent a developed countries--can look forward year for the next 50 years, the total global to catching up with developed countries GDP will more than quadruple. within the next hundred years. And Whether such a drastic increase in those 10 countries will catch up only if human economic activity will be com- they can maintain their high growth patible with the requirements of environ- rates. Doing so will be a challenge. In mental and social sustainability will fact, the poorer a country is, the harder depend on the "quality of growth," on it is to maintain the high volume of the proper balancing of economic goals investment needed for its economic with environmental and social goals (see growth (see Chapter 6). Fig.1.2 and Chapter 16). 27 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 28 5 Income Inequality To begin to understand what life is like be understood with the help of Figure How does income in a country--to know, for example, 5.1, which shows the percentages of inequality affect how many of its inhabitants are poor--it national income received by equal per- is not enough to know that country's per centiles of individuals or households poverty and capita income. The number of poor peo- ranked by their income levels. quality of life in a ple in a country and the average quality country? of life also depend on how equally--or In Hungary the richest 20 percent (quin- unequally--income is distributed. tile) of the population received about 4.5 times more than the poorest quintile, while in Brazil the richest quintile Cross-country Comparisons received more than 30 times more than of Income Inequality the poorest quintile. Compare these ratios with an average of about 6:1 in high- In Brazil and Hungary, for example, the income countries. In the developing GNP per capita levels are rather close, world income inequality, measured the but the incidence of poverty in Brazil is same way, varies by region: 4:1 in South higher. The reason for this difference can Asia, 6:1 in East Asia and the Middle East 28 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 29 5 INCOME INEQUALITY and North Africa, 10:1 in Sub-Saharan households are divided into 5 groups, 20 Africa, and 12:1 in Latin America. percent in each, (or 10 groups, 10 per- cent in each) and the income of each group is calculated and expressed as a Lorenz Curves and Gini Indexes percentage of GDP (see Fig. 5.1). Next, economists plot the shares of GDP To measure income inequality in a coun- received by these groups cumulatively-- try and compare this phenomenon that is, plotting the income share of the among countries more accurately, econo- poorest quintile against 20 percent of mists use Lorenz curves and Gini the population, the income share of the indexes. A Lorenz curve plots the cumu- poorest quintile and the next (fourth) lative percentages of total income quintile against 40 percent of the popu- received against the cumulative percent- lation, and so on, until they plot the ages of recipients, starting with the poor- aggregate share of all five quintiles est individual or household (see Fig. (which equals 100 percent) against 100 5.2). How do they construct the curve? percent of the population. After con- necting all the points on the chart-- First, economists rank all the individuals starting with the 0 percent share of or households in a country by their income received by 0 percent of the pop- income level, from the poorest to the ulation--they get the Lorenz curve for richest. Then all these individuals or this country. 29 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 30 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH The deeper a country's Lorenz curve, A Gini index is even more convenient the less equal its income distribution. than a Lorenz curve when the task is to For comparison, see in Figure 5.2 the compare income inequality among many "curve" of absolutely equal income dis- countries. The index is calculated as the tribution. Under such a distribution area between a Lorenz curve and the line pattern, the first 20 percent of the pop- of absolute equality, expressed as a per- Is a more equal ulation would receive exactly 20 percent centage of the triangle under the line (see distribution of of the income, 40 percent of the popu- the two shaded areas in Fig. 5.2). Thus a lation would receive 40 percent of the Gini index of 0 percent represents perfect income good or income, and so on. The corresponding equality--the Lorenz curve coincides with bad for a country's Lorenz curve would therefore be a the straight line of absolute equality. development? straight line going from the lower left A Gini index of 100 implies perfect corner of the figure (x = 0 percent, inequality--the Lorenz curve coincides y = 0 percent) to the upper right corner with the x axis and goes straight upward (x = 100 percent, y = 100 percent). against the last entry (that is, the richest Figure 5.2 shows that Brazil's Lorenz individual or household; see the thick dot- curve deviates from the hypothetical ted line in Figure 5.2). In reality, neither line of absolute equality much further perfect equality nor perfect inequality is than that of Hungary. This means that possible. Thus Gini indexes are always of these two countries Brazil has the greater than 0 percent but less than 100 higher income inequality. percent (see Fig. 5.3 and Data Table 1). 30 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 31 5 INCOME INEQUALITY Costs and Benefits growth, and undermine a country's of Income Inequality international competitiveness. Is a less equal distribution of income good On the other hand, excessive inequality or bad for a country's development? There adversely affects people's quality of life, are different opinions about the best pat- leading to a higher incidence of poverty, tern of distribution--about whether, for impeding progress in health and educa- example, the Gini index should be closer tion, and contributing to crime. Think to 25 percent (as in Sweden) or to 40 per- also about the following effects of high cent (as in the United States). Consider income inequality on some major factors the following arguments. of economic growth and development: An excessively equal income distribution · High inequality reduces the pool of can be bad for economic efficiency. people with access to the resources-- Take, for example, the experience of such as land or education--needed socialist countries, where deliberately to unleash their full productive low inequality (with no private profits potential. Thus a country deprives and minimal differences in wages and itself of the contributions the poor salaries) deprived people of the incen- could make to its economic and tives needed for their active participation social development. in economic activities--for diligent · High inequality threatens a country's work and vigorous entrepreneurship. political stability because more people Among the consequences of socialist are dissatisfied with their economic equalization of incomes were poor disci- status, which makes it harder to reach pline and low initiative among workers, political consensus among population poor quality and limited selection of groups with higher and lower goods and services, slow technical incomes. Political instability increases progress, and eventually, slower eco- the risks of investing in a country and nomic growth leading to more poverty. so significantly undermines its devel- opment potential (see Chapter 6). In many high-income countries relatively · High inequality may discourage cer- low inequality of incomes is achieved tain basic norms of behavior among with the help of considerable transfer economic agents (individuals or payments from the government budget. enterprises) such as trust and com- However, economists often argue that mitment. Higher business risks and mitigating inequality by increasing the higher costs of contract enforcement burden of government taxes tends to dis- impede economic growth by slowing courage investment, slow economic down all economic transactions. 31 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 32 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH · High inequality limits the use of decreasing income inequality in devel- important market instruments such as oping countries to help accelerate eco- changes in prices and fines. For exam- nomic and human development. But ple, higher rates for electricity and hot the simple fact that high levels of water might promote energy effi- income inequality tend to strike many ciency (see Chapter 15), but in the people as unfair, especially when they face of serious inequality, governments imply starkly different opportunities introducing even slightly higher rates available to children born in the same risk causing extreme deprivation country, also matters for sustainable among the poorest citizens. development. After all, how can people care about the needs of future genera- These are among the reasons why some tions if they don't care about people liv- international experts recommend ing today? 32 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 33 6 Poverty and Hunger The Nature of Poverty fore equitable access to health and educa- tion services and development of social What is poverty? Poverty is pronounced deprivation of security systems. Poverty reduction How can poverty well-being. But what is "deprivation," and strategies also must allow for the fact that in different how can it be measured? Traditionally different aspects of poverty interact and poverty was understood primarily as reinforce each other. For example, countries be material deprivation, as living with low improving social security not only makes compared? income and low consumption, character- poor people feel less vulnerable, but also ized primarily by poor nutrition and poor allows them to take advantage of higher- living conditions. However, it is easy to risk opportunities, such as moving to observe that income poverty in most cases another location or changing qualifica- is associated with so-called human tions. And increasing poor people's poverty--the low health and education representation and participation not only levels that are either the cause or the helps them overcome the feeling of being result of low income. Income and human excluded from society, but also con- poverty also tend to be accompanied by tributes to better targeting of public such social deprivations as high vulnera- health and education services. bility to adverse events (for example, dis- ease, economic crisis, or natural disaster), Note that this chapter is devoted only to voicelessness in most of society's institu- income poverty and hunger while the tions, and powerlessness to improve one's other dimensions of poverty are dis- living circumstances. This multidimen- cussed, in more or less detail, in some of sional nature of poverty is revealed by the following chapters. interviews with the poor themselves and confirmed by special sociological studies. Measures of income poverty are different in different countries. Generally speaking, The broader definition of poverty as a the richer a country is, the higher its multidimensional phenomenon leads to national poverty line. To allow for interna- a clearer understanding of its causes and tional comparisons, the World Bank has to a more comprehensive policy aimed at established an international poverty line of poverty reduction. For example, in addi- $1 a day per person in 1985 purchasing tion to the issues of economic growth power parity (PPP) prices, which is and income distribution, it brings to the equivalent to $1.08 a day per person in 33 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 34 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH 1993 PPP prices. According to this mea- number of poor people decreased very sure, the portion of extremely poor people modestly. Using Map 6.1 and Data in the world's population--those living on Table 2, you can identify the developing less than $1 a day--fell between 1990 and countries with the highest percentages 1999, from 29 percent to 23 percent. But, of their population living below the owing to the fast growth of the world's international poverty line. population, the absolute number of peo- ple living in extreme poverty decreased by Analysts have found a strong positive only 123 million in that time period. For relationship between economic growth middle-income countries, an interna- and poverty reduction. For example, East tional poverty line of $2 a day, $2.15 in Asia (including China), which contains 1993 PPP prices, is closer to a practical the world's fastest-growing economies, minimum. Of the 6 billion people living reduced the share of its population living on Earth at the end of the 20th century, below the international poverty line from almost half--about 2.8 billion--lived on about 29 percent in 1990 to about 15 less than $2 a day, and about one-fifth-- percent in 2000. In China alone, nearly 1.2 billion--lived on less than $1. 150 million people were lifted out of The Geography of Poverty Most of the world's poor live in South Asia (over 40 percent), Sub-Saharan Africa (almost 25 percent), and East Asia (about 23 percent). Almost half of the world's poor live in just two large coun- tries--China and India. The highest incidence of poverty is observed in Sub-Saharan Africa, with almost half of its population living below the $1 poverty line (see Data Table 2). Sub-Saharan Africa is followed by South Asia, where over the 1990s the incidence of poverty went down from about 41 percent to about 32 percent (see Fig. 6.1), although the absolute 34 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 35 6 POVERTY AND HUNGER poverty. But in Sub-Saharan Africa, The Vicious Circle of Poverty where negative growth of GNP per capita predominated during that period, Economists generally assume that peo- both the incidence of poverty and the ple's willingness to save for future con- absolute number of poor people sumption grows with their incomes. It increased--from 47 percent to 49 per- seems natural that the poorer people cent and by 74 million. In relative terms, are, the less they can afford to plan for the fastest growth of poverty took place the future and save. Thus in poor coun- in the region of Eastern Europe and tries, where most incomes have to be Central Asia that lived through the acute spent to meet current--often urgent-- economic recession associated with mar- needs, national saving rates tend to be ket-oriented reforms. Between 1987 and lower. In combination with the small 1998, the incidence of poverty in this size of poor countries' economies, lower region increased from 0.2 percent to 5.1 saving rates account for a much smaller percent and the number of poor people pool of savings available for desperately from about 1 million to 24 million. needed domestic investment in both 35 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 36 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH physical capital and human capital. For example, Sub-Saharan Africa consis- tently has the lowest saving rate and the smallest pool of savings. By contrast, high-income countries in 1996­2000 saved a smaller share of their GDP than Can poor countries some developing countries, but their break the vicious pool of savings was about three times as large as all the savings of developing circle of poverty? countries combined (see Fig. 6.2). But without new investment, an economy's productivity cannot be increased and incomes cannot be raised. That closes the vicious circle of poverty (see Fig. 6.3). So are poor countries doomed to remain poor? The data on saving and investment in East Asia over the past two decades sug- gest that the answer is no. Despite low initial GNP per capita, the rates of gross advanced technology from developed domestic saving and gross domestic countries. The opportunity to benefit investment in the region were higher from foreign investment and technology than in any other region and resulted in is sometimes referred to as the "advan- some of the highest economic growth tage of backwardness," which should rates (see Fig. 6.2 and Fig. 4.4). Experts (at least theoretically) enable poor coun- are still trying to explain this phenome- tries to develop faster than did today's non. Generally speaking, however, many rich countries. However, many of the of the factors that encourage people to conditions needed to attract foreign save and invest are well known. They investment to a country are the same include political and economic stability, as those needed to stimulate domestic a reliable banking system, and favorable investment. government policy. A favorable investment climate includes In addition to domestic investment, for- many factors that make investing in one eign investment can help developing country more profitable and less risky countries break out of the vicious circle than in another country. Political stabil- of poverty, particularly if such invest- ity is one of the most important of these ment is accompanied by transfers of factors. Both domestic and foreign 36 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 37 6 POVERTY AND HUNGER What is the relationship between poverty and political instability? investors are discouraged by the threat capital assets. As a result a country can of political upheaval and by the fall into another vicious circle, one seen prospect of a new regime that might historically in many African and some impose punitive taxes or expropriate Latin American countries (see Fig. 6.4). 37 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 38 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Political instability scares away new Figure 6.5 for the regional distribution investments, which prevents faster eco- of hunger and Data Table 2 for the nomic growth and improvements in shares of undernourished adults1 and people's economic welfare, causing even malnourished children2 in individual more dissatisfaction with the political countries. Note that three-quarters of regime and increasing political instabil- the world's hungry people live in rural ity. Falling into this vicious circle of areas and the majority of the hungry are political instability can seriously impede women. efforts to boost economic development and reduce poverty. Particularly disturbing is the recent dynamics of world hunger. During the first half of the 1990s the number of The Challenge of Hunger undernourished people decreased by 37 million, but over the next 5 years it Hunger is the most extreme manifesta- increased by more than 18 million. The tion of poverty and arguably the most numbers of undernourished have fallen morally unacceptable. In the globalized in East Asia and Pacific, but remain high world of the 21st century, with more in South Asia and continue to rise in than enough food produced to feed all Sub-Saharan Africa and in the Middle of its 6 billion inhabitants, there are still East and North Africa. In India, after a over 800 million poor suffering from decline of 20 million between chronic undernourishment (which is 1990­1992 and 1995­1997, the num- more than the entire population of Latin ber of undernourished climbed by 19 America or Sub-Saharan Africa). million over the following four years. According to the recent estimate of the And in China, where the number of UN Food and Agriculture Organization undernourished people was reduced by (FAO), in 1999-2001 there were 842 58 million over the 1990s, progress is million undernourished people in the gradually slowing. In countries with world, including 798 million in develop- transition economies the second half of ing countries, 34 million in countries the 1990s brought another increase in with transition economies, and 10 mil- the number of undernourished people, lion in high-income countries. See from 25 million to 34 million. 1Undernourishment means consuming too little food to maintain a normal level of activity. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) sets the average requirement at 1,900 calories a day, although the needs of indi- viduals vary with age, sex, and height. In the FAO's estimation, extreme hunger occurs with a shortfall of more than 300 calories. 2Child malnutrition is measured by comparing these children's weight and height with those of well-nourished children of the same age. 38 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 39 6 POVERTY AND HUNGER On the surface, the causes of hunger Statistics show that in the world as a appear to be multiple and to differ whole there is more than enough food among countries. Many hungry people produced to feed all the hungry. live in countries that lack sufficient Moreover, they also show that countries arable land or water to feed their grow- with smaller proportions of undernour- ing populations. But there are also many ished people tend to be more dependent hungry people in other countries, with on food imports than countries with plentiful natural capital. Some of these more widespread undernourishment latter countries specialize in producing (even though they spend smaller shares and exporting a single agricultural com- of their export earnings on food modity, such as cacao, coffee, or cotton, imports). The conclusion appears to be and suffer from declining prices in the that persistent hunger is an issue not of world markets. It is arguable that these insufficient global food production but same land and water resources could be of extremely unequal distribution better used for growing food and mak- among countries as well as within coun- ing it available to these countries' popu- tries. The low export earnings of the lations. But still other countries, like poorest countries prevent them from Brazil, specialize in exporting those same buying enough food in the world mar- food products that are desperately kets, but even where food is available needed by their own poor and inside a country, the poorest of its citi- malnourished. zens are often unable to pay for it. 39 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 40 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Poverty of countries and extreme poverty ural emergencies. Poverty breeds con- of households are the most undisputable flicts, and many refugees are trying to causes of hunger. escape not only violence but also eco- nomic deprivation. According to FAO observations, most food emergencies across the world are But seeing poverty only as a root cause of directly caused by natural disasters hunger (see Fig. 6.6) actually oversimpli- (droughts and floods), conflicts, fies the real picture. In fact, poverty is refugees, and economic crises. But is it both a cause and a consequence of hunger. not poverty that makes people so vulner- Undernourishment is a critical link in the able to natural as well as man-made dis- vicious circle of poverty, leading to poor asters? And is it not poverty that lies at health, lower learning capacity and dimin- the root of many of these disasters? For ished physical activity, and thus to lower example, poverty impedes investment in productivity and poverty (see Fig. 6.7).3 irrigation that could prevent the disas- Nearly one-third of poor health outcomes trous consequences of droughts in many in developing countries are associated with countries. And poverty (low export earn- hunger and malnutrition. Malnourish- ings) hinders the food imports that ment negatively affects children's school could compensate for unpredictable nat- attendance and their educational attain- 3Think also about other vicious circles of poverty, linked through other aspects of human poverty, such as poor education (Chapter 7) or serious disease (Chapter 8). 40 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 41 6 POVERTY AND HUNGER How can global hunger be eliminated for good? ment, and the legacy of malnourishment national governments. For example, in in childhood, combined with insufficient Brazil, President Luiz Inácio Lula da food intake in adulthood, manifests itself Silva has pledged to eradicate hunger by in lower wages and reduced earning the end of his four-year term and has capacity for adults, who will be unable to launched the comprehensive Fome Zero support their own families. In addition, (Zero Hunger) Project. Note that Brazil malnourished mothers are more likely to is one of the major exporters of crops give birth to underweight babies. Thus and meat, but over 40 million of its 170 closes an intergenerational vicious circle of million people live on less than $1 a day. malnourishment and poverty, particularly threatening to the social sustainability of However, many developing countries national and global development. may fail to meet the enormous twin challenges of hunger and poverty on So, given the close and complex interac- their own. The role of the international tion between hunger and poverty, is community is therefore indispensable there a hope of doing away with too. As a practical step, the World hunger--as the most demeaning of Summit on Sustainable Development in human deprivations--any time soon? Johannesburg (South Africa, August­ September 2002) and the United Nations Obviously, a lot will depend on the General Assembly (December 2002) political will and responsibility of called for immediate implementation of 41 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 42 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH the World Solidarity Fund to reinforce ment and landlessness can be most effec- the global fight against extreme poverty tive in ensuring the sustainable eradica- and hunger. However, perhaps even more tion of hunger. important for improving the lot of devel- oping countries' poor and hungry might Vietnam appears to be a good example. be pro-poor reforms in international Economic reforms started in 1986 gave trade, such as those discussed during the farmers control over land, allowed them Doha round of world trade negotiations to increase sales to the market, reduced (see Chapter 12). agricultural taxation, and increased pub- lic investments in rural infrastructure. Finally, identifying and committing to That allowed Vietnamese farmers to take the most effective policy measures will advantage of improved access to global be of crucial importance. In the short markets and resulted in the doubling of term, even emergency measures aimed at per capita food production and in even giving hungry people direct access to the faster growth of agricultural exports. food they need (such as public food dis- Over the 1990s, agricultural growth tribution or food-for-work programs) helped boost overall economic growth to may hold important keys to breaking the an average of 7 percent a year and helped persistent vicious circle of undernourish- reduce the proportion of undernourished ment and poverty. But most experts people from 27 percent to 19 percent. agree that any longer-term and more This shows how rapid economic growth sustainable solutions should address and trade can result in sustainable reduc- hunger and poverty simultaneously. For tions of poverty and hunger thanks to example, environmentally sound irriga- pro-poor policies and investments. tion in drought-prone areas can raise the productivity of local agriculture, simul- * * * taneously improving the local availability of food and increasing local farmers' FAO Director-General Jaques Diouf incomes (see food availability and eco- appealed to national governments and nomic access to food in Fig. 6.6). Public the international community to create investment in construction of rural roads an international Alliance against Hunger can simultaneously improve the physical that would be based "not on a plea for access of the rural poor to markets (for charity but on . . . recognizing that the buying food as well as for selling their suffering of 800 million hungry people outputs, see Fig. 6.6) and create addi- represents . . . a threat to economic tional jobs outside of agriculture. growth and political stability on a global Government strategies directly attacking scale." Would you agree with the logic of such root causes of poverty as unemploy- this appeal? 42 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 43 7 Education Capital is a stock of wealth used to pro- and development activities, R&D) as duce goods and services. Most often, by well as in knowledge dissemination How are human capital people mean physical capital: (through investing in education as well as capital and buildings, machines, technical equip- in information and communication tech- physical capital ment, stocks of raw materials and goods. nologies, ICT) tended to become most But "human capital"--people's abilities, successful in solving their development similar? How are knowledge, and skills--is at least as problems (see Data Table 2). Moreover, it they different? important for production, and at least as is now widely believed that even poor valuable to people who have it. The countries, with insufficient resources to importance of the "human factor" in invest in creating new knowledge, can modern production is reflected in the "leapfrog" in their development provided distribution of income among people that they succeed in absorbing advanced who own physical capital and people global knowledge and adapting it for the who "own" knowledge and skills. For needs of their developing economies. A example, in the United States in the well-educated and adaptive population is 1980s the income received on knowledge seen as central to this task. and skills (through wages and salaries) was about 14 times that received on physical capital (through dividends and Education and Human Capital undistributed corporate profits). This phenomenon led economists to acknowl- Most human capital is built up through edge the existence of human capital. education or training that increases a person's economic productivity--that is, Next, in the 1990s, came the recognition enables him or her to produce more or of a new stage in global economic devel- more valuable goods and services and opment: the "knowledge economy," thus to earn a higher income. knowledge-based and knowledge- Governments, workers, and employers driven.1 This recognition stemmed from invest in human capital by devoting the fact that the countries that invested money and time to education and train- most actively in knowledge creation and ing (to accumulating knowledge and adaptation (through investing in research skills). Like any other investment, these 1These terms are relatively new and are not yet strictly defined, although many researchers and journalists use them, often interchangeably. 43 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 44 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH investments in human capital require · Workers with lower and higher edu- sacrifices. People agree to make these cation and skills are deliberately paid sacrifices if they expect to be rewarded similar wages to preserve a relative with additional income in the future. equality of earnings--as used to hap- pen in centrally planned economies. Governments spend public funds on edu- These distortions in relative wages What are the best cation because they believe that a better- are being eliminated as part of these ways to build a educated population will contribute to countries' transition to market faster and more sustainable development. economies. country's human Employers pay for employee training capital? because they expect to cover their costs The national stock of human capital and and gain additional profits from increased its rate of increase are critical to a coun- productivity. And individuals are often try's level and rate of economic develop- prepared to spend time and money to get ment, primarily because these are education and training, since in most important determinants of a country's countries people with better education ability to produce and adopt technologi- and skills earn more. Educated and skilled cal innovations. But investing in human people are usually able to deliver more capital, although extremely important, is output or output that is more valuable in not sufficient for rapid economic growth. the marketplace, and their employers tend Such investment must be accompanied to recognize that fact with higher wages. by the right development strategy. Economic returns to education are not Consider the Philippines and Vietnam. always the same, however. Returns to In both countries adult literacy is higher education may be lower if: than in most other Southeast Asian countries (see Data Table 2). · The quality of education is low or Nevertheless, until recently both coun- knowledge and skills acquired at tries were growing relatively slowly, school do not match market demand. largely because of development strategies In this case investments in human cap- that prevented them from taking full ital were not efficient enough, result- advantage of their stock of human capi- ing in less human capital and lower tal. In Vietnam central planning stood returns to individuals and society. in the way, and in the Philippines eco- · There is insufficient demand for nomic isolation from the global market human capital because of slow eco- was to blame. In recent years, however, nomic growth. In this case workers' both countries have realized a return on human capital may be underused their investments in human capital-- and underrewarded. Vietnam by adopting a more market- 44 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 45 7 EDUCATION based approach to development and rad- GDP to education today than they did ically improving its growth rate, and the in 1980. But this share is still smaller Philippines by "exporting" many of its than that in developed countries: 3.3 educated workers and "importing" their percent of GDP in low-income coun- foreign exchange earnings. tries and 4.8 percent in middle-income counties compared with 5.4 percent in Most governments are playing an high-income countries. Using Data increasingly active role in providing edu- Tables 1 and 2, you can calculate the cation (see Map 7.1 and Data Table 2). absolute gap between per capita public Differences in public spending on edu- spending on education in developed and cation (relative to GDP) across countries developing countries. This gap is an reflect differences in government efforts important manifestation of the vicious to increase national stocks of human circle of poverty described in Chapter 6: capital. Governments of developing low per capita income inhibits invest- countries devote a larger share of their ment in human (as well as physical) 45 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 46 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH capital, slows productivity growth, and In vocational education, employers often so prevents per capita income from play an important role in providing on- increasing significantly. the-job training for employees and in financing training in vocational schools. Data on public education spending do Governments try to encourage employ- not, however, paint a complete picture of ers' involvement in order to save public investment in human capital because in funds and to link vocational education many countries private spending on edu- to the needs of the labor market. Specific cation is considerable. Around the world, work skills are best developed through the difference between public and private training during employment, especially spending on education varies enormously in jobs involving substantial technologi- and does not seem to be correlated with a cal change. country's average income. Among low- income countries, for example, the share Public financing of vocational training is of private spending on education ranges generally considered justified when from about 20 percent in Sri Lanka to 60 employer training capacity is weak (as in percent in Uganda and Vietnam, while small and medium-size firms) or absent among high-income countries it ranges (as with retraining for unemployed from 5 percent in Austria to 50 percent workers). High-quality general pre- in Switzerland. employment education is the best guar- antee of an individual's ability to learn There are, however, certain patterns in new skills throughout a career and of the balance between public and private employers' willingness to invest in that spending on different levels of educa- individual's professional training. Most tion. Most governments are committed importantly, employees must be able to to providing free primary and often sec- communicate clearly in writing and to ondary education because it is believed use mathematics and science skills to that not just individuals but the entire diagnose and solve problems. country benefits significantly when most of its citizens can read, write, and fully participate in social and economic life. Primary Education and Literacy At the same time, tertiary education institutions, both private and public, Attending primary school helps children usually charge tuition, because more of acquire basic literacy and numeracy as the benefits from this level of education well as other knowledge and skills needed are believed to accrue to graduates (in for their future education. In low-income the form of much higher future earn- countries primary education in itself often ings) rather than to society at large. improves the welfare of the poor by mak- 46 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 47 7 EDUCATION ing them more productive workers, Because economic and social returns to enabling them to learn new skills through- society are known to be higher for pri- out their working lives, and reducing the mary education than for other levels of risk of unemployment. In addition, pri- study, most governments are committed mary education--especially for girls and to providing free access to primary school women--leads to healthier and smaller to all children. But in low-income coun- families and fewer infant deaths. tries the public funds available for this For low-income purpose are often insufficient to meet the countries, what are Despite rapid growth in the number of increasing demand of rapidly growing the main obstacles children of primary school age, since populations. These funds also tend to be 1970 developing countries have suc- allocated inequitably, with better educa- to universal ceeded in considerably increasing the tion opportunities often provided to primary education? percentage of children enrolled in pri- urban children relative to rural children, mary school (see Fig. 7.1). But universal to well-off children relative to poor chil- primary education, a goal being pursued dren, and to boys relative to girls. by most governments of developing countries, is still far from being achieved Even when primary education is accessi- in many of them (see Data Table 2). ble, poor children may be unable to bene- Low enrollments in many low-income fit from it. Many of these children must countries may signal inadequacies in work rather than attend school. Premature education system capacity as well as and extensive involvement in work dam- social conditions that prevent children ages their health and impedes develop- from enrolling. ment of their social skills, decreasing their 47 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 48 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH future earning power as adults and perpet- uating the vicious circle of poverty. In addition, primary school enrollments are generally lower for girls than for boys. This gender gap is widest in South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East. The only developing region that has already managed to do away with the gender gap in primary (and even secondary) education is Latin America and the Caribbean (see Data Table 2). The persistent gender gap in education reflects cultural norms, early childbearing, and limited employment opportunities for women, as well as tra- ditional expectations of girls' larger con- tribution to household work. As a result, of the 900 million adults in developing countries who are illiterate (nearly one in three), almost two-thirds are women (see Fig. 7.2). Issues in Secondary and Tertiary Education Note that child labor is known to be a poverty issue--that is, its incidence In most developing countries enrollment declines as per capita income rises. That in secondary schools is much lower than means that further economic growth will in primary schools (see Data Table 2). tend to remove this obstacle to universal Although the situation has been improv- primary education. By contrast, gender ing over the past few decades, on average disparities in school enrollments are not less than 60 percent of children of sec- correlated with overall living standards, so ondary school age in low- and middle- countries do not just "grow out of them." income countries are enrolled, while in Narrowing the gender gap requires sup- high-income countries secondary educa- portive national policies, such as reducing tion has become almost universal (see the direct and indirect costs of girls' Fig. 7.3). Among the world's regions, schooling for their parents and building Sub-Saharan Africa has the largest share more schools for girls in education sys- of children not enrolled in secondary tems that are segregated by sex. school. Check Data Table 2 for the indi- 48 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 49 7 EDUCATION How does a country's economic position affect its education needs? cator of child labor incidence--that is, many Sub-Saharan countries this propor- the percentage of children in the 10­14 tion is one-half. In fact, the situation age range who work. Note that this indi- may be even worse: in many countries cator too is highest in Sub-Saharan data on child labor are underreported or Africa. Child labor remains the most for- not reported at all because officially the midable obstacle to education for chil- problem is presumed not to exist. dren in low-income countries. According to available data, almost one-third of The gap between developed and devel- children in the 10­14 age range are in oping countries is particularly wide in the labor force in low-income countries tertiary education (see Fig. 7.4 and Data (excluding China and India), while in Table 2). In high-income countries 49 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 50 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH tertiary enrollments have increased (Singapore and Republic of Korea), while rapidly since 1980, but in low- and the most "expensive" students (those middle-income countries they have from Denmark and Switzerland) showed improved only slightly. relatively modest results. Thus increased expenditure on education may not Note that neither the number of students always be the answer--improving the enrolled at a level of study nor the quality of curriculum and pedagogy and amount of resources invested in educa- the quality of management in education tion can indicate the quality of education may be more effective. and thus provides only a rough idea of a country's educational achievements. For Vast opportunities for improving the example, Figure 7.5 shows that across the quality of education in the lagging devel- countries, secondary students' perfor- oping countries are offered by modern mance in math and science appears to be information and communication tech- unrelated to per student real educational nologies (ICT). Computers with expenditure, so that the best interna- Internet access can be used by teachers tional test scores were received by stu- and students as an invaluable source of dents from the countries with relatively up-to-date information and cutting-edge modest cost of a student's education knowledge, particularly precious in 50 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 51 7 EDUCATION places with limited access to other teach- per capita income largely thanks to its ing and learning resources. Potentially, successes in education and technological ICT in education could be instrumental innovation and in spite of its insufficient in bridging the knowledge gap between natural resource base. developed and developing countries (see also Chapter 9). But this potential can To see which countries appear to provide materialize only if the so-called digital the best-quality math and science educa- Is there any hope divide­the gap in access to ICT dividing tion to their secondary students, exam- of bridging the these countries--is bridged first. In fact, ine the recent outcomes of the OECD digital divide? as of 2000 even Eastern Europe and Program for International Student Central Asia, leading other developing Assessment (PISA). Among the 32 coun- regions in access to ICT, had about 50 tries that participated in PISA 2000 (29 computers per 1,000 people compared OECD countries plus Brazil, Latvia, and with almost 400 in high-income coun- the Russian Federation), the highest tries. At the same time South Asia and rankings were received by Korea, Japan, Sub-Saharan Africa had just 4 and 10 Finland, New Zealand, the United computers per 1,000 people respectively. Kingdom, Canada, and Australia (see The gap in access to the Internet is even Fig. 7.6). Brazil and Mexico were at the wider (see Data Table 2). bottom of the list. This cross-country comparison is particularly important Given the high cost and limited avail- because PISA's methodology was aimed ability of computers and Internet con- at testing students' ability to use their nectivity in low- and middle-income knowledge rather than to just present countries, their benefits can be maxi- it--to recognize scientific and mathe- mized by installing computers first in matical problems in real-life situations, schools, libraries, and community cen- identify the relevant facts and methods ters. For example, when the government involved, develop chains of reasoning, of the Republic of Korea decided to and support their conclusions. eliminate the digital divide (in April 2000), it engaged in distributing per- To generate economic returns, education sonal computers to school teachers, pro- and training have to meet the ever- viding free-of-charge high-speed Internet changing demands of the labor market-- access to schools, and organizing com- that is, they have to equip graduates with puter training for educators (as well as the knowledge and skills needed at each the wider public). Note that the stage of a country's economic develop- Republic of Korea--one of the most ment. For example, countries moving successful developing countries--has from planned to market economies recently crossed the boundary of high usually need more people trained in 51 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 52 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH But perhaps most importantly, flexible workers who are ready to learn are needed everywhere, and an education system that fails to develop these quali- ties in its graduates can hardly be consid- ered fully effective. Given the accelerating rate of technological and economic change, today's students should be morally and intellectually pre- pared for several career changes over their working lifetime. The ability for lifelong learning is becoming a major require- ment of the new job market, characteris- tic of the knowledge economy. * * * Investing in education is not only an important way to build a country's human capital and move it closer to the knowledge economy, thus improving its prospects for economic growth and higher living standards. For every indi- vidual, education also has a value in its economics and business management to own right because education broadens work in emerging private sectors as well people's horizons and helps them to live as in reformed public sectors. Today's healthier, more financially secure, and ICT revolution requires more people more fulfilling lives. This is why experts with computer skills, and globalization use data on literacy, for example, as (see Chapters 12 and 13) has increased important indicators of the quality of the demand for foreign language skills. life in a country. 52 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 53 8 Health and Longevity The health of a country's population is Global Trends often monitored using two statistical Which factors indicators: life expectancy at birth and During the second half of the 20th cen- account for most the under-5 mortality rate. These indica- tury health conditions around the world of the health tors are also often cited among broader improved more than in all previous measures of a population's quality of life human history. Average life expectancy at improvements in because they indirectly reflect many birth in low- and middle-income coun- the 20th century? aspects of people's welfare, including tries increased from 40 years in 1950 to their levels of income and nutrition, the 65 years in 1998. Over the same period quality of their environment, and their the average under-5 mortality rate for this access to health care, safe water, and group of countries fell from 280 to 79 per sanitation. 1,000. But these achievements are still considerably below those in high-income Life expectancy at birth indicates the countries, where average life expectancy number of years a newborn baby would at birth is 78 years and the average under- live if health conditions prevailing at the 5 mortality rate is 6 per 1,000. time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. This indicator does Throughout the 20th century, national not predict how long a baby will actually indicators of life expectancy were closely live, but rather reflects the overall health associated with GNP per capita. If you conditions characteristic of this particular compare Figure 8.1 (Life expectancy at country in this particular year. The birth, 1998) with Figure 2.1 (GNP per under-5 mortality rate indicates the capita, 1999), you will find that in general number of newborn babies who are likely the higher a country's income per capita, to die before reaching age 5 per 1,000 the higher is its life expectancy--although live births. Because infants and children this relationship does not explain all the are most vulnerable to malnutrition and differences among regions and countries. poor hygienic living conditions, they (See Data Tables 1 and 3 for country- account for the largest portion of deaths specific data.) The two other factors in most developing countries. Therefore, believed to be the most important for decreasing under-5 mortality is usually increasing national and regional life seen as the most effective way of increas- expectancies are improvements in medical ing life expectancy at birth in the devel- technology (with some countries clearly oping world. making better use of it than others) and 53 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 54 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH development of and better access to public 50 years even though GNP per capita is health services (particularly clean water, still less than $500. sanitation, and food safety control). Education, especially of girls and women, In general, for nearly all countries, life makes a big difference too, because wives expectancy at birth continued to grow in and mothers who are knowledgeable recent years (see Data Table 3). In devel- about healthier lifestyles play a crucial role oping countries this growth was largely in reducing risks to their families' health. due to much lower under-5 mortality (see Fig. 8.2). Better control of commu- These other factors help explain how nicable diseases that are particularly dan- most developing countries are catching gerous for children, such as diarrhea and up with developed countries in terms worm infections, accounts for most of of people's health even though they are the gains. In many countries higher per generally not catching up in terms of per capita incomes (see Chapter 4 and Data capita income (see Chapter 4). Progress Table 1) also contributed to better nutri- in medical technology, public health ser- tion and housing for most families. vices, and education allows countries to realize "more health" for a given income Governments of developing countries than before. For example, in 1900 life have invested in improving public health expectancy in the United States was measures (safe drinking water, sanitation, about 49 years and income per capita mass immunizations), training medical was more than $4,000. In today's Sub- personnel, and building clinics and hos- 54 Saharan Africa life expectancy is about pitals. But much remains to be done. BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 55 8 HEALTH AND LONGEVITY How are major health risks changing for different groups of countries? The average level of public health expen- in midwifery to attend all deliveries ditures in low-income countries is still could make a big difference. only 1 percent of GDP compared with 6 percent in high-income countries. In those countries where the total bur- Malnutrition, especially among women den of disease has declined, the structure and children, is still a big problem (see of disease has shifted from a preponder- Chapter 6). Communicable, largely pre- ance of communicable disease (diarrhea, ventable diseases still claim millions of worm infections, measles) to a prepon- lives (see below in this chapter). And lit- derance of non-communicable disease tle progress has been made in reducing (heart and circulatory disease, cancer). maternal mortality rates. Over half a However, this shift is particularly obvi- million women die every year in preg- ous in industrialized countries (includ- nancy or childbirth, most often in low- ing European transitional countries), income countries (see Data Table 3). while in developing countries infectious The main reasons are low access of poor diseases are responsible on average for women to trained health personnel and almost half of mortality. emergency care combined with high fertility rates. Whereas in Europe 1 in 2,400 women dies in pregnancy or child- Population Age Structures birth, in Africa this figure is as high as 1 in every 20 women. Initiatives aimed at The health and the longevity of a coun- helping women prevent unwanted preg- try's people are reflected in its population 55 nancies and at getting personnel trained age structure--that is, the percentages of BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 56 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH total population in different age groups. A expected to happen to both pyramids by population age structure can be illustrated 2025. using a "population pyramid," also known as an age-sex pyramid. In such pyramids a As seen in Figure 8.3, in low-income What are the social country's population is divided into males countries more than one-third of the and females as well as age groups (for population is under 15, compared with and economic example, five-year age groups, as in Figure less than one-fifth in high-income coun- challenges that 8.3). Figure 8.3 shows population pyra- tries. From a social and economic per- result from mids typical of low- and high-income spective, a high percentage of children in different countries in 1995 and those expected to a population means that a large portion is be typical in 2025 if current population too young to work and, in the short run, population age trends continue. Note how these shapes is dependent on those who do. This is the structures? represent higher birth rates, higher death main reason for the relatively high age rates (particularly among children), and dependency ratio in most developing lower life expectancies in low-income countries. While in high-income coun- countries. Think about why in poor coun- tries there are roughly 2 people of work- tries the base of the pyramid is broader ing age to support each person who is too and the pyramid is basically triangular young or too old to work, in low-income rather than pear-shaped or rectangular as countries this number is around 1.0­1.5. in rich countries. Explain also the changes The good news is that declining fertility 56 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 57 8 HEALTH AND LONGEVITY in developing countries (see Chapter 3) is less prepared to deal with it and because expected to result in declining depen- the rate of growth in life expectancy and dency ratios for the next few decades, therefore population aging is much faster before the enormous army of today's and there than in developed countries. tomorrow's young workers become too old to work, and dependency ratios rise again. Experts point out that this opens a The Burden "window of opportunity" for developing of Infectious Disease countries to spend relatively less on sup- porting the nonworking, economically In sharp contrast to successes in control- dependent population and to invest more ling some of the most dangerous killers of their savings in improving productiv- of children such as diarrhea and worm ity and reducing poverty (see Chapter 6). infections, other infectious diseases per- However, this window of opportunity can sist into the 21st century. For example, be used only if almost all the members of the average rate of measles immuniza- the working-age population are gainfully tion worldwide is only about 80 percent, employed and able to save and to invest and every year more than 1 million chil- in their children's future. High unem- dren die of the disease. Many of those ployment would not allow these benefits children are in Sub-Saharan Africa, to materialize. where the rate of measles immunization is the lowest--under 60 percent. High-income countries currently face the problem of an aging population--that is, About half of all infectious disease mor- a growing percentage of elderly nonwork- tality in developing countries--more ing people. In 1997 people 65 and above than 5 million deaths a year--can be made up 13.6 percent of the population in attributed to just three diseases: these countries, and this portion is HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), and expected to grow to almost 17.4 percent malaria. None of the three has an effec- by 2015. In several of these countries tive vaccine, but there are proven and (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, cost-effective ways to prevent these dis- Sweden) the share of elderly people has eases. Prevention, however, is compli- already reached or surpassed 15 percent. cated by the fact that infections occur An aging population puts greater pressure primarily in the poorest countries and on a country's pension, health care, and among the poorest people, perpetuating social security systems. As life expectancy their poverty even further. continues to increase in developing coun- tries, they too will face the problem of an HIV/AIDS, according to United aging population (see Fig. 8.3). In fact, Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, developing countries are expected to be hit "has become a major development cri- 57 even harder because they are financially sis." Despite recent medical advances BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 58 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH there is still no cure available, while the Africa (see Map 8.1). Note that about half total number of people living with of all new infections are estimated to HIV/AIDS has reached 40 million. In occur in the age group 15­24. the hardest-hit low-income countries AIDS has already lowered the average In high-income countries, the number life expectancy by a decade or more. of AIDS-related deaths considerably Can the spread of Since the disease first surfaced in the late decreased in the late 1990s thanks to HIV in developing 1970s-early 1980s, about 22 million effective therapy that is keeping infected people have died from it ( including 3 people alive longer. However, this newly countries be million in the year 2000 alone), and 13 developed therapy is very expensive-- curbed? million children have lost one or both from US$10,000 to US$20,000 per parents. About three-quarters of these year--so for most people in developing deaths occurred in Africa, where AIDS is countries it is utterly out of reach. now the primary cause of death. In Preventing new HIV infections is much many African countries 10 to20 percent more affordable, particularly in the early of all adults are infected with HIV. The stage of an epidemic. Raising awareness Caribbean has the highest prevalence of about AIDS and simple ways of personal HIV infection outside of Sub-Saharan protection can go a long way in fore- Africa (in percentage terms), while in stalling a full-blown national epidemic. other regions HIV prevalence is consid- At the same time the African countries erably lower (see Data Table 3). hardest hit by HIV/AIDS cannot be expected to cope with this crisis without An extremely steep increase in the number substantial support from the international of new HIV infections is currently being community. According to some estimates, seen in the countries of Eastern Europe effectively fighting the epidemic in low- and Central Asia, where the epidemic and middle-income countries would arrived only in the early 1990s. Between require US$10.5 billion annually, while the end of 1999 and that of 2000, the in reality the total amount of inter- number of people living with HIV/AIDS national assistance for this purpose in this region almost doubled, rising from reached US$2.5 billion in 2003 (after 420,000 to more than 700,000. This is increasing eight-fold since 1996). already more than in Western Europe both in absolute terms (compare with Tuberculosis--another global epidemic-- 540,000 in Western Europe) and in per- threatens to get out of control as a result centage of the total adult population (0.35 of combination with HIV/AIDS and the percent versus 0.24 percent). Particularly emergence of multi-drug-resistant TB alarming is the number of new infections strains. HIV radically weakens a person's in this region and in Asia, although immune system, and TB becomes the nowhere else is HIV spreading on a scale first manifestation of AIDS in over 50 58 comparable with that in Sub-Saharan percent of all cases in developing coun- BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 59 8 HEALTH AND LONGEVITY tries. In addition, multi-drug-resistant TB Tuberculosis kills about 2 million people develops, caused by inconsistent and par- a year worldwide even though modern, tial TB treatment. And poverty remains low-cost anti-TB drugs can cure at least the main factor of TB epidemics because 85 percent of all cases. In fact, according the probability of becoming infected and to World Health Organization (WHO) that of developing active TB are both estimates, only 19 percent of all TB cases associated with homelessness, crowded in 20 high TB burden countries1 are cur- living conditions, poor air circulation and rently cured. Tragically, there are more sanitation, malnutrition, psychological TB deaths today than at any other point stress, and substance abuse. Thus TB in history. The main burden of TB is thrives on the most vulnerable such as carried by Southeast Asia and Sub- refugees, seasonal migrant workers, and Saharan Africa, where most of the prison inmates. world's poor reside (see Chapter 6). In 1The 20 high TB burden countries, which in March 2000 adopted the Amsterdam Declaration to Stop TB, are Bangladesh, Brazil, Cambodia, China, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Russian Federation, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, Vietnam, 59 and Zimbabwe. BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 60 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH addition, new outbreaks of TB have investment, and increased social instabil- recently occurred in a number of coun- ity. According to the WHO, African tries of Eastern Europe and the former countries lose 1 to 5 percent of their Soviet Union, fueled by socioeconomic GDP because of malaria. By reducing crises and growing poverty. the accumulation of both physical and human capital in malaria-affected coun- Malaria, a largely preventable and treat- tries, the disease undermines their long- able infectious disease, nevertheless kills term development prospects. almost as many people as TB each year. Its spread is limited to countries with The most radical solution to the prob- tropical climates and has shrunk consid- lem of hard-to-treat infectious diseases erably over the past 50 years. Former like HIV/TB or hard-to-prevent diseases gains are being eroded, however, like malaria would come from develop- because of global climate warming (see ment of effective vaccines that are Chapter 14), poorly designed irrigation affordable for poor countries. But the projects, and multiple social crises search for low-cost vaccines to prevent including armed conflicts, mass move- diseases that affect largely the poor is ments of refugees, and disintegration of generally slowed down by the highly health services. As with TB, the situa- unequal distribution of global income tion is exacerbated by the emergence of among countries. Pharmaceutical com- multi-drug-resistant strains of the para- panies find it more profitable to invest site. And like TB, malaria hits the poor in research and development (R&D) hardest of all, because they are the least devoted to issues of concern primarily to able to afford treatment as well as pre- developed countries, where customers ventive measures: moving out of are able to pay higher prices. The WHO malaria-affected areas, using sprays to estimates that in the early 1990s only 5 control mosquito nuisance, buying percent of all health-related R&D in the mosquito repellents and special world was devoted to the health con- bed-nets. cerns of the much more populous devel- oping world. Many experts believe that The total number of people suffering the failure of the market to provide suffi- from malaria worldwide is estimated to cient incentives for production of such be 300-500 million each year, with 90 global public goods as anti-AIDS vac- percent of them living in Sub-Saharan cine calls for action on the part of donor Africa. Malaria exacts a particularly high governments and international develop- toll on the poorest countries of Africa ment institutions such as the United through work loss, school drop-out, cost Nations and the World Bank (see also of treatment and prevention, decreased Chapter 13). 60 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 61 8 HEALTH AND LONGEVITY Lifestyle Challenges of exercise, excessive consumption of alcohol, and smoking. All these factors, In most middle- and high-income coun- particularly smoking, are more prevalent tries noncommunicable diseases affect- in Eastern Europe (see Fig. 8.4 and Data ing mostly people in their middle and Table 3). older years are the leading cause of death. These diseases are expensive and Cigarette smoke does more damage to Why is the difficult to treat, so prevention should be human health than all air pollutants incidence of the main focus of public health mea- combined. Smoking is hazardous not smoking higher in sures. But prevention will require chang- only to smokers, about half of whom die ing people's behaviors and lifestyles. prematurely from tobacco-related dis- poorer countries? eases including cancer, heart disease, and The importance of lifestyle choices can respiratory conditions, but also to "pas- be illustrated by the health gap between sive" smokers (those inhaling second- Eastern and Western Europe. The largest hand smoke). According to some contributors to this health gap are heart estimates, passive smokers increase their attacks and strokes, for which the main risk of cancer by 30 percent and their risk factors include unhealthy diet, lack risk of heart disease by 34 percent. 61 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 62 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH The governments of most developed According to the same report, while in countries have made efforts to reduce Western Europe and the United States smoking and so lower its costs to society the number of smokers is declining, in by introducing tobacco taxes, limiting most developing countries smoking is on tobacco advertising, and educating people the rise, particularly among women and about the risks of smoking. Cigarette taxes young people. European and U.S. are highest in Western Europe. According tobacco firms, facing declining demand to a 1998 report by the Worldwatch in their home countries, have managed Institute, smokers in Norway pay $5.23 in to increase sales by entering underregu- taxes per pack of cigarettes, which is 74 lated and underinformed overseas mar- percent of the total price. And in the kets. In the past 10 years exports of United Kingdom smokers pay $4.30 in cigarettes as a share of production have taxes, which is 82 percent of the total doubled to 60 percent in the United price. Experience in many countries has Kingdom and 30 percent in the United shown that tobacco taxes are effective in States, the two largest exporters. If cur- discouraging smoking: a 10 percent rent smoking trends persist, the number increase in cigarette prices leads to a 5 per- of tobacco-related deaths worldwide will cent decrease in smoking among adults soar from 3 million a year today to 10 and a 6-8 percent decrease among young million a year in 2020, with 70 percent adults (age 15 to 21), who usually have of the deaths occurring in the develop- less disposable income. ing world. 62 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 63 9 Industrialization and Postindustrialization Everything that grows also changes its which should be prevented from occur- structure. Just as a growing tree con- ring? Think of these questions while stantly changes the shape, size, and con- reading this chapter and the three that figuration of its branches, a growing follow it. economy changes the proportions and interrelations among its basic sectors-- agriculture, industry, and services-- Major Structural Shifts and between other sectors--rural and urban, public and private, domestic- and One way to look at the structure of an export-oriented (see Chapters 10, 11, economy is to compare the shares of its and 12). Are there any common patterns three major sectors--agriculture, indus- in how all growing economies change? try, and services1--in the country's total Which changes should be promoted and output (see Fig. 9.1) and employment 1Agriculture here refers to crop cultivation, livestock production, forestry, fishing, and hunting. Industry includes manufacturing, mining, construction, electricity, water, and gas. Services cover all other economic activities, including trade, transport, and communications; government, financial, and business services; and personal, 63 social, and community services. BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 64 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH (see Fig. 9.2). Initially, agriculture is a same time, because of new farm tech- developing economy's most important niques and machinery, labor productiv- sector. But as income per capita rises, ity increases faster in agriculture than in agriculture loses its primacy, giving way industry, making agricultural products first to a rise in the industrial sector, relatively less expensive and further then to a rise in the service sector. These diminishing their share in gross domes- What are the two consecutive shifts are called indus- tic product (GDP). The same trend in economic trialization and postindustrialization (or relative labor productivity also dimin- "deindustrialization"). All growing ishes the need for agricultural workers, reasons behind economies are likely to go through these while employment opportunities in industrialization stages, which can be explained by struc- industry grow. As a result, industrial out- and postindustrial- tural changes in consumer demand and put takes over a larger share of GDP ization? in the relative labor productivity of the than agriculture and employment in three major economic sectors. industry becomes predominant. Industrialization. As people's incomes Postindustrialization. As incomes con- increase, their demand for food--the tinue to rise, people's needs become less main product of agriculture--meets its "material" and they begin to demand natural limit, and they begin to demand more services--in health, education, relatively more industrial goods. At the information, entertainment, tourism, 64 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 65 9 INDUSTRIALIZATION AND POSTINDUSTRIALIZATION and many other areas. Meanwhile, labor reliant on industry (see Fig. 9.3 and productivity in services does not grow as Map 9.1). But even in countries still fast as it does in agriculture and industry industrializing, the service sector is because most service jobs cannot be growing relative to the economy taken as filled by machines. This makes services a whole. By the end of the 1990s ser- more expensive relative to agricultural vices made up almost two-thirds of and industrial goods, further increasing world GDP (see Data Table 3), whereas their share of GDP. Lower mechaniza- they had only been about half of world tion of services also explains why GDP in the early 1980s. employment in the service sector contin- ues to grow while employment in indus- try and agriculture declines because of Knowledge Revolution technological progress that increases labor productivity and eliminates jobs The fastest-growing part of the service (see Fig. 9.2). Eventually, the service sec- sector consists of knowledge- and infor- tor replaces the industrial sector as the mation-related services such as educa- leading sector of the economy. tion, research and development (R&D), modern communications (telephones Most high-income and middle-income and Internet), and business services. This countries today are postindustrializ- is the result of the so-called knowledge ing--becoming less reliant on indus- revolution that started in the second half try--while many low-income countries of the 20th century--a radical speeding are still industrializing--becoming more up of scientific advances and their eco- 65 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 66 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH nomic applications in the form of new use new knowledge for their economic technologies as well as new consumer and social development. products. Technological innovation rather than investment per se became However, the majority of developing the main source of increased productiv- countries face considerable difficulties in ity, the major tool of economic competi- joining the global knowledge revolution tion in the world market, and the most because of the wide knowledge, educa- important driver of economic growth tion, and information and communica- (see Table 9.1). So developing countries tion technology (ICT) gaps dividing striving to improve their economic them from the most knowledge-based prospects today should aim at investing economies of the world. Consider the not only in their physical capital (see fact that about 85 percent of global Chapter 6), but also directly in their R&D expenditure is concentrated in "knowledge base"--in their capacity to high-income countries. Clearly, this is create, absorb, adapt, disseminate, and where most new knowledge is created. 66 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 67 9 INDUSTRIALIZATION AND POSTINDUSTRIALIZATION Table 9.1 Stages of Economic Development Stages Preindustrial, Postindustrial, Characteristics agrarian Industrial knowledge-based Leading Agriculture Industry Services economic sector Nature of dominant Labor- and natural Capital-intensive Knowledge-intensive How can poor technologies resource-intensive Major type of Food and hand-made Industrial goods Information and countries benefit consumer products clothes knowledge services from the ongoing Nature of most Human-nature Human-machine Human-human production processes interaction interaction interaction knowledge Major factor of Nature's productivity Labor productivity Innovation/intellectual revolution? economic (soil fertility, climate, productivity wealth/growth biological resources) Moreover, developing countries' capacity In the interests of sustainable global to tap the internationally available flows development, the international commu- of knowledge and adapt them for their nity should help developing countries specific needs is impeded by the rela- bridge the widest knowledge and infor- tively small number of scientists and mation gaps by increasing official devel- engineers working in these countries opment aid and private capital flows (see (see Data Table 3) and the relatively low Chapter 13) as well as by directly facili- level of their populations' education. tating the transfer of modern technolo- Consider that the average number of gies from developed countries, including years of schooling received by adults in technologies for improved agricultural low- and middle-income countries is productivity (see Chapter 6), education only about 5.5 years, compared with 10 (Chapter 7), control of infectious dis- years in high-income countries. Add to eases (Chapter 8), and environmental that the so-called digital divide--the fact protection (Chapter 10 and Chapter14). that about 80 percent of the world's personal computers and almost 90 per- cent of its Internet users are also found Implications for in high-income countries (see Data Development Sustainability Table 3). And you will understand that although the global knowledge revolu- The service sector produces "intangible" tion has the potential to solve many goods, some traditional--government, development problems, it is also fraught health, education--and some quite new, with the danger of dramatically aggra- central for transition to a knowledge vating global inequality. economy--modern communication, 67 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 68 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH information, and business services. discussion about what part of today's Producing services tends to require rela- developed countries' consumption tively less natural capital and more should be seen as overconsumption, as human capital than producing agricul- meeting people's competitive wants tural or industrial goods. As a result, rather than their real needs. For exam- demand is growing for more educated ple, is air-conditioning a need or just a Is "over- workers, prompting countries to invest want? Do people really need so many consumption" more in education--an overall benefit to cars or could they benefit from better- their people. Another benefit of the developed public transport in combina- a threat to growing service sector is that by using tion with cleaner urban air? Should rich sustainable fewer natural resources than other sec- countries attempt to limit their con- development? tors, it puts less pressure on the local, sumption so as to enable increased con- regional, and global environment.2 sumption in poor countries? Or should they at least try to modify the composi- Conserving natural capital and building tion of their growing consumption so as up human capital may help national to minimize its unsustainable environ- and global development become more mental and social impacts? Anyway, environmentally and socially sustain- there are reasons to believe that if able. But growth of the service sector people's needs (and wants) across the will not be a miracle solution to the world are met by making greater use problem of sustainability, since agricul- of knowledge--embodied in better- tural and industrial growth are still educated workers and more productive, going to be necessary to meet the mater- more socially and environmentally ial needs of the fast-growing population appropriate technologies--rather than of developing countries and the con- by using more of the same kinds of sumption preferences of the relatively machines, equipment, and processes, affluent population of developed coun- the damage to the natural environment tries (such as personal cars or fashion- and the potential for social conflict can driven remodeling). There is an ongoing be lessened. 2Note that the pressure put by high-income countries on the global environment is in fact much heavier than might be suggested by the postindustrial-appearing structure of their economies. This is because in today's global- ized world many natural resources extracted and industrial products manufactured in developing countries are actually consumed by the "golden billion" of people living in rich countries. 68 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 69 10 Urban Air Pollution Urbanization is a process of relative ages of this population represent more growth in a country's urban population people. In addition, urbanization in the accompanied by an even faster increase developing world is progressing much in the economic, political, and cultural faster than in developed countries (see importance of cities relative to rural Fig. 10.1). As a result, by the late 1990s areas. There is a worldwide trend toward about three-quarters of the world's 2.5 urbanization. In most countries it is a billion urban residents lived in develop- natural consequence and stimulus of ing countries. The share of the urban economic development based on population in the total population of industrialization and postindustrial- low- and middle-income countries ization (see Chapter 9). Thus the level increased from less than 22 percent in of urbanization, as measured by the 1960 to 41 percent in 1998 and is share of a country's urban population in expected to exceed 50 percent by 2015. its total population, is highest in the most developed, high-income countries A rough indication of the urban contri- and lowest in the least developed, low- bution to GDP is the combined share of income countries (see Data Table 4). GDP produced in the industry and ser- vice sectors relative to agriculture. Judging However, because the population of by this indicator, cities in developing developing countries is larger, percent- countries are already more economically 69 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 70 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH important than rural, primarily agricul- these cities are in Asian countries with tural areas, because more than half of the low per capita incomes but big popula- developing world's GDP originates in tions, such as China, India, and cities. (This is not yet true for every coun- Indonesia. These cities have high con- try, as you can see in Data Table 4.) centrations of poor residents and suffer from social and environmental problems Why is urban air While urbanization is characteristic of including severe air pollution. pollution often nearly all developing countries, levels of urbanization vary quite significantly by higher in region. Most Latin American countries Particulate Air Pollution developing are as urbanized as Europe, with about countries? three-quarters of the population living in Suspended particulate matter is made up urban areas. At the same time, South of airborne smoke, soot, dust, and liquid Asia, East Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa droplets from fuel combustion. The remain predominantly rural, though they amount of suspended particulate matter, are urbanizing rapidly (see Fig. 10.2). usually measured in micrograms per cubic meter of air, is one of the most Most of the world's most populous cities important indicators of the quality of are in developing countries. Many of the air that people breathe. According to 70 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 71 10 URBAN AIR POLLUTION the World Health Organization's air Table 10.1 Particulate air pollution in the largest cities, 1995 quality standards, the concentration of SPM suspended particulates should be less City population (micrograms than 90 micrograms per cubic meter. In Country City (thousands) per m3) many cities, however, this number is sev- Brazil Săo Paolo 16,533 86 eral times higher (see Table 10.1 and Australia Sydney 3,590 54 Map 10.1). Austria Vienna 2,060 47 Belgium Brussels 1,122 78 High concentrations of suspended par- Brazil Sao Paolo 16,533 86 ticulates adversely affect human health, Rio de Janeiro 10,187 139 provoking a wide range of respiratory Bulgaria Sofia 1,188 195 diseases and exacerbating heart disease Canada Toronto 4,319 36 Montreal 3,320 34 and other conditions. Worldwide, in China Shanghai 13,584 246 1995 the ill health caused by such pollu- Beijing 11,299 377 tion resulted in at least 500,000 prema- Taiwan 2,502 568 ture deaths and 4­5 million new cases of Lanzhou 1,747 732 chronic bronchitis. Most of the people at Czech Republic Prague 1,225 59 risk are urban dwellers in developing Finland Helsinki 1,059 40 countries, especially China and India. In France Paris 9,523 14 Germany Berlin 3,317 50 many Chinese cities air quality is so poor India Bombay 15,138 240 that nationwide, economic losses caused Calcutta 11,923 375 by excess illness and mortality of urban Delhi 9,948 415 residents are estimated at 5 percent of Indonesia Jakarta 8,621 271 GDP. According to estimates for 18 Italy Rome 2,931 73 cities in Central and Eastern Europe, Japan Tokyo 26,959 49 18,000 premature deaths a year could be Osaka 10,609 43 Korea, Rep. Seoul 11,609 84 prevented and $1.2 billion a year in Mexico Mexico City 16,562 279 working time lost to illness could be Philippines Manila 9,286 200 regained by achieving European Union Russian Federation Moscow 9,269 100 pollution standards for dust and soot. Nizhny Novgorod 1,456 170 The level of air pollution depends on a Sweden Stockholm 1,545 9 country's technologies and pollution Ukraine Kiev 2,809 100 United States New York control, particularly in energy produc- (1987-90) 16,332 61 tion. Using cleaner fossil fuels (such as natural gas and higher-grade coal), burn- ing these fuels more efficiently, and increasing reliance on even cleaner, 71 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 72 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH renewable sources of energy (hydro, one of the "cleanest" sources of electric- solar, geothermal, wind) are some of the ity, but safe disposal of nuclear waste best ways to control and reduce air pol- and the risks of radioactive pollution in lution without limiting economic case of a serious accident are of major growth. See Figure 10.3 for the main concern. Sources with the least environ- sources of electricity in China, the mental impact, such as solar and wind United States, and Russia. Judge these energy, are not shown because they data against the concentrations of sus- account for only a small fraction of gen- pended particulates in the biggest cities erated electricity in these countries. of these three countries as shown in Table 10.1. Note that coal and oil are Fuel combustion by motor vehicles is considered to be the "dirtiest" of the another major source of suspended par- sources shown, although a lot depends ticulate emissions in urban areas. These on their quality and methods of com- emissions are particularly detrimental to bustion. In many ways nuclear energy is human health because pollutants are 72 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 73 10 URBAN AIR POLLUTION Is it possible to reduce air pollution without slowing economic growth? emitted at ground level. Motor vehicles rates in motive fuel consumption of are much more common in developed 10­15 percent a year are possible. And countries: in 1998 there were 585 of in many transition countries, the num- them per 1,000 people in high-income ber of cars in use grew rapidly despite countries compared with just 9 per the contraction in economic activity and 1,000 people in low-income countries reduced per capita incomes in the late and 104 in middle-income countries. 1980s and early 1990s. For example, in (See Data Table 4 for the number of Moscow (Russian Federation) the pas- motor vehicles in individual countries.) senger car fleet grew 10 percent a year But motor vehicles in developing coun- during 1984-94 and 17.5 percent a year tries still cause serious air pollution during 1990-94. Without effective poli- because they are concentrated in a few cies to curb motor vehicle emissions, the large cities, many are in poor mechanical growing number of cars can have grave condition, and few emission standards consequences for urban residents' health. exist. According to World Bank estimates, Airborne Lead Pollution demand for gasoline in developing coun- tries tends to grow 1.2­1.9 times faster Airborne lead is one of the most harmful than GNP per capita. Then, with per particulate pollutants. Young children capita income growth rates of 6­8 per- are especially vulnerable: lead poisoning cent a year observed in some fast- of children leads to permanent brain growing developing countries, growth damage, causing learning disabilities, 73 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 74 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH hearing loss, and behavioral abnormali- United States converted to unleaded ties. In adults lead absorption causes gasoline, it saved more than $10 for hypertension, blood pressure problems, every $1 it invested thanks to reduced and heart disease. The main sources of health costs, savings on engine mainte- airborne lead are motor vehicles using nance, and improved fuel efficiency. leaded gasoline, industrial processes such Recognizing the high costs of the dam- as ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, age to human health caused by lead and coal combustion. emissions and adopting appropriate national policy are matters of high While governments increasingly control urgency for many developing countries. large industrial sources of pollution, motor traffic is rapidly growing. In International experience shows that in many urban areas vehicles using leaded most countries air quality deteriorates gasoline cause more than 80 percent of in the early stages of industrialization lead pollution. Therefore, since the and urbanization. But as countries 1970s--when medical evidence on the become richer their priorities shift-- adverse health impacts of lead became they recognize the value of their nat- available--many countries have reduced ural resources (clean air, safe water, or eliminated lead additives in gasoline. fertile topsoil, abundant forests), enact The elimination of leaded gasoline has and enforce laws to protect those been achieved, for example, in Austria, resources, and have the money to tackle Japan, and Sweden. But in much of the environmental problems. As a result air developing world lead additives are still quality and other environmental condi- widely used, especially in Africa. Experts tions start to improve. Certain experts suspect that in developing countries all have even calculated the average levels children under 2 and more than 80 per- of per capita income at which levels of cent of those between 3 and 5 have various pollutants peaked for a panel of blood lead levels exceeding World countries between 1977 and 1988. Health Organization standards. Smoke, for example, tended to peak in Economists have calculated that, with the urban air when a country reached a the technological options available per capita income of about $6,000, today, phasing out leaded gasoline is after which this kind of air pollution highly cost-effective. Shifting production tended to decrease. For airborne lead, from leaded to unleaded gasoline rarely peak concentrations in urban air were costs more than 2 cents a liter, and registered at considerably lower levels of countries can save 5 to 10 times as much per capita income--about $1,900. as that, mostly in health savings from However, these past observations reduced illness and mortality. When the should not be interpreted as comforting 74 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 75 10 URBAN AIR POLLUTION and automatic "laws of nature." An pressures from environmentally con- improved quality of air does not result cerned population groups, and only directly from economic growth. Any through democratic mechanisms can environmental benefits are usually these pressures translate into regulatory achieved only as a result of political and technological changes. 75 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 76 11 Public and Private Enterprises: Finding the Right Mix During the 20th century the economic years the share of government spending Is a growing share importance of the state grew all over the in the GDP of developed countries of government world. In developed countries central roughly doubled. government spending accounted for less spending a reliable than 10 percent of gross domestic In developing countries the economic indicator of product (GDP) in the early 1900s, but role of government grew dramatically in development? by the 1990s that share had grown to the second half of the 20th century, after nearly 50 percent in many of those the end of colonialism and in pursuit of countries (see Fig. 11.1, Data Table 4). such development goals as industrial- Historians point out that the Great ization and social equity. In many of Depression of the 1930s and economic these countries the state was striving to competition with socialist countries con- mobilize resources and direct them tributed to this government expansion. toward accelerated economic growth, But the data suggest that this expansion rather than just to stabilize the economy, probably continues. Over the past 35 as in most developed countries. Until 76 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 77 11 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISES: FINDING THE RIGHT MIX the 1980s the pattern of state-dominated development--which included central- ized planning and state control of the economy--was widely followed. Still, the share of government spending in the GDP of developing countries is less than half that in developed countries (see Fig. 11.1 and Data Table 4). Does this mean that a growing share of government spending in GDP should be seen as a sign of development? The Dilemma of Public-Private Ownership Government budgets in developing countries are not only proportionately smaller, but they are also structured dif- ferently. In developed countries more than half of government spending is devoted to social services, including pen- sions, unemployment insurance, social security, and other transfer payments. domestic investment tends to be higher In developing countries much less in poorer countries (see Fig. 11.2). government spending goes for social services and much more is used to sub- Is a high share of state enterprises a sidize commercial (that is, selling goods problem? Is it good or bad for the eco- and services) state-owned enterprises. nomic growth and development of Unlike other state-owned enterprises developing countries? that provide free public services (for example, schools and health clinics), Those who want to preserve extensive these state-owned enterprises could also state enterprises argue that: be run for profit by private firms. Governments, however, sometimes pre- · Only government is capable of pro- fer to keep them under their direct con- viding sufficient investment for tech- trol. The share of commercial state nical modernization of major enterprises in GDP and in gross national industries. 77 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 78 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH · Only direct government control over Note that this argumentation focuses on certain enterprises can prevent profitability as the main indicator of socially unacceptable high prices for economic efficiency. Indeed, an enter- basic goods and services such as prise's profitability summarizes all the energy, housing, and transportation. indicators of economic efficiency as seen · Only government ownership of the from the viewpoint of its private owners. When should biggest enterprises can help avoid But from the point of view of national governments mass unemployment. economic growth and development, social costs and benefits, which are not intervene in On the other hand, proponents of priva- reflected in profitability, can be no less economic tization point out that the experience of important. For example, when a priva- activities? many countries demonstrates that state tized enterprise achieves profitability by enterprises are usually less efficient than dismissing its excess workers, the econ- private firms as measured by their prof- omy as a whole does not necessarily itability. One of the main reasons is that become more efficient. If economic con- state enterprise managers have little or no ditions prevent the fired workers from incentive to pursue profitability for their finding other employment or starting enterprises. Easy access to government their own business, this downsizing subsidies and government-guaranteed might lead to an overall economic loss loans effectively remove the threat of for the country because people were bankruptcy. Besides, it is often hard to moved from low-productivity jobs to run state enterprises at a profit because zero-productivity unemployment. governments tend to keep state enter- Additional social costs might include prises' selling prices artificially low, and increased child labor/lower educational because rules often do not allow these achievement, a heavier load on the gov- enterprises to lay off excess employees. In ernment budget for providing social ser- countries where the share of state enter- vices, higher crime, and greater social prises is high, their typically low effi- and political instability (see Fig. 6.4). ciency can hinder economic growth. In addition, governments have to cover the Given all that, when is it preferable to keep financial losses of these unprofitable enterprises under government ownership? enterprises. To meet the resulting budget What is the ideal size and composition of a deficits, governments often have to either country's public sector? And can there be print more money and thus cause infla- any general answers to these questions tion, or borrow and build up their independent of ideological beliefs? domestic or foreign debt. In both cases national economies are destabilized and In fact, it is increasingly recognized that, growth opportunities are lost. generally speaking, state intervention in 78 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 79 11 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISES: FINDING THE RIGHT MIX economic activities is justified only · insufficient supply of social services where the market system (based on pri- such as pensions or medical and vate ownership) fails. But market sys- unemployment insurance; tems are not the same in different · insufficient information available to countries. In particular, in developing some parties affected by market countries markets are underdeveloped processes (for example, information and in some sectors even nonexistent. about the quality of food products For example, there are often no private and medicines available to con- enterprises interested in purchasing agri- sumers whose health is at risk). cultural produce from small farmers and marketing it domestically or internation- These five situations call for some kind ally. So governments have to fill this gap of government intervention. But even by creating state-owned marketing where markets clearly fail, government boards, engaged in business activities provision of undersupplied goods and which, in more developed countries, are services is not necessarily the best option. carried out by private firms. We have already discussed the reasons for the typically low profitability of state Furthermore, even in well-established enterprise management. Add to that the market economies there are five basic sit- possibility of corruption among govern- uations, called market failures, where the ment bureaucrats (see Chapter 16) and private sector tends to underproduce or you get what came to be called "govern- overproduce certain goods and services: ment failure." Increased awareness of this problem is among the reasons explaining · underproduction of public goods why some governments of developed such as defense, law and order, roads, countries are searching for alternatives to and environmental protection; state ownership, such as new models of · underproduction of goods and ser- public-private partnership, based on pri- vices with positive externalities (for vatization plus close government regula- example, public health and educa- tion or government funding for private tion) and overproduction of goods provision of public goods. An extraordi- and services with negative externali- nary example of such an alternative solu- ties (for example, cigarettes, see tion to both market and government Chapter 8); failures is provided by the new phenome- · overpricing and underproduction by non of public funding for private prisons natural monopolies, for example, in the United States.1 But particularly by electric and water utilities; important for sustainable development of 1Prisons were traditionally state-owned "enterprises" because they "produce" such public goods as obedience to the law and public safety. 79 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 80 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH most countries is the ongoing debate sion may be that no single solution fits about the optimal public-private inter- all countries. However, there is general action in providing water and sanitation agreement that the final responsibility services. for providing such vital services as water and sanitation (as well as basic As of 2000, about 2 of every 10 people health and education services) lies with When is in developing countries were without governments. privatization access to safe water; 5 of 10 lived with- out adequate sanitation; and 9 of 10 economically lived without their waste-water being Is There a Trend toward warranted? treated in any way. As a result water- Privatization? When can it be related diseases rank among the top rea- detrimental? sons for child mortality (see Chapter 8) By privatizing all the enterprises that can and adult illness. Moreover, in Africa be successfully run by private firms, gov- and Asia--where the world's poor are ernments can often make national concentrated--the overall trends in the economies more efficient, on the one 1990s showed little or no progress. The hand, and free their budgets from the main argument in favor of private com- burden of subsidizing loss-making enter- panies' involvement is that it will help prises, on the other. As a result they are mobilize the additional investment able to focus on tasks that cannot be needed for bringing water and sanita- handed over to markets, such as building tion services to a greater number of human capital and providing for people. On the other hand, experience human development (see Chapter 1) or shows that privatization often leads to developing and implementing national increased tariffs unaffordable to poor development strategies (see Chapter 17). households and sometimes to outright For example, according to some esti- exclusion of poor rural areas viewed as mates, shifting budget funds from state unprofitable by private providers. Only enterprise subsidies to public health care pro-poor government regulation, would have allowed central governments including subsidies for the poor and to increase their health spending by special economic incentives for private about four times in Mexico and five companies to work for the poor, can times in India. Alternatively, Mexico's neutralize these drawbacks of private central government could have increased service delivery. Overall, the experience its education spending by 50 percent, of various countries appears to present a and India's by 550 percent. mixed picture of success and failure both in mostly public and in mostly But if governments are to shift away private service delivery, and the conclu- from supplying marketable goods and 80 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 81 11 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISES: FINDING THE RIGHT MIX services, there must be active private sec- tors that are ready to take up their activi- ties. In some cases reducing the economic prominence of state enterprises is even possible without extensive privati- zation, mainly by means of market liber- alization that leads to accelerated growth of the private sector. That was the case in the Republic of Korea in the 1970s and 1980s, and in China in the 1980s and 1990s. But more often, particularly where public sectors are much larger than private sectors and so absorb a lot of scarce national resources, special privati- zation programs are needed. Since the 1980s many developing and some developed countries have adopted privatization programs. You can attempt to judge their scale by examining data on government proceeds from privatiza- tion in Data Table 4. Note that this indi- cator depends not only on the scale of privatization but also on its methods. Selling state enterprises to outside own- ers normally brings more revenue than selling them to enterprise managers and employees, while voucher privatization (such as in Russia in 1991­93) brings no revenue at all. The most impressive pri- vatization took place in former socialist other regions of the developing world, countries over the 1990s. Their transi- privatization programs were imple- tion to market-oriented economies mented in Latin America and Southeast required unprecedented mass privatiza- Asia, while in Sub-Saharan Africa the tion of formerly dominant state enter- process was less pronounced. prises. For the different starting points and speeds of privatization in this group Unfortunately, in some transition coun- of countries, see Figure 11.3. Among tries radical market reforms have 81 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 82 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH resulted in neglect of the state's vital ting water supplies to a settlement functions, such as law and order or criti- whose residents were unable to afford cal social services. Important programs increased user fees. Shortly after that a in education and health, for instance, cholera epidemic broke out in that have been cut along with or even province and nearly 14,000 people instead of cutting subsidies to money- became infected. losing enterprises. Such policies have not only damaged people's welfare, they * * * have also eroded the foundations of these countries' further national devel- Many experts argue that, although state- opment. Another case of the govern- dominated development has failed, so ment's questionable priorities involved would "stateless" development. Think an African country, where local authori- about it: why are an effective state and a ties attempted to improve the economic viable private sector both important for efficiency of their water services by cut- development? 82 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 83 12 Globalization: International Trade and Migration "Globalization" refers to the growing efits of globalization are distributed too interdependence of countries resulting unfairly. In short, they see the ongoing Can globalization from their increased economic integration globalization process as unsustainable serve the interests via trade, foreign investment, foreign (see Chapter 1). Is it the only kind of of sustainable aid, and international migration of people globalization possible? Is deglobalization and ideas. Is globalization an inevitable the only alternative? Or can a more development? phenomenon of human history? Can all democratic, more inclusive management countries benefit from it? Or does it bring of globalization turn it into the most about new forms of inequality and effective tool for dealing with the press- exploitation? The balance of globaliza- ing problems of our time? tion's costs and benefits for different groups of countries and different groups of people within these countries is one of Waves of Modern Globalization the hottest topics in development. It inspires not only academic and public Globalization is not altogether new. debates but also violent clashes in the Researchers point out three waves of streets of many capital cities. modern globalization, the first of which started more than 100 years ago and Most activists of various antiglobaliza- took place between 1870 and 1914. tion movements would probably agree Over this period, exports nearly doubled that they are not against the idea of relative to world GDP (to about 8 per- closer international trade ties and coop- cent) and foreign investment nearly eration per se. What really concerns tripled relative to the GDP of develop- them is the practice of globalization dri- ing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin ven by narrow economic interests of America. International migration was large transnational corporations particularly dramatic, with about 10 per- (TNCs). They argue that the interests of cent of the world's population moving poorer countries and the interests of the from Europe to the New World and less privileged in developed countries are from China and India to the less popu- often not taken into account. Or that lated neighboring countries. However, the environmental and social costs of this impressive wave of globalization was economic development tend to be virtually reversed during the First World underestimated. And the economic ben- War, the Great Depression, and the 83 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 84 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Second World War. By the end of the eralization of trade and capital markets: 1940s foreign trade as a share of GDP more and more governments of develop- was at about the same level as in 1870. ing countries choose to reduce protec- tion of their economies from foreign The second wave of globalization lasted competition and influence by lowering from the 1950s to the 1980s and import tariffs and minimizing nontariff involved mostly developed countries. barriers such as import quotas, export Trade and investment flows were grow- restraints, and legal prohibitions. A ing among the countries of Europe, number of international institutions North America, and Japan, aided by a established in the wake of the Second series of multilateral agreements on trade World War--including the World liberalization under the auspices of the Bank, the International Monetary General Agreement on Tariffs and Fund (IMF) , and the World Trade Trade (GATT). At the same time most Organization (WTO, preceded by the developing countries were stuck in the GATT until 1995)--play an important role of primary goods exporters and role in promoting global free trade in were largely isolated from international place of protectionism. capital flows. Researchers also noticed that while there was a trend toward con- Over the past two decades some 24 vergence of per capita incomes between developing countries have approximately the richer and poorer members of the doubled their ratio of trade (exports plus Organization for Economic imports) to GDP. This group of "new Cooperation and Development globalizers" includes the countries with (OECD), the gap between the devel- the largest populations­China and oped and the developing countries India­and is home to about 3 billion widened (see also Fig. 4.4). people overall. On the other hand, about 2 billion people live in developing coun- The third, current wave of globalization tries that are trading less today than they started in the 1980s and continues did 20 years ago. today, driven by two main factors. One involves technological advances that Statistical data suggest that the most have radically lowered the costs of trans- globalized developing economies portation, communication, and compu- enjoyed the highest GNP per capita tation to the extent that it is often growth rates and were gradually catching economically feasible for a firm to locate up with the group of developed coun- different phases of production in differ- tries (see Asian newly industrialized ent and far-away countries. The other economies and China in Fig. 4.4). But factor has to do with the increasing lib- much of the rest of the developing 84 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 85 12 GLOBALIZATION: INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND MIGRATION world, including most of Sub-Saharan producers utilizing their country's Africa, failed to participate in globaliza- comparative advantages in the global tion processes and faced negative income markets produce more efficiently, and growth rates (see Chapter 4). There are consumers enjoy a wider variety of good reasons to believe that interna- domestic and imported goods at lower tional trade and foreign investment do prices. explain much of the difference in eco- nomic growth between the more and the In addition, an actively trading country less globalized developing countries (see benefits from the new technologies that below in this chapter and Chapter 13). "spill over" to it from its trading part- However, some may argue that the ners, such as through the knowledge cause-and-effect connection can also embedded in imported production work in the opposite direction: those equipment. These technological countries that are most successful in eco- spillovers are particularly important for nomic development and growth can developing countries because they give afford to be more open to foreign trade them a chance to catch up more quickly (and thus to foreign competition) and with the developed countries in terms of also tend to be more attractive for for- productivity. Former centrally planned eign investors (see also Chapter 13). economies, which missed out on many Moreover, for countries that are actively of the benefits of global trade because of engaged in globalization, the benefits their politically imposed isolation from come with new risks and challenges. market economies, today aspire to tap into these benefits by reintegrating with the global trading system. Costs and Benefits of Free Trade But a country opening to international For participating countries the main trade (undertaking trade liberalization) benefits of free foreign trade (unre- also faces considerable risk associated stricted, liberalized trade) stem from the with the strong competition in interna- increased access of their producers to tional markets. On the one hand, it can larger, international markets. For a be argued that international competition national economy that access means an creates the necessary pressures to prevent opportunity to benefit from the interna- economic and technological stagnation, tional division of labor by moving its to stimulate domestic producers to pro- resources to the most productive uses-- duce better goods, and to lower the costs by specializing in producing and export- of production. But on the other hand, ing what it can produce best, while there is a high risk that many national importing all the rest. Overall, domestic enterprises and even entire industries-- 85 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 86 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH those that are less competitive and they allow domestic producers to con- adaptable--will be forced out of busi- tinue producing less efficiently and even- ness. Unfortunately, in real life, the tually lead to economic stagnation. physical and human capital previously Wherever possible, investing in increased employed in these industries is not easily international competitiveness of key transferable to other, more productive industries should be considered as an Should all uses for many reasons--the lack of addi- alternative to protectionist policies.1 countries be tional investment, shortage of informa- tion on markets and new technologies, But "free global trade" is still more of an equally open to and others. Meanwhile, closing of enter- ideal to be reached than a present-day foreign trade? prises and higher unemployment impov- reality. Although developing countries erish people and slow national economic have cut their average import tariffs by growth. That explains why trade liberal- half over the past 20 years (from 15 per- ization is so often opposed even in high- cent to 7 percent), the remaining tariffs income, better prepared countries. still constitute a serious obstacle to expanding trade relationships within the Not surprisingly, governments of devel- developing world.2 In developed coun- oping countries often argue that many tries, the average import tariffs are con- of their national industries require tem- siderably lower (about 2­2.5 percent), porary protection until they become bet- but they are much higher for exactly ter established and less vulnerable to those goods in which developing coun- foreign competition. To protect domes- tries are most competitive--for agricul- tic producers, governments seek to tural products (frequently higher than weaken competition from foreign- 100 percent) and labor-intensive manu- produced goods by introducing import factures, such as textiles and clothing. As quotas or, more often, by imposing a result, according to the World Bank import tariffs to make foreign goods estimate, developing countries on aver- more expensive and less attractive to age face tariffs twice as high as those consumers. Economists justify protec- faced by developed countries. The situa- tionist policies--used by developed tion is additionally aggravated by the countries too--mostly as temporary non-tariff barriers (sanitary, environ- measures. In the long run, such policies mental, and others) extensively used by can be economically dangerous because developed countries and often seen as 1Some development experts argue that the most successful, newly industrialized developing countries of East Asia succeeded in maximizing their benefits from globalization by lowering their protective barriers very carefully, after they considerably expanded their exports, accelerated economic growth, and made sure that enough new enter- prises and jobs would be created in place of those that would have to be closed as internationally uncompetitive. 2In some developing regions and countries tariffs remain much higher than average--20 percent in South Asia, 13 percent in Latin America, 31 percent in India, and 15 percent in China (all as of 2001). 86 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 87 12 GLOBALIZATION: INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND MIGRATION unjustifiable by developing countries. theme was indignation over the destruc- The World Bank has estimated that low- tive impact that enormous government ering tariff barriers to trade in textiles subsidies paid to developed countries' and agricultural products by developed farmers have on global agricultural trade. countries could boost annual economic These subsidies amount to $300 billion growth in developing countries by an a year (compared with about $50 billion extra 0.5 percent in the long run and by given to all developing countries as offi- 2015 could lift an additional 300 mil- cial development assistance) and result lion people out of poverty. in much lower world prices for the agri- cultural exports of developing countries. The issues of trade and development But the initial Doha declarations about interrelationships are at the center of the need to contribute to development attention during the current round of by reducing "trade-distorting" farm sub- global trade negotiations launched by sidies and cutting import tariffs on agri- the World Trade Organization (WTO) cultural goods and textiles did not meet in 2001 in Doha, the capital of Qatar. with sufficient support from the rich The previous Uruguay round of the countries in Cancún. The talks were WTO negotiations ended in outcomes closed with no agreement achieved and that were, according to its many critics, with unclear prospects for further global more favorable for developed countries, trade negotiations. because trade in industrial goods and services exported by advanced economies--from automobiles and Geography and Composition machinery to information technology of Global Trade and financial services--was liberalized first. So in the next round developing The costs and benefits of participating countries signaled their determination to in international trade also depend on push for more balanced liberalization such country-specific factors as the size with priority given to the interests of the of a country's domestic market, its nat- poorest countries. ural resource endowment, and its geo- graphic location. For instance, countries During the WTO ministerial meeting in with large domestic markets generally Cancún (Mexico, September 2003) a trade less. Countries that are well new block of 21 developing countries endowed with a few natural resources, emerged (the so-called G-21), led by such as oil, tend to trade more. And the Brazil, China, and India and represent- so-called land-locked countries--with ing half the world's population and two- no easy access to sea port--face particu- thirds of its farmers. The major unifying lar difficulties in developing foreign 87 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:46 PM Page 88 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH trade because of much higher trans- century the ratio of world trade to world portation costs. (Think of examples of GDP (in purchasing power parity countries whose geographic location is terms) had reached almost 30 percent-- particularly favorable or unfavorable for on average about 40 percent in devel- their participation in global trade.) oped countries and about 15 percent in developing countries (see Map 12.1 and How is the role Despite the many risks of economic Data Table 4). of developing globalization, most countries have been choosing to globalize their economies to The growing role of international trade countries in global a greater extent. One way to measure the in the economies of most developing trade changing? extent of this process is by the ratio of a countries (see Fig. 12.1) has not yet country's trade (exports plus imports) to resulted in a considerably increased share its GDP or GNP. By this measure, glob- of developing countries in total global alization has roughly doubled on average trade as compared with what this share since 1950. Over the last 35 years of the was in the 1980s. Developed countries 20th century world exports increased still trade mostly among themselves. In about twice as fast as GNP (see Fig. 1999 only 23 percent of world imports 12.1). As a result, by the end of the 20th went to low- and middle-income coun- 88 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 89 12 GLOBALIZATION: INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND MIGRATION tries, of which 9 percent went to East 1990s because prices of primary Asia and the Pacific and only 1 percent goods--which used to make up the to Sub-Saharan Africa and 1 percent to largest share of developing country South Asia. The Middle East and North exports--have fallen relative to prices of Africa received about 2 percent of world manufactured goods. For example, imports, while Europe and Central Asia between 1980 and 2000 real prices of and Latin America and the Caribbean wheat and rice dropped about twofold, received 5 percent each. Even though prices of cocoa more than threefold, and developing countries have increased sugar about fivefold. Even petroleum trade among themselves, developed prices went down fourfold between countries still remain their main trading 1980 and 1998 (although by 2000 they partners, the best markets for their grew about twofold). There is still exports, and the main source of their debate about whether this relative imports. decline in commodity prices is perma- nent or transitory, but developing coun- Most developing countries' terms of tries that depend on these exports have trade deteriorated in the 1980s and already suffered heavy economic losses 89 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 90 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH that have slowed their economic growth stantly search for its own best place in and development. the international division of labor based on its dynamic comparative advantages Generally speaking, a country that and on considerations of economic risk would attempt to produce almost every- minimization. thing it needs domestically would deprive itself of the enormous economic In response to the recent unfavorable benefits of international specialization. changes in their terms of trade, many On the other hand, narrow international developing countries are increasing the specialization, which makes a country share of manufactured goods in their overly dependent on exports of one or a exports, including exports to developed few goods, is too risky because unfavor- countries (see Fig. 12.2). The most able changes in global demand can sig- dynamic categories of their manufactured nificantly worsen such a country's terms exports are labor-intensive, low-knowl- of trade. Thus a certain diversification of edge products (clothes, carpets, some production and exports is considered to manually assembled products) that allow be desirable. Every country should con- these countries to create more jobs and 90 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 91 12 GLOBALIZATION: INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND MIGRATION make better use of their abundant labor growth of the world's migrant popula- resources. By contrast, developing coun- tion was 2.6 percent, more than twice try imports from developed countries are the level recorded in the 1960s. There mostly capital- and knowledge-intensive was a certain slowing of migration in the manufactured goods--primarily machin- first half of the 1990s as the result of ery and transport equipment--in which restrictions introduced by many high- developed countries retain their compara- income countries, but beginning in tive advantage. 1997­98 the flows of migrants acceler- ated again.3 The major destination A popular debate in many developed countries, rated by the size of migrant countries asks whether the growing com- inflows in 2000, are the USA, Germany, petitive pressure of low-cost, labor- Japan, Australia, Canada, the United intensive imports from developing Kingdom, and Italy. Rated by the share countries pushes down the wages of of the foreign and foreign-born popula- unskilled workers in developed countries tion in the total population, the leaders (thus increasing the wage gap between are such traditional immigration coun- skilled and unskilled workers, as in the tries as Luxembourg, Australia, United Kingdom and United States) and Switzerland, Canada, the USA, Austria, pushes up unemployment, especially and Germany, while in Japan and Italy, among low-skill workers (as in Western the new immigration countries, the pro- Europe). But empirical studies appear to portions of foreigners are still relatively suggest that although trade with devel- low (see Table 12.1). oping countries affects the structure of industry and the demand for industrial Over 60 percent of the world's migrants labor in developed countries, the main moved from developing to developed reasons for the wage and unemployment countries, and this South-North migra- problems are internal and stem from tion is expected to grow in the future labor-saving technological progress and owing to economic as well as demo- postindustrial economic restructuring graphic reasons. The enormous and still (see Chapters 7 and 9). growing gap between per capita incomes in developed and developing countries (see Chapter 4), the rapid population International Migration growth in developing countries (see Chapter 3) with job creation failing to The increased international mobility of keep pace, the aging of developed coun- people is an important aspect of global- tries' populations (see Chapter 8) with a ization. In 1985­1990 the annual rate of resultant reduction in the size of their 3According to some estimates, there are currently about 150­160 million migrants in the world, if "migrants" are 91 defined as people residing in foreign countries for more than one year. BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 92 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 12.1 Foreign population and labor in selected OECD countries moving from developing to developed countries tend to be clustered at the Inflows of Foreign or Foreign or foreign foreign-born foreign-born extremes of the skills and education lad- population population labor force der--either more or less qualified than (thousands) (% of total (% of total most residents of the host countries. A population) labor force) significant feature of recent years has 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 been the particularly rapid rise in migra- Australia 121 316 22.8 23.6 25.7 24.5 tion of qualified and highly qualified Austria . . 66 5.9 9.3 7.4 10.5 workers, most notably in response to Belgium 50 69 9.1 8.4 7.1 8.9 labor shortages in the information and Canada 214 313 16.1 .. 18.5 .. communications sectors of developed Denmark 15 20 3.1 4.8 2.4 3.4 countries, but also in the research and Finland 6 9 0.5 1.8 .. 1.5 France 102 119 6.3 5.6 6.2 6.0 development, health, and education sec- Germany 842 649 8.4 8.9 .. 8.8* tors. For example, according to some Ireland .. 24 2.3 3.3 2.6 3.7 estimates, there is a shortfall of some Italy .. 272 1.4 2.4 1.3 3.6 850,000 IT technicians in the USA and Japan 224 346 0.9 1.3 0.1 0.2 nearly 2 million in Western Europe. Luxembourg 9 11 29.4 37.3 45.2* 57.3* Against this background, many high- Netherlands 81 91 4.6 4.2 3.1* 3.4* income countries are competing to Norway 16 28 3.4 4.1 2.3 4.9 Portugal 14 16 1.1 2.1 1.0 2.0 attract the needed human capital and Spain .. .. 0.7 2.2 0.6 1.2 adjusting their immigration rules to Sweden 53 34 5.6 5.4 5.4 5.0 facilitate the entry of ICT specialists, sci- Switzerland 101 87 16.3 19.3 18.9 18.3 entists, medical doctors, and nurses. At United Kingdom 204 289 3.2 4.0 3.3 4.4 the other extreme, demand is also high United States 1,536 3,590 7.9 10.4 9.4 12.4 for low-skilled foreign labor for tasks * Includes cross-border workers resistant to automation, such as care of the elderly, house cleaning, agriculture, labor force, and the declining costs of and construction. migration (information and transporta- tion costs)­all these factors are likely to There are reasons to believe that interna- contribute to a drastically greater supply tional migration of labor can be benefi- of, and demand for, international cial to both the receiving and the migrants over the next several decades. sending countries. While in the receiv- ing countries migrants help meet labor Employment-related migration is on the shortages in certain industries, the send- rise relative to other types of migration, ing countries benefit from easing of such as migration of refugees or people unemployment pressures and increased seeking political asylum. And workers financial flows in the form of remit- 92 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 93 12 GLOBALIZATION: INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND MIGRATION tances from migrant workers to their between sending and receiving coun- families staying behind. Remittances to tries. Solutions should take into account developing countries increased by more the interests of all the countries involved than 20 percent during 2001­03 and as well as those of the migrants them- reached $93 billion, which was about selves. For example, tighter controls on one-third more than the total sum of labor migration introduced in one official aid received from developed receiving country will affect not only the How would you countries (see Chapter 13). sending countries but also other poten- make South-North tially receiving countries. In many cases migration more However, concerns are growing about it can also lead to higher illegal migra- the damage done to the development tion, most often associated with discrim- beneficial to both aspirations of the poorer countries by inatory and exploitative treatment of sides? emigration of the most qualified profes- migrant workers. sionals--the so-called "brain drain." Professionals from the developing world The advice currently offered to devel- contribute to expanding knowledge- oped and developing countries on based industries in high-income coun- managing international migration tries, while their countries of origin flows is incomplete and sometimes struggle with a shortage of qualified staff disputable. to provide basic health and education services and find themselves unable to For example, developing countries are reach the critical threshold levels of advised to develop mechanisms for research and development staff needed encouraging retention and return to succeed in the most productive, high- migration of their qualified workers. technology industries. At the same time, Returning migrants bring back foreign increased immigration from developing knowledge and experience (converting countries remains a politically sensitive "brain drain" into "brain circulation") issue in receiving countries, with some and can play an important role by facili- real issues related to cultural assimilation tating the transfer of foreign technolo- of foreigners as well as some exaggerated gies or by helping the development of fears and misconceptions. cultural and economic ties with other countries.4 Further, developing coun- Dealing with all the stresses of increased tries are advised to facilitate and reduce international migration is a global chal- the cost of remittance of funds by their lenge, requiring closer cooperation migrant workers. 4China is known to have some success in stimulating the return of former migrant engineers and researchers educated abroad. 93 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 94 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH As for developed countries, they are Sometimes it is also suggested that both counseled to improve their immigration developing and developed countries laws, policies, and practices for ensuring should encourage temporary rather than orderly migration and to strengthen permanent migration, so as to allow enforcement of minimum labor and sending countries to benefit from the workplace standards so as to discourage new knowledge and skills of returning illegal migration and employment. To migrants and simultaneously reduce ease the political tensions and to facili- some existing anxiety in receiving tate the integration of immigrants, gov- countries. ernments are advised to assist the latter in learning the language of the host Are you personally concerned with inter- country and to fight all forms of racism national migration in any way? In your and discrimination (in employment, opinion, what should governments do to housing, schooling, and all other areas). better manage this process? 94 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 95 13 Globalization: Foreign Investment and Foreign Aid Financial flows to developing countries to expand the markets for their exports, take three main forms--investment and to reduce poverty and military con- from foreign private companies, known flicts threatening international security. as private capital flows, remittances from After the end of the Cold War and upon migrant workers, and aid from foreign the start of market-oriented reforms in governments, often called official devel- Eastern Europe and Central Asia, former opment assistance (ODA). centrally planned economies also started to receive official assistance, aimed pri- After World War II and until the early marily at supporting market reforms. 1990s, the main source of external However, the fast growth of private capi- financing for developing countries was tal flows to developing countries and the official development assistance provided declining total amount of ODA have by the governments of high-income shifted the latter into third place as a countries in the form of food aid, emer- source of external financing for develop- gency relief, technical assistance, peace- ing countries--after foreign direct keeping efforts, and financing for investment (see Fig. 13.1) and even after construction projects. Donor countries remittances from migrant workers (see were motivated by the desire to support Chapter 12). Table 13.1 shows the 1999 their political allies and trade partners, amounts of net official assistance and 95 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 96 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 13.1 Net capital flows from high-income OECD countries, 1999 (millions of U.S. dollars) Official assistance Private capital flows Foreign direct Portfolio Total investment investment Total to Total to Total to Total to Total to Total to Total to Total to developing transition developing transition developing transition developing transition countries countries countries countries countries countries countries countries Australia 982 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. Austria 527 184 1,334 512 831 512 .. .. Belgium 760 82 4,765 17,604 277 1,825 4,636 15,691 Canada 1,699 165 4,484 -21 4,052 .. 460 .. Denmark 1,733 128 410 .. 344 .. .. .. Finland 416 74 313 378 145 225 70 167 France 5,637 550 3,524 8,229 5,517 3,953 -1,388 4,058 Germany 5,515 729 13,853 14,007 5,871 4,946 7,075 8,700 Greece 194 11 .. .. .. .. .. .. Ireland 245 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Italy 1,806 92 9,484 6,137 1,655 -209 8,335 6,831 Japan 15,323 67 -4,297 1,018 5,277 2,624 -3,149 -1,656 Luxembourg 119 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. Netherlands 3,134 22 4,581 2,299 4,103 3,247 -327 .. New Zealand 134 0 16 .. 16 .. .. .. Norway 1,370 28 522 556 340 548 .. 0 Portugal 276 28 1,953 2,782 1,650 2,779 .. .. Spain 1,363 13 27,655 57 27,710 57 .. .. Sweden 1,630 99 1,192 1,215 665 1,133 .. 0 Switzerland 969 70 2,236 6,899 1,834 6,894 .. 0 United Kingdom 3,401 326 6,160 -6,446 6,361 -1,734 -98 -4,877 United States 9,145 3,521 32,218 16,221 22,724 15,693 9,319 3 Total 56,378 6,193 110,404 71,446 89,373 42,490 24,934 28,917 Note: Negative figures in the table indicate net outflow of capital to respective OECD countries. Total private capital flows in the table can be greater or smaller than the sum of foreign direct and portfolio investments because they also include smaller flows of capital such as private export credits and grants by nongovernmental institutions. private capital flows to developing and Private Capital Flows transition countries from the member countries of the Organization for In 1997 the growing net private capi- Economic Co-operation and tal flows to developing countries Development (OECD) Development reached their peak at about 7 times the Assistance Committee. net official assistance (see Fig. 13.2). 96 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 97 13 GLOBALIZATION: FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND FOREIGN AID The structure of private flows also unequal. In the second half of the changed notably, shifting from a pre- 1990s, more than half of FDI went to dominance of bank loans to foreign just 4 countries and over one-third to direct investment (FDI) and portfolio just 2 big countries--China and Brazil investment (see Table 13.1). The share (see Fig. 13.3). At the end of the 1990s of foreign direct investment going to the share of the top 10 developing developing countries has increased to countries receiving the largest amounts Can increased 38 percent of global foreign direct of FDI amounted to 78 percent (see private capital investment, driven by rapid growth of Data Table 4). Note that about half of flows to transnational corporations and encour- all developing countries receive little or aged by liberalization of markets and no foreign direct investment. For exam- developing better prospects for economic growth ple, Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole countries make up in a number of developing countries. receives about 5 percent of all FDI and for reduced official However, following the East Asian most is concentrated in countries rich assistance? financial crisis of 1997, net private in petroleum and minerals. The bulk of capital flows to developing countries FDI flows tends to go to middle- decreased to the level of the early income countries, so the exclusion of 1990s (see Fig. 13.2) and the share of the poorest countries may have FDI to developing countries in global contributed to further widening of FDI fell to about 20 percent. global income disparities. The distribution of FDI among devel- The developing countries that attract the oping countries remains extremely most private capital flows do so thanks 97 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 98 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Should developing and transition countries strive to attract more foreign investment? to their favorable investment climate, responsibility of national governments which includes such elements as a stable to protect their citizens from the possi- political regime, good prospects for eco- ble negative consequences of foreign nomic growth, liberal and predictable direct investments and to use these government regulation, and easy con- investments in the interests of national vertibility of the national currency. economic development. Unfortunately, Higher foreign investment in these in some cases competition among devel- countries helps them break the vicious oping countries for attracting FDI pre- circle of poverty (see Chapter 6) with- vents them from fully meeting this out adding to their foreign debt. In responsibility. addition, foreign direct investment may bring with it advanced technologies, Furthermore, the increased international managerial and marketing skills, and mobility of capital is associated with con- easier access to export markets. The siderable economic risks. If private added competition between foreign and investors (foreign and domestic alike) domestic companies may also make suddenly lose confidence in a country's national economies more efficient. On stability and growth prospects, they can the other hand, foreign investors can be move their capital out of the country less sensitive to social and economic much faster. In that respect portfolio needs of receiving countries. It is the investment is much more dangerous than 98 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 99 13 GLOBALIZATION: FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND FOREIGN AID foreign direct investment, because port- more important, for preventing and folio investors--who own only a small reversing domestic capital flight. percentage of shares in a company and have little or no influence on its manage- ment--are much more likely to try to get Official Development Assistance rid of these shares at the first sign or sus- picion of falling profits. The East Asian For most low-income countries, unable Should your financial crisis of 1997 is seen by some to attract private investors, official devel- country spend experts as an example of the negative opment assistance (ODA) remains the more on implications of excessive capital mobility. most important source of foreign finan- cial flows. However, the share of ODA development Another example of excessive capital in their economies is not as high as assistance? mobility can be found in Russia, where many people in developed countries liberalization of capital markets was car- tend to think--less than 3 percent of ried out in the midst of the transition low-income countries' GDP and only crisis with high inflation, characteristic 0.5 percent of GDP in middle-income uncertainties about property rights and countries. Most high-income donor government regulations, and a generally countries decreased the share of their negative investment climate. As a result, gross domestic product (GDP) spent while some transition countries have for ODA from the average of 0.5 per- managed to rely on foreign investment cent in the early 1960s to 0.3 percent in to alleviate the difficulties of their transi- 1990 and 0.2 percent at the turn of the tion to market economies, Russia (as century. Many of the 22 members of the well as some other former Soviet Union OECD Development Assistance countries) has suffered from significant Committee have pledged to provide 0.7 capital outflows, legal and illegal. percent of their GDP for aid to develop- According to some estimates, about $20 ing countries, but only 4 of them-- billion in capital flowed out of Russia Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, annually throughout most of the 1990s, and Sweden--have met this target. making "capital flight" the biggest obsta- cle to Russia's economic development.1 Even in absolute numbers, ODA This situation underscores the impor- expressed in real terms dropped by tance of creating a favorable investment about 20 percent over the 1990s (see climate, which is critical not only for Fig. 13.2). In 2002 it increased to $58 attracting foreign investors but, even billion, but remained more than 10 1If the illegal outflows of the 1990s were reflected in statistics (for example, see Table 13.1), the numbers for net capital flows to Russia and some other countries with unfavorable investment climate would turn negative. 99 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 100 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH times smaller than the sum of defense Grants account for 95­100 percent of expenditure by high-income countries the official assistance of most donor (about $600 billion). At the UN countries. A significant part of the offi- Conference on Financing for cial assistance, however, comes in the Development in Monterrey (Mexico, form of "tied" aid, which requires recipi- March 2002) a number of high-income ents to purchase goods and services from countries made new commitments on the donor country or from a specified aid that, if realized, would raise ODA's group of countries. Tying arrangements total in real terms by about $15 billion may prevent a recipient from misappro- by 2006 (see Chapter 17). priating or mismanaging aid receipts, but they may also reduce the value of aid if Use Table 13.1 and Data Table 1 to cal- the arrangements are motivated by a culate which donor countries spent the desire to benefit suppliers of certain largest and the smallest shares of their countries, and that may prevent recipi- GDP on official development assistance. ents from buying at the lowest price. Do you think that your country should spend a larger share of its GDP to aid Official assistance can also be "tied up" developing countries in their fight by conditionalities--can depend on the against poverty? enactment of certain policy reforms that donors see as beneficial for recipient Official assistance to developing and countries' economic growth and poverty transition countries has three main com- reduction. For example, aid to transition ponents: countries is often tied to the speed of market reforms. That partially explains · Grants, which do not have to be why such rapidly reforming countries as repaid. the Czech Republic and Poland received · Concessional loans, which have to more official assistance (relative to their be repaid but at lower interest rates population and GDP) than other transi- and over longer periods than com- tion countries that were slower to reform mercial bank loans. (see Data Table 4). · Contributions to multilateral insti- tutions promoting development, The main problem with conditionalities such as the United Nations, is that, even if the donors' concept of International Monetary Fund, beneficial reforms is fundamentally cor- World Bank, and regional develop- rect, the recipient government may not ment banks (Asian Development accept these reforms as its own priority. Bank, African Development Bank, Conditionalities imposed on developing Inter-American Development Bank). countries can weaken their governments' 100 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 101 13 GLOBALIZATION: FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND FOREIGN AID "ownership" of reforms and make these program, countries must be not only reforms' implementation but formal, poor (low-income countries, by World superficial, and unsustainable. On the Bank criteria), and not only severely other hand, donors are legitimately con- indebted (with the sum of foreign debt cerned that their aid may not be used effi- exceeding 150 percent of their export ciently enough in the countries with poor returns). They must also be able to show policy environments and particularly in their ability to develop and implement those suffering from high levels of corrup- their own poverty reduction strategies. tion among government officials. Large The goal is to make sure that the budget amounts of development aid can be funds that will be freed up from servic- wasted in such countries, while they could ing those countries' foreign debt will have brought considerable improvements indeed be used in the interests of their to people's lives in other countries. development rather than diverted to other uses (such as military).2 An important example of policy-based development assistance is the program Would you agree that the quality of launched by the International Monetary national policies aimed at economic Fund and the World Bank in 1996 and growth and poverty reduction should as aiming to reduce the unsustainable bur- a rule govern donors' decisions to pro- den of foreign debt of the "heavily vide aid to this or that country? Which indebted poor countries", the HIPCs. In other ways of improving ODA's effec- order to qualify for assistance under this tiveness would you suggest? 2Developing countries spend on military purposes about $200 billion annually. 101 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 102 14 The Risk of Global Climate Change Since the beginning of industrializa- Though these may still seem like minor tion, economic development in most increases, they could have multiple countries has been accompanied by adverse consequences (along with some growth in the consumption of fossil uncertain benefits). Forests, coral reefs, fuels, with more and more coal, oil, and and other ecological systems, unable to natural gas being burned by factories, adapt to changing temperatures and pre- electric power plants, motor vehicles, cipitation patterns, will be damaged and and households. The resulting carbon irreversible losses for biological diversity dioxide (CO2) emissions have turned will result. People will also suffer--and into the largest source of greenhouse those in poor countries are likely to suf- gases--gases that trap the infrared radia- fer the most, being less prepared to cope tion from the earth within its atmos- with the changes. phere and create the risk of global warming. Because the earth's environ- Many developing countries in arid and mental systems are so complex, the exact semiarid regions may see their access to timing and extent to which human eco- safe water worsen. (As things stand nomic activities will change the planet's today, more than one billion people lack climate are still unclear. But many scien- access to safe water.) Tropical diseases tists believe that the changes are already may spread farther to the north. observable. Droughts will become more frequent and intense in Asia and Africa, and According to the 1995 report of the flooding will likely become a bigger Intergovernmental Panel on Climate problem in temperate and humid Change, by 2100 the mean global tem- regions. While food production could perature could increase by 1.0­3.5 become easier in middle and high lati- degrees Celsius and the global sea level tudes (in areas that tend to have higher could rise by 15­95 centimeters if cur- per capita incomes), in the tropics and rent trends in greenhouse gas emissions subtropics yields will likely fall. Large continue. The 2001 report of the same numbers of people could be displaced by Intergovernmental Panel has corrected a rise in the sea level--including tens of the range of predicted temperature millions in Bangladesh alone, as well as increase to 1.4­5.8 degrees Celsius. entire nations inhabiting low-lying 102 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 103 14 THE RISK OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE islands such as those in the Caribbean by China as the second largest emitter, Sea and the Pacific Ocean. but on a per capita basis it is still far ahead of China (see Figs. 14.1 and 14.2). Most threatening is the fact that, accord- ing to current understanding, the global Traditionally, increased energy consump- climate is a finely tuned mechanism that tion--accompanied by increased carbon can be pushed out of balance and irre- dioxide emissions--was directly linked to Who is primarily versibly set on a course toward cata- economic growth (so that the greater a responsible for strophic consequences that scientists country's GDP, the higher its energy con- creating the risk can't even fully predict. These risks are sumption and pollutant emissions). hard to evaluate, but they appear credi- However, in the 1980s and 1990s carbon of global climate ble enough to demand urgent attention. dioxide emissions per dollar of GDP change? declined substantially across developed and developing countries (see Data Table Whose Responsibility Is It? 5). This occurred because environmen- tally cleaner technologies were intro- The amount of carbon dioxide a country duced, and energy use became more emits into the atmosphere depends efficient. In addition, the share of the ser- mainly on the size of its economy, the vice sector--which requires proportion- level of its industrialization, and the ately less energy than industry--increased efficiency of its energy use. Even though in many countries (see Chapter 9). developing countries contain most of Unfortunately, these changes were not the world's population, their industrial sufficient to stop the growth of global car- production and energy consumption per bon dioxide emissions. To eliminate the capita are relatively low. Thus at this risk of global climate change, concerted point there seems to be little doubt that efforts are needed from the governments the primary responsibility for creating of most countries to further increase the risk of global warming lies with energy efficiency and move away from developed countries (see Map 14.1; today's heavy reliance on fossil fuels. Figs. 14.1 and 14.2). At the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de The United States is the largest contribu- Janeiro (Brazil), developed and transi- tor to global greenhouse gas emissions. tion countries agreed to work toward Although it contains just 4 percent of the stabilizing their greenhouse gas emis- world's population, it produces almost sions at 1990 levels by 2000 (in the 25 percent of global carbon dioxide Framework Convention on Climate emissions. Russia was recently replaced Change). However, by 1997, when 103 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 104 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH representatives of 165 countries gathered cost of reducing global greenhouse gas in Kyoto (Japan) for the United Nations emissions, the broad range of economic Conference on Climate Change, it was activities that will have to be affected by clear that most countries--including the climate-friendly technological change, United States--were falling far short of and the long-term nature of the environ- that target. The Kyoto Protocol, adopted mental risks under consideration. Thus at the conference, was for the first time it is no wonder that achieving a broad meant to become legally binding and international consensus on the ways of called on all wealthy nations to reduce implementing the Kyoto Protocol greenhouse gas emissions by 6­8 percent proved extremely difficult. Developing below 1990 levels by 2008­12. countries' participation in it was post- poned and concrete mechanisms of This agreement is still considered the implementation remained to be further most ambitious global environmental negotiated. At the next global conference undertaking in history, given the high in The Hague (Netherlands) in 2000, 104 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 105 14 THE RISK OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 105 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 106 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH representatives of 184 states still failed to output could rise in spite of the agree on specific mechanisms for Kyoto Kyoto Protocol implementation. Protocol implementation. Moreover, in 2001 US President George Bush offi- Developed countries are expected to take cially refused to proceed with its ratifica- the lead in preventing global climate tion, referring to the possible damage to change even though in less than 20 years US economic interests and asserting that developing countries will likely surpass the scientific proof of the risk of global them as the main emitters of carbon climate change was, in his opinion, still dioxide. But it will take much longer not sufficiently valid and that too many than 20 years for per capita energy con- countries were not prepared to share in sumption in developing countries to the global efforts. become comparable to that in today's developed countries. So, in terms of fair- True, most developing countries refuse ness, today's poor countries have every to commit to reducing greenhouse gas right to continue polluting the atmos- emissions, arguing that phere. The real question is whether it would be wise for them to follow a · the problem was created mostly by model of development that has already developed countries, and proven unsustainable? And is it true that · such commitments would under- environmental concerns cannot be mine their economic development addressed without impeding poor coun- and impede poverty alleviation. tries' economic growth? An inspiring example is set by China (not a party to On the other hand, it can be argued that the Kyoto Protocol), which in 1996- 2000 managed to increase its GDP by 36 · the share of developing countries in percent while still reducing its carbon global carbon dioxide emissions is dioxide emissions, largely through indus- rapidly increasing, and trial restructuring and fuel improve- · without developing countries' cooper- ments. Many analysts believe that the ation any progress achieved in devel- sooner developing countries take advan- oped countries could be offset by tage of cleaner production technologies "leakages" beyond their borders. For and more efficient ways of generating example, an energy-inefficient steel and using energy, the better it will be for plant could move its operations to a their long-term development prospects. developing country not covered by an agreement instead of switching to a Assume, for the sake of fairness, that more energy-efficient technology. As every person on earth has an equal right a result, the global greenhouse gas to the atmosphere as a resource. In that 106 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 107 14 THE RISK OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE Should all developing countries join in international efforts to reduce carbon dioxide case carbon dioxide emission quotas for action are distributed unevenly among emissions? countries would be determined by popu- countries. For example, the Alliance of lation size. Low-income countries would Small Island States (AOSIS), whose not yet have reached their quota and members are directly threatened by the would have the right to continue emit- prospect of the rising sea level, has already ting carbon dioxide. Middle-income adopted unilateral carbon abatement countries would have almost reached measures. But to most other developing their quota (if China with its 21 percent countries, with much higher greenhouse of the world's population is included gas emissions, increased burning of fossil among them) or already exceeded it (if fuels in the course of their industrializa- China is counted among low-income tion and continued burning of forests for countries, as it was till the end of the agriculture appear to be much higher eco- 1990s). Most important, high-income nomic and social priorities. countries would have exceeded their quotas almost by a factor of three (com- The potential benefits of preventing the pare Figs. 2.2 and 14.3). global climate change are estimated to be several times greater for the group of developing countries--avoiding the loss Will the North-South of up to 9 percent of their GDP com- cooperation work? pared with 1.0­1.5 percent in devel- oped countries. At the same time the The challenge of agreeing on concerted costs of prevention of greenhouse gas global action in response to the risk of emissions are considerably lower in global climate change is complicated by developing countries as compared with the fact that the costs and benefits of such developed, where energy production 107 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 108 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH and consumption are already relatively tries, the resulting emissions reductions efficient and simple improvements are are independently verified and certified, harder to make. According to some esti- and the Fund's contributors are then mates, reducing carbon dioxide emis- allowed to count these reductions towards sions by 1 ton can cost over US$12 in their Kyoto Protocol commitments. If developed countries, but only US$2-3 this type of deal becomes widespread, in many developing countries, where many developing countries may addition- introducing modern, energy-efficient ally benefit from greater foreign invest- technologies (already widely used in ment and easier access to modern high-income economies) can make a big technologies, while the global problem of and quick difference. Does not this climate change prevention may be solved mean that developing countries should at a much lower cost. be more interested in taking action against the global climate change? The very first PCF deal happened to take place with Latvia, as part of the In fact, low-income countries can rarely Liepaja Solid Waste Management afford any long-term planning, and the Project. This project, financed jointly by cost of US$2­3 per ton of carbon dioxide the government of Latvia, the city of emissions prevented is still too high for Liepaja, the World Bank, the Nordic them in the presence of many other Investment Bank, and the Swedish urgent socioeconomic needs. Is there a International Development Agency, is way to further increase the benefits of cli- aimed at replacing several outdated land- mate-friendly programs for developing fills in the Liepaja region, many of countries and to further reduce their costs? which pose a risk to local groundwater resources, with a modern regional waste The Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) treatment facility. With the PCF contri- established by the World Bank in 1999 bution, a state-of-the-art energy cell sys- with contributions from interested gov- tem will be installed to collect landfill ernments and private companies was a gases produced by decaying waste. These first attempt to deal practically with this gases, containing 50 percent methane, task. The underlying idea is to create a will then be used to generate electricity market for trading carbon dioxide emis- and heat. It is expected that, over the sions reductions between developed project lifetime of 25 years, an equiva- countries, on the one hand, and develop- lent of about 2 million tons of carbon ing and transition countries, on the other. dioxide will be prevented from entering Developed countries contributing to the the earth's atmosphere by (1) capturing Fund sponsor the introduction of cleaner the methane-containing landfill gases technologies in the less developed coun- and (2) substituting this methane for 108 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 109 14 THE RISK OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE natural gas in generating electricity for stabilizing greenhouse gases emissions Latvia's power grid. In addition, the citi- would require switching the world to zens of Liepaja will get a lower-cost, alternative, zero-emission energy sources cleaner waste disposal facility using a such as hydro, wind, and solar power. minimum of land and sustainable for an As of 1999, these sources accounted for indefinitely long time. only 5 percent of total energy produc- tion (mostly hydropower). Intensified * * * research and development is still needed to make them economically competitive, At the time of this writing, the Kyoto and even then it might take 30-50 years protocol has been ratified by many more to completely replace the old countries but still has not entered into energy-producing and energy-consum- legal force, because these countries repre- ing stock of equipment and structures. sent less than 55 percent of all the 1990 If countries fail to commit to concerted greenhouse gases emissions of developed emissions control without further delay, countries. Meanwhile, the need for triggering catastrophic and irreversible action is truly urgent, given that any climate change might become longer-term solution to reducing and unavoidable. 109 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 110 15 Composite Indicators of Development Comparing countries' GNP (or GDP) per capita are presented, one on each Can you suggest a per capita is the most common axis, then connected with bold lines to better way to approach to assessing their level of devel- form a polygon. The shape of this "dia- opment. But higher per capita income in mond" can easily be compared to the measure countries' a country does not always mean that its reference diamond (see colored dia- development (than people are better off than those in a monds), which represents the average those described in country with lower income, because indicators for the country's income this chapter)? there are many aspects of human well- group, each indexed to 100 percent. Any being that these indicators do not cap- point outside the reference diamond ture. (Can you give some examples? See shows a value better than the group aver- Chapter 2.) Seeking a better measure of age, while any point inside signals development success, experts use differ- below-average achievement. ent methods of integrating data on aver- age incomes with data on average health Botswana's development diamond has a and education levels. These methods triangular shape because data on the per- make it possible to assess a country's centage of its population with access to achievements in both economic devel- safe water were unavailable in the World opment and human development (see Bank (Figure 15.1). Think of another Chapter 1). indicator, possibly even more important for Botswana's development, that you would use to compare it China. Use an "Development Diamonds" indicator from the data tables at the back of this book to complete the devel- Experts at the World Bank use so-called opment diamond for Botswana and one development diamonds to portray rela- or two other countries of your choice. tionships among four socioeconomic indicators for a given country relative to Note that the development diamonds the averages for that country's income for India and Ethiopia, and Botswana group (low-income, lower-middle- and China were constructed using income, upper-middle-income, or high- indexes based on average indicators for income). Life expectancy at birth, two different groups of countries: low- gross primary (or secondary) enroll- income and middle-income (see Figure ment, access to safe water, and GNP 15.1). This approach makes it impossi- 110 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 111 15 COMPOSITE INDICATORS OF DEVELOPMENT How can countries use their wealth more effectively for the benefit of their people? ble to visually compare the develop- power parity terms). Achievement in ment achievements of these two pairs each area is measured by how far a coun- of countries. try has gone in attaining the following goal: life expectancy of 85 years, adult literacy and enrollments of 100 percent, Human Development Index and real GDP per capita of $40,000 in purchasing power parity terms. United Nations experts prefer to use the Although highly desirable, these goals human development index to measure a have not yet been fully attained by any country's development. This composite country, so the actual indicators are index is a simple average of three indexes expressed as decimal shares of the ideal. reflecting a country's achievements in health and longevity (as measured by life The advantage of the human develop- expectancy at birth), education (mea- ment index relative to the development sured by adult literacy and combined diamond method is that it allows coun- primary, secondary, and tertiary enroll- tries to be ranked in order of their ments), and living standard (measured achievements in human development. In by GDP per capita in purchasing the ranking based on 1998 data, the top 111 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 112 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 15.1 Differences between rankings by GNP per capita ative importance of its different compo- and by the human development index nents or to understand why a country's Real GNP per index changes over time--whether, for capita (PPP$) example, it happens because of a change Rank by real Rank by rank minus in GNP per capita or because of a (PPP$) GNP index of human human per capita, development, development change in adult literacy. Countries 1999 1998 index rank Botswana 84 122 ­38 The human development index ranking South Africa 69 103 ­34 of some countries differs significantly Namibia 92 115 ­23 from their ranking by real GNP (or Switzerland 6 13 ­7 GDP) per capita. For example, Sweden United States 4 3 ­1 ranks only 28th in real GNP per capita Canada 16 1 15 but 6th in human development--a dif- Hungary 60 43 17 ference of 22 points (Table 15.1). The Sweden 28 6 22 China 128 99 29 difference between a country's human Tajikistan 184 110 74 development ranking and its per capita income ranking shows how successful it is (or isn't), compared with other coun- five countries were Canada, Norway, the tries in translating the benefits of eco- United States, Australia, and Iceland. nomic growth into quality of life for its The bottom five countries were Sierra population (see Data Table 5). A positive Leone, Niger, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, difference means that a country is doing and Guinea-Bissau. The top five devel- relatively better in terms of human devel- oping economies were Singapore, Hong opment than in terms of per capita Kong (China), Brunei, Cyprus, and the income. This outcome is often seen in Republic of Korea. (See Data Table 5) former socialist countries and in the developed countries of Europe. A nega- The disadvantage of the human develop- tive difference means the opposite. The ment index is that, as any aggregate most striking examples are Botswana and index, it does not allow us to see the rel- South Africa (see Table 15.1). 112 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 113 16 Indicators of Development Sustainability Classical economists consistently identi- tors of sustainable--or unsustainable-- fied three sources and components of development. How does the national wealth: land, labor, and capital. structure of By contrast, Western economists of the 20th century preferred to focus on capi- Composition of National Wealth national wealth tal, understood to be human-made change as a physical capital only--the stock of According to a number of recent World country develops? structures and equipment used for pro- Bank studies, physical capital (produced duction. Thus expenses aimed at adding assets) is not the main--much less the to this stock were the only expenses cate- only--component of a country's wealth. gorized as investment. Most other Most important for all countries are expenses, such as those for education or human resources, which consist of "raw for environmental protection, were con- labor," determined mainly by the num- sidered to constitute consumption and ber of people in a country's labor force, treated as deductions from potential cap- and human capital. Natural capital is ital accumulation. another important component of every nation's wealth. A better understanding of the need for sustainable development first led to A country's level of development deter- attempts to "green" national accounts-- mines the roles played by the different that is, to account for changes in nat- components of its national wealth. The ural capital in calculations of gross dominance of human capital is particu- domestic product and gross national larly marked in the most developed coun- product--then to the development of tries, where natural capital is calculated to statistical methods to account for account for just 2­5 percent of aggregate changes in a country's human capital. wealth. By contrast, in West Africa--one Although valuation methods for natural of the world's poorest regions--natural and human capital are still imperfect, capital still prevails over physical capital, they allow experts to explore some criti- and the share of human resources is cal development issues. These include among the lowest in the world despite a the changing composition of a country's large population (see Fig. 16.1). national wealth and operational indica- Comparing West Africa with Western 113 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 114 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Europe is particularly indicative because managing a portfolio of assets to pre- in absolute terms the two regions have serve and enhance the opportunities roughly the same per capita value for nat- people face." The assets that this defini- ural capital. Thus the striking difference tion refers to include not just tradition- in the composition of their national ally accounted physical capital, but also wealth can be entirely attributed to the natural and human capital. To be sus- fact that the average West European has tainable, development must provide for 13­14 times as much human and physi- all these assets to grow over time--or at cal capital at his or her disposal. least not to decrease. The same logic applies to prudent management of a national economy as applies to prudent Accumulation of National management of personal property. Wealth as an Indicator of Sustainable Development With that definition in mind, one possi- ble indicator of sustainable (or unsustain- Over the past 10 years the concept of able) development might be the "genuine sustainable development has become domestic saving rate" or "genuine domes- more comprehensive and measurable. A tic investment rate," a new statistical recent World Bank study defined sus- indicator being calculated by World tainable development as "a process of Bank experts for most countries and for 114 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 115 16 INDICATORS OF DEVELOPMENT SUSTAINABILITIY all the regions of the world. Standard in valuating changes in their human and measures of wealth accumulation ignore natural capital. But the effort is consid- the depletion of, and damage to, natural ered worthwhile because of the poten- resources such as forests and oil deposits, tial importance of sustainable on the one hand, and investment in one development indicators for informing of a nation's most valuable assets--its and guiding practical policymaking. In people--on the other. The genuine Data Table 5, please see the genuine How can countries domestic saving (investment) rate is domestic saving rates estimated by make their designed to correct for this shortcoming World Bank economists taking into by adjusting the traditional domestic sav- account net domestic saving (gross development more ing rate downward by an estimate of nat- domestic saving less consumption of sustainable? ural resource depletion and pollution physical capital over the year), educa- damages (the loss of natural capital), and tion expenditure, depletion of a nation's upward by growth in the value of human energy, mineral, and forest resources, capital (which comes primarily from and damage from CO2 emissions.1 investing in education and basic health services). (See Fig. 16.2.) These preliminary estimates show that many of the most resource-dependent Calculating genuine saving rates for dif- countries, including all the major oil ferent countries is extremely challeng- exporters, have low or negative genuine ing, particularly because of difficulties domestic savings. That means that losses 1Note that these calculations do not account for such important negative factors as damage to water resources, degradation of soils, health losses from local pollution, depletion of fish stocks or such important positive factor as basic health expenditure. 115 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 116 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH of their national wealth caused by deple- maintenance of the Earth's life support tion of natural capital and damage done systems, such as the atmospheric ozone by CO2 emissions outweigh the benefits that protects all biological species from from net domestic saving and education harmful solar radiation. Humans as a bio- expenditure. Thus it is quite possible logical species would not survive without that in these countries the aggregate these kinds of services from nature. There national wealth was actually decreasing, are also many natural resources that have to the detriment of the people's quality no known practical use to people as of of life and these countries' future devel- now, but may prove indispensable at some opment prospects. And such unsustain- time in the future. That is why, for exam- able development might be happening ple, there exists wide agreement on the in spite of positive economic growth importance of preserving all the existing indicators, which are usually at the cen- biological species--the irreversible losses ter of all governments' attention. of biological diversity can seriously com- promise the choices of both current and Note that this indicator of sustainable future generations. development assumes high substitutability among different components of national Clearly there are certain critical limits or wealth. It is assumed, for example, that thresholds beyond which different kinds depletion of natural resources can be com- of natural capital cannot be replaced by pensated for by investing incomes received anything else. Unfortunately, in most from these resources in education (to cases scientists cannot even tell us build up national human capital) or in approximately where these critical limits new enterprises (a country's physical capi- are. Moreover, is "survivability" really a tal). But this can only be true to the extent sufficient criterion for preserving natural that these "compensatory" investments resources? Even if humanity could sur- can bring about new technologies that vive without the unique beauty and bio- allow use of renewable resources instead of logical diversity of coral reefs or tropical nonrenewable ones (for example, solar rainforests, would we agree to deprive energy instead of oil) or ensure much our grandchildren of the opportunity to more efficient production, using less see them? That is why many develop- energy and materials as inputs. One can ment experts advocate the principle of also hope that higher income levels would precaution in depleting any natural increase demand for "less material" ser- resources, particularly where there is a vices rather than for energy- and material- risk of serious or irreversible damage. intensive goods (see Chapter 9). Even so, there are certain natural resources that The limited substitutability of natural humanity is not likely ever to be able to capital (as well as of many forms of replace. Think, for example, of all the human capital) underlies the limitations 116 ecospheric resources that are vital for the of the genuine domestic saving rate as an BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 117 16 INDICATORS OF DEVELOPMENT SUSTAINABILITIY indicator of sustainable development, dangerous deforestation, pollution, and even though these limitations are the flip loss of biodiversity that accompanied fast side of the much-needed attempt to economic growth in East Asia. As for bring together all three aspects of sustain- high-income countries, part of their rela- able development--economic, social, tive environmental sustainability results and environmental. On the one hand, from importing energy and mineral this indicator can play an important role resources instead of depleting their own. in attracting governments' attention to That highlights another weakness of the the issue of rational use of natural indicator in question--its focus on coun- resources for the long-term benefit of try-level sustainability, while truly sustain- their countries. It should be understood, able development can be only global.2 however, that even those countries that appear to perform quite well in terms of this indicator might actually be very close Material Throughput and to critical limits in using many of their Environmental Space natural resources. In Figure 16.3, based on Data Table 5, the groups of East These indicators theoretically allow us to Asian and high-income countries appear measure and monitor sustainability on to be leading the world in the overall sus- the global scale but, unlike the genuine tainability of their development. How- domestic saving rate, they focus solely ever, environmentalists point to the on environmental sustainability. 2Note that, in spite of economic globalization, governments still bear the main responsibility for the rational use of natural resources within their national territories. Thus, country-level indicators of sustainability are important for 117 practical policymaking, but arguably need to be supplemented by global-level indicators. BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 118 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Theoretically it should be possible today, they would need 10 planets like to measure the volume of material Earth, not one. Can it be claimed that resources flowing through the human people in the most successful economies production and consumption cycle. have a legitimate right to a much bigger The total volume of this flow--called share of the common environmental throughput--determines the total stress space? Does this mean that natural envi- Is development that humans put on their natural envi- ronment itself precludes the possibility possible without ronment. Then the task of environmen- that the poor countries will ever catch up tal sustainability can be seen as limiting with the rich (see Chapter 4)? growth of material material throughput to what nature can throughput? tolerate without serious damage to its Many development experts agree that resource-regeneration, pollution-absorp- more equitable distribution of access to tion, and other important functions. global natural resources is not only The "space" within these limits is called morally desirable but also politically "environmental space," shared by all necessary to create the conditions for humanity. Then to determine whether a successful cooperation between devel- certain country is developing in an envi- oped and developing countries in deal- ronmentally sustainable way, its use of ing with multiple global challenges of natural resources and its pollution can sustainable development. But the practi- be compared with the environmental cal--political, economic, and techno- space that belongs to that country.3 logical--possibility of radically reducing the use of environmental space by high- In fact, different countries use the limited income countries is much more dis- global environmental space very putable. Such a radical change would unequally. High-income countries with require a strong political commitment less than one-fifth of the world popula- to creating economic incentives for tion consume about three-quarters of the shifting the focus of technological raw materials and energy traded in the development from saving labor to sav- world and are responsible for a dispropor- ing natural resources. Then economic tionately large share of all pollution in the growth in both developed and develop- world (see, for example, Fig. 14.3). Some ing countries would continue with environmentalists have calculated that if stable or even decreasing material all the people on Earth were to consume throughput. Interestingly, some envi- natural resources in the same quantities as ronmentalists point out that many of people in high-income countries do the technologies needed for uncoupling 3A rather similar concept of ecological footprint looks at the area of land that a particular group of consumers uses. This concept works reasonably well with some issues, for example, when different ways of producing food or paper are examined, but is less helpful in dealing with other issues, such as global warming (see Chapter 14) or water pollution. 118 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 119 16 INDICATORS OF DEVELOPMENT SUSTAINABILITIY economic growth from throughput capital" might be able to answer this growth already exist, but suboptimal question and "capture" most aspects of a economic conditions prevent their use. country's social development. Material throughput and environmental Refer to Figure 16.1 once again. What space as indicators of global environ- this picture fails to acknowledge is per- mental sustainability show that devel- haps the most critical factor in any soci- How can countries oped countries need to change their ety's development: the way people build their social modes of production and consumption interact, cooperate, and resolve their capital? beyond those changes already under way conflicts. This is what conventional sta- in the course of their postindustrializa- tistical indicators have trouble measur- tion (see Chapter 9). ing. And this is what researchers have recently come to call the social capital of society. Social Capital and Public Officials' Corruption Social capital refers to organizations and associations (including public, private, Measuring and monitoring social sus- and nonprofit) as well as to norms and tainability is probably even more chal- relationships (such as laws, traditions, lenging than measuring environmental and personal networks). It is the glue sustainability because of the lack of a that holds societies together--what widely accepted unifying concept similar social cohesion depends on. Abundant to that of environmental space. Experts social capital considerably lowers the know how to measure many of the nega- costs of doing business and increases tive factors undermining social sustain- productivity by promoting trust, coordi- ability, such as unemployment, income nation, and cooperation at all levels. By inequality (see Chapter 5), or poverty contrast, a lack of social capital leads to (see Chapter 6). The population's educa- conflicts and inefficiencies. tion (see Chapter 7) and health status (see Chapter 8) are also understood to Because social capital is so multidimen- affect social sustainability. But any of sional, there can hardly be a single "best" these factors taken separately fails to way of measuring it. But that does not explain why some countries and com- mean that measurement is impossible. munities consistently tend to use all Researchers measure social capital in a their production resources (human, number of creative ways, usually by cal- physical, and natural capital) much culating composite indexes based on a more efficiently than do others and so range of data collected through surveys. are developing more successfully. The The data used for these calculations gen- recently introduced concept of "social erally reflect the number of formal and 119 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 120 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 16.1 The 2000 Corruption Perception Index (selected countries) Country rank 1 2 3 5 6 10 14 17 Country Finland Denmark New Zealand, Canada Singapore United USA Germany Sweden Kingdom CPI score 10.0 9.8 9.4 9.2 9.1 8.7 7.8 7.6 Country rank 21 23 27 28 32 34 42 43 Country France Japan Estonia Taiwan Hungary, South Czech Poland, (China) Tunisia Africa Republic El Salvador CPI score 6.7 6.4 5.7 5.5 5.2 5.0 4.3 4.2 Country rank 49 52 57 63 65 68 76 79 Country Brazil Argentina, Latvia, China, Kazakhstan, Romania Tanzania, Uzbekistan Ghana Zambia Egypt Zimbabwe Vietnam CPI score 3.9 3.5 3.4 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.5 2.4 Country rank 82 85 87 89 90 Country Kenya, Angola, Azerbaijan, Yugoslavia Nigeria Russia Indonesia Ukraine CPI score 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.2 Source: Transparency International Press Release, Berlin, September 13, 2000 informal groups and networks that peo- One red flag of social capital degradation ple call upon, prevailing norms of coop- is corruption among public servants, eration and reciprocity, and people's including bribery, misappropriation of subjective trust in others, in public and public funds, and misuse of authority. private institutions, and in governments. Corruption not only wastes resources by distorting government policies away from Mounting evidence suggests that social the interests of the majority, it also gener- capital is critical for economies to grow ates apathy and cynicism among citizens, and for people to prosper. However, radi- makes laws dysfunctional, and con- cal reforms or even rapid but unbalanced tributes to a rise in crime. Eventually, cor- development often undermine existing ruption discredits political democracy, forms of social capital without replacing which is essential for development, and them with new ones. Such degradation undermines broad public support for eco- of social capital threatens social cohesion nomic reforms. It is no wonder that, and renders development unsustainable. according to some studies, countries suf- Some development experts believe that fering from high levels of corruption typi- this is what has happened recently in cally exhibit lower rates of economic many transition countries. growth. Such elements of social capital as 120 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 121 16 INDICATORS OF DEVELOPMENT SUSTAINABILITIY good governance and the rule of law are and nontransparent private gains no less important for sustainable eco- (bribes). Some of the most common nomic development than such basic eco- examples of administrative corruption, nomic conditions as sufficient saving and reported in enterprise surveys, are bribe investment (see Chapter 6) or strong payments to obtain state licenses and incentives for efficiency (see Chapter 11). permits, to deal with taxes, and to gain government contracts. Household sur- How can countries Corruption among government officials veys show bribery in the police force, fight the curse is widely seen to be particularly wide- particularly the traffic police, as well as in of government spread in some African countries and in the health and education systems as most transition countries, where it became common. On the other hand, so-called corruption? hard to control owing to simultaneous state capture refers to the actions of indi- political and economic reforms carried viduals, groups, or firms to influence the out amid a massive redistribution of formation of laws, rules, and regulations state assets. Table 16.1 shows selected to their own advantage by means of illicit Corruption Perception Indexes (CPI), and nontransparent provision of private calculated by an influential nongovern- benefits to public officials. The "sales" to mental organization (NGO), Trans- private interests of parliamentary votes, parency International, based on the presidential decrees, or civil and criminal results of multiple surveys among busi- court decisions are some of the most nesspeople, international analysts, and common examples of state capture. the general public. These indexes range between 10 (highly clean from corrup- Researchers explain the different typol- tion) and 0 (highly corrupt). The 2000 ogy of corruption in the group of transi- CPI table ranked 90 countries for which tion countries (see Fig. 16.4) by the data were available, from Finland (most differences in their historical legacies and clean) to Nigeria (most corrupt). economic realities. Administrative cor- ruption is typically lower in countries Note that the nature of corruption can with longer experience of sovereignty differ significantly among countries. One (within recent history) and closer links of the ways of classifying various corrupt to European standards of civil service. behaviors is based on how deep the cor- These countries tend to benefit from rel- rupt transaction reaches into the opera- atively developed systems of public tions of the state. So-called administrative administration and better-trained public corruption refers to intentional mis- officials. As for state capture, it is implementation of existing laws, rules, explained mostly as a result of high con- and regulations by public officials to pro- centration of economic power. Thus vide advantages to selected individuals, countries richly endowed with natural groups, or firms in exchange for illicit resources (like Azerbaijan and Russia) or 121 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 122 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH well placed to serve as transit routes for representing various groups of the pop- the distribution of these resources (like ulation; fostering truly independent Latvia) are the most fertile ground for mass media; and creating a competitive state capture. In these countries there is private sector, free from excessive gov- always a risk that dominant private or ernment regulation as well as from public firms will develop close ties to monopolization. Market liberalization political leaders and succeed in further- and de-monopolization are often seen as ing their own interests at the expense of particularly effective means of reducing the broader public interest. the opportunities for different forms of corruption. To control corruption and minimize its harmful effect on a country's develop- * * * ment, governments can use different strategies. Reforming public administra- Think of the other possible ways to mea- tion to reduce opportunities and incen- sure and monitor the sustainability of tives for corruption and to increase development at local, national, and transparency and accountability in gov- global levels. In your opinion, which ernment decisionmaking is usually nec- issues in sustainable development appear essary but insufficient. Other necessary to be the most urgent? Awareness of measures include strengthening the which indicators could help people, independence and efficiency of the judi- governments, and the international 122 cial system; giving more voice to NGOs community to deal with these issues? BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 123 17 Development Goals and Strategies Over the past several decades some To begin to answer those questions, it is developing countries have achieved important to remember that develop- high economic growth rates, signifi- ment is far more complex than simply cantly narrowing the gap between them- economic growth or the quantitative selves and the most developed accumulation of national capital, even countries. But many more developing in the broader meaning of the term (as countries have actually seen the eco- described in Chapter 16, for instance). nomic gap widen (see Fig. 4.4). Thus, Development is also the qualitative while accelerated growth and develop- transformation of a whole society, a shift ment leading to convergence with devel- to new ways of thinking, and, corre- oped countries are possible, these are in spondingly, to new relations and new no way guaranteed. In fact there is a high methods of production. Moreover, as risk that today's gap between the rich and you will probably agree, transformation the poor countries--with 80 percent of qualifies as development only if it bene- the world's population commanding less fits most people--improves their quality than 20 percent of global GDP--will of life and gives them more control over become even wider. There is also a high their destinies (see Chapter 1). This risk that the number of people living in comprehensive process of change has to extreme poverty--on less than US$1 a involve most of the population and can- day--will not substantially decrease (see not be imposed from outside the coun- Chapter 6). All these risks are aggravated try or from above--for example, by by the growth of the world's population, means of unpopular government policy which in the next 30 years is projected to or by means of foreign aid. expand by two billion people, almost all of them expected to be born in develop- ing countries (see Chapter 3). Millennium Development Goals Whose responsibility is it to stop the The 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de global spread of poverty? Janeiro issued the famous Agenda 21 (for the 21st century), which--in its 40 And what can governments do to cat- chapters--provided the main framework alyze their countries' development? for international understanding of and 123 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 124 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH cooperation on the issues of sustainable developed and developing countries, as development. Notably, Agenda 21 recog- well as the private sector. nized combating poverty as a basic con- dition for ensuring sustainability--social, In summary form, the Millennium economic, and even environmental. Development Goals and their related Since 1992 international agreement on targets call for achieving the following Which other goals the key issues of sustainable develop- outcomes by 2015: and targets would ment has deepened and a wide consen- sus on the urgent need to combat 1. Decreasing by half the proportion of you add to the list poverty in its many forms has arisen. A people living in extreme poverty (on of Millennium number of world conferences organized less than US$1 a day) and suffering Development by the United Nations following the Rio from hunger. Goals? Earth Summit discussed the so-called 2. Achieving universal primary educa- International Development Goals, tion. which were meant to help focus and 3. Eliminating gender disparity at all coordinate the efforts of donor coun- levels of education. tries, international development agen- 4. Reducing the under-five mortality cies, and the governments of developing rate by two-thirds. countries themselves. In September 5. Reducing the maternal mortality 2000 many of those goals were incorpo- ratios by three-quarters. rated into the resolutions of the UN 6. Halting and beginning to reverse the Millennium General Assembly in New spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and York (also called the Millennium other diseases. Summit) and endorsed by 189 countries 7. Ensuring improved environmental as Millennium Development Goals. sustainability (by integrating sustain- able development into country poli- There are eight major Millennium cies, reversing the loss of Development Goals, seven of which for- environmental resources, and halv- mulate far-reaching improvements in ing the proportion of people without some of the most important indicators access to potable water and basic of development, followed by concrete sanitation). targets to be achieved by 2015, in com- 8. Building a Global Partnership for parison with the figures for 1990. The Development. eighth goal specifies some of the main means of achieving the first seven goals (In Annex 3, see the exact list of eight in the portion of the work that requires long-term goals along with concrete tar- joint effort by international develop- gets and indicators for tracking progress ment partners--the governments of towards these targets.) 124 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 125 17 DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND STRATEGIES The eighth goal was added in 2001, and active participation on the part of the its specific targets and indicators con- private sector, including the leading tinue to be actively discussed and formu- pharmaceutical and ICT companies. lated under the leadership of the main international development agencies. As It is important to understand that all of of early 2002, wide agreement seemed to the Millennium Development Goals are be achieved on the following targets: closely interconnected, so that achieving What will be the one of them can be expected to con- main difficulties · Further develop open and nondis- tribute to achieving the others. For criminatory trading and financial example, reducing the share of people in building an systems, which would include an living in extreme poverty from about effective Global increased level of official develop- 30 percent of the developing world's Partnership for ment assistance (up to 0.7 percent of population to about 15 percent would Development? the donor countries' GDP), certainly help to deal with the health · Address the special needs of the least and education challenges, but achieving developed countries and those of health and education goals would also the landlocked and small island contribute to the fight against poverty. developing countries (which have It can also be shown that providing for greater difficulty competing in the environmental sustainability, although it global economy), may initially require some additional · Deal comprehensively with the spending, will ultimately more than pay problem of the unsustainable foreign for itself in terms of better health, debt of developing countries, longer lives, and more natural resources · Develop and implement strategies available for poverty reduction. for reducing youth unemployment, Unfortunately, failure to achieve some · Provide access to affordable essential of these goals can also preclude the drugs in developing countries, achievement of many or all of the oth- · Spread more widely the benefits of ers. Particularly devastating can be the new technologies, especially infor- effects of an unchecked HIV/AIDS epi- mation and communication tech- demic, which, by killing adults in their nologies (ICT). most productive years, exposes millions to extreme deprivation. And a failure to Note that success in the first three com- build an effective Global Partnership for ponents of Goal 8 will depend mostly Development can make the challenge of on the partnership between the govern- attaining the Millennium Development ments of developed and developing Goals disproportionately hard for many countries, while attainment of the last developing countries, particularly the three will also require good will and poorest of them. 125 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 126 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH The last decade of the 20th century has had lower barriers to girls' schooling brought some progress toward all the than some other places. Millennium Goals, but if improvements are not accelerated, these goals will not The main precondition for achieving the be achieved by the 2015 deadline in Millennium Goals is sufficiently fast and many or even in most developing coun- equitable economic growth in develop- tries. For example, if the average rate of ing countries to provide the material economic growth of the 1990s (1.7 per- resources for reducing all kinds of cent a year) is not increased, the average poverty, including human poverty proportion of people living on less than (poverty in health and education). The US$1 a day will probably not decline main responsibility for meeting this below 19 percent. Moreover, most challenge lies with the governments of improvements are likely to occur in developing countries, but donor coun- China and India, while in countries of tries and international development Sub-Saharan Africa the number of poor agencies can have important roles to play may actually continue to rise. Overall, by building a Global Partnership for according to the World Bank estimate Development to complement these made in 2002, only 22 developing coun- efforts. In addition to increasing the tries seemed to be on target to meet this amount of official development assis- goal, while 65 other countries were tance and improving its effectiveness in unlikely to meet it without additional poverty reduction, developed countries external assistance or their governments' can make a big contribution by remov- policy changes or both. Progress in ing the remaining barriers to imports reducing under-five mortality has also from developing countries, thus helping been uneven across countries: although to accelerate their economic growth. 26 developing countries were well on track to reach or exceed the goal by According to the World Bank's prelimi- 2015, 11 other countries experienced nary estimates, reducing protectionism increased morality rates. Most of the lat- by half worldwide would yield develop- ter countries are in Sub-Saharan Africa, ing countries a gain in welfare approxi- where HIV/AIDS has significantly mately equivalent to US$200 billion in aggravated the problem. Sub-Saharan 2015, much more than any expected Africa also has the largest proportion of official assistance. However, this gain children out of school (see Data Table 2) would not substitute for development and is lagging behind other developing assistance because of its unequal distrib- world regions in narrowing the gap ution among developing countries-- between girls' and boys' school enroll- most of the new trade opportunities ments, even though it has traditionally would be taken by middle-income, 126 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 127 17 DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND STRATEGIES already high-trading economies. The represent at least an extra US$7 billion need for additional development assis- in that year. For its part, the United tance is estimated by various interna- States pledged to begin increasing its tional agencies to be in the range of allocations for development assistance so US$40-60 billion a year, which would as to bring the increase up to US$5 bil- mean practically doubling the existing lion a year by 2006. Australia, Canada, levels of assistance. Is it realistic to Norway, and Switzerland also made new Which roles expect such an increase? commitments on aid. Overall, these ini- in national tiatives are expected to raise official development The International Conference on development assistance by about US$15 Financing for Development (Monterrey, billion by 2006 and from 0.22 percent should the Mexico, March 2002) appears to have of donor countries' GDP to 0.26 per- government play? marked a turning point in the way the cent (see Chapter 13). These new com- How can the main donor countries view the role of mitments were welcomed by all the government development assistance. As expressed by development stakeholders, even though World Bank President James it is widely understood that much more catalyze national Wolfensohn, in 2002 an "imaginary needs to be done to ensure the achieve- development? wall" that has long separated the rich ment of the Millennium Development world from the poor came crashing Goals. More efforts will be needed from down, and it became clear that there are both donor countries and developing not two worlds, but one. "We are linked countries themselves. by trade, investment, finance, by travel and communication, by disease, by crime, by migration, by environmental The Role of National degradation, by drugs, by financial crisis, Development Policies and by terror." Thus development assis- tance should be provided not because it The governments of developing coun- is ethically right, not as charity, but in tries are the most important actors in the order to build a better and safer world development process, and no amount of for all of us, our children, and our foreign aid can be effective in a country grandchildren. where the government is corrupt (see Chapter 16) or fails to implement good Notably, in preparation for the policies enabling national economies to Monterrey Conference, the European grow. However, even governments truly Union countries committed themselves seeking to accelerate their countries' to raising their official development development face a lot of difficult assistance to the average level of 0.39 choices, if only because they have to percent of GDP by 2006, which will operate with limited resources. While 127 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 128 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH development is by its nature a compre- were comprehensive enough to stand for hensive process of change, governments sustainable development strategies. But must, nevertheless, identify and focus on in some others, social policies aimed at a few areas where their limited action poverty reduction were formulated with- can make the biggest difference. In addi- out adequate consideration of economic tion to making up for multiple market and environmental policies, even though Does your country failures (see Chapter 11), including the poor were known to be badly hurt have a national those in the area of environmental pro- by environmental losses. At the same tection, government can also play an time, policies for agricultural and indus- sustainable important role in coordinating the trial development in many cases have development involvement of all development failed to take into account poverty strategy? If so, agents--private firms, public agencies, reduction and environmental protection what are its and civic associations--within the priorities. Agenda 21 and the framework of a national sustainable Millennium Development Goals are main goals? development strategy. Government can meant to help developing countries' gov- help different segments of society arrive ernments to formulate their specific at a common vision of the country's national development strategies in a medium-term and long-term future, comprehensive manner, with due regard build broad national consensus on ways for complex interactions among all the of making this vision a reality, and aspects of sustainable development. enable all the development agents to act in accordance with their social responsi- Note that the roles of the government bilities. Formulating comprehensive and the private sector in implementing national development priorities and the national development strategy can- coordinating their achievement is a cru- not be the same in all countries. They cial task that can never be entrusted to depend on the maturity and capabilities the private sector or to any foreign aid of the country's private sector, on the providers. one hand, and on the organizational and financial capabilities of the government, Note that in early 2002 around 50 on the other. But there are certain areas countries reported to the World Summit where government involvement is indis- on Sustainable Development pensable: providing for universal basic (Johannesburg, South Africa) that they health care and primary education, pro- had already adopted or were developing tecting the economically vulnerable, cre- national sustainable development strate- ating and maintaining an effective legal gies, integrating economic, social, and system with strong law enforcement and environmental goals. In some cases, independent, well-functioning courts. national poverty reduction strategies Supporting the preservation and devel- 128 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 129 17 DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND STRATEGIES opment of national culture is another Difficult Choices important role for government, particu- larly where the private sector and civic Every country faces many choices in deal- associations are weak. Cultural values ing with its development issues. These can serve as a strong cohesive force when choices are made daily in more or less other forces are being weakened by war coordinated and more or less democratic or by rapid social change. Cultural ways, with a longer- or shorter-term per- development is not a luxury, but a way spective in mind. They entail big risks or to strengthen social capital and thus one big benefits for entire nations, but there of the keys to successful development. is a lot of uncertainty in every choice. Learning from historical experience, In the economic sphere, the government national as well as global, may be the best is indispensable in promoting and safe- way to minimize this uncertainty. The guarding market competition in the pri- author of this book hopes that it will help vate sector. The government can also you start thinking about your country's play an important role in improving development in a global context--com- public access to the information and paring countries and searching for useful knowledge needed for development-- lessons of development experience from for example, by supporting modern around the world--and looking forward means of communication (telephones, to what can realistically be achieved in faxes, Internet), investing in basic 10, 20, or 50 years. research, and creating a favorable envi- ronment for independent media and The author also hopes that this book civic associations. will encourage you to play an active role in your country's development efforts, Some government roles are still highly including discussions on the vision for debatable, however. For example, it is its future and on its unique path of not clear to what extent governments development. Your attitude--active or should support and protect from foreign passive, optimistic or pessimistic--is competition those industries identified part of your country's social capital, too. as areas of a country's comparative The Rio Declaration adopted by the advantage (see Chapter 12). Nor is it Earth Summit specifically pointed out clear if there is any universal optimal that the "creativity, ideals, and courage level of redistribution of incomes of the youth of the world should be through the government budget--via mobilized to forge a global partnership taxation and various social programs-- in order to achieve sustainable develop- in the interests of social equity (see ment and ensure a better future for all." Chapter 5). You can in fact make a real difference by 129 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 130 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH developing informed opinions and mak- these policies bring about do not contra- ing them known to other people, by dict most people's values and sense of influencing the course of public debates fairness can the ongoing process of and eventually the choice of government change be broadly acknowledged as policies. The experience of many coun- development. That is why your partici- tries shows that policies can be sustained pation, and that of your peers, in shap- over the long term only if they are ing and implementing a national understood and supported by most of development strategy is so important for the population. Only if the changes that your country's future success. 130 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 131 Glossary Absolute advantage. An advantage that Age dependency ratio. The ratio of the a country has in producing certain goods nonworking population--people under or services relative to all or many other 15 or over 65-to the working popula- countries due to specific factors of pro- tion--people 15-64. In 1996 the average duction at its disposal--such as rich ratio for low-income countries was 0.7, farmland and a favorable climate for for middle-income countries 0.6, and agricultural production or a highly edu- for high-income countries 0.5. cated labor force for high-tech manufac- turing. A country's absolute advantage Agriculture. The sector of an economy means that it can produce certain goods that includes crop production, animal or services at a lower cost than would be husbandry, hunting, fishing, and possible for other countries. Thus it is forestry. clearly beneficial for this country to spe- cialize in producing and exporting these Birth rate. The number of live births in goods and services. But even countries a year expressed as a percentage of the that do not have any absolute advantages population or per 1,000 people. can benefit from international trade; see comparative advantage. Capital (capital assets). A stock of wealth used to produce goods and Access to safe water. The percentage of services. Modern economists divide the population with reasonable means of capital into physical capital (also called getting safe water--either treated surface produced assets), natural capital, and water or clean untreated water from human capital. springs, wells, or protected boreholes. Carbon dioxide emissions per capita. Accumulation of capital. Using invest- The amount of carbon dioxide a country ment to build capital assets. releases into the atmosphere during a certain period--usually one year-- Adult illiteracy. The percentage of the divided by the total population of that population 15 and older who cannot, country. Large amounts of carbon diox- with understanding, read and write a ide are released when people burn fossil simple statement about their everyday fuels and biomass--fuelwood, charcoal, life. dung--to produce energy. 131 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 132 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Child mortality rate (under-five mor- no absolute advantages whatsoever. This tality rate). The probability that a new- can be done by correctly choosing the born baby will die before reaching age country's international specialization in five. Expressed as a number per 1,000 accordance with its comparative advan- live births. tages. In this case, by using export earn- ings to import other goods and service at Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). prices that are lower than the costs of Inexpensive synthetic gases often used as their domestic production, the country coolants in refrigerators and air condi- will maximize the overall value of tioners and as propellants in aerosol national production and consumption. spray cans. Although originally consid- ered harmless, CFCs are now known to Countries with transition economies accumulate in the earth's atmosphere, (transition countries, transition where they destroy the protective ozone economies). Countries moving from layer and trap the sun's heat--contribut- centrally planned to market-oriented ing to the greenhouse effect (see green- economies. These countries--which house gases). The use of CFCs is now include China, Mongolia, Vietnam, for- controlled by the Montreal Protocol, an mer republics of the Soviet Union, and agreement signed by many countries. the countries of Central and Eastern Europe--contain about one-third of the Comparative advantage. The concept, world's population. formulated by British economist David Ricardo, according to which economic Death rate. The number of deaths in a agents--people, firms, countries--are year expressed as a percentage of the most efficient when they do the things population or per 1,000 people. that they are best at doing. Comparative advantage is particularly important in Demography. The scientific study of global markets, where countries benefit human populations, including their size, most by producing and exporting goods composition, distribution, density, and and services that they can produce more growth as well as the causes and socio- efficiently (at a lower cost, by using less economic consequences of changes in physical, human, and natural capital) than these factors. other goods and services. In particular, Ricardo showed that a country can bene- Developed countries (industrial coun- fit from international trade even if it has tries, industrially advanced countries). higher costs of production for all traded High-income countries, in which most peo- goods and services relative to the coun- ple have a high standard of living. tries it trades with--that is, even if it has Sometimes also defined as countries with a 132 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 133 GLOSSARY large stock of physical capital, in which cal and social progress. The main indica- most people undertake highly specialized tor of economic development is increas- activities. According to the World Bank ing GNP per capita (or GDP per classification, these include all high- capita), reflecting an increase in the eco- income economies except Hong Kong nomic productivity and average material (China), Israel, Kuwait, Singapore, and the wellbeing of a country's population. United Arab Emirates. Depending on who Economic development is closely linked defines them, developed countries may with economic growth. also include middle-income countries with transition economies, because these coun- Economic growth. Quantitative change tries are highly industrialized. Developed or expansion in a country's economy. countries contain about 15 percent of the Economic growth is conventionally mea- world's population. They are also some- sured as the percentage increase in gross times referred to as "the North." domestic product (GDP) or gross national product (GNP) during one year. Developing countries. According to the Economic growth comes in two forms: World Bank classification, countries with an economy can either grow "exten- low or middle levels of GNP per capita as sively" by using more resources (such as well as five high-income developing physical, human, or natural capital) or economies--Hong Kong (China), Israel, "intensively" by using the same amount Kuwait, Singapore, and the United Arab of resources more efficiently (produc- Emirates. These five economies are clas- tively). When economic growth is sified as developing despite their high achieved by using more labor, it does not per capita income because of their eco- result in per capita income growth (see nomic structure or the official opinion Chapter 4). But when economic growth of their governments. Several countries is achieved through more productive use with transition economies are sometimes of all resources, including labor, it results grouped with developing countries based in higher per capita income and on their low or middle levels of per improvement in people's average stan- capita income, and sometimes with dard of living. Intensive economic developed countries based on their high growth requires economic development. industrialization. More than 80 percent of the world's population lives in the Ecosphere. The surface zone of the Earth more than 100 developing countries. and its adjacent atmosphere in which all living organisms exist in interaction with Economic development. Qualitative other living organisms and their non-liv- change and restructuring in a country's ing environment (temperature, water, economy in connection with technologi- light, oxygen, carbon dioxide, and so on). 133 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 134 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Humans' survival as biological species does not compensate the negatively depends on ecoshperical "services"--such affected local residents. Positive externali- as climate stabilization or pollution ties can be produced through primary absorption. education--which benefits not only pri- mary students but also society at large. Efficiency (economic). See productivity. Governments can reduce negative exter- nalities by regulating and taxing goods Energy use per capita. The amount of with negative externalities. Governments energy a country consumes in a certain can increase positive externalities by sub- period--usually one year--divided by sidizing goods with positive externalities the population of that country. This or by directly providing those goods. includes fossil fuels burned by machines (such as cars), as well as electricity gener- Fertility rate. The average number of ated from nuclear power, geothermal children a woman will have during her power, hydropower, and fossil fuels. No lifetime, by country or region. Between matter what its source, energy use per 1980 and 1995 the average fertility rate capita is measured in equivalent in low-income countries and middle- amounts of oil. Though substantial in income countries fell from 4.1 to 3.1, some developing countries, energy from while in high-income countries it fell from biomass--fuelwood, charcoal, dung-- 1.9 to 1.7. not considered in this statistic because reliable data are not available. Foreign direct investment. Foreign investment that establishes a lasting European Union (EU). A regional inter- interest in or effective management con- national organization with most devel- trol over an enterprise. Foreign direct oped countries of Europe among its investment can include buying shares of members. In 1995 it succeeded the an enterprise in another country, rein- European Economic Community (EEC), vesting earnings of a foreign-owned established in 1957 to promote economic enterprise in the country where it is integration among its member countries. located, and parent firms extending loans to their foreign affiliates. Externalities. Effects of a person's or International Monetary Fund (IMF) firm's activities on others which are not guidelines consider an investment to be a compensated. Externalities can either foreign direct investment if it accounts hurt or benefit others--they can be nega- for at least 10 percent of the foreign tive or positive. One negative externality firm's voting stock of shares. However, in arises when a company pollutes the local many countries 10 percent is not environment to produce its goods and enough to establish effective manage- 134 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 135 GLOSSARY ment control of a company or demon- negotiations. Issues discussed during the strate an investor's lasting interest. last round of GATT negotiations, in Uruguay (1986­94), included reducing Foreign investment. Investment in an government restrictions on foreign enterprise that operates outside the investment and on trade in services such investor's country. See also foreign direct as banking, insurance, transport, investment and portfolio investment. tourism, and telecommunications. In 1995 GATT was succeeded by the Fossil fuels. Coal, natural gas, and World Trade Organization (WTO). petroleum products (such as oil) formed from the decayed bodies of animals and GNP. See gross national product. plants that died millions of years ago. A nonrenewable source of energy. GNP per capita. A country's gross national product (GNP) divided by its Free trade. International trade, which is population. Shows the income each per- neither restricted nor encouraged by direct son would have if GNP were divided government intervention. In principle, equally. Also called income per capita. economists consider free trade to be desir- GNP per capita is a useful measure of eco- able for maximizing overall economic effi- nomic productivity, but by itself it does not ciency. However in reality international measure people's well-being or a country's trade is usually heavily influenced by success in development. It does not show import tariffs, import quotas, and export how equally or unequally a country's subsidies (see Chapter 12). Free-trade income is distributed among its citizens. It agreements between two countries and does not reflect damage made by produc- free-trade areas including several countries tion processes to natural resources and the are often used to remove or reduce such environment. It does not take into tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. account any unpaid work done within households or communities or production GDP. See gross domestic product. taking place in the gray (shadow) economy. It attributes value to anything being pro- General Agreement on Tariffs and duced whether it harms or contributes to Trade (GATT). From 1947 until 1995, general welfare (for example, medicines an international organization with a and chemical weapons). And it ignores the mandate to reduce protection and pro- value of such elements of people's well- mote free trade among nations. Many being as leisure or freedom. barriers to trade--import tariffs, import quotas,, and others--were reduced dur- Gray economy (shadow economy). ing its eight rounds of international Consists of business activities that are 135 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 136 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH not accounted for by official statistics. It Gross domestic saving rate. Gross includes illegal activities (or the so-called domestic product (GDP) minus con- black market) and activities that are in sumption by government and the private themselves legal but go unreported or sector, expressed as a percentage of GDP. under-reported for purposes of tax A high gross domestic saving rate usually evasion. indicates a country's high potential to invest. See also savings and investment. Greenhouse gases. Gases that trap the sun's heat within the earth's atmosphere, Gross enrollment ratio. The number of creating a greenhouse effect that may students enrolled at a certain level of edu- dangerously raise temperatures around cation as a percentage of the population of the globe. Greenhouse gases include car- the age group that officially corresponds bon dioxide, ozone, methane, water to that level. Can be above 100 percent if vapor, nitrousoxide, and chlorofluorocar- some enrolled students are older or bons (CFCs). younger than the age group that officially corresponds to that level of education. Gross domestic investment rate. All the outlays made to replace and increase Gross national product (GNP). The a country's physical capital, plus changes value of all final goods and services pro- in inventories of goods, expressed as a duced in a country in one year (gross percentage of GDP. Gross domestic domestic product) plus income that res- investment, along with foreign direct idents have received from abroad, minus investment, is critical for economic growth income claimed by nonresidents. GNP and economic development. may be much less than GDP if much of the income from a country's production Gross domestic product (GDP). The flows to foreign persons or firms. But if value of all final goods and services pro- the people or firms of a country hold duced in a country in one year (see also large amounts of the stocks and bonds gross national product). GDP can be mea- of firms or governments of other coun- sured by adding up all of an economy's tries, and receive income from them, incomes--wages, interest, profits, and GNP may be greater than GDP. For rents--or expenditures--consumption, most countries, however, these statistical investment, government purchases, and indicators differ insignificantly (see net exports (exports minus imports). Both Chapter 2). "Gross" indicates that the results should be the same because one value lost through the "wear and tear" person's expenditure is always another per- of capital used in production is not son's income, so the sum of all incomes deducted from the value of total output. must equal the sum of all expenditures. If it were deducted, we would have a 136 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 137 GLOSSARY measure called net domestic product ernments. In 1995 this group included (NDP), also known as national Hong Kong (China), Israel, Kuwait, income. The words "product" and Singapore, and the United Arab "income" are often used interchange- Emirates. ably, so GNP per capita is also called income per capita. Human capital. People's innate abilities and talents plus their knowledge, skills, Gross primary school enrollment and experience that make them econom- ratio. The ratio of primary school ically productive. Human capital can be enrollment to the number of primary increased by investing in health care, school-aged children (usually children 6- education, and job training. 11). The gross secondary school enrollment ratio is calculated in the Human development index (HDI). A same way, except that the corresponding composite of several social indicators age group is 12-17. For the gross ter- that is useful for broad cross-country tiary education enrollment ratio, cal- comparisons even though it yields little culations are based on the number of specific information about each country. young people in the five-year age group First used in the United Nations following the secondary school leaving Development Programme's Human age. Gross enrollment ratios can be Development Report 1990. higher than 100 percent because some students are younger or older than the Human resources. The total quantity corresponding age group. and quality of human effort available to produce goods and services. The muscle High-income countries. Classified by power and brain power of human the World Bank as countries whose GNP beings. Human resources can be viewed per capita was $9,266 or more in 1999. as consisting of "raw labor"--deter- The group includes both developed coun- mined mostly by the number of people tries and high-income developing in a country's labor force--combined economies. with human capital. High-income developing economies. Import quotas. Government-imposed Economies that the United Nations clas- limits on the quantities of certain goods sifies as developing even though their per and services allowed to be imported. Like capita incomes would place them with import tariffs, import quotas are used by developed countries. This classification governments to protect domestic indus- may be based on their economic struc- tries from foreign competition. See pro- ture or the official opinion of their gov- tection. 137 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 138 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Import tariffs. Taxes imposed on certain International poverty line. An income imported goods or services. May be level established by the World Bank to levied as a percentage of the value of determine which people in the world are imports or as a fixed amount per unit. poor--set at $1 a day per person in 1985 Used to increase government revenue international purchasing power parity and protect domestic industries from (PPP) prices (equivalent to $1.08 in 1993 foreign competition. See protection. PPP prices). A person is considered poor if he or she lives in a household whose Income per capita. Another term for daily income or consumption is less than GNP per capita. $1 per person. Although this poverty line is useful for international comparisons, it Industrial countries. See developed is impossible to create an indicator of countries. poverty that is strictly comparable across countries. The level of $1 a day per per- Industrialization. The phase of a coun- son is close to national poverty lines in try's economic development in which low-income countries but considerably industry grows faster than agriculture and lower than those in high-income countries. gradually comes to play the leading role For comparing poverty levels across mid- in the economy. dle-income countries, international poverty lines of $2, $4, and $11 a day per person Industry. The sector of an economy that are considered to be more appropriate. includes mining, construction, manufac- turing, electricity, gas, and water. Investment. Outlays made by individu- als, firms, or governments to add to their Infant mortality rate. Of every 1,000 capital. From the viewpoint of individ- infants born, the number that die before ual economic agents, buying property reaching their first birthday. rights for existing capital is also an investment. But from the viewpoint of International Monetary Fund (IMF). an economy as a whole, only creating An international institution founded in new capital is counted as an investment. 1944--together with the World Bank-- Investment is a necessary condition for to promote international monetary economic growth. See savings, gross domes- cooperation and facilitate balanced tic saving rate, and gross domestic invest- growth of trade by encouraging the ment rate. removal of foreign exchange restrictions, promoting exchange rate stability, and Labor force. All the economically active expediting payments among member people in a country between 15 and 65. countries. Includes all employed persons, the 138 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 139 GLOSSARY unemployed, and members of the armed not produce enough public goods and services, but excludes students and goods with positive externalities, when it unpaid caregivers such as homemakers. produces too many goods with negative externalities, when goods are overpriced Least developed countries. Low-income by natural monopolies, and when market countries where, according to the United agents do not have access to sufficient Nations, economic growth faces long- information, such as information about term impediments--such as low human the quality of some consumer goods. resources development. A category used These market failures usually justify eco- to guide donors and countries in allocat- nomic intervention by the government. ing foreign assistance. But there is always the risk of govern- ment failure--in which faulty political Life expectancy at birth. The number of processes or institutional structures pre- years a newborn baby would live if, at vent government measures from improv- each age he/she passes through, the ing social welfare (see Chapter 11). chances of survival were the same as they were for that age group in the year of Maternal mortality rate. The annual his/her birth. The change in this indicator number of women who die from preg- reflects changes in the overall health of a nancy-related causes during pregnancy country's population, in people's living and childbirth, per 100,000 live births. conditions (environmental, economic, The data are particularly difficult to col- social) and in the quality of health care. lect, so expert estimates based on avail- able data are often used instead. Living standard. See standard of living. Market liberalization. Removing and Low-income countries. Classified by abstaining from using state controls that the World Bank as countries whose GNP impede the normal functioning of a per capita was $755 or less in 1999. market economy--for example, lifting price and wage controls and import quo- Manufactured goods. Goods produced tas or lowering taxes and import tariffs. using primary goods. Include petroleum, Market liberalization usually does not steel, textiles, baked goods, and others. mean that a government completely abstains from interfering with market Market failures. Cases when a market processes. economy fails to provide people with a desirable supply of certain kinds of Middle-income countries. Classified by goods and services. Market failures can the World Bank as countries whose GNP occur in a market economy when it does per capita was between $756 and $9,265 139 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 140 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH in 1999. These countries are further picturesque landscapes). See also divided into lower-middle-income coun- ecosphere. tries ($756­$2,995) and upper-middle- income countries ($2,996­$$9,265). Net official assistance. The sum of grants and concessional loans from Natural capital. A stock of natural donor country governments to recipient resources--such as land, water, and min- countries, minus any repayment of loan erals--used for production. Can be principal during the period of the loans. either renewable or nonrenewable. Net private flows. Privately financed Natural monopoly. A situation that capital flows that enter a country on occurs when one firm in an industry can market terms, minus such flows that serve the entire market at a lower cost leave the country. An example of a net than would be possible if the industry private flow is net portfolio invest- were composed of many smaller firms. ment--the value of stocks and bonds Gas and water utilities are two classic bought by foreign investors minus the examples of natural monopolies. These value of stocks and bonds sold by them. monopolies must not be left to operate See also portfolio investment. freely; if they are, they can increase prices and profits by restricting their Nominal indicator. An indicator mea- output. Governments prevent such a sured using the prices prevailing at the scenario by regulating utility monopolies time of measurement. A change in a or providing utility services themselves. nominal indicator sometimes reflects changing market prices more than any Natural population increase. The dif- other changes (changes in the real indi- ference between the birth rate and the cator). For example, during periods of death rate over a period of time. See also inflation, nominal wages can increase population growth rate. while their real value decreases. In mak- ing cross-country comparisons, this Natural resources. All "gifts of term also applies to the conversion of nature"--air, land, water, forests, indicators calculated in local currency wildlife, topsoil, minerals--used by peo- units into some common currency, most ple for production or for direct con- often US dollars. Nominal indicators sumption. Can be either renewable or are those converted into US dollars nonrenewable. Natural resources include using current exchange rates, while real natural capital plus those gifts of nature indicators are calculated based on pur- that cannot be stocked (such as sunlight) chasing power parity (PPP) conversion or cannot be used in production (such as factors. 140 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 141 GLOSSARY Nonrenewable natural resources. period--usually one year--expressed as a Natural resources that cannot be replaced percentage of the population when the or replenished. See renewable natural period began. The population growth resources. rate is the sum of the difference between the birth rate and the death rate--the Organisation for Economic natural population increase--and the dif- Cooperation and Development ference between the population entering (OECD). An organization that coordi- and leaving the country--the net migra- nates policy mostly among developed tion rate. countries. OECD member countries exchange economic data and create uni- Portfolio investment. Stock and bond fied policies to maximize their countries' purchases that, unlike direct investment, economic growth and help nonmember do not create a lasting interest in or countries develop more rapidly. The effective management control over an OECD arose from the Organisation for enterprise. See foreign direct investment. European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which was created in 1948 to Postindustrialization. The phase in a administer the Marshall Plan in Europe. country's economic development that fol- In 1960, when the Marshall Plan was lows industrialization and is character- completed, Canada, Spain, and the ized by the leading role of service sector United States joined OEEC members to in the national economy. form the OECD. Poverty line (national). The income Ozone. A gas that pollutes the air at low level below which people are defined as altitudes, but that high in the atmos- poor. The definition is based on the phere forms a thin shield protecting life income level people require to buy life's on earth from harmful solar radiation. basic necessities--food, clothing, hous- Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) destroy this ing--and satisfy their most important high-level ozone layer. sociocultural needs. The poverty line changes over time and varies by country. Physical capital (produced assets). Also called subsistence minimum. Official Buildings, machines, and technical national poverty line is determined by a equipment used in production plus country's government. See also interna- inventories of raw materials, half-fin- tional poverty line. ished goods, and finished goods. Primary goods. Goods that are sold (for Population growth rate. The increase in consumption or production) just as they a country's population during a certain were found in nature. Include oil, coal, 141 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 142 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH iron, and agricultural products like wheat countries through negotiations or cotton. Also called commodities. under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Produced assets. See physical capital. Public goods. Goods that are nonri- Production resources. The main inputs val--consumption by one person does for any production. Traditionally, econo- not reduce the supply available for oth- mists identified three factors of produc- ers--and nonexcludable--people cannot tion: labor, land, and capital. More be prevented from consuming them. recently, economists came to use the These characteristics make it impossible concept of three types of capital: physical to charge consumers for public goods, so (or produced) capital, human capital, and the private sector is not interested in natural capital. supplying them. Instead, they are often supplied by government. Public goods Productivity (economic productivity, are usually national or local. Defense is a efficiency). Output of goods and services national public good--benefiting the per unit of input--for example, per unit entire population of a country. Rural of labor (labor productivity), per unit of roads are local public goods, benefiting a energy (such as GNP per unit of energy smaller group of people. There can also use), or per unit of all production be global public goods, benefiting most resources combined (see Chapter 2). of the world's population, for example global peace and security, or information Protection, protectionism. The impo- needed to prevent global climate change. sition of import tariffs, import quotas, Providing such goods (and services) is a or other barriers that restrict the flow function of international organizations. of imports. The opposite of free trade. Used to: Purchasing power parity (PPP) con- version factor. The PPP conversion fac- · Protect "strategically important" tor shows how much of a country's industries, without which a country currency is needed in that country to would be vulnerable in times of war. buy what $1 would buy in the United · Protect new industries until they are States. By using the PPP conversion fac- strong enough to compete in inter- tor instead of the currency exchange national markets. rate, we can convert a country's GNP · Retaliate against protectionist poli- per capita calculated in national cur- cies of trade partners. Since World rency units into GNP per capita in U.S. War II protectionist policies have dollars while taking into account the dif- been significantly reduced in most ference in domestic prices for the same 142 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 143 GLOSSARY goods. Thus PPP helps us compare action. Fish and forests are renewable GNPs of different countries more accu- natural resources. Minerals and fossil rately. Because prices are usually lower in fuels are nonrenewable natural resources developing countries, their GNP per because they are regenerated on a geo- capita expressed in PPP dollars is higher logical, rather than human, time scale. than their GNP per capita expressed in Some aspects of the environment--soil U.S. dollars. In developed countries the quality, assimilative capacity, ecological opposite is true (see Chapter 2). support systems--are called semirenew- able because they are regenerated very Quality of life. People's overall well- slowly on a human time scale. being. Quality of life is difficult to mea- sure (whether for an individual, group, Savings. Income not used for current or nation) because in addition to mater- consumption. See also gross domestic sav- ial well-being (see standard of living) it ing rate and gross domestic investment rate. includes such intangible components as the quality of the environment, national Services. Intangible goods that are often security, personal safety, and political produced and consumed at the same and economic freedoms. time. An example is education: students consume a lesson--an educational ser- Real indicator (price, income, other). vice--at the same time a teacher pro- An economic indicator that uses the duces it. The service sector of the prices from some base year. This economy includes hotels, restaurants, approach controls for fluctuating market and wholesale and retail trade; transport, prices so that other economic changes can storage, and communications; financing, be seen more clearly. In cross-country insurance, real estate, and business ser- comparisons, this term also applies to the vices; community and social services conversion of indicators calculated in (such as education and health care); and local currency units into some common personal services. currency, most often US dollars. Real indicators are calculated with the help of Shadow economy. See gray economy. purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion factors, while nominal indicators are those Standard of living. The level of well- converted into US dollars using current being (of an individual, group or the exchange rates. population of a country) as measured by the level of income (for example, GNP Renewable natural resources. Natural per capita) or by the quantity of various resources that can be replaced or replen- goods and services consumed (for exam- ished by natural processes or human ple, the number of cars per 1,000 people 143 BEG_i-144.qxd 6/10/04 1:47 PM Page 144 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH or the number of television sets per pensions, welfare, and unemployment capita). See also quality of life. benefits. Subsistence minimum. Another term Transition countries. See countries with for poverty line. transition economies. Sustainable development. According Under-five mortality rate. See child to the United Nations World mortality rate. Commission on Environment and Development (1987), sustainable devel- Undernourished people. People opment is "development that meets the whose food intake is chronically insuffi- needs of the present without compro- cient to meet their minimum energy mising the ability of future generations requirements. to meet their own needs." According to the more operational (practice-oriented) World Bank. An international lending definition used by the World Bank, sus- institution that aims to reduce poverty tainable development is "a process of and improve people's lives by strengthen- managing a portfolio of assets to pre- ing economies and promoting sustain- serve and enhance the opportunities able development. Owned by the people face." Sustainable development governments of its 181 member coun- includes economic, environmental, and tries, the Bank lends about $20 billion a social sustainability, which can be year to development projects, provides achieved by rationally managing physi- technical assistance and policy advice, cal, natural, and human capital (see and acts as a catalyst for investment and Chapters 1 and 16). lending from other sources. The World Bank's poorest members receive loans for Terms of trade. The ratio of export up to 50 years without interest. Other prices to import prices. A high ratio ben- needy members receive loans for 15-20 efits an economy, because then the years at lower interest rates than are country can pay for many imports by charged by commercial banks. selling a small amount of exports. If terms of trade worsen, the country needs World Trade Organization (WTO). to sell more exports to buy the same An international organization estab- amount of imports. lished on January 1, 1995, to succeed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Transfer payments. Payments from the Trade (GATT). Serves as a forum for government to individuals used to redis- multilateral trade negotiations and helps tribute a country's wealth. Examples are resolve its members' trade disputes. 144 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 145 Annex 1 Classification of Countries BEG_145-205.qxd 146 Classification of Economies by Income and Region, 2000 Sub-Saharan Africa Europe and Central Asia 6/9/04 East and Asia Eastern Middle East Income Southern East Asia Europe and Rest of and North Africa group Subgroup Africa West Africa and Pacific South Asia Central Asia Europe Middle East North Africa Americas 4:47 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 PM Angola Benin Cambodia Afghanistan Armenia Yemen, Rep. Haiti Burundi Burkina Faso Indonesia Bangladesh Azerbaijan Nicaragua Page Comoros Cameroon Korea, Dem. Bhutan Georgia Congo, Dem. Central African Rep. India Kyrgyz Rep. 146 Rep. Rep. Lao PDR Nepal Moldova Eritrea Chad Mongolia Pakistan Tajikistan Ethiopia Congo, Rep. Myanmar Turkmenistan Kenya Côte d'Ivoire Solomon Ukraine Lesotho Gambia, The Islands Uzbekistan Madagascar Ghana Vietnam Low- Malawi Guinea income Mozambique Guinea- Rwanda Bissau Somalia Liberia Sudan Mali Tanzania Mauritania Uganda Niger Zambia Nigeria Zimbabwe Săo Tomé and Principe Senegal Sierra Leone Togo Namibia Cape Verde China Maldives Albania Turkey Iran, Islamic Algeria Belize Swaziland Equatorial Fiji Sri Lanka Belarus Rep. Djibouti Bolivia Guinea Kiribati Bosnia and Iraq Egypt, Arab Colombia Marshall Herzegovina Jordan Rep. Costa Rica Islands Bulgaria Syrian Arab Morocco Cuba Micronesia, Kazakhstan Rep. Tunisia Dominican Fed. Sts. Latvia West Bank Republic Papua New Lithuania and Gaza Ecuador Guinea Macedonia, El Salvador Middle- Lower Philippines FYRa Guatemala income Samoa Romania Guyana Thailand Russian Honduras Tonga Federation Jamaica Vanuatu Yugoslavia, Paraguay Fed. Rep.b Peru St. Vincent and the Grenadines Suriname BEG_145-205.qxd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Botswana Gabon American Croatia Isle of Man Bahrain Libya Antigua and Mauritius Samoa Czech Rep. Lebanon Malta Barbuda Mayotte Korea, Rep. Estonia Oman Argentina 6/9/04 Seychelles Malaysia Hungary Saudi Barbados South Africa Palau Poland Arabia Brazil Slovak Rep. Chile Dominica 4:47 Grenada Middle- Upper Mexico PM income Panama Page Puerto Rico St. Kitts and Nevis 147 St. Lucia Trinidad and Tobago Uruguay Venezuela, RB Australia Austria Canada Japan Belgium United States New Zealand Denmark Finland Francec Germany Greece Iceland Ireland OECD Italy countries Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Portugal Spain Sweden High- Switzerland income United Kingdom Brunei Slovenia Andorra Israel Aruba French Channel Kuwait Bahamas, The Polynesia Islands Qatar Bermuda Guam Cyprus United Arab Cayman Non- Hong Kong, Faeroe Emirates Islands OECD Chinad Islands Netherlands countries Macao, Greenland Antilles Chinae Liechtenstein Virgin New Monaco Islands (U.S.) Caledonia N. Mariana Islands Singapore Taiwan, China Total 207 25 23 35 8 27 27 14 7 41 147 a. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. b. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro). c. The French overseas departments French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Réunion are included in France. d. On 1 July 1997 China resumed its exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong. e. On 20 December 1999 China resumed it exercise of sovereignty over Macao. BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 148 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 149 Annex 2 Data Tables BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 150 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 1. Indicators to chapters 1­5 Gross domestic Average annual product GDP growth Population Fertility rate Birth rate $ millions % millions births per woman per 1,000 people COUNTRY or REGION 1990 1999 1980-90 1990-99 1980 1999 1980 1999 1980 1999 Afghanistan .. .. .. .. 15.95 23.48 7.0 6.7 50 47 Albania 2,102 3,058 1.5 2.3 2.67 3.40 3.6 2.4 29 16 Algeria 61,902 47,015 2.7 1.6 18.67 30.50 6.7 3.4 42 25 American Samoa .. .. .. .. 0.03 0.06 .. .. .. .. Andorra .. .. .. .. .. 0.07 .. .. .. .. Angola 10,260 5,861 3.4 0.8 7.02 12.40 6.9 6.7 34 48 Antigua and Barbuda .. .. 0.06 0.07 2.1 1.7 17 20 Argentina 141,352 281,942 -0.7 4.9 28.11 36.60 3.3 2.5 24 19 Armenia 4,124 1,911 .. -3.1 3.10 3.80 2.3 1.3 23 11 Aruba .. .. .. .. .. 0.09 .. .. .. .. Australia 297,204 389,691 3.4 3.8 14.69 18.05 1.9 1.8 15 13 Austria 159,499 208,949 2.2 2.0 7.55 8.10 1.6 1.3 12 10 Azerbaijan 9,837 4,457 .. -9.0 6.17 8.00 3.2 2.0 25 15 Bahamas, The .. .. .. . 0.21 0.30 3.3 2.2 24 19 Bahrain .. .. .. .. 0.33 0.58 5.2 .. 34 20 Bangladesh 29,855 45,779 4.3 4.8 86.70 127.70 6.1 3.2 44 28 Barbados .. .. .. .. 0.25 0.27 2.0 1.8 17 1 Belarus 34,911 25,693 .. -4.3 9.64 10.02 2.0 1.3 16 9 Belgium 196,134 245,706 1.9 1.7 9.85 10.02 1.7 1.6 13 11 Belize .. .. .. .. 0.15 0.25 .. .. .. 30 Benin 1,845 2,402 2.5 4.7 3.46 6.10 7.0 5.6 49 40 Bermuda .. .. .. .. 0.05 0.06 .. .. .. .. Bhutan .. .. .. .. 0.49 0.78 .. 5.7 .. 38 Bolivia 4,868 8,516 -0.2 4.2 5.36 8.10 5.5 4.0 39 32 Bosnia and Herzegovina .. .. .. .. 4.09 3.88 2.1 1.6 19 13 Botswana 3,766 5,996 10.3 4.3 0.90 1.60 6.1 4.1 45 33 Brazil 464,989 760,345 2.7 2.9 121.70 168.10 3.9 2.2 31 20 Brunei .. .. .. .. 0.19 0.32 4.0 2.7 31 21 Bulgaria 20,726 12,103 3.4 -2.7 8.86 8.20 2.0 1.1 15 8 Burkina Faso 2,765 2,643 3.6 3.8 6.96 11.00 7.5 6.6 47 44 Burundi 1,132 701 4.4 -2.9 4.13 6.70 6.8 6.1 46 41 Cambodia 1,115 3,117 .. 4.8 6.80 11.80 4.7 4.4 40 32 Cameroon 11,152 8,781 3.4 1.3 8.70 14.70 6.4 4.9 45 38 Canada 572,673 612,049 3.3 2.3 24.59 30.60 1.7 1.5 15 11 Cape Verde .. .. .. .. 0.29 0.43 6.5 3.8 37 36 Cayman Islands .. .. .. .. .. 0.04 .. .. .. . Central African Republic 1,488 1,053 1.4 1.8 2.31 3.50 5.8 4.7 43 36 Chad 1,739 1,574 6.1 2.3 4.48 7.50 6.9 6.3 44 45 Channel Islands .. .. .. .. 0.13 0.15 1.4 1.8 12 11 Chile 30,307 71,092 4.2 7.2 11.14 15.00 2.8 2.2 23 18 China 354,644 991,203 10.1 10.7 981.24 1,249.70 2.5 1.9 18 16 Hong Kong, China 74,784 158,611 6.9 3.9 5.04 6.90 2.0 1.0 17 8 Macao, China .. .. .. .. 0.29 0.47 2.3 1.4 20 10 Colombia 46,907 88,596 3.6 3.3 27.89 41.50 3.9 2.7 31 23 Comoros .. .. .. .. 0.34 0.54 7.2 4.4 .. 34 Congo, Dom. Rep. 9,348 6,964 1.6 -5.1 27.01 49.80 6.6 6.2 48 45 Congo, Rep. 2,799 2,273 3.3 0.9 1.67 2.90 6.3 5.9 45 43 Costa Rica 5,713 11,076 3.0 4.1 2.28 3.60 3.6 2.5 31 21 Côte d'Ivoire 10,796 11,223 0.7 3.7 8.19 14.70 7.4 4.9 51 37 Croatia 13,370 21,752 .. -0.4 4.59 4.50 .. 1.5 .. 10 150 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 151 ANNEX 2 DATA TABLES: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 1­5 GDP per capita Average annual growth Death rate population growth GNP per capita average annual Gini index per 1,000 people % $ PPP $ real growth % 1980 1999 1980-99 1999-2015 1999 1999 1990-1999 Survey year 23 19 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 6 5 1.2 1.0 870 2,892 2.8 12 6 2.5 1.7 1,550 4,753 -0.5 1995 35.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 23 19 3.0 2.7 220 632 -2.8 .. .. 6 5 .. 1.0 .. .. 2.7 .. .. 9 8 1.4 1.0 7,600 11,324 3.6 .. .. 6 6 1.1 0.4 490 2,210 -3.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7 7 1.3 0.8 20,050 22,448 2.9 1994 35.2 12 10 0.4 -0.1 25,970 23,808 1.4 1987 23.1 7 6 1.4 0.9 550 2,322 -10.7 .. .. 7 5 .. .. .. .. -0.1 .. .. 6 3 .. .. .. .. 0.8 .. .. 18 9 2.0 1.6 370 1,475 3.1 1995-96 33.6 8 9 .. .. .. .. 1.5 .. .. 10 14 0.2 -0.4 2,630 6,518 -2.9 1998 21.7 12 10 0.2 0.0 24,510 24,200 1.4 1992 25.0 .. 5 .. .. 2,730 4,492 0.7 .. .. 19 13 3.0 2.4 380 886 1.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9 .. .. 510 1,496 3.4 .. .. 15 9 2.2 1.8 1,010 2,193 1.8 1990 42.0 7 7 -0.3 0.6 .. .. 32.7 .. .. 10 18 3.0 0.6 3,240 6,032 1.8 .. .. 9 7 1.7 1.1 4,420 6,317 1.5 1996 60.0 5 3 .. .. .. .. -0.5 .. .. 11 14 -0.4 -0.7 1,380 4,914 -2.1 1995 28.3 20 19 2.4 2.1 240 898 1.4 1994 48.2 18 20 2.5 1.7 120 553 -5.0 1992 33.3 27 12 2.9 1.4 260 1,286 1.9 1997 40.4 16 13 2.8 1.8 580 1,444 -1.5 .. .. 7 7 1.1 0.6 19,320 23,725 1.7 1994 31.5 11 6 .. .. 1,330 3,497 3.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 19 19 2.2 1.4 290 1,131 -0.3 1993 61.3 22 16 2.7 2.8 200 816 -0.9 .. .. 12 10 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7 5 1.6 1.0 4,740 8,370 5.6 1994 56.5 6 7 1.3 0.7 780 3,291 9.5 1998 40.3 5 5 1.5 0.7 23,520 20,939 1.9 .. .. 7 3 .. .. .. .. 0.7 .. .. 7 6 2.0 1.3 2,250 5,709 1.4 1996 57.1 .. 9 .. .. 350 1,360 -3.1 .. .. 16 15 3.2 2.6 .. .. -8.1 .. .. 16 16 2.8 2.6 670 897 -3.3 .. .. 4 4 2.4 1.3 2,740 5,770 3.0 1996 47.0 17 17 3.4 1.7 710 1,546 0.6 1995 36.7 .. 12 -0.1 -0.2 4,580 6,915 1.0 1998 26.8 151 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 152 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 1. Indicators to chapters 1­5 (continued) Gross domestic Average annual product GDP growth Population Fertility rate Birth rate $ millions % millions births per woman per 1,000 people COUNTRY or REGION 1990 1999 1980-90 1990-99 1980 1999 1980 1999 1980 1999 Cuba .. .. .. .. 9.72 11.15 2.0 1.6 14 13 Cyprus .. .. .. .. 0.61 0.76 2.5 1.9 20 13 Czech Republic 34,880 56,379 1.7 0.9 10.23 10.30 2.1 1.2 15 9 Denmark 133,361 174,363 2.3 2.8 5.12 5.30 1.5 1.8 11 12 Djibouti .. .. .. .. 0.28 0.65 6.6 5.2 48 37 Dominica .. .. .. .. 0.07 0.07 .. 1.9 25 20 Dominican Republic 7,074 17,125 3.1 5.7 5.70 8.40 4.2 2.8 33 24 Ecuador 10,686 18,712 2.0 2.2 7.96 12.50 5.0 3.1 36 24 Egypt, Arab Rep. 43,130 92,413 5.4 4.4 40.88 62.40 5.1 3.3 39 26 El Salvador 4,807 12,229 0.2 4.9 4.55 6.20 4.9 3.2 36 27 Equatorial Guinea .. .. .. .. 0.22 0.44 5.7 5.3 43 40 Eritrea 437 670 .. 5.2 .. 4.00 .. 5.6 .. 39 Estonia 6,760 5,101 2.2 -1.3 1.48 1.40 2.0 1.2 15 9 Ethiopia ,842 6,534 1.1 4.8 37.72 62.80 6.6 6.3 48 44 Faeroe Islands .. .. .. .. .. 0.04 .. .. .. .. Fiji .. .. .. .. 0.63 0.80 3.5 2.8 30 22 Finland 134,806 126,130 3.3 2.5 4.78 5.20 1.6 1.8 13 11 France 1,195,438 1,410,262 2.3 1.7 53.88 59.10 1.9 1.8 15 13 French Polynesia .. .. .. .. 0.16 0.23 .. 2.7 31 22 Gabon .. .. .. .. 0.69 1.25 4.5 5.1 33 36 Gambia, The .. .. .. .. 0.64 1.11 6.5 5.5 48 41 Georgia 12 4,192 0.4 -10.3 5.07 5.50 2.3 1.3 18 9 Germany 1,719,510 2,081,202 2.2 1.5 78.30 82.00 1.4 1.4 11 9 Ghana 5,886 7,606 3.0 4.3 10.74 18.90 6.5 4.3 45 30 Greece 82,914 123,934 1.8 1.9 9.64 10.50 2.2 1.3 15 9 Greenland .. .. .. .. .. 0.06 .. .. .. .. Grenada .. .. .. .. 0.09 0.10 .. 3.4 .. 25 Guam .. .. .. .. 0.11 0.15 .. 3.9 28 28 Guatemala 7,650 18,016 0.8 4.2 6.92 11.10 6.3 4.7 43 34 Guinea 2,818 3,693 .. 4.2 4.46 7.20 6.1 5.3 46 40 Guinea-Bissau .. .. .. .. 0.81 1.19 5.8 5.5 43 41 Guyana .. .. .. .. 0.76 0.86 3.5 2.3 30 21 Haiti 2,981 3,871 -0.2 -1.7 5.35 7.80 5.9 4.1 37 31 Honduras 3,049 5,342 2.7 3.2 3.66 6.30 6.5 4.0 43 32 Hungary 33,056 48,355 1.3 1.0 10.71 10.10 1.9 1.3 14 9 Iceland .. .. .. .. 0.23 0.28 2.5 2.0 20 15 India 322,737 459,765 5.8 6.1 687.33 997.50 5.0 3.1 34 26 Indonesia 114,426 140,964 6.1 4.7 148.30 207.00 4.3 2.6 34 22 Iran, Islamic Rep. 120,404 101,073 1.7 3.4 39.12 63.00 6.7 2.7 44 21 Iraq .. .. .. .. 13.01 22.80 6.4 4.4 41 32 Ireland 45,527 84,861 3.2 7.9 3.40 3.70 3.2 1.9 22 14 Isle of Man .. .. .. .. .. 0.08 .. .. .. .. Israel 52,490 99,068 3.5 5.1 3.88 6.10 3.2 2.9 24 21 Italy 1,093,947 1,149,958 2.4 1.2 56.43 57.60 1.6 1.2 11 9 Jamaica 4,239 6,134 2.0 0.1 2.13 2.60 3.7 2.5 28 22 Japan 2,970,043 4,395,083 4.0 1.4 116.78 126.60 1.8 1.4 14 10 Jordan 4,020 7,616 2.5 4.8 2.18 4.70 6.8 3.7 .. 30 Kazakstan 40,304 15,594 .. -5.9 14.91 15.40 2.9 2.0 24 14 Kenya 8,533 10,603 4.2 2.2 16.56 30.00 7.8 4.5 51 35 Kiribati .. .. .. .. 0.06 0.09 4.6 4.0 .. 30 152 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 153 ANNEX 2 DATA TABLES: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 1­5 GDP per capita Average annual growth Death rate population growth GNP per capita average annual Gini index per 1,000 people % $ PPP $ real growth % 1980 1999 1980-99 1999-2015 1999 1999 1990-1999 Survey year 6 7 0.7 0.3 .. .. .. .. .. 8 8 .. .. 11,960 18,395 2.8 .. .. 13 11 0.0 -0.2 5,060 12,289 0.9 1996 25.4 11 11 0.2 0.0 32,030 24,280 2.0 1992 24.7 20 17 .. .. 790 .. -5.1 .. .. 5 6 .. .. 3,170 4,825 1.8 .. .. 7 5 2.0 1.3 1,910 4,653 3.9 1996 48.7 9 6 2.3 1.5 1,310 2,605 0.0 1995 43.7 13 7 2.2 1.5 1,400 3,303 2.4 1995 28.9 11 6 1.5 1.6 1,900 4,048 2.8 1996 52.3 22 16 .. .. 1,170 .. 16.3 .. .. .. 13 2.7 2.2 200 1,012 2.2 .. .. 12 13 -0.1 -0.5 3,480 7,826 -0.3 1995 35.4 22 20 2.7 2.1 100 599 2.4 1995 40.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 6 6 .. .. 2,210 4,536 1.2 .. .. 9 10 0.4 0.1 23,780 21,209 2.0 1991 25.6 10 9 0.4 0.3 23,480 21,897 1.1 1995 32.7 6 5 .. .. .. .. -0.1 .. .. 18 16 2.9 2.1 3,350 5,325 0.6 .. .. 24 13 3.5 2.2 340 1,492 -0.6 .. .. 9 8 0.4 -0.1 620 3,606 .. .. 12 10 0.2 -0.2 25,350 22,404 1.0 1994 30.0 15 10 2.9 1.7 390 1,793 1.6 1997 32.7 9 10 0.5 -0.1 11,770 14,595 1.8 1993 32.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7 .. .. 3,450 5,847 2.2 .. .. 4 4 .. .. .. .. .. .. 11 7 2.6 2.4 1,660 3,517 1.5 1989 59.6 24 17 2.6 1.9 510 1,761 1.5 1994 40.3 25 21 2.1 1.8 160 595 -1.9 .. .. 7 8 .. .. 760 3,242 5.2 .. .. 15 13 2.0 1.6 460 1,407 -3.4 .. .. 10 5 3.0 2.1 760 2,254 0.3 1996 53.7 14 14 -0.3 -0.4 4,650 10,479 1.4 1996 30.8 7 7 .. .. 29,280 26,283 1.8 .. .. 13 9 2.0 1.3 450 2,149 4.1 1997 37.8 12 7 1.8 1.2 580 2,439 3.0 1996 36.5 11 6 2.5 1.7 1,760 5,163 1.9 .. .. 9 10 3.0 2.0 .. .. .. .. .. 10 9 0.5 0.8 19,160 19,180 6.1 1987 35.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7 6 2.4 1.6 .. .. 2.3 1992 35.5 10 10 0.1 -0.3 19,710 20,751 1.2 1995 27.3 7 6 1.0 0.9 2,330 3,276 -0.6 1996 36.4 6 8 0.4 -0.1 32,230 24,041 1.1 1993 24.9 .. 4 4.1 2.3 1,500 3,542 1.1 1997 36.4 8 10 0.0 0.1 1,230 4,408 -4.9 1996 35.4 13 13 3.0 1.5 360 975 -0.3 1994 44.5 .. 8 .. .. 910 3,186 1.0 .. .. 153 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 154 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 1. Indicators to chapters 1­5 (continued) Gross domestic Average annual product GDP growth Population Fertility rate Birth rate $ millions % millions births per woman per 1,000 people COUNTRY or REGION 1990 1999 1980-90 1990-99 1980 1999 1980 1999 1980 1999 Korea, Dem. Rep. .. .. .. .. 18.26 23.41 2.8 2.0 22 20 Korea, Rep. 252,622 406,940 9.4 5.7 38.12 46.80 2.6 1.6 22 14 Kuwait 18,428 29,572 1.3 .. 1.38 1.90 5.3 2.7 37 22 Kyrgyz Republic .. 1,629 .. -7.4 3.63 4.70 4.1 2.7 30 21 Lao PDR 865 1,373 3.7 6.4 3.21 5.10 6.7 5.4 45 37 Latvia 12,490 6,664 3.7 -4.8 2.54 2.40 2.0 1.1 15 8 Lebanon 2,838 17,229 .. 7.7 2.83 4.30 4.0 2.4 30 21 Lesotho 622 874 4.6 4.4 1.37 2.10 5.5 4.5 41 34 Liberia .. .. .. .. 1.88 3.04 6.8 6.1 47 45 Libya .. .. .. .. 3.04 5.42 7.3 3.6 46 28 Liechtenstein .. .. .. .. .. 0.03 .. .. .. .. Lithuania 13,264 10,454 .. -3.9 3.41 3.70 2.0 1.4 16 10 Luxembourg .. . .. .. 0.36 0.43 1.5 1.7 11 13 Macedonia, FYR 2,635 3,445 .. 1.9 1.89 2.00 2.5 1.8 21 14 Madagascar 3,081 3,733 1.1 1.7 8.71 15.10 6.6 5.6 47 41 Malawi 1,803 1,820 2.5 4.0 6.14 10.80 7.6 6.3 57 46 Malaysia 42,775 74,634 5.3 6.3 13.76 22.70 4.2 3.0 31 24 Maldives .. .. .. .. 0.16 0.28 6.9 4.3 42 29 Mali 2,421 2,714 0.8 3.6 6.59 10.90 7.1 6.4 49 46 Malta .. .. .. .. 0.36 0.38 2.0 1.8 15 12 Marshall Islands .. .. .. .. .. 0.06 .. .. .. .. Martinique .. .. .. .. 0.33 0.38 .. .. .. .. Mauritania 1,020 959 1.8 4.1 1.55 2.60 6.3 5.3 43 39 Mauritius .. .. . .. 0.97 1.17 2.7 2.0 24 17 Mayotte .. .. .. .. .. 0.13 .. .. .. .. Mexico 262,710 474,951 1.1 2.7 66.56 97.40 4.7 2.8 33 27 Micronesia, Fed. Sts. .. .. .. .. 0.07 0.12 .. 3.8 .. 27 Moldova 10,583 1,092 3.0 -11.5 4.00 4.30 2.4 1.7 20 12 Monaco .. .. .. .. .. 0.03 .. .. .. .. Mongolia .. 905 5.4 0.7 1.66 2.60 5.3 2.7 38 21 Morocco 25,821 35,238 4.2 2.3 19.38 28.20 5.4 2.9 38 25 Mozambique 2,512 4,169 -0.1 6.3 12.10 17.30 6.5 5.2 46 40 Myanmar .. .. 0.6 6.3 33.82 45.00 4.9 3.1 36 26 Namibia 2,340 3,075 1.3 3.4 1.03 1.70 5.9 4.7 41 35 Nepal 3,628 4,904 4.6 4.8 14.64 23.40 6.1 4.3 44 34 Netherlands 283,672 384,766 2.3 2.7 14.15 15.80 1.6 1.6 13 13 Netherlands Antilles .. .. .. .. 0.17 0.22 2.4 2.2 .. 16 New Caledonia .. .. .. .. 0.14 0.21 3.3 2.6 26 21 New Zealand 43,103 53,622 1.7 2.9 3.11 3.60 2.0 2.0 16 15 Nicaragua 1,009 2,302 -1.9 3.2 2.80 4.90 6.3 3.6 45 30 Niger 2,481 2,067 -0.1 2.5 5.52 10.50 7.4 7.3 51 51 Nigeria 28,472 43,286 1.6 2.4 71.15 123.90 6.9 5.2 50 40 Northern Mariana Islands .. .. .. .. .. 0.07 .. .. .. .. Norway 115,453 145,449 2.8 3.7 4.09 4.50 1.7 1.8 12 13 Oman .. .. .. .. 1.10 2.35 9.9 4.5 45 28 Pakistan 40,010 59,880 6.3 4.0 82.70 134.80 7.0 4.8 47 34 Palau .. .. .. .. .. 19.00 .. .. .. .. Panama 5,313 9,606 0.5 4.2 1.96 2.80 3.7 2.5 29 21 Papua New Guinea 3,221 3,571 1.9 4.0 3.09 4.70 5.8 4.2 36 31 Paraguay 5,265 8,065 2.5 2.4 3.14 5.40 5.2 4.0 36 30 154 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 155 ANNEX 2 DATA TABLES: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 1­5 GDP per capita Average annual growth Death rate population growth GNP per capita average annual Gini index per 1,000 people % $ PPP $ real growth % 1980 1999 1980-99 1999-2015 1999 1999 1990-1999 Survey year 6 10 1.5 0.6 .. .. .. .. .. 6 6 1.1 0.5 8,490 14,637 4.7 1993 31.6 4 2 1.8 2.5 .. .. .. .. .. 9 7 1.5 1.1 300 2,223 -6.4 1997 40.5 20 13 2.4 2.2 280 1,726 3.8 1992 30.4 13 14 -0.2 -0.7 2,470 5,938 -3.7 1998 32.4 9 6 1.9 1.2 3,700 4,129 5.7 .. .. 15 13 2.4 0.9 550 2,058 2.1 1986-87 56.0 17 17 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 12 4 3.0 2.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 10 11 0.4 -0.1 2,620 6,093 -3.9 1996 32.4 11 9 .. .. 44,640 38,247 3.8 .. .. 7 8 0.4 0.4 1,690 4,339 -1.5 .. .. 16 12 2.8 2.5 250 766 -1.2 1993 46.0 23 24 2.9 1.8 190 581 0.9 .. .. 6 4 2.6 1.6 3,400 7,963 4.7 1995 48.5 13 5 .. .. 1,160 3,545 3.9 .. .. 22 19 2.5 2.2 240 693 1.1 1994 50.5 9 8 .. .. 15,066 3 4.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. -3 .. .. .. 7 .. .. .. .. .. .. 19 13 2.7 2.2 380 1,522 1.3 1995 38.9 6 7 1.0 0.9 3,590 8,652 3.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7 5 1.9 1.3 4,400 7,719 1.0 1995 53.7 .. 6 .. .. 1,810 .. -1.8 .. .. 10 11 0.4 -0.2 370 2,358 -10.8 1992 34.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 11 6 1.9 1.5 350 1,496 -0.6 1995 33.2 12 7 2.0 1.4 1,200 3,190 0.4 1998-99 39.5 20 20 1.9 1.7 230 797 3.8 1996-97 39.6 14 10 1.5 1.1 .. .. 5.1 .. .. 14 15 2.6 1.1 1,890 5,369 0.8 .. .. 18 10 2.5 2.1 220 1,219 2.3 1995-96 36.7 8 9 0.6 0.4 24,320 23,052 2.1 1994 32.6 .. 6 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7 5 .. .. .. .. -0.8 .. .. 9 7 1.1 0.6 13,780 16,566 1.8 1991 43.9 11 5 2.7 2.1 430 2,154 0.4 1993 50.3 23 18 3.3 3.0 190 727 -1.0 1995 50.5 18 16 2.9 2.0 310 744 -0.5 1996-97 50.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 10 10 0.5 0.4 32,880 26,522 3.2 1995 25.8 10 3 4.0 2.2 .. .. 0.3 .. .. 15 8 2.6 2.2 470 1,757 1.3 1996-97 31.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 6 5 1.9 1.2 3,070 5,016 2.4 1997 48.5 14 10 2.2 1.7 800 2,263 2.3 1996 50.9 8 5 2.9 2.1 1,580 4,193 -0.2 1995 59.1 155 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 156 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 1. Indicators to chapters 1­5 (continued) Gross domestic Average annual product GDP growth Population Fertility rate Birth rate $ millions % millions births per woman per 1,000 people COUNTRY or REGION 1990 1999 1980-90 1990-99 1980 1999 1980 1999 1980 1999 Peru 32,802 57,318 -0.3 5.4 17.30 25.20 4.5 3.1 35 24 Philippines 44,331 75,350 1.0 3.2 48.32 76.80 4.8 3.5 35 27 Poland 61,197 154,146 2.2 4.7 35.58 38.70 2.3 1.4 20 10 Portugal 69,132 107,716 3.1 2.5 9.77 10.00 2.2 1.5 16 12 Puerto Rico .. .. .. .. 3.21 3.89 2.6 1.9 23 16 Qatar .. .. .. .. 0.23 0.76 5.6 2.7 29 14 Romania 38,299 33,750 0.5 -1.2 22.20 22.50 2.4 1.3 18 10 Russian Federation 579,068 375,345 .. -6.1 139.01 146.50 1.9 1.3 16 9 Rwanda 2,584 1,956 2.2 -1.5 5.16 8.30 8.3 6.0 51 45 Samoa .. .. .. .. 0.16 0.17 .. 4.4 .. 30 Sao Tome and Principe .. .. .. .. 0.09 0.15 .. 4.5 39 32 Saudi Arabia 104,670 128,892 0.0 1.6 9.37 21.40 7.3 5.5 43 34 Senegal 5,698 4,791 3.1 3.2 5.54 9.30 6.8 5.4 46 38 Seychelles . .. .. .. 0.06 0.08 .. 2.1 29 18 Sierra Leone 897 669 1.2 -4.8 3.24 4.90 6.5 5.9 49 45 Singapore 36,638 84,945 6.7 8.0 2.28 3.20 1.7 1.5 17 13 Slovak Republic 15,485 19,307 2.0 1.9 4.98 5.40 2.3 1.4 19 10 Slovenia 12,673 20,653 .. 2.4 1.90 2.00 2.1 1.2 15 9 Solomon Islands .. .. .. .. 0.23 0.43 6.7 4.6 44 34 Somalia .. .. .. .. 6.71 9.39 7.3 7.1 52 51 South Africa 111,997 131,127 1.0 1.9 29.17 42.10 4.6 2.9 36 26 Spain 491,938 562,245 3.0 2.2 37.39 39.40 2.2 1.2 15 9 Sri Lanka 8,032 15,707 4.0 5.3 14.74 19.00 3.5 2.1 28 17 St. Kitts and Nevis .. .. .. .. 0.04 0.04 .. 2.3 27 19 St. Lucia .. .. .. .. 0.12 0.15 4.4 2.4 31 19 St. Vincent and the Grenadines .. .. .. .. 0.10 0.11 .. 2.2 28 18 Sudan .. .. .. .. 18.68 28.99 6.5 4.5 45 33 Suriname .. .. .. .. 0.36 0.41 3.9 2.4 28 24 Swaziland .. .. .. .. 0.57 1.02 6.2 4.5 44 36 Sweden 229,756 226,388 2.3 1.5 8.31 8.90 1.7 1.5 12 10 Switzerland 228,415 260,299 2.0 0.5 6.32 7.10 1.5 1.5 12 11 Syrian Arab Republic 12,309 19,380 1.5 5.7 8.70 15.70 7.4 3.7 46 29 Tajikistan 4,857 1,778 .. -9.8 3.97 6.20 5.6 3.3 37 22 Tanzania 4,220 8,777 .. 3.1 18.58 32.90 6.7 5.4 47 40 Thailand 85,345 123,887 7.6 4.7 46.72 61.70 3.5 1.9 28 17 Togo 1,628 1,506 1.7 2.5 2.62 4.60 6.8 5.1 45 38 Tonga .. .. .. .. 0.09 0.10 4.9 3.8 29 26 Trinidad and Tobago .. .. .. .. 1.08 1.29 3.3 1.8 29 15 Tunisia 12,291 21,188 3.3 4.6 6.38 9.50 5.2 2.2 35 17 Turkey 150,721 188,374 5.4 4.1 44.44 64.40 4.3 2.4 32 21 Turkmenistan 6,333 2,708 .. -3.5 2.86 4.80 4.9 2.8 34 21 Uganda 4,304 6,349 2.9 7.2 12.81 21.50 7.2 6.4 49 46 Ukraine 91,327 42,415 .. -10.8 50.04 49.90 2.0 1.3 15 9 United Arab Emirates .. .. .. .. 1.04 2.82 5.4 3.3 30 18 United Kingdom 975,512 1,373,612 3.2 2.2 56.33 59.10 1.9 1.7 13 12 United States 5,554,100 8,708,870 3.0 3.4 227.76 272.90 1.8 2.1 16 15 Uruguay 8,355 20,211 0.4 3.7 2.91 3.30 2.7 2.3 19 16 Uzbekistan 23,673 16,844 .. -2.0 15.95 24.50 4.8 2.7 34 23 Vanuatu .. .. .. .. 0.12 0.19 .. 4.6 .. 31 Venezuela 48,593 103,918 1.1 1.7 14.87 23.70 4.2 2.9 33 24 156 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 157 ANNEX 2 DATA TABLES: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 1­5 GDP per capita Average annual growth Death rate population growth GNP per capita average annual Gini index per 1,000 people % $ PPP $ real growth % 1980 1999 1980-99 1999-2015 1999 1999 1990-1999 Survey year 10 6 2.0 1.4 2,390 4,387 3.2 1996 46.2 9 6 2.3 1.6 1,020 3,815 0.9 1997 46.2 10 10 0.4 0.0 3,960 7,894 4.4 1996 32.9 10 11 0.1 0.0 10,600 15,147 2.3 1994-95 35.6 6 8 1.0 0.7 .. .. 1.9 .. .. 7 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 10 12 0.1 -0.3 1,520 5,647 -0.5 1994 28.2 11 14 0.3 -0.5 2,270 6,339 -5.9 1998 48.7 19 22 2.5 1.8 250 .. -3.0 1983-85 28.9 .. 6 .. .. 1,060 3,915 1.4 .. .. 10 9 .. .. 270 1,335 -0.9 . .. 9 4 4.0 2.9 .. .. -1.1 .. .. 18 13 2.7 2.3 510 1,341 0.6 1995 41.3 7 7 .. .. 6,540 10,381 1.3 .. .. 29 25 2.2 1.9 130 414 -7.0 1989 62.9 5 5 2.6 1.4 29,610 27,024 4.7 .. .. 10 10 0.4 0.0 3,590 9,811 1.6 1982 19.5 10 10 0.2 -0.2 9,890 15,062 2.5 1995 26.8 10 4 .. .. 750 1,949 0.3 .. .. 22 18 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 12 14 2.2 0.5 3,160 8,318 -0.2 1993-94 59.3 8 10 0.3 -0.2 14,000 16,730 2.0 1990 32.5 6 6 1.3 1.1 820 3,056 4.0 1995 34.4 11 12 .. .. 6,420 9,801 4.9 .. .. 7 7 .. .. 3,770 5,022 0.9 .. .. 7 7 .. .. 2,700 4,667 2.6 .. .. 17 11 2.3 2.1 330 1,298 .. .. .. 8 7 .. .. .. .. 3.3 .. .. 15 13 .. .. 1,360 4,200 -0.2 .. .. 11 11 0.3 -0.1 25,040 20,824 1.2 1992 25.0 9 9 0.6 0.0 38,350 27,486 -0.1 1992 33.1 9 5 3.1 2.1 970 2,761 2.7 .. .. 8 5 2.4 1.5 290 981 .. .. .. 15 17 3.0 1.8 240 478 -0.1 1993 38.2 8 7 1.3 0.8 1,960 5,599 3.8 1998 41.4 16 15 2.9 2.0 320 1,346 -0.5 .. .. 9 7 .. .. 1,720 4,281 0.7 .. .. 7 7 0.9 0.7 4,390 7,262 2.0 .. .. 9 6 2.1 1.2 2,100 5,478 2.9 1990 40.2 10 6 1.9 1.2 2,900 6,126 2.2 1994 41.5 8 6 2.7 1.2 660 3,099 -9.6 1998 40.8 18 19 2.7 2.4 320 1,136 4.0 1992-93 39.2 11 15 0.0 -0.8 750 3,142 -10.3 1996 32.5 5 3 5.2 1.9 .. .. -1.6 .. .. 12 11 0.3 0.0 22,640 20,883 2.1 1991 36.1 9 9 1.1 0.8 30,600 30,600 2.0 1997 40.8 10 10 0.7 0.6 5,900 8,280 3.0 1989 42.3 8 6 2.2 1.3 720 2,092 -3.1 1993 33.3 .. 7 .. .. 1,170 2,771 -0.8 .. 6 4 2.4 1.5 3,670 5,268 -0.5 1996 48.8 157 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 158 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 1. Indicators to chapters 1­5 (continued) Gross domestic Average annual product GDP growth Population Fertility rate Birth rate $ millions % millions births per woman per 1,000 people COUNTRY or REGION 1990 1999 1980-90 1990-99 1980 1999 1980 1999 1980 1999 Vietnam 6,472 28,567 4.6 8.1 53.70 77.50 5.0 2.3 36 20 Virgin Islands (U.S.) .. .. .. .. 0.10 0.12 .. 2.4 26 16 West Bank and Gaza .. .. .. .. 1.20 2.84 .. 5.8 .. 41 Yemen, Rep. 4,660 6,769 .. 3.0 8.54 17.00 7.9 6.2 53 40 Yugoslavia, FR (Serbia, Montenegro) .. .. .. .. 9.52 10.62 2.3 1.7 18 12 Zambia 3,288 3,325 1.0 1.0 5.74 9.90 7.0 5.4 50 41 Zimbabwe 8,784 5,716 3.6 2.4 7.01 11.90 6.4 3.6 49 30 World 21,390,644 30,211,993 3.2 2.5 4,430.20 5,974.70 3.7 2.7 27 22 Low Income 889,723 1,067,242 4.4 2.4 1,612.90 2,417.00 5.3 3.7 31* 29 Middle income 3,525,445 5,488,604 3.2 3.5 2,027.90 2,666.80 3.2 2.2 28 18 Lower middle income 1,820,097* 2,575,942* 4.0* 3.4* 1 607.9* 2 093.7* 3.0 2.1 28 17 Upper middle income 1,722,041 2,918,403 2.5 3.6 419.90 573.10 3.7 2.4 28 21 Low & middle Income 4,413,061 6,557,913 3.4 3.3 3,641.00 5,083.80 4.1 2.9 30 24 East Asia & Pacific 925,765 1,888,729 8.0 7.4 1,397.80 1,836.90 3.0 2.1 22 18 Europe & Central Asia 1,240,214 1,093,237 2.4 -2.7 425.80 475.20 2.5 1.6 19 12 Latin America & Carib& 1,146,895 2,055,025 1.7 3.4 360.30 509.20 4.1 2.6 31 23 Middle East & N. Africa 402,799 590,253 2.0 3.0 174.00 290.90 6.1 3.5 41 26 South Asia 410,341 595,915 5.7 5.7 902.60 1,329.30 5.3 3.4 37 27 Sub-Saharan Africa 297,397 332,744 1.7 2.4 380.50 642.30 6.6 5.3 47 40 High Income 16,967,888 23,662,676 3.1 2.4 789.10 890.90 1.8 1.7 14 12 *indicates income-group aggregate that includes data on China. Note: Revisions to estimates of China's GNP per Capita, made by analysts in 2000-01, caused that economy to be reclassified from low to lower middle income. As a result, for different indicators in these data tables China figures as part of one or the other income group, which considerably affects these group aggregates. 158 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 159 ANNEX 2 DATA TABLES: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 1­5 GDP per capita Average annual growth Death rate population growth GNP per capita average annual Gini index per 1,000 people % $ PPP $ real growth % 1980 1999 1980-99 1999-2015 1999 1999 1990-1999 Survey year 8 6 1.9 1.2 370 1,755 6.2 1998 36.1 .. 5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4 .. 3.5 1,610 .. -0.2 .. .. 19 12 3.6 2.8 350 688 -0.4 1992 39.5 9 11 0.4 0.1 .. .. .. .. .. 15 21 2.9 1.3 320 686 -2.4 1996 49.8 12 16 2.8 0.6 520 2,470 0.6 1990-91 56.8 10 9 1.6 1.1 4,890 6,490 1.1 11* 11 2.1 1.5 410 1,790 1.1 9 8 1.4 0.9 2,000 4,880 2.3 10 8 1.4 0.8 1,200* 3,960* 2.2 8 7 1.6 1.0 4,900 8,320 2.2 11 9 1.8 1.2 1,240 3,410 1.9 7 7 1.4 0.8 1,000 3,500 6.1 10 11 0.6 0.0 2,150 5,580 -2.5 8 7 1.8 1.3 3,840 6,280 1.8 12 7 2.7 1.8 2,060 4,600 0.8 14 9 2.0 1.4 440 2,030 3.6 18 16 2.8 1.9 500 1,450 -0.4 9 9 0.7 0.3 25,730 24,430 1.6 159 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 160 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 2. Indicators to chapters 6­7 Agri- cultural Gross Gross Prevalence of Prevalence of Cereal produc- domestic domestic Poverty undernourishment child malnutrition yield tivity investment saving % of people Low weight Low height 1995 living on for age for age US$ less than (% of children (% of children kg per per COUNTRY $1 a day (PPP) % of population under 5) under 5) hectare worker % of GDP % of GDP or REGION Survey year 1990-92 1998-2000 1993-2001 1993-2001 2000 2000 1990 1999 1990 1999 Afghanistan .. .. 63 70 49 48 794 .. .. .. .. .. Albania .. .. .. .. 14 15 3175 1837 29 16 21 -7 Algeria 1995 <2 5 6 6 18 883 1826 29 27 27 30 American Samoa .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Andorra .. .. .. .. .. .. Angola .. .. 61 50 41 53 574 127 12 23 30 48 Antigua and Barbuda .. .. .. .. .. .. 1600 2621 .. .. .. .. Argentina .. .. 5 12 3454 10260 14 18 20 16 Armenia .. .. .. .. 3 13 1183 2653 47 19 36 -14 Aruba .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Australia .. .. .. .. 0 0 1962 35789 21 22 21 21 Austria .. .. .. .. .. .. 5423 33217 24 25 25 25 Azerbaijan .. .. .. .. 17 20 2335 978 .. 34 .. 5 Bahamas, The .. .. .. .. 1950 .. .. .. .. .. Bahrain .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Bangladesh 1996 29.1 35 35 48 45 3374 315 19 20 11 14 Barbados .. .. .. .. .. .. 2500 18912 .. .. .. .. Belarus 1998 <2 .. .. .. .. 1952 2959 27 26 29 20 Belgium .. .. .. .. .. .. 7331 57556 20 18 22 22 Belize .. .. 2420 5731 .. .. .. .. Benin .. .. 19 13 23 31 1102 615 14 18 5 8 Bermuda .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Bhutan .. .. .. .. .. .. 1469 158 .. .. .. .. Bolivia 1990 11.3 26 23 8 27 1646 748 13 18 11 11 Bosnia and Herzegovina .. .. .. .. 4 .. 2550 7634 .. .. .. .. Botswana 1985-86 33.3 17 25 13 29 117 569 32 20 37 14 Brazil 1997 5.1 13 10 6 11 2661 4712 20 21 21 20 Brunei .. .. .. .. .. 1667 .. .. . .. Bulgaria 1995 <2 .. .. .. .. 2763 7959 26 16 22 12 Burkina Faso 1994 61.2 23 23 34 37 859 190 21 27 8 10 Burundi .. .. 49 69 45 .. 1249 150 15 10 -5 1 Cambodia .. .. 43 36 45 45 2134 423 8 15 2 5 Cameroon .. .. 32 25 22 29 1764 1184 18 19 21 19 Canada .. .. .. .. .. .. 2812 44136 21 20 21 21 Cape Verde .. .. 795 2607 .. .. .. .. Cayman Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Central African Republic 1993 66.6 49 44 23 28 1088 493 12 14 -1 7 Chad .. .. 58 32 28 29 528 208 7 18 -6 0 Channel Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. Chile 1994 4.2 8 4 1 2 4362 6039 25 24 28 23 China 1998 18.5 16 9 10 14 4789 333 35 40 38 42 Hong Kong, China .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 27 25 36 30 Macao, China .. .. .. .. .. .. Colombia 1996 11.0 17 13 7 14 3297 3601 20 17 25 19 Comoros .. .. .. .. 1324 504 .. .. .. .. 160 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 161 ANNEX 2 DATA TABLES: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 6­7 Ratio of girls to boys in Public primary and expenditure School enrollment secondary Adult illiteracy Child labor on education % of corresponding age group education percent of children % of people 10­14 in the 15 and above, 1998 labor force % of GNP Primary Secondary Tertiary % male fem. total 1980 1999 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 2000 .. .. 65 28 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9 24 17 4 1 .. 3.1 113 107 67 38 5 11 102 24 46 35 7 1 7.8 5.1 95 108 33 63 6 13 98 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 30 26 .. .. 175 .. 21 .. 0 1 84 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3 3 3 8 3 2.7 3.5 106 111 56 73 22 42 103 1 3 2 0 0 .. 2.0 .. 87 .. 90 .. 12 104 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 100 .. .. .. 0 0 5.5 5.4 112 101 71 153 25 80 100 .. .. .. 0 0 5.5 5.4 99 100 93 103 22 48 97 .. .. .. 0 0 .. 3.0 115 106 95 77 24 18 97 5 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 14 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 104 49 71 60 35 29 1.1 2.2 61 .. 18 .. 3 6 102 .. .. .. 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 100 0 1 1 0 0 .. 5.9 104 98 98 93 39 44 102 .. .. .. 0 0 6.0 3.1 104 103 91 146 26 57 106 .. .. 7 4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 101 46 77 62 30 27 .. 3.2 67 78 16 18 1 3 62 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 63 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9 22 16 19 13 4.4 4.9 87 .. 37 .. 16 24 98 .. .. .. 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 27 22 24 26 15 6.0 8.6 91 108 19 65 1 6 102 16 16 16 19 15 3.6 5.1 98 125 34 62 11 15 103 .. .. 9 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 102 1 2 2 0 0 4.5 3.2 98 99 85 77 16 41 98 68 87 78 71 47 2.2 1.5 18 40 3 .. 0 1 70 45 63 54 50 49 3.4 4.0 26 51 3 7 1 1 79 43 80 63 27 24 .. 2.9 139 113 .. 24 2 1 83 20 33 26 34 24 3.8 .. 98 85 18 27 2 4 .. .. .. .. 0 0 6.9 6.9 99 102 88 105 57 90 100 27 16 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 43 68 56 .. .. .. .. 71 .. 14 .. 1 1 .. 51 69 61 42 37 1.7 .. 58 .. 10 0 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4 5 5 0 0 4.6 3.6 109 101 53 75 12 31 100 9 25 17 30 9 2.5 2.3 113 123 46 70 2 6 98 4 11 7 6 0 2.4 2.9 107 94 64 73 10 28 .. .. .. .. 7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 9 9 9 12 6 1.9 4.1 112 113 39 67 9 17 104 42 45 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 161 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 162 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 2. Indicators to chapters 6­7 (continued) Agri- cultural Gross Gross Prevalence of Prevalence of Cereal produc- domestic domestic Poverty undernourishment child malnutrition yield tivity investment saving % of people Low weight Low height 1995 living on for age for age US$ less than (% of children (% of children kg per per COUNTRY $1 a day (PPP) % of population under 5) under 5) hectare worker % of GDP % of GDP or REGION Survey year 1990-92 1998-2000 1993-2001 1993-2001 2000 2000 1990 1999 1990 1999 Congo, Dem. Rep. .. .. 32 73 34 45 782 220 9 8 9 9 Congo, Rep. .. .. 37 32 .. .. 781 459 16 26 24 45 Costa Rica 1996 9.6 6 5 5 6 4003 5258 27 28 21 32 Cote d'Ivoire 1995 12.3 18 15 21 25 1475 1044 7 19 11 25 Croatia .. .. .. .. 1 1 3987 9383 10 23 2 14 Cuba .. .. 5 10 .. .. 2526 .. .. .. .. .. Cyprus .. .. .. .. .. 931 .. .. .. .. .. Czech Republic 1993 <2 .. .. .. .. 3908 6307 25 30 28 29 Denmark .. .. .. .. .. .. 6205 60999 20 21 25 24 Djibouti .. .. 1625 68 .. .. .. .. Dominica .. .. .. .. .. .. 1308 4314 .. .. .. .. Dominican Republic 1996 3.2 27 26 5 11 4139 3340 25 26 15 16 Ecuador 1995 20.2 8 5 14 26 2235 3303 17 15 23 20 Egypt, Arab Rep. 1995 3.1 5 4 4 19 7280 1300 29 23 16 14 El Salvador 1996 25.3 12 14 12 23 2155 1705 14 16 1 2 Equatorial Guinea .. .. 920 .. .. .. .. Eritrea .. .. .. 58 44 38 406 61 5 45 -31 -20 Estonia 1995 4.9 .. .. .. .. 2115 3687 30 28 22 17 Ethiopia 1995 31.3 .. 44 47 52 1115 147 12 19 7 4 Faeroe Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Fiji .. .. .. .. .. .. 2495 2475 .. .. .. .. Finland .. .. .. .. .. .. 3503 42454 28 17 26 26 France .. .. .. .. .. .. 7240 58018 22 17 22 21 French Polynesia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Gabon .. 11 8 12 21 1630 2048 .. .. .. .. Gambia, The .. .. 21 21 17 30 1305 297 .. .. .. .. Georgia .. .. .. .. 3 12 1362 .. 31 7 25 -6 Germany .. .. .. .. .. .. 6453 32724 23 21 23 23 Ghana .. .. 35 12 25 26 1309 568 14 22 5 4 Greece .. .. .. .. .. .. 3748 13870 23 20 11 12 Greenland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Grenada .. .. .. .. .. .. 1000 2297 .. .. .. .. Guam .. .. .. .. .. .. 2000 .. .. .. .. .. Guatemala 1989 39.8 14 25 24 46 1773 2127 14 16 10 6 Guinea .. .. 40 32 33 41 1357 279 18 18 18 17 Guinea-Bissau .. .. .. .. 25 .. 1111 325 .. .. .. .. Guyana .. .. .. .. .. .. 3819 4126 .. .. .. .. Haiti .. .. 64 50 17 23 932 .. 12 11 -1 -7 Honduras 1996 40.5 23 21 17 39 1370 1043 23 26 20 9 Hungary 1993 <2 .. .. .. .. 3632 4925 25 30 28 28 Iceland . .. 49337 .. .. .. .. India 1997 44.2 25 24 53 52 2295 391 25 24 22 20 Indonesia 1999 15.2 .. 6 25 42 4026 747 31 14 33 24 Iran, Islamic Rep. .. .. 4 5 11 15 1833 3684 29 16 27 16 Iraq .. .. 7 27 .. .. 354 .. .. .. .. 162 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 163 ANNEX 2 DATA TABLES: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 6­7 Ratio of girls to boys in Public primary and expenditure School enrollment secondary Adult illiteracy Child labor on education % of corresponding age group education percent of children % of people 10­14 in the 15 and above, 1998 labor force % of GNP Primary Secondary Tertiary % male fem. total 1980 1999 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 2000 29 53 41 33 29 2.6 .. 92 72 24 26 1 2 80 14 29 22 27 26 7.0 6.1 141 114 74 53 5 8 89 5 5 5 10 5 7.8 5.4 105 104 48 48 21 33 101 47 64 56 28 19 7.2 5.0 75 71 19 25 3 5 .. 1 3 2 0 0 .. 5.3 .. 87 77 82 19 28 102 4 0 .. 7.2 .. 106 106 81 81 17 12 100 3 4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 101 .. .. .. 0 0 .. 5.1 96 104 99 99 18 24 101 .. .. .. 0 0 6.7 8.1 96 102 105 121 28 45 96 .. 38 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 71 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 102 17 17 17 25 14 2.2 2.3 118 94 42 54 10 23 106 8 11 9 9 5 5.6 3.5 118 127 53 50 35 26 101 35 58 46 18 10 5.7 4.8 73 101 51 78 16 23 93 19 25 22 17 14 3.9 2.5 75 97 24 37 13 18 96 .. .. 19 40 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 88 34 62 48 44 39 .. 1.8 .. 53 .. 20 .. 1 79 .. .. .. 0 0 .. 7.2 103 94 127 104 25 45 99 58 70 64 46 42 3.1 4.0 37 43 9 12 0 1 68 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8 5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 103 .. .. .. 0 0 5.3 7.5 96 99 100 118 32 74 106 .. .. .. 0 0 5.0 6.0 111 105 85 111 25 51 100 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 29 .. 2.7 .. 174 162 34 56 4 8 .. 65 44 .. 3.3 53 77 11 25 .. 2 85 .. .. .. 0 0 .. 5.2 93 88 109 77 30 41 102 .. .. .. 0 0 .. 4.8 .. 104 .. 104 27 47 99 22 40 31 16 13 3.1 4.2 79 79 41 .. 2 1 88 2 5 3 5 0 2.0 3.1 103 93 81 95 17 47 101 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 76 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 25 40 33 19 15 1.8 1.7 71 88 19 26 8 8 92 .. .. .. 41 32 .. 1.9 36 54 17 14 5 1 57 .. .. 63 43 .. .. .. 68 62 6 .. .. .. 65 2 2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 50 54 52 33 24 1.5 .. 77 .. 14 .. 1 1 27 27 27 14 8 3.2 3.6 98 111 30 .. 8 11 .. 1 1 1 0 0 4.7 4.6 96 103 70 98 14 25 100 .. .. .. 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 103 33 57 44 21 13 3.0 3.2 83 100 30 49 5 7 79 9 20 14 13 9 1.7 1.4 107 113 29 56 4 11 98 18 33 25 14 3 7.5 4.0 87 98 42 77 .. 18 95 .. .. 46 11 .. 3.0 .. 113 85 57 42 9 11 77 163 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 164 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 2. Indicators to chapters 6­7 (continued) Agri- cultural Gross Gross Prevalence of Prevalence of Cereal produc- domestic domestic Poverty undernourishment child malnutrition yield tivity investment saving % of people Low weight Low height 1995 living on for age for age US$ less than (% of children (% of children kg per per COUNTRY $1 a day (PPP) % of population under 5) under 5) hectare worker % of GDP % of GDP or REGION Survey year 1990-92 1998-2000 1993-2001 1993-2001 2000 2000 1990 1999 1990 1999 Ireland .. .. .. .. .. .. 7842 .. 21 20 27 37 Isle of Man .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Israel .. .. .. .. .. .. 2562 .. 25 20 14 10 Italy .. .. .. .. .. .. 4994 26474 21 18 21 22 Jamaica 1996 3.2 14 9 4 4 1147 1445 28 32 24 19 Japan .. .. .. .. .. .. 6257 32015 32 29 33 30 Jordan 1997 <2 4 6 5 8 1751 1135 32 27 1 6 Kazakstan 1996 1.5 .. .. 4 10 944 1598 32 15 30 15 Kenya 1994 26.2 47 44 22 33 1375 213 20 15 14 7 Kiribati .. .. .. .. .. .. 1001 .. .. .. .. Korea, Dem. Rep. .. .. 18 34 28 .. 2367 .. .. .. .. .. Korea, Rep. 1993 <2 .. .. .. .. 6436 13758 38 27 37 34 Kuwait .. .. 22 4 2 3 2324 .. 18 12 4 22 Kyrgyz Republic .. .. .. .. 11 25 2670 1799 24 10 4 -11 Lao PDR .. 29 24 40 41 3006 617 .. 25 .. 24 Latvia 1998 <2 .. .. .. .. 2172 2653 40 20 39 10 Lebanon .. .. .. 3 3 12 2363 28916 18 28 -64 -13 Lesotho 1993 43.1 27 26 18 44 944 576 53 47 -51 -35 Liberia .. .. 33 39 .. .. 1278 .. .. .. .. .. Libya .. .. .. .. 5 15 635 .. .. .. .. Liechtenstein .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Lithuania 1996 <2 .. .. .. .. 2713 3445 33 24 24 12 Luxembourg .. .. .. .. .. .. Macedonia, FYR .. .. .. .. 6 7 2560 4395 14 23 15 7 Madagascar 1993 60.2 35 40 40 48 1890 154 17 12 6 5 Malawi .. .. 40 33 25 49 1675 129 20 15 10 7 Malaysia .. .. 3 .. 20 .. 3038 6894 34 32 36 45 Maldives .. .. 800 .. .. .. .. .. Mali 1994 72.8 25 20 27 49 1006 261 23 20 6 8 Malta .. .. 4008 . .. .. .. Marshall Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. Martinique .. .. .. .. .. .. Mauritania 1995 3.8 14 12 32 35 864 455 20 22 5 12 Mauritius .. .. 6 5 15 10 8900 4698 .. .. .. .. Mayotte .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Mexico 1995 17.9 5 5 8 18 2761 1781 23 24 22 23 Micronesia, Fed. Sts. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Moldova 1992 7.3 .. .. .. .. 2033 935 25 18 23 -4 Monaco .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Mongolia 1995 13.9 34 42 13 25 779 1432 34 26 13 20 Morocco 1990-91 <2 6 7 .. .. 368 1333 25 23 16 18 Mozambique 1996 37.9 69 55 26 36 933 129 16 35 -12 11 Myanmar .. .. 10 6 43 45 3191 .. 13 12 11 11 Namibia 1993 34.9 15 9 .. .. 374 1630 34 20 18 9 Nepal 1995 37.7 19 19 48 51 2136 200 18 19 8 11 164 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 165 ANNEX 2 DATA TABLES: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 6­7 Ratio of girls to boys in Public primary and expenditure School enrollment secondary Adult illiteracy Child labor on education % of corresponding age group education percent of children % of people 10­14 in the 15 and above, 1998 labor force % of GNP Primary Secondary Tertiary % male fem. total 1980 1999 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 2000 .. .. .. 1 0 6.3 6.0 100 105 90 118 18 41 100 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2 6 4 0 0 8.2 7.6 95 98 73 88 29 44 100 1 2 2 2 0 .. 4.9 100 101 72 95 27 47 98 18 10 14 0 0 7.0 7.4 103 100 67 .. 7 8 101 .. .. .. 0 0 5.8 3.6 101 101 93 103 31 43 101 6 17 11 4 0 6.6 6.8 82 71 59 57 13 19 101 .. .. .. 0 0 .. 4.4 85 98 93 87 34 32 98 12 27 20 45 40 6.8 6.5 115 85 20 24 1 2 97 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 4 3 0 0 3.7 3.7 110 94 78 102 15 68 100 17 22 19 0 0 2.4 5.0 102 77 80 65 11 19 101 .. .. .. 0 0 .. 5.3 116 104 110 79 16 12 99 38 70 54 31 26 .. 2.1 114 112 21 29 0 3 82 0 0 0 0 0 3.3 6.3 102 96 99 84 24 33 101 9 21 15 5 0 .. 2.5 111 111 59 81 30 27 102 29 7 18 28 21 5.1 8.4 104 108 18 31 1 2 105 .. .. 49 26 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 70 .. .. 22 9 .. 3.4 .. 125 .. 76 .. 8 20 103 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0 1 1 0 0 .. 5.4 79 98 114 86 35 31 99 .. .. .. 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 103 .. .. .. 1 0 .. 5.1 100 99 61 63 28 20 98 28 42 35 40 35 4.4 1.9 130 92 .. 16 3 2 97 27 56 42 45 33 3.4 5.4 60 134 5 17 1 1 94 9 18 14 8 3 6.0 4.9 93 101 48 64 4 11 105 4 23 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 101 54 69 62 61 52 3.7 2.2 26 49 8 13 1 1 66 9 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 98 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 48 69 59 30 23 .. 5.1 37 79 11 16 1 4 90 16 5 .. 5.3 .. 93 106 50 65 1 6 97 .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7 11 9 9 6 4.7 4.9 120 114 49 64 14 16 101 .. .. .. 9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 2 1 3 0 3.4 10.6 83 97 78 81 30 27 102 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 28 49 39 4 2 .. 5.7 107 88 92 56 22 19 112 40 66 53 21 3 6.1 5 83 86 26 39 6 11 85 42 73 58 39 33 3.1 .. 99 60 5 7 0 1 76 11 21 16 28 24 1.7 1.2 91 121 22 30 5 6 98 18 20 19 34 19 1.5 9.1 .. 131 .. 62 .. 9 103 43 78 61 56 43 1.8 3.2 86 113 22 42 3 5 81 165 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 166 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 2. Indicators to chapters 6­7 (continued) Agri- cultural Gross Gross Prevalence of Prevalence of Cereal produc- domestic domestic Poverty undernourishment child malnutrition yield tivity investment saving % of people Low weight Low height 1995 living on for age for age US$ less than (% of children (% of children kg per per COUNTRY $1 a day (PPP) % of population under 5) under 5) hectare worker % of GDP % of GDP or REGION Survey year 1990-92 1998-2000 1993-2001 1993-2001 2000 2000 1990 1999 1990 1999 Netherlands .. .. .. .. .. .. 7627 59652 22 20 27 27 Netherlands Antilles .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. New Caledonia .. .. .. .. .. .. 3697 .. .. .. .. .. New Zealand .. .. .. .. .. .. 6273 28265 19 21 20 21 Nicaragua .. .. 30 29 12 25 1648 1603 19 37 -2 1 Niger 1995 61.4 42 36 40 40 290 187 8 10 1 4 Nigeria 1997 70.2 13 7 31 34 1120 716 15 11 29 0 Northern Mariana Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. 3879 36785 23 25 30 32 Oman .. .. .. .. 23 23 2321 .. .. .. .. Pakistan 1996 31.0 25 19 38 36 2408 733 19 15 11 11 Palau .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Panama 1997 10.3 19 18 8 18 2043 2965 17 34 21 25 Papua New Guinea .. .. 25 27 .. .. 4109 853 24 36 16 37 Paraguay 1995 19.4 16 14 .. .. 1845 3312 22 19 16 17 Peru 1996 15.5 40 11 7 25 3086 1876 21 22 22 20 Philippines .. 26 23 32 32 2581 1440 24 21 18 16 Poland 1993 5.4 .. .. .. .. 2535 1548 25 28 32 18 Portugal 1994 <2 .. .. .. .. 2781 7505 29 26 21 17 Puerto Rico .. .. .. .. .. .. 1731 .. .. .. .. .. Qatar .. .. 3856 .. .. .. .. .. Romania 1994 2.8 .. .. .. .. 1932 3103 30 15 21 10 Russian Federation 1998 7.1 .. .. 3 13 1561 3570 30 14 30 29 Rwanda 1983-85 35.7 34 40 24 43 848 249 15 14 6 -1 Samoa .. .. 1886 .. .. .. .. Sao Tome and Principe .. .. .. .. .. .. 2230 396 .. .. .. .. Saudi Arabia .. .. 4 3 .. .. 3472 15497 20 21 30 26 Senegal 1995 26.3 23 25 18 23 879 345 14 21 9 14 Seychelles .. .. 905 .. .. .. .. Sierra Leone 1989 57.0 46 47 27 .. 1081 358 9 5 8 -2 Singapore .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 44213 37 33 44 52 Slovak Republic 1992 <2 .. .. .. .. .. .. 33 39 24 28 Slovenia 1993 <2 .. .. .. .. 4815 36170 17 25 26 24 Solomon Islands .. .. 4000 .. .. .. .. .. Somalia .. 67 71 26 23 497 .. .. .. .. .. South Africa 1993 11.5 .. .. 8 23 2927 4061 12 16 18 18 Spain .. .. .. .. .. .. 3590 22243 25 21 21 22 Sri Lanka 1995 6.6 29 23 33 20 3338 741 22 25 14 19 St. Kitts and Nevis .. .. .. .. .. 2537 .. .. .. .. St. Lucia .. .. .. .. .. 2298 .. .. .. .. St. Vincent and the Grenadines .. .. .. .. .. .. 1667 2370 .. .. .. .. Sudan .. .. 31 21 11 34 533 .. .. .. .. .. Suriname .. .. 3897 3267 .. .. .. .. Swaziland .. .. 18 18 10 .. 1528 2017 .. .. .. .. Sweden .. .. .. .. .. .. 4616 39843 21 14 22 21 166 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 167 ANNEX 2 DATA TABLES: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 6­7 Ratio of girls to boys in Public primary and expenditure School enrollment secondary Adult illiteracy Child labor on education % of corresponding age group education percent of children % of people 10­14 in the 15 and above, 1998 labor force % of GNP Primary Secondary Tertiary % male fem. total 1980 1999 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 2000 .. .. .. 0 0 7.7 5.1 100 108 93 132 29 47 97 .. .. 4 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 96 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0 0 5.8 7.3 111 101 83 113 27 63 103 34 31 32 19 13 3.4 3.9 94 102 41 55 12 12 105 78 93 85 48 44 3.2 2.3 25 29 5 7 0 1 68 30 48 39 29 25 6.4 0.7 109 98 18 33 3 4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0 0 6.5 7.4 100 100 94 119 26 62 101 .. .. 31 6 .. 2.1 .. 51 76 12 67 .. 8 98 42 71 56 23 16 2.1 2.7 40 .. 14 .. 2 4 61 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8 9 9 6 3 4.9 5.1 107 106 61 69 21 32 100 29 45 37 28 18 .. .. 59 80 12 14 2 3 90 6 9 7 15 7 1.5 4.0 106 111 27 47 9 10 98 6 16 11 4 2 3.1 2.9 114 123 59 73 17 26 .. 5 5 5 14 6 1.7 3.4 112 117 64 78 24 35 103 0 0 0 0 0 .. 7.5 100 96 77 98 18 24 98 6 11 9 8 1 3.8 5.8 123 128 37 111 11 38 102 .. .. 7 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 42 42 .. .. 20 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 103 1 3 2 0 0 3.3 3.6 104 104 94 78 12 23 100 0 1 1 0 0 3.5 3.5 102 107 96 .. 46 41 .. 29 43 36 43 41 2.7 .. 63 .. 3 .. 0 1 93 20 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 104 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 17 36 25 5 0 4.1 7.5 61 76 30 61 7 16 93 55 74 65 43 29 .. 3.7 46 71 11 16 3 3 84 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 101 .. .. .. 19 15 3.5 .. 52 .. 14 .. 1 2 .. 4 12 8 2 0 2.8 3.0 108 94 60 74 8 39 .. .. .. .. 0 0 .. 5.0 .. 102 .. 94 18 22 101 0 0 0 0 0 .. 5.7 98 98 .. 92 20 36 101 .. .. .. 40 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 38 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 15 16 15 1 0 .. 7.9 90 133 .. 95 5 17 100 2 4 3 0 0 2.3 5.0 109 107 87 120 23 53 102 6 12 9 4 2 2.7 3.4 103 109 55 75 3 5 102 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 123 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 107 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 104 .. .. 44 33 .. 4.8 .. 50 51 16 21 2 4 86 .. .. .. 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 106 .. 17 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0 0 9.0 8.3 97 107 88 140 31 50 115 167 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 168 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 2. Indicators to chapters 6­7 (continued) Agri- cultural Gross Gross Prevalence of Prevalence of Cereal produc- domestic domestic Poverty undernourishment child malnutrition yield tivity investment saving % of people Low weight Low height 1995 living on for age for age US$ less than (% of children (% of children kg per per COUNTRY $1 a day (PPP) % of population under 5) under 5) hectare worker % of GDP % of GDP or REGION Survey year 1990-92 1998-2000 1993-2001 1993-2001 2000 2000 1990 1999 1990 1999 Switzerland .. .. .. .. .. .. 6601 .. 28 20 29 25 Syrian Arab Republic .. .. 5 3 13 21 1149 2602 15 29 16 18 Tajikistan .. .. .. .. .. 31 1323 731 23 .. 14 .. Tanzania 1993 19.9 36 47 29 44 1338 184 23 18 -1 14 Thailand 1998 <2 28 18 18 13 2719 847 41 21 34 32 Togo .. .. 28 23 25 22 1053 514 27 14 15 6 Tonga .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3013 .. .. .. .. Trinidad and Tobago .. .. 13 12 .. .. 2836 3075 .. .. .. .. Tunisia 1990 <2 .. .. 4 8 986 3158 32 28 25 24 Turkey 1994 2.4 .. .. 8 16 2311 1909 24 24 20 21 Turkmenistan 1993 20.9 .. .. 12 22 1465 626 40 .. 28 .. Uganda 1992 36.7 23 21 23 39 1539 342 13 17 1 6 Ukraine 1996 <2 .. .. 3 16 1951 1467 27 21 26 18 United Arab Emirates .. .. 3 .. 7 .. 656 .. .. .. .. .. United Kingdom .. .. .. .. .. .. 7165 34516 19 16 17 15 United States .. .. .. .. 1 2 5854 54410 17 19 15 17 Uruguay 1989 <2 6 3 4 10 3696 8480 11 14 17 13 Uzbekistan 1993 3.3 .. .. 19 31 2435 1424 32 19 13 19 Vanuatu .. .. 538 1395 .. .. .. .. Venezuela 1996 14.7 11 21 4 13 3244 5298 10 15 29 17 Vietnam .. .. 27 18 34 37 4113 254 13 29 6 21 Virgin Islands (U.S.) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. West Bank and Gaza .. .. .. .. 15 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Yemen, Rep. 1998 5.1 36 33 46 52 1085 404 15 21 9 13 Yugoslavia, FR (Serbia, Montenegro) .. .. .. .. 2 5 .. .. .. .. .. .. Zambia 1996 72.6 15 50 24 42 1462 198 17 17 17 6 Zimbabwe 1990-91 36.0 43 38 13 27 1412 380 17 18 17 15 World 21 18 .. .. 2043 1047 24 22 23 23 Low Income 28* 25* ..* ..* 1324 409 24 20 21 19 Middle income 15 10 13 25 2311 805 26 24 27 26 Lower middle income 16 10 10 17 1932 700 31* 27* 30* 30* Upper middle income 9 9 9 .. 2737 3863 23 22 25 23 Low & middle Income 21 18 .. .. 1751 616 26 24 26 25 East Asia & Pacific 17 11 15 14 3006 .. 35 33 35 37 Europe & Central Asia .. .. .. .. 2311 2280 28 20 26 23 Latin America & Carib& 14 12 9 19 2473 3501 19 21 22 20 Middle East & N. Africa 7 8 15 .. 1387 2275 24 22 22 19 South Asia 27 25 53 47 2216 405 23 22 19 19 Sub-Saharan Africa 32 33 .. .. 1111 357 15 17 16 14 High Income .. .. .. .. 3868 33274 23 21 23 22 *indicates income-group aggregate that includes data on China. Note: Revisions to estimates of China's GNP per Capita, made by analysts in 2000-01, caused that economy to be reclassified from low to lower middle income. As a result, for different indicators in these data tables China figures as part of one or the other income group, which considerably affects these group aggregates. 168 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 169 ANNEX 2 DATA TABLES: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 6­7 Ratio of girls to boys in Public primary and expenditure School enrollment secondary Adult illiteracy Child labor on education % of corresponding age group education percent of children % of people 10­14 in the 15 and above, 1998 labor force % of GNP Primary Secondary Tertiary % male fem. total 1980 1999 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 1980 1997 2000 .. .. 22 0 0 4.7 5.4 84 97 94 100 18 34 96 13 42 27 14 4 4.6 3.1 100 101 46 43 17 15 92 1 1 1 0 0 .. 2.2 .. 95 .. 78 24 20 87 17 36 26 43 38 .. .. 93 67 3 6 0 1 100 3 7 5 25 14 3.4 4.8 99 89 29 59 15 21 95 28 62 45 36 28 5.6 4.5 118 120 33 27 2 4 70 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7 1 .. 4.0 .. 99 99 69 74 4 8 102 21 42 31 6 0 5.4 7.7 102 118 27 64 5 14 100 7 25 16 21 9 2.2 2.2 96 107 35 58 5 21 84 .. .. .. 0 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. 23 20 .. 24 46 35 49 44 1.3 2.6 50 74 5 12 1 2 89 0 1 0 0 0 5.6 7.3 102 .. 94 .. 42 42 98 25 0 .. 1.3 .. 89 89 52 80 3 12 100 .. .. .. 0 0 5.6 5.3 103 116 84 129 19 52 110 .. .. .. 0 0 6.7 5.4 99 102 91 97 56 81 100 3 2 2 4 1 2.3 3.3 107 109 62 85 17 30 105 7 17 12 0 0 .. 7.7 81 78 106 94 29 36 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7 9 8 4 1 4.4 5.2 93 91 21 40 21 25 104 5 9 7 22 7 .. 3.0 109 114 42 57 2 7 93 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 34 77 56 26 19 .. 7.0 .. 70 .. 34 4 4 56 .. .. .. 0 .. .. .. .. 69 .. 62 18 22 101 16 31 24 19 16 4.5 2.2 90 89 16 27 2 3 .. 8 17 13 37 28 5.3 .. 85 112 8 50 1 7 95 18 32 25 20 12 3.9 4.8 97 106 49 64 13 19 93 30 49 39 24 19 3.4 3.3 94* 107* 34* 56* 3* 6* 84 10 20 15 21 7 3.8 4.8 100 106 60 66 20 25 98 10* 23* 16.4* 24* 7* 3.5* 4.8* 98 103 67 67 24 27 97 9 11 10 9 6 4.0 5.0 103 109 50 65 13 23 101 18 33 26 23 13 3.5 4.1 96 107 42 59 8 12 92 9 22 16 26 9 2.5 2.9 111 119 44 69 4 8 97 2 5 4 3 1 .. 5.1 99 100 86 .. 30 32 98 11 13 12 13 9 3.8 3.6 105 113 42 60 14 20 102 26 48 37 14 5 5.0 5.2 87 95 42 64 11 16 95 35 59 47 23 16 2.0 3.1 77 100 27 49 5 6 81 32 49 41 35 30 3.8 4.1 81 78 15 27 2 2 82 .. .. .. 0 0 5.6 5.4 102 103 87 106 35 59 101 169 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 170 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 3. Indicators to chapters 8­9 Under-five Maternal Age Life expectancy mortality Improved mortality dependency at birth, 1998 rate sanitation facilities Improved water source ratio ratio dependents % of total % of rural % of total % of rural estimates to working- per 1,000 population population population population per 100,000 age COUNTRY years live births with access with access with access with access live births population or REGION male fem. total 1980 1998 2000 2000 2000 2000 1995 1980 1998 Afghanistan .. .. 46 .. .. 12 8 13 11 820 0.8 .. Albania 69 75 72 57 31 91 85 97 95 31 0.7 0.6 Algeria 69 72 71 139 40 92 81 89 82 150 1 0.7 American Samoa .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Andorra .. .. .. .. .. 100 100 100 100 .. .. .. Angola 45 48 47 261 204 12 8 38 40 1,300 0.9 1 Antigua and Barbuda .. .. 75 .. .. 91 85 91 89 .. .. .. Argentina 70 77 73 38 22 92 81 .. .. 85 0.6 0.6 Armenia 71 78 74 .. 18 .. .. 29 0.6 0.5 Aruba .. .. .. .. 100 100 .. .. .. .. .. Australia 76 82 79 13 6 100 100 100 100 6 0.5 0.5 Austria 75 81 78 17 6 100 100 100 100 11 0.6 0.5 Azerbaijan 68 75 71 .. 21 81 70 78 58 37 0.7 0.6 Bahamas, The .. .. 74 .. 100 100 97 86 .. 0.7 .. Bahrain .. .. 73 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.6 .. Bangladesh 58 59 59 211 96 48 41 97 97 600 1 0.8 Barbados .. .. 76 .. .. 100 100 100 100 .. 0.7 .. Belarus 63 74 68 .. 14 .. .. 100 100 33 0.5 0.5 Belgium 75 81 78 15 6 .. .. .. .. 8 0.5 0.5 Belize .. .. 75 .. .. 50 25 92 82 .. 1.1 .. Benin 52 55 53 214 140 23 6 63 55 880 1 1 Bermuda .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Bhutan .. .. 61 .. 70 70 62 60 .. 0.8 .. Bolivia 60 64 62 170 78 70 42 83 64 550 0.9 0.8 Bosnia and Herzegovina .. .. 73 .. .. .. .. .. 15 0.5 0.4 Botswana 45 47 46 94 105 66 43 95 90 480 1 0.8 Brazil 63 71 67 80 40 76 43 87 53 260 0.7 0.5 Brunei .. .. 76 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.7 .. Bulgaria 67 75 71 25 15 100 100 100 100 23 0.5 0.5 Burkina Faso 43 45 44 .. 210 29 27 42 37 1400 1 1 Burundi 41 44 42 193 196 88 90 78 77 1900 0.9 0.9 Cambodia 52 55 54 330 143 17 10 30 26 590 0.7 0.8 Cameroon 53 56 54 173 150 79 66 58 39 720 0.9 0.9 Canada 76 82 79 13 7 100 99 100 99 6 0.5 0.5 Cape Verde .. .. 68 .. .. 71 32 74 89 .. 1.1 0.9 Cayman Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Central African Republic 43 46 44 .. 162 25 16 70 57 1200 0.8 0.9 Chad 47 50 48 232 172 29 13 27 26 1500 0.8 1.2 Channel Islands .. .. 79 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Chile 72 78 75 35 12 96 97 93 58 33 0.6 0.6 China 68 72 70 65 35 40 27 75 66 60 0.7 0.5 Hong Kong, China 76 82 79 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.5 0.4 Macao, China .. .. 78 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Colombia 67 73 70 58 28 86 56 91 70 120 0.8 0.6 Comoros .. .. 60 .. 98 98 96 95 .. 1 .. 170 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 171 ANNEX 2 DATA TABLES: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 8­9 Fixed line and Research Scientists mobile and devel- and Smoking phone Personal Inter- opment engi- prevalence Agricul- Indus- Ser- sub- compu- net expendi- neers Tuberculosis HIV (% of adults) ture try vices scribers ters users ture in R&D per People per per per 100,000 thousand % of infected % of % of % of 1,000 1,000 thou- million people of cases adults (all ages) male female GDP GDP GDP people people sands % of GDP people 1997 1997 1997 1997 1985-98 1985-98 1999 1999 1999 2000 2000 2001 1989-2000 1990-2000 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 .. .. .. 28 2 0.01 <100 50 8 54 25 21 59 8 10 .. .. 44 14 0.07 .. .. .. 13 54 33 61 7 60 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 740 .. .. 238 56 2.1 110,000 .. .. 7 70 23 7 1 60 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 786 .. .. 56 30 0.69 120,000 40 23 6 32 61 389 71 3,300 0.44 713 44 2 0.0 <100 .. .. 33 32 35 145 7 50 0.20 1313 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 518 .. .. 8 2 0.14 11,000 29 21 .. .. .. 987 470 7,200 1.51 3353 19 2 0.18 75,000 42 27 .. .. .. 1245 278 2,600 1.85 2313 58 7 0.01 <100 .. .. 19 43 38 156 25 0.24 2799 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 478 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 594 150 .. .. 246 620 0.03 21,000 60 15 21 27 52 6 2 250 .. 51 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 569 82 .. .. 65 10 0.17 9,000 .. .. 13 46 40 280 422 .. 1893 16 2 0.14 7,500 31 19 1 28 71 1065 224 3,200 1.96 2953 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 219 125 220 21 2.06 54,000 .. .. 38 14 48 17 2 25 .. 174 .. .. .. .. .. .. 465 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 22 8 .. .. 253 27 0.07 2,600 50 21 16 31 54 133 17 150 0.29 98 81 5 0.04 .. .. .. .. .. .. 231 45 0.29 .. 503 9 25.1 190,000 .. .. 4 45 51 204 37 50 .. .. 78 194 0.63 580,000 40 25 9 29 62 319 50 8,000 0.77 323 .. .. .. .. .. 529 69 .. .. 43 6 0.01 .. 49 17 18 27 55 444 44 605 0.57 1316 155 19 7.17 370,000 .. .. 32 27 41 7 1 19 0.19 16 252 16 8.3 260,000 .. .. 52 17 30 5 1 6 .. 21 539 101 2.4 130,000 70 10 51 15 35 12 1 10 .. .. 133 35 4.89 320,000 .. .. 44 20 36 16 3 45 .. .. 7 2 0.33 44,000 31 29 .. .. .. 944 419 13,500 1.84 2985 .. .. .. .. .. 171 57 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1072 .. .. 237 9 10.77 180,000 .. .. 55 20 25 4 2 2 .. 47 205 22 2.72 87,000 .. .. 38 14 48 2 1 4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 29 5 0.2 16,000 38 25 8 33 59 441 93 3,102 0.54 370 113 2721 0.06 400,000 .. .. 17 50 33 178 16 33,700 1.00 545 95 6 0.08 3,100 29 3 0 15 85 1406 354 2,601 0.44 93 .. .. .. .. .. 722 159 41 55 31 0.36 72,000 35 19 14 24 61 223 35 1,154 0.25 101 .. .. .. .. .. 10 4 .. .. 171 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 172 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 3. Indicators to chapters 8­9 (continued) Under-five Maternal Age Life expectancy mortality Improved mortality dependency at birth, 1998 rate sanitation facilities Improved water source ratio ratio dependents % of total % of rural % of total % of rural estimates to working- per 1,000 population population population population per 100,000 age COUNTRY years live births with access with access with access with access live births population or REGION male fem. total 1980 1998 2000 2000 2000 2000 1995 1980 1998 Congo, Dem. Rep. 49 52 51 210 141 21 6 45 26 940 1 1 Congo, Rep. 46 51 48 125 143 51 17 1100 0.9 1 Costa Rica 74 79 77 29 15 93 97 95 92 35 0.7 0.6 Cote d'Ivoire 46 47 46 170 143 52 35 81 72 1200 1 0.9 Croatia 69 77 73 23 10 18 0.5 0.5 Cuba .. .. 76 22 9 98 95 91 77 24 0.7 0.4 Cyprus .. .. 78 .. .. 100 100 100 100 .. 0.5 .. Czech Republic 71 78 75 19 6 .. .. .. .. 14 0.6 0.4 Denmark 73 78 76 10 .. .. .. 100 100 15 0.5 0.5 Djibouti .. .. 50 .. .. 91 50 100 100 .. 0.9 .. Dominica .. .. 76 .. .. 83 75 97 90 .. .. .. Dominican Republic 69 73 71 92 47 67 60 86 78 110 0.8 0.6 Ecuador 68 73 70 101 37 86 74 85 75 210 0.9 0.6 Egypt, Arab Rep. 65 68 67 175 59 98 96 97 96 170 0.8 0.7 El Salvador 67 72 69 120 36 82 76 77 64 180 0.9 0.7 Equatorial Guinea .. .. 50 .. .. 53 46 44 42 .. 0.8 .. Eritrea 49 52 51 .. .. 13 1 46 42 1100 .. 0.9 Estonia 64 75 70 25 12 .. .. .. .. 80 0.5 0.5 Ethiopia 42 44 43 213 173 12 7 24 12 1800 0.9 1 Faeroe Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Fiji .. .. 73 .. .. 43 12 47 51 .. 0.7 .. Finland 74 81 77 9 5 100 100 100 100 6 0.5 0.5 France 75 82 78 13 5 .. .. .. .. 20 0.6 0.5 French Polynesia .. .. 72 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Gabon .. .. 53 .. .. 53 43 86 47 620 0.7 0.8 Gambia, The .. .. 53 .. .. 37 35 62 53 1100 0.8 0.8 Georgia 69 77 73 .. 20 100 99 79 61 22 0.5 0.5 Germany 74 80 77 16 6 .. .. .. .. 12 0.5 0.5 Ghana 58 65 60 157 96 72 70 73 62 590 0.9 0.9 Greece 75 81 78 23 8 .. .. .. .. 2 0.6 0.5 Greenland .. .. 68 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Grenada .. .. 72 .. .. 97 97 95 93 .. .. .. Guam .. .. 77 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.6 .. Guatemala 61 67 64 .. 52 81 79 92 88 270 1 0.9 Guinea 46 47 47 299 184 58 41 48 36 1200 0.9 0.9 Guinea-Bissau .. .. 44 .. 205 56 44 56 49 910 0.8 0.9 Guyana .. .. 64 .. .. 87 81 94 91 .. 0.8 .. Haiti 51 56 54 200 116 28 16 46 45 1100 0.9 0.8 Honduras 67 72 69 103 46 75 55 88 81 220 1 0.8 Hungary 66 75 71 26 12 99 98 99 98 23 0.5 0.5 Iceland .. .. 79 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.6 .. India 62 64 63 177 83 28 15 84 79 440 0.7 0.6 Indonesia 64 67 65 125 52 55 46 78 69 470 0.8 0.6 Iran, Islamic Rep. 70 72 71 126 33 83 79 92 83 130 0.9 0.7 Iraq .. .. 59 93 125 79 31 85 48 370 0.9 0.8 172 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 173 ANNEX 2 DATA TABLES: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 8­9 Fixed line and Research Scientists mobile and devel- and Smoking phone Personal Inter- opment engi- prevalence Agricul- Indus- Ser- sub- compu- net expendi- neers Tuberculosis HIV (% of adults) ture try vices scribers ters users ture in R&D per People per per per 100,000 thousand % of infected % of % of % of 1,000 1,000 thou- million people of cases adults (all ages) male female GDP GDP GDP people people sands % of GDP people 1997 1997 1997 1997 1985-98 1985-98 1999 1999 1999 2000 2000 2001 1989-2000 1990-2000 263 188 4.35 950,000 .. .. 58 17 25 0 6 .. .. 277 11 7.78 100,000 .. .. 10 48 42 31 4 1 33 18 1 0.6 10,000 35 20 14 22 64 274 149 384 0.20 533 290 48 10.06 700,000 .. .. 24 24 52 50 6 70 .. .. 64 5 0.01 .. .. .. 9 32 59 616 112 250 0.98 1187 18 2 0.02 1,400 49 25 .. .. .. 44 12 120 0.49 480 .. .. .. .. .. 970 221 0.26 400 20 2 0.04 2,000 43 31 4 39 57 800 122 1,400 1.35 1348 11 1 0.12 3,100 37 37 .. .. .. 1346 507 2,900 2.09 3474 .. .. .. .. .. 16 10 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 310 71 .. .. 114 14 1.89 83,000 66 14 11 35 54 187 186 .. .. 165 32 0.28 18,000 .. .. 12 33 55 135 22 328 0.09 83 36 35 0.03 .. .. .. 17 33 50 108 13 600 0.19 493 74 7 0.58 18,000 38 12 10 28 61 218 19 50 .. 47 .. .. .. .. .. 25 4 .. .. 227 15 3.17 .. .. .. 16 27 57 8 2 15 .. .. 52 1 0.01 <100 52 24 6 27 66 750 153 430 0.76 2128 251 213 9.31 2,600,000 .. .. 49 7 44 4 1 25 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 932 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 175 44 .. .. 13 1 0.02 500 27 19 .. .. .. 1271 396 2,235 3.37 5059 19 11 0.37 110,000 40 27 2 26 72 1070 304 15,653 2.15 2718 .. .. .. .. .. 401 322 .. .. 174 4 4.25 23,000 .. .. .. .. .. 130 10 17 .. .. 211 4 2.24 13,000 .. .. .. .. .. 30 12 18 .. .. 67 5 0.01 <100 .. .. 22 13 65 140 22 25 0.33 2421 15 12 0.08 35,000 37 22 1 .. 36 1196 336 30,800 2.49 3161 214 67 2.38 210,000 .. .. 36 25 39 18 3 41 .. .. 29 3 0.14 7,500 46 28 .. .. .. 1097 71 1,400 0.67 1400 .. .. .. .. .. 753 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 378 127 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 656 .. .. 85 13 0.52 27,000 38 18 23 19 58 135 11 200 .. .. 171 22 2.09 74,000 .. .. 23 36 41 9 4 15 .. .. 181 4 2.25 12,000 .. .. .. .. .. 9 4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 126 26 .. .. 385 36 5.17 190,000 .. .. 30 20 50 16 30 .. .. 96 9 1.46 43,000 36 11 18 30 52 72 11 40 .. 73 47 7 0.04 2,000 40 27 6 34 60 687 87 1,480 0.82 1445 .. .. .. .. .. 1448 391 2.73 6639 187 4854 0.82 4,100,000 70 .. 28 25 46 36 5 7,000 1.23 157 285 1606 0.05 52,000 .. .. 20 45 35 50 10 4,000 .. .. 55 62 0.01 .. .. .. .. .. .. 164 63 1,005 .. 590 160 56 0.01 .. 40 5 .. .. .. 29 .. .. .. .. 173 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 174 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 3. Indicators to chapters 8­9 (continued) Under-five Maternal Age Life expectancy mortality Improved mortality dependency at birth, 1998 rate sanitation facilities Improved water source ratio ratio dependents % of total % of rural % of total % of rural estimates to working- per 1,000 population population population population per 100,000 age COUNTRY years live births with access with access with access with access live births population or REGION male fem. total 1980 1998 2000 2000 2000 2000 1995 1980 1998 Ireland 73 79 76 14 7 .. .. .. .. 9 0.7 0.5 Isle of Man .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Israel 76 80 78 19 8 .. .. .. .. 8 0.7 0.6 Italy 75 82 78 17 6 .. .. .. .. 11 0.5 0.5 Jamaica 73 77 75 39 24 99 99 92 85 120 0.9 0.6 Japan 77 84 81 11 5 .. .. .. .. 12 0.5 0.5 Jordan 69 73 71 .. 31 99 98 96 84 41 1.1 0.8 Kazakstan 59 70 65 .. 29 99 98 91 82 80 0.6 0.5 Kenya 50 52 51 115 124 87 82 57 42 1300 1.1 0.9 Kiribati .. .. 61 .. .. 48 44 48 25 .. .. .. Korea, Dem. Rep. .. .. 63 .. 68 99 100 100 100 35 0.8 0.5 Korea, Rep. 69 76 73 27 11 63 4 92 71 20 0.6 0.4 Kuwait 74 80 77 35 13 .. .. 77 66 25 0.7 0.6 Kyrgyz Republic 63 71 67 .. 41 100 100 37 29 80 0.8 0.7 Lao PDR 52 55 54 200 .. 30 19 .. .. 650 0.8 0.9 Latvia 64 76 70 26 19 .. .. 100 100 70 0.5 0.5 Lebanon 68 72 70 .. 30 99 87 78 74 130 0.8 0.6 Lesotho 54 57 55 168 144 49 40 .. .. 530 0.9 0.8 Liberia .. .. 47 235 .. .. .. 72 68 .. 0.9 .. Libya .. .. 70 .. 27 97 96 .. .. 120 1 0.7 Liechtenstein .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Lithuania 67 77 72 24 12 .. .. .. 27 0.5 0.5 Luxembourg .. .. 77 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.5 .. Macedonia, FYR 70 75 73 69 18 .. .. .. .. 17 0.6 0.5 Madagascar 56 59 58 216 146 42 30 47 31 580 0.9 0.9 Malawi 42 42 42 265 229 76 70 57 44 580 1 1 Malaysia 70 75 72 42 12 98 94 39 0.8 0.6 Maldives .. .. 67 .. .. 56 41 100 100 .. 0.9 .. Mali 49 52 50 .. 218 69 58 65 61 630 1 1 Malta .. .. 77 .. .. 100 100 100 100 .. 0.5 .. Marshall Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Martinique .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Mauritania 52 55 54 175 140 33 19 37 40 870 0.9 0.9 Mauritius .. .. 71 .. 22 99 99 100 100 45 0.6 0.5 Mayotte .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Mexico 69 75 72 74 35 74 34 88 69 65 1 0.6 Micronesia, Fed. Sts. .. .. 67 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.9 .. Moldova 63 70 67 .. 22 99 98 92 88 65 0.5 0.5 Monaco .. .. .. .. .. 100 100 100 100 .. .. .. Mongolia 65 68 66 .. 60 30 2 60 30 65 0.9 0.7 Morocco 65 69 67 125 61 68 44 80 56 390 0.9 0.6 Mozambique 44 47 45 .. 213 43 26 57 41 980 0.9 0.9 Myanmar 58 62 60 134 118 64 57 72 66 170 0.8 0.5 Namibia 54 55 54 114 112 41 17 77 67 370 0.9 0.8 Nepal 58 58 58 180 107 28 22 88 87 830 0.8 0.8 174 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 175 ANNEX 2 DATA TABLES: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 8­9 Fixed line and Research Scientists mobile and devel- and Smoking phone Personal Inter- opment engi- prevalence Agricul- Indus- Ser- sub- compu- net expendi- neers Tuberculosis HIV (% of adults) ture try vices scribers ters users ture in R&D per People per per per 100,000 thousand % of infected % of % of % of 1,000 1,000 thou- million people of cases adults (all ages) male female GDP GDP GDP people people sands % of GDP people 1997 1997 1997 1997 1985-98 1985-98 1999 1999 1999 2000 2000 2001 1989-2000 1990-2000 21 1 0.09 1,700 29 28 .. .. .. 1134 359 895 1.21 2184 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7 0 0.07 .. 45 30 .. .. .. 1176 254 1,800 3.62 1563 10 5 0.31 90,000 38 26 3 31 67 1211 180 16,400 1.04 1128 8 0 0.99 14,000 43 13 8 33 59 340 46 100 .. .. 29 48 0.01 6,800 59 15 2 37 61 1112 315 55,930 2.98 5095 11 1 0.02 .. .. .. 2 27 71 199 30 212 .. 1948 104 27 0.03 2,500 .. .. 10 30 60 125 100 0.29 716 297 106 11.64 1,600,000 .. .. 27 17 56 15 5 500 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 44 9 .. .. 178 91 0.01 .. .. .. .. .. .. 22 0 .. .. 142 90 0.01 3,100 68 .. 5 44 51 1060 405 24,380 2.68 2319 81 3 0.12 .. 52 12 .. .. .. 431 114 200 0.20 212 99 7 0.01 <100 .. .. 44 22 35 79 5 151 0.19 581 167 17 0.04 1,100 62 8 53 22 25 10 3 10 .. .. 82 2 0.01 <100 67 12 5 33 63 469 140 170 0.40 1078 26 1 0.09 .. .. .. 12 27 61 401 53 300 .. .. 407 13 8.35 85,000 38 1 18 38 44 20 5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3 1 .. .. 19 2 0.05 .. .. .. .. .. .. 115 .. 20 .. 361 .. .. .. .. .. 915 .. .. 80 5 0.01 <100 52 10 10 33 57 463 65 250 0.63 2027 .. .. .. .. .. 1446 456 .. .. 47 2 0.01 <100 .. .. 11 28 60 308 70 .. 387 205 58 0.12 8,600 .. .. 30 14 56 8 2 35 0.13 12 404 33 14.92 710,000 .. .. 38 18 45 9 1 20 .. .. 112 30 0.62 68,000 .. .. 14 44 43 419 95 6,500 0.40 160 .. .. .. .. .. 119 37 .. .. 292 58 1.67 89,000 .. .. 47 17 37 5 1 30 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 817 205 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 84 38 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 226 13 0.52 6,100 .. .. 25 29 46 13 10 7 .. .. 66 1 0.08 .. 47 4 .. .. .. 386 101 158 0.28 360 .. .. .. .. .. 72 .. .. 41 60 0.35 180,000 38 14 5 27 68 267 58 3,636 0.43 225 .. .. .. .. .. 84 .. .. 73 5 0.11 2,500 .. .. 21 24 55 165 14 60 0.62 334 .. .. .. .. .. 1600 .. .. 205 9 0.01 <100 40 7 33 28 40 115 13 40 .. 531 122 28 0.03 .. 40 9 17 32 51 131 12 400 .. .. 255 66 14.17 1,200,000 .. .. 32 24 44 8 4 15 .. .. 171 163 1.79 440,000 58 2 53 9 38 6 2 10 .. .. 527 12 19.94 150,000 .. .. 13 33 55 108 42 45 .. .. 211 99 0.24 26,000 69 13 41 22 37 12 3 60 .. .. 175 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 176 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 3. Indicators to chapters 8­9 (continued) Under-five Maternal Age Life expectancy mortality Improved mortality dependency at birth, 1998 rate sanitation facilities Improved water source ratio ratio dependents % of total % of rural % of total % of rural estimates to working- per 1,000 population population population population per 100,000 age COUNTRY years live births with access with access with access with access live births population or REGION male fem. total 1980 1998 2000 2000 2000 2000 1995 1980 1998 Netherlands 75 81 78 11 7 100 100 100 100 10 0.5 0.5 Netherlands Antilles .. .. 76 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.6 .. New Caledonia .. .. 73 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.7 .. New Zealand 75 80 77 16 7 .. .. .. .. 15 0.6 0.5 Nicaragua 66 71 68 143 42 85 72 77 59 250 1 0.9 Niger 44 48 46 317 250 20 5 59 56 920 1 1 Nigeria 52 55 53 196 119 54 45 62 49 1100 1 0.9 Northern Mariana Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Norway 76 81 78 11 6 .. .. 100 100 9 0.6 0.5 Oman .. .. 73 .. 25 92 61 39 30 120 0.9 0.9 Pakistan 61 63 62 161 120 62 43 90 87 200 0.9 0.8 Palau .. .. 71 .. .. 100 100 79 20 .. .. .. Panama 72 76 74 36 25 92 83 90 79 100 0.8 0.6 Papua New Guinea 57 59 58 .. 76 82 80 42 32 390 0.8 0.7 Paraguay 68 72 70 61 27 94 93 78 59 170 0.9 0.8 Peru 66 71 69 126 47 71 49 80 62 240 0.8 0.6 Philippines 67 71 69 81 40 83 69 86 79 240 0.8 0.7 Poland 69 77 73 .. 11 .. .. .. .. 12 0.5 0.5 Portugal 72 79 75 31 8 .. .. .. .. 12 0.6 0.5 Puerto Rico .. .. 76 22 .. .. .. .. .. 30 0.7 0.5 Qatar .. .. 74 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.5 .. Romania 66 73 69 36 25 53 10 58 16 60 0.6 0.5 Russian Federation 61 73 67 .. 20 .. .. 99 96 75 0.5 0.5 Rwanda 40 42 41 .. 205 8 8 41 40 2300 1 0.9 Samoa .. .. 69 .. .. 99 100 99 100 .. 1 .. Sao Tome and Principe .. .. 64 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Saudi Arabia 70 74 72 85 26 100 100 95 64 23 0.9 0.8 Senegal 51 54 52 .. 121 70 48 78 65 1200 0.9 0.9 Seychelles .. .. 72 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Sierra Leone 36 39 37 336 283 66 53 57 46 2100 0.9 0.9 Singapore 75 79 77 13 6 100 .. 100 .. 9 0.5 0.4 Slovak Republic 69 77 73 23 10 100 100 100 100 14 0.6 0.5 Slovenia 71 79 75 18 7 .. .. 100 100 17 0.5 0.4 Solomon Islands .. .. 71 .. .. 34 18 71 65 .. 1 .. Somalia .. .. 48 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 .. South Africa 61 66 63 91 83 87 80 86 73 340 0.7 0.6 Spain 75 82 78 16 7 8 0.6 0.5 Sri Lanka 71 76 73 48 18 94 93 77 70 60 0.7 0.5 St. Kitts and Nevis .. .. 70 .. .. 96 .. 98 .. .. .. .. St. Lucia .. .. 72 .. .. 89 .. 98 .. .. .. .. St. Vincent and the Grenadines .. .. 73 .. .. 96 93 .. .. .. .. .. Sudan .. .. 55 132 105 62 48 75 69 1500 0.9 0.7 Suriname .. .. 70 .. .. 93 75 82 50 .. 0.8 .. Swaziland .. .. 56 .. 5 .. .. .. .. .. 1 .. Sweden 77 82 79 9 5 100 100 100 100 8 0.6 0.6 176 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 177 ANNEX 2 DATA TABLES: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 8­9 Fixed line and Research Scientists mobile and devel- and Smoking phone Personal Inter- opment engi- prevalence Agricul- Indus- Ser- sub- compu- net expendi- neers Tuberculosis HIV (% of adults) ture try vices scribers ters users ture in R&D per People per per per 100,000 thousand % of infected % of % of % of 1,000 1,000 thou- million people of cases adults (all ages) male female GDP GDP GDP people people sands % of GDP people 1997 1997 1997 1997 1985-98 1985-98 1999 1999 1999 2000 2000 2001 1989-2000 1990-2000 10 1 0.17 14,000 36 29 .. .. .. 1291 394 7,900 2.02 2572 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 470 .. .. 5 0 0.07 1,300 24 22 .. .. .. 893 366 1,092 1.11 2197 95 5 0.19 4,100 .. .. 26 21 53 50 24 50 0.15 73 148 32 1.45 65,000 .. .. 40 17 43 2 0 12 .. .. 214 442 4.12 2,300,000 24 7 41 62 -3 5 7 115 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 452 .. .. 6 0 0.06 1,300 36 36 2 32 66 1481 489 2,700 1.70 4112 13 0 0.11 .. .. .. .. .. .. 152 32 120 .. 4 181 583 0.09 64,000 27 4 26 25 49 24 4 500 .. 69 .. .. .. .. 57 2 0.61 9,000 .. .. 8 18 74 296 37 90 0.35 124 250 30 0.19 4,500 46 28 30 46 24 14 55 50 .. .. 73 5 0.13 3,200 24 6 26 22 52 201 13 60 .. .. 265 70 0.56 72,000 41 13 8 39 54 117 41 3,000 0.08 229 310 481 0.06 24,000 .. .. 17 31 52 124 19 2,000 .. 156 44 26 0.06 12,000 51 29 4 33 63 458 69 3,800 0.70 1428 55 4 0.69 35,000 38 15 .. .. .. 1095 105 2,500 0.71 1576 10 0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 593 600 .. .. .. .. .. 470 150 .. .. 121 42 0.01 5,000 68 32 16 40 44 285 32 1,000 0.37 913 106 241 0.05 40,000 67 30 7 34 58 240 63 4,300 1.00 3481 276 17 12.75 370,000 .. .. 46 20 34 7 20 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 62 6 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 31 .. .. 46 14 0.01 .. 53 .. 7 48 45 201 60 300 .. .. 223 33 1.77 75,000 .. .. 18 25 57 48 17 100 0.01 2 .. .. .. .. .. 555 136 .. .. 315 23 3.17 68,000 .. .. 44 24 32 6 7 .. .. 48 2 0.15 3,100 32 3 0 36 64 1168 483 1,500 1.89 4140 35 2 0.01 <100 43 26 4 32 64 520 137 674 0.69 1843 30 1 0.01 <100 35 23 4 39 57 1006 275 600 1.48 2180 .. .. .. .. .. 21 38 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 .. .. 394 266 12.91 2,900,000 52 17 4 32 64 304 66 3,068 .. 992 61 23 0.57 120,000 48 25 4 28 69 1031 145 7,500 0.94 1921 48 14 0.07 6,900 55 1 21 28 51 65 7 150 0.18 191 .. .. .. .. .. 512 155 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 331 142 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 240 106 .. .. 180 112 0.99 .. .. .. .. .. .. 13 3 56 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 268 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 65 12 14 .. .. 5 0 0.07 3,000 22 24 .. .. .. 1475 507 4,600 3.80 4511 177 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 178 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 3. Indicators to chapters 8­9 (continued) Under-five Maternal Age Life expectancy mortality Improved mortality dependency at birth, 1998 rate sanitation facilities Improved water source ratio ratio dependents % of total % of rural % of total % of rural estimates to working- per 1,000 population population population population per 100,000 age COUNTRY years live births with access with access with access with access live births population or REGION male fem. total 1980 1998 2000 2000 2000 2000 1995 1980 1998 Switzerland 76 82 79 11 5 100 100 100 100 8 0.5 0.5 Syrian Arab Republic 67 72 69 73 32 90 81 80 64 200 1.1 0.8 Tajikistan 66 71 69 .. 33 90 88 60 47 120 0.9 0.8 Tanzania 46 48 47 176 136 90 86 68 57 1100 1 0.9 Thailand 70 75 72 58 33 96 96 84 81 44 0.8 0.5 Togo 47 50 49 188 144 34 17 54 38 980 0.9 1 Tonga .. .. 71 .. .. .. .. 100 100 .. .. .. Trinidad and Tobago .. . 73 39 18 99 .. 90 .. 65 0.7 0.5 Tunisia 70 74 72 100 32 84 62 80 58 70 0.8 0.6 Turkey 67 72 69 133 42 90 70 82 86 55 0.8 0.5 Turkmenistan 63 70 66 .. 44 .. .. .. .. 65 0.8 0.7 Uganda 42 41 42 180 170 79 77 52 47 1100 1 1 Ukraine 62 73 67 .. 17 99 98 98 94 45 0.5 0.5 United Arab Emirates .. .. 75 .. 10 .. .. .. .. 30 0.4 0.4 United Kingdom 75 80 77 14 7 100 100 100 100 10 0.6 0.5 United States 74 80 77 15 .. 100 100 100 100 12 0.5 0.5 Uruguay 70 78 74 42 19 94 85 98 93 50 0.6 0.6 Uzbekistan 66 73 69 .. 29 89 85 85 79 60 0.9 0.8 Vanuatu .. .. 65 .. .. 100 100 88 94 .. 0.9 .. Venezuela 70 76 73 42 25 68 48 83 70 43 0.8 0.6 Vietnam 66 71 68 105 42 47 38 77 72 95 0.9 0.7 Virgin Islands (U.S.) .. .. 77 .. .. .. .. .. West Bank and Gaza .. .. 71 .. 26 .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 Yemen, Rep. 55 56 56 198 96 38 21 69 68 850 1.1 1.1 Yugoslavia, FR (Serbia/ Montenegro) .. .. 72 .. 16 100 99 98 97 15 0.5 0.5 Zambia 43 43 43 149 192 78 64 64 48 870 1.1 0.9 Zimbabwe 50 52 51 108 125 62 57 83 73 610 1 0.8 World 65 69 67 123 75 56 38 81 71 .. 0.7 0.6 Low Income 59 61 63* 177 107 43 31 76 70 .. 0.8* 0.6* Middle income 67 72 69 79 38 61 43 82 70 .. 0.7 0.6 Lower middle income 67* 72* 68 83* 39* 59 42 81 70 .. 0.7 0.6 Upper middle income 67 74 71 66 35 79 64 88 77 .. 0.7 0.6 Low & middle Income 63 67 65 135 79 52 36 79 70 .. 0.8 0.6 East Asia & Pacific 67 71 69 82 43 47 36 76 67 .. 0.7 0.5 Europe & Central Asia 65 74 69 .. 26 .. .. 91 83 .. 0.6 0.5 Latin America & Caribbean 67 73 70 78 38 77 52 86 65 .. 0.8 0.6 Middle East & N. Africa 66 69 68 136 55 85 72 88 78 .. 0.9 0.7 South Asia 62 63 62 180 89 34 21 84 80 .. 0.8 0.7 Sub-Saharan Africa 49 52 50 188 151 54 46 58 46 .. 0.9 0.9 High Income 75 81 78 15 6 .. .. .. .. .. 0.5 0.5 *indicates income-group aggregate that includes data on China. Note: Revisions to estimates of China's GNP per Capita, made by analysts in 2000­01, caused that economy to be reclassified from low to lower middle income. As a result, for different indicators in these data tables China figures as part of one or the other income group, which considerably affects these group aggregates. 178 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 179 ANNEX 2 DATA TABLES: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 8­9 Fixed line and Research Scientists mobile and devel- and Smoking phone Personal Inter- opment engi- prevalence Agricul- Indus- Ser- sub- compu- net expendi- neers Tuberculosis HIV (% of adults) ture try vices scribers ters users ture in R&D per People per per per 100,000 thousand % of infected % of % of % of 1,000 1,000 thou- million people of cases adults (all ages) male female GDP GDP GDP people people sands % of GDP people 1997 1997 1997 1997 1985-98 1985-98 1999 1999 1999 2000 2000 2001 1989-2000 1990-2000 11 1 0.32 12,000 36 26 .. .. .. 1370 652 2,223 2.64 3592 75 17 0.01 .. .. .. .. .. .. 105 15 60 0.18 29 87 9 0.01 <100 .. .. 6 30 65 36 3 .. 660 307 124 9.42 1,400,000 .. .. 48 14 38 11 3 300 .. .. 142 180 2.23 780,000 49 4 13 40 49 143 28 3,536 0.10 74 353 19 8.52 170,000 65 14 43 21 36 20 22 150 .. 102 .. .. .. .. .. 100 .. .. 11 0 0.94 6,800 .. .. .. .. .. 370 62 120 0.14 145 40 6 0.04 .. .. .. 13 28 59 112 23 400 0.45 336 41 42 0.01 .. 63 24 18 26 56 529 38 2,500 0.64 306 74 5 0.01 <100 27 1 25 42 34 83 8 .. .. 312 94 9.51 930,000 .. .. 44 18 38 11 3 60 0.75 24 61 49 0.43 110,000 57 22 14 34 51 223 18 600 0.95 2118 21 1 0.18 .. .. .. .. .. .. 833 136 976 .. .. 18 11 0.09 25,000 28 26 .. .. .. 1316 338 24,000 1.86 2666 7 15 0.76 820,000 28 23 2 26 72 1054 572 142,823 2.70 4099 31 1 0.33 5,200 41 27 9 29 62 402 105 400 0.26 219 81 29 0.01 <100 .. .. 31 27 42 69 150 .. 1754 .. .. .. .. .. 37 13 .. .. 42 11 0.69 .. 29 12 5 24 71 330 46 1,265 0.34 194 189 221 0.22 88,000 73 4 26 33 42 42 8 1,010 .. 274 .. .. .. .. .. 951 .. .. 26 1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 142 .. 60 .. .. 111 31 0.01 .. .. .. 17 49 34 21 2 17 .. .. 51 8 0.01 .. .. .. .. .. .. 349 23 600 .. 2389 576 61 19.07 770,000 .. .. 17 26 57 18 7 25 .. 543 74 25.84 1,500,000 36 15 19 24 56 49 17 100 .. .. 136 16,146 0.95 .. .. 4 32 61 215 80 501,478 2.38 .. 180 1.22 ..* ..* 27 30 43 26 5 15,932 .. 241 0.71 50 21 10 36 55 192 31 96,658 .. 778 101 0.92 .. .. 15* 40* 46* 162 26 60,355 0.72 818 64 0.41 46 22 7 32 61 337 72 36,303 .. 453 157 1.06 .. .. 12 35 54 98 19 112,591 .. .. 151 0.2 .. .. 13 46 41 101 16 50,902 1.00 545 75 0.08 60 27 10 32 58 276 53 18,778 0.80 2074 81 0.59 39 20 8 29 63 216 49 26,282 .. 287 67 0.03 .. .. .. .. .. 107 29 3,356 .. .. 193 0.66 .. .. 28 25 47 30 4 7,973 158 267 7.28 .. .. 18 32 50 19 10 5,300 .. .. 18 0.36 37 23 2 30 64 1081 391 388,888 2.61 3281 179 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 180 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 4. Indicators to chapters 10­13 Central govern- Proceeds Urban ment from Military popu- Motor Passenger expendi- State-owned privati- expendi- Trade Net private lation vehicles cars ture enterprises zation tures in goods capital flows share in Gross % of domestic total per per invest- popu- 1,000 1,000 share in ment, $ mil- % of PPP COUNTRY lation people people % of GDP GDP, % % lions % of GNP GDP $ millions or REGION 1980 1999 1980 1998 1980 1998 1980 1998 1990-97 1990-97 1990-99 1992 1997 1989 1999 1990 1999 Afghanistan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Albania 34 41 .. 40 .. 27 .. 29.8 .. .. 28.5 4.7 1.4 6.7 13.9 31 37 Algeria 44 60 .. 52 30 25 .. 29.2 .. .. 55.1 1.8 3.9 16.4 14.3 -424 -1,486 American Samoa .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Andorra .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Angola 21 34 .. 20 .. 18 .. .. .. .. 6.2 24.2 20.5 31.1 16 235 2,373 Antigua and Barbuda 31 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 65 .. .. Argentina 83 90 155 176 .. 137 18.2 15.3 1.3 3.1 44,588.00 1.9 1.2 5.1 10.9 -203 32,296 Armenia 66 70 .. 2 .. 0 .. .. .. .. 219.2 3.5 3.5 .. 13.3 0 122 Aruba .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Australia 86 85 502 605 401 488 22.7 24.5 .. 12 .. 2.5 2.2 28.2 26.9 .. .. Austria 65 65 330 521 297 481 36.6 40.5 .. .. .. 1 0.9 50.8 65.1 .. .. Azerbaijan 53 57 .. 47 .. 36 .. 25.1 .. .. 15.8 2.9 1.9 .. 8.6 .. 596 Bahamas, The .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Bahrain 81 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Bangladesh 14 24 .. 1 .. 1 7.4 .. 2.5 11.9 59.6 1.3 1.4 4.1 6.8 70 198 Barbados 40 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Belarus 57 71 .. 112 .. .. .. 32.2 .. .. 10.8 1.9 1.7 .. 18.2 .. 394 Belgium 95 97 349 485 .. 435 50.1 46.6 .. .. .. 1.8 1.5 .. 129.6 .. .. Belize 49 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Benin 27 42 .. 8 .. 7 .. .. .. .. 39 1.3 1.3 19.8 18.1 1 31 Bermuda 100 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Bhutan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Bolivia 46 62 19 52 .. 32 .. 21.9 11.4 18 1,045.40 2.2 1.9 12.5 14.6 3 1,016 Bosnia and Herzegovina 36 .. .. 26 .. 23 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0 Botswana 15 50 27 45 9 15 29.8 35.3 5.5 12.4 .. 4.4 5.1 54.7 44 77 36 Brazil 66 81 85 77 75 .. 20.2 .. 7.4 8.2 69,607.70 1.1 1.8 6.3 8.4 562 22,793 Brunei 60 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Bulgaria 61 69 .. 252 92 220 .. 48.1 .. .. 3,199.00 3.3 3 59.7 22.9 -42 1,112 Burkina Faso 9 18 .. 5 .. 4 12.2 .. .. .. 7.5 2.4 2.8 6.6 8.7 0 10 Burundi 4 9 .. .. .. .. 21.5 24 .. .. 4.2 2.7 6.1 7 4.5 -5 0 Cambodia 12 16 .. 6 .. 5 .. .. .. .. .. 4.9 4.1 2 6.7 0 122 Cameroon 31 .. 8 12 .. 7 15.7 12.7 5.4 6.8 133.1 1.6 3 15.4 12.7 -125 -13 Canada 76 77 548 560 417 455 21.1 24.7 .. .. .. 2 1.3 43.5 57.3 .. .. Cape Verde 24 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Cayman Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Central African Republic 35 41 8 1 .. 0 22 .. .. .. .. 2 3.9 8.9 12 0 13 Chad 19 23 .. 8 .. 3 .. .. .. .. .. 4 2.7 8.7 9.8 -1 14 Channel Islands 32 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Chile 81 85 61 110 45 71 28 21.6 8.3 6.7 2,138.40 2.5 3.9 24 23.7 2,098 11,851 180 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 181 ANNEX 2: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 10­13 Foreign direct investment Portfolio investment Aid dependency Aid as % % of gross of gross domestic % of Bonds Equity Aid per Aid as domestic $ millions investment PPP GDP $ millions $ millions $ millions capita $ % of GNP investment 1990 1999 1990 1999 1989 1999 1990 1999 1990 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0 41 0.0 6.6 0.0 0.4 0 0 0 0 164.8 479.7 51.7 142.1 8.4 12.8 46.4 77.7 0 7 0.0 0.1 0.0 .. -16 0 0 3 419.4 88.9 15.3 3.0 1.0 0.2 3.1 0.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. -335 2,471 -27.9 71.9 1.4 .. 0 0 0 0 449.6 387.5 42.3 31.4 23.1 13.1 66.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,836 23,929 9.3 44.2 0.4 5.5 -857 8,000 13 404 146.8 91.3 4.3 2.5 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2 0 122 .. 34.0 .. 2.6 0 0 0 0 191.3 208.5 51.0 54.7 8.1 .. 34.6 58.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7,456 5,655 10.9 6.7 4.5 2.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 653 2,834 1.7 5.6 1.0 3.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 510 .. 32.2 .. 2.2 .. 0 .. 0 147.4 162.0 19.4 20.3 4.5 4.7 29.2 10.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3 179 0.1 1.8 0.0 0.1 0 0 0 4 1,751.7 1,203.1 14.9 9.4 5.0 2.5 28.2 11.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 225 .. 3.5 .. 0.3 .. 0 .. 0 119.1 24.0 11.6 2.4 0.6 0.1 1.8 0.4 .. 38,392 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 31 0.4 7.9 2.0 1.0 0 0 0 0 256.0 210.8 48.1 34.5 17.5 9.0 108.5 50.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 27 1,016 4.4 64.7 0.7 5.3 0 0 0 0 568.5 568.6 78.6 69.9 9.8 7.0 66.1 36.2 .. 0 .. 0.0 .. .. .. 0 .. 0 390.6 1,063.0 107.5 273.9 .. 22.8 .. 69.4 95 37 8.0 3.1 0.7 0.6 0 0 0 0 85.6 60.9 60.1 38.3 2.0 1.1 7.2 5.2 989 32,659 1.1 21.3 0.2 2.9 129 2,683 0 1961 252.8 183.6 1.6 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4 806 0.1 34.1 0.0 2.1 65 18 0 102 158.0 264.8 18.7 32.3 1.6 2.1 17.2 11.2 0 10 0.0 0.1 0.1 .. 0 0 0 0 432.6 398.1 44.4 36.2 23.5 15.5 113.4 55.4 1 0 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.0 0 0 0 0 312.1 74.2 51.8 11.1 34.2 10.5 319.3 114.0 0 126 0.0 28.1 .. 0.9 0 0 0 0 326.6 278.9 31.5 23.7 13.6 9.0 73.3 .. -113 40 -5.7 3.0 0.6 .. 0 0 0 0 730.3 433.8 57.0 29.5 10.0 5.0 60.6 24.3 7,581 25,129 6.4 19.6 2.4 6.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1 13 0.5 3.3 0.2 .. 0 0 0 0 165.3 117.2 51.3 33.1 19.9 11.3 165.6 77.9 0 15 0.0 9.5 0.8 .. 0 0 0 0 213.0 187.8 33.0 25.1 18.5 12.4 108.5 118.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 590 9,221 7.8 62.8 2.0 10.8 -7 862 320 18 151.2 69.1 10.8 4.6 0.3 0.1 1.2 0.5 181 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 182 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 4. Indicators to chapters 10­13 (continued) Central govern- Proceeds Urban ment from Military popu- Motor Passenger expendi- State-owned privati- expendi- Trade Net private lation vehicles cars ture enterprises zation tures in goods capital flows share in Gross % of domestic total per per invest- popu- 1,000 1,000 share in ment, $ mil- % of PPP COUNTRY lation people people % of GDP GDP, % % lions % of GNP GDP $ millions or REGION 1980 1999 1980 1998 1980 1998 1980 1998 1990-97 1990-97 1990-99 1992 1997 1989 1999 1990 1999 China 20 32 2 8 .. 3 .. 9.3 .. 27.6 20,593.20 2.8 2.2 7.3 8 8,107 40,632 Hong Kong, China 92 100 54 77 41 56 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 165.4 239.2 .. .. Macao, China .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Colombia 64 73 .. 40 11 21 11.5 16 .. .. 5,979.50 2.4 3.7 6.7 9.3 345 3,635 Comoros 21 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Congo, Dem. Rep. 29 .. .. .. .. .. 12.4 10.4 .. .. .. 3 5 4 2.4 -24 1 Congo, Rep. 41 62 .. 20 .. 14 49.4 38.4 .. .. .. 5.7 4.1 88.8 104.5 -100 5 Costa Rica 43 48 .. 130 20 85 25 30.1 .. 11.5 50.8 1.4 0.6 19.9 40.6 23 924 Cote d'Ivoire 35 46 24 28 .. 18 31.7 24 .. .. 597.4 1.5 1.1 26.9 28.6 57 74 Croatia 50 57 .. .. .. .. .. 45.6 .. .. 1,318.30 7.7 6.3 .. 36.5 .. 2,392 Cuba 68 .. .. 32 .. 16 .. .. .. .. 706 .. .. .. .. .. .. Cyprus 46 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Czech Republic 75 75 .. 402 .. 358 .. 35 .. .. 5,633.10 2.7 1.9 .. 41.6 876 4,837 Denmark 84 85 322 413 271 355 38.6 41.4 .. .. .. 2 1.7 58.3 67.8 .. .. Djibouti 74 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Dominica .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Dominican Republic 51 64 36 45 20 27 16.9 16.7 .. .. 643.4 0.9 1.1 21.4 29 130 1,404 Ecuador 47 64 .. 45 28 41 14.2 .. .. 13.9 169.3 3.5 4 15.5 20.1 183 944 Egypt, Arab Rep. 44 45 .. 30 8 23 50.3 30.6 .. .. 2,905.40 3.7 2.8 8.2 9.1 698 1,558 El Salvador 42 46 .. 61 16 30 .. .. .. .. 1,070.10 2.1 0.9 11.4 16.1 8 360 Equatorial Guinea 27 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Eritrea 14 18 .. 2 .. 2 .. .. .. .. 2 .. 7.8 .. .. .. 0 Estonia 70 69 .. 372 .. 312 .. 32.9 .. .. 778.2 0.5 1.5 .. 58.5 104 569 Ethiopia 11 17 2 2 1 1 19.9 .. .. .. 172 3.7 1.9 .. 5.5 -45 78 Faeroe Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Fiji 38 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Finland 60 67 288 448 256 392 28.1 35.5 .. .. .. 2.2 1.7 54.2 61.3 .. .. France 73 75 402 530 355 442 39.5 46.6 .. .. .. 3.4 3 37.6 44 .. .. French Polynesia 60 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Gabon 36 .. .. 29 .. 17 36.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. 52.8 52.2 .. 209 Gambia, The 18 .. .. 17 11 8 31.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. 14.5 14.9 .. 14 Georgia 52 60 .. 87 .. 80 .. 8.6 .. .. .. 2.4 1.4 .. 6.3 21 86 Germany 83 87 399 552 297 506 .. 32.9 .. .. .. 2.1 1.6 51.9 52 .. .. Ghana 31 38 .. 7 .. 5 10.9 .. .. .. 888.4 0.8 0.7 11.3 15.1 -5 -16 Greece 58 60 134 328 91 238 29.3 34 .. .. .. 4.4 4.6 20.7 25.5 .. .. Greenland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Grenada .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Guam 40 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Guatemala 37 39 .. 17 .. 9 14.3 .. 2 4.8 1,351.20 1.5 1.4 11.5 16.6 44 98 Guinea 19 32 .. 5 .. 2 .. 16.9 .. .. 45 1.4 1.5 13.9 14.1 -1 63 182 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 183 ANNEX 2: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 10­13 Foreign direct investment Portfolio investment Aid dependency Aid as % % of gross of gross domestic % of Bonds Equity Aid per Aid as domestic $ millions investment PPP GDP $ millions $ millions $ millions capita $ % of GNP investment 1990 1999 1990 1999 1989 1999 1990 1999 1990 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999 3,487 38,753 2.8 10.5 0.3 1.0 -48 660 0 3732 3,225.2 2,323.8 2.7 1.9 0.6 0.2 1.4 0.6 .. .. .. .. .. 35.3 .. .. .. .. 26.9 3.7 4.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 500 1,109 6.7 10.1 0.4 0.8 -4 1,235 0 25 77.4 301.3 2.0 7.3 0.1 0.4 0.4 2.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. -12 1 -1.4 0.2 .. .. 0 0 0 0 245.5 132.3 5.8 2.7 4.8 .. 53.4 .. 0 5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0 0 0 362.1 140.3 145.5 49.1 23.9 8.4 37.6 28.4 163 669 8.3 25.5 0.7 2.1 -42 283 0 0 73.3 -9.8 22.5 -2.7 0.7 -0.1 3.3 -0.4 48 350 6.6 19.2 0.1 1.8 -1 -46 0 8 1,593.5 447.0 118.0 29.0 23.1 4.3 165.7 24.5 .. 1,408 .. 29.2 .. 4.8 .. 539 .. 0 110.3 48.2 23.7 10.8 0.9 0.2 5.2 1.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 47.1 58.1 4.3 5.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 207 5,093 2.4 33.7 .. 4.0 0 175 0 500 148.3 318.1 14.3 30.9 0.4 0.6 1.2 2.1 1,132 8,482 4.2 24.8 3.2 13.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 133 1,338 7.5 30.6 0.4 2.9 0 -4 0 0 60.5 194.7 7.9 23.2 0.6 1.2 2.7 4.5 126 690 6.7 28.1 0.6 1.9 0 -19 0 0 211.6 145.6 18.9 11.7 1.4 0.8 6.7 5.9 734 1,065 5.9 5.2 1.0 0.5 -1 100 0 550 2,689.8 1,579.0 47.1 25.2 5.2 1.8 31.3 7.8 2 231 0.3 11.4 0.3 0.9 0 150 0 0 304.7 182.7 55.0 29.7 3.8 1.5 19.0 9.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0 .. 0.0 .. .. .. 0 .. 0 157.2 148.5 45.1 37.2 23.7 19.5 173.5 48.6 82 305 7.2 23.8 .. 3.6 .. 45 .. 191 43.9 82.7 29.3 57.3 1.1 1.6 4.0 6.4 12 90 1.5 0.2 0.0 .. 0 0 0 0 1,071.0 633.4 19.5 10.1 22.2 9.9 144.4 54.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 812 4,754 2.0 18.7 4.2 14.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 13,183 38,828 4.6 14.3 3.0 10.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 200 5.7 16.4 2.5 .. 0 0 0 0 181.1 47.6 169.1 39.3 4.9 1.2 19.8 3.9 .. 14 0.0 20.0 1.1 0.7 0 0 0 0 69.6 33.1 64.7 26.5 19.5 8.6 105.9 47.3 .. 82 0.0 17.8 .. 0.6 .. 0 .. 0 176.5 238.6 32.5 43.8 .. 8.4 .. 51.8 2,532 52,232 1.0 11.2 1.8 7.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 15 17 1.8 0.9 0.1 0.0 0 0 0 19 546.0 607.5 32.8 32.3 10.2 8.0 41.9 33.7 1,005 984 5.2 3.9 0.7 0.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 48 155 4.6 4.9 0.3 4.2 -11 -31 0 0 217.2 292.9 22.4 26.4 1.7 1.6 10.7 9.2 18 63 3.6 10.0 0.1 0.5 0 0 0 0 359.0 237.6 55.9 32.8 10.7 7.0 67.9 39.0 183 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 184 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 4. Indicators to chapters 10­13 (continued) Central govern- Proceeds Urban ment from Military popu- Motor Passenger expendi- State-owned privati- expendi- Trade Net private lation vehicles cars ture enterprises zation tures in goods capital flows share in Gross % of domestic total per per invest- popu- 1,000 1,000 share in ment, $ mil- % of PPP COUNTRY lation people people % of GDP GDP, % % lions % of GNP GDP $ millions or REGION 1980 1999 1980 1998 1980 1998 1980 1998 1990-97 1990-97 1990-99 1992 1997 1989 1999 1990 1999 Guinea-Bissau 17 .. .. 10 .. 6 .. .. .. .. 0.5 .. .. 12.8 17.9 .. 3 Guyana 31 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Haiti 24 35 .. 7 .. 4 17.4 .. .. .. 16.5 1.5 .. 4 10.7 8 30 Honduras 35 52 .. 37 .. .. .. .. .. .. 74.1 1.4 1.3 18.4 26.9 77 251 Hungary 57 64 108 268 95 229 56.2 43.4 .. .. 13,998.90 2.1 1.9 18.2 46.1 -308 4,961 Iceland 88 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. India 23 28 2 7 .. 5 12.3 14.4 13.4 32.4 8,983.40 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.6 1,873 1,813 Indonesia 22 40 8 22 .. 12 22.1 17.9 .. 15.7 6,134.80 1.4 2.3 12.1 12.3 3,235 -8,416 Iran, Islamic Rep. 50 61 .. 36 .. 26 35.7 26.7 .. .. .. 3 3 12.6 8.4 -392 -1,385 Iraq 66 .. .. 56 .. 39 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Ireland 55 .. 236 314 216 279 45.1 35.5 .. .. .. 1.4 1.2 92.1 120.1 .. .. Isle of Man .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Israel 89 91 123 264 107 215 72.8 49 .. .. .. 11.7 9.7 43.3 52.4 .. .. Italy 67 67 334 591 303 539 41.3 44.6 .. .. .. 2.1 2 30.5 35 .. .. Jamaica 47 56 .. 48 .. 40 41.5 .. .. .. 385.5 1 0.9 36.5 40.2 92 425 Japan 76 79 323 560 203 394 18.4 .. .. 6.5 .. 1 1 20.8 23.2 .. .. Jordan 60 74 56 66 41 48 41.3 34 .. .. 63.8 8.8 9 30.9 29.4 254 112 Kazakstan 54 56 .. 82 .. 62 .. .. .. .. 6,375.90 2.9 1.3 .. 12.5 117 1,477 Kenya 16 32 8 14 7 11 25.3 29 .. .. 318.3 3 2.1 14.4 15.6 122 -51 Kiribati .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Korea, Dem. Rep. 57 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Korea, Rep. 57 81 14 226 7 163 17.3 17.4 .. .. .. 3.7 3.4 35.7 35.9 1,056 6,409 Kuwait 90 97 390 462 .. 359 27.7 50.9 .. .. .. 77 7.5 86.8 .. .. .. Kyrgyz Republic 38 34 .. 32 .. 32 .. .. .. .. 139.5 0.7 1.6 .. 8.4 .. -16 Lao PDR 13 23 .. 4 .. 3 .. .. .. .. 32 9.8 3.4 7.3 11.2 6 79 Latvia 68 69 .. 237 .. 198 .. 33 .. .. 490.9 1.6 0.9 .. 30.7 43 303 Lebanon 74 89 .. .. .. .. .. 32.1 .. .. .. 4 3 53.2 39 12 1,771 Lesotho 13 27 10 17 3 6 45.3 55.8 .. .. 16.2 3.6 2.5 39.4 28.4 17 168 Liberia 35 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Libya 70 .. .. 209 .. 154 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Liechtenstein .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Lithuania 61 68 .. 293 .. 265 .. 30.4 .. .. 1,535.60 0.7 0.8 .. .. -3 1,148 Luxembourg 79 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Macedonia, FYR 54 62 .. 156 .. 142 .. .. .. .. 679.3 2.2 2.5 .. 33.1 .. 51 Madagascar 18 29 .. 5 .. 4 .. 17.3 .. .. 9 1.1 1.5 6.9 6.7 7 52 Malawi 9 24 5 5 2 2 34.6 .. .. .. 18.9 1.1 1 20.1 16.6 2 60 Malaysia 42 57 .. 172 52 145 28.5 19.7 .. 25.7 10,159.60 3.2 2.2 59.3 80.2 769 3,247 Maldives 22 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Mali 19 29 .. 5 .. 3 19.4 .. .. .. 21.9 2.3 1.7 14.9 16.1 -8 19 Malta 83 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 184 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 185 ANNEX 2: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 10­13 Foreign direct investment Portfolio investment Aid dependency Aid as % % of gross of gross domestic % of Bonds Equity Aid per Aid as domestic $ millions investment PPP GDP $ millions $ millions $ millions capita $ % of GNP investment 1990 1999 1990 1999 1989 1999 1990 1999 1990 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999 .. 3 2.7 1.1 0.0 .. 0 0 0 0 172.1 52.4 162.4 44.2 77.7 25.7 335.5 147.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8 30 2.2 1.9 0.5 0.1 0 0 0 0 601.1 262.8 85.8 33.7 30.7 6.1 899.8 55.5 44 230 6.3 13.0 1.6 0 0 0 0 293.3 816.9 53.4 129.3 9.1 15.6 22.7 46.1 0 1,950 0.0 14.0 0.0 2.0 921 605 150 592 200.5 247.6 19.5 24.6 0.5 0.5 2.2 1.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 162 2,169 0.2 2.1 0.0 0.1 147 -1,126 105 1302 2,324.3 1,484.4 2.5 1.5 0.7 0.3 3.1 1.4 1,093 -2,745 3.1 -9.2 0.2 0.9 26 -1,458 312 1273 1,638.7 2,206.3 8.6 10.7 1.0 1.7 3.0 6.5 -362 85 -1.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0 0 0 0 130.3 161.4 2.2 2.6 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 259.2 75.8 12.8 3.3 .. .. .. .. 627 19,091 6.3 87.6 0.2 25.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 129 2,363 1.1 11.1 0.4 3.1 .. .. .. .. 1,237.2 905.7 229.1 148.3 1.7 0.9 6.9 4.3 6,411 6,783 2.6 2.8 0.4 1.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 138 524 11.7 28.9 0.9 6.7 0 -65 0 0 109.1 -22.6 43.7 -8.7 2.7 -0.3 7.7 -1.2 1,777 12,308 0.2 1.1 2.0 1.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 38 158 3.0 9.4 0.2 0.9 0 -9 0 11 368.7 430.0 90.8 90.7 6.2 5.4 17.8 25.6 100 1,587 1.2 56.8 .. 2.2 .. -200 .. 0 48.3 161.0 3.0 10.8 0.2 1.1 0.9 5.8 57 14 3.4 1.0 0.3 0.0 0 0 0 5 675.3 308.0 25.7 10.5 10.0 2.9 57.5 21.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5.8 200.7 0.3 8.6 .. .. .. .. 788 9,333 0.8 8.5 0.5 2.1 168 -1,414 518 12426 -114.2 -55.2 -2.6 -1.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 .. 72 .. 2.0 4.9 .. .. .. .. .. 3.4 7.2 2.3 3.8 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 .. 36 .. 15.7 .. 0.3 .. 0 .. 0 172.0 266.6 37.9 54.8 5.5 22.7 59.7 118.2 6 79 .. 14.7 0.1 1.1 0 0 0 0 215.9 293.8 48.1 57.7 14.0 21.1 .. .. 29 348 1.1 21.1 .. 2.4 .. 240 .. 0 52.6 96.4 20.6 39.7 1.0 1.6 5.0 5.8 6 250 1.2 4.2 .. .. 0 -114 0 3 235.2 193.9 59.9 45.4 2.5 1.2 8.0 .. 17 163 5.1 64.1 0.8 4.2 0 0 0 0 116.0 31.1 61.5 14.8 9.5 2.8 24.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4.0 7.3 0.8 1.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 487 0.0 20.0 .. 2.7 .. 505 .. 0 71.4 128.9 19.2 34.9 1.2 1.2 6.6 5.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 30 .. 4.1 .. 0.3 .. 0 .. 0 104.3 273.0 53.5 135.1 4.4 8.0 27.6 37.0 22 58 4.2 2.9 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 289.2 358.2 22.4 23.8 10.2 9.8 89.1 74.6 0 60 0.0 22.4 0.0 .. 0 0 0 0 466.6 445.8 49.2 41.3 41.0 25.1 135.7 166.2 2,333 1,553 16.4 8.8 2.1 0.8 -1,239 747 293 522 65.9 142.6 3.3 6.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. -7 19 -1.3 3.4 0.1 0.5 0 0 0 0 440.7 354.0 46.9 33.4 25.3 14.0 91.5 65.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 185 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 186 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 4. Indicators to chapters 10­13 (continued) Central govern- Proceeds Urban ment from Military popu- Motor Passenger expendi- State-owned privati- expendi- Trade Net private lation vehicles cars ture enterprises zation tures in goods capital flows share in Gross % of domestic total per per invest- popu- 1,000 1,000 share in ment, $ mil- % of PPP COUNTRY lation people people % of GDP GDP, % % lions % of GNP GDP $ millions or REGION 1980 1999 1980 1998 1980 1998 1980 1998 1990-97 1990-97 1990-99 1992 1997 1989 1999 1990 1999 Marshall Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Martinique .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Mauritania 27 56 .. 12 .. 8 .. .. .. .. 1.1 3.5 2.3 32.4 18.8 6 0 Mauritius 42 .. 44 92 27 71 27.2 22.4 .. .. .. .. .. 41.8 34.4 .. 102 Mayotte .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Mexico 66 74 .. 144 60 97 15.7 16.3 4.9 10.3 28,593.00 0.5 1.1 14.1 35.6 8,253 26,780 Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 25 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Moldova 40 46 .. 65 .. 46 .. .. .. .. 26.6 0.5 1 .. 11.9 .. 12 Monaco .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Mongolia 52 63 .. 30 .. 16 .. 23 .. .. .. 2.6 1.9 43.4 18.7 28 28 Morocco 41 55 .. 48 .. 38 33.1 33.3 .. .. 3,102.20 4.5 4.3 13.1 18.6 341 -118 Mozambique 13 39 .. 1 .. 0 .. .. .. .. 138.2 7.6 2.8 11.8 8.7 35 374 Myanmar 24 27 .. 1 .. 1 15.8 8.9 .. .. .. 8.3 7.6 .. .. 153 203 Namibia 23 30 .. 82 .. 46 .. .. .. .. .. 2.2 2.7 38.7 36 .. .. Nepal 7 12 .. .. .. .. 14.3 17.5 .. .. 15.1 1 0.8 4.6 6.8 -8 -8 Netherlands 88 89 343 421 322 391 52.9 47.6 .. .. .. 2.5 1.9 85.4 101.4 .. .. Netherlands Antilles 68 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. New Caledonia 57 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. New Zealand 83 86 492 579 420 470 38.3 33.4 .. .. .. 1.6 1.3 35.8 36.7 .. .. Nicaragua 50 56 .. 34 8 18 30.4 33.2 .. .. 130.3 3.1 1.5 11 21.3 21 382 Niger 13 20 6 5 5 4 18.6 .. .. .. .. 1.3 1.1 10.9 8.5 9 -8 Nigeria 27 43 4 26 3 9 .. .. .. .. 730.2 2.6 1.4 21.3 20.5 467 860 Northern Mariana Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Norway 71 75 342 498 302 402 34.4 35.7 .. .. .. 3.1 2.1 62.7 62.2 .. .. Oman 8 .. .. 152 .. 103 38.5 31.6 .. .. 60.1 .. .. .. .. .. -413 Pakistan 28 36 2 8 2 5 17.5 21.4 .. 28.2 1,992.30 7.4 5.7 8.5 8 182 53 Palau .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Panama 50 56 .. 102 .. 79 30.5 27 7.3 4.6 1,427.30 1.3 1.4 15.1 26.3 127 620 Papua New Guinea 13 17 .. 27 .. 7 34.4 .. .. .. 223.6 1.5 1.3 46.1 27.5 204 499 Paraguay 42 55 .. 24 .. 14 9.9 .. 4.6 5.5 42 1.8 1.3 11 12.8 67 109 Peru 65 72 .. 42 .. 26 19.5 16.4 5.1 4.5 8,134.40 1.8 2.1 7.5 12.2 59 3,140 Philippines 38 58 .. 31 6 10 13.4 19.3 2.2 9.9 3,960.00 1.9 1.5 9.5 24.5 639 4,915 Poland 58 65 86 273 67 230 .. 37.7 .. .. 12,171.90 2.3 2.3 11.5 22.4 71 10,452 Portugal 29 63 145 347 .. 309 33.1 40.8 .. .. .. 2.7 2.4 29.9 38.9 .. .. Puerto Rico 67 .. .. 280 .. 229 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Qatar 86 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Romania 49 56 .. 135 .. 116 44.8 31.9 63 72.9 1,865.70 3.3 2.4 12.4 13.9 4 714 Russian Federation 70 77 .. 154 .. 120 .. 25.4 .. .. 2,671.60 8 5.8 .. 10.6 5,562 3,780 Rwanda 5 6 2 3 1 1 14.3 .. .. .. .. 4.4 4.4 6.2 4.6 6 2 Samoa 21 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 186 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 187 ANNEX 2: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 10­13 Foreign direct investment Portfolio investment Aid dependency Aid as % % of gross of gross domestic % of Bonds Equity Aid per Aid as domestic $ millions investment PPP GDP $ millions $ millions $ millions capita $ % of GNP investment 1990 1999 1990 1999 1989 1999 1990 1999 1990 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 7 2 3.4 3.5 0.1 0.0 0 0 0 0 267.2 218.5 118.0 84.1 27.4 23.6 125.5 128.2 .. 49 5.0 4.2 0.7 0.5 0 0 0 6 14.2 41.5 12.8 35.3 0.4 1.0 1.3 3.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2,634 11,786 4.3 10.5 0.6 1.5 661 5621 563 1129 424.9 34.5 4.7 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 34 0.0 13.1 .. 0.6 .. 0 .. 0 53.6 102.1 12.3 23.8 2.0 8.5 6.8 39.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2 30 .. 12.7 0.0 0.7 .. 0 .. 0 182.4 218.6 81.3 91.9 27.6 25.4 107.2 91.3 165 3 2.5 0.0 0.2 0.9 0 -35 0 91 631.1 678.0 24.3 24.0 2.2 2.0 9.7 8.0 9 384 2.3 29.6 0.0 1.6 0 0 0 0 1,199.9 118.4 77.8 6.8 58.1 3.2 267.2 9.1 161 216 .. .. .. .. 0 0 0 0 161.4 73.2 3.8 1.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2.0 1.4 .. .. .. .. 137.1 177.6 91.2 104.4 4.5 5.7 19.3 28.7 6 4 0.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 0 0 0 0 447.9 343.7 21.6 14.7 10.9 6.7 49.4 34.0 12,352 34,154 14.8 39.4 9.4 20.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,735 745 21.3 7.4 7.1 12.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0 300 0.0 30.7 0.0 2.7 0 0 0 0 596.9 674.7 138.7 137.2 46.5 33.0 143.9 69.1 -1 15 -0.5 7.3 0.1 .. 0 0 0 0 376.8 187.1 42.6 17.8 24.6 9.4 231.9 90.7 588 1,005 14.0 11.8 2.8 1.0 0 0 0 2 190.1 151.6 1.8 1.2 0.9 0.5 4.1 1.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,003 3,597 3.7 8.6 3.6 7.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 60 10.2 .. .. .. 0 0 0 11 95.2 39.9 45.8 17.0 1.0 .. 5.0 .. 244 530 3.2 4.3 0.2 0.3 0 -75 0 0 1,605.1 732.0 13.4 5.4 3.0 1.2 15.8 8.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 132 22 14.8 0.7 1.8 5.0 -2 381 0 0 30.6 13.6 11.8 4.8 0.4 0.2 1.5 0.4 155 297 19.7 46.3 3.5 2.7 0 0 0 232 322.1 215.7 76.7 45.8 6.3 6.3 28.1 33.7 76 72 6.3 5.3 0.1 0.6 0 0 0 0 93.3 77.6 19.8 14.5 1.2 1.0 5.1 4.3 41 1,969 0.9 17.3 0.1 1.7 0 -255 0 289 336.2 452.2 14.5 17.9 0.8 0.9 3.4 4.0 530 573 5.0 4.0 0.3 0.3 395 3895 0 422 1,057.2 690.2 15.8 9.3 1.6 0.9 6.9 4.9 89 7,270 0.6 17.8 0.0 2.6 0 1096 0 721 1,805.8 983.8 46.9 25.5 1.8 0.6 10.1 2.4 2,610 1,112 13.6 10.8 1.7 3.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. -681 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0 1,041 0.0 15.4 0.0 0.8 0 0 0 0 143.8 373.4 6.3 16.6 0.5 1.1 2.1 5.5 .. 3,309 0.0 5.3 .. 0.5 310 .. 0 644 1,847.3 1,816.3 12.5 12.4 0.6 0.5 2.2 2.9 8 2 2.1 0.6 0.2 0.0 0 0 0 0 714.0 372.9 114.6 44.9 95.3 19.2 809.8 133.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 187 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 188 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 4. Indicators to chapters 10­13 (continued) Central govern- Proceeds Urban ment from Military popu- Motor Passenger expendi- State-owned privati- expendi- Trade Net private lation vehicles cars ture enterprises zation tures in goods capital flows share in Gross % of domestic total per per invest- popu- 1,000 1,000 share in ment, $ mil- % of PPP COUNTRY lation people people % of GDP GDP, % % lions % of GNP GDP $ millions or REGION 1980 1999 1980 1998 1980 1998 1980 1998 1990-97 1990-97 1990-99 1992 1997 1989 1999 1990 1999 Sao Tome and Principe 32 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Saudi Arabia 66 85 163 166 67 98 .. .. .. .. .. 26.8 14.5 37.5 36 .. .. Senegal 36 47 19 14 .. 10 23.3 .. .. .. 410.7 2.8 1.6 22.4 19.3 42 54 Seychelles 43 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Sierra Leone 24 36 .. 6 .. 5 26.5 17.7 .. .. 1.6 3.2 5.9 10.6 4.3 36 1 Singapore 100 100 .. 168 71 108 20 16.8 .. .. .. 5.2 5.7 264.5 275.1 .. .. Slovak Republic 52 57 .. 253 .. 222 .. .. .. .. 1,979.40 2.2 2.1 .. 37.6 278 281 Slovenia 48 50 .. 440 .. 403 .. .. .. .. 521.1 2.1 1.7 .. 58.5 .. .. Solomon Islands 11 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Somalia 19 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. South Africa 48 52 133 .. 85 85 21.6 29.7 .. .. 2,964.20 3.2 1.8 14 14.2 .. 4,533 Spain 73 77 239 467 202 385 26.5 36.1 .. .. .. 1.6 1.5 24.2 35.8 .. .. Sri Lanka 22 23 .. 34 8 15 41.4 25 .. .. 804.5 3.8 5.1 11.5 16.9 54 109 St. Kitts and Nevis 36 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. St. Lucia 42 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. St. Vincent and the Grenadines 27 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Sudan 20 .. .. 10 .. 9 17.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 371 Suriname 45 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Swaziland 18 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Sweden 83 83 370 468 347 428 39.3 42.7 .. 8.7 .. 2.6 2.5 66.1 76.5 .. .. Switzerland 57 68 383 516 356 477 19.2 27.9 .. .. .. 1.8 1.4 70.9 82.7 .. .. Syrian Arab Republic 47 54 .. 27 .. 9 48.2 24.6 .. .. .. 9.7 5.6 18.1 10.4 18 87 Tajikistan 34 28 .. 2 .. 0 .. .. .. .. .. 0.3 1.7 .. .. .. 10 Tanzania 15 32 3 5 2 1 .. .. 8.6 22.9 272.3 2.2 1.3 12.6 14.3 4 171 Thailand 17 21 13 103 9 27 18.8 18.6 .. 10 2,985.80 2.6 2.3 23.9 29.4 4,399 2,471 Togo 23 33 .. 27 .. 19 30.8 .. .. .. 38.1 2.9 2 14.5 13 0 30 Tonga 24 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Trinidad and Tobago 63 .. .. 108 .. 90 30.9 28.2 .. .. 276.2 .. .. 38.4 44.6 .. 713 Tunisia 52 65 38 64 20 30 31.6 32.6 .. .. 523 2.4 2 24.5 25.5 -122 739 Turkey 44 74 23 81 .. 64 21.3 29.9 5 13.8 4,654.40 3.8 4 11.1 16.2 1,782 8,667 Turkmenistan 47 45 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4.6 .. 16.8 .. -54 Uganda 9 14 1 4 1 2 6.2 .. .. .. 174.4 2.4 4.2 4.8 7.4 16 221 Ukraine 62 68 .. 94 .. .. .. .. .. .. 31.5 1.9 3.7 .. 13.6 369 371 United Arab Emirates 72 .. .. 14 .. 11 12.1 11 .. .. .. .. .. 78.3 106.7 .. .. United Kingdom 89 89 303 439 268 375 38.3 37.9 2.8 4.6 .. 3.8 2.7 36.8 44.8 .. .. United States 74 77 .. 767 536 483 22 21.1 .. 4 .. 4.8 3.3 14.9 19.8 .. .. Uruguay 85 91 .. 169 .. 154 21.8 33.3 .. .. 17 2.3 1.4 14.6 19 -192 65 Uzbekistan 41 37 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 212 2.7 2.5 .. 7.7 40 658 Vanuatu .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Venezuela 79 87 112 .. 91 69 18.7 19.8 .. .. 6,072.00 2.6 2.2 22.6 26.6 -126 3,130 188 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 189 ANNEX 2: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 10­13 Foreign direct investment Portfolio investment Aid dependency Aid as % % of gross of gross domestic % of Bonds Equity Aid per Aid as domestic $ millions investment PPP GDP $ millions $ millions $ millions capita $ % of GNP investment 1990 1999 1990 1999 1989 1999 1990 1999 1990 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.5 0.4 .. 0 .. .. 16.3 28.8 0.9 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 57 60 7.2 4.0 0.4 1.5 0 .. 0 0 640.0 534.3 78.9 57.5 18.3 11.4 94.7 59.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 32 1 37.9 51.0 0.7 .. 0 .. 0 0 275.4 73.5 62.6 14.9 33.9 11.3 348.6 3,751.0 5,575 6,984 41.5 25.1 10.6 13.3 .. .. .. .. 16.9 -1.1 5.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0 354 0.0 5.6 .. 1.3 0 415 0 0 78.5 318.3 14.7 59.0 0.5 1.6 2.4 5.1 .. 181 5.0 3.2 .. 0.7 .. .. .. .. 31.7 31.0 15.9 15.6 0.2 0.2 1.1 0.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,376 .. 6.7 0.2 0.7 .. 234 .. 3855 294.6 539.2 7.7 12.8 0.2 0.4 1.4 2.6 13,984 9,321 10.1 6.5 2.1 6.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 43 177 2.4 4.1 0.1 0.4 0 0 0 6 595.2 251.4 33.3 13.2 5.2 1.6 18.8 5.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 371 .. .. .. .. 0 0 0 0 409.8 242.9 15.7 8.4 5.6 2.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1,982 59,386 3.5 147.2 8.0 39.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4,961 9,944 9.3 14.2 8.7 22.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 71 91 3.7 1.6 0.0 0.4 0 0 0 0 744.6 228.2 54.3 14.5 4.8 1.5 16.4 4.0 .. 24 .. 14.9 .. .. .. 0 .. 0 66.7 122.0 11.6 19.6 .. 6.6 .. 75.9 0 183 0.0 12.1 0.0 1.1 0 0 0 0 965.3 989.6 33.5 30.1 22.2 11.3 86.8 66.4 2,444 6,213 6.9 23.8 1.0 1.8 -87 -1,358 449 2527 577.8 1,003.3 9.9 16.7 0.4 0.8 1.0 3.8 0 30 0.0 15.9 0.2 0.9 0 0 0 0 125.3 71.3 31.4 15.6 13.5 5.2 84.7 37.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 633 17.1 44.0 2.0 7.5 -52 230 0 0 21.2 26.2 16.9 20.3 0.5 0.4 2.1 1.8 76 350 1.9 6.3 0.3 0.6 -60 240 0 0 106.2 244.5 12.0 25.9 0.7 1.2 2.8 4.4 684 783 1.9 1.8 0.3 0.3 597 3223 35 800 159.3 -9.7 2.7 -0.2 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.0 .. 80 .. 5.4 .. 0.9 .. 0 .. 0 25.0 20.9 5.7 4.4 0.8 0.7 .. 1.4 0 222 0.0 21.1 0.0 0.9 0 0 0 0 749.5 589.8 40.3 27.5 19.0 9.2 127.7 56.1 .. 496 0.0 6.5 .. 0.3 .. 187 .. 0 289.8 479.8 5.6 9.6 0.6 1.3 1.6 6.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. -8.1 4.2 -3.5 1.5 0.0 .. -0.1 .. 32,518 84,812 16.3 33.4 7.4 23.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 48,954 275,535 4.8 10.6 2.5 5.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0 229 0.0 7.2 0.0 0.8 -16 -137 0 0 74.3 21.7 23.3 6.5 0.5 0.1 2.9 0.7 40 113 1.5 7.1 .. .. .. 0 .. 0 27.7 133.9 1.2 5.5 0.1 0.8 0.7 5.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 451 3,187 9.1 20.0 0.4 2.8 345 134 0 67 27.0 43.5 1.3 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 189 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 190 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 4. Indicators to chapters 10­13 (continued) Central govern- Proceeds Urban ment from Military popu- Motor Passenger expendi- State-owned privati- expendi- Trade Net private lation vehicles cars ture enterprises zation tures in goods capital flows share in Gross % of domestic total per per invest- popu- 1,000 1,000 share in ment, $ mil- % of PPP COUNTRY lation people people % of GDP GDP, % % lions % of GNP GDP $ millions or REGION 1980 1999 1980 1998 1980 1998 1980 1998 1990-97 1990-97 1990-99 1992 1997 1989 1999 1990 1999 Vietnam 19 20 .. .. .. .. .. 20.1 .. .. 7.6 3.4 2.8 7.4 16 16 828 Virgin Islands (U.S.) 46 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. West Bank and Gaza .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Yemen, Rep. 19 24 .. 32 8 14 .. 42.2 .. .. .. 9.4 8.1 25.9 34.1 30 -150 Yugoslavia, FR (Serbia/ Montenegro) 46 .. 118 188 .. 173 .. .. .. .. 921.7 .. .. .. .. .. 0 Zambia 40 40 .. 23 .. 15 37.1 .. .. .. 826 3.3 1.1 33.9 18.7 194 151 Zimbabwe 22 35 .. 31 .. 28 27.9 35.7 9.2 .. 217.8 3.8 3.8 14.9 14.4 85 70 World 40 46 72 116 .. 91 25.3 28.7 .. .. .. 3.2 2.5 22.5 27.4 .. .. Low Income 24 31 3* 9* .. 5* ..* 12.4* .. .. .. 2.7 2.9 7.2 7.8 6,630 2,083 Middle income 38 50 .. 104 .. 79 20.9 .. .. .. .. 4 2.9 14.1 16.9 36,030 216,992 Lower middle income 31* 43* .. 78 .. 55 .. 24 .. .. .. 4.2* 3.2* 11.5 11.7 20,673 83,086 Upper middle income 64 76 77 173 62 140 19.5 .. .. .. .. 3.8 2.8 17.2 26 15,357 133,906 Low & middle Income 32 41 14 38 .. 25 20.1 18.9 .. .. .. 3.8 2.9 12.3 14.7 43,645 219,076 East Asia & Pacific 22 34 3 21 .. 11 .. 13.8 .. .. .. 2.9 2.5 14.5 15.3 19,405 51,062 Europe & Central Asia 59 67 .. 157 .. 138 .. 29.1 .. .. .. 5.2 4 .. 17.7 7,667 43,164 Latin America & Caribbean 65 75 93 89 62 67 19 .. .. .. .. 1.4 1.8 10.2 18.2 12,626 111,367 Middle East & N. Africa 48 58 .. 65 .. 45 .. .. .. .. .. 14.4 7 19.4 16.8 399 979 South Asia 22 28 2 6 .. 4 13.5 15.8 .. .. .. 3.1 3.1 4 4.6 2,173 2,054 Sub-Saharan Africa 23 34 21 21 14 13 22.1 .. .. .. .. 3.1 2.3 15.9 16.3 1,374 10,449 High Income 75 77 321 585 355 429 26.4 31.2 .. .. .. 3.1 2.4 28.5 37.4 .. .. *indicates income-group aggregate that includes data on China. Note: Revisions to estimates of China's GNP per Capita, made by analysts in 2000-01, caused that economy to be reclassified from low to lower middle income. As a result, for different indicators in these data tables China figures as part of one or the other income group, which considerably affects these group aggregates. 190 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 191 ANNEX 2: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 10­13 Foreign direct investment Portfolio investment Aid dependency Aid as % % of gross of gross domestic % of Bonds Equity Aid per Aid as domestic $ millions investment PPP GDP $ millions $ millions $ millions capita $ % of GNP investment 1990 1999 1990 1999 1989 1999 1990 1999 1990 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999 16 1,609 1.9 22.1 .. .. 0 0 0 0 890.8 1,420.6 12.4 18.3 5.7 5.0 22.5 19.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 459.8 511.8 196.5 180.3 12.6 10.2 44.8 30.9 -131 -150 -19.2 -11.8 1.5 1.7 0 0 0 0 170.0 456.4 11.5 26.8 5.2 7.4 23.0 36.0 .. 0 .. .. .. .. .. 0 .. 0 49.2 638.5 4.7 60.1 .. .. .. .. 203 163 35.7 29.6 2.5 .. 0 0 0 0 718.1 623.4 82.2 63.1 23.1 20.8 260.4 113.3 -12 59 -0.8 9.2 0.0 .. -30 -30 0 4 560.4 244.2 52.0 20.5 8.5 4.7 27.9 38.0 200,479 884,452 4.2 10.2 2.0 4.6 .. .. .. .. 67,506.0 59,125.4 12.1 9.9 0.3 0.2 1.1 0.9 2,201 9,830 1.1 3.0 0.2 0.3 142 -2,548 417* 2,616 29,422.4 22,399.1 13.4 9.3 2.9 2.2 13.8 10.0 22,064 175,577 2.3 14.0 0.4 1.6 1,018 27,993 2,341 31,839 24,531.4 22,923.9 9.7 8.6 0.6 0.4 2.1 1.7 9,584 66,214 1.8 9.7 0.3 1.0 1,099 8,126 484 13,289 18,315.1 17,816.4 9.2 8.5 0.9 0.7 3.3 2.6 12,480 109,364 3.0 17.8 0.5 2.6 -81 19,868 1,857 18,550 4,932.9 3,848.0 9.2 6.7 0.2 0.1 0.9 0.6 24,265 185,408 2.1 12.4 0.3 1.3 1160 25,446 3,743 34,456 58,475.2 48,472.8 12.4 9.5 1.1 0.8 4.3 3.1 11,135 56,041 3.5 9.6 0.4 1.1 -802 1,072 2,290 21,133 9,431.5 9,811.2 5.4 5.3 0.7 0.5 1.7 1.7 1,051 26,534 0.3 11.6 .. 1.1 1893 6,167 235 3,550 9,728.0 10,878.3 20.6 22.9 1.0 1.0 4.6 4.7 8,188 90,352 3.8 22.3 0.4 3.0 101 19,067 1,111 3,893 5,683.7 5,855.7 12.1 11.5 0.4 0.3 1.6 1.4 2,504 1,461 2.3 0.8 0.3 0.5 -148 182 0 669 7,194.0 5,127.7 27.4 17.7 1.6 0.9 7.0 3.9 464 3,070 0.5 2.4 0.0 0.1 147 -1,201 105 1,312 7,057.1 4,254.3 5.8 3.2 1.6 0.7 7.2 3.3 923 7,949 2.0 9.3 0.6 0.7 -31 158 0 3,899 19,380.9 12,545.6 34.4 19.5 7.2 4.1 39.4 22.0 176,213 699,045 4.8 9.6 2.9 7.2 .. .. .. .. 2,197.3 1,823.2 2.5 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 191 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 192 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 5. Indicators to chapters 14­16 Commercial energy use GDP per unit of energy use Total, thousand metric tons of oil equivalent per capita, kg of oil equivalent PPP $ per kg of oil equivalent COUNTRY or REGION 1990 1997 1990 1997 1990 1997 Afghanistan .. .. .. .. .. .. Albania 2,567 1,048 782 317 3.4 8.5 Algeria 23,959 26,497 958 912 4.7 5.3 American Samoa .. .. .. .. .. .. Andorra .. .. .. .. .. .. Angola 5,617 6,848 609 587 3.1 2.6 Antigua and Barbuda .. .. .. .. .. .. Argentina 43,313 61,710 1,332 1,730 5.6 6.9 Armenia 7,941 1,804 2,240 476 1.5 4.3 Aruba .. .. .. .. .. .. Australia 87,155 101,626 5,107 5,484 3.2 4.0 Austria 25,699 27,761 3,326 3,439 5.5 6.7 Azerbaijan 22,841 11,987 3,191 1,529 1.5 1.3 Bahamas, The .. .. .. .. .. .. Bahrain .. .. .. .. .. .. Bangladesh 20,936 24,327 190 197 5.0 6.8 Barbados .. .. .. .. .. .. Belarus 43,050 25,142 4,196 2,449 1.6 2.4 Belgium 48,426 57,125 4,858 5,611 3.8 4.1 Belize .. .. .. .. .. .. Benin 1,678 2,182 354 377 1.9 2.3 Bermuda .. .. .. .. .. .. Bhutan .. .. .. .. .. .. Bolivia 2,896 4,254 441 548 4.0 4.1 Bosnia and Herzegovina .. .. .. .. .. .. Botswana .. .. .. .. .. .. Brazil 136,131 172,030 920 1,051 5.8 6.5 Brunei .. .. .. .. .. .. Bulgaria 27,126 20,616 3,111 2,480 1.7 1.9 Burkina Faso .. .. .. .. .. .. Burundi .. .. .. .. .. .. Cambodia .. .. .. .. .. .. Cameroon 5,058 5,756 441 413 3.5 3.6 Canada 209,712 237,983 7,546 7,930 2.6 3.0 Cape Verde .. .. .. .. .. .. Cayman Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. Central African Republic .. .. .. .. .. .. Chad .. .. .. .. .. .. Channel Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. Chile 13,876 23,012 1,059 1,574 4.5 5.7 China 866,666 1,113,050 763 907 1.8 3.3 Hong Kong, China 10,455 14,121 1,833 2,172 8.7 10.6 Macao, China .. .. .. .. .. .. Colombia 26,762 30,481 765 761 7.4 8.2 Comoros .. .. .. .. .. .. Congo, Dem. Rep. 11,858 14,539 317 311 4.5 2.7 Congo, Rep. 1,117 1,242 503 459 2.0 2.2 Costa Rica 2,025 2,663 676 769 6.8 7.7 Cote d'Ivoire 4,596 5,597 395 394 3.5 4.0 Croatia .. 7,650 .. 1,687 .. 4.0 192 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 193 ANNEX 2 DATA TABLES: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 14­16 Human PPP GNP Genuine Forest Development HDI per capita domestic CO2 emissions area Index rank rank savings total, million, per capita, kg per thousand % of metric tons metric tons PPP $ of GDP sq.km GDP 1990 1996 1990 1996 1980 1996 1995 1998 1998 1999 1998 .. 1.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 8.4 1.9 2.6 0.6 .. 0.2 10 0.713 94 137 -13.4 80.4 94.3 3.2 3.3 1.1 0.7 19 0.683 107 101 5.6 .. 0.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4.6 5.1 0.5 0.5 .. 0.3 222 0.405 160 199 10.4 .. 0.3 .. .. 0.8 .. .. 0.833 37 .. .. 109.7 129.9 3.4 3.7 0.6 0.3 339 0.837 35 56 4.8 3.7 3.7 1.0 1.0 .. 0.5 3 0.721 93 150 -21.0 .. 1.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 266.0 306.6 15.6 16.7 1.4 0.8 409 0.929 4 20 12.2 57.4 59.3 7.4 7.4 0.7 0.3 39 0.908 16 15 21.1 47.1 30.0 6.4 3.9 .. 0.2 10 0.722 90 146 -29.5 .. 1.707 .. .. 3.7 .. .. 0.844 33 .. .. .. 10.578 .. .. 2.0 .. .. 0.820 41 .. .. 15.4 23.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 10 0.461 146 168 10.0 .. 0.835 .. .. 0.5 .. .. 0.858 30 .. .. 94.3 61.7 9.1 6.0 .. 1.1 74 0.781 57 79 14.4 97.4 106.0 9.8 10.4 1.3 0.5 .. 0.925 7 13 .. .. 0.355 .. .. 0.8 .. .. 0.777 58 .. .. 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 46 0.411 157 189 2.7 .. 0.462 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.260 .. .. 0.1 .. .. 0.483 142 .. .. 5.5 10.1 0.8 1.3 .. 0.6 483 0.643 114 151 4.7 .. 3.111 .. .. .. .. 27 .. .. .. .. 2.2 2.1 1.7 1.4 0.7 0.2 139 0.593 122 84 14.5 202.6 273.4 1.4 1.7 0.4 0.3 5,511 0.747 74 81 11.9 .. 5.071 .. .. 2.1 .. .. 0.848 32 .. .. 75.3 55.3 8.6 6.6 3.1 1.3 32 0.772 60 99 4.6 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 43 0.303 172 187 2.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 .. 3 .. .. .. -14.8 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 .. 0.0 98 0.512 136 176 0.2 1.5 3.5 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.2 196 0.528 134 169 10.4 409.6 409.4 14.7 13.8 1.5 0.6 2,446 0.935 1 16 13.2 .. 0.121 .. .. 1.0 .. .. 0.688 105 .. .. .. 0.282 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 299 0.371 166 180 -1.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 110 0.367 167 190 -2.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 36.3 48.8 2.8 3.4 1.0 0.4 79 0.826 38 68 13.6 2,401.7 3,363.5 2.1 2.8 3.6 1.0 1,333 0.706 99 128 32.0 26.2 23.1 4.6 3.7 0.5 0.2 .. 0.872 26 26 20.8 .. 1.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 55.9 65.3 1.6 1.7 0.4 0.3 530 0.764 68 88 4.1 .. 0.055 .. .. 0.3 .. .. 0.510 137 .. .. 4.1 2.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 .. 0.430 152 .. .. 2.0 5.0 0.9 1.9 0.4 1.8 195 0.507 139 188 5.4 2.9 4.7 1.0 1.4 0.3 0.2 12 0.797 48 87 20.6 9.9 13.1 0.9 0.9 0.5 0.6 55 0.420 154 163 19.4 .. 17.5 .. 3.9 .. 0.6 18 0.795 49 78 .. 193 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 194 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 5. Indicators to chapters 14­16 (continued) Commercial energy use GDP per unit of energy use Total, thousand metric tons of oil equivalent per capita, kg of oil equivalent PPP $ per kg of oil equivalent COUNTRY or REGION 1990 1997 1990 1997 1990 1997 Cuba .. .. .. .. .. .. Cyprus .. .. .. .. .. .. Czech Republic 45,020 40,576 4,344 3,938 2.8 3.3 Denmark 18,282 21,107 3,557 3,994 5.0 6.0 Djibouti .. .. .. .. .. .. Dominica .. .. .. .. .. .. Dominican Republic 3,973 5,453 559 673 5.6 6.6 Ecuador 6,558 8,513 639 713 4.1 4.6 Egypt, Arab Rep. 31,895 39,581 608 656 3.9 4.7 El Salvador 2,695 4,095 527 691 5.5 5.9 Equatorial Guinea .. .. .. .. .. .. Eritrea .. .. .. .. .. .. Estonia 10,163 5,556 6,469 3,811 1.2 2.0 Ethiopia 15,208 17,131 297 287 1.6 2.1 Faeroe Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. Fiji .. .. .. .. .. .. Finland 28,813 33,075 5,779 6,435 3.0 3.2 France 227,600 247,534 4,012 4,224 4.3 5.0 French Polynesia .. .. .. .. .. .. Gabon .. .. .. .. .. .. Gambia, The .. .. .. .. .. .. Georgia 10,590 2,295 1,940 423 4.3 7.9 Germany 355,732 347,272 4,478 4,231 4.3 5.2 Ghana 5,233 6,896 352 383 4.0 4.5 Greece 22,056 25,556 2,171 2,435 5.1 5.7 Greenland .. .. .. .. .. .. Grenada .. .. .. .. .. .. Guam .. .. .. .. .. .. Guatemala 4,377 5,633 500 536 5.5 6.5 Guinea .. .. .. .. .. .. Guinea-Bissau .. .. .. .. .. .. Guyana .. .. .. .. .. .. Haiti 1,585 1,779 245 237 6.5 5.9 Honduras 2,442 3,182 501 532 4.1 4.7 Hungary 28,463 25,311 2,746 2,492 3.3 4.0 Iceland .. .. .. .. .. .. India 359,846 461,032 424 479 3.3 4.2 Indonesia 98,846 138,779 555 693 3.4 4.5 Iran, Islamic Rep. 72,342 108,289 1,330 1,777 2.9 3.0 Iraq .. .. .. .. .. .. Ireland 10,463 12,491 2,984 3,412 3.8 6.0 Isle of Man .. .. .. .. .. .. Israel 11,923 17,591 2,559 3,014 5.1 5.8 Italy 153,316 163,315 2,703 2,839 6.3 7.3 Jamaica 3,037 3,963 1,264 1,552 2.5 2.2 Japan 438,797 514,898 3,552 4,084 5.4 6.0 Jordan 3,445 4,795 1,087 1,081 2.1 3.3 Kazakstan 106,028 38,418 6,486 2,439 1.0 1.8 Kenya 12,479 14,138 530 494 1.8 2.0 Kiribati .. .. .. .. .. .. 194 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 195 ANNEX 2 DATA TABLES: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 14­16 Human PPP GNP Genuine Forest Development HDI per capita domestic CO2 emissions area Index rank rank savings total, million, per capita, kg per thousand % of metric tons metric tons PPP $ of GDP sq.km GDP 1990 1996 1990 1996 1980 1996 1995 1998 1998 1999 1998 .. 31.170 .. .. .. .. 18 0.783 56 .. .. .. 5.379 .. .. 1.3 .. .. 0.886 22 .. .. 141.7 126.7 13.7 12.3 .. 0.9 26 0.843 34 52 21.2 50.7 56.6 9.9 10.7 1.3 0.5 4 0.911 15 12 17.6 .. 0.366 .. .. .. .. .. 0.447 149 .. .. .. 0.081 .. .. 0.4 .. .. 0.793 51 .. .. 9.4 12.9 1.3 1.6 0.6 0.4 16 0.729 87 103 11.9 16.6 24.5 1.6 2.1 0.9 0.6 111 0.722 91 141 5.9 75.4 97.9 1.4 1.7 1.0 0.6 0 0.623 119 127 10.0 2.6 4.0 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.2 1 0.696 104 114 -4.5 .. 0.143 .. .. .. .. .. 0.555 131 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3 0.408 159 183 -33.9 21.4 16.4 13.8 11.2 .. 1.6 20 0.801 46 74 12.8 3.0 3.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 136 0.309 171 200 -8.7 .. 0.630 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.762 .. .. 0.7 .. .. 0.769 66 .. .. 51.1 59.2 10.2 11.5 1.3 0.6 200 0.917 11 25 19.6 353.2 361.8 6.2 6.2 0.9 0.3 150 0.917 12 24 14.8 .. 0.561 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3.7 .. .. 1.6 0.5 179 0.592 123 .. 25.4 .. 0.216 .. .. 0.3 0.1 1 0.396 161 .. -6.1 15.2 3.0 2.8 0.5 .. 0.2 30 0.762 70 122 -10.5 889.2 861.2 11.1 10.5 .. 0.5 107 0.911 14 21 15.8 3.5 4.0 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 90 0.556 129 157 1.4 72.2 80.6 7.1 7.7 0.8 0.6 65 0.875 25 50 .. .. 0.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.161 .. .. 0.4 .. .. 0.785 54 .. .. .. 4.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5.1 6.8 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.2 38 0.619 120 125 -2.3 1.0 1.1 0.2 0.2 .. 0.1 64 0.394 162 158 8.7 .. 0.23 .. .. 0.5 0.2 23 0.331 169 .. -13.5 .. 0.953 .. .. 4.0 .. .. 0.709 96 .. .. 1.0 1.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0.440 150 170 20.1 2.6 4.0 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.3 41 0.653 113 148 20.1 64.1 59.5 6.2 5.8 1.5 0.6 17 0.817 43 60 21.3 .. 2.195 .. .. 0.4 .. .. 0.927 5 .. .. 675.3 997.4 0.8 1.1 0.8 0.5 650 0.563 128 153 10.3 165.2 245.1 0.9 1.2 0.8 0.4 1,098 0.670 109 143 5.9 212.4 266.7 3.9 4.4 1.1 0.9 15 0.709 97 95 -7.9 .. 91.4 .. .. 0.5 .. 1 0.583 126 .. .. 29.8 34.9 8.5 9.6 1.4 0.5 6 0.907 18 34 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 34.6 52.3 7.4 9.2 0.7 0.5 1 0.883 23 .. 0.1 398.9 403.2 7.0 7.0 0.7 0.3 65 0.903 19 29 13.9 8.0 10.1 3.3 4.0 2.1 1.1 2 0.735 83 129 12.8 1,070.7 1,167.7 8.7 9.3 0.9 0.4 251 0.924 9 14 20.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0 0.721 92 124 -1.8 292.7 173.8 17.7 10.9 .. 2.5 105 0.754 73 106 -7.8 5.8 6.8 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.2 13 0.508 138 185 -2.7 .. 0.022 .. .. 1.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. 195 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 196 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 5. Indicators to chapters 14­16 (continued) Commercial energy use GDP per unit of energy use Total, thousand metric tons of oil equivalent per capita, kg of oil equivalent PPP $ per kg of oil equivalent COUNTRY or REGION 1990 1997 1990 1997 1990 1997 Korea, Dem. Rep. .. .. .. .. .. .. Korea, Rep. 91,402 176,351 2,132 3,834 4.0 3.9 Kuwait 13,132 16,165 6,180 8,936 .. .. Kyrgyz Republic 1,875 2,793 427 603 8.3 3.8 Lao PDR .. .. .. .. .. .. Latvia 3,274 4,460 1,226 1,806 6.6 3.1 Lebanon 2,297 5,244 632 1,265 3.2 3.3 Lesotho .. .. .. .. .. .. Liberia .. .. .. .. .. .. Libya .. .. .. .. .. .. Liechtenstein .. .. .. .. .. .. Lithuania 17,224 8,806 4,628 2,376 .. 2.6 Luxembourg .. .. .. .. .. .. Macedonia, FYR .. .. .. .. .. .. Madagascar .. .. .. .. .. .. Malawi .. .. .. .. .. .. Malaysia 23,974 48,473 1,317 2,237 4.0 4.0 Maldives .. .. .. .. .. .. Mali .. .. .. .. .. .. Malta .. .. .. .. .. .. Marshall Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. Martinique .. .. .. .. .. .. Mauritania .. .. .. .. .. .. Mauritius .. .. .. .. .. .. Mayotte .. .. .. .. .. .. Mexico 124,187 141,520 1,492 1,501 4.2 5.1 Micronesia, Fed. Sts. .. .. .. .. .. .. Moldova 9,959 4,436 2,283 1,029 2.0 2.1 Monaco .. .. .. .. .. .. Mongolia .. .. .. .. .. .. Morocco 6,745 9,275 281 340 9.9 9.5 Mozambique 7,318 7,664 517 461 1.0 1.6 Myanmar 10,787 13,009 266 296 .. .. Namibia .. .. .. .. .. .. Nepal 5,834 7,160 311 321 2.8 3.7 Netherlands 66,593 74,910 4,454 4,800 3.8 4.6 Netherlands Antilles .. .. .. .. .. .. New Caledonia .. .. .. .. .. .. New Zealand 14,157 16,679 4,120 4,435 3.4 4.0 Nicaragua 2,174 2,573 568 551 2.8 3.9 Niger .. .. .. .. .. .. Nigeria 70,905 88,652 737 753 1.0 1.1 Northern Mariana Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. Norway 21,456 24,226 5,059 5,501 3.6 4.8 Oman .. .. .. .. .. .. Pakistan 43,238 56,818 400 442 3.3 3.9 Palau .. .. .. .. .. .. Panama 1,535 2,328 640 856 5.8 6.1 Papua New Guinea .. .. .. .. .. .. Paraguay 3,097 4,191 734 824 5.3 5.5 196 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 197 ANNEX 2 DATA TABLES: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 14­16 Human PPP GNP Genuine Forest Development HDI per capita domestic CO2 emissions area Index rank rank savings total, million, per capita, kg per thousand % of metric tons metric tons PPP $ of GDP sq.km GDP 1990 1996 1990 1996 1980 1996 1995 1998 1998 1999 1998 .. 254.3 .. .. .. .. 62 .. .. .. .. 241.2 408.1 5.6 9.0 1.2 0.6 76 0.854 31 49 25.9 .. .. .. .. 1.0 .. 0 0.836 36 .. -31.2 11.8 6.1 2.6 1.3 .. 0.6 7 0.706 98 149 -2.7 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 .. 0.0 .. 0.484 140 161 18.5 13.1 9.3 5.0 3.7 .. 0.7 29 0.771 63 85 5.4 9.1 14.2 2.5 3.5 .. 0.9 1 0.735 82 113 -22.0 .. .. .. .. .. .. 0 0.569 127 155 -44.5 .. 0.326 .. .. 1.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 40.6 .. .. 0.7 .. 4 0.760 72 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 21.4 13.8 5.7 3.7 .. 0.6 20 0.789 52 83 6.8 .. 8.3 .. .. 1.9 .. .. 0.908 17 .. .. .. 12.7 .. 6.4 .. 1.5 10 0.763 69 108 .. 0.9 1.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 151 0.483 141 192 -0.2 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 33 0.385 163 203 -8.2 55.3 119.1 3.0 5.6 0.8 0.6 155 0.772 61 72 36.8 .. 0.297 .. .. .. .. .. 0.725 89 .. .. 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 116 0.380 165 196 5.2 .. 1.75 .. .. 0.7 .. .. 37 0.865 27 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 100 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 86 .. .. .. 2.6 2.9 1.3 1.2 0.4 0.8 6 0.451 147 164 -18.5 .. 1.744 .. .. 0.5 .. 0 0.761 71 .. 16.8 .. .. .. .. 0.3 0.2 .. .. .. .. .. 295.0 348.1 3.5 3.8 0.9 0.5 554 0.784 55 75 12.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 21.8 12.1 5.0 2.8 .. 1.3 4 0.700 102 144 -5.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 10.0 8.9 4.5 3.6 3.8 2.4 94 0.628 117 166 .. 23.5 27.9 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.3 38 0.589 124 131 9.7 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.1 169 0.341 168 191 -4.3 4.1 7.3 0.1 0.2 .. .. 272 0.585 125 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 124 0.632 115 92 13.2 0.6 1.6 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 48 0.474 144 177 -1.8 138.9 155.2 9.3 10.0 1.1 0.5 3 0.925 8 17 20.3 .. 6.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 23.6 29.8 6.9 8.0 0.6 0.4 79 0.903 20 42 15.9 2.6 2.9 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.3 56 0.631 116 152 -5.2 1.0 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 26 0.293 173 194 -4.9 88.7 83.3 0.9 0.7 1.9 0.9 138 0.439 151 193 -14.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 47.7 67.0 11.2 15.3 2.2 0.6 81 0.934 2 8 23.1 .. 15.1 .. .. 1.5 .. 0 0.730 86 .. .. 67.9 94.3 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.4 17 0.522 135 159 4.0 .. 0.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3.1 6.7 1.3 2.5 0.7 0.5 28 0.776 59 98 20.5 2.4 2.4 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.2 369 0.542 133 147 .. 2.3 3.7 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.2 115 0.736 81 111 10.6 197 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 198 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 5. Indicators to chapters 14­16 (continued) Commercial energy use GDP per unit of energy use Total, thousand metric tons of oil equivalent per capita, kg of oil equivalent PPP $ per kg of oil equivalent COUNTRY or REGION 1990 1997 1990 1997 1990 1997 Peru 11,549 15,127 535 621 5.3 7.3 Philippines 28,294 38,251 452 520 6.8 7.2 Poland 100,114 105,155 2,626 2,721 2.1 2.7 Portugal 16,419 20,400 1,659 2,051 6.6 7.1 Puerto Rico .. .. .. .. .. .. Qatar .. .. .. .. .. .. Romania 61,117 44,135 2,634 1,957 2.3 3.2 Russian Federation 906,433 591,982 6,112 4,019 1.6 1.7 Rwanda .. .. .. .. .. .. Samoa .. .. .. .. .. .. Sao Tome and Principe .. .. .. .. .. .. Saudi Arabia 63,275 98,449 4,004 4,906 2.5 2.1 Senegal 2,213 2,770 302 315 3.8 4.1 Seychelles .. .. .. .. .. .. Sierra Leone .. .. .. .. .. .. Singapore 13,357 26,878 4,938 8,661 2.8 2.9 Slovak Republic 21,363 17,216 4,044 3,198 2.1 3.0 Slovenia 5,250 .. 2,627 .. .. 4.4 Solomon Islands .. .. .. .. .. .. Somalia .. .. .. .. .. .. South Africa 91,229 107,220 2,592 2,636 3.1 3.3 Spain 90,552 107,328 2,332 2,729 5.3 5.9 Sri Lanka 5,476 7,159 322 386 6.2 7.6 St. Kitts and Nevis .. .. .. .. .. .. St. Lucia .. .. .. .. .. .. St. Vincent and the Grenadines .. .. .. .. .. .. Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. Suriname .. .. .. .. .. .. Swaziland .. .. .. .. .. .. Sweden 47,747 51,934 5,579 5,869 3.1 3.5 Switzerland 24,998 26,218 3,724 3,699 6.2 6.9 Syrian Arab Republic 11,928 14,642 984 983 2.4 3.0 Tajikistan 3,268 3,384 616 562 4.0 1.6 Tanzania 12,529 14,258 492 455 0.9 1.0 Thailand 43,706 79,963 786 1,319 4.9 4.7 Togo .. .. .. .. .. .. Tonga .. .. .. .. .. .. Trinidad and Tobago .. .. .. .. .. .. Tunisia 5,683 6,805 697 738 5.5 7.2 Turkey 52,498 71,273 935 1,142 5.0 5.7 Turkmenistan 18,923 12,181 5,159 2,615 1.1 1.0 Uganda .. .. .. .. .. .. Ukraine 252,631 150,059 4,868 2,960 1.3 1.1 United Arab Emirates .. .. .. .. .. .. United Kingdom 213,090 227,977 3,702 3,863 4.4 5.3 United States 1,925,680 2,162,190 7,720 8,076 2.9 3.6 Uruguay 2,233 2,883 719 883 8.2 9.7 Uzbekistan 43,697 42,553 2,130 1,798 1.1 1.1 Vanuatu .. .. .. .. .. .. Venezuela 40,851 57,530 2,095 2,526 2.4 2.4 198 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 199 ANNEX 2 DATA TABLES: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 14­16 Human PPP GNP Genuine Forest Development HDI per capita domestic CO2 emissions area Index rank rank savings total, million, per capita, kg per thousand % of metric tons metric tons PPP $ of GDP sq.km GDP 1990 1996 1990 1996 1980 1996 1995 1998 1998 1999 1998 22.2 26.2 1.0 1.1 0.5 0.3 676 0.737 80 107 11.1 44.3 63.2 0.7 0.9 0.3 0.2 68 0.744 77 118 7.6 347.6 356.8 9.1 9.2 7.3 1.3 87 0.814 44 73 14.6 42.3 47.9 4.3 4.8 0.5 0.3 29 0.864 28 45 15.0 .. 15.8 .. .. 0.7 .. 3 .. .. .. .. .. 29.1 .. .. .. .. .. 0.819 42 .. .. 155.1 119.3 6.7 5.3 2.1 0.8 62 0.770 64 89 0.4 1,954.4 1,579.5 13.1 10.7 .. 1.5 7,635 0.771 62 80 -3.3 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 .. 3 0.382 164 .. -10.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.711 95 .. .. .. 0.1 .. .. 0.6 .. .. 0.547 132 .. .. 177.1 267.8 11.2 13.8 1.3 1.3 2 0.747 75 .. -11.0 2.9 3.1 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.3 74 0.416 155 173 9.9 .. 0.2 .. .. 0.4 .. .. 0.786 53 .. .. 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 13 0.252 174 206 -10.6 41.9 65.8 15.5 21.6 2.4 0.9 0 0.881 24 7 40.7 43.0 39.6 8.1 7.4 .. 0.8 20 0.825 40 64 21.1 .. 13.0 .. 6.5 .. 0.5 11 0.861 29 47 12.0 .. 0.2 .. .. 1.0 .. .. 75 0.614 121 .. .. 0.015 .. .. 0.7 .. .. 100 .. .. .. 291.1 292.7 8.3 7.3 1.3 0.8 85 0.697 103 69 7.9 211.7 232.5 5.5 5.9 0.8 0.4 84 0.899 21 41 16.0 3.9 7.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 18 0.733 84 136 14.8 .. 0.1 .. .. .. .. .. 0.798 47 .. .. .. 0.2 .. .. .. .. .. 0.728 88 .. .. .. 0.1 .. .. 0.4 .. .. 0.738 79 .. .. .. 3.5 .. .. 0.3 0.1 416 0.477 143 .. .. .. 2.1 .. .. 5.5 .. .. 0.766 67 .. .. .. 0.3 .. .. 1.2 .. .. 0.665 112 .. .. 48.5 54.1 5.7 6.1 0.9 0.3 244 0.926 6 28 19.0 42.7 44.2 6.4 6.3 0.5 0.2 11 0.915 13 6 18.2 35.8 44.3 3.0 3.1 1.3 1.0 2 0.660 111 139 .. 21.3 5.8 3.8 1.0 .. 1.0 4 0.663 110 184 .. 2.3 2.4 0.1 0.1 .. 0.2 325 0.415 156 205 4.5 95.7 205.4 1.7 3.4 0.6 0.5 116 0.745 76 90 33.7 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 12 0.471 145 172 -1.6 .. 0.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 22.2 .. .. 3.1 2.4 2 0.793 50 .. -5.7 13.3 16.2 1.6 1.8 0.6 0.3 6 0.703 101 91 18.0 143.8 178.3 2.6 2.9 0.7 0.5 89 0.732 85 82 17.1 34.2 34.2 8.5 7.4 .. 2.4 38 0.704 100 134 .. 0.8 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 61 0.409 158 179 -1.8 631.1 397.3 12.1 7.8 .. 2.3 92 0.744 78 133 6.6 .. 81.8 .. .. 1.5 1.6 1 0.810 45 .. .. 563.3 557.0 9.8 9.5 1.2 0.5 24 0.918 10 27 8.2 4,824.0 5,301.0 19.3 20.0 1.6 0.7 2,125 0.929 3 4 8.4 3.9 5.6 1.3 1.7 0.4 0.2 8 0.825 39 70 7.1 106.5 95.0 5.0 4.1 .. 2.0 91 0.686 106 154 2.9 .. 0.1 .. .. 0.7 .. .. 0.623 118 .. .. 113.6 144.5 5.8 6.5 1.5 1.1 440 0.77 65 94 4.4 199 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 200 BEYOND ECONOMIC GROWTH Table 5. Indicators to chapters 14­16 (continued) Commercial energy use GDP per unit of energy use Total, thousand metric tons of oil equivalent per capita, kg of oil equivalent PPP $ per kg of oil equivalent COUNTRY or REGION 1990 1997 1990 1997 1990 1997 Vietnam 24,451 39,306 369 521 2.7 3.2 Virgin Islands (U.S.) .. .. .. .. .. .. West Bank and Gaza .. .. .. .. .. .. Yemen, Rep. 2,665 3,355 224 208 3.0 3.5 Yugoslavia, FR (Serbia,Montenegro) .. .. .. .. .. .. Zambia 5,220 5,987 671 634 1.1 1.2 Zimbabwe 8,934 9,926 917 866 2.6 3.1 World 8,608,411 9,431,190 1,705 1,692 .. .. Low Income 1,122,683 1,194,696 607 563 .. .. Middle income 3,297,830 3,523,253 1,397 1,368 .. .. Lower middle income 2,426 917* 2 384 856* 1,302* 1,178* .. .. Upper middle income 870,913 1,138,397 1,753 2,068 .. .. Low & middle Income 4,420,513 4,717,949 1,049 1,005 .. .. East Asia & Pacific 1,188,126 1,647,182 743 942 .. .. Europe & Central Asia 1,799,838 1,240,586 3,966 2,690 1.8 2.2 Latin America & Caribbean 457,439 575,389 1,057 1,181 .. .. Middle East & N. Africa 266,687 374,375 1,134 1,354 3.3 3.3 South Asia 435,330 556,496 394 443 .. .. Sub-Saharan Africa 273,093 323,921 705 695 .. .. High Income 4,187,901 4,713,241 4,996 5,369 .. .. *indicates income-group aggregate that includes data on China. Note: Revisions to estimates of China's GNP per Capita, made by analysts in 2000-01, caused that economy to be reclassified from low to lower middle income. As a result, for different indicators in these data tables China figures as part of one or the other income group, which considerably affects these group aggregates. 200 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 201 ANNEX 2 DATA TABLES: INDICATORS TO CHAPTERS 14­16 Human PPP GNP Genuine Forest Development HDI per capita domestic CO2 emissions area Index rank rank savings total, million, per capita, kg per thousand % of metric tons metric tons PPP $ of GDP sq.km GDP 1990 1996 1990 1996 1980 1996 1995 1998 1998 1999 1998 22.5 37.6 0.3 0.5 .. 0.3 91 0.671 108 160 10.3 .. 12.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0 0.448 148 197 -26.3 .. 36.2 .. .. .. .. 18 .. .. .. .. 2.4 2.4 0.3 0.3 1.0 0.3 314 0.420 153 198 -3.6 16.6 18.4 1.7 1.6 1.0 0.6 87 0.555 130 142 12.3 16,183.1 22,690.1 3.3 4.0 1.2 0.6 32,712 0.712 13.3 1,376.8 2,433.8 0.7 1.1 1.6* 0.7* 7,379* .. .. .. 20* 5,772.8 9,524.1 2.7 3.7 1.0 0.7 18,898 .. .. .. 10.6 3,721.6* 6,734.6* 2.2* 3.3* 1.0 0.9 11,101 .. .. .. 5.9 2,051.2 2,789.6 4.3 5.1 1.0 0.6 7,797 .. .. .. 12.9 7,150.8 11,959.5 1.8 2.5 1.2 0.7 26,277 .. .. 13.5 3,289.6 4,717.5 2.0 2.7 2.1 0.8 3,832 .. .. .. 28.3 924.8 3,448.9 9.1 7.3 2.2 1.3 8,579 .. .. .. 8.3 966.4 1,207.5 2.2 2.5 0.6 0.4 9,064 .. .. .. 9.8 737.6 987.2 3.3 3.9 1.1 0.8 89 .. .. .. -2.2 765.9 1,125.1 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.5 744 .. .. .. 9.6 465.3 471.7 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.5 3,969 .. .. .. 3.7 9,033.5 10,732.1 11.9 12.3 1.2 0.5 6,436 .. .. .. 13.3 201 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 202 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 203 Annex 3 Millennium Development Goals BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 204 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Goals and Targets Indicators Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people 1. Proportion of population below $1 per day whose income is less than one dollar a day 2. Poverty gap ratio [incidence x depth of poverty] 3. Share of poorest quintile in national consumption Target 2: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people 4. Prevalence of underweight children (under five years of age) who suffer from hunger 5. Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls 6. Net enrollment ratio in primary education alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary 7. Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5 schooling 8. Literacy rate of 15­24 year olds. Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education 9. Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education preferably by 2005 and to all levels of education no later than 10. Ratio of literate females to males of 15­24 year olds 2015 11. Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector 12. Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament Goal 4: Reduce child mortality Target 5: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the 13. Under-five mortality rate under-five mortality rate 14. Infant mortality rate 15. Proportion of 1 year old children immunized against measles Goal 5: Improve maternal health Target 6: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the 16. Maternal mortality rate maternal mortality rate 17. proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases Target 7: Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, the spread 18. HIV prevalence among 15­24 year old pregnant women of HIV/AIDS 19. Contraceptive prevalence rate 20. Number of children orphaned by HIV/AIDS Target 8: Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, the incidence 21. Prevalence and death rates associated with malaria of malaria and other major diseases 22. Proportion of population in malaria risk areas using effective malaria prevention and treatment measures 23. Prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis 24. Proportion of TB cases detected and cured under DOTS (Directly Observed Treatment Short Course) 204 BEG_145-205.qxd 6/9/04 4:47 PM Page 205 ANNEX 3 MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS Goals and Targets Indicators Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability* Target 9: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into 25. Proportion of land area covered by forest country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of 26. Land area protected to maintain biological diversity environmental resources 27. GDP per unit of energy use (as proxy for energy efficiency) 28. Carbon dioxide emissions (per capita) Target 10: Halve by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable 29. Proportion of population with sustainable access to an access to safe drinking water improved water source Target 11: By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the 30. Proportion of people with access to improved sanitation lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers 31. Proportion of people with access to secure tenure Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development* Official Development Assistance** Target 12: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, 1. Net ODA as percentage of Development Assistance Committee non-discriminatory trading and financial system donors' GNP [targets of 0.7% in total and 0.15% for Least Developed Countries] Includes a commitment to good governance, development, 2. Proportion of ODA to basic social services (basic education, primary and poverty reduction--both nationally and internationally health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation) 3. Proportion of ODA that is untied 4. Proportion of ODA for environment in small island developing states 5. Proportion of ODA for transport sector in land-locked contries Target 13: Address the Special Needs of the Least Developed Countries Market Access 6. Proportion of exports (by value and excluding arms) admitted free of Includes: tariff- and quota-free access for LDC exports; duties and quotas enhanced programme of debt relief for HIPC, cancellation of 7. Average tariffs and quotas on agricultural products and textiles and official bilateral debt; and more generous ODA for countries clothing committed to poverty reduction 8. Domestic and export agricultural subsidies in OECD countries 9. Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity Target 14: Address the Special Needs of landlocked countries and small Debt Sustainability island developing states 10. Proportion of official bilateral HIPC debt cancelled Target 15: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing 11. Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services countries through national and international measures in order 12. Proportion of ODA provided as debt relief to make debt sustainable in the long term 13. Numbers of countries reaching HIPC decision and completion points Target 16: In cooperation with developing countries, develop and 14. Unemployment rate of 15­24 year olds implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth Target 17: In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access 15. Proportion of population with access to affordable essential drugs on to affordable essential drugs in developing countries a sustainable basis Target 18: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the 16. Telephone lines per 1000 people benefits of new technologies, especially information and 17. Personal computers per 1000 people communications Other indicators to be determined *Source: 2002 World Development Indicators, p. 16­17 (<>). **Note: Some of the indicators will be monitored separately for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Africa, landlocked countries and small island developing states. 205