INTERNATIONALBANK FOR WORLD BANK R E T C N O E N STRUCTION PM AND DEVELO February 2004 No.42 A regular series of notes highlighting recent lessons emerging from the operational and analytical program of the World Bank`s Latin America and Caribbean Region SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AROUND EMERGENCY OPERATIONS Sandra Cesilini, Indu John-Abraham and Lisandro Martín Background community activities increased considerably, especially through community support for social services such as In December 2001, an unparalleled soup kitchens, kindergartens/ economic crisis unfolded, triggering childcare to assist parents working high rates of unemployment and under extreme conditions, extreme poverty. Increases in communal purchases of goods, etc. informal and precarious At the same time, civil society employment, such as sub-standard found mechanisms to express jobs with low wages, reduced discontent, including earnings in many households. GDP demonstrations, picketing and fell by 20 percent in the last four local assemblies that interrupted years and by nearly 11 percent in the country's daily life. Traditional 2002 alone. Per capita income at the civil society organizations (CSOs), end of 2002 stood at an estimated including non-governmental US$2,695, down from over organizations (NGOs), churches, US$8,000 in the 1997/98 period. unions and community-based organizations serving the poorest The social cost of these figures has sectors of society, demanded been enormous-- poverty rose to a immediate action from the zenith of 58 percent in 2002, with government and multilateral indigence levels affecting 28 percent organizations to improve the of the population, or approximately 9 million people. As efficacy of social programs created by the government in a result, access to basic public health and education the late 1990s, some through loans from the World Bank services has been severely impacted, while purchasing (WB) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). power has decreased dramatically. During the peak of the economic crisis, the WB's programs were refocused to strengthen social safety nets Civil society responses to the crisis were varied and to ensure basic health, nutrition and education for the most active. On one the hand, proactive participation in 1 vulnerable, particularly poor families with young or based organizations, professional associations, indigenous adolescent children. communities, etc. In April 2001, the WB organized a capacity building An Experimental Initiative workshop on "Participatory Public Management". More than 200 representatives from technical NGOs, grassroots organizations, churches, think tanks, and the government In this context, the WB led a process to develop and participated in the training sessions. The goal of the implement a set of mechanisms to strengthen civil workshop was to expose CSOs to international experiences society's capacity to influence and monitor the use of on social accountability. A concrete outcome of these public resources in emergency social programs co- meetings was that a wide range of organizations financed by the international financial institutions (IFIs). demonstrated a greater commitment to institutionalize mechanisms of social These social accountability accountability in order to strengthening activities promote greater transparency were comprised of two of public administrative independent initiatives: 1.) procedures. the Social Monitor, and 2.) a training program on tools Simultaneously, the WB and for social accountability for UNDP supported a Program grassroots organizations. for Capacity Building on Social Accountability that The Social Monitor has trained 630 CSOs in cities sought to incorporate throughout Argentina in program beneficiaries in specific tools and instruments the assessment of the for social accountability. program's results, impacts, These included the design and level of transparency and execution of participatory accessibility to budgets, as well as an overview information. The program of the institutional and legal contains two critical components. First, a competitively framework for accountability in Argentina. The training selected consortium of CSOs has carried out surveys, appears to have developed among CSOs, at local and interviews, workshops, and in situ observations to verify national levels, a shared commitment to strengthen social the legal and efficient use of resources. These tools accountability, while increasing the self-confidence of civil complemented other analysis and all conclusions have society in its capacity to act on this commitment and demand been compiled in periodic reports to the WB. Second, a wider participation. hotline has been established to receive allegations and complaints from citizens. In July 2002, tenders were solicited from coalitions of CSOs to serve as the Social Monitor. By December 2002, El Foro The capacity building training program was developed for del Sector Social, a consortium of 56 CSOs, was selected to grassroots organizations in methods and techniques for manage the program's activities, including capacity building, social accountability, including participatory budgeting, coordinating local monitoring and data collection, and explanation of social program goals and mechanism to preparing regular reports to the donors and relevant access information from public and private sources. Argentine authorities. UNDP, academic institutions and notable NGOs have provided operational support in the development of the trainings. Results on the Ground Developing Social Accountability In March 2003, the WB, UNDP and IDB officially Inititiatives launched the Social Monitor for an initial six-month period with the possibility of extension for a maximum of eighteen months. The initiatives have offered new and By March 2001, the design process of these initiatives had productive opportunities for strengthening social begun with an intense agenda of meetings with the accountability, yet the process has proven more Government of Argentina, through the Technical Secretary challenging than anticipated. At present, the Social for the National Council for the Coordination of Social Monitor's mandate has been extended for an additional Policy, and CSOs, including technical NGOs, community- three months in order to gradually put into service the hotline on a national basis. Although many of the 2 operational difficulties found in the exploratory phases Nevertheless, the Social Monitor, as an ongoing have been resolved, additional efforts are required to initiative, has not been exempt of obstacles. The Foro del successfully prepare tools that can be transferred to civil Sector Social and the other selected CSOs have society at large. encountered several difficulties in the development of an operative network to implement the Social Monitor. One The managing consortium already has presented several of the principal requisites of the bidding contract in reports that contain and analyze information on building the consortium has been the demand to include a irregularities observed in the distribution of social minimum of 48 NGOs, two organizations from each of the assistance, and helped identify new unmet needs of country's 24 administrative provinces. This condition vulnerable groups most affected by the crisis. was established as a means to guarantee full national participation in the process and to compile information on The initiative has promoted an increase in civil society's social emergency projects nationwide. Yet this mandate access to information, contributing to the exercise of the has proven an impediment to the process, as the capacity civic and social right to be clearly informed on the and representation of the different organizations has implementation and results of social programs financed varied dramatically, complicating their collaborative with public funds. This appears to have two main concrete efforts. As a result, the schedule of activities has been outcomes. First, by publicizing the requisites and compressed and readapted several times, a situation that responsibilities of emergency plans, the Social Monitor has delayed the timely and satisfactory submission of has helped to increase the dissemination of information reports and has caused some budget constraints. on program benefits to vulnerable groups. Second, the Learning from this experience, the Social Monitor Social Monitor has offered beneficiaries of emergency initiatives currently underway in Paraguay and Uruguay services, whose voices frequently are unheard, a space to have eliminated this requisite from their programs. express complaints and recommendations through a hotline to receive relevant opinions and allegations. This The launch of the Social Monitor was widely covered by has created an environment that is more conducive to the national media. Despite a modest follow-up during the improved quality of and satisfaction with public services. last few months, the recent implementation of the hotline has renewed interest in the initiative. Additional efforts to The topic of social control and accountability also has further disseminate the Social Monitor's activities could advanced higher on the political agenda and in academic increase awareness among citizens on the availability of and social forums. Social accountability mechanisms this mechanism intended to ensure transparency in the use have been included in 10 social emergency programs of public funds. financed by the WB and IDB. As However, there has been additional resources progress to increase the are directed towards engagement with civil these activities, other society in the design of stakeholders also new strategies to face could assume more of crises, and to include these responsibilities. social control mechanisms managed by CSOs. For The program has example, during August linked various actors and September 2003, more from all regions of the than 1,200 people from country, including numerous CSOs took part direct beneficiaries, in a participatory process technical NGOs, user/ to develop a new Country c o n s u m e r Assistance Strategy (CAS) organizations and for Argentina. Participants multilateral agency called for increased social technical teams, participation in the through forums and informal discussions on the design decision-making processes of the State regarding public and execution of the Social Monitor. This has contributed expenditures (e.g. ­ priorities in health, education, to a socialization process, and shared best practices of infrastructure). They also requested the inclusion of organizations in various contexts to overcome similar social accountability mechanisms so that civil society can problems. The combination of these outputs appears to contribute in the preparation and control of projects, have fostered civil society's opportunities to engage in including those financed by the World Bank. common strategies and reduce vulnerabilities tied to horizontal competition. 3 Lessons Learned is important to share international best practices and experiences of social auditing widely to build greater Effective involvement of civil society and responsiveness consensus and support for these activities. to their concerns can play an important role in mitigating The use of regional networks within the country in a the risks of social unrest and discontent and help begin to national monitoring system could help the government restore public confidence. Hence, the different social widen its own social auditing programs. Information on accountability initiatives have specifically sought to help nationwide activities could be collected and analyzed. vulnerable sectors of society, and organizations that Regional networks also could help to identify and remedy represent their interests, to become more active in the problems of overlapping authority at the municipal, public sphere, by strengthening their capacity and serving provincial and national levels. as interlocutors to enable monitoring and evaluation of social emergency programs by beneficiaries. The Social Monitor program is one of many steps in Argentina's efforts towards better governance and Numerous weaknesses within civil society limit their participatory decision-making. In the coming months, the ability to fully assume their newly-realized rights and new government is expected to demonstrate its declared responsibilities. Despite concerted efforts to develop civil intention to open political decision making to civil society capacity, the high learning curve for effective society. If the commitment of government, civil society civic participation often lags behind the demands of the and international institutions to increase social timeline established for organized civic action. This accountability and transparency proves stronger than the knowledge gap inhibits active and effective engagement tension of increasing demands, a solid social monitoring in the new spheres of influence. In addition, distrust system could be established, empowering civil society to toward the State and multilateral organizations persists, improve the poor's access to the resources allocated to deterring civic action. Changes in attitudes require time them and helping to restore trust in public institutions. coupled with positive new experiences. There also is a considerable degree of competition among CSOs. The diversity of interests represented naturally ***************** generates conflicting priorities, particularly among different regions of the country. In addition, there exists an unspoken hierarchy among CSOs, with greater importance often given to organizations based in Buenos Aires, creating a sense of favoritism against CSOs from the provinces. In order to ensure the inclusion of the diversity of voices, the IFIs should be fully aware of such differences, and design strategies that consider a wide variety of organizations that represent different realities and deal with diverse priorities. Want to Learn More? Next Steps: Moving From Crisis To Sustainability See http://www.worldbank.org/laccs As with all pilot programs, the social accountability About the Authors initiatives are benefiting from an extensive evaluation process to distill best practices and make appropriate adjustments. An independent private agency will produce This note was prepared by Sandra Cesilini, Senior Social an evaluation report focusing on three critical areas in the Development & Civil Society Specialist, Indu John- design and implementation of the project: 1) institutional Abraham, Consultant, and Lisandro Martin, Junior Profes- aspects; 2) management analysis and 3) strengths and weaknesses in the design and execution of the Social sional Associate, at the World Bank Civil Society Team for Monitor. The evaluation exercise also is expected to serve Latin America and the Caribbean Region. as a valuable tool to deepen transparency and build trust among the various actors. About "en breve" Information dissemination will prove key to ensuring the quality and effectiveness of the program. Specifically, it To subscribe to "en breve" send and email to "en_breve@worldbank.org" 4