THE CHALLENGES
FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
by
ROBERT S. McNAMARA
Sir John Crawford Memorial Lecture
Washington, D.C.
November 1, 1985



INTRODUCTIONa
am deeply pleased to have been invited to deliver this first Memo-
rial Lecture, sponsored by the government of Australia, in honor
of Sir John Crawford. Those of you who knew him personally
will understand why. It is not merely that he was a man of immense
accomplishment in the complicated field of development econom-
ics-at once a scholar, a teacher, an administrator, and a brilliant
policy adviser-but that he wore all of these talents and abilities
with such grace and modesty and contagious good humor.
All who are interested in the advancement of the developing
peoples will be deeply indebted to Sir John. For he was both a man
of vision, and a man of action. A man who dearly understood that
progress throughout the developing world was not only theoretically
possible, but quite certainly attainable. Attainable, however, only
if all of us-in the rich and poor countries alike-are willing, as he
was, to think clearly enough, plan wisely enough, and work hard
enough to help make it happen.
I want to explore with you today a part of the developing world
which is not experiencing progress and whose outlook is far from
bright. It is the huge expanse of Africa and, in particular, sub-Saharan
Africa.
No area of the world has captured more dramatically in recent
months the attention of people everywhere. The graphic reality of
mass starvation has shocked television viewers in the affluent na-
tions. There has been an outpouring of private and public donations
of emergency assistance. Sensibilities have been jolted, and con-
sciences have been touched. There is a strong personal desire on
the part of millions of concerned individuals :o help in a direct and
practical way.
Ironically this avalanche of compassion for the open and visible
suffering of the victims of famine-genuine as it is-has tended to
,I am indebted to the staff of the World Bank, and particularly to S. Shahid Husain,
Armeane M. Choksi, and John L. Maddux, for assisting me in preparing this statement.
They, of course, bear no responsibility for the judgment; and conclusions I am pre-
senting.


obscure the more fundamental problems not only of the Sahelian
zone itself, but of much of sub-Saharan Africa as a whole.
Part of the public's problem of comprehension is the sheer di-
versity of this vast region. It encompasses 45 countries. These con-
tain some 800 different ethnic and linguistic groups, constituting a
total population of 400 million people. Ten percent of them live in
countries which have few resources (for example, Burundi, Lesotho,
Rwanda, and Senegal) or low rainfall (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, and Somalia). Thirty-five percent live in oil-ex-
porting countries (Nigeria, Angola, Cameroon, Congo, and Gabon).
The remainder in countries with land, water, or other natural re-
sources that are generally adequate for long-term development.
Except for Ethiopia and Liberia, none of these sovereign states
has been independent for more than 30 years. Their administrative
structures are still recent, and their territorial divisions are often
fragile and fragmented. Per capita incomes range from $80 per year
in Chad to $3,950 in Gabon (see Annex 1).
The diversity, then, of sub-Saharan Africa is enormous, and the
inclination of the mass media-and indeed of some governments-
to oversimplify the issues is understandable. But it is important to
recognize that there are certain long-term development problems
in this immense region that tend to affect adversely virtually all of
its countries, and all its peoples. These problems are not unique to
Africa, nor are they equally severe in every corner of the continent.
But they are basic, and they are serious, and they are getting worse
rather than better.
They are going to determine the future of sub-Saharan Africa.
Already they are severely eroding its present.
I want to review with you four of these critical issues as they
affect the outlook for economic growth, and examine how they
might best be addressed. They are:
* The macroeconomic policy adjustments required to achieve
long-term development;
* The mounting pressures of population growth;
* The ecological degradation of the resource base; and
2      * The shortfall in external development finance.


I will conclude with a few brief comments on the task ahead for
all of us.
Before beginning this review, however, I want to underscore an
important point. It is this. Much has already been written about
these issues. The World Bank, in particular, has published three
reports. One, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An
Agenda for Action, was prepared in 1981 before I left the Bank.
The other two, Sub-Saharan Africa: A Progress Report on Devel-
opment Prospects and Programs and Toward Sustained Develop-
ment in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Joint Program of Action, were issued
in 1983 and 1984, respectively. One, then, might well ask, What
possible justification is there for another statement at this time? My
answer is this: the action proposed in the previous reports has, for
the most part, not yet even been initiated; the situation is continuing
to deteriorate; and the external financial flows that will be needed
in the second half of this decade to support whatever structural
adjustments the African governments are prepared to initiate are
simply not now in prospect.
It is for those reasons that these issues deserve to be considered
again now.
I. AFRICA'S ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES
AND THE NEED FOR POLICY REFORM
The Nature of the Problem
A discussion of Africa's economic and social problems must begin
by reemphasizing the fact, as is shown in Table 1 below and in
more detail in Annex II, that per capita gross domestic product
growth rates began to fall in the 1970s and have been negative on
average in the 1980s.
Table 1
Per Capita GDP Growth Rates, 1961-84
(annual average in percent)
Country Group            1961-70    1971-79    1980-84
Sub-Sahara: Low Income      1.4       -0.1        -2.8
Sub-Sahara: Other           1.4        1.3        -4.7
Sub-Sahara: Total           1.4        0.4        -3.6
Other Africa                3.1        4.2         2.0
Total Africa              1.8        1.2        -2.4     3


No set of statistics, however dramatic, can convey the level of
human misery that exists and is increasing throughout the continent.
The most helpless victims are the children. It is they who reflect
most quickly in physical terms the fact that tens of millions of human
beings are living, literally, on the margin of life.
In Zambia's poorer regions, for example, height-for-age ratios
have fallen in all categories under 15 years. Child mortality in all
of sub-Saharan Africa was 50% higher than that in other developing
countries in the 1950s, now it is almost 100% higher. The number
of severely hungry and undernourished children has risen 25% in
the past 10 years, and there is every reason to believe that mal-
nutrition is so great and so widespread it will lead to increasing
physical and mental impairment of children in the next 10 years.
Why are Africa's economic growth rates falling?
Some would say that the continent's present problems are the
result of external economic conditions that it has neither caused
nor could change. And to a degree that is, of course, true. Despite
its differences and relative remoteness from the more industrialized
areas of the world, the continent has not been able to escape the
turbulence of the international economic environment of recent
years: the persistent recessions; the severe decline in commodity
prices; increasing protectionism (which has been particularly dam-
aging to two of Africa's major exports: sugar and livestock); the
high real interest rates; and the decreasing net capital flows.
All of this is the price of living in an interdependent world. Dis-
tance no longer isolates Africa, or virtually anywhere else, from
major international economic currents.
But it is not true that Africa is simply the hapless victim of im-
personal economic forces over which it has no control. Other re-
gions, facing similar outside forces, have suffered far less. Africa's
present difficulties have not been imposed on it exclusively from
the external environment. Like all newly developing societies, the
countries of sub-Saharan Africa have had to wrestle with their own
internal economic distortions. And they have made their own share
of mistakes.
There have been: inadequate trade and pricing policies, espe-
cially in agriculture; overvalued exchange rates that discriminate
4    against exports; mounting fiscal deficits; and a variety of burden-


some government interventions and controls in the production pro-
cess. Such policies, by and large, have pervaded sub-Saharan Africa
for decades. They have exacted the inevitable penalties: an erosion
of productivity, pragmatism, and entrepreneurial energy. And that,
inevitably, has translated into sluggish economic growth.
A major cause of the distorted policy environment in many of
the African nations has been the encroachment of the state into
almost every sphere of economic activity. The politicizing of eco-
nomic life has proceeded further in Africa than in any other region
of the developing world. More and more areas of the economy have
fallen under the control of the political elite. That in turn has led
to the practice of accumulating wealth through access to state power
rather than through contributions to productive enterprise.
This is not to suggest, of course, that all government interventions
are bad. Clearly there is a major role for African governments to
play in promoting their countries' economic growth. This is espe-
cially true where markets are imperfect, as is the case in many of
these nations.
But government interventions are not without cost, and, in the
future, officials must weigh far more carefully than in the past the
penalties of intervention-reduced private incentive; inefficient
parastatal institutions; dictated prices; and a suffocating atmosphere
of administrative controls-against the penalties of less than perfect
markets.
The Plight of Agriculture
As is shown in Table 2 below, and in more detail in Annex Ill,
Table 2
Growth Rates of Per Capita Food Production
and Levels of Food imports
Growth of Per Capita Food  Levels of Food Imports
Production (%)       (millions of US$)
Country Group      1961-70 1971-80 1980-84  1970  1980  1985
Sub-Sahara: Low  Income  1.3  -1.3  -2.1   562  2,307   1,966
Sub-Sahara: Other   0.6     -1.1   -1.8    554  4,200   3,353
Sub-Sahara: Total   1.0     -1.2   -2.0   1,116  6,507  5,319
Other Africa        0.8     -1.5   -1.8    770    8    _7,_129
Total Africa       0.9    -1.3    -1.9   1,886  13,889  12,448  5


per capita food production, which barely held its own in the 1960s,
began to decline in the 1970s, and fell at a rate of 1.9% per year
in 1980-84. As a result, in current dollars, food imports rose sev-
enfold between 1970 and 1985 ($1.9 billion versus $12.4 billion).
The destruction of Africa's ability to feed itself need not have
occurred. The fact is that agriculture, which accounted for a third
of the continent's gross national product (GNP) in 1982, has been
discriminated against for decades. Not only has it suffered from
unrealistic pricing and exchange rate policies, but it has often been
deprived of desperately needed government investment-invest-
ment in irrigation, in research, in training, and in extension services.
It has been deprived of this essential investment by a distorted policy
framework that has siphoned it off into an overprotected and in-
efficient industrial sector.
The key importance of agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa must not
be underestimated. It is a labor-intensive sector in which most of
these countries can enjoy a comparative advantage, particularly
relative to industry. A vigorous growth in agricultural production
and exports is an absolutely essential condition for the creation of
significant employment and earning opportunities for the rural poor.
The reality is that the average African, who depends critically on
agriculture for a living, is poorer today than he was in 1970. If the
problems of agriculture are not addressed more effectively, he will
be poorer in 1990 than he was at the time his country became
independent. And what is even more ominous, the disastrous fa-
mines that are currently restricted to years of drought-and to only
a few countries will become everyday occurrences affecting a ma-
jority of the sub-Saharan nations.
The Debt Crisis
Another critical component of sub-Saharan Africa's economic
environment-and one made worse by inappropriate domestic pol-
icies-is its debt crisis.
The roots of the problem reach back into the turmoil of the 1970s
with the transitory commodity booms, the sharp increases in foreign
borrowing, and the reluctance of governments to cut back on spend-
ing programs. Matters grew worse in the early 1980s as the global
6    recession persisted, and the structural adjustment programs were


delayed. The prolonged drought over much of the region com-
pounded the problem even further, and all of this has resulted in
severe debt-servicing difficulties.
The estimated total of disbursed and outstanding debt at the close
of 1983 for sub-Saharan Africa was some $80 billion. About 75%
($60.3 billion) of this was public, or publicly guaranteed, medium-
and long-term debt. $5.1 billion of it is owed to the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and $8.0 billion to the World Bank Group
(see Annex V).
The absolute size of the African debt, particularly the commercial
component, is of course much smaller than that of the highly pub-
licized Latin American debt. Thus, it has received much less atten-
tion from the international financial community. But the reality is
that the adjustments necessary to service this debt are as critical for
most of the African countries as are those of the major Latin Amer-
ican nations. Sudan, for example, is already $110 million in arrears
to the IMF alone on $700 million in outstanding loans, and Liberia
and Zambia may soon be in similar straits.
Indeed for many African societies the futu,e debt service profile
is staggering. Already, in the recent past, they have been caught up
in reschedulings and arrears. Now these are expanding. Scheduled
debt service in the 1985-87 period for pubic and publicly guar-
anteed medium- and long-term debt is double what it was in 1983-
85. The adjustment problems will be formidable.
The Importance of Reforming the Policy Framework
Given the nature of the problems confronting sub-Saharan Afri-
ca-and the food and debt crises are typical-the importance of
economic reform cannot be overstated. Failure to face up to it will
seriously jeopardize the long-term prospects both for growth, and
for reducing absolute poverty.
What is required now is not another call for further studies. What
is required now is remedial action.
The policy distortions that have penalized African progress are
well documented in most countries. And the required compass
headings to set a new course are clear.
They include: realignment and closer control of government ex-  7


penditures; keeping fiscal deficits to a lower fraction of GDP; tighter
discipline on monetary expansion; more realistic trade and pricing
policies and exchange rates in order to encourage production and
promote exports; reforming, and where necessary eliminating, in-
efficient public enterprises and marketing boards; and avoiding
extravagant projects designed for prestige rather than economic
viability.
No country anywhere, including some of the most advanced of
the industrialized nations, is free of temptations to turn away and
temporize when confronted with painful economic dilemmas.
But in the end such dilemmas must be faced if they are to be
solved. And that means adjustment.
There are signs that such adjustment is beginning to take place
in some African countries. The recent efforts of Ghana are encour-
aging, and other countries, including Cameroon, Malawi, Botswana,
and Rwanda, are beginning to show the beneficial effects of moving
toward sound macroeconomic management.
But many other nations are postponing action. They fear that the
necessary macroeconomic policy reforms may, in the short run,
lead to lower-and perhaps even negative-consumption and GNP
growth. There will be an inevitable transition period, and these years
will be difficult. As the structural adjustments take hold, some groups
in these societies will benefit, and some will be adversely affected.
Some will gain new opportunities, and others will lose old privileges.
Those with vested interests against the reforms will undoubtedly
bring political pressure to delay or reverse them. Certainly there
will be political and economic costs that must be paid in order to
see the adjustment process through.
The costs of adjustment come early, the benefits only later on.
There are no quick and easy solutions, and none should be ex-
pected. After three decades of policy-induced distortions, sustain-
able growth with equity cannot be achieved overnight.
But what African governments must recognize is that the costs of
failing to adjust will be incalculably greater. This is certainly true
over the longer term, and it is very likely to be the case in the short
8    run as well.


The critical point is to make a start, and to make it now. The
penalties of further delay will be enormous.
Policy reform, of course, must go hand in hand with institutional
reform. The fact is that the marked decline of key institutions is an
important dimension of the crisis facing many sub-Saharan African
countries. It is not simply that desirable institutional development
may not yet have taken place, but rather that a number of previously
able and functioning institutions are now losing their effectiveness.
There are, for example, entire central ministries that are no longer
in adequate control of their budgets and personnel; public agencies
that have lost their capacity to carry out their proper tasks; state
universities, scientific facilities, and statistical offices that have se-
riously declined in the quality of their work; parastatal organizations
and marketing boards that impede rather than promote productivity;
and critically important agricultural research institutions that are
becoming increasingly ineffective.
The primary weakness in agricultural research today is not an
inadequacy of staff or funding, but rather the ineffective use of
existing capacity: management is weak; researchers are underem-
ployed and are too isolated from farmers and extension workers;
and the results of research are inadequately disseminated.
The deterioration of critical institutions is iot, of course, uniform
(Senegal, Togo, Mauritania, and Malawi, for example, are showing
some progress), but it is widespread, it is serious, and it is not yet
being dealt with effectively. The matter is urgent because it is un-
likely that the overall economic crisis can be halted without at least
a minimally efficient level of performance by the public institutions.
A major part of the problem is that many African politicians have
used the state to reward themselves and their supporters with jobs,
contracts, public monopolies, and illicit income. The state itself, in
turn, has become increasingly ineffective as a producer of goods
and services for the mass of the population.
It is vital that this trend of institutional decline be reversed. Good
public policy, no matter how wise and appropriate, cannot be put
into practice-indeed, cannot even be researched and formulated
in the first place-without effective public institutions. That is why
institutional reform is a bedrock responsibility of African govern-  9


ments. Nothing lasting can be achieved without it. It is not a huge,
heroic, one-time event. It is more difficult even than that. It is a
vigilant, careful, and continuous process.
Public institutions are, after all, living organisms, and must remain
responsive to changes in their environment. They deteriorate when
they harden into inflexibility and indifference, and lose sight of their
fundamental purpose: to serve and assist the public.
Before concluding this section on the importance of the reform
of policies and institutions, I want to return to the problems of
Africa's agriculture and to emphasize once again the key to Africa's
economic recovery lies in its agricultural sector. The economic
policy environment within which the sector operates is of crucial
importance.
It is not enough simply to have "good agricultural projects." They
can be completely undermined by an inappropriate set of incentives,
and particulary by the wrong cost/price relationship. This is not to
suggest that getting the agricultural prices right is the one all-purpose
remedy for every possible problem in the development of the sector.
But governments need to reflect that getting them wrong can and
does lead to immense difficulties.
Altering the economic policy environment in sub-Saharan Africa
more in favor of agriculture would dramatically alter the economic
scene. It would apportion scarce economic resources more ration-
ally across the economy. It would improve the international com-
petitiveness of the agricultural sector. It would provide incentives
to farmers both to produce more, and to produce more efficiently.
And it would stimulate more employment, more exports, and more
income-earning opportunities.
All of the suggestions for reforms that I have made would help
alleviate poverty. And they would serve as well to ease the debt
problem, both by reducing aggregate demand-which for many
African countries is essential in the short term-and by expanding
the supply of tradable goods in agriculture.
Clearly, only the African governments and peoples themselves
can take the fundamental actions required to solve the critical prob-
lems that flow out of the crippling distortions in the economic policy
10   framework of their countries. No outside assistance-however mas-


sive or generous or well-meaning-can possibly substitute for these
internal efforts.
But given the resolve of Africans themselves to take on that heavy
task, the international development community has a clear obli-
gation to assist and support them in those efforts. I will expand on
this point in Section IV. I only want to stress here that if we do not
make those joint efforts, then all of us must prepare ourselves for a
scenario of suffering and starvation and economic collapse in Africa
beyond anything we have seen thus far.
II. THE MOUNTING PRESSURES OF POPULATION GROWTH'
Eliminating economic distortions, then, is of immediate concern.
But they are not the sole set of constraints to sustainable develop-
ment. The most important long-term issue is the rampant growth of
population. For most countries in Africa that issue constitutes a
ticking time bomb.
The Dimensions of the Population Problem
Africa's 1980 population was estimated to be about 453 million,
including 363 million in sub-Saharan Africa (Annex VIII). The den-
sities vary, but are generally low. Most countries have densities of
under 40 persons per square kilometer, and even in the most heavily
settled areas densities rarely exceed 200. By sharp contrast, national
densities in Asia range from 42 to 600, with heavily settled areas
exceeding 1,000 persons per square kilometer.
The population problem in Africa, then, is not that there are now
too many people there. There are not. The problem is that the
population growth rate is explosively high.
During the 1950s and 1960s, with death rates on the whole
declining faster than birth rates, the rates of population growth con-
tinued to increase in most developing countries. But beginning with
the early 1970s, a slow deceleration of population growth has be-
come evident in all regions of the world except Africa. For the
I am indebted to the staff of the Population Council and to members of the World Bank's
Population Study Task Force for assisting me in collectirg material for this section.  11


developing world as a whole, measured over five-year periods, the
growth rate peaked at 2.46% in the first half of the 1970s. For Africa
it is continuing to grow, reaching 3.01% in 1980-85.
Table 3
Population Growth Rates, by Region, 1950-85
(annual average in percent)
Region            1950-55  1960-65  1970-75  1975-80  1980-85
Africa             2.11    2.44    2.74     3.00    3.01
Latin America      2.72    2.80    2.51    2.37     2.30
East Asian         2.08    1.81    2.36     1.47    1.20
South Asia         2.00    2.51    2.44    2.30     2.20
All Developing
Countries        2.11    2.30     2.46    2.14    2.02
aExcluding Japan.
Source: United Nations 1982 assessment.
Sub-Saharan Africa, already the poorest region in the world, now
has the highest population growth rate in the world, even exceeding
that of the rest of Africa. It is 3.2% per year. Were that to continue,
the population would double in 22 years, quadruple in 44 years,
and increase eightfold in 66 years.
What are population growth prospects in Africa for the next few
decades, and for the longer term?
Uncertainties affecting the future argue for some caution in an-
swering. Demographic processes have a built-in momentum that
permits relatively accurate forecasts for 15 to 20 years ahead. Be-
yond that time span, the possibility of error becomes much greater.
The question, however, remains highly appropriate, and is an-
swerable with a fair degree of accuracy. We know, for example,
that a large majority of the children born in the 1980s will still be
alive past the midpoint of the next century.
To answer the question for the longer term, we can spell out
plausible assumptions as to the future course of fertility and mor-
tality, and calculate demographic characteristics. Those who wish
to challenge the orders of magnitude resulting from such calcula-
tions can best do so by challenging the underlying assumptions,
and by proposing and defending alternative assumptions that they
consider more plausible.
12      The results of such a projection exercise for Africa covering the


time span 1980 to 2100, undertaken by the World Bank, are sum-
marized in Table 4 below and presented in more detail in Annex
VIII.
Table 4
African Population Projections, 1980-2100
(population in millions)
Total   Year in
Selected                                              Fertility  Which
Countries          1950  1980 2000 2025  2050  2100 Rate, 1983 NRR = la
Cameroon            4.6   8.7  17    30    42    50    6.5     2030
Ethiopia           18.0  37.7  64   106   142   173    5.5     2035
Ghana               4.4  11.5  23    40    53    62    7.0     2025
Kenya               5.8  16.6  37    69    97   116    8.0     2030
Malawi              2.9   6.0  11    21    29    36    7.6     2040
Mozambique          6.5  12.1  22    39    54    67    6.5     2035
Niger               2.9   5.5  11    20    29    38    7.0     2040
Nigeria            40.6  84.7 163   295   412   509    6.9     2035
Tanzania            7.9  18.8  37    69    96   120    7.0     2035
Uganda              4.8  12.6  25    46    64    80    7.0     2035
Zaire              14.2  27.1  50    86   116   139    6.3     2030
Other Sub-Sahara   59.8 121.7 218   381   524   651    6.5     2040
Total Sub-Sahara  172.4 363.0 678 1202 1658 2041     6.7     2040
Other Africa       42.6  89.6 148   225   282   319    5.5     2025
Total Africa    215.0 452.6 826 1,427 1,94C 2360     6.5     2040
aNRR refers to net reproduction rate. When NRR =  1, fertility is a  replacement level.
The projections are based on the estimated population size in
1980 and its sex and age distribution. They incorporate the as-
sumption that mortality improvements in the future will track the
historical experience of the more advanced countries in moving
toward higher levels of life expectancy.
The nature of the more crucial fertility assumptions is summarized
in the last two columns of the table. Starting with the estimated
level of fertility in 1983 (expressed in terms of the total fertility rate,
that is, the number of children an average woman would have
during her lifetime), the projections stipulate a decline to replace-
ment-level fertility by a date that is specified for each country sep-
arately. Replacement-level fertility means a level of childbearing in
which each couple on average replaces itself in the next generation.
If sustained over a substantial period, this would result in zero
population growth.
But when replacement-level fertility is reached in a society, it
does not mean that the population immediately ceases to grow. It         13


may continue increasing for decades, depending on the society's
age structure. Compare, for example, the current age distribution
in Nigeria (which is typical of that in most developing countries)
and Sweden.
Nigeria, 1980           Sweden, 1980
4i 4,,
1 44 4                                              5 '
, 4' ,5                                          I
o <eC,r! flaub and1 Un-1-  Gr-n1 ,r  The, nrn etlFn
When replacement-level fertility is first reached in a country with
an age distribution similar to that of Nigeria, the population will
still possess a strong growth momentum. It will continue to grow
for decades until the very large numbers of females at the bottom
of the age pyramid have passed through their reproductive years.
Such a nation will not reach a stable population level until 50 or
70 years after it has achieved replacement-level fertility. During that
period its population will have increased by an additional 50 to 60%.
The assumptions concerning the future tempo of fertility decline
in the African countries, incorporated in the projections, reflect the
judgment-or the hope-that the high fertility rates, which are still
increasing in some countries, will start to decline well before the
century's end, and that then the downward trend will be precipitous
and sustained until replacement-level fertility is achieved.
These are, in fact, heroic assumptions.
14      They require that the move from high fertility to replacement-


level fertility-which took about a century and a half in the United
States-be completed within a drastically shorter time span in Af-
rica. They envisage no possibility of temporary reversals or pauses
on the downward course of fertility. They allow for no "baby booms"
such as the West experienced, once replaccment fertility has been
attained.
And yet the populations that must conform to these demanding
assumptions are largely poor and rural. They are populations in
which security in old age is still derived primarily from the support
of one's children. Many are populations with religious and cultural
values that place a high premium on fertility.
But let us take the assumptions at face value, despite their implicit
optimistic bias. The projections in Table 4 are frightening. For the
reasons I referred to, rates of growth in the African countries will
remain high for decades to come.
By the year 2025-only 40 years from now-Kenya will be four
times the size it was in 1980; Nigeria and Ghana will have grown
more than threefold; all of the other countries listed in Table 4 will
have at least tripled; and the population of sub-Saharan Africa as
a whole will have risen from 363 million to 1,201 million.
The Consequences of Rapid Population Growth
What does so rapid a population growth rate in fact mean for the
region?
To begin with, countries will find it increas ngly difficult to reverse
the 20-year decline in per capita food production. Implementing
proper agricultural policies will, of course, help. But sub-Saharan
Africa will almost certainly find it impossible to achieve and main-
tain a rate of growth in food production that exceeds its current
population growth rate of 3.2%. Agricultura growth rates that high
have been achieved by very few countries, and only then under the
most favorable conditions. The reality is that agriculture in sub-
Saharan Africa is unlikely to grow at more 1:han 2.5% per year for
at least the next two decades. Thus, the already high levels of mal-
nutrition will grow even worse, and the punishing years of
famine will become even more frequent.
Another serious consequence of the run-away population growth  15


rate will be mounting unemployment. Between now and the end
of the century, industry and agriculture combined will be able to
absorb only about half of the projected increase in the labor force.
The other half will either have to subsist on marginal land, or be
jobless. One must remember that it will require 20 years before
lowered fertility-if achieved-could begin to limit the growth of
the labor force.
The present population explosion will also aggravate the ecolog-
ical vulnerabilities of the continent. Already the pressures have led
to a significant decline in the wood resources. The demand for
firewood has increased so intensely that it has resulted in widespread
deforestation. This in turn has brought on severe fuel shortages.
In many countries of West Africa families that traditionally cooked
two meals a day now have fuel for only one hot meal a day, or one
every other day. Thus the deforestation is beginning to lead to an
accelerated degradation of the basic life-support system. I will turn
to this subject in more detail in a moment, but I want to make the
point here that the population problem in Africa is clearly related
to its growing ecological difficulties.
High population growth rates will also put heavy strains on al-
ready overburdened educational and health care systems. Countries
such as Kenya face a doubling or tripling of their school-age pop-
ulation within the next 15 years. Growth rates such as these will
immensely exacerbate the problems of expanding these services to
anything approaching required levels.
Such growth rates will almost certainly lead to pervasive and
restrictive regulation of private life. Restraints on reproductive free-
dom could become the law of the land in cases where governments,
through incapacity or unawareness, have allowed demographic
pressures to build to extremes. I am not speaking here of government
measures aimed at creating greater social responsibility in the re-
productive decisions freely made by families. I am talking about
coercive government intrusions into the decisions themselves-
forced sterilization, for example.
Such government actions would, moreover, be accompanied by
increasingly harsh and desperate actions by families themselves:
higher rates of abortion; use of pregnancy tests to determine the sex
16    of an unborn child, followed by abortion of female fetuses; and


rising rates of female infanticide.
If the present growth trends continue, such coercive measures by
governments and such desperate actions by families are likely to
be common in sub-Saharan Africa by the end of the century.
In sum, overly rapid population growth strains virtually every
component of a developing society. It expands the labor force faster
than new jobs. It rings the cities with slums. It overstrains the food
supply and the ecological life-support system. It entrenches illiter-
acy, malnourishment, and ill health. And it perpetuates a culture of
poverty.
Even in a vigorously prosperous environment, coping with such
demographic pressures would be difficult. Ii the weak economies
of sub-Saharan Africa they will be overwhelming. If appropriate
action is delayed-if procrastination is prolonged-then we can
be sure of only one thing: the problem will eventually be dealt with,
but at an immeasurably higher cost. By famine, perhaps. Or by
violent civil unrest. Or by draconian coercion in a context of public
repression and private brutality.
What then can be done?
Let us begin to answer that question by examining the causes of
Africa's population problem.
The Root Causes of Rapid Population Growth
Falling mortality rates plus constant or increasing fertility pro-
duces population growth. Mortality rates vary widely across Africa.
This is due in part to natural factors such as food quality, climatic
conditions, and the prevalence of disease. But it is due also, of
course, to developmental influences such as GNP growth rates,
levels of education-particularly that of women-and the effec-
tiveness of public health programs.
As development has made headway in Africa, mortality rates have
fallen. But they still remain substantially above the rates in other
parts of the world. They can, therefore, be expected to fall further
in the decades ahead.
The high fertility rate-an average of 6.7 children per woman in
1983-is the result of a broad mix of economic, social, and cultural  17


forces. These include such factors as the early age of marriage for
African girls; the diminishing practice of prolonged breastfeeding,
and sexual abstinence, after childbirth; and the very limited use of
modern contraception. Fewer than 5% of couples use contracep-
tives in sub-Saharan Africa, as compared with some 30% in India,
and some 70% in China.
The high fertility rates are due in part also to the low relative
status that women have in many African societies. Though both
males and females derive benefits from children, it is generally the
women who bear most of the costs. In addition to the health risks
of bearing children, women often have the major financial respon-
sibility for raising them. This is particularly true in polygamous
households, where each wife has primary responsibility for her own
children.
Men, on the other hand, enjoy the benefits of children at a much
lower cost. They are less involved in their day-to-day care, less
concerned with their health, educational, and emotional needs, and
hence less conscious of the costs to the children of having many
siblings. Thus, to the extent that males continue to dominate the
decision to have another child, fertility is likely to remain high.
Recent surveys of a number of African countries, however, have
indicated that women too express a very high demand for children.
These surveys show that even though most married women already
have six children, more than 80% want still more. In six of the
countries surveyed, women said they wanted between six and nine
offspring.
Since most families in Africa still make their living on the land,
child labor is commonly regarded asa valuable advantage despite the
fact that careful economic studies show the reverse to be the case.
Added to all of this is the fact that many sub-Saharan African
governments-including many of the Francophone countries-
simply have no clear population policies in place. Some countries
do provide family planning services for health and human rights
reasons, but without any explicit demographic purpose. In general,
most governments have neither formulated nor implemented poli-
cies specifically designed to moderate rapid population growth.
There is little evidence that they are seriously committed to that
18   objective.


Why is this so?
There are many reasons.
Until quite recently many African leaders regarded population
growth as a distinct asset, rather than a potential hazard. They had
not fully realized the inevitable consequences of runaway growth
rates. Population control, furthermore, is often a sensitive political
issue in Africa, particularly when different groups in a society com-
pete for power and resources.
There is the added problem that in many countries modern con-
traception itself is poorly understood, and lacks social approval.
Because infertility affects a disproportionate number of Africans,
couples are reluctant to control their childbearing through modern
means.
The perception, moreover, that much of the pressure for small
families comes from western aid donors leads to resentment and
inaction on the part of officials. Government commitment is further
constrained by the lack of recent and reliable demographic data.
Many countries do not have a history of census-taking, and even
when censuses have been taken, political controversy has often
prevented them from being published. The result is that the size of
the population and its rate of growth in coUntries such as Guinea,
Nigeria, and Zaire are not known with any degree of certainty.
There are, then, very few countries in sub-Saharan Africa that
have adopted policies to moderate their population growth. As re-
cently as 1974-the year of the United Nations Conference on
Population in Bucharest-only two countries, Kenya and Ghana,
had such policies in place. In neither courtry have they been ef-
fective. The total fertility rate in Kenya has increased from 7.6 chil-
dren per woman in 1975 to 8 in 1983, and ih Ghana from 6.7 to 7.
This is the general pattern in most of sub-Saharan Africa. The
resulting strains are already acute in countries such as Kenya,
Burundi, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, and the Sahelian nations. With-
in the next decade they will be felt in many more.
Action to Slow Population Growth
Fortunately, at least on the surface, the attitudes of sub-Saharan
African governments are beginning to change. Today, in contrast to  19


the position that many held in 1974, more than three-fourths of
them give at least lip-service support to family planning.
Early last year, 36 countries adopted the Kilimanjaro Program of
Action on population. It called on them to ensure the availability
of family planning services to all couples and individuals, compared
with the mere 5% who are actually utilizing such services today.
Among the larger countries, Zimbabwe has developed a strong
family planning program. Kenya and Botswana have programs under
way, and several other countries have recently made a beginning.
But despite these formal commitments, the progress is disappointing.
The words are in place. But the day-to-day effectiveness of the
programs is not yet apparent.
What is apparent is that the task will require far greater effort than
is presently being applied to it. The political will to accord popu-
lation policy the priority it deserves is, of course, essential. But
political will alone is not enough.
An effective fertility reduction program clearly requires an ap-
preciable degree of administrative capacity. Experience has shown
that this can best be achieved by greater decentralization of re-
sponsibility for the management of the program.
The administrative burden on national governments can be eased,
for example, by placing greater emphasis on nongovernmental ef-
forts in distributing contraceptive supplies, both nonprofit and com-
mercial. It is too readily taken for granted that governments must
necessarily assume the major operational responsibility for distri-
bution of family planning services-even in those settings where
they have obviously been unable to deliver a wide variety of other
basic services.
And it is, of course, clear that by the end of the century substantial
increases in expenditures will be required to implement effective
population programs in each country. The funds required will have
to come from a variety of national and international sources: cost-
recovery programs; central and local government budgets; private
family planning organizations; international welfare institutions;
donor countries; and international development agencies.
Properly designed education and health services, important in
20   their own right, can and do provide strong synergistic support to


family planning goals. Reducing current infant and child mortality
rates, and expanding basic education-with special emphasis on
increasing the proportion of girls in school-can achieve high re-
turns in lowered fertility.
Of all the aspects of social development, the educational level
appears most consistently associated with lower fertility. It is sig-
nificant that an increase in the education oi' women tends to lower
fertility to a greater extent than a similar increase in the education
of men.
Instruction for women in nutrition, child care, and family planning
are all, of course, important. But women need market-oriented train-
ing and services as well: access to credit, extension service, and
the skills necessary for participating in a cash economy.
Indeed, enhancing the status of women socially, economically,
and politically-and thereby expanding their range of roles and
opportunities in society-is of critical importance in this whole
matter.
Women represent a seriously undervalued potential in the entire
development process. To prolong inequitable practices that relegate
them exclusively to narrow traditional rolEs not only denies both
them and society the benefits of that potential, but very seriously
compounds the problem of reducing fertility.
There are, of course, a variety of other components that can
strengthen a national family planning effort: appropriate financial
incentives; an effective public information program; a broad choice
of contraceptive techniques and services; and dependable delivery
systems through which parents can in fact get the services they
wish.
But the most important single step that any nation can take to
reduce its rate of population growth is to establish a framework-
a national plan-within which all of these measures can be for-
mulated, and against which progress can be periodically evaluated.
The truth is that had sub-Saharan African countries established
such plans 10 years ago, not a single country would today be sat-
isfied with its demographic progress during the past decade.
As a foundation, then, for action, country fertility targets should  21


be set for specific time periods. Realistic policies should then be
introduced to lead to desired family sizes consistent with those
targets, and family planning services should be provided which will
assist parents to achieve them.
Reports to the nation each year on the degree to which the overall
targets, and the necessary supporting actions, are being realized
would provide an assessment of the progress achieved. Such reports
would introduce a social consciousness and discipline that would
lead, over a reasonable period-say, five to ten years-to an ef-
fective fertility reduction program.
I want to emphasize that the demographic penalties for procras-
tination and delay are inexorable. For example, as is illustrated in
the table below, if Nigeria were to begin to introduce now those
policies which would permit it to achieve replacement-level fertility
by the year 2000-instead of the year 2035, as is projected in Table
4-its population would level off at about 239 million instead of
532 million. Similarly, were Kenya to reach replacement-level fer-
tility in 2000, rather than in the projected year of 2030, its popu-
lation would ultimately stabilize at 55 million instead of the pro-
jected 120 million. And Africa, as a whole, would level off at 1.2
billion instead of 2.5 billion.
Table 5
Effect on Ultimate Population Size of Reaching
Replacement Level Fertility (NRR =1) in the Year 2000
Instead of as Projected in Table 4
(population in millions)
Difference Due to
Ultimate    Ultimate     Delay in Reaching
Population  Population       NRR= 1
Population  if NRR=1  per Table 4       % of 1980
Country   in 1980  in Year 2000  Pop.  Year NRR= 1  Pop.  Pop.
Nigeria      85     239      532   2035       293   346
Kenya        17      55      120   2030       65    392
Total Africa  453  1,236   2,462   2040     1,226   271
It is clear that efforts to moderate population growth today will
ease Africa's problems of tomorrow. But unless firm action is taken
now, the continent's present difficulties will multiply manyfold. Let
22    me turn now to a critical case in point: the ecological decline.


Ill. THE ECOLOGICAL DEGRADATION OF THE CONTINENT'
Throughout Africa the physical resources that underpin the econ-
omy are being degraded. One sees: dwindling forests, eroding soils,
and falling water tables. What is less evident, but even more alarm-
ing, is that the continued overuse of these ecosystems can set in
motion dangerous processes that are self-reinforcing.
The loss of forest cover is taking place in virtually every country
on the continent. In Mauritania and Rwanca the forests are almost
completely gone. In Ethiopia and Zimbabwe they are rapidly dis-
appearing. In Tanzania and Sudan woodcutting is proceeding at
twice the sustainable level. In Kenya it is taking place at five times
that level. And in West Africa the coastal forests are disappearing
at the rate of 5% per year. At that pace they are not likely to last
into the next century. The Ivory Coast, for example, which once
had 30 million hectares of tropical forest, now is left with only 4.5
million.
This depletion of wood supplies has led families to turn to cow
dung and crop residues for fuel. But this removes vital nutrients
from the land, which in turn reduces crop yields and the ability of
pastures to support livestock. Spurred by explosive population growth,
these forces of ecological degradation appear to be gathering mo-
mentum.
Each stage of ecological deterioration appears to accelerate the
onset of the next. As land is cleared of vegetation, soil erosion
accelerates and more rainfall runs off to the ocean rather than seep-
ing into the earth. With less water retained in the land to be re-
evaporated into the atmosphere, fewer clouds are recharged and
rainfall declines. The diminishing rainfall, in turn, dries out the
landscape and further aggravates the already serious desertification.
These self-reinforcing processes may in part explain the persist-
ence of drought in the southern parts of the Sahel. If in fact the
shrinkage of the forests, the loss of soils, the overgrazing of the
rangelands, and the drying out of the agricultural land itself have
contributed to the decline in rainfall, then sub-Saharan Africa may
be caught in a vicious circle.
,I am grateful to Lester Brown, President of Worldwatch Institute, and James Gustave
Speth, President of World Resources Institute, for reviewing this section of the statement.  23


We usually think of drought as a temporary anomaly that will
pass in time-when so-called normal conditions return. But some
experts now fear that what we are observing may not in fact be
temporary. Africa's famine has rightly commanded headlines. But
the extent of Africa's ecological degradation has not been widely
noted. Certainly not by the world at large. And not sufficiently even
by some African officials themselves. It is not just the tree cover or
the rangelands that are under threat. It is the whole range of Africa's
extraordinarily rich and diverse ecological inheritance that is threat-
ened. The combination of the rising populaton growth, the declining
per capita output of subsistence economies, and the overuse and
misuse of natural resources is laying the foundation for a human
tragedy of vast proportions. It is Africa's future that is in jeopardy,
if these trends are not reversed.
Reversing the Trends
In 1981 the World Bank stated that in Africa "a strategy to stop
the accelerating degradation of soils and vegetation is overdue."
That is still true today. Neither the African governments nor the
international community has given priority attention to the resto-
ration of African soils.
The specific actions required will, of course, vary country by
country. But sound and feasible programs are likely to include the
following actions: reducing erosion through the promotion of con-
servation and new farming practices; better terrace design; and
agroforestry systems tailored specifically for the Sahel and for the
farmlands of equatorial and coastal West Africa.
Most of the international agencies that support forestry are cur-
rently reappraising their efforts. They are beginning to recognize
that the complex relationship between forests, farmlands, and
household fuel requirements should shape reforestation strategies.
Clearly more trees need to be planted. But the critical questions
are, Which trees? And in which regions? And planted for whom?
And planted by whom? It is the detailed answers to these questions
that will determine the success or failure of any reforestation pro-
gram.
It is, of course, the local conditions that will help shape the
24   approach. In areas adjacent to cities it will be important to establish


plantations of fast-growing trees that can readily supply firewood
and charcoal to urban dwellers. It is an urgent need. Plantations
today supply less than 5% of Africa's fuelwood demands, and less
than one-sixth of the wood and charcoal used in cities and towns.
In the Sahel, where water supplies are limited, efforts must be
expanded to identify and develop varieties oF drought-tolerant trees.
And the woodlands that remain must be better managed, and the
wood supplies themselves used more efficiently.
In many parts of the continent, providing tree seedlings to rural
families to plant and maintain on their own land could in effect
increase the forestry workforce by an order of magnitude. And
throughout the area more careful management of the existing forests
would increase wood supplies at a very low cost. These are urgent
needs since restoring Africa's woodlands and forests is absolutely
essential to the continent's economy.
But if all the suggestions that I have made here are pursued, will
they in fact resolve the problem? Will the cegradation of the eco-
system of a continent be reversed? I don't krow and I don't believe
anyone knows. The extent, the causes, and the implications of the
environmental degradation are far from clear. What we do know is
that reversing the process of deterioration is essential to the social
and economic welfare of the 1.5 billion people who will be living
in Africa in 40 years' time.
I urge, therefore, that a special research program be undertaken
to increase the world's understanding of African ecological issues.
The project could be organized under the chairmanship of the World
Bank and the United Nations Development Programme. It could be
operated at a cost of perhaps $5 million per year. Given the very
real potential for a massive ecological disaster in Africa, such a
research effort ought to be a high priority both for the nations of
Africa and for the international community.
IV. THE REQUIREMENTS AND PROSPECTS
FOR EXTERNAL FINANCE
Let me turn now to the overall requirements and prospects for
external finance for sub-Saharan Africa.                 25


The arguments for substantial-and indeed increasing-levels of
concessionary assistance are very powerful. Such assistance is need-
ed to:
* Support the structural adjustments which are required for long-
term economic growth;
* Invest in physical infrastructure and human resource devel-
opment needs;
* Arrest the growing desertification and environmental degra-
dation of the continent; and
* Support the immediate humanitarian objective of assisting the
victims of famine to get back to productive activity as soon as
possible.
The success of any feasible strategy to turn around Africa's eco-
nomic decline will depend on the availability of external finance.
It is difficult, of course, to estimate the amount of external aid
required-so much depends on the assumptions one makes on
desired growth rates, on the ability of countries to mobilize their
own domestic resources, and on the efficiency with which such
resources are used. The link between economic growth and external
financing is complex and difficult to define precisely. But I believe
all would agree that if the sub-Saharan African countries are to
reverse the downward trend in per capita incomes, they will need
large increases in capital flows. Such increases are not now in
prospect.
Indeed, on the basis of present plans, it appears probable that
external financial assistance to sub-Saharan Africa will decline sub-
stantially below the totally inadequate level of 1984, which was
associated with very low levels of economic activity.
In the years 1980-84, for example, per capita incomes in the
region declined on average 3.6% per year (see Table 6).
Table 6
Per Capita GDP Growth Rates, 1980-84
(annual average in percent)
Country Group                  1980-84
Sub-Sahara: Low Income           -2.8
Sub-Sahara: Other                -4.7
26              Total Sub-Saharan Africa       -3.6


During that period, as shown in Table 7, external aid dropped
precipitously from $11.3 billion in 1980 to $3.6 billion in 1984.
Table 7
Sub-Saharan Africa: Net Financial Transfers, 1980, 1982, and 1984a
(millions of US$)
Source of Funds                     1930      1982      1984
To Low-Income Countries
IMF                                378       492       164
World Bank                         376       552       553
Other Multilateral                 704       463       183
Bilateral Aid                     4,758     3,970    3,251
Commercial Banks                  854       424     -468
Subtotal                        7,070     5,901     3,683
To Other Countries
IMF                                 85        87      -38
World Bank                          97       335       453
Other Multilateral                 177       251       150
Bilateral Aid                    2,0-8      1,915    1,906
Commercial Banks                  1,806     2,757   -2)3
Subtotal                        4,183     5,344     -132
To All Sub-Saharan Countries
IMF                                463       579       126
World Bank                         473       887      1,006
Other Multilateral                 881       714       333
Bilateral Aid                     6,776    5,885     5,157
Commercial Banks                  2,660     3,11    -3,071
Total Net Transfers            11 123      246        5
'Excludes short-term loans.
In the absence of special efforts to increase financial assistance
above the levels presently projected, the net capital flow to sub-
Saharan countries will fall still further in 1985-87. Such an alarming
outlook cannot be allowed to stand. It calls for immediate action
by all of the parties concerned.
How Much Additional Finance Is Required
and How Might It Be Obtained
To provide illustrative figures, I will focus on the 29 low-income
countries. They account for one-third of the region's gross national
product and almost two-thirds of its population. At a minimum,  27


external aid to these nations should not drop below the $6.5 billion
per year level of 1980-82. Even with this assistance, the countries
were forced to cut imports of essential goods and services by about
15%, and the service on their outstanding debt rose by nearly 50%.
However we chose to estimate their financial requirements for 1985-
90, $6.5 billion per year would seem to be a minimum. And yet
the forecast is for no more than 40% of that amount.
The decline in commercial bank lending was very sharp in 1984,
and the outstanding loans are likely to decline further in the years
ahead.
The IMF, which provided substantial assistance in the first half of
the 1980s, will expect repayment of its loans in the second half.
This shift in commercial bank and IMF lending is neither surprising
nor unjustified. But it does mean that action must be initiated for
further debt rescheduling and, in addition, sizable increases in
concessional assistance, beyond those presently projected, will be
necessary.
Bilateral aid, therefore, must be increased-it should probably
rise by at least 30%, from $5 billion to $6.5 billion per year. But
of the countries providing concessional assistance to sub-Saharan
Africa, many of the OPEC donors and eight of the DAC countries
-in particular France, Germany, and the United Kingdom-have
now decreased their aid.
The World Bank's Special Facility for Africa, which will add about
$200 million in each of the next three years to the financial flows
projected above, is a small step in the right direction. But it is not
nearly enough.
The new financial facility recently proposed by the United States,
if supported by other governments, would help. It would provide
about $500 million to $800 million per year for five years to sub-
Saharan Africa.
But taken together, all these various actions will still leave a
substantial deficit in the funds required for the low-income countries
of the region. And we have said nothing as yet of the needs of other
sub-Saharan nations such as the Ivory Coast and Nigeria. As Table
7 indicates, net transfers to these "Other Countries" fell from $5.3
28    billion in 1982 to a negative $132 million in 1984.


Given the magnitude of Africa's financial problems in the years
immediately ahead, I see no alternative to the World Bank Group's
taking a much larger role-a role comparable to that performed by
the IMF in the debt crises of Latin America-a role of drawing
together all sources of external finance ir order to lay a proper
foundation for long-term growth in all the countries of the region.
To carry out such a program for Africa, in addition to fulfilling
similar responsibilities elsewhere in the developing world, will re-
quire that the World Bank Group, including in particular the Inter-
national Development Association, increase its lending substan-
tially. The Bank itself should probably aim at quadrupling the net
transfer of funds. Within that expanded lending program, the share
of structural adjustment loans should increase sharply. And the Bank's
actions should be coordinated with measures to refinance a portion
of the payments due to be made to the IMF within the next five
years.
At the very moment that this statement is being sent to the printer,
the Annual Meeting of the World Bank and the International Mon-
etary Fund is about to begin in Korea. I am very hopeful that while
in Seoul, the Governors of the Fund and the Bank will take the first
steps to permit these two institutions to provide the financial support
that Africa so clearly requires.
V. THE TASK AHEAD FOR THE WORLD
The overriding development task that faces the world today is to
reverse the decline in the living standards of the sub-Saharan people.
And that challenge is shared not only by the African governments,
but by the international development community as well.
In the past there has been close collaboration between those
governments and that community. Hence the problems that have
grown up over the years-in the economic policy framework, in
the population growth, and in the management of the environ-
ment-are not problems that can be laid exclusively at the door of
those governments. All of us care about Africa. All of us have tried
to help Africa. And all of us have to share some responsibility for
its present plight.                                      29


One of the most fundamental issues that both the governments
and the international community have all too often neglected is the
development of the human resources throughout the continent. The
colonial inheritance in this matter was extremely poor. At inde-
pendence, Tanzania and Cameroon, for example, had no institutions
of higher learning at all. Zambia had only 36 university graduates
and Malawi only 33. Countries such as Ivory Coast, The Gambia,
Senegal, and Somalia had an illiteracy rate of over 90%.
Since independence, neither the governments nor the interna-
tional community have done enough-nor are they doing enough
even now-to create the human capital that is essential for long-
term growth.
The current deficiencies in Africa of trained and skilled profes-
sionals necessary to manage a nation's development are well known.
The weaknesses in the political and administrative decisionmaking
systems are a function of this problem. A highly trained corps of
civil servants that can keep government responsive and efficient is
missing, and this has in large measure contributed to the institutional
decline that I commented on earlier.
Until these staff resources can be developed domestically, many
African countries will have to rely on expatriate experts in order to
strengthen the administrative and institutional framework. Much of
this expertise can be drawn from the large scientific and technical
pool available in other developing countries. There is no room in
this matter for xenophobia. Pragmatism must prevail if Africa is to
cope with its emergencies.
Can the African governments-and the international donors-
learn from the past? And will they? I am cautiously optimistic.
There is now increased recognition on all sides that it is imperative
to rethink the development strategy of sub-Saharan Africa. There is,
in particular, a noticeable willingness among African governments
and policymakers to draw lessons from the errors of the past. Many
now have come to appreciate the importance of developing agri-
culture; of giving greater support to peasant farmers; of eliminating
or, at least, reforming ineffective bureaucracies; of moderating pop-
ulation growth; and of reversing ecological decline.
30     But the most difficult decisions that must be made to turn all this


around, and get the right policies in place--and working-still lie
ahead.
Africa faces an extraordinarily tough and prolonged period of
adjustment. What matters is to get the relorms under way now.
Further hesitation will only make present problems worse.
But, as I have stressed, laying the foundations for sustainable long-
term economic growth will require substantal increases in external
financial assistance. When approaching this problem, African lead-
ers should not ignore the fact that there is increasing concern in the
industrialized nations over a number of disturbing issues affecting
many African countries. There is concern over the pervasiveness of
corruption. There is concern over the use of scarce resources to
build large defense establishments and luxury projects. There is
concern over the harsh treatment of regional groups. And there is
concern over the repression of internal dissent.
None of these practices is, of course, unique to Africa or indeed
to the developing world. But Africa's record on human rights, and
on the encouragement of discussion and debate of critical issues-
including economic policies-is very poor. Among the friends
and supporters of Africa in western countries there is what almost
seems to be a conspiracy of silence over these concerns. That is
unfortunate.
It is unfortunate because although these concerns in the devel-
oped nations do not alter the need to increase assistance to Africa,
they do erode the public's sympathetic understanding of the con-
tinent's plight. Further, African leaders themselves should recognize
that these harsh aspects of national political life not only will not
reverse the deepening crisis in their countries, but will exacerbate
it. International support will not be easy to mobilize so long as these
concerns persist. Already they are adversely affectirng public
opinion
These are strong statements. But the problems of Africa call for
candor as well as for compassion. After 13 years of working with
the African peoples to address these problems, I hope they will
allow me to speak frankly. The sheer urgency of the situation re-
quires a fresh and open discussion of these issues.
The harsh truth is that sub-Saharan Africa today faces a crisis of  31


unprecedented proportions. The physical environment is deterio-
rating. Per capita production of food grains is falling. Population
growth rates are the highest in the world and rising. National econ-
omies are in disarray. And international assistance in real terms is
moving sharply downward.
For the governments and peoples of Africa-and for you and me
and all of us in the international community-the grim warning in
these facts is unavoidable.
Further delay, further temporizing with reform, further weakening
of external support-in effect, further failure to recognize and con-
front this crisis head on-will condemn an entire continent to un-
imaginable human misery.
We cannot let that happen.
Anthropologists tell us that Africa is where man himself first walked
on earth. In that ancient ancestral sense it is the home of us all.
It needs our help. Our generous help. And it needs it now.
32


ANNEXES


ANNEX I
Africa: Basic Indicators
Primary School              Enrollment in
GNP Per      Iife     Adult    Enrollment    Infant    Higher Education
Population   Area      Capita  Expectancy  Literacy  (% of age    Mortality    (% of pop.
(millions)  (thousands of  (US$)  (years)   Rate     group)    (per thousand)  aged 20-24)
Country                Mid-1983    sq. km.)   1983       1983      (%)        1982         1983         1982
Sub-Sahara: Low Income
Benin                   3.8        113       290        48       27.9        65          148           2.0
Burkina Faso            6.5        274       180        44        8.8        28          148           1.0
Burundi                 4.5         28       240        47       25.0        33          123           1.0
Central African Republic  2.5      623       280        48       33.0        70          142            1.0
Chad                    4.8       1,284       80        43       15.0        -           142            -
Ethiopia               40.9      1,222       120        43       53.0        46          142           1.0
Gambia                  0.7         11       290        36       20.1        56          200
Ghana                   12.8       239       310        59        -          76           97            1.0
Guinea                  5.8        246       300        37       20.0        33          158           3.0
Guinea-Bissau           0.9         36       180        38       18.9       101          158            -
Kenya                  18.9        583       340        57       47.1       104           81           1.0
Madagascar              9.5        587       310        49       50.0       100           66           3.0
Malawi                  6.6        118       210        44       25.0        62          164            -
Mali                     7.2      1,240      160        45       10.0        27          148            -
Mozambique              13.1       802        -         46        -         104          109            -
Niger                   6.1       1,267      240        45        9.8        23          139
Rwanda                  5.7         26       270        47       49.7       70           125
Sierra Leone             3.6        72       330        38       15.0        40          198           1.0
Somalia                  5.1       638       250        45       60.0        30          142           1.0
Sudan                   20.8      2,506      400        48       32.0        52          117           2.0
Tanzania               20.8        945       240        51       79.0        98           97
Togo                     2.8        57       280        49       18.0       106          112           2.0
Uganda                 13.9        236       220        49       52.0       60           108           1.0
Zaire                   29.7      2345       170        51       54.5        90          106           1.0
Subtotal             247.0     1549        235        48       44.1        68          119            1.3


Sub-Sahara: Other
Angola                   8.2      1,247       --        43         -        -            148            -
Botswana                 1.0       600       920        61       35.0      102            74            -
Cameroon                9.6        475       820        54       40.5       107          116           2.0
Congo                    1.8       342      1,230       63         -                      82           6.0
Gabon                   0.8        268     3,950        50                  202          ill            -
Ivory Coast             9.5        322       710        52       35.0       76           121           3.0
Lesotho                  1.5        30       460        53       53.0       112          109           2.0
Liberia                 2.1        111       480        49       25.4       66           111           2.0
Mauritania               1.6      1,031      480        46       17.0        33          136            -
Mauritius                1.0         2      1,160       67       79.0       107           32
Nigeria                93.6        924       770        49       34.0       98           113           3.0
Senegal                 6.2        196       440        46       10.0       48           140           3.0
Swaziland               0.7         17       870        55       65.0       110          128            -
Zambia                   6.3       753       580        51       44.0        96          100           2.0
Zimbabwe                 7.9       391       740        56       68.8       130           69            1.0
Subtotal             151.8      6,709      762        50       36.2        96          113            2.8
Total Sub-Saharan Africa  398.8   22,20        436        49       41.0       79           117           2.0
Other Africa
Algeria                20.6       2,382     2,320       57       35.0        93          107            5.0
Egypt                  45.2       1,001      700        58       44.0       78           102           15.0
Libya                   3.4       1,760    8,480        58         -                      91           6.0
Morocco                2U.6        447       760        52       28.0        80           98           6.0
Tunisia                  6.9       164      1,290       62       62.0       111           83            5.0
Subtotal              96.9      5         1,372       57       39.8        84          100            9.9
TOTAL AFRICA            495.7     27 61        627        50       40.8       80           114           3.8
For Comparison
China and India                              280        62       55.4        98          61             4.0
This table and all subsequent tables include 39 countries of sub-Saharan Africa with population exceeding one half-million in 1983. The six remaining sub-
Saharan African countries (Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, and Seychelles) are not included because of lack of
data.
Source: World Bank, World Developrnent Report 1985 and World Bank data.


ANNEX II
Africa: Per Capita GDP Growth Rates
(annual average in percent)
Country                  1961-70    1971-79    1980-84
Sub-Sahara: Low Income
Benin                     0.8        0.7      -0.1
Burkina Faso              1.0        2.2      -3.1
Burundi                   3.8        1.2      -0.9
Central African Republic  0.5        0.6       -2.3
Chad                    -1.3       -2.2       -16.0
Ethiopia                  2.0      -0.5       -0.1
Gambia, The               3.7        2.0      -2.6
Ghana                   -0.3       -3.5       -5.4
Guinea                    1.7        2.6      -0.4
Guinea-Bissau             -        -0.8         1.3
Kenya                     2.7        1.3      -1.8
Madagascar                0.7      -2.2       -5.7
Malawi                    2.9        2.9      -0.8
Mali                      1.0        2.7      -1.2
Mozambique                2.9      -6.1       -5.1
Niger                   -0.1       -0.4       -6.6
Rwanda                    0.4        2.2        1.4
Sierra Leone              2.9      -0.4       -2.0
Somalia                 -2.0         0.4        1.8
Sudan                   -1.5         4.8      -2.2
Tanzania                  3.1        1.6       -6.5
Togo                      5.6        1.1       -7.4
Uganda                    -          -
Zaire                     1.6      -3.1       -2.7
Subtotal                1.4       -0.1       --2.8


Sub-Sahara: Other
Angola                   2.8      -10.6       -6.1
Botswana                 3.1        7.4        4.8
Cameroon                 1.8        2.9        2.9
Congo                    1.0        1.2        6.4
Gabon                    3.6        5.5       -0.4
Ivory Coast              3.9        1.2       -6.5
Lesotho                  2.8        7.6       -0.8
Liberia                  2.7       -1.2       -4.9
Mauritania               4.4       -1.0       -0.8
Mauritius               - 1.8       6.1        2.2
Nigeria                  1.0        2.6       -6.5
Senegal                 -0.1       -0.1        2.0
Swaziland                4.8        0.7       -1.0
Zambia                   2.4       -2.1       -2.9
Zimbabwe                 0.7       -1.9       - 2.0
Subtotal                1.4        1.3      -4.7
Total Sub-Saharan Africa   1.4        0.4       -3.6
Other Africa
Algeria                  3.3        4.2        2.1
Egypt                    2.6        4.9        3.8
Libya                   19.5       -0.2       -9.8
Morocco                  2.0        3.3        0.3
Tunisia                  2.6        4.1        1.0
Subtotal                3.1        4.2        2.0
TOTAL AFRICA               1.8        1.2       -2.4
Source: World Bank data.
'.4


ANNEX III
Africa: Growth Rates of Per Capita Food Production and Levels of Food Imports
Levels of Food Imports
Growth of Per Capita Food Production (%)               (millions of US$)
Country                  1961-70    1971-79    1980-84        1961          1970          1980          1985
Sub-Sahara: Low Income
Benin                     0.2        0.3         0.5          6.4           10.8          95.6          99.1
Burkina Faso              1.9        0.0       -2.1           8.8           11.3          71.8          74.5
Burundi                  - 0.3       0.0       -3.0           1.2            3.9          29.6          23.6
Central African Republic  0.0        0.0       - 1.2          4.7            8.2          22.9          26.4
Chad                     -1.9       -0.1       -4.2           5.9           12.6           5.4            -
Ethiopia                  2.4       -1.6       -3.9           7.9           16.8         105.9         158.4
Gambia, The              0.02       -5.5         2.7          3.0            5.6          37.5          32.2
Ghana                     0.8       -3.5       -0.8          61.4           77.2         131.6         214.7
Guinea                    0.5       -1.7         1.2          6.1            9.8          75.0            -
Guinea-Bissau            -1.8        0.1         7.1          2.3            8.1          12,2            -
Kenya                     0.1       -1.6       -2.0          40.6          49.7          213.5         152.9
Madagascar                1.5       -0.5        -0.5         17.4           21.2          76.0          80.6
Malawi                    0.1       -1.3         0.7          5.3           16.9          31.8          21.3
Mali                     -0.3       -0.8       -1.6           8.3           17.2          70.0          81.8
Mozambique                0.9       - 3.6      -3.9          21.2           37.3         114.0          84.0
Niger                    -1.7        0.0       -5.7           3.0            8.9          82.0          44.6
Rwanda                    2.6        0.4       -1.2           0.3           4.1           43.7          39.7
Sierra Leone              1.2       -1.9       -2.7           15.8          30.3          89.8          75.8
Somalia                   0.5       -4.6       -4.1           12.4          16.4         147.3         163.6
Sudan                     2.2         0.4      -3.6          41.4           65.3         390.0         202.6
Tanzania                  2.6       -0.7       -3.4           31.0          32.4         164.8         100.7
Togo                      5.8       -1.3       -3.2           6.4           13.4          86.0         125.1
Uganda                    0.7       -1.2         0.7          14.6          21.3          45,0          17.6
Zaire                     1.3       -1.5         0.6         27.4           63.4         165.5         146.8
Subtotal                 1.3      -1.3       -2.1          352.7         562.1        2,307.0       1,966.0


Sub-Sahara: Other
Angola                   1.0       -2.2      -2.2          25.4          55.7        267.6         211.1
Botswana                 0.6      -5.3         0.7          3.3          18.9         93.1          91.9
Cameroon                 1.4       -0.5      -2.1          13.6          31.1        130.9         151.9
Congo                    0.7       - 1.1     -1.7           9.2          10.4         68.2          64.0
Gabon                    2.6      -0.4        0.03          5.3          11.8        108.9         132.5
Ivory Coast              4.8        0.4      -1.5          37.8          82.2        486.5         422.2
Lesotho                 -1.1      -2.1       -3.8           7.9          11.8        110.5          59.2
Liberia                  0.6      -0.5       -1.9          13.8          25.4         103.8        113.3
Mauritania              -0.5       -1.9      -3.4           9.3          13.1         89.6          86.9
Mauritius               -1.7        0.8        1.7         21.4          26.2         161.5        137.6
Nigeria                  0.2      -0.7       -1.6          90.1         127.2       2,085.4       1,523.9
Senegal                 -1.9       -4.4        2.9         57.9          71.1        254.9         250.4
Swaziland                6.1       - 1.1       0.7          5.2           9.9         32.2            -
Zambia                  -0.2        1.9      -2.4          19.7          47.9         144.8         67.6
Zimbabwe                 2.3       -2.8      -7.9          12.2          10.8         61.9          40.4
Subtotal               0.6       -1.1       -1.8        332.0         553.5       4,199.8       3,352.8
Total Sub-Saharan Africa   1.0      -1.2       -2.0         684.7       1,115.6       6,506.8       5,318.8
Other Africa
Algeria                 -0.1       -3.1      -3.1         260.4         172.6       2,262.4       1,999.8
Egypt                    1.6      -1.3       -0.6         187.5         214.0       2,381.0       3,934.7
Lihy                   -0.3        8.7      -2.0          23.7         123.1       1,290.5
Morocco                 -0.1       -2.2      -2.9         132.7         167.8        931.5         700.1
Tunisia                  0.5       -0.7        2.6         63.1          91.9         516.4        494.9
Subtotal               0.8       -1.5       -1.8        667.3         769.8       7,381.9       7,129.5
TOTAL AFRICA               0.9      -1.3       -1.9       1,352.0       1,885.4      13,888.6      12,448.4
Sources: World Bank data and FAO.


4;.
Africa: External Debt and Debt Service                         ANNEX IV
(public and publicly guaranteed debt, amounts in millions of US$)
Debt
Outstanding
Debt              and Disbursed
Outstanding   Debt     as % of
and     Outstanding  Exports
Disbursed    and    of Goods and                        Amortization
(as of   Disbursed  Nonfactor
Country                 12/31/83) as % of GNP  Services     1978       1980       1982        1984       1986
Sub-Sahara: Low Income
Benin                    614.8       59.2      301.5        3.6       5.2        8.4         56.3       73.0
Burkina Faso             398.4       37.6      242.9        4.5      10.6        9.1         25.2       28.6
Burundi                  289.0       22.6      288.4        3.4       4.2        3.4         17.6       22.5
Central African Republic  241.9      37.3      163.8        3.8        6.8        3.0        18.6       22.7
Chad                     136.3       42.5      127.7        5.6        5.2       0.0         11.1        8.3
Ethiopia                1,328.6      28.6      240.8       14.6       17.3      35.4         89.7      109.2
Gambia, The              192.0       97.5      290.9        2.4       0.3        11.3        10.4       20.4
Ghana                   1,375.3       6.4      127.3       47.4       77.7      43.1         57.7       85.5
Guinea                  1,227.5      69.9      220.3       56.2       73.3       54.8        93.7      132.0
Guinea-Bissau            140.6       63.0      969.7        0.8        2.2       2.4         15.1       10.5
Kenya                   2,800.6      50.6      192.3       83.2      127.0     197.4        262.8      286.3
Madagascar              1,629.1      57.1      430.3       15.5       34.7      29.4        225.1      196.1
Malawi                   820.7       63.1      327.9       23.4       34.2      43.6         71.2       75.3
Mali                     927.1       47.0      413.5        7.5       8.2        3.8         55.5       87.2
Mozambique                  -         -          -          -          -          -           -          -
Niger                    661.5       51.1      222.1        5.5       22.9      66.6         27.8       64.3
Rwanda                   219.7       13.9      136.8        1.0       0.6        3.3          3.9        8.6
Sierra Leone             427.6       41.1      328.9       31.8       45.6       9.6         36.1       41.2
Somalia                 1,260.6     139.9      933.8        3.5        7.0       10.0       100.5      122.2
Sudan                   6,288.8      90.4      793.2       81.9       95.6     132.3        461.2      606.9
Tanzania                1,870.3      42.6      336.1       55.7       52.4       32.3       162.5      118.6
Togo                     844.6      119.5      376.4       46.0       33.2       15.0        93.4       87.2
Uganda                   977.1       16.2      286.8       23.3       32.8      56.3        105.7      144.1
Zaire                   4,532.1     103.1      276.3       60.5      249.3       87.1       206.6      453.2
Subtotal             29,204.2      40.7      304.9      581.1      946.3      857.6      2,207.7    2,803.9


Sub-Sahara: Other
Angola                                            - -
Botswana                 230.2       27.2      42.9        3.6        6.0       3.7         21.4       16.6
Cameroon                1,882,8      29.4      87.6       64.9       96.4      146.3       178.7      204.5
Congo                   1,486.8      76.1      129.0      18.9       65.1      110.5       213.4      237.6
Gabon                    730.8       27.2      32.9      201.9      285.7      193.2       189.6      140.9
Ivory Coast             5,386.3      88.0     222.2      252.5      521.0      489.0       680.9      791.3
Lesotho                  145.2       23.0     285.8        0.7        3.4       4.5         12.3       8.8
Liberia                  904.7       93.3     206.5       13.4       18.7       19.0        52.6      134.2
Mauritania              1,212.3     177.5     329.5       16.6       25.8       17.5        62.4      144.8
Mauritius                504.3       44.0      99.1        3.3       14.7       28.8        76.6       74.2
Nigeria                11,757.1      17.2     109.1       54.6      101.8      657.5     2,249.4    3,161.9
Senegal                 1,692.6      69.2     232.3       71.9      125.7       23.9       109.6      183.4
Swaziland                193.3       32.0      46.5        1.7        5.1       10.2        11.5       14.3
Zambia                  3,303.6     105.0     320.3      165.5      242.3      187.6       355.2      428.7
Zimbabwe                1,697.3      31.6      123.4       4.2       34.3       53.3       213.0      259.7
Subtotal             31,127.3      30.7      128.8      873.7    1,546.0    1,945.0     4,426.6   5,800.9
Total Sub-Saharan Africa  60,331.5    34.8      178.7     1,454.8   2,492.3    2,802.6     6,634.3    8,604.8
Other Africa
Algeria                12,915.6      28.0      99.4      894.3     2,453.4   2,892.9     3,831.1    2,676.3
Egypt                  15,582.4      37.8     138.0      869.8     1,207.9   1,535.5     1,884.1    1,309.0
Libya                            -         -          -               -          -           -          -
Morocco                10,365.4      77.2     346.2      295.6      666.8      788.4       634.1    2,056.7
TUnii                   3,427.1    42.4       197      1116.4     214.9     289.7       ^20.6      390.9
Subtotal             42,290.5      38.8      140.3    2,176.1    4,543.0    5,506.5     6,769.9   6,432.9
TOTAL AFRICA            102,622.0     36.4      160.6    3,630.9    7,035.3    8,309.1    13,404.2   15,037.7
Note: No debt data are available for Mozambique, Angola, and Libya.
Sources: World Bank data and International Monetary Fund.



ANNEX V
Africa: Creditors and Amortization Recipients
(public and publicly guaranteed debt, amounts in millions of US$)
Debt Outstanding and Disbursed (as of 12/31/83)                Amortization for 1983
World                                                World
Bank                        Other                    Bank                      Other
Country Group           IMF    Group   Bilateral Commercial Multilateral  Total  IMF  Group Bilateral Commercial Multilateral  lotal
Sub-Sahara: Low Income  2,962,9  4,790.2 13,150.2  5,274.7  3,026.2  29,204.2  203.0  70.0  253.2    313.7      91.3      931.2
Sub-Sahara: Other      2,110.5  3,177.S  6,910.1  17116    1,787.6  31,127.3  172.4 119.8  202.6   2,042.8     77.0    2,614.6
Subtotal
Sub-Saharan Africa  5,073.4  7,967.7 20,060.3  22,416.3  4       60,331.5  375.4 189.8  455.8   2,356.5    168.3    3,545.8
Other Africa            971.7  3       18,284.0  11p91.8    8,888.2  42,290.5  37.8 163.2   880.5   5,367,5    307.9    6,756.9
TOTAL AFRICA           6,045.1 11,022.5 38,344.3  O3,508.1  13,702.  102,622.0  413.2 353.0 1,336.3  7,724.0   476.2   103_27
Note Data exclude commercial nonguaranteed loans.
Source: World Bank data.
4,


ANNEX VI
Africa: Current Account Balances
Amount
(annual average in millions of US$)            As % of GDP
Country                   1970-79      1980-84       1985         1970-79     1980-84     1985
Sub-Sahara: Low Income
Benin                     -83.1       -158.1        -81.7        -15.3      -15.2       -8.4
Burkina Faso             -116.9       -194.0       -173.6        -16.9      -17.5      -16.1
Burundi                      -        - 158.7      -164.1          0.0      - 15.3     -12.5
Central African Republic  -52.2       -110.3        -94.9        -13.8      -15.9      -13.2
Chad                         -            -            -            -          -
Ethiopia                  -61.3       -329.0       -789.9         -2.0        -7.3     -18.2
Gambia, The               -15.2        -74.1        -32.5         -9.5      -35.1      -18.8
Ghana                     -55.1       -290.8       -490.0         -1.1       -1.7      -10.1
Guinea                       -            -            -            -          -           -
Guinea-Bissau                -            -            -            -          -           -
Kenya                    -268.3       -595.4       -369.6         -7.7       -9.1       -6.3
Madagascar               -133.7       -517.6       -267.1         -7.2      -17.5       -8.8
Malawi                    -89.8       -149.6        -69.0        -13.5      -11.6        -4.9
Mali                     -102.8       -214.5       -185.5        -16.3      -19.8      -18.4
Mozambique                   -            -            -            -          -
Niger                    -161.2       -439.9       -215.5        -16.9       -26.7     -17.9
Rwanda                    -47.3       -166.8       -159.0         -8.5      -12.1       -9.8
Sierra Leone              -72.7       -163.8        -57.2        -10.8      -14.5       -5.3
Somalia                   -92.5       -288.7       -426.0        -12.0       -17.1     -46.7
Sudan                    -152.1       -475.5       -620.0         -3.4       -5.7       -8.7
Tanzania                 -236.0       -531.5       -457.0         -8.3      -11.0      -10.2
Togo                      -90.5       -112.1       -122.8        -13.0      -12.9       -16.5
Uganda                    -14.7       -126.1       -136.0         -0.6       -3.9       -3.6
Zaire                    -459.8       -338.9       -322.0        -13.9        -6.8       -6.4
Subtotal              -2   4       -5   4      -               -6.7       -7.9       -10.3


Sub-Sahara: Other
Angola
Botswana                 -95.9       -273.1       -69.5        -36.7      -32.2       -6.8
Cameroon                 -111.6      -337.0         81.4        -4.5       -5.2         1.1
Congo                    -160.1      -357.0       -297.0       -24.8      -17.6      -13.3
Gabon                      45.3       222.5        -9.2          0.8        6.3       -0.3
Ivory Coast             - 394.7    -1,150.2      -219.2         -8.3      -13.6       -3.2
Lesotho                  -30.8        -99.5       -70.3        - 16.3     -27.8      -18.4
Liberia                  -79.1       -160.6       -179.0        -9.8      -14.7      -15.5
Mauritania               -121.6      -297.8       -245.0       -23.8      -40.1      -34.7
Mauritius                -34.5        -83.9       -22.1         -3.1       -7.5       - 1.7
Nigeria                    33.9    -2,841.7      -613.0        -0.04       -4.1       -0.9
Senegal                  -191.1      -476.0       -363.0       -11.1      -18.4      -13.7
Swaziland                   -                  -           -                 -          -
Zambia                   -163.8      -561.4       -311.9        -7.1      -15.5       -9.2
Zimbabwe                  -45.9      -501.7      -172.5         -1.5       -8.3       -2.9
Subtotal                    9     -617.5      -2,490.3        - 2.6      - 6.3      - 2.4
Total Sub-Saharan Africa  3    3      1           -,25            -4.1       -6.8       -5.0
Other Africa
Algeria                -1,049.3        10.6      1,178.1        -5.8       0.04         2.1
Egypt                  -1,104.7    -1,114.9     -4,122.5        -8.2       -3.6       -8.0
Libya                   1,537.4       -99.6          -          12.1       -0.8
Morocco                  -677.2    -1,516.7       -738.0        -6.1      -10.4       -5.6
Tunisia                  -240.7      -673.5       -719.3        - .3       -b.2       -.3
Subtotal              -1,345      -4.1        -               -2.9       -2.5       -3.4
TOTAL AFRICA                                     -118.8  1   1    -3.8       -5.0       -4.3
Source: World Bank data.
.P.



Sub-Saharan Africa: Net Transfers of External Financea                    ANNEX VII
(millions of US$)
Country Group                        1978               1980               1982               1983               1984
Sub-Sahara: Low Income
International Monetary            -117                 378                492                779                164
Fund
World Bank Group                    297                376                552                494                553
Other Multilateral Loans            460                704                463                405                183
Bilateral Grants and Loans        2,982              4,758              3,970              4,243              3,251
Commercial                          905                854                424              -337               -468
Total                           4,527              7,070              5,901              5,584               3,683
Sub-Sahara: Other
International Monetary              168                 85                 87                358               -38
Fund
World Bank Group                    139                 97                335                322                453
Other Multilateral Loans            139                177                251                140                150
Bilateral Grants and Loans        1,179              2,018              1,915              2,176               1,906
Commercial                                           1,806              2,757              2,012             -2,603
Total                           4026               4,18 144                              q,008              -132
Total Sub-Sahara
International Monetary               51                463                579              1,137                126
Fund
World Bank Group                    436                473                887                816               1,006
Other Multilateral Loans            599                881                714                545                333
Bilateral Grants and Loans        4,161              6,776              5,885              6,419              5,157
Commercial                        3,306              2,660              3,181              1,675             -3,071
Total                            8553                253              11,246            10,591                 5
a Net transfers are based on official grants, medium- and long-term public and publicly guaranteed loans, and on medium- and long-term private
nonguaranteed loans.
Sources: World Bank, World Debt Tables 1984-85, and IMF, International Financial Statistics, various issues.


Africa: Population, Actual and Projected                       ANNEX VIII
Population (millions)                          Total
Fertility
Rate
Country                     1950       1980       2000       2025       2050        2100     1983      NRR=1
Sub-Sahara: Low Income
Benin                       1.6        3.6       6.5        11.6       16.0        19.8     6.5        2035
Burkina [aso                3.4       6.2        9.2        16.2      23.2         30.0     6.5        2040
Burundi                     2.5       4.1        7.4        13.2       18.4        23.0     6.5        2035
Central African Republic    1.4        2.3       4.0        6.9        9.4         11.7     5.5        2035
Chad                        2.7       4.5        7.3        12.1       16.6        21.1     5.5        2040
Ethiopia                   18.0       37.7      63.7       105.8      142.0       173.3     5.5        2035
Gambia, The                 0.3        0.7        1.1        1.8       2.4          3.0     6.5        2040
Ghana                       4.4       11.5       23.1       39.9       53.4        62.2     7.0        2025
Guinea                      3.4        5.5       8.3        13.2       17.7        22.8     6.0        2045
Guinea-Bissau               0.5       0.8         1.2       2.0        2.6          3.4     6.0        2045
Kenya                       5.8       16.6      36.5       69.3       96.6        116.4     8.0        2030
Madagascar                  4.4       8.7       16.2       29.8        41.9        52.2     6.5        2035
Malawi                      2.9        6.0       11.4       20.6       28.7        36.2     7.6        2040
Mali                        3.3        6.7       11.2       19.8       27.9        34.9     6.5        2035
Mozanbique                 6.5       12.1       21.7      38.7       53.7         67.0     6.5        2035
Niger                       2.9       5.5        10.5      20.1       29.2         38.1     7.0        2040
Rwanda                      2.1        5.1       10.2      20.1       29.5         38.5     8.0        2040
Sierra Leone                2.1        3.4       5.4        8.9        12.2        15.9     6.5        2045
Somalia                     2.1        4.7       8.5        15.8       22.7        29.5     6.8        2040
Sudan                       9.2       18.9      33.4       57.8        79.1        97.5     6.6        2035
Tanzania                    7.9       18.8       36.9       68.5       96.4       119.6     7.0        2035
Togo                        1.3        2.6       4.9        8.7        12.1        14.9     6.5        2035
Uganda                      4.8      12.6       24.6       45.6       64.1         79.5     7.0        2035
Zaire                      14.2       27.1       49.9       86.0      116.4       138.9     6.3        2030
Subtotal                107.7      225.7      413.1      732.4    1,012.2      1,249.4    6.6        2040


Sub-Sahara: Other
Angola                      4.1         7.6       13.2       23.2       32.2         41,4      6.5        2040
Botswana                    0.4        0.9         T.8        2.9        3.8          4.3      6.5        2020
Camneroon                   4.6         8.7       1 6.6      30.2        41.6        50.3      6.5        2030
Congo                       0.8         1.6        3.4        5.8         7.8         9.1      6.0        2020
Gabon                       0,7        0.8         1.2        2.1        2.9          3.7      4.5        2035
Ivory Coast                 2.8        8.4        17.3       29.2       38.4         45.4      6.6        2030
Lesotho                     0.7         1.3        2.2        3.7        4.9          5.8      5.8        2030
Liberia                     0.9         1.9        3.5        6,1        8.5         10.5      6.9        2035
Mauritania                  0.8         1.5        2.6        4.5        6.3          7.9      6.0        2035
Mauritius                   0.5         1.0        1.4        1.7         1.8         1.9      2.8        2010
Nigeria                    40.6       84.7       162.7      295.1      411.5        508.8      6.9        2035
Senegal                     2.7         5.7       10.1       17.2       23.3         28.7      6.7        2035
Swaziland                   0.3         0.6        1.2        2.1        2.9          3.4      7.0        2030
Zambia                      2.4         5.6       11.0       19.6        26.8        32.1      6.8        2030
Zimbabwe                    2.4         7.0       14.3       24.7        33.0        38.3      7.0        2025
Subtotal                  64.7      137.3      262.5      468.1       645.7       791.6      6.8        2035
Total Sub-Saharan Africa    172.4      363.0       675.6     1,200.5    1,657.9      2,041.0     6.7        2040
Other Africa
Algeria                     8.8        18.7       37.7       65.9        88.7       104.0      7.0        2025
Egypt                      20.3       42.3        62.8       85.8      101.7        110.5      4.6        2015
Libya                       1.0        3.0         6.7       11,6       15.4         18.1      7.2        2025
Morocco                     9.0        19.2       31.2       47.3        59.3        67.9      5.8        2025
Tunisia                     3.5         6.4       10.0       14.1        16.9        18.4      4.9        2015
Subtotal                  42.6       89.6      148.4      224.7       282.0        318.9     5.5        2025
TOTAL AFRICA                215.0      452.6       824.0     1,425.2    1,939.9      2,359.9     6.5        2040
NRR= 1 shows the year in which the net reproduction rate is projected to equal 1 .
Source: World Bank data.