NOTE NUMBER 350 Public Disclosure Authorized viewpoint PUBLIC POLICY FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR APRIL 2016 Public Disclosure Authorized Competition and Poverty Tania Begazo and How Competition Affects the Distribution of Welfare T r a d e a n d C o m p e t i t i v e n e s s G l o b a l P r a ct i c e Sara Nyman A literature re v ie w s ho ws c o m p e t it io n p o lic y r e f o r m s c a n d el i v e r Tania Begazo (tbegazo@ worldbank.org) is a Senior b e nef its f or the p o o r e s t ho us e ho ld s a nd im p r o v e inc o m e d ist r i b u t i o n . Economist and Sara A lack of comp et it io n in f o o d m a r k e t s hur t s t he p o o r e s t ho u s e h o l d s Public Disclosure Authorized Nyman (snyman@ the most. Comp e t it io n in inp ut m a r k e t s a nd b e t we e n b uy e r s h e l p s worldbank.org) is an Economist in the Trade f arme rs and sma ll b us ine s s e s . And m o r e c o m p e t it iv e m a r k e ts b o l s t e r and Competitiveness job growth ove r t he lo ng e r t e r m . Mo r e r e s e a r c h is ne e d e d , h o w e v e r , Global Practice of the World Bank Group. to b ette r und e r s t a nd t he im p a c t o f c o m p e t it io n r e f o r m s a nd a n t i t r u s t e nf orce me nt on p o v e r t y a nd s ha r e d p r o s p e r it y . 1 The authors would like to thank Carlos While the impact of competition on overall wel- productive firms and higher-growth industries, and Rodriguez Castelan, fare has been well documented, the relationship there are likely to be short-term costs involved in Catriona Purifeld, between competition, poverty, and the distribu- this adjustment. Martha Licetti, and Jose Reis of the World Bank tion of welfare is less well understood. Of the The distributional effects of a lack of competi- Group, and Natalie evidence that does exist, most studies point to a tion have long been acknowledged in the literature. positive relationship between competition and Monopolies can have a major impact on inequality Public Disclosure Authorized Timan of the U.K. Competition and Markets the distribution of gains toward the poorest, but in the distribution of household wealth (Comanor Authority for their valu- there can be trade-offs and short-term costs.2 and Smiley 1975). Policies that reduce monopoly able comments. Research The relationship between the level of compe- power can have positive effects on both growth for this note was tition and the welfare of those at the lower end and income distribution (Dutt 1984). Rodriguez- THE WORLD BANK GROUP supported by the govern- of the income distribution can be examined in Castelan (2011) finds that, while theoretically ments of Canada, the terms of the functions that households perform there are conditions under which higher prod- United Kingdom, and in the market—namely as consumers, producers, uct market concentration could lower poverty, an the United States through and employees. Because a lack of competition in increase in poverty is more realistic. Baker and the Impact Program of a specific market affects these actors differently, Salop (2015) hypothesize that market power con- the World Bank Group’s competition can have mixed effects on their wel- tributes to inequality by raising the return to capital Trade and Competitive- fare. For example, there may be a short-term relative to the rate of economic growth, and by ness Global Practice. trade-off between lower prices for consumers and discouraging innovation and productivity. In this returns to producers or employees, especially for context, they suggest that antitrust enforcement less productive firms and their employees. Over and regulatory agencies might consider placing the long term, resources tend to shift to more a higher priority on reducing inequality. Several o m p e t i t i o n and C ompetition e r t y H o w C o m p e t i t i o n A f f e ct a n d P o v ert the Distribution of Welfare c t s th studies provide evidence that competition can Cournot duopoly at successive stages of the food improve the distributional impact of trade lib- marketing chain, in conjunction with oligopsony eralization by directing more benefits toward power among processors, reduces consumer sur- developing country producers (Sexton et al. plus by 75 percent. 2007) and raising the relative wages of less- Households with lower income suffer rela- skilled workers (Borjas and Ramey 1995). tively larger welfare losses from monopoly and This review focuses, where possible, on devel- imperfect competition in basic goods than those oping country evidence, although much of the with higher incomes. Lower-income households literature relates to high-income countries. Results often have a greater share of basic goods in their 2 may not be directly transferable to developing consumption baskets. In Mexico, while all income countries given differences in market character- groups experience reduced consumer welfare istics, including the greater likelihood of market from market power in seven commodity mar- and institutional failures in developing economies. kets, losses for the lowest income decile were 19.8 percent higher in urban areas (22.7 percent The bottom 40 percent as consumers higher in rural areas) than for the highest income Food prices, together with the share of food in decile (Urzúa 2013). Similarly, the welfare loss an income group’s expenditure basket, play an associated with monopoly power for 14 commod- important role in how competition affects the ity groups in Australia is 46 percent higher for distribution of consumer welfare. The low elastic- households in the lowest decile than for those in ity of demand for staple foods and high spending the highest (Creedy and Dixon 1998). In Kenya, on food (Figure 1), particularly for those in the allowing sugar prices to fall by 20 percent would lowest income deciles, implies significant direct lead to welfare gains for all income deciles, but welfare costs and distributional effects from high gains as a share of income would be 4.4 times food prices as a result of market power in this higher for the poorest income decile than for sector.3 Monopolies, collusion among competi- the highest (Argent and Begazo 2015). tors, and rigid regulations that shield firms from Sanctioning and deterring anticompetitive competition increase market power and harm behavior can generate important consumer sav- the distribution of consumer welfare. Sexton ings, particularly by eliminating cartels in basic and Zhang (2006) show that market power in a food products and commodities. Connor (2014) suggests that cartels lead to a median overcharge4 Expenditure shares across product categories, by country in order of increasing of 23 percent and a mean of 49 percent, although Figure per-capita expenditure Boyer and Kotchoni (2014) produce lower esti- 1 mates (about 16 percent for both mean and 1.0 0.9 median). According to Connor (2014), 60 per- 0.8 cent of cartel episodes that include overcharges 0.7 have an overcharge above 20 percent, and of 0.6 0.5 these, the mean overcharge is 79.7 percent. 0.4 Notaro (2014) finds that a cartel discovered in 0.3 0.2 2007 in the Italian pasta market overcharged by 0.1 around 11 percent. Mncube (2013) estimates 0.0 that, due to price fixing among major bread Congo, Dem. Rep. Niger Guinea-Bissau Gambia, The Uganda Haiti Senegal Mauritania Lao PDR India Pakistan Angola Indonesia Mongolia Namibia Guatemala Ecuador El Salvador Turks and Caicos South Africa Thailand Jordan Serbia Panama Romania Mexico Uruguay Turkey St. Kitts and Nevis The Bahamas Lithuania Saudi Arabia Sint Maarten Curaçao Kuwait Macao SAR, China Singapore United Kingdom Finland Austria Norway United States manufacturers in South Africa, independent bakeries were overcharged by 7–42 percent on the price of wheat flour, harming both baker- Economies in ascending order of per capita expenditure ies and bread consumers. A World Bank study Food Housing, furnishing and maintenance Health and education (2016) finds that, in South Africa, tackling only Transport and communications Clothing Recreation Other four cartels (in wheat, maize milling, poultry, and pharmaceuticals) reduced poverty by 0.4 percent- Note: SAR abbreviates special administrative region. age points. In comparison, cash transfers and free Source: Based on International Comparison Program (2011) data. basic services reduced poverty by 13 percentage Table Effect of competition on shared prosperity of households as consumers 1 Country Study Reform / Impact of… Effect Welfare effects of limited competition Mexico Urzúa (2013) High market power for seven markets, Welfare loss 19.8% higher for lowest income decile than including food, beverages, and medicines for highest in urban areas, 22.7% higher in rural areas Australia Creedy and Dixon (1998) Monopoly power for 14 commodity groups Welfare loss 46% higher for lowest income decile than for highest Effects of competition law enforcement: elimination of anticompetitive business practices International Connor (2014) Cartel (sample of 1,530 cartel episodes across Median average overcharge of 23%; mean of 49%. 60% 3 sectors and countries) of the cartel episodes with overcharges of 20% or higher have a mean overcharge of 79.7% South Africa Mncube (2013) Cartel (wheat flour) Overcharge to independent bakeries of 7–42% Effect of removing policy and regulatory obstacles to competition Kenya Argent and Begazo (2015) Reducing barriers to competition leading to i) Effect equivalent to 1.2% increase in real income with a 20% fall in the price of i) maize and ii) sugar greater gains for the poor, 1.8% fall in poverty ii) Welfare gains for the poorest income decile 4.4 times higher than for the highest, 1.5% fall in poverty Dominican Republic Busso and Galiani (2015) Entry of new grocery stores into a conditional 1% increase in number of stores operating in the cash transfer program market reduces prices by 0.06% without affecting product or service quality United States Hausman and Leibtag (2007) Entry and expansion of retail supercenters Welfare gains from direct effect of increased variety is about 20% of average food expenditure; indirect price effect of 5% Lower-income households benefit by 50% more than average effect Mexico Atkin, Faber, and Foreign supermarket entry Significant welfare gains for average household (6.2% Gonzalez-Navarro (2015) of household income), driven by direct consumer gains from new foreign stores with cheaper prices; richest income groups gain about 50% more than the poorest points, but at a disproportionately greater cost tion in retail also affects the prices and quality (3.8 percent of gross domestic product). of food and other necessities. Busso and Galiani Competition can be intensified by removing (2014) show that entry into the retail market in government-imposed barriers that stifle well- the Dominican Republic led to a significant functioning markets. State interventions that and robust reduction in prices (around 6 per- distort markets and raise food prices—including cent) without affecting the quality of products import tariffs or minimum support prices—are or services provided by grocery stores. Griffith often justified as a tool to increase the incomes of and Harmgart (2012) find that more restrictive agricultural producers. However, most empirical planning regulation in the United Kingdom analyses suggest that higher food prices generally reduces entry of large supermarkets, increases harm low-income households, since poor people prices, and leads to consumer losses of up to £10 are often net consumers of food (Christiansen million per year. Hausman and Leibtag (2007) and Demery 2007; Wodon et al. 2008; Wodon and find that the entry and expansion of supercenters Zaman 2010).5 Argent and Begazo (2015) find in the United States, which compete with tra- that allowing sugar and maize prices to fall by 20 ditional retail food outlets, lead to direct con- percent in Kenya by relaxing government policies sumer welfare gains (at 20.2 percent of average that restrict competition would decrease poverty food expenditure) through increased variety, by 1.5 percent and 1.8 percent, respectively. and to indirect gains through a price effect (4.8 Farther down the food value chain, competi- percent). Lower-income households benefit by C ompetition and P o v ert y H o w C o m p e t i t i o n A f f e ct s th e D i s t r i b u t i o n o f W e l f a r e Table Effect of competition on shared prosperity of households as producers 2 Country Study Reform / Impact of… Effect Effect of upstream anticompetitive behavior or regulations on the cost of inputs for small producers United States (in trade Fink, Mattoo, and Neagu (2002) i) Removing anticompetitive practices, such as i) Transport prices decline by 25%, cost savings of $2 with developing countries) rate fixing by maritime conferences billion ii) Removing restrictive government policies, ii) Transport prices decline by 9%, cost savings of $850 such as restrictions on foreign suppliers million Sierra Leone Ghani and Reed (2015) Entry into the market for ice manufacturing as Each new manufacturer associated with a 5–6% fall in an input for fishermen, previously held by a price monopoly manufacturer 19 percentage-point increase in credit provision to fishermen from retailers following introduction of competition Effect of downstream buyer power on prices for small producers India Banerji and Meenakshi (2004) Buyer collusion in wheat auctions Prices paid to farmers depressed by about 1–4% Benin, Burkina Faso, Porto, Chauvin, and Olarreaga Increased competition between processors Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, (2011) in export crops: Malawi, Rwanda, i) Largest processing firm splits i) Average increase in farmer income of 2.8% Uganda, and Zambia ii) Entry of a small processor ii) Average increase in farmer income of 0.25% Effect of government policies on small producers Madagascar Cadot, Dutoit, and Melo (2009) Elimination of the vanilla monopoly/ Price received by producers increases from 2–11% to monopsony marketing board 22% of free on board price to 22%, 20,000 individuals lifted out of poverty Indonesia Warr (2005) Effective ban on rice imports Increase in poverty in urban and rural areas, 1% overall about 50 percent more than the average house- pertinent in developing countries, where health hold because they are more likely to shop at out- insurance coverage is rarer.6 lets with lower prices. The progressive nature of these gains, however, depends on context and the The bottom 40 percent as producers type of entry. Atkin, Faber, and Gonzalez-Navarro Anticompetitive behavior and regulations that (2015) find that entry of foreign supermarkets unreasonably constrain competition increase in Mexico led to significant welfare gains for the the cost of inputs. Anticompetitive behavior can average household, but that the richest groups inflict particular harm on low-income producers gained around 50 percent more than the poorest when it occurs in markets for agricultural inputs groups because poor people transfer less of their such as fertilizer, seeds, pesticides, and transport retail consumption to foreign stores. services. Globally, the existence of international Consumers can also benefit from competition cartels in the fertilizer sector raised prices of in other sectors that play a key role in welfare chemical fertilizers by 17 percent on average improvements and poverty alleviation, such as during 1990–2010 (Connor 2012). Jenny (2012) pharmaceuticals (Bokhari and Fournier 2013; projects the price of potash for 2011–2020 under Tenn and Wendling 2014). Consumer welfare a Canadian cartel arrangement to be double what gains from new entry in the United States market it would be under a competitive scenario. In the for anti-cholesterol drugs is higher for consum- transport sector, Arvis, Raballand, and Marteau ers in the lowest income decile than for higher (2010) find that transitioning from cartelized income deciles, driven in part by the fact that control of transit freight allocation to an efficient lower-income households tend to be more price trucking market would reduce logistics costs by sensitive (Dunn 2012). Indeed, more price-sen- over 30 percent in landlocked developing coun- sitive consumers—such as those without health tries. Breaking up anticompetitive practices in insurance—generally benefit more from the international shipping services would reduce availability of low-priced generic drugs (Frank transport prices for goods shipped to the United and Salkever 1992, 1997). This is particularly States from developing countries by 25 percent and lead to cost savings of up to $2 billion (Fink, to raise the incomes of poor farmers—benefited Mattoo, and Neagu 2002). Removing restrictive only the richest farmers and raised the incidence government policies would drop transport prices of poverty by just under 1 percent of the popula- by 9 percent and yield cost savings of up to $850 tion due to high household expenditure on rice million. In Sierra Leone, upstream entry in the (Warr 2005). manufacture of ice as an input for fishermen— Similarly, while broader procompetitive previously a monopoly market—helped fisher- reforms help both small and large firms, the men achieve better contractual terms vis-à-vis ice extent to which they do so can vary by firm size. retailers on both price and timeliness (Ghani and Scarpetta et al. (2002) find that, for 10 countries 5 Reed 2014). Moreover, ice manufacturer entry of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation boosted the provision of trade credit by retailers, and Development (OECD), more stringent prod- with multiple ice retailers competing for buyer uct market regulations limit market access for relationships. small and medium-sized firms. In particular, Downstream buyer power depresses prices reducing by two standard deviations the admin- for small producers. While lower prices for pro- istrative regulations affecting entrepreneurial ducers could theoretically be passed on to lower activity could increase small firm entry rates by prices for end consumers, this pass-through is about 1.3 percentage points. In Australia, imple- often limited by the high market power of inter- mentation of the country’s National Competition mediaries.7 Collusion between three large buyers Policy8 helped businesses overall, but offered in wheat auctions in India depressed prices paid greater benefits for larger rather than smaller to farmers by around 5–20 rupees per quintal businesses and in metropolitan areas more than (Banerji and Meenakshi 2004). Porto, Chauvin, rural areas (Productivity Commission 1999). and Olarreaga (2011) show that more competi- tion among downstream processors of certain The bottom 40 percent as employees African export crops benefits farmers and raises Product market reform tends to boost employ- farm gate prices. Where the downstream firm ment in the long term and/or on aggregate. This with the largest market share splits, for example, conclusion is confirmed in both theoretical mod- the average income of producing households els (Spector 2004; Blanchard and Giavazzi 2003)9 increases by 2.8 percent across all case studies. and empirical work (Griffith, Harrison, and Competition reforms often benefit some pro- Macartney 2007; Fiori et al. 2012; Nicoletti and ducers, but the distribution of those effects can Scarpetta 2005).10 The basic intuition is that more vary across income groups. A household’s net intense competition lowers prices toward mar- position as a producer or consumer matters. The ginal cost, increasing the output demanded by elimination of Madagascar’s monopsony/monop- consumers and, therefore, the labor demanded oly vanilla marketing board, and its replacement by producers. Lower prices also raise real wages, with imperfectly competitive domestic vanilla trad- which can increase the supply of labor. In Egypt, ers, had a large positive effect on the purchase a lack of competition due to capture by firms price paid to vanilla farmers, lifting about 20,000 that were connected to the former Mubarak individuals out of poverty. The impact on income regime dampened job creation (Schiffbauer et distribution was limited, however, because cash al. 2015). Entry by connected firms in new, pre- made up a small proportion of rural households’ viously unconnected sectors reduced aggregate overall income and much of their consumption employment growth by 1.4 percentage points per was self produced (Cadot, Dutoit, and Melo 2009). year in those sectors. Employment increases from Also in Madagascar, Barrett and Dorosh (1996) the entry of connected firms did not outweigh found that first-order gains from higher rice prices the job losses in unconnected firms that could through market-oriented reforms accrued mainly not compete with distortive policy privileges for to large farmers producing a marketable surplus, connected firms, including energy subsidies and since farmers below the poverty line made substan- trade protections. tial net purchases of rice. Similarly, an effective ban The impact on jobs depends on the type of on rice imports in Indonesia—introduced in part reform, whether outcomes are observed at the C ompetition and P o v ert y H o w C o m p e t i t i o n A f f e ct s th e D i s t r i b u t i o n o f W e l f a r e Table Effect of competition on shared prosperity of households as employees 3 Country Study Reform / Impact of… Effect Effect on unemployment OECD countries Fiori et al. (2012) Two quartile reduction in Product Market Employment increase of 1.1% in short run and 3.5% in Regulation index in high labor market long run regulation environment Egypt, Arab Rep. Schiffbauer et al. (2014) Entry of politically connected firms into new, Decline in aggregate employment growth by about 1.4 previously unconnected sectors percentage points annually during 1996–2006 compared to unconnected sectors without entry France Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) Existence of entry restrictions on large 10% reduction in employment retail stores Mexico Atkin, Faber, and Foreign supermarket entry Traditional retail employment reduced by 11% and Gonzalez-Navarro (2015) monthly incomes of workers reduced by 5.9% in the long term; no significant effect on employment or incomes at the municipal level Effect on wages and income equality OECD countries Causa, De Serres, and Reduction in Product Market Regulation Long-run average income increased by 3%, median Ruiz (2014) index equivalent to average decline in income by 4%, and income of poor by 8%, implying regulation observed during 1995–2005 lower inequality across OECD firm level or on aggregate, and the stance of gains for poor people, and lower income inequal- labor regulations. Employment outcomes in ity in OECD countries. the short run are less clear-cut than in the long Labor impacts in sectors that employ a sig- run. Cacciatore, Duval, and Fiori (2012) find nificant number of lower-income workers are a negative short-run employment effect (but the most likely to improve shared prosperity. a positive wage effect) from product market The retail sector is prominent in this regard.11 reform that reduces entry barriers. Profitable Evidence from Europe shows a negative impact investment opportunities in new firms induce on employment in the sector as a result of gov- households to save more and consume less, which ernment regulations that restrict entry of large outweighs the jobs created through increased retail stores. Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) find entry. It could also be argued that the exit of that retail employment could have been 10 per- less productive firms due to increased competi- cent higher in France had entry regulation not tion could lead to job losses. However, Dierx et been introduced in the early 1970s. In Italy, less al. (2015) find a positive net effect of competi- restrictive regulations on large store entry are tion enforcement on employment in the short associated with fewer small retail owners, but run in the European Union, and Spector (2004) this is compensated for by greater employment finds a positive employment effect of greater in both small and large retail outlets such that competition (measured by an increase in the moving to a free entry scenario would increase number of firms allowed to sell a good) in the the employment rate by 0.8 percentage points short run. Braconier and Ruiz-Valenzuela (2014) (Viviano 2008).12 In Mexico, foreign retail store and Guadalupe (2007) find that product market entry decreases employment and labor incomes competition has contributed to increased wage for workers in the traditional retail sector over inequality across OECD countries and across skill the medium to long run (Atkin, Faber, and levels in the British manufacturing sector, respec- Gonzalez-Navarro 2015). However, these nega- tively. On the other hand, Causa, De Serres, and tive effects apply only to a fraction of households Ruiz (2014) show that procompetitive product and are thus muted in the aggregate by reduc- market regulation is associated with higher aver- tions in the overall cost of living that benefit all age household disposable income, with higher households. Conclusion ing socioeconomic characteristics, and the rela- Empirical evidence shows that tackling anti- tive impact on small and medium enterprises can competitive behavior by firms and reducing be considered. Access to tax return and customs government restrictions on competition can data as well as firm-level economic variables will have a positive distributional impact by lower- support this type of analysis to better understand ing consumer prices in markets that are key for these dynamics in developing economies. the poor and raising returns to small producers. More competitive markets can bolster job growth and improve income distribution. Importantly, Notes 7 though, the fact that most households perform 1. Shared prosperity combines the goals of economic more than one function in the market is fun- growth and equity, targeting growth in household in- damental to understanding the distributional come and consumption among the poorest 40 percent impact of competition reforms. of the population of each country (World Bank 2015). Given the potential impact, this area deserves 2. See World Bank (2016), for a broader literature further research for developing and emerging review on the effects of competition and competition economies. More methodologically rigorous esti- policy on shared prosperity. mations of cartel overcharges and pass-through 3. Access to services, such as telecommunications, en- rates from intermediate customers to end con- ergy, and banking, may also have an important effect on sumers would allow a sharper focus on the dis- poverty and inequality across generations, despite mak- tributional impact of cartels and other forms of ing up a relatively small proportion of poor households’ anticompetitive behavior or mergers. It would consumption basket. also be enlightening to analyze the impacts of 4. Defined as the difference between the observed competition in a broader range of sectors, par- market price and the price that would have prevailed in ticularly those with strong income and consump- the absence of collusion. tion effects on the bottom 40 percent—including 5. Unskilled wages also rise in response to an increase service sectors such as transport, energy, tele- in commodity prices. Overall, evidence suggests that communications, and financial services—where the effect of higher consumption prices due to lack of evidence on poverty and distributional impacts is competition is generally not offset by the induced in- lacking. It would be useful to research the impact creases in wages (Rashid 2002; Ivanic and Martin 2008; on small producers of weak competition in inter- De Hoyos and Medvedev 2011). mediary functions in value chains, in terms of 6. Governments can spur pro-poor gains by setting drug both upstream inputs and downstream buyers. procurement rules that encourage the entry of generics, Moreover, moving from partial equilibrium to for example, and more competitive pricing of drugs. general equilibrium analysis and incorporating 7. In the long run, depressed producer prices may the effect of high market power on employment, disincentivize producers from entering the market and wages, and capital returns, would provide more from innovating. complete conclusions. Similarly, it would be use- 8. The National Competition Policy, introduced in the ful to learn more about the dynamics of the inter- 1990s, implemented reforms to minimize competition action between competition and welfare through, restrictions and promote competitive neutrality between for example, asset accumulation in the long term, public and private players engaged in business activities. and utilization of and returns to those assets in 9. The long-term positive effect found by Blanchard the short to medium term. and Giavazzi (2003) assumes a reduction in entry costs. Much of the evidence on the effect of procom- 10. The applicability of these results outside the OECD petitive reforms on firm-related variables relates is not clear. One might expect the effects of product to OECD countries. As more data (such as indica- market regulation to be more modest in developing tors on product market regulation and firm-level countries, for example, due to greater informality and a data) become available for emerging and devel- lower capacity for supervision. oping economies, empirical analysis of the effect 11. In analyzing over 100 countries, IFC (2013) found on productivity, employment, entrepreneurship, services (including retail) to lead job creation in devel- wage distribution across households with differ- oping countries. C ompetition and P o v ert y H o w C o m p e t i t i o n A f f e ct s th e D i s t r i b u t i o n o f W e l f a r e 12. It is worth noting that this note focuses on product Overcharges: Legal and Economic Evidence” origi- markets and therefore does not cover the existence nally published in Research in Law and Economics, 22: of market power in labor markets, although there is 59–153 (2007). a strand of literature on this topic (see, for example, Creedy, J., and R. Dixon. 1998. “The Relative Burden of Brummund 2014). Monopoly on Households with Different Incomes.” viewpoint Economica, 65(258): 285–293. Fink, C., A. Mattoo, and C. Negau. 2002. “Trade in References International Maritime Service: How Much Does is an open forum to For a list of all studies cited in this note, go to http:// Policy Matter?” World Bank Economic Review 16(1): encourage dissemination of www.worldbank.org/competition. 81–108. public policy innovations Fiori, G., G. Nicoletti, S. Scarpetta, and F. 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