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**Report No. 12629**

**PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT**

**ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT**

**GREATER CAIRO URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT  
(LOAN 2176-EGT)**

**DECEMBER 22, 1993**

**Infrastructure Operations Division  
Country Department II  
Middle East and North Africa Regional Office**

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Currency Equivalents  
 Currency Unit: Egyptian Pound (LE) = 100 Piasters = 1000 Miliemes

Exchange Rates<sup>1</sup>  
 (Egyptian Pound per US Dollar)

<u>Period</u>	<u>Official</u> <u>End of Period</u>	<u>Market</u> <u>Period Average</u>
1984	0.7000	0.8317
1985	0.7000	1.3009
1986	0.7000	1.3502
1987	0.7000	1.5015
1988	0.7000	2.2129
1989	1.1000	2.5171
1990	2.0000	2.7072
1991	3.3000	3.3000
1992	3.3303	3.3303
Jan. 1993	3.3390	3.3390

Fiscal Year

July 1 - June 30

Measures and Equivalents

1 hectare (ha) = 10,000 m<sup>2</sup> or 2.471 acres

List of Abbreviations

CBD	-	Central Business District
CG	-	Cairo Governorate
CGAO	-	Central Government Audit Organization
CTA	-	Cairo Transport Authority
ECA/MENA	-	Europe & Central Asia/Middle East and North Africa Regions
ERR	-	Economic Rate of Return
GESBOF	-	Gisr El Suez Bus Overhaul Facility
GG	-	Giza Governorate
IBRD	-	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA	-	International Development Association
JICA	-	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
MENA	-	Middle East and North Africa Region
PA	-	Project Agreement
PCR	-	Project Completion Report
PPF	-	Project Preparation Facility
SAR	-	Staff Appraisal Report
SFD	-	Social Fund for Development
TMU	-	Traffic Management Unit

THE WORLD BANK  
Washington, D.C. 20433  
U.S.A.

Office of Director-General  
Operations Evaluation

December 22, 1993

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Egypt  
Greater Cairo Urban Development Project  
(Loan 2176-EGT)

Attached is the "Project Completion Report on Egypt - Greater Cairo Urban Development Project (Loan 2176-EGT)" prepared by the Infrastructure Operations Division, Country Department II of the Middle East and North Africa Regional Office. Part II contains the Borrower's perspective.

The project upgraded selected low income areas and improved the operations of the public bus company. It failed to initiate an approach to urban transport based on low-cost engineering and management measures, and to strengthen the institutional capability of the participating governorates. Not only was the project not successful in consolidating an urban transport strategy based on low cost mechanisms, but it appears that the Cairo Central Government has been implementing a strategy based on capital intensive projects. The explosive growth of traffic volume in Cairo, not contemplated in the project's design, may have contributed to its lack of success. The project also encountered problems due to the cessation of IDA lending to Egypt, which created a difficult environment as well as a significant reduction in the support for the project by Government. Additional factors that contributed to the project's lack of accomplishment include (i) its complexity and the many integrated components it included, (ii) the failure to identify at appraisal the limited absorption capacity of the implementing agencies; and (iii) the lack of flexibility to respond to the changing circumstances in the borrowing country, and to ensure support for the project. The technical assistance package included in the original project was duplicated by a technical assistance package financed by USAID. Thus, the institutional component included in the Project was canceled.

On balance, while the project outcome is rated as marginally satisfactory due to the completion of a revised set of justified project components after its restructuring, its institutional development impact is rated as negligible and its sustainability as uncertain.

The Project Completion Report is of good quality. The project may be audited.



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**PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT**  
**ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT**  
**GREATER CAIRO URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT**  
**(LOAN 2176-EGT)**

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Photos of some project components  
Map: IBRD 24848

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**PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT**  
**ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT**  
**GREATER CAIRO URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT**  
**(LOAN 2176-EGT)**

**PREFACE**

1. This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Greater Cairo Urban Development Project in the Arab Republic of Egypt, for which Loan 2176-EGT in the amount of US\$ 59.0 million, was signed on October 26, 1982. The loan was closed on December 31, 1992, five years behind original schedule, and the remaining undisbursed balance of US\$1.13 million has been cancelled in addition to the US\$5.0 million cancelled on September 22, 1987.
2. The PCR was jointly prepared: the Infrastructure Operations Division of MENA Regional Office prepared the Preface, Evaluation Summary, and Parts I and III; the Borrower, the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the implementing agencies: the Cairo Governorate (CG), the Giza Governorate (GG) and the Cairo Transport Authority (CTA) prepared their respective Part IIs.
3. Preparation of the PCR started during the Bank's final supervision mission of the project in January/February 1993 and is based, *inter alia*, on the Staff Appraisal Report, correspondence between the Bank and the Borrower; and the Bank's internal memoranda and reports.



**PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT**  
**ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT**  
**GREATER CAIRO URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT**  
**(LOAN 2176-EGT)**

**EVALUATION SUMMARY**

**Objectives**

1. The primary objectives of the project were to initiate a revised approach to urban transport based on low cost engineering and management measures, and to strengthen the institutional ability of the governorates thereby enhancing their capacity to undertake further urban development. The secondary objectives were to improve the living conditions of the urban poor in the Greater Cairo region through upgrading selected low income areas, and to improve the efficiency of the public bus company.

**Implementation Experience**

2. The closing of the loan was delayed by five years as a result of various factors (para. 5.6). All components, as revised after project restructuring in October 1987, were completed. The implementation of many of the studies' recommendations were either stalled through the administrative process, not implemented, or implemented using the Government's own resources (paras. 5.4 and 5.5).

3. The Project encountered a major procurement issue concerning the Gisir El Suez Bus Overhaul Facility (GESBOF), where the Bank expressed concern over the "single responsibility" contract preferred by CTA. Eventually, CTA went along with the Bank's recommendations of splitting the equipment procurement into a number of different packages. This latter approach proved to be troublesome to the Project since CTA was not accustomed to managing such complex international contracting procedures (para. 5.8).

4. The overall project cost, in nominal terms, without taking into consideration the changes that occurred in the scope of the project, increased in LE by 35 percent, while the cost in US\$ decreased by 22 percent (para. 5.9). If, however, the changes in the scope are taken into consideration, the adjusted cost would have increased, in nominal terms, by 41 percent in LE, attributed to the depreciation of the rate of exchange of the Egyptian Pound relative to the US Dollar and other European currencies which accounted for a large part of equipment procurement (para. 5.10).

5. The remaining undisbursed balance of US\$ 1.13 million by the end of the 4-month grace period beyond the closing date was cancelled in addition to the US Dollar 5.0 million cancelled in September 1987 (para. 3.3).

6. Audits received of project accounts were frequently late despite persistent reminders from the Bank.

### Results

7. The main CTA component, GESBOF, was completed and commissioned in 1991. However, the facility is operating below optimal capacity depriving CTA of potential revenues that could curb its rising annual deficit. The rehabilitated Monib Training Center is providing effective training for a range of specialist skills critical for the operational needs of CTA (paras. 6.1 and 6.2).

8. For the CG, two of the principal physical components of the Project (the Opera and Ataba Squares, multi-storey parking garages) were completed and have provided the Central Business District (CBD) with much needed parking space (1,780 spaces) as well as a gross area of 17,230 m<sup>2</sup> for commercial space. The remaining components of the core program for CG were never implemented because of changing priorities and a lack of counterpart funds and were subsequently cancelled after restructuring the project in October 1987 (paras. 3.3 and 6.3).

9. The GG has implemented all components although some small scale traffic improvement measures were completed using its own resources (para. 6.5).

10. The Project did not lead to the consolidation of a new approach to urban transport based on low cost traffic engineering and management measures. Extraneous factors, however, such as the unforeseen explosive growth of traffic volume in Cairo have contributed to the Government's change in investment priorities (para. 8.2).

### Sustainability

11. The key to the sustainability of the investment in GESBOF, the largest component of this Project, would have been for an autonomous management to run the facility on a commercially sound basis. The current dependence of GESBOF on its financially strapped parent, CTA, will ultimately jeopardize the bus transport system in Cairo and Alexandria affecting some 7 million riders (para. 9.1).

12. After Project restructuring, in October 1987, and the arrangement of attaching the core institutional development components originally proposed under this project to the USAID's LDII Project, the Bank's involvement in institutional development was limited to following up through USAID (paras. 5.5 and 10.2).

### Findings and Lessons Learned

13. The Project from the onset faced problems because due to the reclassification of Egypt's borrowing status and the changing priorities of the Government, support for an already overly complex project with funds borrowed at a high interest rate dropped sharply. This situation proved to be costly since the Project never recovered its earlier momentum. It would have been advisable to restructure the project at an earlier stage in consideration of the new situation. The lessons learned are that the Bank should:

- avoid complex projects with too many integrated components when the implementing agencies have limited absorptive capacity and insufficient exposure to the intricacies of complex international contracting procedures;
- respond appropriately to the changing circumstances and needs of the borrowers in order to maintain support for the project; and
- ensure that conditions exist for the financial viability of public entities that apply to the Bank for support, and that, related covenants are strictly adhered to.



# **PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT**

## **ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT**

### **GREATER CAIRO URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT** **(LOAN 2176-EGT)**

#### **PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE**

##### 1. Project Identity

Project Name	Greater Cairo Urban Development Project
Loan Number	2176-EGT
Loan Amount	US\$ 59.0 million
Loan Cancellation(s)	US\$ 6.13 million
Regional Vice Presidential Unit	MENA
Country	Arab Republic of Egypt
Sector	Urban/Transport

##### 2. Background

###### Introduction

2.1 In 1981, Egypt had an estimated population of 43 million and was growing at an annual rate exceeding 2.5 percent. Rural population growth was outstripping rural job creation resulting in large scale rural-to-urban migration. Greater Cairo had about 8.5 million people and was growing at an alarming rate of 4 percent per annum with about 30 percent of all urban families having incomes below the Bank-defined poverty threshold of US\$715 per household per year in 1980 terms. The average gross population density was high by all standards, at 40,000 per square km, reaching 100,000 in some older Cairo districts. The sharp increase in urban population was not accompanied by a similar increase in urban infrastructure provision. The Government had recognized the dimension and severity of the growing urban problems, and had in response given them high priority in its 1978-82 Development Plan.

2.2 Discussions about an urban project in Cairo were held in parallel with the supervision of the First Urban Development Project (Credit 831-EGT). The project was identified in November 1978 and a feasibility study was prepared with financial assistance from the Overseas Development Administration of the United Kingdom. Continuing discussions with the Government resulted in what was thought of as an important shift in emphasis away from construction of costly elevated roadworks and flyovers to relatively low-cost traffic engineering and management schemes. Project preparation was reviewed by Bank missions in June 1979, September 1979, and February 1980. The project was appraised in May 1980,

and as a result of the Government's subsequent proposal to substitute some components, the project scope was further refined in follow-up discussions in Cairo in September 1980 and January 1981. At the Government's request, the project was held in abeyance for a period of time pending discussion of the lending terms. Negotiations were held in Washington in April 1982 and the loan was approved on June 10, 1982. The loan was signed on October 26, 1982 and became effective on February 16, 1983.

### Sector Development Objectives

2.3 The development objectives of this project took a synergetic approach to metropolitan development in the form of an integrated project, similar to a third of the Bank's urban development lending approved in the late 1970s and early 1980s. These projects combined the provision of infrastructure, urban transport and solid waste management.

2.4 Transport problems of Cairo residents included severe congestion (characterized by long delays and low moving speeds), high accident rates, extreme crowding in buses, bumpy rides and obstructed sidewalks, chaotic parking habits seriously reducing traffic lanes capacity and poor accessibility to any motorized mode of travel particularly for the residents of several lower-income districts of Cairo. Behind these problems lay an array of deficiencies on the supply side of urban transport. On the infrastructure side, these included the poor state of paved roads, particularly bus routes, with a high proportion (60%) of the road network without any surfacing or street lighting, precluding access to vital service vehicles. On the traffic side, traffic signals were widely disobeyed and parking space was scarce. Moreover there was an absence of trained staff, facilities and institutional arrangements for the range of activities related to road traffic. On the local government side, the three Governorates co-responsible for Greater Cairo were inadequately staffed and their pay scales were too low to attract and/or retain technicians necessary to regulate and manage various urban service systems at a time when sectoral ministries had started to transfer responsibility for urban projects to the Governorates.

### Policy Context

2.5 The approach for this project essentially applies strategies recommended by the World Bank for populous urban areas in developing countries--Urban Transport, published by the World Bank in 1976 and later updated in 1986. The three principles that constitute the conceptual framework that served as the basis of this policy are economic and financial viability and efficiency. The principal policy focus of this project was on efforts to reshape urban transport policy, notably to shift emphasis away from expensive construction of new elevated roadways and flyovers in to the cost efficient area of traffic engineering and management schemes. The project also addressed broader municipal management and planning issues.

## Linkages Between the Project and Macro Policy Objectives

2.6 The urban contribution to economic growth in Egypt is very large, particularly for Greater Cairo and Alexandria. Cairo alone accounts for about one-quarter of the nation's jobs, and in the last two decades twice as many jobs have been created there as in the rest of the country. In the manufacturing sector Greater Cairo accounts for almost one-half of the national output, and its share of manufacturing employment is almost as large.

2.7 The efficiency of economic activities in cities such as Cairo, therefore, affects the overall efficiency of the economy, which would be clearly impaired by the difficulties of moving goods and people around and by high transportation costs. The adverse impact of housing and service deficiencies and pollution on productivity is more indirect, and perhaps impossible to measure, but is real enough. Overall, the net agglomeration economies of Greater Cairo were being eroded by decreased efficiencies of the urban infrastructure. Actions to reduce these inefficiencies by sound investments, policy reform and improved urban management would, by allowing net agglomeration economies to increase again, have both direct and indirect effects on overall economic efficiency.

### 3. Project Objectives and Description

#### Project Objectives

3.1 The main objectives of the project, at appraisal, were to initiate a revised approach to urban transport based on low cost measures, with special attention to the needs of lower income groups; to improve the efficiency of public transport; and to strengthen Government institutions, thereby developing their planning and management capabilities and enhancing their capacity to undertake further urban development. In addition, the project sought to alleviate the living and environmental conditions of Greater Cairo's urban poor through the upgrading of selected low income areas.

#### Project Components

3.2 The project pursued the above objectives through an integrated package of measures. This consisted of a four-year "time-slice" of traffic engineering, road maintenance and traffic management programs to improve the existing road network, pave new bus routes, and reduce congestion in Cairo's Central Business District (CBD), together with associated policy measures to enforce traffic regulations and parking controls. It also provided for institutional improvements including a series of organizational and administrative measures, staff training, related technical assistance and studies; a pilot area upgrading program; and improvements in the operations of the Cairo Transport Authority (CTA). The major components at appraisal were grouped into:

Traffic Engineering and Road Maintenance - (US\$56 million, (48 percent of the total estimated project cost)) consisting of the construction of two parking garages and a

series of traffic engineering measures along selected circulation corridors and access loops in CG and GG and in the CBD.

Enforcement of Traffic Rules and Training - (US\$4 million, (4 percent)) through improved traffic police training programs and the purchase of course materials, training aides, motorcycles and tow trucks.

Area Upgrading - (US\$15 million, (13 percent)) consisting of the installation of street lighting equipment, partial leveling and paving of secondary roads and footpaths, partial rehabilitation of water and sewerage networks and a pilot program of solid waste collection in four low-income neighborhoods in CG and GG.

Public Transport - (US\$28 million, (24 percent)) consisting of completing the construction of a bus overhaul facility at Gisir El-Suez (GESBOF) including the provision of related equipment and spare parts, as well as the refurbishing and equipping of the Monib training center for CTA drivers and maintenance staff.

Institutional Development - (US\$13 million, (11 percent)) comprising a program of organizational and administrative improvements necessary to facilitate more efficient management of urban services in the CG and GG, as well as a program for improving operational, financial and management procedures of the CTA.

3.3 In October 1987, the project was restructured because of lack of performance and changing priorities of the CG and as such eleven components in that agency were cancelled and one each in GG and the CTA. The funds released from the cancellation of these thirteen components were reallocated to finance two additional components in Giza as well as the higher than anticipated foreign exchange requirements of GESBOF.<sup>1</sup> Details of the various components before and after restructuring are given in Table 5, Part III.

#### 4. Project Design and Organization

4.1 The project, as originally conceived, had two project preparation facilities (PPF) totalling US\$1 million to finance the preparation of the project which were granted to the implementing agencies through the government on IDA terms because the project was initially proposed to be financed with an IDA credit. However, because of the change in the classification of Egypt's borrowing status (cessation of IDA lending to Egypt), detailed design for the project was temporarily suspended. The net result was that only about 50

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<sup>1/</sup> On September 22, 1987, the Egyptian Government requested the cancellation of US Dollars 14.0 million from the loan allocated to CG. However, on November 12, 1987, the Government requested that the cancellation be limited to US Dollars 5.0 million, with the remaining US Dollars 9.0 million being reallocated to GG to enable it to extend the upgrading to Omrania West and Monira West. However, as GG was unable to obtain the necessary counterpart funding for these two components, the Government further requested, on March 8, 1989, the reallocation of the US Dollars 9.0 million to the CTA to enable it to complete GESBOF.

percent or US\$370,000 of the second PPF advance was used by the time the loan ultimately became effective.

4.2 In line with the policy of decentralization and transferring greater decision making authority to the Governorates, in the early 1980s, the responsibility for project implementation was given to CG, GG and CTA. Each of the implementing agencies was completely responsible for the requisite programming, budgeting, design, bidding, procurement, construction and supervision of their respective components. This arrangement proved inadequate since the absorptive capacity of the implementing agencies was limited.

## 5. Project Implementation

### Loan Effectiveness and Project Start-up

5.1 Although the loan was approved on June 10, 1982, and signed on October 26, 1982, it only became effective on February 16, 1983, almost three years after the original appraisal date, due to uncertainties resulting from the change in the classification of Egypt's borrowing status (para. 4.1). This created a difficult political environment as Government support for the project dropped at a time when Government policy was directed against the utilization of loan funds for municipal infrastructure projects. Reviving Government support for the project was a lengthy process.

### Construction

5.2 The components, as revised after project restructuring in October 1987, were completed. The two composite real estate developments of offices and shops incorporating multi-storey car parking space at Opera and Ataba Squares were completed satisfactorily, although slightly behind schedule. The delay was mainly caused by a disgruntled subcontractor who was eventually legally dismissed from the site after the Governorate's intervention. The civil works construction of the GESBOF were completed satisfactorily; however, there were several problems with procurement (para. 5.8).

5.3 The upgrading of the two areas in GG was completed after concerns about the initial quality of the work carried out by the contractor. Some subcomponents, originally included in the project but removed after the restructuring, were implemented by the Central Government using its own resources (para. 6.4).

5.4 Implementation of many of the traffic engineering and road maintenance measures was either stalled or not implemented for several reasons among which were the changing priorities of the CG and fiscal constraints, and were subsequently cancelled after project restructuring in October 1987.

## Studies and Technical Assistance

5.5 The original technical assistance package, which was divided into four sub-components (Strategic Action Plan, Urban Service Delivery Program, Infrastructure Survey and Solid Waste Management Master Plan), was no longer needed since the technical assistance package financed by USAID, in effect, paralleled the institutional component included in the Project. Consequently, after October 1987, the Bank cancelled this component and limited its involvement in institutional development to working indirectly with USAID. The final report on the USAID project, Local Development II (LDII), is under preparation, and is believed to indicate favorable results have been achieved.

## Implementation Delays

5.6 The project was substantially completed by the end of 1991, after the commissioning of GESBOF, about four years later than originally envisaged. The original project completion date, set for December 31, 1987 (less than 5 years after the actual effectiveness date) was unrealistic for such a complex project. The implementation profile for less complex projects in Egypt is about nine years. Notwithstanding the over-optimistic implementation schedule, the project incurred delays for a variety of reasons prominent among which:

- (i) the reclassification of Egypt's borrowing status (from IDA to IBRD) created a difficult political environment whereby the general perception among officials was that the loan terms were very expensive for a non-productive sector financing, coupled with a growing resistance to finance technical assistance from external borrowings. Deliberations by Government as to whether to proceed with project implementation or not took a long time, eventually leading to considerable delays. This resistance was further exacerbated by a series of declines in the Bank interest rates which did not affect the loan since the interest was fixed at 11.6 percent per annum. Support for the project waned and reviving it proved very lengthy;
- (ii) an attempt by a subcontractor to block the site of the two parking garages, who had to be forcibly removed by a court order;
- (iii) the uncertainty of counterpart funds;
- (iv) the cumbersome bureaucratic procedures for bid evaluation and issuance of letters of credit;
- (v) frequent changes in senior and project management teams accompanied by changes in priorities for certain components;

- (vi) inexperience with complex international contracting procedures such as required by the GESBOF.

#### Closing Date Extensions and Completion

5.7 The closing date was extended four times to allow for the completion of the construction works and equipment procurement. At the time the loan was closed all physical works under the restructured project were completed. The institutional objectives were carried out under the USAID project (para. 5.5).

#### Procurement

5.8 The project encountered a major procurement issue concerning the GESBOF. At the time of preparation of the bidding documents for GESBOF, CTA felt that the award of a "single responsibility" contract would serve their interest best because of the complexity and risk involved with commissioning such a facility. The Bank went along with this approach initially. However, because of concerns over the large overheads charged by single responsibility contractors for coordinating a multitude of subcontractors, the Bank subsequently insisted that the bidding documents be revised, splitting the equipment procurement into eleven different packages to ensure a tighter and more competitive bidding. The latter approach, however, neglected to consider the consequences and risks fraught with such a complex task with which CTA was not accustomed. The resulting design modifications to accommodate the different packages were expensive, cumbersome, time consuming and at times confusing. Furthermore, as all the contracts were won by European firms, delays in project implementation resulted in substantial increases in this component's cost, due to the depreciation of the US Dollar against the European currencies.

#### Project Cost and Disbursement

5.9 Without taking into consideration the impact of changes that occurred in the scope of the project, the total cost estimated at LE 94.5 million during appraisal increased to LE 128.0 million, or an overrun of about 35 percent. The total expenditure in US dollars, on the other hand, decreased from the appraisal estimate of US\$ 116.2 million to US\$ 91.0 million, or an underrun of about 22 percent, mainly due to the depreciation in the rate of exchange of the Egyptian pound relative to the U.S. Dollar (Table 1).

Table 1: Project cost by implementing agency  
(in nominal US\$ million)

Implementing Agency	Appraisal Estimates		Actual		Total Appraisal	Total Actual
	Local	Foreign	Local	Foreign		
Governorate of Cairo	38.34	33.28	11.20	12.02	71.62	23.20 <sup>a)</sup>
Governorate of Giza	7.71	5.64	12.87	4.24	13.35	17.11
Cairo Transport Authority	9.84	21.43	13.10	37.60	31.27	50.70
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>55.89</b>	<b>60.35</b>	<b>37.17</b>	<b>53.86</b>	<b>116.24</b>	<b>91.01</b>

\* Several components were cancelled after project restructuring (see Tables 5 & 6, Part III).

5.10 In order to provide a meaningful comparison of costs, readjustments to the appraisal estimates were introduced to reflect the impact of changes that took place in the scope of work during the period of project implementation, i.e. cancellation of portions of the components related to Traffic Engineering and Road Maintenance, Traffic Enforcement and Institutional Development for both the Governorates of Cairo and Giza; and increases in the scope of work at CTA (Table 2). The changes in the scope of work were reflected through several amendments to the Loan Agreement. Adjusted costs indicate an increase of LE 37.17 million, or about 41 percent, attributed to the change in the rate of exchange of the Egyptian pound over the duration of the project. The adjusted costs in terms of US\$ decreased by US\$ 1.46 million, or about 2 percent.

Table 2: Cost Adjustments due to change in scope of works  
(in nominal million currency units)

	Appraisal Estimate		Actual	
	LE	US\$	LE	US\$
Appraisal and actual costs	94.52	116.24	127.99	91.01
Net adjustments to:				
Governorate of Cairo	-26.95 <sup>a)</sup>	-33.66 <sup>a)</sup>		
Governorate of Giza	+0.73	+0.91		
CTA	+22.55	+8.98		
<b>Adjusted Costs</b>	<b>90.85</b>	<b>92.47</b>	<b>127.99</b>	<b>91.01</b>

\* Several components were cancelled after project restructuring (see Tables 5 and 6, Part III)

5.11 The disbursement of the loan took a little more than twice as long as that anticipated at appraisal (Table 3, Part III). By the original closing date of December 1987, only about 40 percent of the loan proceeds had been drawn down. At the request of the government, an amount of US\$ 5.0 million was cancelled on September 22, 1987. (para 3.3) At the end of the

4-month grace period beyond the closing date an amount of US\$ 1.13 million remained undisbursed and was cancelled.

### Audits and Reporting

5.12 The project agreements required the three agencies involved in the project implementation to provide the Bank with annual audits of their accounts as well as quarterly implementation reports. The annual audits were frequently received late from the Central Government Audit Organization (CGAO) despite persistent reminders from the Bank. The progress reports received were short of disclosing full information on implementation, and the records kept by some agencies were not comprehensive.

## 6. Project Results

6.1 The main CTA component was implemented as envisaged, though with considerable delays. GESBOF was commissioned in 1991 and is now one of the largest central bus overhaul workshops in the world. Prior to completion of the GESBOF the maintenance practices and procedures of CTA were fragmented, with poor production line techniques. The facility is currently operating below optimal capacity because of the pervasive lack of qualified technicians and spare parts. The financial viability of CTA has not been achieved, although there were continuous attempts by CTA management to raise bus fares fixed by the Central Government: CTA's annual deficits have an upward trend<sup>2</sup>; cumulative deficits for fiscal years 1989/90, 1990/91, and 1991/92 were LE 165 million, 230 million and 217 million respectively (Table 9, Part III). In an effort to revise the downward slide, the Bank was able to convince CTA to negotiate with a consulting firm a study for the privatization of GESBOF, however, CTA reneged because of political pressure. Recently, the Social Fund for Development (SFD) has revived the idea.

6.2 The Monib Training Center was completed and commissioned in 1985. The center offers a wide range of training courses customized to the specific operational needs of CTA. In fiscal year 1992, the center had a total enrollment of about 4,000 trainees, covering 124 courses ranging from basic training to skill upgrading and refresher courses with an overall average cost of LE 1,500 per trainee per course.

6.3 For the Cairo Governorate; two of the principal physical components of the project, namely the two multi-storey garages at Opera and Ataba squares were successfully completed and commissioned in April 1986. The garages provided parking space (1,130 spaces in Opera Square and 650 in Ataba Square) and a gross area of 17,230 m<sup>2</sup> for commercial space (11,730 m<sup>2</sup> in Opera and 5,500 m<sup>2</sup> in Ataba). The garages are being managed by private sector companies, and parking charges have been set to recover full operating and capital costs with average annual revenues to CG of around LE 873,000. Occupancy levels in the garages, on

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<sup>2/</sup> The deficit situation of CTA has been made worse by the recent decision to merge the operations of the loss-making Heliopolis Metro to CTA, thereby widening the gap between the revenues and expenditures.

average, have exceeded 90 percent of capacity. The commercial space is being leased out at market rates through a competitive bidding procedure with a total revenue of LE 13.8 million from lease contracts. Additionally, these garages have triggered the construction of other, similar parking garages in other congested areas of Cairo by both the public and the private sectors. The remaining components of the core program for CG (the improvements to the CBD, the three access corridors to Cairo and the creation of a traffic management unit (TMU)) were never implemented even though the tender documents for the traffic schemes were completed and the decree establishing the TMU was signed into law, due to the lack of counterpart funds and changing priorities.

6.4 Traffic Police Management: nine police officers received a total of 32 weeks of traffic police training in the USA. Traffic enforcement equipment (250 motorcycles and 261 radios) was purchased. The practice of enforcement is slowly improving. However, the traffic management specialists on staff left after their initial two-year contracts expired and have since not been replaced. The refurbishing of a training center and the construction of a motor vehicle inspection center were left out.

6.5 The Giza Governorate implemented all components. Some small scale engineering measures in Giza/Galaa/Dokki Squares were completed using its own resources. The upgrading done in Old Giza and East Monira under the project have been successfully completed. The current population of the two areas is estimated at 250,000 and 175,000 with an average annual income per capita of LE 1200 and LE 1000 respectively. The Governorate of Giza has achieved an important objective of the project - replication: with funds from the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Giza city is now upgrading the area of West Omrania (designed with loan proceeds) and has recently started discussions for funding the upgrading of West Monira.

## 7. Economic Re-Evaluation and Rates of Return

7.1 Due to the various problems encountered during its implementation the Project had to be restructured (para 3.3). As a result, in the following re-evaluation only a limited use of the appraisal analysis and data could be made. Therefore, a full ex-post calculation of the economic rate of return (ERR) of the Project as it was implemented would require an extensive empirical study to collect data and carry out a comparative analysis of the actual situation with what would have prevailed without the Project. No such extensive data collection and analysis could be carried out for the purposes of this PCR. The following re-evaluation, therefore, is limited only to the financial performance of the two parking garages and the GESBOF which were created under the Project. The financial return analysis carried out shows that the project components that were completed have yielded satisfactory financial returns (Paras. 7.2 and 7.3). These project components, the Opera and Ataba parking facilities and GESBOF, have also yielded economic benefits to society which could not be quantified. In the case of the parking facilities these benefits occurred, as a result of reduction in traffic congestion in the form of travel time savings, savings in vehicle operating costs, and a reduction in air pollution by the CBD traffic

in Cairo. In the case of GESBOF, the benefits generated by the project accrued to the whole economy in the form of savings in foreign exchange and vehicle operating costs.

7.2 The Opera and Ataba Parking Facilities: At the time of appraisal its was envisaged that these two parking facilities would be combined with junction improvements, better traffic management practices and on-street parking controls to improve traffic flow in the CBD. However, as noted earlier, due to the implementation problems, only the parking facilities could be realized. Based on solely the financial costs and revenues of these two facilities, the ex-post financial return of this project component was estimated to be about 16 percent (Table 9, Part III).

7.3 The GESBOF: Originally, the bus overhaul facilities were to be combined with various other measures to improve CTA's operational efficiency and the overall quality of public transport services. On this basis, at the time of appraisal, the ERR of this component of the project was estimated at 26 percent. In the absence of these complementary measures, the re-assessment of this project component was based solely on costs and benefits of the bus overhaul facility. On this basis, the ex-post financial rate of return was estimated at 19 percent, (Table 9, Part III).

## 8. Impact of the Project

8.1 The greatest impact of this project is felt by the five million Cairo residents who use the bus fleet of CTA every day (estimated demand is about 8 million passenger trips per day) which is maintained by the GESBOF. The two parking garages have tremendously reduced traffic congestion (resulting from double and triple street parking) and air pollution in the area as well as providing employment to several hundred citizens. Since the completion of the upgrading in Old Giza and East Monira, business activity in the area has flourished because of the more dependable services and easier circulation (see photos comparing the before and after conditions).

8.2 The project was not successful in consolidating a new approach to urban transport based on low cost traffic engineering and management measures. Quite the contrary, it appears that the approach actually implemented in Cairo by the Central Government reaches first for the most intensive capital investment projects (as demonstrated by projects like the Metro, the elevated roads and viaducts) with marginal improvements to the traffic and public transport in contrast to the understanding reached during project preparation. A justification offered for the latter policy was the unforeseen explosive growth in the traffic volume (around 17 percent per annum) in the early to mid 1980's as a result of the "open-door" policy initiated by the late President Sadat.

## 9. Project Sustainability

9.1 The GESBOF, which is the largest component of this project, is currently operating below optimal capacity primarily because of a chronic shortage of spare parts and the lack of

autonomy of the management of the facility in making sound business decisions. These two conditions, if not rectified, will have a negative impact on the operations of CTA which will jeopardize the bus transport systems in Cairo and Alexandria. Moreover, if GESBOF is allowed to operate at optimum capacity it could generate around LE 100 million annually (at current prices) of net revenue for CTA thereby reducing its huge deficit which is threatening the sustainability of CTA's operations.

9.2 The parking garages are being leased at market rates and are generating a net revenue to the CG. This arrangement is expected to ensure sustainability provided that the facilities are kept well maintained in the future.

## 10. Bank Performance

10.1 The Bank did not assess correctly the limited absorptive and implementation capacity of the three agencies responsible for implementing the project components. Also, in its desire to achieve many priority objectives, the project was made excessively complex: one of the reasons why the project had to be restructured. The Bank was overly optimistic in expecting that basic changes would be made in existing Government institutions and their mode of operation. The Bank also overestimated the capabilities of the Borrowers to implement such a complex multi-component project, thus requiring very heavy supervision by the Bank (Table 7, Part III).

10.2 After the cancellation of the remaining physical components in CG, the vehicle for maintaining dialogue between the Bank and CG was eliminated, especially when the core institutional development components were attached to the USAID's LDII project. Subsequently Bank supervision missions had to follow up on institutional matters through the work of USAID.

10.3 The Bank's decision to insist on splitting up the procurement of GESBOF's equipment into several packages instead of the initially agreed to "single-responsibility" contract, contributed to further delays, design complications and extra demands on CTA to coordinate the complex task of managing these packages separately.

## 11. Borrower Performance

11.1 The Borrower's performance was also mixed. The Borrower delayed effectiveness as a result of waning enthusiasm after a difficult political environment in which the Borrower's support for the project dropped sharply. The implementing agencies were forced to suspend project preparation because of the ensuing uncertainty at the central government level and the absence of secure financing. Consequently the Borrower's priorities started changing and the process of getting back the momentum to the project proved to be a difficult process.

11.2 The Borrower was not able to secure the necessary counterpart funds to implement certain restructured components (upgrading of Monira West and Omrania West) which were subsequently cancelled. The Borrower also did not apply pressure on the project implementing agencies to adhere to the provisions of the audit covenants on several occasions, and refrained

from giving CTA the autonomy to set its own fare levels in order to strengthen its financial position.

12. Bank - Borrower Relationship

12.1 The relationship between the Bank's missions and the Government and its implementing agencies remained cordial. The implementing agencies endeavored to provide the Bank with as much requested information as possible.

13. Consulting Services

13.1 The project relied on the inputs provided by several consultants for conducting studies, design and supervision of the various project components. The consultants included foreign and local firms as well as individual expatriates and local specialists who were employed by the various implementing agencies to strengthen their in-house capabilities to supervise the design and supervision. All the project consultants provided good services throughout project implementation.

14. Project Documentation and Data

14.1 The legal documents were numerous and complicated (one loan agreement and three project agreements) with five subsequent loan amendments. The appraisal report was generally comprehensive but did not highlight specific monitoring indicators for all components to be tracked during project implementation nor was there any supporting data for the economic evaluation, making re-evaluation difficult. The data needed to prepare this report were difficult to collect due to the long time that elapsed during project preparation and the changes in staff assigned to supervise the project. The statistical data on the various components and project expenditures were difficult to reconcile and often not available.

15. Status of Covenants

15.1 Except for the covenants relating to Audits, and improving the revenues of CTA which were subject to delays and partial implementation, other covenants were complied with or at closing of the loan were under implementation.

16. Lessons Learned

16.1 In retrospect, it seems that the project was overly complex, involving a large number of integrated components. The reclassification of Egypt's borrowing status (cessation of IDA lending to Egypt) created a difficult political environment for the project culminating in a sharp drop in support for the project, which proved to be costly because the project never recovered its earlier momentum. Under the circumstances, the Bank should have taken the initiative to restructure the project, at an earlier stage, in line with the changing priorities of the

**Government.** The Bank should allow for possible policy changes in Governments and should simplify institutional objectives of projects to ensure continuous support for them.

In retrospect, the Bank should attempt to:

- avoid complex projects with too many integrated components when the implementing agencies have limited absorption capacity and insufficient exposure to the intricacies of complex international contracting procedures;
- respond appropriately to the changing circumstances and needs of the borrowers in order to maintain support for the project; and
- ensure that conditions exist for the financial viability of public entities that apply to the Bank for support and that related covenants are strictly adhered to.

**PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT**

**ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT**

**GREATER CAIRO URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT**  
**(LOAN 2176-EGT)**

**PART II : PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE**  
**(Text as submitted by Borrower without editing)**

**PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE**  
**By CAIRO TRANSPORT AUTHORITY (CTA)**

**(LOAN NO. 2176-EGT)**

**PREFACE**

Within the plan of transport Development of Egypt, the Governorate of Cairo and the Cairo Transport Authority (C.T.A.) of the Arab Republic Of Egypt have decided to erect a new Bus overhaul Facility located in Gisir El Suez - Cairo.

This new bus workshop insures the complete overhauling of the present and future fleet of the buses of Cairo.

For this Purpose the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt has received a loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and development the World Bank (loan 2176 EGT) to finance the following projects:

1. Gisir El Suez Workshop Facility
2. Al Mounib Training Center

The disbursements of Al Mounib Training center Reached 1.3 million in U.S.D where as the remaining Amount of the loan allocated for Gisir El Suez Bus overhaul facility (GESBOF) as it is considered the main project of the loan.

Accordingly, the Project Completion Report (PCR) deals with:

- Gisir El Suez Bus overhaul Facility
- Al Mounib Training Center

FIRST: GISR EL SUEZ BUS OVERHAUL FACILITY (GESBOF)

1. GENERAL ISSUES OF IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE

1.1 Insufficiency Of Data Before The Implementation Of The Project

The data and information concerning the future expansion of the project were not sufficient.

Cairo Transport Authority tried to prepare frequent studies with many parts such as the studies between the Egyptian and Canadian sides.

C.T.A. seized the opportunity when the World Bank approved a loan for the Greater Cairo Urban Development including Cairo Transport Authority to carry out this ambitious project.

C.T.A. has taken the positive procedures for preparing the studies to get the approvals of the concerned authorities. Unfortunately, the project size was Based on data which was not realistic and led to a design of 5 production lines. After the commencement of the project and the actual operation, C.T.A. realized that the volume of the project is larger than its actual needs and there is now additional Capacity which is not yet used.

1.2 Modification of TOR For Tthe Project Led To Delay In Execution

The Bank approved the TOR for consultant's services and agreed to the contract with Transurb Consultant prior to its conclusion.

Accordingly on 13/7/84 the consultants sent the TOR and the documents related to a world adjudication concerning the project for all civil and procurement works on turnkey basis.

A copy of these documents was sent to the World Bank to obtain its prior approval.

Nevertheless, the Bank sent a telex on 3/7/84 to the consultant - with a copy to the Borrower - requesting modification of the adjudication TOR on the basis of separation between the civil works and the procurement works. The latter works should be divided into 11 categories, each one of them to be announced into a separate tender.

On 14/8/84 a joint meeting was held between the representative of the World Bank, the borrower and the consultant. The mission of the Bank explained their point of view in modifying the condition of the consultant contract. They confirmed the necessity of the a/m modification of procedures. Otherwise, the Bank would not finance the procurement works

100% according to the loan agreement and would consider the whole project as civil work financed by the Bank 37% only.

Therefore the consultant modified the TOR and separated the civil works from the procurement works. Preparation of the terms of conditions of 11 tenders for procurement works lasted the period from September 84 up to Feb 85. Preparation of the terms and conditions for civil works was continued up to July 1985.

Such TOR were sent to the Bank and were revised and approved by them in Sept 85. Such modification procedures led to their postponement from 13/7/84 up to Sept 85 for a period more than one year.

### 1.3 Insufficiency Of Amounts Allocation For Execution Of GESBOF

After agreement with the Bank on modification of the procedures concerning the project works to be announced in separate tenders for civil works and procurement works, there was a problem due to the insufficiency of the allocated amounts to cover the complete tenders.

Therefore, the borrower - in collaboration with the consultant analyzed the works of the project in order to coordinate them with available allocated amounts. Such study resulted the following modifications:

#### Civil works

Postponement of executing the works of administrative building, fire extinguishing building and the shed for overhauled buses.

The execution of these works could be received after availability of necessary allocation.

#### Procurement works

Postponement of the tender concerning the hand tools. Their supply would be contracted in due time before the workshop operation.

During the visit of the World Bank mission to Cairo during 6 to 14 of Nov., 88, they warned C.T.A. from incompleteness of the project in case of the non-execution of the postponed works and the insufficiency of the amount allocated for civil works, thus hindering the Bank from covering the foreign currency portion for the executed works in accordance with the price adjustment formula.

The mission also recommended the necessity of signing a management contract with a group of experts satisfactory to the Bank for commissioning the works during the first

period, and the necessity of obtaining budgetary funds for adequate spare parts for the first two years of commissioning the works.

Under such circumstances the Bank mission informed that there was an unallocated amount in the loan amounting to 9 million u.s.d. They asked the borrower to take the necessary steps in front of the Ministry of Planning and Ministry of International Cooperation for the appropriate guarantees requested by the Bank, especially the approval of the Ministry of Planning for reallocation of the a/m amounts in favor of the borrower including its counter value in C.T.A. five Year Plan and confirming the availability of its counter - value in local currency.

Obtaining the necessary approvals for allocated the a/m lasted more than a year.

Such amount was approved on 10/1/90 resulting delay in paying due amounts to some contractors.

The reallocated amount was destined to complementary the postponed civil and procurement works and for contracting with London Transport International (LTI) for management during the first commissioning period.

In regard to the non availability of further amounts to procure necessary spare parts for commissioning, the Bank mission which came to Cairo in Nov., 90, informed that there was another unallocated amount of 5 million u.s.d. that can be specialized for the spare parts. According to such advice, the borrower took the necessary steps in front of the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of International Cooperation, they approved the above mentioned amount in favor of the Authority on 17/1/90<sup>1</sup>.

The borrower contacted the Bank for its reallocation, but the Bank asked for signing a complementary contract with LTI to study and organize the administrative and financial body of GESBOF.

As a result of the objection of some popular councils, the borrower was forced to delay the procedures for signing the a/m complementary contract.

On 14/1/92 the Bank approved the reallocation of 5 million USD in favor of the Borrower after the expiry of more than one year after the date of their advice of its availability.

A contract was signed to supply the spare parts necessary for commissioning the workshop from Iveco - the manufacturer of buses operated in C.T.A.

The delay in reallocating 5 million u.s.d.in favor of the authority led to termination of the withdrawal period from the loan before completion of supplying the spare parts subject to the credit in favor of Iveco.

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<sup>1/</sup> January 1991.

## 2. The Performance Evaluation

### 2.1 The Bank Performance

Following up from the World Bank was effective through its missions and written reports which led to solving the problems and complaints of C.T.A. during the phases of implementation of the project especially when the Bank mission - during their visit to Cairo from 6 to 14/11/1988 - informed C.T.A. that there was an unallocated amount in the loan totalling 9 million U.S.D. which could be used to carry out the postponed works.

The Bank played a major role when its mission informed C.T.A. that there was another unallocated amount totalling 5 million U.S.D. and could be used to purchase spare parts needed for the project.

C.T.A. can't ignore the positive efforts of the Bank through the various phases of the project to solve the complaints of the consultant and the problems of the contractors.

### 2.2 The Borrower Performance

When C.T.A. decided to carry out the terms and stipulations of the loan agreement it formed a high committee to supervise the implementation of works. This committee followed up the various stages of the project starting with signing a contract with Belgium Consultant Office (TRANSURB) which made the sufficient studies in the primary reports, drawings and the technical specifications of the procurement beside preparing all tender documents and took part in tender evaluation.

It is realized that changing the project's implementation from a turnkey project to multi-contracts which requested modification of the adjudication terms of reference on bases of separation between the civil works and the latter were divided into categories, that led to delay in the project's implementation.

The project also faced a delay to obtain the approval of the concerned authority to reallocate 9 million u.s.d., these factors led to prolonging the elapsing time to implement the project.

C.T.A. was forced to form the high committee again to supervise and follow up the project's achievements.

The separation between the civil works and procurement works led into 10 categories each one of them to be announced into a separate tender which needed to several committees to study, examination and evaluation of these adjudications. This procedure resulted in overestimation of some equipments or duplicating quantities of some equipment by putting them into more than one parcel.

### 3. Lessons Learned

3.1 The members of Cairo Transport Authority had no experience in the field of such projects, whereas the Bank mission members were highly qualified in this respective fields.

This factor resulted in the approval of C.T.A. to the most suggestions of the mission members of the Bank some of these suggestions led to un satisfactory results especially the suggestion of changing the projects implementation from a tun key basis to multi contracts. This procedure from the Bank's side led to postponement of the project for more than one year, besides the additional expenses which C.T.A. bears for the consultant's fees and other disbursements.

The modification of the adjudication TOR on the basis of the separation between civil works and procurement. works was not satisfactory because of some contractors have been awarded more than one parcel, these contractors procured the equipment from more than one place (or factory), this means that such a separation did not lead to the aimed objective, but on the contrary C.T.A. suffered additional expenses beside delaying in the project's implementation.

3.2 The World Bank put expiry dates for the disbursements which were not suitable for the contracted periods between C.T.A. and the contractors which led to the refusal of some contractors to carry out their obligations unless the loan covered the period of achieving the contract.

The communication's difficulties between C.T.A. and the World Bank forced the authority so often to wait till it receives the responses of the Bank concerning the questions of C.T.A., this led also to a delay of more than two years from the originally planned effective date of the loan.

3.3 Unfortunately, the loan's currency was the American Dollar where as 90% of the tenders were in other currencies namely the Dutch Mark and the Belgium Franc.

The postponement of works and the devaluation of the dollar led to reduce the purchasing capabilities of the loan of more than 40% of its value which forced C.T.A. to increase the loan's amounts to carry out the requirements the project.

The several negotiations between C.T.A. and the World Bank which lasted a long period to assign a consultant to manage the project.

C.T.A. stopped the procedures of studying the bids of this adjudication in order to find a local experience or companies with the same activity to give a hand to C.T.A. In this respect. the a/m reasons led to the delay of Bank's approval to reallocate 9 million USD and consequently to a delay in the starting up of the project i.e. from september 89 to second quarter of 1991.

#### 4. Consulting Services

4.1 The Consultant made sufficient studies and reports, He also prepared all Tender documents and took part in tender evaluation and also during the implementation CTA also contracted with the consultant to work as the coordinator of the project.

4.2 The consultant did not take an active role in the commissioning of the project.

4.3 Operating the project revealed weak points in the design of the project, which can be summarized as the following:-

- Overestimation of some equipments (Jib cranes, lifters for buses), duplicating quantity of some equipments by putting them in two parcels (fiber glass m/Cs has been put in parcel 1 implemented by CFE and also in parcel 11 implemented by Italwork).
- Specification of some equipments was not suitable for their purposes (Items P025, PO55, P512) which made them not operable according to their function.
- No study was made to find the best use of the scrap materials detached from the buses.
- Areas and equipment in some stations of the assembly line and manufacturing workshops were not adequate that was clear in the following areas.
  - a) Station no. 10 - repair of bus body - in the assembly line.
  - b) Workshop for manufacturing of the body parts and of the sheet metal workshop.
  - c) The fiberglass workshop.
  - d) Machinery workshop.
- Scrap stores area not suitable to the daily delivery of the scrap.
- No place was put in the design to be used as a garage or park area for the staff cars, buses and the lorries.
- No available area for future expansion or when the need is found to establish new section or workshops.

4.4 Fire fighting system was designed of 2" network which was not accepted by Fire fighting department in Cairo, also putting workshops and Compressor & power stations in the basement was not easily accepted by industrial safety and fire fighting department.

4.5 No internal broadcast system which can also be used as warning and calling system in emergency cases.

4.6 No computerized managerial system was put to the workshop.

## 5. The Recent Situation

5.1 CTA has contracted with London Transport international (LTI) Company to help in the management and starting of the project. A team from LTI has worked in managing the project with Egyptian managers from 5/8/90 until 31/12/1992.

5.2 Recruitment of workers started since January 1990 and continued gradually with some experienced workers from the old workshops in CTA, and many new workers. The work force now in GESBOF is

Direct workers	(783)
Technical Support workers	(430)
Administration Financial staff	(119)

Technical support activities includes; production engineers, workers in; production planning and production control, quality control, maintenance, stores, drivers and general services.

5.3 Production in the workshop had started in July 1991 with only one line for the rebuilding of buses and it was at that month.

Bus	(15)
Engine	(45)
Transmission	(10)
Other bus component	(119)

The production now (March 1993) is

Bus	(45)
Engine	(64)
Transmission	(51)
Other bus component	(1467)

5.4 Lack of materials and spare parts resembles the main problem for the workshop. This problem affects the production in quantity and quality.

5.5 The designed production capacity per day for the workshop is

Buses	(5)
Engines	(8)
Transmission	(8)
Other component	(96)

For several reasons the workshop utilizes now only 40% of this capacity, to make the full use of the Capacity of the workshop it is necessary to:

- Study the real capacity of the workshop after the experience gained in the last Two years.
- Study the various options to use the unused capacity of the workshop.

5.6 Since Starting the production in the workshop until March 31st the total production of the workshop reached.

Bus	(783)
Engine	(1421)
Transmission	(867)

5.7 Average Cost of bus rebuilt is 120.000 L.E. and reaches 180.000 L.E. if the workshop uses new Engine, Transmission & Steering in the assembly, this cost includes Material, Spare Parts, Labor Cost and all overheads. The life time of the rebuilt bus is expected to be 3 years, that to be compared with price 500.000 L.E. of new bus and life time 6 Year.

## SECOND: THE MOUNIB TRAINING CENTER

As a result of the Open Economic Policy, Public Sector and the Government Organizations suffered severely especially Cairo Transport Authority (C.T.A.) which complained from the critical shortages in the skilled manpower.

This policy led to the immigration of C.T.A.'s workers because of the low salaries to the investment projects which were created in the shadow of this policy.

This problem affected C.T.A. activity which is considered as the backbone of the all projects in Cairo i.e. it affected especially in passengers transfer of Cairo Transport Authority.

This severe shortages of skilled and technical manpower of C.T.A. especially in bus drivers obliged the government to recruit 500 drivers from the armed forces to fill the gap of C.T.A's shortage in drivers staff.

This number increased to 700 drivers in 1980 and reached 1200 in 1983.

We have to mention in this respect that those drivers didn't have the sufficient experinece to drive C.T.A. fleet buses which resulted in poor operation. C.T.A. suffered from the shortages of maintenance workers too.

These obstacles put C.T.A. at the crossroads helpless. This critical situation forced the Authority to the self solution to find out an answer to solve the shortages of its skilled manpower by allocating a part of Loan No. 2176 EGT to develop C.T.A. Training Center in Mounib.

## 1. Generalities

- 1.1 The project didn't face any problems during its execution because it was carried out according to the assigned Time Schedule.
- 1.2 The project didn't face any financial problems at the various phases as it was achieved at the beginning of the Loan. The low costs of the project led to money availability to carry out it.
- 1.3 This facility depended basically on Consultant Services to develop the training methods which represented the cornerstone of the project. The consultant activities had been executed according to the assigned Time Schedule.
- 1,4 The World Bank played a significant part in the contracting procedures for consultant services to develop the training methods of the center.

## 2. The Consultant Services:

C.T.A. signed a contract with the consultant societe Francaise d'Etudes et de Realisations de Transports Urobans (SOFRETO) to carry out the contract according to the following phases:

### Phase I: Preparatory work:

Review and analyze the existing structure and services available at the Mounib Center, as well as all the relevant plans and studies.

Phase II: Preliminary Curriculum Development and Preliminary Engineering:

- Develop preliminary curriculum and provide a team of experts to undertake the task analyses for all occupational trades that would undergo training in Mounib Center.
- Develop requirements for relevant training equipments and teaching aids, including preliminary specifications and cost estimates.

Phase III: Detailed Course Development and Engineering

Provide supervision and assist the C.T.A. training staff in developing a detailed training curriculum including program structure, course objectives and content and teaching methods.

Prepare bidding documents suitable for international competitive bidding.

Phase IV: Supervision

Advise the C.T.A. on bids, bidders and prices for supplying and installing equipments for the Monuib Training Center.

Advise on the preparation of the contracts, supervising, inspecting, testing and commencing of the equipments provided.

Assist the C.T.A. in developing records and manuals necessary for operation and maintenance of the equipments.

Supervise and inspect the minor construction works in the center in order to ensure their compliance with the design.

Phase V: Training

Design and submit to the C.T.A. a draft of a detailed training program for C.T.A. managers and staff working in the training field.

3. The Recent Situation of the Center:

3.1 The Mounib Training Center has significant and positive role to raise the training methods beside providing C.T.A. with the technical staff and the fleet manpower required.

3.2 We enclose herewith numbers of trainees during the period of 84/85 up to 92/93.

Numbers of Technical Trainees from 85/86 up to 91/92

The Year	Practical Training	C.T.A. Trainees	Other Authorities Trainees
85/86	189	155	199
86/87	234	98	197
87/88	224	236	323
88/89	268	310	303
89/90	270	210	362
90/91	299	381	696
91/92	322	425	423

The Practical and Raising the Performance from 84/85 to 92/93

THE PROGRAM		84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92
		85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93
-PRACTICAL TEACHING										
-Unlicensed bus drivers		907	1542	1598	1095	582	853	1277	208	627
-Unlicensed lorry drivers		389	144					198	209	236
-Fare Collectors		430	500	843	213	486	16	646	259	552
-From bus driver to road controller					37		70	160	110	04
-Road Observer						29		70		
-Fare Collector to Controller					106		121	177	121	155
-Supervisors							183			
-Road Controller					21	21	39			
Raising the Performance										
-Bus driver Conduct						699	886	513	492	354
-Fare Collector Conduct						731	616	370	516	46
-Drivers make Faults in Roads						63	110	150	266	216
-Road Observer								25	35	40
-Controller and bus gterminal clerk							84	69	68	89
-Work distributor							8	12	18	18
-Operation Chief							10	8	10	17
-Tickets and Subscribing Clerk							11	8		22
-Operation and Supervising Chief							10	13	10	

**GOVERNORATE OF CAIRO<sup>1</sup>**  
**OFFICE OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY**

**SUMMARY REPORT PERTAINING TO GREATER CAIRO**  
**URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT LN. 2176-EGT**

The total amount of the loan disbursed for the Cairo Governorate projects is US\$12,019,876.54.

This loan financed the following projects:

- (A) Ataba and Opera Garages
- (B) Upgrading of the Salah Salam, the Cornich El-Nile, and the Shubra roads
- (C) Bus route Paving
- (D) Study of the Central Business District in downtown Cairo
- (E) Upgrading of the Rod El Farag and the Abdeen regions
- (F) The Sekeit El Wailli Street
- (G) Study pertaining to the provision of services or the construction of houses
- (H) Training of Traffic Police at the Interior Ministry
- (I) (Missing)
- (J) Import of equipment and machinery

PROJECT REVIEW

(A) Ataba and Opera Garages:

1) Project Objective:

The Ataba region is among the busiest areas in Cairo because of the high level of business and trade concentration; thus, the issue of limited space forced area businesses to expand vertically adding to the density of the area. The problem is compounded by the fact that this area is adjacent to downtown Cairo. In addition, the issue is complicated by the public transportation system (Buses and taxis) which has added to the traffic back up, especially across the streets surrounding the Ataba area, creating traffic delays and increasing pollution. Thus the objective of the Ataba and Opera Garages became a necessity for the following reasons:

- a) To secure traffic flow so as to shorten travel time
- b) To alleviate the level of air pollution

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1/ Cairo Governorate's Report for Part II of the PCR was submitted to the Bank in Arabic, and was subsequently translated into English by the Bank.

2) **Completed Project Components and Expenditure:**

Cost: Foreign Currency Equivalent	LE 4,000,000
Local Currency	LE 7,973,200
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>LE 11,973,200</b>

- a) The Opera Garage is comprised of many floors with an area of 11,700 square meters and has 1,130 parking spaces. The garage also contains administrative offices.
- b) The Ataba Garage is comprised of many floors with an area of 5,500 square meters and has 500 parking spaces.
- c) In addition, the ground floor of the above mentioned two garages is used by businesses and also serves as a Bus Terminal. This project is completed.

3) **Reasons for the Non-Implementation of some Components of the Project:**

None. The project is fully implemented.

4) **Project Shortcomings as per the Governorate Assessment:**

None.

5) **Achieved objective:**

- a) Concerning traffic delays, these two garages met 40% of the current demand. As for public transportation station, the Ataba Garage met 50%.
- b) The project had some economic impact considering the benefits derived from leasing the business stores and offices. Furthermore, it facilitated the traffic flow and eased congestion in the main downtown avenues. This has encouraged other agencies to build other multi-storey garages on the Gamhuria and Bustaan streets.

6) **Lessons Learned:**

- a) This is a pilot project that helped resolve the issue of traffic congestion. It has encouraged authorities to build other garages in areas like Maaruf and Ashash Aturgamaan in addition to what has been accomplished in the Gamhuria and Bustaan streets.

7) **Projects Benefits:**

- a) Total returns from the Ataba and Opera Garages from June 1, 1986 to May 31, 1995 amounted to LE 7,870,108.
- b) Total profits from leasing the stores and offices in both garages as of December 12, 1992 amounted to as follows:

Ataba Garage	LE 1,010,511
Opera Garage	LE 4,878,799
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>LE 13,759,418</b>

- c) In addition, there are 2 offices and 2 floors at the Ataba Garage; and, 7 offices and 2 floors at the Opera Garage that are still not leased.

(B) **Salah Salem, Cornich El-Nile, and Shubra Roads Development Upgrading Project**

1) **Objectives:**

To find solutions to improve traffic flows of these congested routes.

2) **Application of Funds and Completed Projects Components:**

- a) Application of funds for study           US\$ 431,363
- b) The Salah Salem suggested road upgrading is completed. As for the Cornich El-Nile, there was a need for additional studies because of new factors. In the case of Shubra Roads, the issue was the tramway; and efforts are underway to replace the various public transport routes to facilitate the implementation of the first metro line linking Shubra El Khima to Giza.

3) **Causes for the Non-Implementation of some Project Components:**

There is a need for more studies as explained above (See 2) b)).

4) **Project Shortcomings as per the Governorate Assessment:**

None.

5) **Projects Results:**

The Salah Salem Street has become a pilot project and has helped in the course of the studies pertaining to the Shubra Street.

6) Lessons Learned:

These studies can be utilized for other areas.

(C) Bus Route Paving:

1) Objectives:

To secure the traffic flows by removing obstacles such as potholes and road bumps which constituted the cause for bus delays. Moreover, there is an excessive amount of money spent to buy buses' necessary spare parts.

2) Completed Project Components and Expenditure:

Cost for completed studies            US\$ 6,000

3) Reasons for the Non-Implementation of some Components of the Project:

None.

4) Project Shortcomings as per the Governorate Assessment:

None.

5) Achieved Objectives:

Efficient traffic flows achieved in the different areas.

6) Lessons Learned:

These kind of activities should be replicated.

(D) Central Business District Study:

1) Objective:

To undertake an upgrading of the areas formed by the Ramses, Ataba, and Tahrir triangle so as to facilitate the traffic flow, to find an appropriate alternative for pedestrian crossing, and to select some streets for pedestrians only.

2) Completed Projects Components and Expenditure:

- a) Cost for the full study           US\$ 568,620
- b) The Ramses street component of the pavement project has been fully implemented. The remaining components of the study of street upgrading is postponed until further decisions are made by the Governorate.

3) Reasons for the Non-Implementation of Some Components of the Project:

As stated above at the end of section 2) b).

4) Project Shortcomings as per the Governorate Assessment:

None.

5) Achieved objectives:

Efficient Traffic flows in the Ramses area.

6) Lessons Learned:

To conduct further studies in other similar areas of the Cairo Governorate.

(E) Upgrading of the Rod El Farag and Abdeen Areas:

1) Objective:

To improve the life of the districts communities.

2) Completed Project Component and Expenditure:

- a) Cost for Overall Studies       LE 235,000
- b) The project did not reach the implementation stage.

3) Reasons for the Non-Implementation of some Project Components:

The lack of entering the implementation stage was dictated by the fact that the Metro line (underground) crossing these districts(i.e., Shubra, El Khima, and Giza) was under construction. This helped avoid the problem of projects coordination.

4) Project Shortcomings as per the Governorate Assessment:

None.

5) Achieved Objectives:

Not achieved.

6) Lessons learned:

None.

(F) Sekeit El Wailli:

1) Objective of the Study:

To find a principal corridor that connects mortorway and Shubra through Ismael Alfangari, Abdelmagid Salim, Sekeit El Wailli streets to Shubra Rod El Farag which has been built already so that the heavy traffic takes place outside the heavily populated overpass area of Cairo.

2) Completed Projects Components and Expenditure:

a) Cost of the study: US\$ 116,610

b) The following are the achieved components of the project:

i) Roads and flyovers financed by the state budget, at the exception of the Al Farz Overpass currently under design so as to fully achieve the project.

3) Reasons for the Non-Implementation of some Project Components:

None.

4) Project Shortcomings as per the Governorate Assessment:

None.

5) Achieved objectives:

The roads and bridges (and overpasses) have facilitated the traffic flow in this corridor and decreased users travel time.

6) Lessons learned:

This corridor connects the eastern and the western parts of Cairo. The study is useful if it can be replicated to find other corridors to connect other districts.

(G) Training of Traffic Police at the Ministry of Interior:

The training was undertaken by the ministry of interior.

(H) Provision of Urban Services:

1) Project Objectives:

- a) Finding government land appropriate for urban development, preparation of cadastre, and design of detailed projects.
- b) Establishing and developing an administrative organizational structure for the support of these projects, and initiating development schemes for these regions.
- c) Making all efforts to identify desert land belonging to the government in the vicinity of inhabited areas.
- d) Attracting the informal housing sector to develop the project and to manage it.
- e) Empowering the Governorate to retain the proceeds generated by government land sale.
- f) Encouraging self-reliance so that the project generates its own financing.
- g) Establishing a land management authority composed of experts and technicians.
- h) Training and improving the institutional framework for these projects by creating a land data bank to identify usable land so as to utilize it for housing and construction projects.
- i) Setting up detailed plans for these projects. That is the case for the two housing projects of Qatamia and Ayn Hilwan.

2) Completed Project and Expenditure:

- a) Cost: US\$ 324,840
- b) This cost covers the preparation of detailed plans for the two above mentioned projects of Qatamia and Ayn Hilwan.
- c) The governor of Cairo enacted a 1990 Law No. 579 pertaining to the use of the hills south of Cairo (south of Naser city). This law applies to an area of 1600 feddan. The second phase of the project comprises housing plans for the Qatamia region. The distribution of detailed plans for the Ayn Hilwan area has been achieved and work is underway.

3) Reasons for the Non-Implementation of some Project Components:

None.

4) Project Shortcomings as per the Governorate Assessment:

None.

5) Achieved Objectives:

- a) Preparation of the final studies for the first component of the project.
- b) Setting up the general land development authority at the Governorate level.
- c) Awareness to provide self-financed projects.

6) Lessons Learned:

This would have been a perfect pilot project if it had been financed. It would have helped the Governorate receive proceeds from land transactions within its jurisdiction.

(I) (Missing) (sic)

(J) Equipment and Machinery Imports:

1) Objectives:

This will enable the districts to undertake necessary road upgrading as well as other streets cleaning projects. It will also improve the traffic flow due to the provision of motorcycles and radio/telephone equipment.

2) Completed Project Components and Expenditure:

a)	Cost of Imported Equipment	US\$ 3,560,329
	Custom duties	LE 1,281,899

b) Imported items:

2	Tow trucks
10	Handcarts
12	Steamrollers
1	Asphalt remover unit
1	Mobile bitumen sprayer
261	Base communication equipment
250	Motorcycles
2	Graders
	Cleaning hand tools
	Street lighting equipment

3) Reasons for the Non-Implementation of some Project Components:

None.

4) Project Shortcomings as per the Governorate Assessment:

None.

5) Lessons Learned:

It is possible to use this pilot project in other districts of the city in the areas of traffic flow and street cleaning.

**GOVERNORATE OF GIZA  
OFFICE OF THE MAYOR OF GIZA CITY**

**Greater Cairo Urban Development Project  
Project Completion Report**

(A) Objectives of the Project:

A Project Agreement between the World Bank and Giza Governorate was signed on October 26, 1982. The Project includes the following items :

- 1- Upgrading of old Giza and East Mounira
- 2- Bus Routes
- 3- Equipment
  - 3-a Street clearing equipment
  - 3-b Street lighting equipment
  - 3-c Street paving equipment
- 4- L. A. Project (Land Assembly)

The objectives of the Project were most and foremost to help Giza Governorate in upgrading the old, worn out and heavily populated areas, and providing them with basic needs and services to improve their standard of living. In fact, no budget is available on the priority list of the Central Government to meet such requirements.

(B) Parts of the projects that were completed:

All the items mentioned in Section (A) were completed except the L. A. Project.

The basic studies for the L. A. Project already started, but due to some difficulties related to the allocation of the required land for the Project, the studies were stopped.

(C) Deficiencies of the Project as conceived:

As clarified before, almost all components of the Project were completed except the L. A. Project. In our view, the L. A. Project is a very important and urgently needed one, judging by the current situation in Giza Governorate, where the densely populated areas are deprived of

the basic utilities and facilities which are badly needed by the citizens of those areas to improve their living conditions.

(D) Relations with the World Bank staff:

It was a relation of very close and remarkable cooperation. Giza Governorate received very strong support from the World Bank staff. All mission members were extremely cooperative and helpful, and always kindly gave us valuable, constructive recommendations.

(E) Objectives attained:

I- Old Giza and East Mounira were upgraded. Actually, any comparison drawn between the existing situation and the previous one gives us a very clear indication of the vital importance of such projects and their positive impact on the lives of the inhabitants of those areas.

II- The bus routes project helped in a very direct way to save trip-time in heavily populated areas, and eventually facilitated life conditions with regard to this important factor, definitely making them better. This, no doubt, reflects positively and effectively on the social life of the people in those areas.

III- Equipment:

The purchased equipment is still working, and helped in a very efficient way in cleaning, paving and street lighting of heavily populated areas.

(F) Lessons learned:

1- The upgrading Projects, specially in non-formal areas, are very essential, and have positive reflections on the social life and basic human needs of the citizens living in those areas.

Since such projects are directly related to the fundamental improvement urgently and continuously required for those areas, they should be expanded, and self financing should be also considered, in order to increase the number of projects to be studied, and to help these projects to revolve and be repeated on their own.

2- The presence of the World Bank, with all its capacities and potentialities, certainly gives a positive reflection and ensures good and efficient control of the Project, through its various technical, administrative or financial channels. In fact, the World Bank's direct supervision over the Project had a tremendously positive effect which helped a great deal in bringing about the Project in this successful and admirable way.

**PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT**  
**ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT**  
**GREATER CAIRO URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT**  
**(LOAN 2176-EGT)**

PART III

**STATISTICAL INFORMATION**

1. **Related IBRD Loans/IDA Credits**

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<b>Credit Title</b>	<b>Purpose</b>	<b>Year of Approval</b>	<b>Status</b>	<b>Comments</b>
<b>Cr. 831-EGT First Urban Development Project</b>	<b>●Provide shelter, employment and urban services for the lowest income groups at affordable costs thus eliminating the need for direct public subsidies and permitting the project to be replicated on a larger scale. ●Provide technical assistance in project implementation and institution building in the urban sector.</b>	<b>06/1978</b>	<b>Closed 12/1984</b>	<b>Project as implemented differed greatly from the project as appraised. The project largely achieved objectives related to demonstrating low-cost alternative approaches to resolving shelter and urban services problems. The project, however, was not very successful in meeting the long-term institutional development goals.</b>

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**Source: ECA/MENA Information Center  
Egypt: First Urban Development Project - Project Completion Report, June 1985.**

2. Project Timetable

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<b>Item</b>	<b>Planned Date</b>	<b>Revised Date</b>	<b>Actual Date</b>
<b>Identification</b>	10/78		10/78
<b>Preparation</b>	06/79		06/79
<b>Pre-appraisal</b>	09/79	10/79	10/79
<b>Appraisal</b>	11/79	05/80	05/80
<b>Credit Negotiations</b>	04/80	11/80	04/82
<b>Board Presentation/Approval</b>	06/80	01/81	06/82
<b>Credit Signature</b>			10/82
<b>Credit Effectiveness</b>			02/83
<b>Credit Closing</b>	12/87	12/88 12/89 12/90 12/92	12/92

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Source: Project Files

3. Loan Disbursements

Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements  
(US\$ millions)

Semester Ending	Appraisal Estimate			Actual		
	Disbursed	Cumulative	Percentage	Disbursed	Cumulative	Percentage
12/82	2.00	2.00	3.4	0.00	0.00	0.0
06/83	4.30	6.30	10.7	0.22	0.22	0.4
12/83	8.01	14.31	24.3	0.76	0.98	1.8
06/84	6.53	20.84	35.3	0.61	1.59	2.9
12/84	7.20	28.04	47.5	3.24	4.83	8.9
06/85	6.59	34.63	58.7	3.29	8.12	15.0
12/85	6.68	41.31	70.0	3.82	11.94	22.1
06/86	6.90	48.21	81.7	2.62	14.56	27.0
12/86	5.79	54.00	91.5	1.87	16.43	30.4
06/87	3.50	57.50	97.5	1.28	17.71	32.8
12/87	1.50	59.00	100.0	3.69	21.40	39.6
06/88				3.95	25.35	46.9
12/88				1.79	27.14	50.3
06/89				6.26	33.40	61.9
12/89				4.64	38.04	70.4
06/90				3.14	41.18	76.3
12/90				2.07	43.25	80.1
06/91				3.75	47.00	87.0
12/91				0.51	47.51	88.0
06/92				3.28	50.79	94.1
12/92				2.03	52.82	99.9
06/93				0.05	52.87 <sup>(1)</sup>	100.0

Source: Project Files and MIS data as of 02/09/93

Comments:

(1) US\$ 6.13 million were cancelled from the Loan.

**PART III**  
**Project Completion Report**  
**Greater Cairo Urban Development Project (Loan 2176-EGT)**

4. Status of Covenants

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Covenant	Subject	Deadline for Compliance	Status
<u>Loan Agreement - Arab Republic of Egypt</u>			
LA 2.04	Closing Date shall be December 31, 1987.		Extended to December 31, 1992.
LA 2.04	Government will relend US\$37.0 million to CTA over 20 years at %11.6.		Met
<u>Project Agreement - Cairo Governorate</u>			
PA 2.03	Cairo Govern. will establish sufficient parking charges to recover operating and capital costs of Ataba and Opera garages.		Met
PA 2.04	Cairo Govern. will adequately staff and equip the traffic and parking control unit in CBD.		Not met, but component was cancelled.
PA 2.04	Cairo Govern. will appoint 2 engineers, 4 technicians all with adequate qualifications by 03/83.	11/83	Met, but unit has since been dissolved.
PA 2.05	Cairo Govern. will employ 2 engineering advisors by 11/82.	03/83	Met, but advisors were released and remaining project components were cancelled.
PA 2.06	Cairo Govern. will establish and maintain a traffic investigation unit by 12/84.		Not met, but component was cancelled.
PA 2.11(d)	Cairo Govern. will prepare a project completion report.	06/93	Met.
<u>Project Agreement - Giza Governorate</u>			
PA 2.03	Giza Govern. will establish a traffic planning unit and appoint it 2 engineers and 3 technicians by 03/83.		Not met, but component cancelled.
PA 2.03	Giza Govern. will employ an engineering advisor by 03/83.	11/83	Met, but unit is now dissolved.
PA 2.04	Giza Govern. will establish and maintain a traffic investigation unit by 12/84.		Not met, but traffic component in Giza was cancelled.
PA 2.08(d)	Giza Govern. will prepare a project completion report by 06/93.		Met.

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**PART III**  
**Project Completion Report**  
**Greater Cairo Urban Development Project (Loan 2176-EGT)**

4. Status of Covenants (continued)

Covenant	Subject	Deadline for Compliance	Status
<u>Project Agreement - Cairo Transport Authority (CTA)</u>			
PA 2.05(d)	CTA will prepare a project completion report by 06/93.		Not met.
PA 3.01	CTA will continue to operate and develop a system for monitoring through performance indicators by 06/88.		Not met, although the consultants selected for plant management have submitted proposals related to Gisir El-Suez Bus Overhaul Facility.
PA 4.03	CTA shall (a) take measures to increase revenues & decrease expenses (b) exchange views with the Bank.		Met partially.

Source: Project Files

**PART III**  
**Project Completion Report**  
**Greater Cairo Urban Development Project (Loan 2176-EGT)**

5. Project Components

List of project components in original Loan Agreement, October 1982	List of project components after project restructuring, October 1987
<p>I. <u>Traffic Engineering and Road Maintenance</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Improvement of several streets and junctions.</li> <li>2. Construction of overpass at junction of Ramses Street and Misr-Sudan Street.</li> <li>3. Carrying out of a feasibility study for widening Corniche El-Nile Street,</li> <li>4. Paving selected bus routes in Giza and Cairo.</li> <li>5. Construction of access roads and paving streets in Manshiet Naer and El Shuvabeyia.</li> <li>6. Improvement of the Ghamra Depot.</li> <li>7. Construction of 2 parking garages in CBD.</li> <li>8. Implementation of traffic engineering of management measures along selected routes in CBD.</li> </ol> <p>II. <u>Enforcement of Traffic Rules; Training</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Provision of vehicles, motorcycles, tow trucks and licensing and communication equipment.</li> <li>2. Improvement of an existing traffic police training center.</li> <li>3. Construction of Vehicle Inspection Center.</li> <li>4. Training of selected traffic police officers.</li> </ol> <p>III. <u>Institutional Development</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Cairo: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Preparation of a strategic action plan to Greater Cairo.</li> <li>(b) Review of urban services.</li> <li>(c) Survey of underground utilities in older areas of Cairo.</li> <li>(d) Preparation of solid waste management program for Cairo.</li> </ol> </li> <li>2. CTA: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Formulation of plans to improve CTA performance.</li> <li>(b) Training.</li> </ol> </li> </ol> <p>IV. <u>Area Upgrading</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Cairo: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Rod El-Farg.</li> <li>(b) Abdine.</li> </ol> </li> <li>2. Giza: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Old Giza.</li> <li>(b) Monira.</li> </ol> </li> </ol> <p>V. <u>Public Transport</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Construction of GESBOF.</li> <li>2. Rehabilitation of the Monib Training Center.</li> </ol> <p>VI. <u>Study</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. A study to identify a high capacity east-west road.</li> </ol>	<p>I. <u>Traffic Engineering and Road Maintenance</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Design and supervision of improvements to three streets, the CBD and various upgrading and Land Assembly areas.</li> <li>2. Construction of five parking garages and provision of maintenance equipment.</li> </ol> <p>II. <u>Enforcement of Traffic Rules; Training</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Provision of vehicles, motorcycles, tow trucks and licensing and communication equipment.</li> <li>2. Training of selected traffic police officers.</li> </ol> <p>III. <u>Institutional Development</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Cairo: <p>(All components included in a technical assistance package in a USAID financed project: Local Development II).</p> </li> <li>2. CTA: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Formulation of plans to improve CTA performance.</li> <li>(b) Training.</li> </ol> </li> </ol> <p>IV. <u>Area Upgrading</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Giza: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) Old Giza</li> <li>(b) Monira</li> </ol> </li> </ol> <p>V. <u>Public Transport</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Construction of GESBOF.</li> <li>2. Rehabilitation of the Monib Training Center.</li> </ol> <p>VI. <u>Study</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. A study to identify a high capacity east-west road.</li> </ol>

Source: Legal Agreement and amendments.

6. Appraisal and Actual Cost

CAIRO GOVERNORATE  
(all values in million currency units)

	Appraisal Estimates (May 1985)		Restructured Project (October 1987)		Actual (February 1993)	
	Total Cost (LE)	Total Cost (US\$)	Total Cost (LE)	Total Cost (US\$)	Total Cost (LE)	Total Cost (US\$)
<u>Active Components</u>						
Traffic Engineering & Road Maintenance:						
CBD Parking Garages	10.49	12.90	11.31	13.73	11.97	14.53
Maintenance Equipment	2.33	2.86	1.91	2.32	1.84	2.23
Traffic Enforcement:						
Equipment	2.23	2.74	1.02	1.24	2.00	2.43
Traffic Officer Training	1.88	2.31	0.85	1.03	0.84	1.02
Institutional Development:						
Advisory Services	0.49	0.60	0.54	0.65	0.46	0.55
Design & Supervision:						
Traffic Engineering	0.77	0.95	0.13	0.16	0.12	0.14
Land Assembly Project	0.00	0.00	0.95	1.15	0.27	0.32
Sekeit El Wailli Feasibility Study	0.49	0.60	0.22	0.27	0.10	0.12
Central Business District	0.23	0.28	1.05	1.28	0.64	0.78
Area Upgrading	0.29	0.36	0.13	0.16	0.24	0.29
Shoubra, Salah Salem and Corniche	0.19	0.23	0.62	0.75	0.36	0.43
Supervision	0.28	0.35	0.29	0.35	0.29	0.35
Total Active Components	19.66	24.18	19.03	23.09	19.12	23.20
<u>Inactive Components</u>						
Traffic Engineering & Road Maintenance:						
CBD Traffic Circulation Scheme	3.59	4.42	7.89	9.57	0.00	0.00
Others	22.20	27.31				
Area Upgrading:						
District of Rod Al Farag and Abdine	6.56	8.07	4.37	5.30	0.00	0.00
Traffic Enforcement:						
Others	0.72	0.89	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Institutional Development:						
Traffic Management Unit	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Others	4.92	6.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Design and Supervision:						
	0.57	0.70	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Total Inactive Components	38.57	47.44	12.25	14.87	0.00	0.00
GRAND TOTAL	58.23	71.62	31.28	37.96	19.12	23.20

Source: Project Files and CG

6. Appraisal and Actual Cost (continued)

GIZA GOVERNORATE  
(all values in million currency units)

	Appraisal Estimates (May 1985)		Restructured Project (October 1987)		Actual (February 1993)	
	Total Cost (LE)	Total Cost (US\$)	Total Cost (LE)	Total Cost (US\$)	Total Cost (LE)	Total Cost (US\$)
<b>Active Components</b>						
Transport Infrastructure:						
Bus Route Paving	2.79	3.43	0.09	0.11	0.90	1.25
Maintenance Equipment	1.49	1.83	0.68	0.84	1.23	1.71
Area Upgrading:						
East Mounira and Old Giza	4.94	6.08	9.20	11.32	9.42	13.09
Institutional Development:						
Advisory Services	0.46	0.56	0.24	0.30	0.11	0.16
Design and Supervision:	0.48	0.59	0.80	0.99	0.38	0.52
New Components:						
Consulting Services for Monira West and Omranayah West	0.00	0.00	0.57	0.70	0.27	0.37
Total Active Components	10.16	12.49	11.59	14.26	12.31	17.11
<b>Inactive Components</b>						
Transport Infrastructure:						
Giza/Gala/Dokki Squares	0.67	0.82	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Design and Supervision:	0.03	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Total Inactive Components	0.70	0.86	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	10.86	13.35	11.59	14.26	12.31	17.11

Source: Project Files and GG

6. Appraisal and Actual Cost (continued)

CAIRO TRANSPORT AUTHORITY

(all values in million currency units)

	Appraisal Estimates (May 1985)		Restructured Project (October 1987)		Actual (February 1993)	
	Total Cost (LE)	Total Cost (US\$)	Total Cost (LE)	Total Cost (US\$)	Total Cost (LE)	Total Cost (US\$)
<b>Active Components</b>						
<b>Gisar El-Suez Bus Overhaul Facility:</b>						
Building Yard	7.15	8.80	8.31	10.22	35.86	19.32
Equipment and Parts	14.23	17.50	10.51	12.93	46.45	25.30
Design and Supervision	0.93	1.14	1.07	1.31	5.70	2.38
Project Management	0.00	0.00	0.28	0.35	6.28	1.90
<b>Monib Training Center:</b>						
Equipment	0.58	0.71	0.32	0.39	0.71	0.44
Vocational development	1.27	1.56	.85	1.05	4.56	1.36
<b>Total Active Components</b>	<b>24.16</b>	<b>29.71</b>	<b>21.34</b>	<b>26.25</b>	<b>96.56</b>	<b>50.70</b>
<b>Inactive Components</b>						
<b>Institutional Development:</b>						
<b>Total Inactive Components</b>	<b>1.27</b>	<b>1.56</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>
<b>Total Inactive Components</b>	<b>1.27</b>	<b>1.56</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>25.43</b>	<b>31.27</b>	<b>21.34</b>	<b>26.25</b>	<b>96.56</b>	<b>50.70</b>

Source: Project Files and CTA

7. Appraisal and Actual Project Financing

CAIRO GOVERNORATE  
(all values in million currency units)

	BANK Expenditure		Government Expenditure		Total	
	Appraisal Estimate (US\$)	Actual (US\$)	Appraisal Estimate (US\$)	Actual (US\$)	Appraisal (US\$)	Actual (US\$)
<b>Active Components</b>						
<b>Traffic Engineering &amp; Road Maintenance:</b>						
CBD Parking Garages	4.52	4.82	8.38	9.71	12.90	14.53
Maintenance Equipment	2.79	1.55	0.07	0.68	2.86	2.23
<b>Traffic Enforcement:</b>						
Equipment	2.74	2.01	0.00	0.43	2.74	2.43
Traffic Officer Training	1.73	1.02	0.58	0.00	2.31	1.02
<b>Institutional Development:</b>						
Advisory Services	0.45	0.55	0.15	0.00	0.60	0.55
<b>Design &amp; Supervision:</b>						
Traffic Engineering	0.26	0.12	0.69	0.02	0.95	0.14
Land Assembly Project	-	0.19	-	0.14	0.00	0.32
Sekeit El Wailli Feasibility Study	0.45	0.13	0.15	0.00	0.60	0.12
Central Business District	0.08	0.78	0.20	0.00	0.28	0.78
Area Upgrading	0.09	0.08	0.27	0.21	0.36	0.29
Shoubra, Salah Salem and Corniche	0.06	0.41	0.17	0.02	0.23	0.43
Supervision	0.35	0.35	.000	0.00	0.35	0.35
Total Active Components	13.52	12.02	10.66	11.20	24.18	23.20
<b>Inactive Components</b>						
<b>Traffic Engineering &amp; Road Maintenance:</b>						
CBD Traffic Circulation Scheme	1.55	0.00	2.87	0.00	4.42	0.00
Others	10.10	0.00	17.21	0.00	27.31	0.00
<b>Area Upgrading:</b>						
District of Rod Al Farag and Abdine	2.82	0.00	5.25	0.00	8.07	0.00
<b>Traffic Enforcement:</b>						
Others	0.46	0.00	0.43	0.00	0.89	0.00
<b>Institutional Development:</b>						
Others	4.55	0.00	1.50	0.00	6.05	0.00
<b>Design and Supervision:</b>						
Others	0.28	0.00	0.42	0.00	0.70	0.00
Total Inactive Components	19.76	0.00	27.68	0.00	47.44	0.00
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	33.28	12.02	38.34	11.20	71.62	23.20

Source: Project Files and CG

7. Appraisal and Actual Project Financing (continued)

**GIZA GOVERNORATE**  
(all values in million currency units)

	BANK Expenditure		Government Expenditure		Total	
	Appraisal Estimate (US\$)	Actual (US\$)	Appraisal Estimate (US\$)	Actual (US\$)	Appraisal (US\$)	Actual (US\$)
<b>Active Components</b>						
Transport Infrastructure:						
Bus Route Paving	1.20	0.46	2.23	0.79	3.43	1.25
Maintenance Equipment	1.43	1.42	0.40	0.29	1.83	1.71
Area Upgrading:						
East Mounira and Old Giza	2.13	1.30	3.95	11.79	6.08	13.09
Institutional Development:						
Advisory Services	0.42	0.16	0.14	0.00	0.56	0.16
Design and Supervision:	0.16	0.52	0.43	0.00	0.59	0.52
New Components:						
Consulting Services for Monira West and Omraniyah West	-	0.37	-	0.00	0.00	0.37
Total Active Components	5.34	4.24	6.72	12.87	12.49	17.11
<b>Inactive Components</b>						
Transport Infrastructure:						
Giza/Gala/Dokki Squares	0.29	0.00	0.53	0.00	0.82	0.00
Design and Supervision:	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.04	0.00
Total Inactive Components	0.30	0.00	0.56	0.00	0.86	0.00
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>5.64</b>	<b>4.24</b>	<b>7.71</b>	<b>12.87</b>	<b>13.35</b>	<b>17.11</b>

Source: Project Files and GG

7. Appraisal and Actual Project Financing (continued)

CAIRO TRANSPORT AUTHORITY

(all values in million currency units)

	BANK Expenditure		Government Expenditure		Total	
	Appraisal Estimate (US\$)	Actual (US\$)	Appraisal Estimate (US\$)	Actual (US\$)	Appraisal (US\$)	Actual (US\$)
<u>Active Components</u>						
Giar El-Suez Bus Overhaul Facility:						
Building Yard	4.05	7.83	4.75	11.50	8.80	19.32
Equipment and Parts	14.20	24.16	3.30	1.14	17.50	25.30
Design and Supervision	0.32	2.38	0.82	0.00	1.14	2.38
Project Management	-	1.90	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.90
Monib Training Center:						
Equipment	0.53	0.33	0.18	0.11	0.71	0.44
Vocational development	1.17	1.01	0.39	0.35	1.56	1.36
Total Active Components	20.27	37.60	9.44	13.10	29.71	50.70
<u>Inactive Components</u>						
Institutional Development:	1.16	0.00	0.40	0.00	1.56	0.00
Total Inactive Components	1.16	0.00	0.40	0.00	1.56	0.00
GRAND TOTAL	21.43	37.60	9.84	13.10	31.27	50.70

Source: Project Files and CTA

7. Appraisal and Actual Project Financing (continued)

**SUMMARY OF BANK EXPENDITURES**  
(all values in million currency units)

Category	APPRAISAL		ACTUAL	
	(US\$)	(%)	(US\$)	(%)
(1) Civil Works:				
(a) CG	13.30	37	4.82	33
(b) GG	2.50	37	1.76	12
(c) CTA	2.70	37	7.83	40
(2) Materials and Equipment:				
(a) CG	4.40	100	3.56	77
(b) GG	1.60	100	1.42	83
(c) CTA	10.20	100	24.49	95
(3) Consultants' Services and Training:				
(a) CG	10.40	100	3.64	91
(b) GG	0.80	100	1.05	100
(c) CTA	3.60	100	5.29	94
(4) Unallocated:	10.50		0.00	
(5) Cancellations	0.00		6.14	
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>59.00</b>		<b>59.00</b>	

Source: Disbursements

8. Mission Data

Type of Mission	Mon/Yr	# of Persons	Days in Field	Performance Rating	Types of Problems
<u>A- Up to Appraisal</u>					
Reconnaissance	07/78	2	18	N/A	
Identification	11/78	4	17	N/A	
Preparation	06/78	4	8	N/A	
Preappraisal	10/79	6	13	N/A	
Preappraisal	12/79	2	6	N/A	
Preappraisal	02/80	5	16	N/A	
<u>B- Appraisal to Board Approval</u>					
Appraisal	09/80	6	19	N/A	
Progress Review	05/81	4	15	N/A	
Progress Review	09/81	1	3	N/A	
Progress Review	11/81	1	4	N/A	
Post Appraisal	02/82	3	17	N/A	
Supervision I (prior to Board)	05/82	5	12	N/A	
<u>C- Board Approval to Effectiveness</u>					
Supervision II (prior to effectiveness)	06/82	2	13	N/A	
Supervision III (prior to effectiveness)	10/82	4	20	N/A	
Supervision IV (prior to effectiveness)	12/82	1	4	N/A	
<u>D- Effectiveness to Completion</u>					
Supervision V	01/83	4	28	N/A	
Supervision VI	04/83	3	16	1	
Supervision VII	07/83	2	11	1	
Supervision VIII	10/83	4	29	1	
Supervision IX	01/84	3	16	1	M,P
Supervision X	05/84	1	8	2	M,P,T
Supervision XI	07/84	1	9	2	M,P,T
Supervision XII	08/84	1	8	2	M,P,T
Supervision XIII	11/84	2	22	2	M,P,T,I
Supervision XIV	01/85	1	7	2	M
Supervision XV	07/85	1	9	2	
Supervision XVI	10/85	3	22	2	F
Supervision XVII	02/86	1	11	2	Pr
Supervision XVIII	04/86	1	9	3	Pr
Supervision XIX	07/86	2	14	3	Pr
Supervision XX	11/86	2	21	3	
Supervision XXI	02/87	2	12	3	
Supervision XXII	07/87	1	6	3	
Supervision XXIII	02/88	2	9	3	M,I
Supervision XXIV	04/88	2	16	4	F
Supervision XXV	01/89	1	22	4	I
Supervision XXVI	02/89	2	10	3	I,F
Supervision XXVII	10/89	2	10	3	I,F
Supervision XXVIII	01/90	2	N/A	3	I,F
Supervision XXIX	05/90	1	1	3	M
Supervision XXX	11/90	2	21	3	M
Supervision XXXI	06/91	2	37	3	F
Supervision XXXII	09/91	2	15	3	
Supervision XXXIII	02/92	1	30	2	
Supervision XXXIV	11/92	1	9	2	M
Supervision XXXV	01/93	2	22	N/A	

M: Managerial; P: Political; I: Institutional; T: Technical; Pr: Procurement; F: Local Funding

Source: Project Files



9. Rate of Return for the two Parking Garages and Commercial Space at Opera and Ataba Squares

(all values in LE million in 1987 prices)

Year	Project Cost Stream	Benefit Streams from		Net Benefits
		Parking	Commercial	
1984	18.27	0.00	0.00	-18.27
1985	5.02	0.00	0.00	-5.02
1986	6.36	2.21	1.14	-3.02
1987	0.58	3.74	1.93	5.09
1988	0.58	3.74	1.93	5.09
1989	0.58	3.74	1.93	5.09
1990	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
1991	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
1992	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
1993	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
1994	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
1995	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
1996	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
1997	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
1998	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
1999	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
2000	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
2001	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
2002	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
2003	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
2004	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
2005	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
2006	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
2007	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
2008	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
2009	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
2010	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
2011	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
2012	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
2013	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
2014	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
2015	0.58	3.93	1.93	5.28
2016	0.58	3.93	21.93	25.28

**Rate of Return = 16%**

Notes:

- (a) The value of land was LE 15.24 million (in 1987 prices).
- (b) The life of the two garages is assumed to be 30 years.
- (c) Annual O&M for the garages assumed at 4% of investment cost.
- (d) The residual value of land assumed to be LE 20.0 million.
- (e) Parking contracts are negotiated every 3 years and commercial space contracts every 20 years.

Source: CG and Project Files.

10. Financial Statements of CTA

Cairo Transport Authority: Balance Sheet 1985 - 1992  
(values in LE 1000)

	June 30 1985	June 30 1986	June 30 1987	June 30 1988	June 30 1989	June 30 1990	June 30 1991	June 30 1992
<b>Current Assets:</b>								
Cash in bank	71,843	53,798	56,426	40,331	21,484	19,983	43,014	17,786
Accounts receivable-net	19,221	15,550	14,318	14,411	16,635	18,960	22,564	65,543
Inventory of parts and supplies	48,336	44,525	46,322	60,995	72,501	86,872	111,307	210,617
	139,400	113,872	117,066	115,737	110,620	125,816	176,886	293,946
<b>Other Assets:</b>								
Investment in GCBC, includes loans	34,033	40,960	48,720	67,600	83,858	101,241	124,532	159,293
Deferred Expenses	9,916	7,382	5,390	3,106	3,864	2,125	1,690	6,898
Other investments	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	13
	43,962	48,354	54,123	70,719	87,736	103,380	126,236	166,204
<b>Fixed Assets:</b>								
Land	1,527	1,527	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,800	1,802
Buildings & Furniture	21,385	21,714	22,763	32,842	38,219	39,822	56,404	155,553
Machinery	6,086	6,612	7,042	7,668	8,924	9,952	12,156	74,456
Rolling Stock	176,661	199,652	209,824	213,859	277,203	322,004	379,647	550,836
Construction in Progress	28,363	37,531	43,452	92,353	128,700	181,574	191,240	73,207
Others			4,409	22,320				
	234,022	267,036	289,291	370,842	454,846	555,153	641,247	855,854
<b>Accumulated Depreciation</b>	123,354	136,238	148,656	158,169	195,734	218,705	259,667	383,145
	110,668	130,798	140,635	212,673	259,111	336,448	381,580	472,709
<b>Total Assets</b>	294,030	293,024	311,824	399,129	457,467	565,643	684,702	932,859
<b>Current Liabilities:</b>								
Bank Overdraft	1,567	204	2,099	811	2,612	3,443	1,212	67,668
Short Term Loans		2,228	333	1,297	8,123	8	8	8
Accounts Payable	46,392	46,971	43,864	79,532	56,950	75,223	77,988	125,862
	47,959	49,404	46,296	81,640	67,686	78,674	79,208	193,538
<b>Foreign Loans-Less Current Portion:</b>								
External Lenders	25,107	32,725	19,801	36,031	29,917	20,568	9,724	101,013
World Bank	14,494	1,940	3,006	8,441	15,866	45,004	81,374	89,486
	39,601	34,665	22,807	44,471	45,783	65,571	91,098	190,499
<b>Loans from Inv. Bank &amp; MOF:</b>	320,309	126,968	175,396	272,991	385,813	511,403	652,805	650,637
<b>Reserves:</b>	39,138	19,775	31,449	41,964	57,611	74,593	91,434	115,636
	359,448	146,744	206,845	314,955	443,425	585,995	744,239	766,273
<b>Capital:</b>								
Paid in	16,532	142,166	142,166	142,166	142,166	142,166	142,166	301,413
Accumulated Deficit	(169,509)	(79,952)	(106,291)	(184,102)	(241,593)	(306,763)	(372,010)	(518,861)
	(152,977)	62,214	35,876	(41,936)	(99,427)	(164,597)	(229,844)	(217,448)
<b>Total Liabilities &amp; Equity</b>	294,030	293,027	311,824	399,129	457,467	565,643	684,701	932,862

Source: CTA

10. Financial Statements of CTA

Cairo Transport Authority: Income Statement 1985 - 1992

(values in LE 1000)

Statement of Revenue and Expenses	June 30 1985	June 30 1986	June 30 1987	June 30 1988	June 30 1989	June 30 1990	June 30 1991	June 30 1992
<b>Revenues</b>								
<b>Revenue from Operations:</b>								
Buses	52,128	65,033	91,668	98,292	107,123	114,981	107,789	126,060
Trams	4,739	4,412	3,867	4,333	5,568	5,628	5,573	5,249
River Buses	473	535	756	745	758	880	808	665
Mini-buses							26,228	31,374
Metro								2,151
	57,340	69,980	96,291	103,370	113,449	121,489	140,398	165,498
Other Revenues	3,324	1,694	1,716	3,056	4,264	5,020	5,420	46,403
<b>Total Revenue</b>	<b>60,664</b>	<b>71,674</b>	<b>98,007</b>	<b>106,426</b>	<b>117,713</b>	<b>126,509</b>	<b>145,818</b>	<b>211,902</b>
<b>Expenses</b>								
<b>Direct Expenses:</b>								
Wages	47,035	49,783	52,922	59,977	65,407	71,843	79,187	92,036
Fuel	4,817	5,344	5,956	8,133	9,289	12,426	20,078	40,450
Parts and Supplies	22,018	25,339	29,063	38,118	56,681	66,155	68,906	101,751
	73,870	80,466	87,942	106,228	131,377	150,424	168,172	234,236
<b>Fixed Expenses:</b>								
General Expenses	21,938	18,755	18,410	22,303	23,216	26,904	30,941	77,691
Interest	23,730	12,943	13,345	12,025	15,833	24,232	27,708	53,611
Depreciation	26,640	31,287	32,130	31,288	41,663	48,562	62,772	96,506
	72,307	62,985	63,885	65,616	80,712	99,698	121,421	227,809
<b>Total Expenses</b>	<b>146,177</b>	<b>143,451</b>	<b>151,827</b>	<b>171,844</b>	<b>212,089</b>	<b>250,122</b>	<b>289,593</b>	<b>462,046</b>
<b>Net Loss</b>	<b>(85,513)</b>	<b>(71,777)</b>	<b>(53,820)</b>	<b>(65,419)</b>	<b>(94,376)</b>	<b>(123,614)</b>	<b>(143,775)</b>	<b>(250,144)</b>
Government Operating Subsidy	61,840	61,926	44,107	29,258	40,028	61,187	83,540	122,056
<b>Total Subsidy</b>	<b>61,840</b>	<b>61,926</b>	<b>44,107</b>	<b>29,258</b>	<b>40,028</b>	<b>61,187</b>	<b>83,540</b>	<b>122,056</b>
<b>Net Operating Loss</b>	<b>(23,673)</b>	<b>(9,851)</b>	<b>(9,713)</b>	<b>(36,161)</b>	<b>(54,348)</b>	<b>(62,426)</b>	<b>(60,235)</b>	<b>(128,088)</b>
<b>Net Current Transfers</b>	<b>1,897</b>	<b>(4,743)</b>	<b>(5,615)</b>	<b>(6,230)</b>	<b>(2,901)</b>	<b>(2,744)</b>	<b>(3,001)</b>	<b>(737)</b>
<b>Net Current Income (Loss)</b>	<b>(21,775)</b>	<b>(14,594)</b>	<b>(15,328)</b>	<b>(42,390)</b>	<b>(57,249)</b>	<b>(65,170)</b>	<b>(63,236)</b>	<b>(128,825)</b>

Source: CTA






### ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT GREATER CAIRO URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

- PROJECT SUB-COMPONENTS COMPLETED:
- AREAS UPGRADED
  - CENTRAL BUSINESS DISTRICT
  - GISR EL SUEZ BUS OVERHAUL FACILITY
  - ▲ OFF-STREET MULTI-STORY CAR PARKS AND OFFICE BUILDINGS AT OPERA SQUARE AND ATTABA SQUARE

- BUILT-UP AREAS
- ROADS
  - RAILROADS
  - UNDERGROUND METRO
  - < TRAFFIC FLOW
  - INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES



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