102559 Stabilization and Rehabilitation Needs in the Areas Affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army Democratic Republic of Congo Central African Republic Republic of South Sudan Preliminary Assessment • Main Report June 2013 2013 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 www.tdrp.net www.worldbank.org The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denomina- tions, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of the World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Cover Design and Text Layout: Duina Reyes Table of Contents Acronyms....................................................................................................... 1 Executive Summary........................................................................................ 3 I. Introduction................................................................................................. 7 A. Background...................................................................................................................................... 7 B. Coordination and Harmonization with the AU.................................................................................. 8 C. Status................................................................................................................................................ 9 D. Structure of the report...................................................................................................................... 9 II. Approach.................................................................................................. 10 A. Premises and principles.................................................................................................................. 10 B. Guiding principles.......................................................................................................................... 10 III. Findings.................................................................................................. 11 A. Geographical delimitation.............................................................................................................. 11 B. Triggers of conflict: Internal and external stresses.......................................................................... 13 C. Findings: Policy and governance issues.......................................................................................... 14 Low priority and allocation of resources to the affected areas...........................................................14 Public sector capacity.........................................................................................................................14 D. Findings: Social and economic issues............................................................................................. 15 Poverty, access to services and infrastructure.....................................................................................15 Displaced population and sources of tension – unequal access to resources....................................16 Access to land by the displaced population.......................................................................................16 Weak community structures..............................................................................................................17 E. (In)Security. .................................................................................................................................... 17 The presence of LRA and other armed groups, insecurity, fear and access........................................17 The self-defense forces.......................................................................................................................18 Security and Justice Sector/Rule of law.............................................................................................18 Military forces....................................................................................................................................19 Cross-border issues............................................................................................................................19 Natural resources...............................................................................................................................20 c F. Stabilization and rehabilitation priority needs................................................................................ 20 The context for stabilization and rehabilitation.................................................................................20 Priority needs.....................................................................................................................................21 G. Additional factors for consideration in developing a strategy for stabilization and rehabilitation.................................................................................................................................. 24 H. Vision and preliminary Transitional Results Framework (TRF)......................................................... 26 A proposed vision for stabilization and rehabilitation in the affected areas......................................26 Agreed Scenarios moving forward.....................................................................................................26 Immediate early recovery response...................................................................................................27 Long-term development and cross-border initiatives........................................................................27 Towards a shared Transitional Results Framework.............................................................................28 IV. Next steps............................................................................................... 29 d Acronyms Af DB African Development Bank AFTCS Africa Post-conflict and Social Development Practice Group, the World Bank AU-RTF African Union Regional Task Force (on LRA) AU/AUC African Union / African Union Commission AUBP African Union Border Program Bas Uele Bas Uele District (DRC) BINUCA United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic CAF Country Assistance Framework CAP Consolidated Appeal (United Nations, humanitarian) CAR Central African Republic CBSD Cross-Border Stabilization and Development CES Central Equatoria State (ROSS) COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa DRC Democratic Republic of Congo ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States EES Eastern Equatoria State (ROSS) FACA Armed forces of the Central African Republic FARDC Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo Haut Haut Uele District (DRC) ICGLR International Conference on the Great Lakes Region IDP Internally Displaced Persons IWG International Working Group LRA Lord’s Resistance Army MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo PO Province Orientale (DRC) PSD Peace and Security Department of the AU RCI-LRA Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA 1 REC Regional Economic Community ROSS Republic of South Sudan SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army SRSG UN Special Representative of the Secretary General SSDDRC South Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission TDRP Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program ToR Terms of Reference UN United Nations UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework UNDP United Nations Development Program UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNMISS United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan UNOAU UN Office to the African Union UNOCHA United Nations Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs UPDF Uganda People Defense Forces USA/USAID United States if America / United States Agency for International Development WBGS Western Bahr el Ghazal State (ROSS) WES Western Equatoria State (ROSS) WFP World Food Program 2 Executive Summary Background: The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) originally hailed from Uganda; but over the years has Box 1: UN Regional Strategy on LRA (June 2012) morphed into a regional menace. The LRA has not been active in Uganda since 2007 when its remaining fighters left northern part of the country as part of a since failed Goal 1: The African Union-led Regional Cooperation Initiative internationally supported peace process. This prelimi- against the Lord’s Resistance Army is fully operational and imple- nary assessment covers areas affected since regional mented military action against the group resumed in 2008. Cur- Goal 2: Efforts to promote the protection of civilians are enhanced rently, affected and threatened areas are in the tri-border area of the Republic of South Sudan, the Democratic Goal 3: Current DDRRR activities are expanded to cover all LRA Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic. affected areas On 22 November 2011, the AU Peace and Security Goal 4: A coordinated humanitarian and child protection response Council authorized the implementation of the Regional is promoted in all LRA affected areas Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA). Goal 5: Peacebuilding, human rights, rule of law and long-term development support is provided to LRA- affected governments to On June 29 2012, the UN Security Council endorsed enable them to establish authority across their territory the regional strategy developed by the United Nations to tackle the threat posed by the LRA, and called for the necessary support to be provided to ensure that it improved basic services and infrastructure to promote is implemented successfully. The strategy, developed by economic activity and access, and the establishment of the UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), state territorial authority. focuses on five key strategic objectives to address the threat from the LRA (Box 1). Objectives: The specific objectives of the assessment are: (i) to provide a basic understanding of the social, Concurrently with the development of this UN-AU economic and governance conditions in the LRA strategy, in May 2012, the African Union Commis- affected areas, and (ii) to develop a vision, strategy and sion (AUC) requested senior management in the plan of action to respond to the reintegration, stabiliza- World Bank and African Development Bank (Af DB) tion and development challenges in the area. to support the recovery and development oriented mandates of the RCI-LRA by conducting a regional as- Coordination and field missions: In September 2012, sessment of the stabilization and rehabilitation needs the terms of reference for the assessment were agreed in areas affected by LRA activity. Goal 5 of the UN with the AU and Af DB and shared with the UN and strategy provides the entry point for this assessment. other stakeholders in the International Working Group This goal highlights AU-UN collaboration in support- (IWG) on the LRA. Senior management tasked the ing initiatives on peace building, human rights, rule of Africa Post-Conflict and Social Development Practice law, and long- term development. Priority actions under Group (AFTCS) of the World Bank to respond to the this goal emphasize the importance of attention being AUC request, and teams drawn from AFTCS Tran- given to meeting the needs of affected communities; sitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program the return and resettlement of displaced populations; (TDRP) conducted country missions to ROSS, DRC, 3 and CAR between October and December 2012.1 The A Preliminary Assessment (the current report) that AFTCS/TDRP teams consulted widely and coordinat- will form the basis for Consultations with national and ed with other international partners and national stake- regional partners prior to the Full Assessment that will holders active in the respective counties. be planned and conducted together with the respective national authorities. At AU level, the AFTCS/TDRP coordinates the assess- ment with the AU Office of Special Envoy for the LRA Geographical delineation: The report highlights that Issue, Ambassador Francisco Madeira. This coordina- at a political level in the AU and the affected countries tion is part of an ongoing AU-UN-World Bank partner- consensus needs to be reached on what exactly is meant ship on the AU DDR Capacity Program (2013-2015) by the term LRA affected areas. At the technical level, in the AU Peace and Security Department (PSD). The the proposed design choice is to focus on areas affected AFTCS/TDRP supports this program both technically since 2008, when regional military operations against and financially. the LRA were initiated. Weighing three main interre- lated factors - the security situation, operational access, The senior point of coordination in the UN is Abou and administrative divisions and competencies - the Moussa, the Special Representative of the Secretary- preliminary assessment proposes a focus on the admin- General (SRSG) and head of the UN Regional Office istrative areas identified in each country (Box 2). for Central Africa (UNOCA). At Addis Ababa, the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) acts as focal point for Findings: Priority needs identified include: technical coordination between the AU, UN and the AFTCS/TDRP. i. Improving access, security and development through investments in infrastructure in transport Approach: A three-stage assessment process has been and communications; adopted to cater for the existing lack of information, limited access to the affected areas, and the need to rec- ii. Enhancing local capacities for the implementation oncile the views of multiple national, regional and inter- of stabilization and rehabilitation actions; national stakeholders and programs: iii. Increasing community cohesiveness and resilience; 1   The AU Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program iv. Providing basic services and livelihood support to AU DDRCP (www.peaceau.org). The AFTCS team includes: Abderrahim communities where possible, on a pilot basis; Fraiji (TTL & Mission Leader, AFTCS) Anton Baaré (Senior Stabilization Advisor, consultant AFTCS), Jorge Gavidia (Senior consultant, AFTCS) (Verena Phipps, AFTCS- ROSS mission), Magali Chelpi-den Hamer v. Concurrent national and cross-border trade and (consultant AFTCS- DRC and CAR mission). René Bauman (consultant economic development and regional integration; AFTCS, DRC mission). Benjamin Burckhart (Social Development Specialist, AFTCS) and Doreen Thairu (team assistant AFTCS). vi. Prioritize area-based targeting and ensure equitable funding of strategic priorities, including Box 2: Proposed Geographical Focus cross- border coherence. Ad (i) Addressing infrastructure development. Priority Republic of South Sudan: Western Equatoria State, in the areas needs identified by the preliminary assessment include: bordering DRC and CAR (a) connecting national trunk roads networks and the establishment of cross-border links; upgrading and Democratic Republic of Congo: Dungu, Faradje and Niangara maintenance of trunk roads connecting the affected territories in the Haut-Uele district, Ango territory in the Bas Uele areas to markets enhancing opportunities for trade district (all Province Orientale) with neighboring countries, including Uganda, as well Central African Republic: Haut Mbomou prefecture; Mbomou as with the national transportation networks in DRC prefecture; Eastern part up to Bakouma and Rafai (Province Orientale) and CAR (Bangassu-Bangui) (see map of current trunk road (Map 3); (b) Improv- Source: AFTCS/TDRP, 2013 ing access to radio networks (FM and short wave), although there are many ongoing FM initiatives, receiv- 4 ing support from NGO’s overall coverage is still limited and national levels. This postpones and impedes the (Map2) and radio stations are not economically viable; development of important national and cross-border and (c) Improving mobile telephone coverage, with a strategies on security, reintegration, infrastructure and need for private sector driven approach. economic development. Unmarked borders, lack of national and regionally agreed border management Ad (ii) Enhancing local capacities and institutions. strategies, and non-application of continental border Given the isolation of the affected areas, program management standards characterize the current situa- delivery and follow up operation and maintenance tion. Moreover, RoSS, DRC and CAR are not members has to rely to a large extent on local communities and of a single AU Regional Economic Commission (REC): authorities. A robust program approach is required to CAR and DRC are members of Economic Community enhance the capacity of local authorities and communi- of Central African States (ECCAS), while ROSS and ties to implement “community-driven” of rehabilitation DRC are members of the Common Market for Eastern activities. Improved local capacity needs to go hand in and Southern Africa (COMESA). However, all three hand with an increased presence of the state through its countries are members of the International Conference institutions to ensure the protection of the population for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) that has a regional and the administration of justice and rule of law. peace and security focus. While ICGLR does not have Ad (iii) Strengthening cohesiveness and resilience. AU REC status, it is officially recognized by the AU as There continues to be a pervasive atmosphere of fear in a Regional Mechanism and it is therefore an important the area. This undermines social cohesion and prevents potential platform for dialogue and discussion. people from making future-oriented investments in Ad (vi) Area-based approach and strategic, coherent improved livelihoods. In order to address this problem, and cross-border funding mechanism. There is a need to there is a need to implement activities aimed at increas- balance individual targeting including private benefits, ing community cohesiveness and resilience. Such activ- with community- and area-based targeting including ities would help create a base on which future recovery public goods. Country plans and programs of multiple activities could be built, both through the improvement bilateral and multilateral agencies in principle could be of livelihoods and access to services. A key compo- tuned to achieve this. However, there is considerable nent of this needs to be targeted interventions to help variation in the specific implementation strategies, pro- overcome trauma suffered by people directly affected cesses, institutional arrangements and funding mecha- by violence, and to support the effective integration of nisms to implement such activities. Moreover, current the displaced population and people formerly associ- responses are almost all conceived and executed on a ated with the LRA. ‘country-by-country’ basis. Whilst national level co- Ad (iv) Providing basic services and livelihood support. ordination, development partner harmonization and There is a dire need for basic services and improved alignment with national efforts and plans are impor- livelihoods in the areas. Comprehensively addressing tant, the preliminary assessment finds that cross-border these needs is challenging due to restrictions in access, programming and financing is also crucial to ensure security, delivery capacity and sustainability. Condi- a strategically coherent response to stabilization and tions for the cost-effective implementation of such recovery needs across the region. programs are not currently in place. Implementation of Agreements: On February 19, 2013, the AFTCS team such activities would require careful piloting combined with the mobilization of substantial resources to even- met in Addis Ababa with the Special Envoy of the African tually set up full- scale regional and national program Union for the LRA issue. Representatives from the UN delivery structures in a post-LRA era. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU) also Ad (v) Cross-border trade and economic develop- attended the meeting. The purpose of the meeting was ment and regional economic integration. Concerted (i) to discuss the draft findings of the preliminary needs operational approaches for the stabilization and reha- assessment and receive feedback and comments, and bilitation of LRA-affected areas is lacking at regional (ii) to discuss with the AU the next steps. It was agreed 5 to proceed along two scenarios that require concurrent AU has ensured the required level of endorsement and implementation. technical cooperation from the affected countries, in- cluding formal identification of ministry-level national Scenario 1: contributing to an immediate early focal points who will be engaged in planning the final recovery response that needs to occur under the present phase of the assessment. This would (ii) start with circumstances where the LRA remains a destabilizing a technical planning meeting in Addis Ababa or the factor and military operations against it are ongoing. capitals of one of the affected countries. This scenario requires close external coordination with the UN plans under preparation by the UN Special Status: At the time of writing, the above two criteria for Representative (UNSR) for Central Africa and head of moving to the agreed next steps are not yet fully met. UNOCA, Abou Moussa. However, the AU and UN envoys have reached agree- ments in principle with the governments of RoSS and Scenario 2: a longer-term development-oriented DRC that ministerial level national focal points will be response premised on the assumption that current appointed. These appointments are reported to be in regional and international efforts will result in the process. ending of the security threats posed by the LRA. This scenario would be geared towards the promotion of Unfortunately, the outlook and situation in CAR has Regional Economic Integration as an important strategy significantly worsened during the first quarter of 2013 for addressing systemic state fragility through a cross- as a result of the Séléka rebellion and their seizure of border stabilization and trade and economic develop- power. CAR’s AU membership is currently suspended. ment (CBSD) initiative based on AU Border Program This means that some of the findings presented in this (AUPB) principles. It would develop a package focused report may be outdated. However, it is safe to assume on building social cohesion, institutional development, that an already dire situation only has further deterio- and trade and economic development and growth rated, that the needs identified remain fundamentally based on a vision for stabilization and development the same, but that national capacity to respond has shared between the three currently affected countries waned even further. The current CAR leadership has and Uganda. declared the former national army (FACA) dissolved These scenarios need to be pursued concurrently and and its commitment to the RCI-LRA is unclear and the both assume that the governments of DRC, ROSS subject of debate. and CAR are willing to fully engage in the assessment Next steps: The following immediate next steps are en- process. The AU Envoy for the LRA stated in February visioned: 2013 that African leadership will be provided on national programs and that he personally would take ¡¡ Consultations with UNOCA, this forward together with the UN SRSG. ¡¡ Identification and organization of a meeting with This would involve presenting the assessment’s pre- national focal points of the DRC, ROSS and liminary findings at country-level in order to develop CAR under the auspices of the Office of the AU a shared vision for development of the affected areas LRA Envoy. Meeting objective: presentation of by the governments involved (regional program com- preliminary findings and preparation of terms of ponent), and in order to, where feasible, incorporate reference for full assessment. The meeting will be LRA related recovery responses in national government supported by the AFTCS/TDRP. programs and country-level portfolios of development partners (national program components). ¡¡ Implementation of full assessment pending availability of funds and clearance by senior The full assessment would be implemented once (i) the management. 6 I. Introduction A. Background Box 3: UN Regional Strategy on the Lord’s Resistance Army (June 2012) A crisis has been ongoing since 2008 in the tri-border region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Goal 1: The African Union-led Regional Cooperation Initiative Central African Republic (CAR) and Republic of South against the Lord’s Resistance Army is fully operational and imple- Sudan (ROSS). Activities of the Lord’s Resistance mented Army (LRA) have caused the displacement of a large number of the population living in the area creating a Goal 2: Efforts to promote the protection of civilians are enhanced serious humanitarian situation with widespread impli- cations for stability and the ability of communities to Goal 3: Current DDRRR activities are expanded to cover all LRA remain self-reliant. affected areas Areas affected and threatened by the LRA are among the Goal 4: A coordinated humanitarian and child protection response least developed and isolated in the wider region, com- is promoted in all LRA affected areas pounding the challenges faced by the countries affected Goal 5: Peacebuilding, human rights, rule of law and long-term in overcoming poverty and consolidating governance. development support is provided to LRA- affected governments to LRA activity has also destroyed basic social infrastruc- enable them to establish authority across their territory ture and facilities contributing to a further deteriora- tion in the living conditions and wellbeing of people in the affected areas. to tackle the threat posed by the LRA, and called for the necessary support to ensure that it is carried out suc- Insecurity generated by the operations of the LRA has cessfully. The strategy, developed by the UN Regional intensified existing country-level stresses created by per- Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), focuses on five vasive poverty, lack of livelihood opportunities, dismal key strategic objectives to address the threat from the access to basic services, isolation from infrastructure LRA (Box 3). networks, and the absence of adequate government institutions and the rule of law. Conversely, such con- Concurrently with the development of this UN-AU ditions act as triggers of conflict and the emergence of strategy, in May 2012, the African Union Commis- armed groups. It is expected that the amelioration of the sion (AUC) requested senior management in the situation will remove one of the factors contributing to World Bank and African Development Bank (Af DB) the continued operation of LRA and, in conjunction to support the recovery and development oriented with the implementation of parallel strategies in the po- mandates of the RCI- LRA by conducting a regional litical and military fronts, facilitate the stabilization and assessment of the stabilization and rehabilitation needs rehabilitation of the area. in areas affected by LRA activities. Goal 5 of the UN strategy provides the entry point for the assessment. On 22 November 2011, the AU Peace and Security This goal highlights AU- UN collaboration in support- Council authorized the implementation of the Regional ing initiatives on peace building, human rights, rule of Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA law, and long-term development. Priority actions under (RCI-LRA). this goal emphasize On June 29 2012, the UN Security Council endorsed the importance of attention being given to meeting the regional strategy developed by the United Nations the needs of affected communities; the return and re- 7 settlement of displaced populations; and improved LRA-affected areas. It aims at promoting cross-border basic services and infrastructure to promote economic mechanisms to improve the protection of civilians, activity and access, and the establishment of state ter- early warning capacity and humanitarian access and ritorial authority. response. It addresses issues related to reintegration support for returning internally displaced persons, ab- The AUC request emphasized the attention to issues ductees and former combatants and recommends inter- related to cross-border, stabilization and recovery re- national action to strengthen the capacity of the affected sponses in the context of disarmament, demobilization countries to extend state authority throughout the areas and reintegration (DDR) initiatives; as well as the need where the LRA has a presence. for parallel efforts at the national and regional levels as postulated by its Post-conflict Reconstruction and De- Goal 5 of the UN strategy provides the entry point for velopment Policy (PCRD). this assessment. This goal highlights AU- UN collabora- B. Coordination and Harmonization tion in supporting initiatives on peace building, human rights, rule of law, and long-term development. Priority with the AU actions under this goal emphasize the importance of giving attention to the needs of affected communi- In September 2012 Terms of reference (ToRs) for a ties; the return and resettlement of displaced popula- collaborative assessment were agreed with the African tions; and improved basic services and infrastructure to Union and the African Development Bank. The ToRs promote economic activity and access. were subsequently shared for information with the In- ternational Working Group (IWG) on the LRA that The specific objectives of the assessment are: brings together UN, EU, AU and bilateral organiza- ¡¡ To provide a basic understanding of the social, tions. economic and governance conditions in the LRA At AU level, the AFTCS/TDRP coordinates the assess- affected areas, and ment with the AU Office of Special Envoy for the LRA ¡¡ To develop a vision and strategy to respond to Issue, Ambassador Francisco Madeira. This coordina- the reintegration, stabilization and development tion is part of an ongoing partnership between the AU- challenges in the area. UN-World Bank on the AU DDR Capacity Program (2013-2015) in the AU Peace and Security Depart- A three-stage assessment process has been adopted to ment. The AFTCS/TDRP supports this program tech- cater for the existing lack of information, limited access nically and financially. to the affected areas, and the need to reconcile the views of multiple national, regional and international stake- The senior point of coordination in the UN is Abou holders and programs: Moussa, the Special Representative of the Secretary- General (SRSG) and head of the UN Regional Office 1. A preliminary assessment (this report) — that will for Central Africa (UNOCA). At Addis Ababa level the form the basis for: UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) acts as focal point for technical coordination between the AU, UN and the 2. Consultations with national and regional partners - AFTCS/TDRP. on the formulation of the stabilization, rehabilita- tion and development strategy will be underpinned The design of the assessment takes into account com- by the design of a Transitional Results Framework plementary issues related to the RCI-LRA and the UN (TRF) and an action plan to guide the interven- Regional strategy in LRA affected areas of July 2012 that tions of national and international partners. aims to support efforts led by the AU to neutralize the threat posed by LRA and address its impacts. The UN 3. Full assessment that will be planned and con- strategy focuses on international military, humanitar- ducted as a next step together with the respective ian, development and peacebuilding assistance to the national authorities. 8 C. Status further. The current CAR leadership has declared the former national army (FACA) dissolved and its com- The preliminary assessment field missions were con- mitment to the RCI-LRA is unclear and the subject of ducted between October and December 2012. These debate. D. Structure of the report included field missions to ROSS, DRC and CAR and were coordinated with other international partners active in the respective counties and areas affected by This report presents a summary of the main findings the LRA. of the preliminary assessment of stabilization and re- On February 19, 2013, the AFTCS team met in Addis habilitation needs in the areas affected by LRA activity Ababa with the Special Envoy of the African Union in ROSS, DRC and CAR. The report is based on the for the LRA issue, Francisco Madeira. Representatives review of available documentation and the findings of from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Opera- field missions conducted to the affected areas in the tions (DPKO) and the UN Office to the African Union three countries between October and December 2012. (UNOAU) also attended. The purpose of the meeting Section I, provides the background to the assessment was (i) to discuss the draft findings of the preliminary and its linkages to wider AU and UN initiatives related needs assessment and to receive feedback comments, to the LRA. and (ii) to discuss with the AU the next steps. It was agreed to proceed along two scenarios that need con- Section II, outlines the main premises for the conduc- current implementation. These scenarios are described tion of the assessment, as well as the stages and prin- in Chapter H below ciples applied for its execution: At the time of writing, the above two criteria for moving Section III, presents the findings of the preliminary as- to the agreed next steps are not yet fully met. However, sessment on the main triggers of conflict in the area; the AU and UN envoys have reached agreement in priority needs of stabilization and rehabilitation; and a principle with the governments of RoSS and DRC that preliminary vision for action within the framework of ministerial level national focal points will be appointed. the African Union (AU) Regional Cooperation Initia- These appointments are reported to be in process. Un- tive against the LRA (RCI-LRA). fortunately, the outlook and situation in CAR has sig- Detailed findings of the preliminary assessment, in- nificantly worsened during the first quarter of 2013 as a cluding social and economic conditions in the affected result of the Séléka rebellion and their seizure of power. areas; delivery capacity of stakeholders; and activities CAR’s AU membership is currently suspended. This by partners on LRA related issues are included in com- means that some of the findings presented in this report plementary individual country assessment reports for may be out dated. However, it is safe to assume that an ROSS, DRC and CAR. already dire situation only has further deteriorated, that the needs identified remain fundamentally the same, Section IV, outlines a proposal on the next steps to be but that national capacity to respond has waned even taken for the completion of the assessment. 9 II. Approach A. Premises and principles factor in the assessment of overall stabilization options and planning (Eastern Equatoria, The assessment is based on two main premises: ROSS). i. That current regional and international efforts will B. Guiding principles result in an end to the LRA security threat; The following guiding principles apply to the conducting ii. That the governments of DRC, ROSS and CAR are of the assessment: willing to fully engage in the assessment process and to provide the required national leadership. Regional and national ownership: The assessment and any ensuing strategy and plan of action will be aligned Selective coverage and results: The assessment and its rec- with RCI-LRA and related regional policy instruments, ommendations will be focused on prioritized themes as well as with national policies and priorities. It will and geographical areas of focus in the tri-border state be developed in conjunction with national partners area: ensuring their ownership and leadership in implemen- tation. ¡¡ Thematic coverage: focused on conditions to facilitate return, reintegration needs as well Inclusive: While the strategy will prioritize and focus as those for stabilization and development, on a few “key” stabilization and recovery goals and including national and cross-border conditions outcomes, the process of prioritization started with the and challenges. consideration of a broader set of issues that were the subject of extensive dialogue with a range of national ¡¡ Geographical coverage: the assessment is focused on and international stakeholders. the tri-border zone of DRC, CAR and ROSS affected by LRA activity after 2008 when the most recent Integrated: Although the strategy is focused on stabili- efforts to negotiate an end to the LRA threat zation and rehabilitation measures that place emphasis failed and current military operations started. on the provision of basic services and infrastructure, Areas previously affected are not assessed, either due consideration is given to interrelated political, because LRA no longer poses a meaningful threat security, economic, social and cross-border factors. and responses to their earlier activity are already These elements will constitute the main clusters for part of mainstream development interventions the design of the strategy, and the Transitional Results (Uganda), or are not any longer the determining Framework and plan of action. 10 III. Findings A. Geographical delimitation Democratic Republic of Congo: -- Dungu, Faradje and Niangara territories in the The proposed definition of the territory to be covered Haut-Uele district, Province Orientale in the detailed assessment and ensuing strategy is based -- Ango territory in the Bas Uele district, PO; on three main interrelated factors - the security situa- tion, operational access, and administrative divisions Central African Republic: and competencies. It is proposed to include the follow- ing administrative areas: -- Haut Mbomou prefecture -- Mbomou prefecture, eastern part up to Bakouma Republic of South Sudan: and Rafai -- Western Equatoria State, in the areas bordering DRC and CAR Map 1: Areas affected by LRA activities and administrative divisions, February 2013 ! 11 The preliminary assessment found that there are The last reported LRA incident in ROSS took place marked differences across the proposed areas of geo- in Western Equatoria State in April 2012 (South of graphical focus in terms of the security situation and Yambio and Nzara towns close to the DRC border). No levels of access, with marked difference in the situation LRA incidents have been reported in Eastern Equatoria faced between even neighboring communities in some or Central Equatoria States for close to two years. Two cases. This makes it difficult to easily identify and seg- incidents were reported in Western Bahr el Ghazal State regate geographical sub areas for condition-appropriate along the border with CAR in 2011. There seems to be targeting of interventions. Given present restrictions a trend towards a diminishing number of LRA incidents in access, it is proposed that the detailed assessment in South Sudan and those that have occurred have in- will attempt to identify and group communities in the creasingly moved further north-west along the border affected areas against a number of typologies identified with the CAR. (Box 4 and Chapter F). The presence of LRA in northeast DRC has been The LRA started operating in what is now the territory reported since mid-2005, from where it used to coor- of the ROSS in the mid-1990s, from where it continued dinate attacks on the Sudan People’s Liberation Army incursions in northern Uganda. In 2002, the govern- (ROSS) and Uganda. Attacks on DRC soil intensified ment in Khartoum gave permission for the deployment at the end of 2008, with the failure of the Juba peace of the Ugandan army in South Sudan to fight the LRA talks and the launch of Operation Lighting Thunder. and their engagement in South Sudan continued post South Sudan independence with the agreement of the Recent incidents attributed to LRA concentrate in the Government of the ROSS. UPDF troops were still on Haut Uele and Bas Uele districts. Areas of operation South Sudan soil at the time of the assessment but are roughly cover 3 territories in Haut - Dungu, Faradje, now operating under the AU-RTF umbrella. Niangara - and Ango territory in Bas Uele. The number of reported incidents has decreased since the beginning of 2012. However, it is difficult to ascertain whether this Box 4: Area based targeting Typology of variation in security situation reflects a long-term trend or whether it is be and community stabilization attributed to other factors. Areas that have not registered incidents in the last years, with local LRA activities in the CAR have been reported since communities and displaced population committed to local integra- early 2008, with raids in several localities in the south- tion, and a measure of subsistence through agriculture or small east (Prefecture of Haut Mbomou). Raids intensified in businesses achieved. These conditions are found in areas of Western early 2009, following the dispersal of the LRA forces into Equatoria State, ROSS. smaller units in response to military advances during Areas that have not registered incidents in the last years but where Operation Lighting Thunder. Most of the recorded in- integration has not taken place or is ongoing, and tensions exist due cidents in 2012 occurred in the Haut Mbomou Prefec- to unequal access to resources. These conditions are found mainly in ture and on the eastern half of Mbomou Prefecture, up areas of Western Equatoria State, ROSS to Bakouma and Rafaï. A small number of LRA-related incidents have been reported in the north-east in the Areas left by IDPs and not fully resettled, with security concerns Haute Kotto Prefecture. regarding the return of LRA activities and difficult access. These conditions are found in ROSS areas close to the DRC border as well Reported incidents in the three countries cover a as in DRC and CAR. variety of types of incidents, from simple sightings of armed groups, through direct attacks to households and Areas with high security concerns, with practically no presence of the villages plundering food and supplies, to abductions, state, where a high percentage of the population is displaced, that killings and other abuses. Present incidents attributed are sparsely populated and difficult to access. These conditions are to the LRA tend to be carried out by small groups of 3 to found in DRC and CAR. 5 that generally avoid direct confrontation with RTF or Source: AFTCS/TDRP, 2013 national armies and UN forces (MONUSCO in DRC). It has been reported that the LRA in CAR sometimes 12 regroup in larger numbers (20) but there are no known alliances with other armed groups. B. Triggers of conflict: Internal and external stresses The present strength of the LRA forces is unknown, with estimates of over 100 in ROSS (500 by certain Table 1 below highlights some of the triggers of conflict accounts); 100 to 200 in DRC; and 300 in CAR (in- and associated stresses identified by communities in the cluding abductees). affected areas and their perceived importance. Table 1: Summary table of triggers of conflict identified at country level and perceptions of importance TRIGGER RoSS DRC CAR Policy – governance: Low national priority and allocation of resources for the development of affected area High High High Low priority given to military operations against LRA in relation to other national armed High Very High Very High conflicts and demands No recognition of the presence of LRA in the country (DRC) Low Very High Low Weak or absent state capacity to deliver basic services, political representation and admin- High Very High Very High istration Absence of strategies to promote LRA desertions and facilitate repatriation/relocation and Very High Very High Very High reintegration A weak police force and judiciary unable to discharge their duties Medium Very High Very High Social: High incidence of poverty and lack of social services and facilities Medium High High Unequal access to external support among displaced and local communities Medium High Low Difficult or lack of access to land by the displaced population Medium High High Weak community structures and organizations High High Very High Economic: Lack of infrastructure: roads and communications Medium High High Low productivity and support to improve livelihoods High Very High Very High Security: The presence of and/or continued incidents by LRA, insecurity, fear and limited access Medium High Very High The operation of other armed groups under the name of LRA – delinquency Low High High Mistrust of communities in, and/or lack of capacity of, the government armed forces Medium High High Presence of unregistered foreigners and delinquency Medium Low Low 13 C. Findings: Policy and governance does not outline clear measures to maximize the com- issues parative advantages of each region. Some actions in support of rural areas are included in the strategy for the agricultural sector; but they remain largely unfunded. Low priority and allocation of resources to the Ongoing conflict and greater opportunities for the ex- affected areas ploitation of natural resources in other regions of CAR People in the areas affected by LRA activity in the three have conspired to keep the south-east in a constant state countries share a common perception of neglect and of marginalization from the rest of the country. Follow- isolation from central government authorities both ing the overthrow of the CAR Government in April in terms of the allocation of resources for basic social 2013 the wider environment for the implementation of services and in the promotion of economic develop- the PRS is now unclear to say the least. ment and investment opportunities. This fuels a sense Public sector capacity of resentment and could lead to conflict for the redress- ing of perceived grievances. It is not feasible under present circumstances to implement stabilization and rehabilitation programs through the Republic of South Sudan: A strategic development plan formulated with the support of UNDP exists for public sector in a cost-effective and efficient manner. Despite Western Equatoria State in ROSS and some counties certain differences among them, there is a generalized have set priorities against which to allocate potential lack of public sector capacity to deliver basic services external resources. However, there are in general no re- or support development interventions in the affected sources allocated for the implementation of this plan. areas of the three countries. At the national level the government is presently priori- Republic of South Sudan: Western Equatoria State is tizing the allocation of resources to the northern states administratively organized at the levels of state, county, particularly in need of stabilization after independence payam, boma and village. States are responsible for from Sudan and to areas where larger internal con- planning and delivery of social services in their areas flicts remain unresolved, such as in the east. Follow- of responsibility while federal sectoral organizations ing the policy set by the government, the main focus have a policy-making, normative and national planning of international development partners is also to target role. For all practical purposes, most of the civil service the northern and eastern states. The United States is is concentrated at the state and county level. There is a the main international partner providing LRA-specific dearth of qualified personnel in Western Equatoria State support in Western Equatoria State. It has deployed except for the top layer of state ministers and directors. advisors to assist in the development of actions to The war triggered an exodus of qualified staff, however, support border communities. few are coming back. Top political and management Democratic Republic of Congo: A five-year devel- personnel appear committed towards the development opment plan, 2010-2015 exists in Province Orientale of the young country and Western Equatoria State in in the DRC. The implementation of the plan rests to a particular. However low level of remuneration and lack large extent on the mobilization of external resources of training and skills reinforcement programs contrib- presently not secured, while the limited government utes to a chronic situation of lack of qualified personnel resources committed to Province Orientale are mainly at all levels. used to cover recurrent costs. No particular priority is Democratic Republic of Congo: There is a systemic given in the plan to the development of the Haut Uele lack of resources and operational capacity at all lower and Bas Uele Districts or to the territories and border areas specifically affected by LRA activity. levels of public administration in Province Orientale. There are indications that the situation might not be Central African Republic: The increase of rural too different at the District and Provincial levels given productivity and the strengthening of public sector the observed limited presence and influence they bear capacity are among the main priorities of the Poverty on local conditions. Lack of public sector resources Reduction Strategy 2011-2015 for CAR. However, it coupled with insecurity and restricted access contribute 14 to a chronic understaffing of social services (schools, extensively cultivated despite the fertility of the land health facilities, etc.) and infrastructure in the area is and high potential for food production. The years of very poor. Low salary levels preclude the engagement war leading to the north-south Sudan Comprehensive of qualified personnel, including teachers and health Peace Agreement (2005) and the subsequent activi- workers. This situation contributes to the presence of ties of LRA severely disrupted production patterns and an effective governance vacuum in which armed groups limited the provision of basic services in the region, par- and bandits thrive exacerbating a sense of insecurity ticularly in the area bordering DRC. A lack of second- and absence of the rule of law. ary/feeder roads hinders productivity and preludes the efficient marketing of local produce. Farming practices Central African Republic: The capacity of the au- remain underdeveloped and inefficient and low levels thorities in CAR to delivery services at the Prefecture, of productivity are also found in the livestock, forestry sub- prefecture and municipal/locality levels is for all and fisheries sectors. practical purposes negligible. The Prefect is the rep- resentative of the central government and its sectoral Democratic Republic of Congo: Bas Uele and Haut ministries and agencies at the local level. However, this Uele Districts in Province Orientale are amongst function is performed primarily at the political level to the poorest regions in the country, with 75.5% of the ensure the projection of the authority of the central gov- population living below the poverty line3. Only 2% of ernment over the local population. There is an almost the population has access to safe water and sanitation total absence of de- concentrated facilities or services provision is almost non-existent. The recorded infant provided by the central government. Under these con- mortality rate was 89/1000 in 2009 and primary school ditions, the sense of abandonment of the population by attendance stands at 53%. With the exception of a few the central government is compounded by the presence trunk roads along the east-west axis and from Dungu to of delegated authorities that are perceived as not re- the north and south, the area does not have a network sponsive to local needs and that do not share common of feeder roads and this seriously limits access to rural interests in the development of the communities. communities and hinders the provision of both services and security. The cellular telephone network covers D. Findings: Social and economic only the main towns and has no penetration in rural issues areas. There are, however, several FM radio stations in operation supported by external organizations which Poverty, access to services and infrastructure often offer the only means of conveying information to those with access to radio receivers. With the exception of Western Equatoria State in ROSS, poverty, unfulfilled expectations, poor access to Close to 84% of the population of Province Orien- national economic networks and unequal distribution tale depends on subsistence agriculture and 10% on of wealth are common factors contributing to social fra- informal non-agricultural activities. Most subsistence gility in the affected areas increasing the potential for farmers also produce a small amount of cash crops for conflict and violence. trading (corn, rice, coffee). Farming practices remain underdeveloped and there is a chronic lack of agricul- In Republic of South Sudan, Western Equatoria tural inputs and opportunities for skills transfer fishing State has the second lowest incidence of poverty in and livestock sectors remain largely under developed. the country, which at 42.1% is well below the national Pastoralist groups, like the Mbororo, are also present in average of 50.6%2. With 86% of its population living in the area but are often in a state of conflict with settled rural areas, the main source of livelihood is subsistence farming communities. farming with some small surpluses produced for market sale, mainly staple food and fruits. Cash crops are not Central African Republic: While the Prefectures of Haut Mbomou and Mbomou are close to CAR’s average 2   National Bureau of Statistics, South Sudan (former: Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation), Poverty in Southern Sudan, 3   UNDP, Province Orientale, Profil Resume, Pauverte et Conditions Estimates from the National Baseline Household Survey 2009, March 2010 de Vie Des Ménages, Mars 2009 15 in terms of monetary poverty (63.3% as compared to appear to be focused on complaints that unequal support 62% for CAR as a whole), they are by far the worst is provided to some groups of displaced persons or as a in terms of poverty in living conditions, 95.1% as result of issues related to social tensions arising from a compared to an average of 75.1% for CAR as a whole4. protracted situation of displacement. The percentage of women headed households is above the national average, standing at 26.4% for Mbomou In South Sudan returnees from Sudan and IDPs in and 31.1% for Haut Mbomou. Access to essential Western Equatoria State have received little or no services is extremely limited. Road infrastructure is in support from the ROSS authorities and this has created an appalling state, presenting serious restrictions for the tensions and negative comparisons with the assis- access to the south-east and contributing to the regions tance provided to returning refugees from Uganda isolation from the rest of the country. or elsewhere. Some communities also complain of an increased prevalence of what they consider to be anti- Most of the population in south-east CAR depends on social or delinquent behavior which they associate with subsistence agriculture complemented by game hunting the presence of ‘unregistered nationals’ from DRC, and fishing. As in the other areas assessed, income which is causing resentment and the rejection of some generating activities, agriculture, fishing, hunting and groups within communities. forestry practices remain largely underdeveloped and there is a severe lack of inputs and opportunities for Unlike in ROSS, humanitarian programs in CAR and skills transfer. DRC are of a limited scale or non-existent for large sections of the displaced population. As a consequence, Displaced population and sources of tension – un- there are not major conflicts arising from perceived in- equal access to resources equitable allocation of humanitarian resources in these areas. Despite the generally positive acceptance of IDPs and refugees by the local population and authorities in the Overall, the relations between displaced populations three countries, tensions do sometimes arise. These and local communities in the three countries are rela- tively peaceful thanks in part to their ethnic homogeneity. Refugee laws and Table 2: Estimates of Displaced Population regulations in all three countries are Population in affected areas (1) relatively benign and tend to promote equal access to work and mobility for ROSS DRC CAR the whole population. Total 620,000 (2) 2,800,000 (6) 222,000 (8) Access to land by the displaced population4 IDPs (LRA related mainly) 49,000 (3)(7) 350,000 (7) 22,000 (9) While there is a general availability of agricultural land in the LRA affected Returnees (LRA related mainly) 20,000 (4) n/a n/a areas, displaced households in DRC and CAR face some difficulties in Refugees (LRA related mainly) 10,500 (5) 1,300 (7) 6,000 (9) securing access/tenure. Lack of formal land registries and the disruption of cus- Other displaced (10) 100 n/a n/a tomary practices for land allocation can (1) Rounded figures: census, OCHA, (6) Total for HU and BU districts others (7) September 2012 (2) Total Western Equatoria State (8) Total Haut Mbomou and Mbomou (3)From 75,000 max. recorded in 2011 4   World Bank – Government of (9) November 2012 (4) Returned to November 2012 CAR (2012) Document de Stratégie (10) Figures do not include nomadic Mbororo pastoralists de Reduction de la Pauvreté (DRSP2) (5) From DRC (9,000) and CAR (1,500) in DRC & CAR 2011-2015 16 create uncertainty and breed conflict between displaced and In both ROSS and CAR there may be growing pressure host communities. on land if displacement becomes further protracted. Whilst some of those affected have been able to negoti- The displaced population in Western Equatoria State, ate access to agricultural land through informal agree- ROSS, has not found many obstacles in accessing land, ments, it is not clear whether these agreements can both for shelter construction and agricultural produc- be sustained or how they will evolve if displacement tion. Given that the distance of displacement is rela- becomes long term and as pressure on land increases. tively small, between 50 and 70 km, IDPs tend to have ethnic and kinship links with host communities. Land is Weak community structures allocated by the chief of the community and endorsed at the locality level. Most displaced households keep The weakening of community structures in the LRA affected the land in their places of origin and conduct visits to areas increases their vulnerability to external threats and ensure their tenure and collect produce. Some tensions precludes the emergence of community driven initiatives for over access to and use of land are reported in the eastern local development. part of Western Equatoria State, between Dinka Agar The Azande are the predominant group in Western groups from Lakes State (pastoralist) and the mainly Equatoria State in ROSS in what is considered as a rela- agricultural communities of Western Equatoria State. tively ethnically homogeneous area. The Azande are Given the fear of the LRA, it is not unusual to find also one of the main groups across the border in CAR households in the Haut and Bas Uele districts of and within the Haut district of DRC. Other impor- Province Orientale, DRC reporting that they have tant groups include the Boa in Bas Uele, DRC, and the been displaced five or six times. Displaced households nomadic pastoralist Mbororos in DRC and CAR. There normally move to other rural areas relatively close to are not major ethnic tensions in the affected areas. Cus- their places of origin or to the fringes of the main towns tomary community practices are applied at the village in the region. One of the main problems faced by the level and used to ensure social cohesion and resolve displaced is access to land in their new areas of settle- disputes or tensions that do arise. ment. Some households manage to keep a foothold on Despite the preservation of customary practices, these their original land with the expectation of return. There have been weakened by years of conflict, displacement are some reports of cases of returning IDPs finding their and the intervention of government authorities. With land occupied by another family, with ensuing conflicts some variations, communities’ across the region lack regarding tenure. There are few records of formal land the capacity to embark on significant initiatives for their property, thus land issues tend to be dealt with through development. Many communities have very limited customary mechanisms of land allocation and conflict experience of day-to-day cooperation for the mainte- mediation and resolution. nance of social services or the promotion of income IDPs in the areas affected by the LRA in CAR tend to generation activities through associations or coopera- move close to towns where they normally are able to tives. Their experiences of wide scale community col- access land for housing. Residential plots are awarded laboration work have been mainly related to reaction to by the mayor or village chief depending on the availabil- an external threat or crisis, like the organization of self- ity of land in the locality. Presently, there are no formal defense forces, or to shared-labor for agricultural tasks land registries or title deeds. Access to agricultural land such as land clearance. is more complex and IDPs generally face more chal- lenges in securing access to land for farming. Some E. (In)Security succeed through the use of kinship relations or acquain- The presence of LRA and other armed groups, inse- tances but this is not the norm. Some still keep a link to curity, fear and access their original land, but, as opposed to the situation in ROSS and DRC, many others say that they have cur- The lack of verified information on the incidents of violence rently completely abandoned their original land fearing has led to situation of entrenched fear, where the popula- further LRA attacks. tion tends to attribute all incidents of violence to the LRA. 17 The dispersal of the LRA into small, mobile, groups of 3 Western Equatoria State, ROSS, while presently con- to 5, makes it difficult for conventional armed forces to tributing to a perception of security and stability among mount an effective response, especially those unfamiliar the local communities, could lead to future tensions with the area. This heightens a sense of the group’s om- related to the presence and eventual operations of nipresence and invincibility. Fear and perception of lack the SPLA and AU-RTF military forces. The existence of security preclude access to communities and limits of some form of dialogue between the Home Guards the operations of national and international support or- and the Western Equatoria State authorities has been ganizations. reported, although it is not possible to identify concrete measures of support to these groups. Despite the diminishing number of reported LRA inci- dents in ROSS, it is clear that a climate of fear and uncer- Local self-defense groups have also appeared in DRC in tainty is still present among the population of Western response to the threat of presumed LRA groups. Their Equatoria State, particularly among those living along establishment, while could be a contributing factor to the border with DRC. This situation is reflected in the increased security, is also a potential source of conflict reluctance of the remaining IDPs, to return to their with the government and FADRC as the operation of places of origin. armed groups is not allowed by law. It appears that they have strong support at the local level; however their re- The probable operation of several armed groups under lationship with formal authorities in the Bas Uele and the name of LRA reinforces the perception of insecurity Haut districts is uncertain. and mistrust among the people in the Bas Uele and Haut districts of DRC. Traditional patterns of rural activities Self-defense groups in the areas affected by the LRA in CAR have been disrupted and agricultural plots far from pop- received limited support from the government in 2010, after ulated areas are being abandoned. New agricultural plots which it was discontinued. There was a recent initiative by tend now to be located closer to the villages to reduce the Ministry of risks and work is often done in rotation by groups of households with protection from the security forces. Defense to assess the number of people currently Hunting and other activities that involve movement engaged in self-defense forces in order to develop a far from the villages have been reduced, as has been the policy regarding their operation. Nevertheless, it is not movement of local produce to markets. possible to report on the progress of this initiative or its expected outcomes. The current situation in CAR The state of fear induces the propagation of rumors and means that the situation will need to be reassessed. the passing of unfounded information on presumed LRA incidents. The sense of insecurity is further Security and Justice Sector/Rule of law enhanced as such reports are broadcasted, unverified, The weak presence, and in certain places the total absence, on the local radios. Regardless of whether they are LRA of police forces and judiciary in the LRA affected areas related incidents or not, it is evident that the “percep- creates a vacuum in the presence of the state and results in tion” of insecurity in the area and its impact on the population is very real and response actions will need a sense of impunity. to take this into account. In the ROSS, there is a moderate police presence in The self-defense forces Western Equatoria State. UNDP is supporting a police capacity building program in Western Equatoria State. Local self-defense forces established in LRA-affected areas However, at present, police numbers and resources have been a factor in increasing the perception of security are unable to cope with security demands. There are among communities, however, the presence of additional parallel needs to reinforce the capacity and operation armed groups not recognized by the governments is in of the judiciary. conflict with the mandate of the regular armed forces and increases the risk of armed clashes among rival groups. The police force in Haut and Bas Uele districts in DRC is extremely weak, with no effective capacity to ensure The activities of the Home Guards (Arrow Boys) in the rule of law or even project the presence of state au- 18 thority. This situation is exacerbated by the low capacity in promoting security; however the needs are beyond of the justice law and order sector in general (there are their present capacity. 300 police officers for the whole of Faradje, Dungu, Niangara and Ango territories). To compensate for the The Armed Forces of DRC (FARDC) have a weak limited presence of the police, some NGOs and CBOs presence in the affected areas and its strength has been are promoting the establishment of early warning further reduced by the redeployment of some units to systems as well as the dissemination of information North and South Kivu Provinces. FADRC forces are through radios and other media. mainly concentrated in towns and along important communication lines (Dungu-Faradje-Aru; Dungu- The police (gendarmerie) in CAR has a token presence Duru; Dungu-Bengadi-Doruma) with limited capacity in towns like Obo and is practically absent in other to mobilize in response to incidents. This situation has smaller settlements. The presence of justice law and contributed to weak security and access in Bas Uele and order actors and the state in general is weak and insuf- Haut and has facilitated the operation of other armed ficient to guarantee the safety of the population even groups and bandits. The operations of FADRC do not under normal circumstances. generate confidence among the local population due to the perception that they are pursuing their own inter- Military forces ests and engaging in parallel security activities. The national armies in the LRA-affected areas are not At the time of the field work, the low levels of deploy- fully engaged with the local population and their presence ment of the now defunct FACA (former Armed Forces is often not perceived as a response to the communities of CAR) and their weak operational capacity, contrib- security needs. The lack of official recognition of an LRA uted to a widespread sense of insecurity and fear in the presence in DRC further compounds the sense of inse- Haut Mbomou and Mbomou areas with LRA presence. curity and fear amongst the population. At the time of writing, it was also unclear how the Séléka The presence of the SPLA in Western Equatoria State, defeat of the FACA has affected human security; but it ROSS, is relatively light in comparison to the larger con- is assumed that an already dire situation can only have centrations observed in the northern and eastern parts worsened. of the country due to ongoing tensions and conflict. Cross-border issues There are no reports on conflict fueled by the presence of the SPLA in the area, however the local population The movement of LRA forces across the tri-partite border often sees them as a force dominated by people from areas calls for concerted action among the countries in other regions of South Sudan. A factor contributing order to generate the security conditions required for reha- to the decrease in the number of incidents of violence bilitation and development. The preliminary assessment attributed to LRA in ROSS appears to be the deploy- has not covered military-security issues. However, it ment of the Uganda People Defense Forces (UPDF) is important to have a clear understanding of the mil- in Western Equatoria State under the umbrella of the itary-security environment in which stabilization and AU-RTF. The UPDF are in general well received by the rehabilitation interventions will need to be conducted local population. within the three countries and across borders. In the DRC, the government and military command- Regional cooperation is necessary to harmonize policies on ers in the field do not acknowledge the presence of the demobilization of foreign LRA recruits, in particular LRA forces within DRC territory. Armed incidents in when the process of reintegration involves the return the region are attributed to common banditry. Cur- to the country of origin and the support that needs to rently, there are no foreign military forces deployed in be provided to the returnees and the host communities. the Haut and Bas Uele districts with the exception of Presently, there is no legal or operational framework in MONUSCO peacekeepers and the multi-national team place that articulates how adult LRA recruits in DRC at JIOC ( Joint Intelligence Operations Cell) under and CAR should be handled and reintegrated, and MONUSCO umbrella. MONUSCO security person- those who do come out of the bush can be arrested and nel are deployed in seven bases and are a positive factor subjected to trial at any moment. 19 There are to date no specific national policies or strategies The preliminary assessment has not been able to substan- to deal with the stabilization and recovery of LRA affected tially cover issues of natural resources, conflict and fragil- areas. The absence of national strategies to deal with the ity. The planned full assessment will need to include a LRA threat and agreed modalities on how to approach more detailed evaluation of the practices observed in stabilization and rehabilitation needs preclude the har- the agricultural, forestry, mining and wildlife sectors, monization of approaches and the setting up of effective to determine the extent of the damage caused to the cooperation mechanisms among the three countries. It natural environment and the resulting increased fragil- is also a stumbling block for the effective allocation of ity of local communities as well as potential options and institutional responsibilities and resources to this task. approaches to address these issues. The net result of the above is delayed action and in- creased vulnerability of the affected communities and Despite that the LRA-affected areas in the three coun- countries in general. tries are rich in renewable natural resources, water, land and wildlife, the absence of the state results in the con- The absence of a concerted operational approach for the tinued application of ineffective and unsustainable agri- stabilization and rehabilitation of LRA- affected areas cultural, forestry and mining practices. postpones the development of cross-border strategies on security, reintegration, infrastructure and economic devel- It must be noted that while LRA and other armed groups opment. Due to lack of access, the mission was unable to operating under its name are themselves responsible make a direct evaluation of conditions along the actual for using unsustainable practices for the exploitation of borders between the three countries. As such, it was natural resources, environmental deterioration is also not possible to assess the strength of the controls, the being brought about by the absence of the state and the actual demarcation of the borders, or the actual social use of inappropriate practices by the communities, and and economic interactions among border communi- the operations of illegal entrepreneurs some with the ties. It is envisaged that these issues will be appraised direct support of organized armed groups. in more detail during the detailed assessment mission if appropriate access can be secured. Thus, the findings F. Stabilization and rehabilitation priority needs below refer to the information obtained at the regional headquarters of the areas visited as well as a review of secondary documentation and other available informa- This section provides a first approximation of the tion. The follow-up detailed assessment will aim to look priority needs faced by communities in the affected at these issues in more detail, from the stabilization and areas. rehabilitation perspective, and assess the potential for introducing improved border management and soft The context for stabilization and rehabilitation border principles as adopted in the AU Border Program (AUBP). Conditions in LRA affected vary significantly. Based on observations made during the preliminary assessment The AUBP includes soft-border principles aimed at sup- and subsequent analysis and number of differing types porting the strengthening of traditional ethnic social capital of broad contexts can be identified as co-existing in the and informal and formal trading links between the affected territory covered by the assessment. areas in ROSS, DRC, CAR, as well as with Uganda, are of strategic importance for the stabilization and reha- The proposed working definition for area based targeting is bilitation of the region. LRA activity, the breakdown as follows: of transport infrastructure and the limited coverage of telecommunications are an obstacle to the development 1. Areas that have not registered incidents in the of the region. Important transport corridors connecting last years, with local communities and displaced the ROSS, DRC, CAR and Uganda need to be upgraded population committed to local integration, and as part of an agreed and coherent cross-border strategy a measure of subsistence through agriculture or small businesses achieved. These conditions are Natural resources found in areas of Western Equatoria State, ROSS. 20 2. Areas that have not registered incidents in the last include only those whose implementation is considered years; but where integration has not taken place feasible under the present conditions in the region. As or is ongoing, and tensions exist due to unequal mentioned previously, the Séléka rebellion and collapse access to resources. These conditions are found of the former government of CAR has significantly mainly in areas of Western Equatoria State, ROSS. changed the outlook in that country. However, the fun- damental needs identified remain in an even more pre- 3. Areas left by IDPs and not fully resettled, with carious and fragile overall situation. security concerns regarding the return of LRA ac- tivities and difficult access. These conditions are Improved access to telephone and radio networks could found in ROSS areas close to the DRC border as maintain essential links between isolated communities well as in DRC and CAR. and the rest of the region, promoting improved security and social and economic interactions. Additional 4. Areas with high security concerns, with practically support is required to make such networks accessible to no presence of the state, where a high percentage of the population is displaced, that are sparsely the population by facilitating the acquisition of mobile populated and difficult to access. These conditions telephones and radio sets and the design of affordable are found in DRC and CAR. tariffs as well as structures to ensure their sustainable operation (Map 2). Restrictions in access at the moment hinder the mapping of all communities and sub-areas of the LRA Improved access, security and development through trans- affected territory according to the above categories. If portation and communications. Critical infrastructure the current security and access conditions persist, the interventions could be designed, particularly upgrad- detailed assessment will aim to identify a set of selected ing and maintenance of trunk roads linking the affected communities under the above categories for eventual areas to markets and trade routes with neighboring targeting by a stabilization and rehabilitation program. countries, including Uganda, as well as with the national transportation networks in DRC (Province Orientale) Given the diversity of conditions found among the and CAR (Bangassu-Bangui) (Map 3). communities in the affected areas, program compo- nents would need to be applied selectively according to Enhance local capacities for the implementation of stabili- the specific situation in each community. zation and rehabilitation actions. Given the isolation of the area, program delivery and follow-up operations A challenging environment for the implementation of sta- and maintenance have to rely to a large extent on local bilization and rehabilitation programs. Identified areas of communities and authorities. Therefore, it calls for activity only include those that are considered feasible the implementation of a robust program to enhance in terms of implementation under present circumstanc- the capacity of local authorities and communities for es and for which some form of demand has been expressed implementation of “community- driven” type of reha- by stakeholders in the respective countries. bilitation activities. Improved capacity would need to go hand in hand with an increased presence of the state Limited implementation capacity in the affected areas. A through its institutions for the protection of the popula- realistic balance needs to be found between demand tion and administration of justice. driven processes and the necessity to undertake ap- propriate assessments of community stabilization and Increase community cohesiveness and resilience. At the recovery needs and formulate appropriate plans and present stage in the conflict-recovery process in the funding proposals. Presently, these functions can only LRA affected areas, it is necessary to implement activi- be performed with/by external support. ties aiming at increasing community cohesiveness and Priority needs resilience to cope with present threats and overcome fear. Such activities could contribute to creating a solid The table below presents the priority needs in the base on which to build future recovery activities, both affected areas as identified by the preliminary assess- through the improvement of livelihoods and the access ment in consultation with national partners. They to essential services. They need to be accompanied by 21 Map 2: Current and planned FM radio coverage – LRA affected areas ! more targeted interventions to overcome the trauma era using the pilots to identify effective approaches for experienced by people directly affected by LRA inci- achieving this. dents and to support the effective reintegration of the There is value in exploring the feasibility of implementing displaced population and people associated with the one or two pilot projects. Through small projects in scale, LRA. if appropriate communities are identified, support to Provide basic services and livelihood support to stabilized the full chain of livelihood activities and service provi- communities on a pilot basis. There is a dire need for basic sion can be applied. If successful, such projects could services and improved livelihoods in the areas. However, irradiate good practices to neighboring communities comprehensively addressing these needs is challenging and progressively increase the extension of areas under due to restrictions in access, security, delivery capacity stable conditions. and sustainability. Conditions for the cost-effective Establish an enabling policy and organizational environ- implementation of such programs are not currently in ment for stabilization and rehabilitation as well as for cross place. Implementation of such activities would require border initiatives. There is an urgent need for appropriate careful piloting combined with the mobilization of sub- national institutional arrangements and responsibilities stantial resources to eventually set up full-scale regional to be defined, given the multiple sectors and type of and national program delivery structures in a post-LRA activities involved in implementing a stabilization and 22 Map 3: Network of trunk roads – Areas affected by LRA activities, February 2013 ! rehabilitation program. Concurrently, at the regional has a regional peace and security focus. While ICGLR level, dialogue between the countries of the tri-border does not have AU REC status, it is officially recognized area need to focus on cross-border trade and economic by the AU as a Regional Mechanism and it therefore development. In principle, this could take place in the provides an important potential platform for dialogue context of one of the Regional Economic Communities and discussion on these issues. (RECs). However, it is noted that there is no existing REC to act as a forum for the three countries. For Table 3 summarizes the priority needs for stabilization example, ROSS is not a member of ECCAS (but CAR and rehabilitation for each country as identified during and DRC are), and CAR is not a member of COMESA the preliminary assessment. The overview of needs (but DRC and ROSS are). The assessment notes that “presents only those that the preliminary assessment the AU could play a convening role in this regard and considers as feasible implementation given current that the detailed assessment should explore the possible security and access restrictions, and that reflect actual application of the ‘soft border’ conflict management demands as expressed by stakeholders in the three concept promoted by the AU Border Program. countries”. All three countries are members of the International Despite the fact that some needs might be of relevance Conference for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) that for more than one country, e.g. the “formulation of an operational strategy for LRA affected areas,” they are 23 Table 3: Preliminary assessment: Summary of priority stabilization and rehabilitation needs that can be feasibly implemented INTERVENTION ROSS DRC CAR Policy – governance: Formulation of an operational strategy for LRA affected areas Support to Security Sector Reform Build capacity at the county/sector/commune and state/territory/prefecture level for service delivery Build the capacity of the police and judiciary: rule of law and presence of the state Legal framework and protocols for escapees: reception-verification-relocation/repatriation-integration Social: Delivery basic services: health, education, water, sanitation, and promotion of housing construction Psycho-social support and counseling to ex-combatants and abductees in the process of reintegration Psycho-social support to local communities affected by LRA - counseling on hosting displaced persons Support community structures at village level to strengthen cohesion-resilience, and reduce vulnerabilities Economic: Trunk roads linking affected areas to rest of the country and neighboring countries Delivery of secondary transport infrastructure: rural productivity and security Telecommunications infrastructure and access to telephones and radio sets Livelihood improvement programs focused on agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishing Promotion of private sector investment in the agricultural and forestry sectors Support to the constitution of associations to increase productivity & development activities Security: Awareness, information dissemination and social support on LRA activities, build trust and eradicate fear shown only for those countries where specific demands tionally owned strategy: were expressed, or consultations were held, on the issue. Limited knowledge of RCI-LRA. The interviews conduct- ed during the preliminary assessment with national and G. Additional factors for consideration regional authorities in the three countries show that in developing a strategy for there is in general a limited or no knowledge on the AU’s RCI-LRA and its objectives outside a selected group of stabilization and rehabilitation organizations dealing primarily with DDR issues. In addition to contextual issues that condition the Lack of clarity on national institutional responsibilities actual implementation of stabilization and rehabilita- for LRA related stabilization and rehabilitation. It was tion programs, there are other policy factors that would not possible to ascertain at what policy and decision- need to be addressed in defining a regionally and na- making level rest the responsibility for taking action 24 on LRA-related issues in the three countries. There is those directly created by the LRA. not a single national agency or institution in any of the three countries taking the lead in relation LRA related Participation of DRC in a stabilization and rehabilitation stabilization and rehabilitation. The only institutions strategy. There is the risk of DRC not joining a broader presently engaged are the SPLA and FACA in the secu- stabilization and rehabilitation program in view that the rity-military area. This situation limits the ownership/ government of DRC neither recognizes the presence of commitment of the country with the strategy and fol- LRA in its territory nor has joined the command struc- low-up. It is necessary to bridge existing gaps in national ture of AU-RTF. Negotiations need to be conducted political ownership in preparation for the detailed as- to ensure the participation of DRC in the strategy and sessment and the formulation of the strategy. it might be necessary to find an appropriate approach to incorporate DRC’s views on the activities of other The limits of national DDR institutional competencies. armed groups in the area. Current DDR structures might not have the capacity, Collaboration with international organizations and donors mandate or appropriate features to deal with LRA- in the completion of the assessment. The implementation related stabilization and rehabilitation activities. The of stabilization and rehabilitation programs under the mandate of national DDR organizations normally umbrella of the AU will require close collaboration includes the implementation of individual reintegra- with international actors as the UN and key donors. It tion initiatives. Some DDR organizations are further is recommended that the detailed assessment is con- promoting the setting up of reintegration and recovery ducted following a collaborative process with the full programs with the host communities. However, these engagement of national and international stakeholders actions are limited in coverage and scope. They do not to ensure ownership by national authorities and buy-in amount to the implementation of a broad set of multi- by donors. sectoral activities required for stabilization and rehabili- tation. The identification of an appropriate institutional Security and Justice sector reform. While it is not the counterpart and framework for LRA-related activities is specific objective of the assessment, ongoing initiatives necessary in each of the countries and for cross-border for security and justice sector reform (SJR), particularly coordination. in CAR, should be taken into account in the design of LRA related strategies. No expectations on the cease of LRA-related violence in the short-term. Given the dispersed nature of LRA forces Political support for community-driven processes. Since and its indicted leadership and barring a still elusive the implementation of the activities proposed in the military victory or surrender, for all practical purposes strategy would demand a strong element of communi- all the affected areas in DRC and CAR continue to be ty-based processes and the collaboration with local and subject to incidents of violence and armed conflict international implementing partners, it would be neces- related. There are no initiatives to conduct a dialogue sary to ensure the full support of the national govern- between the LRA and the governments of the countries ments to this approach and the issuing of the necessary where they are active. Thus, there currently are no im- directives to decentralized authorities to facilitate this mediate prospects of an end violence and arrangements modality of work. for DDR of LRA forces - neither through military means nor through dialogue. Area-based approach and strategic, coherent and cross- border funding mechanism. There is a need to balance Need to deal with the effects of activities by armed groups individual targeting including private benefits, with and delinquents operating under the name of LRA. The per- community and area based targeting including public ception of insecurity in the ROSS-DRC-CAR tri-border goods. Country plans and programs of multiple bilater- area, while primarily related to LRA, is also the result of al and multilateral agencies in principle could be tuned the activities by other groups acting under the name of to achieve this. However, there is considerable variation LRA, banditry, and miscellaneous armed groups in the in the specific implementation strategies, processes, in- region. Thus, the strategy needs to develop a broader stitutional arrangements and funding mechanisms to view of insecurity and violence in the region, including implement such activities. Moreover, almost current 25 responses are almost all conceived and executed on a Agreed Scenarios moving forward ‘country- by-country’ basis. This is a necessity to and even desirable to ensure national level coordination, de- On February 19, 2013, the AFTCS team met in Addis velopment partner harmonization and alignment with Ababa with the Special Envoy of the African Union for national effort. However, the preliminary assessment the LRA issue. Representatives from the UN Depart- finds that cross-border trade and economic develop- ment of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the ment and financing are crucial to ensure a strategically UN Office to the African Union (UNOAU) attended. coherent response to stabilization and recovery needs. The purpose of the meeting was (i) to discuss the draft findings of the preliminary needs assessment and receive H. Vision and preliminary feedback and comments, and (ii) to discuss with the AU the next steps. It was agreed to proceed along two Transitional Results Framework scenarios that need concurrent implementation. (TRF) A proposed vision for stabilization and rehabilita- Scenario 1: contributing to an immediate early tion in the affected areas recovery response that needs to occur under the present circumstances where the LRA remains a A medium-term vision for the improvement of con- destabilizing factor and military operations against ditions in the LRA affected areas of ROSS, DRC and it are ongoing. This scenario requires close external CAR would consider an area where security has been coordination with the UN plans under prepara- achieved and illegal armed groups, including LRA, have tion by the UN Special Representative (UNSR) been demobilized and its members reintegrated in their for Central Africa and head of UNOCA, Abou places of origin; with stable local authorities capable to Moussa. manage development in their areas of competence; and self-reliant and cohesive communities with capacity to Scenario 2: a longer-term development-ori- plan and take action for their development, and with ented response premised on the assumption that national government collaborating for the development current regional and international efforts will result of the tri-border area. in ending the LRA security threats. This scenario would be tilted towards Regional economic inte- Within this context, and as argued above, a three-year gration as an important strategy for addressing vision and TRF would ensure that the proposed actions systemic state fragility through a cross-border can better adjust to the evolution of conditions on the stabilization trade and economic development ground. Therefore, the preliminary assessment proposes (CBSD) initiative that applies AU Border Program a three year vision for consideration by national govern- (AUPB) principles and develops package focused ments and the AU: on social cohesions, institutional and economic development and growth based on a vision for stabilization and development shared between the “LRA affected areas in ROSS (Western Equatoria three currently affected countries and Uganda. State), DRC (Faradje, Dungu, Niangara, Ango Ter- ritories) and CAR (Mbomou and Haut Mbomou Pre- fectures) are able to cope with, or free of LRA related These scenarios need to be pursued concurrently and incidents of violence, with representative and recog- both presuppose that the governments of DRC, ROSS nized community organizations; with local authori- and CAR are willing to fully engage in the assessment ties that have the capacity to deliver basic services; process. The AU Envoy for the LRA stated in February where the rule of law is applied, and where the basic 2013 that African leadership will be provided on conditions for undertaking broader stabilization and national programs and that he personally would take rehabilitation programs are present”. this forward together with the UN SRSG. 26 Immediate early recovery response tion activities until LRA activities have been contained or a cease of violence agreed upon, and the affected The proposed objectives and outcomes presented in the population is able to re-engage in longer-term social and TRF below reflect the findings of the assessment and its economic development processes. Given the fluidity of evaluation of what can be done under present circum- the political and security situation in the three coun- stances and while the military operations against the tries: LRA are ongoing (Scenario 1). It is recommended: that a medium-term, 3 years, vision The assessment is aware that the generic description of and strategy is designed “to lay the foundation” for some of the outcomes can be similar to those presented broader stabilization and recovery interventions in the in other programming and fund raising instruments, future” such as the UNDAF, CAF, humanitarian CAPs, and the country plans and programs of multiple bilateral and Long-term development and cross-border multilateral agencies. It is also understood that there initiatives might be a great variation in the specific implementation An initial two-three-year vision and strategy will also fa- strategies, processes, institutional arrangements and cilitate the elaboration of longer-term development of funding mechanisms to implement such activities. As Scenario 2 that would take into account the evolution such, it has not been the aim of the preliminary assess- of the situation on the ground. At this stage, conditions ment to provide detailed linkages between its proposed do not yet permit full access, however, preparing for outcomes and other planned or ongoing initiatives that longer-term development can proceed in a number of appear to have common aims, therefore: ways. Firstly, the AU can incorporate the LRA affected areas to its Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCRD) and Once the detailed assessment goes into the specific AU Border Program (AUBP), while the development design of actions required to produce the proposed partners could support such initiatives technically, in- outcomes, it is recommended to ascertain their compat- cluding through economic sector work (ESW), spatial ibility with other initiatives and assess the convenience analysis and support to regional integration. of their implementation as part of such initiatives or in a complementary manner. Towards a shared Transitional Results Framework The conditions generally accepted for the engagement The proposed initial vision to support reintegration and in transitional support measures are not fully present development interventions in the LRA affected areas in the area of assessment: a sudden breakthrough in will be anchored in a Transitional Results Framework the political and peace transition and ongoing transi- (TRF) that will be structured as follows: tion negotiations among involved parties that demand concrete stabilization measures. Vision On the other hand, lack of action can provide fertile Political Security Economic Social ground to exacerbate existing conflicts and lead a further breakdown of community/social structures, as Cluster/Sector/ (Priority (Priority (Priority (Priority Theme Outcome or Outcome or Outcome or Outcome or well as to the deepening of their alienation from the rest of the country(ies). Thus, Objective) Objective) Objective) Objective) It is recommended to undertake priority actions in Baseline those limited areas and sectors where there is a window Actions or Outputs at Key of opportunity for implementing programs that can 1st period Intervals contribute to create cells of stability from which further actions can irradiate to other areas. 2nd period Present conditions call for a practical and limited Costs/Budget approach to the design of stabilization and rehabilita- 27 The final TFF will (i) form the basis for the formulat- the detailed ToR will be prepared during consulta- ing cross-border and in-country programs responding tions with national LRA focal points and under AU to stabilization and rehabilitation needs in the areas auspices (see page 9). A draft-for-discussion TRF that affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army of the Republic is intended to be the basis for initial discussion with of Congo, Central African Republic and Republic of national stakeholders. At this early stage, the draft TRF South Sudan. Furthermore, (ii) fundraising under the is a tool to structure dialogue and should not be used auspices of the African Union. out of context or for other purposes. A number of tran- sitional objectives are proposed as follows. To achieve national anchoring and African leadership, Table 4: Summary of Transitional Objectives (draft for discussion) Political & Governance Social Economic Security Cross Border National operational Communities counting Communities and local LRA affected areas Countries in the tri- strategies are applied with strong and authorities with feasible with improved security border area with an to eradicate LRA recognized organiza- plans for improved through the presence of agreed strategy for the related activities and tions, with the capacity roads and communi- military forces, civilian improvement of trans- for the stabilization to engage in actions for cations networks to police and judiciary port links, movement of and rehabilitation of their own development, improve access and as part of an overall population, and locally the affected areas, and and with the ability to economic activities. strategy for the security based trade local authorities with deal with the trauma sector; and with greater an increase capacity to of LRA activities and access to information respond to stabilization the reinsertion of the and early warning and recovery demands. affected population systems. including members of LRA and abductees. 28 IV. Next steps The immediate next steps are as follows: ¡¡ Consultations with UNOCA ¡¡ Identification and organization of meeting with national focal points of the DRC, ROSS and CAR (Office of the AU LRA Envoy). ¡¡ Meeting objective: • Presentation of preliminary findings; • Elaboration of TRF; • Preparation of terms of reference for full assessment. ¡¡ Implementation of full assessment pending availability of funds and clearance by senior management. 29 Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington, DC 20433 USA www.TDRP.net 30