Pakistan Earthquake 2005 The Case of Centralized Recovery Planning and Decentralized Implementation Country Case Study Series Disaster Recovery Framework Guide May 2014 Country Case Study Series Introduction to the Recovery Framework Case Study Series The World Bank’s Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) is work- ing with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the European Union (EU) to develop a Disaster Recovery Framework (DRF) Guide that will help governments and partners in planning for resilient post disaster recovery while contributing to longer term sustainable development. The guide is based on global good practices gleaned from country experiences in disaster recovery. Hence, the development of the DRF Guide entailed the development of country-level case studies as well as thematic case studies on disaster recovery. These case studies have been designed to collect and analyze information on: i) disaster recovery standards and principles adapted by countries for specific disasters; ii) means adopted by countries for planning recovery including efforts, considerations and provisions (if any) for making such recovery efficient, equitable and resilient; iii) policies, institutions and capacities put in place by countries to implement and monitor disaster recovery; and iv) ways and means adopted by countries to translate the gains of resilient recovery into longer-term risk reduction and resilient development. Importantly, these case studies aim to learn from, and not evaluate, country reconstruc- tion initiatives. Practices learned from each country’s experience will inform the contents of the DRF Guide. Additionally, the case studies examine the planning processes and not the implementation details of recovery experiences. As such, they do not seek to offer a com- prehensive account of the post-disaster recovery program as it unfolded, but rather provide details and insight into the decision-making processes for reconstruction policies and pro- grams. Country Case Study Series Disaster Recovery Framework Guide / May 2014 i Unless otherwise noted, photographs presented in the document have been included courtesy of ERRA and UN-HABITAT. Country Case Study Series Abbreviations ADB Asian Development Bank AJK Azad Jammu and Kashmir BBB Building Back Better BISP Benazir Income Support Programme CMTs Construction Monitoring Teams DNA Damage and Needs Assessment DRC Data Resource Centers DRR Disaster Risk Reduction DRU District Reconstruction Unit ERRA Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency FRC Federal Relief Commission GOP Government of Pakistan KMC Knowledge Management Cell KPI Key Performance Indicators KPK Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa MIS Management Information System MOU Memorandum of Understanding NESPAK National Engineering Services Pakistan NDMA National Disaster Management Authority NWFP North West Frontier Province (now KPK) PDNA Post-Disaster Needs Assessment PEC Pakistan Engineering Council PERRA Provincial Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency PICU Project Implementation Coordination Units RME Reporting, Monitoring, and Evaluation SERRA State Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency SUPARCO Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission TVS Targeted Vulnerability Survey UN United Nations USD United States Dollar UNDP United Nations Development Program Country Case Study Series Disaster Recovery Framework Guide / May 2014 iii Pakistan Earthquake 2005 The 2005 Earthquake in Context Located in South Asia, Pakistan is the 6th most populous country in the world. Pakistan is divided into four provinces, a state and federally and provincially administrated ter- ritories. The country is exposed to several types of natural disasters, prominent among which are earthquakes, floods, droughts, cyclones and landslides. Recurring floods formed the bulk of the natural disasters to have struck Pakistan since the country’s formation, with the collective toll of the floods prior to the earth- quake of 2005 leaving 6,700 people dead. Windstorms, though less frequent, have also been devastating for Pakistan. As of the earthquake of 2005, the windstorm of 1965 0 0 ,0 remained the most fatal natural disaster in the country’s history, claiming about 10,000 73 lives. The devastation caused by the earthquake of 2005, however, eclipsed all previous disasters. Leaving 73,000 dead, the earthquake’s reconstruction was spread across the North West Frontier Province (NWFP, now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, KPK) and a federally administered state of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). A total of 8 districts across the two administrative entities bore the brunt of the earthquake. The mountainous region made reconstruction particularly difficult. Not only was the terrain not easily navigable for reconstruction, the approaching harsh winter created the need for swift reconstruction. Reacting decisively to the earthquake, the government established a new reconstruction agency, the Earthquake Reconstruction & Rehabilita- tion Authority (ERRA) to lead, coordinate and oversee reconstruction. This case study, based on comprehensive literature review and interviews with key stakeholders, presents the highlights of the post-earthquake reconstruction process. It outlines the decision-making processes in recovery planning and extracts best practices and key lessons learned from the experience. 00 ,0 10 0 70 0 00 4, 4, 0 90 2, 0 4 00 33 8 9 84 1, 0 1, 60 60 Contents A Sense of Scale: Overall Reconstruction Needs at a Glance................................... 1 Overall Recovery Planning Approach and Process................................................. 3 Policy Framework for Recovery............................................................................ 4 Institutional Framework for Recovery.................................................................. 9 Recovery Financing and Financial Management..................................................... 14 Implementation Arrangements and Recovery Management.................................... 16 Monitoring and Evaluation................................................................................... 20 Grievance Redressal Mechanisms......................................................................... 23 Coordination and Communications....................................................................... 24 Role of Leadership and Effective Crisis Management.............................................. 27 Recommendations for Institutionalizing the Learnings of the Post-Earthquake Reconstruction Experience in the Government System.................................... 29 A Snapshot of Good Practices and Lessons Learned............................................... 31 Pakistan Earthquake 2005 On the tranquil early morning of October 73,000 people died during the disaster, 128,309 people were injured, 600,000 houses were destroyed, 8th, 2005, while most people slept, an rendering 3.5 million people homeless. 6,000 earthquake measuring 7.6 on the Richter educational institutions and 574 health facilities were scale devastated Pakistan’s northern destroyed or damaged. The earthquake caused extensive areas of Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK) damage to roads, water and sanitation facilities, power, and Khyber Pakhtunkhuwa (KPK). and telecommunication infrastructure and other services while civil administration in affected areas became largely dysfunctional with the destruction of a large proportion of government buildings. DISASTER KEY FACTS Azad and Jammu Kashmir; North-West Frontier Province Area Most Affected (now Khyber-Phuktunkhwa) Affected Population 130,000 injured and 3.5 million homeless Number of Fatalities 73,000 dead Most Affected Sectors (based on needs) Housing; Education; Transport Estimated Overall Damage (US$) US$3.5 billion Estimated Overall Impact (% GDP – based on damage) 2.91% (includes Damages & losses) RECOVERY KEY FACTS Institution Managing the Reconstruction Process Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency (ERRA) Work plans designed by ERRA; contracts implemented by large and small NGOS, Institution Implementing the Reconstruction Process contractors, and pre-qualified engineering firms. PDNA (Y/N) Yes Donor Conference (Y/N) Yes Amount Pledged (US$) US$6.2 billion RECONSTRUCTION COST BY SECTOR (In US$ million) Source: Pakistan 2005 Earthquake Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment Private housing 2 6 3 0 30 47 41 1,522 30 n th rt ck io po al to at He ns es uc a liv Ed Tr d an re tu ul ric Ag Country Case Study Series A Sense of Scale: Overall Reconstruction Needs at a Glance 1. The destruction and loss caused by the earthquake was the worst recorded in the history of Pakistan to date. Immediately after the earthquake, the local- level administration and provincial governments, the military, the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO), and UN Agencies conducted preliminary damage surveys, which became an impor- tant tool for program planning and the organization of relief activities. The data collected from the rapid survey helped establish a preliminary overview of the extent of damages which later became the basis for the more detailed Damage and Needs Assessment (DNA). 2. The Damage and Needs Assessment carried out by the Government of Pakistan, in partnership with the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank was OVERALL COSTS OF THE EARTHQUAKE published five weeks after the earthquake. Relief, Category US$ million early recovery, and reconstruction costs were cumu- Relief 1,092 latively estimated at USD 5.2 billion. An additional Death and Injury Compensation 205 USD 576 million was estimated in indirect income Early Recovery 301 losses. This was the first such government and cen- Restoration of Livelihoods 97 trally-led, systematic and participatory damage and Reconstruction 3,503 needs assessment in the country, with the active Short-term Reconstruction 450 involvement of the international community. This Medium & Long-term Reconstruction 3,053 assessment provided the Government of Pakistan Total 5,198 with a comprehensive estimate of needs and coher- * An additional $576 million were estimated as indirect income losses. ent recovery strategies for each affected sector, to be presented at the Donors’ conference that was 3. The level of destruction warranted a huge multi- soon to follow. This assessment was instrumental in sectoral recovery and reconstruction program, with leveraging a record amount of funding pledges from private housing as the single largest sector account- international partners, with the result that the recon- ing for 44% of the overall reconstruction needs. This struction program stood amply funded in the first few was followed by the education sector at 13% and the months after the disaster. transport sector at 12%, while the health sector and agriculture, and livestock accounted for 9% each. 5 51 2 40 32 10 .7 15 t1 n n el in tio s io en ce fu m at ita nm ad vi d ig an r n Irr se ic ro sa bl er vi y/ d Pu ow an En p pl ,p ry su st gy er du er at In En W Country Case Study Series Disaster Recovery Framework Guide / May 2014 1 A Sense of Scale: Overall Reconstruction Needs at a Glance 4. Early and credible assessment provided a fairly reli- facilitated the subsequent evolution of the reconstruc- able estimate of the overall resource requirements tion program. This included initial recovery planning and envelope to reconstruction policy and financial activities, such as the development of detailed sector decision makers in the country, allowing them to ini- strategies, programs and operational plans, address- tiate strategic and holistic reconstruction planning. ing identified needs through project development, Such strategic perspective subsequently helps in setting up institutional frameworks to manage the developing operational plans for the commensurate recovery process, and establishing efficient financing deployment of the human, financial, and information mechanisms for recovery. It also informed the pro- resources for the efficient and effective implementa- cess of recovery implementation through consistent tion of such large scale reconstruction programs. It physical quality control standards at the project and also helps in setting up credible data-based baselines intervention level, as well as governance, account- for the subsequent monitoring and evaluation of the ability and supervision processes for the reconstruc- recovery program, at the programmatic, sector, and tion program, both as an integrative whole and in its project levels. detailing at the lowest intervention level. 5. However the most important value addition of the ini- tial disaster damage and needs assessment perhaps lay in setting out and developing broad consensus among various tiers of government and across key development partners on the underlying policies and principles. This only ensured strategic consistency in the development of recovery strategies and estimates across all sectors, such as a focus on livelihood regen- eration and building back better; it also guided and Setting up a Broad and Consistent Policy Framework for Recovery Planning through the Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment The Damage and Needs Assessment set forth guiding principles that were mutually formulated by the Government and international development partners to ensure strategic consistency and operational harmony in subsequent recovery planning and implementing activities. These included: a. Rapid rebuilding of people’s livelihoods b. Independence and self-sufficiency c. Subsidiarity and decentralization d. Focus on the most vulnerable and socially-disadvantaged groups, such as children, women, and the disabled e. Secure development gains and progress in poverty reduction f. Restoring capacities to manage the recovery process g. Transparency and accountability h. Avoid the creation of new disaster risks i. Encourage engagement of private sector and civil society j. Coordinated and coherent approaches to recovery 2 Pakistan Earthquake 2005 The Case of Centralized Planning and Decentralized Implementation through ERRA Overall Recovery Planning Approach and Process 6. Given the urgent need to commence reconstruction and compared to routine and sequential approaches, start delivering in the wake of mounting public expec- and ensured the inclusion of most key stakeholders tations, the Government of Pakistan adopted a simul- from the inception of the planning process. The chart taneous and integrated 4-pronged approach for post below provides a brief recap of the key steps of recov- disaster recovery planning, learning from international ery planning undertaken by the government, most of good practices. This process entailed implementing a which were conducted in either parallel, or sequen- succession of phased actions in the medium to long tial but overlapping timeframes. term. It also significantly reduced planning time, Figure 1: Simultaneous Four-Pronged Approach for Recovery Planning by the Government of Pakistan Strategy and Standard Setting Setting Up the Institutional Setting in Motion Consultative Undertaking Preparatory for Recovery Planning Arrangements Mechanisms Exercises, Surveys and Development of an overall Fieldwork Quick assessment of strengths Quick mapping exercises to strategic vision for and weakness of pre-disaster ensure inclusion of all key Central and Rapid Post Disaster reconstruction with provisions delivery mechanisms stakeholders damages, loss and needs for phased and duly prioritized assessment implementation—while Assessment of governance, Creation of intergovernmental stipulating a definitive implementation capacities, forums to deliberate pros, Detailed damage assessment timeframe for completion and skills at various levels cons, and risks associated with and eligibility verification of government to undertake various institutional options surveys for sectors such as Articulation of policy standards recovery planning and housing and livelihood cash and principles for recovery implementation Creation of forums and grant programs interfaces where stakeholder Aligning planning objectives Determination of institution dialogue can facilitate a Hazard risk identification and with pre-disaster urban and implementation model, based consensus-building process mapping rural contexts, and long-term on geographic delineation and for strategic priorities through planning horizons and the administrative and functional national, regional, and local Social and environmental respective sector development jurisdictions (Result Achieved : level workshops impact assessments goals Hybrid institutional model with Consultation with sub-national Engineering and Structural central level planning and local studies on cost affordable Inclusion of DRM government, civil society, level implementation, and; standards for seismic resistant mainstreaming outcomes into private sector, technical with an iterative strategy for infrastructure recovery planning institutions, academia, combining top down standard- setting and prioritization, with community representatives, etc. Geotechnical studies on the Strategic and comprehensive bottom-up, demand based and in order to foster partnerships land impacts of the earthquake area-wide planning while taking inclusive planning) and avail specialized and landslide mapping and cognizance of urban and rural capabilities inventories land use either individually or Creation and adjustment of collectively Establishing key cross-cutting legal mandate for implementing Key Actors institutions such as ERRA & operating principles and Key Actors Technical experts and later NDMA performance benchmarks for Federal Government: Brought multi-sectoral recovery organizations such as NESPAK, stakeholders together and Commissioning staff from SUPARCO, Geological Survey, articulated a strategic existing government Key Actors International Development reconstruction vision; departments and augmentation Federal and Sub-National Agencies, Academia and of skills and capacity through Governments: Facilitation International Scientific Facilitated strategic planning Organizations: Carried out market-based hiring of inclusive physical and involving all stakeholders technical investigations, data strategic planning and program Key Actors collection, and analysis to Sub-National Governments: development processes. Federal Government: Mobilized support planning; Developed Carried out local-level planning relevant agencies to undertake CSOs and other Partner technical recommendations process; Enabled meaningful and supervise planning; Organizations: Enable and options; Assisted with the local government, civil society provided funding, support, and meaningful community formation of implementation and community participation technical expertise participation of plans. Country Case Study Series Disaster Recovery Framework Guide / May 2014 3 Policy Framework for Recovery 7. Almost concurrently with the estimation of the aggre- 10. The political government also took early ownership gate damages and recovery needs arising from the and the President’s office was actively involved in set- disaster through the DNA, the Government of Pakistan ting basic recovery guidelines. Some of the key policy developed and set up a strategic vision for the overall imperatives articulated by the political leadership reconstruction program. This included enunciating included: (a) building back better, (b) converting the strategic objectives for overall reconstruction adversity into opportunity, and (c) pro-poor recovery. and recovery, articulation of policy standards; stipu- 11. Building Back Better: In consultation with sector experts lation of a possibly phased program and definitive and international agencies, ERRA identified the incorpo- timeframe for its implementation, identification of ration of Disaster Risk Reduction as a primary criterion stakeholders and development of consensus over for building back better. All reconstruction would be strategic priorities for a multi-sectoral scope of work, seismically resilient so that future earthquakes would geographic delineation, and determination of admin- have a less damaging effect. Through the same con- istrative and functional jurisdictions. sultative process, a focus on needs-based reconstruc- 8. Another early step taken by the GOP was the establish- tion was identified as a second operational criterion ment of cross-cutting operating principles and perfor- of building back better. Instead of status quo ante as the target of reconstruction, community needs would mance benchmarks for multi-sectoral recovery. These be taken as the primary driver. In practice, this meant included: central policy making and coordination; that if, for example, a school that had previously had subsidiarity and local implementation, public sector a capacity of 50 children, now needed to service 100 facilitation of private recovery, restoration of sustain- because of changes in the community, the school able livelihoods, independent oversight and transpar- would be rebuilt to service the new need. ency, effective management of public expectations and grievances, fostering public private partnerships 12. Converting Adversity into Opportunity: As with build- and availing community capabilities, ensuring and ing back better, the disaster was seen as an opportunity promoting longer term disaster risk reduction and to reconstruct not just to status quo ante, but with new climate change adaptation, environmental and social innovations and improvements. Based on consultations safeguards, and gender-issues and protection of vul- with sectoral experts and international agencies, the nerable groups. principle of ‘converting adversity into opportunity was ventured upon to replace out of date infrastruc- 9. Concurrent with ERRA’s establishment, key sectors for ture and service delivery systems with newer, more reconstruction were identified and sectoral strategies economically profitable and efficacious ones. Thus, were developed that aimed at mainstreaming overall for example, prior to the earthquake, first aid clin- reconstruction objectives across all sectors. Virtually ics, maternal and child care centers, and family plan- immediately after the disaster, drawing on the initial ning centers were all located in disparate buildings. assessments available and stakeholder consultation, Reconstruction was organized so that these centers twelve sectoral recovery strategies were developed. were collocated as existing or new Basic Health Units. These included: rural/urban housing development, Similarly, prior to the earthquake, district govern- water and sanitation, governance, transport, power, ment offices were distanced from each other. As part communications infrastructure, environment, liveli- of the reconstruction of government buildings, dis- hoods, tourism, social protection, health and edu- trict government offices were placed in the same dis- cation. All sectoral strategies additionally aimed at trict government complex, not only making it possible mainstreaming disaster risk reduction, promoting for someone to have all of his/her municipal needs environmental safeguards, poverty reduction and met at one place, but also improving communication gender sensitivity across all activities. and coordination among the various sections of the 4 Pakistan Earthquake 2005 The Case of Centralized Planning and Decentralized Implementation through ERRA Policy Framework for Recovery district government. In the livelihood sector, subsis- lations were prioritized. With winter approaching, tence farming, a primary per-earthquake enterprise, and a large homeless population living in temporary was replaced with cash crop farming. This proved shelters, housing emerged as the primary sector to particularly successful through the cultivation of receive reconstruction attention. Simultaneously, commercial flowers. with the local economy devastated, and no ready means of income generation, the livelihood sector 13. Pro-Poor Recovery: The pro-poor recovery guiding prin- was also seen as reconstruction sector of immediate ciple was translated as reconstruction that was actively impact on affected populations. aimed at contributing towards an equitable society and ensuring adequate access to services, programs, and 15. Both the housing and livelihood sectors highlighted the resources, particularly land and capital for all. In this need to protect and focus on vulnerable communities regard, particular attention was given to prioritizing in reconstruction activities. As housing was a critical reconstruction planning that addressed the needs need for the most vulnerable populations, they stood of vulnerable individuals and groups, including the at great risk of destitution without a revival of the live- socio-economically disadvantaged: elderly, widows, lihood sector. While housing and livelihood sectoral single mothers, and single- or no-parent families. In reconstruction was underway, education, health, and line with this principle, reconstruction in the liveli- water were also recognized as priority sectors requir- hood sector provided additional grants for those ing immediate attention. Public infrastructure, tour- designated as landless, virtual landless, poor, or oth- ism, and environmental protection received lower erwise vulnerable families. For reconstruction activi- priority and the early recovery measures—such as the ties that provided benefits to affected populations construction of short- and medium-term structures, based on certain criteria, legal assistance for the vul- and the erection of pre-fab buildings—were deemed nerable was also provided. For example, in the hous- sufficient for immediate needs. ing sector reconstruction, ERRA’s flagship initiative, 16. A set of principles was established to determine crite- local partners and communities were encouraged ria for sectoral prioritization. With implementation through social mobilization to support construction devolved to State/Provincial Authorities, and further of houses for widows. The housing sector also priori- to District Reconstruction Units, the identification tized a focus on tenants instead of owners. The deci- of priority sectors alone was insufficient to ensure sion was also taken to categorize all the kutcha (mud) a cohesive and uniform recovery across the various houses as destroyed so that the full compensation / affected districts. There was also need to ensure that cash grant could be provided to support households intra-sectoral reconstruction work-plans for each in constructing earthquake resistant houses. ERRA area aligned. The following key principles outlining undertook special initiatives for disabled persons intra-sectoral prioritization were thus instrumental providing prosthetic limbs, skills training, micro- in ensuring that, though devolved, implementation credit, and job opportunities in newly established across the nine districts was compliant to overall facilities like the Social Welfare Complexes (SWCs) reconstruction objectives. and Women Development Centers (WDCs). a. Broadest Impact: Those buildings and program- 14. Having identified the 12 sectors targeted for reconstruc- matic interventions were prioritized, that had tion, the ERRA’s next step was to develop principles for the greatest impact on the lives of the affected cross-sectoral prioritization. The still-nascent ERRA community. Thus, schools which could educate did not have the requisite capacity to undertake all the greatest number of students, hospitals that twelve sectoral interventions simultaneously, mak- could service the greatest number of people, and ing prioritization and staggered programmatic work bridges that connect the greatest number of peo- necessary. To achieve the greatest impact as early as ple were prioritized. possible, and to “affect the lives of people directly” in the early phases of reconstruction, those sectors b. Building Most-Accessible Structures First: Another with the greatest immediate impact on affected popu- key criterion was accessibility. The earthquake Country Case Study Series Disaster Recovery Framework Guide / May 2014 5 Policy Framework for Recovery Cash grants revive livelihoods and help revitalize economy With the livelihood sector virtually destroyed by the earthquake, a Livelihood Support Cash Grants Program was initiated to meet affected populations’ immediate needs. The program benefitted over 290,000 households. In line with the overall aims of reconstruction, the program provided a means of targeting the most vulnerable populations. It was recognized that the neglect of vulnerable groups in the design of sectoral interventions would greatly exacerbate their marginalization. Thus, the program targeted families of eight or more; families with an income of less than Rs. 3000, and families with a disabled members. 27% of all families helped were women-headed. These families were provided a monthly allowance of Rs. 3,000 for six months. After this period, the program was extended for another 6 months for the 23,000 most vulnerable female-headed households. Not only did these cash grants ensure that vulnerable families had a means of meeting essential life needs, it also contributed to the revitalization of the affected region’s economy. had struck in an area that is not easily navigable. conference, ERRA approached reconstruction by In the interest of rapid recovery, infrastructure first transforming the guiding principles into broad reconstruction in the most inaccessible affected programmatic interventions. An example of a sector areas was de-prioritized while structures in more strategic framework, in this case for the flagship USD accessible areas were built first. 1.5 billion ‘Rural Housing Reconstruction Program,’ serves as a good illustration of how the cross-cutting c. Avoiding Legal Disputes: This was particularly guiding principles were translated into correspond- relevant to land disputes. Establishing land own- ing sector recovery strategies and programs. ership after the earthquake proved a legal chal- lenge as many land deeds had been lost in the 18. The government also set-up consultative processes disaster and competing claims on lands were and forums for inclusive recovery planning at var- commonplace. Even distinguishing between pri- ious tiers, such as the broad stakeholder groups on vate and public land proved to be challenging. housing sector policy and operational aspects. For Meanwhile, work on disputed land was sched- housing, three forums were successful in continu- uled once ownership had been established by the ous and proactive multi-stakeholder inclusion in courts. It is worthy of note that legal assistance the initial years of the program. Standard processes was provided for the protection of vulnerable and forums established for housing sector consulta- populations and gender sensitivity. tions included: (a) carrying out mapping exercises to identify, and ensure inclusion of all key stake- d. Maintaining a Gender Balance: For each interven- holders, (b) creation of intergovernmental forums tion that would benefit men, an intervention was that help develop both horizontal and vertical lines prioritized that would benefit an equal popula- of communications, to deliberate pros, cons, and tion of women. For example, for each school ser- risks associated with various institutional options vicing 500 boys, a girls’ school of equal capacity for housing sector planning and its implementation, was reconstructed. and (c) creation of wider forums and interfaces where 17. Following the above-mentioned cross-sectoral priori- stakeholder dialogue facilitated a consensus-build- tization, ERRA’s first task was to translate the govern- ing process for operational aspects in particular ment’s reconstruction principles into sector recovery through national, regional, and local level workshops programs, which it did in consultation with sector involving sub-national governments, civil society, experts and international agencies. With some data technical institutions and academia, private sector, already available via the rapid assessment conducted community representatives, etc. Concurrent with the for relief and the PDNA conducted for the donor’s policy and strategy formulation processes described 6 Pakistan Earthquake 2005 The Case of Centralized Planning and Decentralized Implementation through ERRA Policy Framework for Recovery Policy Principle Manifested through the following corresponding strategies: ERRA’s Housing Program Objective: Provided financial and technical assistance to affected home owners in AJK and KPK, in reconstruction or rehabilitation of their damaged or destroyed houses. 1. Ensuring Owner-Driven Housing Providing an enabling environment to builders and homeowners, through: Reconstruction – homeowners in charge ■■ Prior training, information and canvassing campaigns, of rebuilding their own homes ■■ Rebuilding with familiar methods & easily accessible materials—ensuring sustainability and cultural preferences in design ■■ Providing technical assistance during construction, ■■ Promoting the use of salvaged material or additional resources such as hired trained craftsmen, etc., ■■ Ensuring building materials supply chains, ■■ Facilitating the opening of bank accounts, etc. 2. Assistance and Inspection ■■ Mobilizing a large number of assistance and inspection (AI) teams, for house-to- Reconstruction & Restoration house outreach ■■ Disbursing in tranches, linked to stages of construction and adoption of seismically acceptable standards ■■ Disbursement through Banks after progress/quality validation ■■ Resources for forming the AI teams and management structures for these resources, to be procured through a public-private partnership arrangement 3. Ensuring seismic safety ■■ Having in place a review and approval mechanism for designs, construction guidelines and training curricula through the development of reference minimum structural design standards that meet internationally accepted requirements for low cost earthquake resistant housing, such as −− Thinner walls −− Lighter roofing −− Well-connected structural systems −− Discourage katcha type (mud) construction ■■ Construction and planning to take into account the results of seismic zoning 4. Uniform assistance packages – across ■■ Coordinate multiple reconstruction initiatives & standards for equity. ERRA to ensure all programs and funding sources −− application of uniform policies across the board −− Ascertain application of seismic design standards Maximizing Outreach – through −− Ensure full spatial coverage optimized designs and implementation −− Reduce risks of beneficiary double counting or being missed mechanisms ■■ Cash grants to target core housing – which may not be necessarily proportionate to the replacement value of loss ■■ Reconstructing only where necessary through damage assessment that distinguishes against set criteria between houses needing reconstruction and those only needing economically feasible restoration/retrofitting ■■ Replacement of a destroyed house with a new seismic resistant core unit ■■ Restoration and strengthening of damaged houses to seismically acceptable standards ■■ Rebuilding In-situ - addressing land ownership & availability issues, minimizing relocation costs ■■ Relocating only where necessary – i.e., where risks or hazards remain very high due to: −− Seismicity −− Topography −− Soil conditions −− Other environmental factors continues Country Case Study Series Disaster Recovery Framework Guide / May 2014 7 Policy Framework for Recovery Policy Principle Manifested through the following corresponding strategies: 4. Uniform assistance packages ■■ Donors/philanthropists encouraged to fund rural housing and adopt entire (Continued) communities/ villages/ towns ■■ Program sustainability to be enhanced through parallel efforts on rehabilitation of livelihoods, physical and social infrastructure linking housing to livelihoods and infrastructure rehabilitation, etc. ■■ Addressing future needs of the affected communities (such as possible loan schemes over and above the cash grants) 5. Ensuring judicious use of grants; ■■ Damage assessment criteria to remain consistent across all affected districts reducing and managing conflicts and (surveys may be done for specific trouble areas) grievances; avoiding socio-economic ■■ Eligibility criteria to include land ownership criteria or in the case of tenants, distortions, inequities and disparities agreements/authorization from owners to rebuild the house ■■ MOUs to be signed with beneficiaries to ensure the judicious and best possible use of the grants with penalizing clauses for those found in intentional incompliance ■■ Developing and putting in place participatory and inclusive information management and grievance redressal systems above, the Government of Pakistan also took early reconstruction program; (c) the creation or readjust- and timely decisions towards setting-up the insti- ment of legislation for the proposed modifications to tutional arrangements for undertaking and meeting pre-disaster arrangements, and; (d) identifying and the challenges of the reconstruction program that mobilizing the requisite capacities, skills and other lay ahead. This essentially consisted of the following resources to be commissioned to staff from multiple processes: (a) a quick review and clarification of the levels of government, semi-government agencies, pre-existing, multi-tiered and multi-sectoral institu- various technical institutions, international develop- tional mandates; (b) developing commensurate insti- ment bodies, and the private sector. tutional structures for managing and executing the 8 Pakistan Earthquake 2005 The Case of Centralized Planning and Decentralized Implementation through ERRA Institutional Framework for Recovery 19. Concurrent with the policy and strategy formulation ing a cross-territorial reconstruction effort, there was processes described above, the Government of Pakistan high likelihood that if left to the development depart- also took early decisions towards setting-up the insti- ments of the two governments, programs modalities tutional arrangements for undertaking and meeting the and implementation would quickly diverge in the two challenges of the reconstruction program. This con- areas. On 10 October, two days after the earthquake, sisted of the following processes: (a) a quick review the Federal Relief Commission (FRC) was established and clarification of the pre-existing, multi-tiered and to address immediate relief needs. On 24 October, multi-sectoral institutional mandates, (b) developing less than three weeks after the earthquake, the Earth- commensurate institutional structures for managing quake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority and executing the reconstruction program, (c) the cre- (ERRA) was established to lead the reconstruction ation or readjustment of legislation for the proposed phase of the post-earthquake response. modifications to pre-disaster arrangements, and (d) 22. ERRA was set up as a time-bound central authority identifying and mobilizing the requisite capacities, under the Prime Minister’s office to tackle residual skills and other resources to be commissioned to staff relief, early recovery, and long term reconstruction and from multiple levels of government, semi-government rehabilitation, with long term efforts forming the over- agencies, various technical institutions, international whelming bulk of its mandate. ERRA’s scope of work development bodies, and the private sector. included strategic planning, resource mobilization, 20. When the 2005 earthquake struck, Pakistan’s legis- coordination with all stakeholders, and monitoring lative and institutional structures were designed for reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in earth- recurring medium-sized floods and focused on disaster quake affected areas. ERRA was established because management and not on disaster recovery and recon- of a recognized need for a central oversight body to struction. The single existing law at the time, the coordinate the activities of the broad spectrum of Calamities Act of 1958, a primarily relief-centric pro- actors participating in the reconstruction—ranging vision, only afforded affected populations temporary from multilateral and bilateral donors, international forgiveness from land and water tax. Paralleling this, NGOs, civil society, and government agencies. It was the only organizations available to offer post-disaster anticipated that having multiple agencies overseeing response were locally organized Emergency Relief reconstruction would likely become unmanageable. Cells, whose mandate was limited to the most imme- Thus, centralizing some functions within a single, diate relief-needs. dedicated body was seen as essential. 21. The magnitude of the earthquake galvanized the gov- 23. Impetus for the centralization also came from the scope ernment into decisive action. It was recognized nearly and pace of the reconstruction required. Without a new from the outset that the severity of damages and agency, the option was to rely on existing line and losses required a radical response and the Earthquake development departments to spearhead reconstruc- Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) tion. Beyond the institutional inertia that would slow was established as an autonomous body on 24 Octo- the shift from regular functioning to reconstruction, ber, 2005. The earthquake had struck two regions: issues of requisite scale and pace suggested the need the state of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and the for a new, dedicated agency. Most line departments North West Frontier Province (NWFP, now known had no experience at constructing at this pace or mag- as Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, KPK). Both territories had nitude. The education ministries of AJK and KPK, for their own governments, budgets and line ministries, example, were faced with responding to the destruc- and consequently separate and distinct chains and tion of 6,000 schools, a thousand-fold increase over structures of command. Given the required scope of their existing annual construction targets. In addi- reconstruction, and with no precedent for coordinat- tion to this vastly expanded scale, there was a need Country Case Study Series Disaster Recovery Framework Guide / May 2014 9 Institutional Framework for Recovery for brisk reconstruction. Affected communities were 25. The ERRA Council, the apex body at ERRA, provided stra- eager to have infrastructure and services restored. To tegic policy oversight and ensured sustained financing. meet these community needs, the restoration of lost At the top was the ERRA Council, headed by the Prime services was prioritized. The relative institutional Minister, with the Deputy Chairman of ERRA as the inability of line departments and developmental secretary. Council members include the Prime Minis- agencies to respond to such time-sensitive needs also ter of AJK, the Chief Minister of KPK, the Minister for contributed to the need for a new agency to manage Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas, the Finance Min- reconstruction. ister, and the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Com- mission. This council provided strategic directions in 24. ERRA’s organization reflected its reconstruction priori- matters of policy formulation and ensured adequate ties, and drew on the best practices recommended by funding. the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, which were later also documented in the Post-Disaster Needs 26. Next in hierarchy was the ERRA Board which ensured Assessment published on November 12th, 2005. Keep- implementation of approved policy decisions and devel- ing the principle of decentralization and subsidiarity oped and implemented annual plans, programs, proj- in mind, ERRA was organized to both ensure unifor- ects and schemes. The Board was headed by Chairman mity in reconstruction while devolving implementa- ERRA with the Deputy Chairman ERRA as a member tion. The government drew on the suggestions of the and the secretary. Other members included the Chief PDNA, to structure ERRA to be operational at the fed- Secretary AJK, the Chief Secretary KPK, Additional eral level, with regional and local offices to oversee Finance Secretary Expenditure, a representative from implementation. With little precedence on constitut- the Ministry of Defense, Additional Secretary Plan- ing such a body, ERRA was represented either directly ning Division, Additional Secretary Economic Affairs or through its affiliates at the federal, provincial/ Division, and six representatives from civil society. state and district level, the institutional apparatus The stature and access to power of the members of was erected to govern an expanse of over the 30,000 the ERRA Board and the ERRA Council contributed to square kilometres and nine districts of AJK and KPK the organization’s credibility. affected by the earthquake. 10 Pakistan Earthquake 2005 The Case of Centralized Planning and Decentralized Implementation through ERRA Institutional Framework for Recovery Key Approval and Council/Board Reporting Reporting and Monitoring ERRA Steering Committee Steering Committee CS/ACS Chairs CS/ACS Chairs Represented: Represented: Departments Departments LGs LGs ERRA ERRA NWFP AJK Reconstruction Agency Reconstruction Agency District Advisory Committee District Advisory Committee Chaired: District Nazim, DCO Chaired: DC DISTRICT RECONSTRUCTION UNITS 27. This bifurcation of policy planning and approval (the personnel, civil society, and international/national responsibility of the ERRA Council), and programmatic consultants. ERRA could draw upon both interna- planning and implementation (the responsibility of the tional experience of expert consultants and sector ERRA Board) was replicated at the lower levels. At the specific experience of the line ministries. Utilizing the provincial and state levels, the Provincial Steering best talent from existing agencies, supplemented by Committee was coupled with the Provincial Earth- the periodic hiring of international experts, allowed quake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority for the dynamic management of recovery. The mix of (PERRA), and the State Steering Committee was cou- personnel from diverse backgrounds also presents pled with the State Earthquake Reconstruction and opportunities for knowledge sharing and encourag- Rehabilitation Authority (SERRA). Similarly, at the ing innovation. The army provided mass and speed, district level, the District Reconstruction Advisory bureaucrats provided guidance on the rules and pro- Committees provided work-plan oversight to the Dis- cedures, and international/national consultants and trict Reconstruction Units which designed program- civil society monitored implementation and ensured matic interventions. the quality of technical outputs. 28. ERRA staffing profile provided another form of ensur- 29. ERRA’s focus on central policy-making also contributed ing widespread ownership of the organization’s man- to keeping the organization mission-focused. In a polit- date and policies. Instituted as a hybrid organization, ical environment with changing governments that ERRA’s staff was comprised of civil servants from fed- brought new priorities, ERRA was able to prevent eral, state and provincial governments, armed forces changes in its mission. It achieved this by fending off Country Case Study Series Disaster Recovery Framework Guide / May 2014 11 Institutional Framework for Recovery Organization Terms of Reference Major Policy Decisions Council/Board Annual Work Plan Approvals Guidance to ERRA Overall Coordination Approval and Project Management of National Scale ERRA Project Policy Formation Program Monitoring and Setting Standards Financial Management of ERRA Funding Donor Coordination Reporting to ERRA Board and Council Steering Committee CS/ACS Chairs Approval Annual Reconstruction Plans Reporting to ERRA Represented: Overviewing Reconstruction Agency Departments Approval of Big Projects (above certain threshold) LGs ERRA Autonomous Body NWFP Reporting to Steering Committee and ERRA Reconstruction Agency Preparing Annual Work Program Implementation of Large Contracts in coordination with Line Agencies Preparing District Reconstruction Plans Implementation Small Contract in coordination with DISTRICT RECONSTRUCTION UNITS District Governments/District Line Level Agencies Reporting to Province/State Coordinating/Partnering with Partners Organizations new political interests through invoking its institu- tional policy approval mechanism. When a new polit- The Inclusion of Line Departments to Ensure ical entity would attempt to influence ERRA to shift Sustainable Reconstruction its focus—for example, regionally, or sectorally—the At first, given ERRA’s reconstruction model, line organization would invoke its policy approval mecha- department were excluded from reconstruction activities. nism, a joint process managed by the ERRA board, as However, as reconstruction progressed, it became the sole means of reconfiguring organizational mis- increasingly clear that sustainable build back better sion. policies required line department support once ERRA’s work was done. 30. ERRA was also careful to build on the institutional Line Departments would have to be prepared to spend for groundwork laid during the relief and early recovery the extra resources to support for the additional costs. periods. ERRA subsumed the staff of the relief and ERRA agreed to provide for the additional resources for early-recovery organizations, thereby gaining their three years, with the agreement that within that period institutional knowledge, as well as the community the provincial and state governments would advertise, relationships and goodwill they had cultivated. Relief hire, and budget for these additional costs. efforts led by the Federal Relief Commission (FRC), 12 Pakistan Earthquake 2005 The Case of Centralized Planning and Decentralized Implementation through ERRA Institutional Framework for Recovery Early Development of Reconstruction Strategy Contributed to a Successful Donor Conference The success of the Donor Conference was seen as a result of an early and well-crafted strategy for implementation that allayed frequent donor concerns of financial transparency and an emphasis on sustainable reconstruction. Of particular note were five aspects of the government’s presentation at the Donor conference: ■■ Implementation plan: Based on the PDNA, the government identified the sectors that required reconstruction. ■■ Implementation arrangements: once again using the PDNA, which suggested the establishment of federal and district level organizations for implementation, the government outlined its strategy for implementing reconstruction. ■■ Coordinationarrangements: Given the scale of reconstruction required, care was taken to address how reconstruction would be sensitive to coordination requirements. This was of particular import to donors, who typically face challenges in coordinating with governments during reconstruction. ■■ Incorporationof DRR in recovery: Disaster Risk Reduction was established early as one of the key guiding principles in recovery, with the reconstruction planning presented at the Donor Conference organized around this principle. ■■ Fiduciary safeguards: Clear and transparent mechanism for tracking funds were outlined at the conference. built initial contact and lines of informal communi- 31. Early Recovery, co-led by ERRA and UNDP, initiated vir- cation with the affected communities. As the sole tually contemporaneously with relief work, and also in agency overseeing recovery, FRC benefitted from the close communication with affected populations, built immediate and deep connections with the affected similar relationships. ERRA’s close work with the populations built by the many small and large imple- UN on Early Recovery meant that the former’s staff menters executing relief work in affected locales. In not only had the benefit of being familiar with Early March of 2006, while FRC’s work was still continuing, Recovery efforts, but as with relief, could ensure effi- the government recognized the need for continuity cient and informed utilization of resources across the from across relief and reconstruction and subsumed two efforts. And, as with FRC, while Early Recovery the organization within ERRA. FRC’s independent sta- was still being implemented, ERRA subsumed its tus was dissolved, and residual relief work delegated work entirely to ensure the greatest possible institu- to ERRA. This not only afforded ERRA the institutional tional continuity. knowledge of FRC’s staff , allowing ERRA to best align relief projects with reconstruction objectives, it also ensured that the reconstruction agency retained the connections with the community that were essential for sustained and productive community feedback on reconstruction activities. Country Case Study Series Disaster Recovery Framework Guide / May 2014 13 Recovery Financing and Financial Management 32. As detailed earlier, the success of the donor confer- empowered to design projects with an estimated cost ence was attributed to the comprehensive planning of up to Rs. 100 Million, and with a territorial scope and the funding channels set up immediately after limited to that district. These designs were submit- the earthquake, which instilled confidence in donors, ted for the approval of the District Reconstruction and encouraged international involvement. This effi- Advisory Committees, which ensured compliance to cacy in planning and institutionalization of systems centrally set guidelines. For projects that exceeded to manage recovery was due in large part to the either that financial ceiling (but were less than Rs. involvement and endorsement of the highest tier of 250 Million), or spanned more than one district, the the political leadership from the early stages of the Provincial or State authorities, PERRA and SERRA, post-disaster response. would design work plans for the approval of their respective Steering Committees. Projects exceeding 33. Funds were in the form of USD 2.5 billion in grants that amount, and up to Rs. 1,000 Million, required and USD 4 billion in loans. The largest bilateral approval at the highest tier, and were designed fed- donors were Saudi Arabia ($593 million in grants and soft loans), the U.S. ($510 million in grant and erally by ERRA and approved by the ERRA Board. in-kind assistance), China ($320 million in grants and This method of bifurcating program design and pol- loans), Iran ($200 million credit line), and the United icy oversight ensured that while at the programmatic Arab Emirates ($200 million in grants). Among multi- level, decisions were made as close to the ground as lateral lenders, the World Bank pledged $1 billion in possible, policy uniformity was maintained across the soft loans; the Asian Development Bank $1 billion in many reconstruction programs being implemented. grants and loans; and the Islamic Development Bank 36. The decentralization of implementation and finan- $500 million in soft loans. cial decisions was also practiced as a form of own- 34. Anticipating the complexity of recovery financing, ERRA ership-building. However, feedback and advice was also established as a means of streamlining the solicitation alone, it was recognized, could not build financial aspects of reconstruction. Fiduciary concerns the effective and widespread ownership that would provided an additional impetus for a single institution make the centralized organization’s initiatives success- to manage recovery. Faced with the fungibility of mon- ful. The devolution of financial responsibility was ies in the financial systems of regional governments, also essential. Thus, ERRA created a tiered financial the reconstruction effort ran the risk of reconstruction independence system, providing individual programs funds being diverted towards non-recovery efforts. (and thereby individual implementing agencies and This risk was made particularly acute by the unavail- affected populations communities) independence ability of any clear or reliable method of monitoring over the choice of initiatives to implement. At the financial flows within regional governments. A single lowest level, District Reconstruction Advisory Teams funding line was seen as a solution, and a single cen- were given authority to approve DRU-designed proj- tralizing institution provided an apropos vehicle for ects. The Provincial and State Steering Committees the solution. This line of funding was to be indepen- were given authority to approve projects prepared by dent and more robust, with the stipulation that no their respective reconstruction authorities (PERRA funds ear-marked for the reconstruction agency could and SERRA). Together, control over programmatic be reassigned to another agency. interventions and financial independence were insti- tuted to build widespread ownership. 35. At the program design level, a tri-tiered planning and project approval structure was developed. Each tier 37. Centralized policy-setting and program design were was bifurcated to ensure a balance between uniformity practiced alongside financial and implementation inde- in policy and devolution in program implementation. At pendence to balance decentralization with uniformity in the lowest level, District Reconstruction Units were reconstruction. Although latitude in financial manage- 14 Pakistan Earthquake 2005 The Case of Centralized Planning and Decentralized Implementation through ERRA Recovery Financing and Financial Management ment engendered ownership, it also introduced the that risk, ERRA enforced its policy of centralized stan- risk of project divergence: the many local implement- dard setting and program design. While the choice of ers, and the provincial and district reconstruction which programs to implement was left to decentral- units, it was worried, would use their money to fund ized bodies, the nature of the programs, the method interventions that provided varying benefits. This of prioritization, and their modalities of implementa- would lead to perceptions of unequal assistance and tion were required to conform to centrally managed ill-planned reconstruction. As a means of mitigating ERRA standards. Country Case Study Series Disaster Recovery Framework Guide / May 2014 15 Implementation Arrangements and Recovery Management 38. Policy and program development continued well into the implementation process of recovery and was period- Principles to Govern and Guide the ically informed by several kinds of post-PDNA surveys. Recovery Program These surveys were conducted to assess the needs ■■ Recovery program is based on needs and demand of those populations prioritized under the govern- driven ment’s guiding principles. While the PDNA provided a ■■ SupportEarthquake Reconstruction and good basis for initial reconstruction needs estimates, Rehabilitation Authority’s (ERRA) mandate to it needed to be complemented with more in depth oversee and monitor the overall reconstruction knowledge of the needs of the affected communi- program ties. Subsequently, comprehensive and consultative ownership of AJK and KPK without ■■ Strengthening assessments were conducted by ERRA for program- compromising implementation efficiency matic planning. Some of the guiding principles that ■■ Complete reconstruction in the shortest possible emerged pertained specifically to implementation time with high quality. Strive for economies of scale issues, as described in the adjacent table. which attracts firms with good management practices 39. The centralization of recovery functions in ERRA how- ■■ Simplify and expedite approval and implementation ever created the risk of partner disengagement. ERRA procedures. Establish appropriate thresholds at mitigated this risk through a variety of ownership build- District Reconstruction Unit (DRU), Reconstruction ing measures that were instituted as policy in ERRA’s Agency (RA), and Steering Committee (SC) levels for approval of plans and contracts organizational and implementation procedures. This centralization of virtually all reconstruction activities ■■ Reconstruction will conform to appropriate seismic into ERRA introduced the related problem of disen- safety, quality, technological, and environmental standards gagement with partners, implementers, stakeholders, and affected communities. The collapsing of the work ■■ Strengthenlong-term capacity building in and responsibilities of multiple, disparate agencies reconstruction and hazard risk management spread across several non-governmental organiza- tions and two governments into a single organization, tures of ownership-building existed in another higher ERRA, created the acute need to disseminate owner- tier, where stakeholders engaged in policy-oriented ship of ERRA’s policies. discussions. 40. At the highest levels of consultation and ownership 41. Designing sectoral policies required input from both building, the ERRA Board included the chief ministers experts as well as from affected communities. ERRA’s of the two governments as secretaries, and all policy first consulted sector experts whose propositions were decisions were made with their consultation and vetted against ground realities, and the final policy approval. This multi-layered consultative process approved by ERRA at the federal level. Policies were was institutionalized to engender ownership across first designed by a technical team within ERRA with the wide range of stakeholders. The requirement for input from relevant international agencies (e.g. WHO ownership-building in mind, ERRA institutionalized for health), considering international best practices. several tiers of building ownership. At the local level, These practices would then be contextualized to the village reconstruction teams encouraged ownership Pakistani experience through a review process by among affected communities via every-day interac- the Technical Advisory Group, which existed for each tion between communities and on-the-ground imple- of the twelve sectors, with each group comprised menters. A tier above, Technical Working Groups of experts from that sector. The plan would then be organized implementers to incorporate feedback with vetted by the implementers and the communities for the aim of engendering ownership. Comparable struc- their input. Once community and implementer feed- 16 Pakistan Earthquake 2005 The Case of Centralized Planning and Decentralized Implementation through ERRA Implementation Arrangements and Recovery Management back was incorporated, the policy design would be Program. Over 600 teams were formed and trained on presented to the ERRA Board, and then for the ERRA the appropriate and consistent application of techni- Council. However, this was a flexible implementation cal damage criteria. These teams conducted compre- system, and feedback loops continually attenuated hensive door-to-door visits over a four-month period the program. in all affected administrative units. This was followed by setting a mammoth implementation mechanism 42. Going from data collection to implementation in the for meeting the housing program objectives of recon- rural housing reconstruction program, is by far the structing or rehabilitating close to 600,000 houses single largest program in ERRA’s portfolio. To begin, to improved seismic resistant standards. To this a detailed damage assessment and eligibility sur- effect, ERRA prepared a detailed operational manual veys were conducted to categorize housing units by that provided guidelines on all key aspects of imple- the extent of damage, determine eligibility, and sign mentation. Although beyond the immediate scope of MOUs with the verified beneficiaries (quasi-legal this case study, a snapshot of the implementation agreement). The survey form and technical guidelines arrangements put in place for this program is pro- were developed under the Rural Housing Reconstruc- vided below, to illustrate the complexities that have tion Program. The information collected was used to to be overcome in the design and implementation of develop beneficiary lists and to better target grant such large scale reconstruction programs. disbursements under the Temporary Shelter Support ERRA Housing Program Management Pakistan Poverty Provincial/ Regional Alleviation Fund Level Army Regional Management Regional Housing Coordinators (2) Sub-provincial/ District Level 9 District Housing 11 PO-Run Partner Organizations Different Army Formations Housing Coordinators Reconstruction Centers PO Field Offices Union Council Level 20+ Partner Organizations Training & Sub-District/ Assistance Mobile Progress Inspection & (POs) Assistance Training Monitoring Teams Teams Teams Teams Inspection Training Mobile Training & Social (AI) Teams (MTTs) (PMTs) Centers Mobilization Teams Community/ Individual Level Village Reconstruction Committees ERRA BENEFICIARIES PPAF BENEFICIARIES Country Case Study Series Disaster Recovery Framework Guide / May 2014 17 Implementation Arrangements and Recovery Management 43. Similarly, a comprehensive targeted vulnerability sur- this translated into the initiation of more profitable vey made identification of vulnerable communities means of living in the affected communities, such as accessible to partners. The Targeted Vulnerability the cultivation of cash crops instead of subsistence Survey (TVS), funded by ADB and GoP, aimed to col- farming. lect data on vulnerable communities in earthquake 46. Streamlining Procurements: ERRA utilized the services affected areas. Between 2007 and 2008, detailed of Pakistan Engineering Council (PEC) to expedite pro- information was collected on 432,130 vulnerable curement processes. PEC pre-approved and ranked persons, including information on educational levels, contractors, simplifying the tendering process, as employment status, skill development needs, dis- well as introducing transparency into the contractor abilities, type of aid received, and income sources. selection process. Contractors formed a large part of The survey findings were made accessible to all stake- the implementing bodies in the reconstruction effort. holders for project planning. This data was used to However, given the scale of tenders and responses to improve delivery of the International Catholic Migra- manage, a system was needed to streamline the con- tion Commission (ICMC) project to protect vulner- tract-issuing process. For this purpose, ERRA utilized able people in 40 villages of districts Mansehra and the services of Pakistan Engineering Council (PEC), Muzaffarabad. TVS data was also shared with the a national government-organized body, which had a Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP). list of national and international contractors that had 44. Identifying Women-Headed Households, the Landless, already been categorized by type of expertise and and the Virtually Landless. As the first step to institut- competence level. This list was used to prequalify ing a livelihood cash grant scheme, while prioritiz- some contractors for reconstruction. This not only ing vulnerable communities and maintaining gender helped expedite the process of issuing contracts, equality, a survey was carried out to identify and map the institutionalized process of evaluating tender the incidence of households headed by women. The responses allowed ERRA to provide well-formulated focus on vulnerable communities also provided the answers to why a particular firm was chosen. Limit- basis for a survey of the extent and identification of the landless (those whose lands had been washed away by the mudslides caused by the earthquake) Tripartite Construction Contracts Ensured and the virtual landless (those whose lands were still Oversight intact and could be cultivated but had been rendered Since the vast majority of the destroyed or damaged so unstable by the earthquake that no sustainable infrastructure was owned by the provincial and state government, dedicated Engineering Wings were construction could take place on them). created within these governments to work solely on 45. Surveys for Community Livelihood Rehabilitation: In reconstruction activities. These wings served as the government’s representative, de jure “employers” of all addition to assistance for the individual losses, there construction contractors, with NESPAK signing as the were communities for cash influx to prevent commu- “Engineer” designated to oversee construction in the nity collapse. Union Councils were taken as the unit tripartite contracts. for assessing the losses of public goods such as small Construction contracts were thus signed by 1) the irrigation channels, micro hydroelectric generators, Engineering Wings as the “employers”, 2) NESPAK as and stream crossings; and each Union Council was the “engineers”, and 3) the construction company as provided Rs.750,000 for their activities. Consulta- the contracted party. tions with these Union Councils provided the basis This arrangement not only ensured ERRA oversight of for translating guiding principles into programmatic all construction, but also served to involve state and interventions. Thus, the guiding principle of pov- provincial governments in reconstruction erty reduction provided ERRA the opportunity to not This arrangement not only ensured ERRA oversight of just reconstruct to the pre-disaster status quo, but all construction, but also served to involve state and to introduce economic revitalization programs as provincial governments in reconstruction. part of its reconstruction activities. On the ground, 18 Pakistan Earthquake 2005 The Case of Centralized Planning and Decentralized Implementation through ERRA Implementation Arrangements and Recovery Management ing tendering this way also eliminated the problem of dealing with inexperienced contractors that would Government Construction Projects severely underbid their more experienced competi- Competed tion to win contracts, but did not have the expertise Typical of earthquakes, a majority of the reconstruction or experience required to successfully perform the required in Pakistan’s disaster centered on work. It also eliminated the associated problem of infrastructure. ERRA recognized the need for—but explaining to other tender competitors why they lost was unable to effectively accomplish—standardization a contract to a relatively inexperienced firm. of construction rates. While the government offered Rs. 2,000 per square foot of reconstruction to its 47. In addition to the need for rapid procurement, the contractors, other implementers, offered up to twice mega-scale infrastructure reconstruction required an that amount, skewing the market towards projects expert group that could rapidly and reliably provide being implemented by the higher paying agencies. oversight and advice in reconstruction. Following soon after ERRA’s establishment, the National Engineering the final year. Based on these targets, and adjusted Services Pakistan (NESPAK), a publically organized, to reflect the previous year’s accomplishments, ERRA independent group of engineers, were installed would submit a budget to the government prior to as General Consultants to the Authority to over- the passage of the federal government’s budget. The see construction & implementation. Their role was strong support for the reconstruction effort among instrumental in the conduct of timely assessments the political leadership meant that ERRA’s budgetary of structural damages and geological hazards, and needs were met entirely for the first three years of its seismic mapping. NESPAK also oversaw and advised work. in the development of seismic resistance standards, 49. After recovery progressed and began to address issues the reconstruction plans for government, health and of development, implementation fatigue began to education buildings, as well as in the urban planning appear in some aspects of reconstruction. Team spirit essential to town and village recovery. and motivation were high in the initial phases of 48. In addition to its role as the general consultant set- reconstruction, resulting in quick delivery of high ting construction standards, and being instrumental in quality outputs. However, as invariably occurs, policy design, NESPAK’s engineering expertise gave it during subsequent years pace of implementation the requisite skills to be the primary party responsible decreased. Once the reconstruction of key damaged for project costing. NESPAK’s costing was combined and destroyed infrastructure had been completed, with ERRA leadership reconstruction goals to develop and reconstruction began to address issues of devel- yearly budget estimates. ERRA projected a standard- opment policy, particularly urban development, the ized reconstruction rate for all its projects: each pace of recovery slowed and observable difference in sector was to be built back at 33% in its first year delivery of outputs was observed. of reconstruction, 33% in the next year, and 34% in Country Case Study Series Disaster Recovery Framework Guide / May 2014 19 Monitoring and Evaluation 50. ERRA’s Monitoring and Evaluation Wing was also estab- lished at the Authority’s inception. This ensured early Implementation Oversight by NESPAK oversight mechanism and also contributed to a success- At the project planning stage, NESPAK was responsible ful donor’s conference by increasing confidence in the for vetting the designs for infrastructure reconstruction reconstruction effort. In joint consultation with stake- to ensure compliance with seismic resistance and urban holders, ERRA’s M&E wing developed an evaluation planning objectives. During project implementation, it framework. Its core principals included a focus on was also responsible for supervision of several of these construction activities. results and beneficiaries, lessons learning, transpar- ency, and communication. The overall M&E system was established to enable ERRA and its partners to measure pliance with centrally set standards for reconstruc- performance on all reconstruction projects undertaken tion. The Social Survey Teams (SSTs) assessed the by implementing organizations and agencies. The sys- social impact of reconstruction activities, providing tem supported project-level monitoring and provided feedback from the impacted communities to continu- independent analysis on overall progress strengthen- ally guide interventions. The teams began monitoring ing accountability. It also ensured compliance with adherence to ERRA standards from the commencement ERRA’s directives and sectoral strategies, and improved of the project, where it ensured tenders were publi- responsiveness to identified problem areas. cized in accordance with federal guidelines, and that procedural requirements were adhered to in tender 51. ERRA adopted parallel systems of monitoring and evaluations. Monitoring continued through the lifecy- evaluation, one internal and one external. The inter- cle of projects, with teams overseeing progress along nal system consisted of detailed project level super- Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) that had been pre- visions and the monitoring of recovery programs defined with input from NESPAK. M&E teams would and projects by PERRA, SERRA, DRUs, line depart- also make frequent site visits to ensure adherence to ments, partner organizations, and NESPAK. Exter- construction standards. M&E teams would verify and nal monitoring was carried out by donor missions, document findings by taking pictures of project sites. institutional reviews, and annual evaluations. The This information, once logged in the M&E system, was accessibility of information provided under the M&E sent back to donors to ensure that there were con- system improved project transparency, increasing stant corrections being made during reconstruction. stakeholder confidence in the recovery program. In addition to alerting the donors of any missteps or lack of adherence to standards by the implementers, 52. Internal monitoring of financial data included joint over- ERRA also asked implementers to correct their proce- sight by ERRA’s M&E Wing and the program manager. dures on the spot. The availability of implementation and financial data was made possible by the joint oversight of all projects 53. The inclusion of individuals with expertise in procure- by the ERRA’s M&E Wing’s audit department and the pro- ment processes and M&E also ensured that all planned gram manager. This structure helped ensure financial activities were continually being vetted for compliance transparency, adherence to standards, as well as facil- to government regulations, and anticipated bottle- itated the involvement of the project management team necks could be resolved in a timely fashion. Maintain- in the oversight process. Additional monitoring teams ing flexibility in its implementation, ERRA instituted oversaw the technical aspects of reconstruction as well new mechanisms for program monitoring that main- as the social impact of the reconstruction activity. The tained close links with affected communities as well M&E Wing deployed two teams at the project level to as project implementers. As project implementation oversee reconstruction. The Construction Monitoring progressed, a capacity deficit for monitoring projects Teams (CMTs) monitored technical aspects of both the at the district level began to appear. This was par- inputs and outputs of reconstruction, ensuring com- ticularly exacerbated by a parallel deficit in the abil- 20 Pakistan Earthquake 2005 The Case of Centralized Planning and Decentralized Implementation through ERRA Monitoring and Evaluation ity to communicate project issues to other recovery rial supply and price monitoring mechanism. The RME actors. Given the scope of the recovery effort, and the had in-built query and monthly reporting options, and breadth of stakeholders involved, Project Implemen- cross-tabulation capacity across the above variables tation Coordination Units (PICUs) were organized and data streams. This enabled a much more effec- in September 2008 to bridge these capacity gaps. tive and efficient monitoring of reconstruction trends, In this role, PICUs served a dual function of main- identification of problematic areas, and consequently taining links with the affected communities, as well more informed decision making and development of as ensuring that reconstruction progress remained mitigation measures. These Monitoring and Evalua- on schedule. The units submitted regular progress tion mechanisms contributed to high project comple- reports to the relevant wings of ERRA, and suggested tion rates. Within 3 years of the earthquake, ERRA’s remedial measures where implementation was facing flagship initiative, the Rural Housing Reconstruction challenges. In this sense PICUs were an essential part program had been nearly completed. Of the houses of the program management machinery, maintaining constructed, a dramatic 96% were constructed to the informal links with the community, and having formal new seismically resistant standards ERRA introduced. chains of command available to raise these issues 55. Similarly, at the 5-year mark, the Water and Sanitation with ERRA leadership. sector saw the completion of 84% of all planned proj- 54. Establishment of a Dedicated Reporting, Monitoring, ects, with the remaining 16% under construction. This and Evaluation (RME) System for Rural Housing based sector’s reconstruction, in line with the principle of in the Program Manager’s office. The system collected, build back better, introduced water quality improve- collated, analyzed, and reported on disaggregated ment processes. Sectors such as Education and Health data on physical and financial progress and seis- registered the slowest performance. A lack of contrac- mic compliance being received from Army regional tors, as well as a lack of contractor expertise contrib- offices, and national citizens’ database (NADRA) and uted to this slow rate of reconstruction. The education ERRA Management Information System (MIS) respec- sector also suffered from sustainability issues as pro- tively. The system also obtained data streams from vincial and state governments, faced with a financial the Training MIS and ERRA M&E unit’s building mate- crunch, struggled to maintain the schools. Country Case Study Series Disaster Recovery Framework Guide / May 2014 21 Monitoring and Evaluation Schematic Illustration of Business Process for ERRA Housing RME Reporting, Monitoring, Evaluation Functions of Central RME: REPORTING Central RME System Generates district and UC level disaggregated monthly reports on: Location: ERRA Program 7d ■■ Physical Progress (number of houses under construction out Manager (Housing)’ Office of those visited by AI teams; stages of construction reached by beneficiaries in percentage terms, rate of physical progress on a timescale) ■■ Financial Progress (number and percent of beneficiaries having received the various grant installments; total amount disbursed by ERRA to beneficiaries in respect of various grant installments; 7d rates of disbursement of various installments on a timescale) MONITORING Dedicated NADRA Team for Housing HME ■■ Monthly monitoring of rates of seismic compliance at a district ■■ Cleaning and preparing data for use and UC level disaggregated basis; ■■ Correlating rates of seismic compliance with (a) coverage and ■■ Incorporation of data in designated software for outputs of training program, (b) reasons for non- compliance, and HME System (c) any other available quantitative and qualitative parameters, ■■ Generating regular and custom query reports- such as availability of materials,adequacy of designs, consistency ■■ Coordinating and liasing with ERRA RME Staff of AI, etc. ■■ Helps identify problem areas/UCs and devise appropriate ■■ Data transmittal to ERRA RME System interventions, thus providing a more enabling environment for informed management decision-making (for which further community level data may also be generated) EVALUATION ■■ Furnishing readily available disaggregated data for third party evaluations, especially for facilitating sample size determination and targeting USUAL Data Streams Data Streams from Army from NADRA Database: routed through NADRA or ERRA MIS: ■■ 2nd Grant MOUs Signed & ■■ No of houses Disbusrements inspected (the sample ■■ 3rd Grant Certifications size) Option A: RME Physical data Processed and ■■ No. of houses directly sent by army units to Disbursements commenced (24-day loop - Only Horizontal Flow of NADRA/ERRA ■■ 4th Grant Certifications ■■ No. and classification Data) Processed and of compliant and non- OPTION A 10d Disbursements compliant houses New Stream of Data for RME System -AI Hubs Army Regional Management AJK 3d (Div HQ) Other Army District Units NADRA’s Regular Database on Financial intermediaries Progress for ERRA Housing Program Army Regional 7d Management NWFP (Div HQ) OPTION B Option B: RME Physical data first (31-day loop - Both Vertical & Horizontal Flow of Data) compiled at Army Div level and then sent to NADRA/ERRA 22 Pakistan Earthquake 2005 The Case of Centralized Planning and Decentralized Implementation through ERRA Grievance Redressal Mechanisms 56. ERRA’s flagship program of rural housing reconstruction 57. ERRA also established twelve Data Resource Centers also instituted a dedicated, low-cost, low- maintenance (DRCs) across the affected areas to handle grievances software-based grievance redress program. Designed and act as information centers. DRC managers were by ERRA, the Pakistan Army and AJK’s SERRA, this focal points for grievance-related issues and had the detailed MIS system enabled ERRA to effectively track authority to update records after due verification. the disbursement of grant tranches. It also enabled ERRA maintained real-time logs of all updates in ERRA to appropriately handle grievance cases related order to guard against future inconsistencies. Addi- to various stages of construction through: the ability tional Grievance Redress Committees (GRCs) were to search hundreds of thousands of individual records established at seven locations to enable wider cover. and their statuses; the rapid generation of correction lists; and the tracking of bank transactions and rec- onciliations. This brought down grievance correction and redressal times from 3 months to 10 days (by a factor of 8-10), and elimination of a backlog of around 37,000 grievance cases in AJK alone. Country Case Study Series Disaster Recovery Framework Guide / May 2014 23 Coordination and Communications 58. Communication management was an integral part of ERRA’s organizational structure serving to strengthen UNDP’s TAMEER Project the organization’s credibility. ERRA established a The UNDP was actively involved in post-earthquake Knowledge Management Cell (KMC) and a media wing to response from the first days of emergency rescue, document experiences and lessons learning, facilitate making it intimately familiar with the disaster. knowledge sharing, and to aid in communications. The Recognizing that ERRA would need support in KMC strengthened ERRA’s communication networks, designing and implementing its mandate, UNDP developed an institutional library, stored information established the Technical Assistance for Management on district profiling. The media wing also undertook of Earthquake Early Recovery (TAMEER) project in and published annual reviews, corporate brochures, December 2005. and case studies aiding in the identification of prob- Set up initially with a 13-month horizon, TAMEER lem areas and supporting course corrections. Press was extended to run for three years, providing reporting was also regularly analyzed to gauge pub- capacity-building support to ERRA in defining lic opinion on the recovery program. ERRA’s effective the new institution’s mandate; drawing up plans communications strategy successfully served to raise for reconstruction and rehabilitation; monitoring implementation, and ensuring effective communication its visibility and profile. among stakeholders. An Information Clearing House Could Have 60. Allowing each of the largest donors to take the lead in a Attracted More Donors sector’s reconstruction also proved beneficial for ERRA. The system provided an ongoing check on program- As reconstruction activities began, the need for an matic activities, since donors could draw upon their information clearing house started to become apparent. The data collected by the multiple surveys was seen sectoral involvement to suggest policy adjustments. to be of great use in recovery planning, particularly This further served to boost donor confidence in the in answering the data questions of donors and reconstruction process, and leading to smooth finan- implementers. Consequently, the program manager cial flows for ERRA. of Social Protection was tasked with combining the datasets on vulnerable populations that had been 61. Although large donors were contributing amply, the collected (reference Guiding Principles). Had this need was recognized for the facilitation of smaller information been available earlier in the reconstruction donors. A dedicated Donor and Sponsor Wing was effort, it could also have been used to mobilize smaller created within ERRA to facilitate contributions from donors who were otherwise put off by lack of ready transparency. smaller donors. While contributions from such donors are far smaller than institutional contributions, large volume compensated for their smaller size. Smaller donors were seen to be particularly less likely to 59. Ownership among the largest donors was cultivated contribute if they encountered multiple steps in the by assigning each major donor a sector in which they donation or sponsorship process. Thus, arising from took the lead in reconstruction. A ‘G7-plus’ group was this requirement, though not limited to dealing exclu- established that included the 7 largest donors. This sively with smaller donors, the Donor and Sponsor group met every month, and each one of these donors Wing was created within ERRA which offered a single picked a sector in which they took the lead. The World window for the facilitation of all of a potential donor’s Bank, for example, took the lead in housing, and the needs. European Union spearheaded education sector recon- struction. This close involvement gave the donors 62. High-level coordination across sectors and programs a sense of ownership, as well as confidence in the was greatly facilitated by daily coordination confer- reconstruction effort. ences. Since programs were so closely tied to each 24 Pakistan Earthquake 2005 The Case of Centralized Planning and Decentralized Implementation through ERRA Coordination and Communications other, ERRA instituted a Morning Coordination Con- ference. Each morning the program managers, the Ensuring Communication for Successful individuals primarily responsible for programmatic Implementation of Guiding Principles planning and oversight of individual reconstruction Communication was key to successful intra-sectoral initiatives would discuss mutually relevant updates. prioritization, and it was observed that after The conferences were often subject specific, with a the earthquake that a multitude of stakeholders program manager from a particular sector present- commenced recovery efforts and programs with little ing on her work, leading to a lively discussion on the coordination. intersection of her work and those of other program This led to an over-emphasis on the principle of managers. This mechanism was a key method of vet- accessibility. ting program mechanics with the ERRA team, and With all implementers prioritizing reconstruction in often served to facilitate mid-course corrections. accessible locations, less navigable areas were being 63. Training of Partner Organizations, Construction Arti- entirely neglected. Reconstruction efforts in accessible areas were being duplicated at the cost of recovery in sans & Communities/Homeowners in Seismic Resistant inaccessible areas. Construction. A very important element of ERRA’s reconstruction program was its emphasis on building A coordination mechanism was therefore put into place to avoid program duplication and ensure equitable awareness and capacities for seismic resistant recon- resources were invested in all provinces, inclusive of struction. For example, a comprehensive 3-pronged rural and urban areas. training strategy and curriculum for seismic resistant reconstruction of houses was developed by ERRA, This mechanism ensured that all recovery effort needed approval of ERRA before being carried out, which could under which a cascade of training facilities were be cumbersome, but ensured comprehensive coverage made available to all partner organizations, inter- of the entire affected area. ested construction artisans in the affected districts, and the affected communities as well as homeowners. All recipients of such training were duly certified by such as providing guidance to affected communities the respective trainers, prior to the commencement of in implementing the owner driven housing recon- reconstruction activities. Grassroots partner organi- struction program and in ensuring compliance with zations were made responsible for training functions social and environmental risk safeguards. Country Case Study Series Disaster Recovery Framework Guide / May 2014 25 Coordination and Communications ANNEX -1: THREE-PRONGED APPROACH FOR INFORMATION SHARING AND TRAINING PUBLIC INFORMATION & BEHAVIORAL CHANGE CAMPAIGN HRC Training Program (by ENSET etc.) HRC Master Trainers Army Master Trainers Prov/Distt. Govts, Housing Sponsors PERA/SERA/DRUs Donors/Private Training of AI Teams by Army Training of PO MTs MTs Structural Design & Construction Methods ■■ Damage Assessment ■■ Structural Design & Construction POs’ Training Program Methods Training of Master Training of Master Training of Village Direct Assistance to Skilled Labor-MSL Self Builders-MSB Reconstruction Beneficiaries by AI Committees-VRCs Teams ■■ Provision of Structural Outreach & Community Mobile Demonstration Design Options, Mobilization Teams Teams Construction Guidelines ■■ Assistance & Compliance Certification Grant Beneficiaries 26 Pakistan Earthquake 2005 The Case of Centralized Planning and Decentralized Implementation through ERRA Role of Leadership and Effective Crisis Management 64. Strong leadership within ERRA was a key reason for the 66. ERRA also benefitted from strong support from high- success of post-earthquake reconstruction. While Paki- level political leadership. Indeed, the single most stan has incurred many high intensity natural disasters important factor identified by many studies of the suc- before and after the 2005 earthquake, none of the recov- cess of the reconstruction experience was that project ery responses by the public sector have come close to and programme leadership cultivated at the highest matching the uniquely successful 2005 reconstruction levels of government. From the moment of its institu- program. A main reason for this success was robust tional inauguration, ERRA as an institution benefitted leadership within ERRA, as well as strong political from strong political support, with the President’s support for the organization from the highest tiers of office providing particularly strident support. This political leadership. high-level backing gave the institution powerful political clout. This political backing was also instru- 65. Close cooperation between the civilian and military mental in overcoming the institutional resistance branches of government were also a factor in the suc- ERRA faced from the well-established line ministries cess of the reconstruction operation. The appointment and departments as well as the absence of subsidiary of military personnel at the head of ERRA assisted rules and procedures which led to problems in staff in ensuring close civil-military coordination. In par- recruitment and procurements. It also helped allevi- ticular, the appointment of a high-ranking member ate institutional resistance to ERRA, particularly that of the country’s armed forces as the Deputy Chief of which centered around its special financing mecha- ERRA, the de facto chief executive of the organiza- nisms. tion, greatly facilitated civilian-military coordination. Strong Leadership was Critical in Providing Livelihoods Assistance to Vulnerable Families Based on a review of international good practices, ERRA opted to launch a livelihoods cash assistance programs which provided unconditional monthly cash transfers to deserving affected families. US $85 million was disbursed to 268,000 deserving families. Despite initial setbacks and criticism that such a program was a dole-out and created dependency on public support. However international literature also suggested that while it was important to ‘take out the relief crutches’, economic restoration was not immediately possible and hence families who were below the poverty line, or had lost their breadwinners or suffered life crippling injuries, or were female-headed households, were eligible to be provided income support in the first six months. In the long run, post program evaluations showed how this program was extremely beneficial in averting another man- made disaster after the first natural disaster, in sustaining poor families in that rough period, and allowed them to gradually find a more sustainable means of livelihood. Country Case Study Series Disaster Recovery Framework Guide / May 2014 27 Role of Leadership and Effective Crisis Management 67. The change in political leadership created a change authority to take quick decisions without having to go in political priorities, impacting the pace of recon- through the usual bureaucratic bottlenecks. However, struction. During the initial years of reconstruction, the change in government in 2008 brought in new with strong political ownership and commitment at priorities. This caused a decrease in support for the the national level, and full backing of the national reconstruction effort, impacting ERRA’s ability to expe- leadership, ERRA was able to requisition quality staff, diently resolve potential delays. obtain requisite financial resources and exercise the BBB in Housing Reconstruction was a Result of Strong Leadership by ERRA Housing Reconstruction and Building Back Better. ERRA faced a formidable challenge in convincing the public to forego speedy reconstruction of homes and traditional ways of construction in favor of more resilient reconstruction which could withstand future earthquakes. Despite demands for a lump-sum payment of the housing subsidy in one go, ERRA leadership implemented the principle of building back better, by devising the public subsidy program around conditional and incremental cash transfers. The payment of grant installments was subject to the houses, constructed through a homeowner driven model, to people meeting the seismic compliance requirements set by the government. There was huge hue and cry from various quarters on this arrangement, and many issues arose with maintaining reasonable rates of compliance, but ERRA leadership most commendably withstood this period in a calm and calculating manner. Various facilitation measures of gigantic proportions were put in place to provide an enabling environment for people to comply with the building back better standards put in place by the government. Teams were provided constant encouragement and motivation to repeatedly extend reach out to the 600,000 families scattered over this largely inaccessible areas, while communities often perched on mountain cliffs well beyond the snowline or buried in deep and dark mountain gorges and ravines. The results proved the program a resounding success: an over 90% rate of seismic compliance was achieved and more than that, the seeds for a culture of seismic compliant reconstruction were sown in the entire affected area. 28 Pakistan Earthquake 2005 The Case of Centralized Planning and Decentralized Implementation through ERRA Recommendations for Institutionalizing the Learnings of the Post- Earthquake Reconstruction Experience in the Government System 68. The recommendations included in this section provide has been a key step in this regard. By giving NDMA a guide for steps that can be taken to institutionalize the lead in disaster management in all stages follow- the learnings of the 2005 earthquake experience into ing the disaster, the lessons learned about the need NDMA policy and the wider government system. The to maintain continuity from relief to reconstruction success of the 2005 program can be used to develop can be introduced across the spectrum of post-disas- not only ex-post best practices, but can also inform ter activities. This will require formalized and pre- ex-ante preparatory work to contribute to disaster dictable strategic and resource commitments towards risk reduction. This final step of the institutionaliza- recovery planning, implementation and performance tion of recovery best practices, learned from the 2005 management. Successful recovery will further require experience, can help guide future recovery efforts sustained national ownership and development coop- under NDMA. eration for maintaining traction and momentum on recovery. 69. Ex-Ante Institutionalization of Recovery can help Ensure Integration of DRR: Among the central learnings from 70. Development of national policy standards for informing the earthquake of 2005 was the need to be ready for and guiding disaster recovery strategies: The emer- disasters. Being prepared for a disaster helps deliver gence of a more conducive national policy environ- good recovery. Knowing risks and vulnerabilities, ment for recovery strategy-formulation, planning and Pakistan can put in place policies, standards, and implementation holds the key to building recovery-led institutional arrangement for managing recovery resilience. Pakistan has made strides in developing before a disaster strikes. The establishment of NDMA national policy standards as a result of the 2005 Country Case Study Series Disaster Recovery Framework Guide / May 2014 29 Recommendations earthquake recovery experience. It can build on this ment, planning and project development. These can by developing common standards for all future recov- also: (a) help make recovery inclusive and resilient, ery endeavors by consolidating past country experi- and (b) increase the likelihood of the gains from the ences, existing legal provisions and contemporary recovery process becoming sustainable and translat- international practices. Developing these standards able into resilient development. In this regard, NDMA and guidelines ex-ante can greatly contribute towards and its lower-tier offices could play a major positive the development of successful recovery strategies in role by developing national, subnational or local the chaotic ex-post environment. recovery frameworks, as necessitated by a particular disaster, as a means of ensuring the systematic inte- 71. Maintaining a strategic and institutional continuum gration of DRR in recovery planning and implementa- between preparedness, recovery and prevention is tion processes. essential for the efficiency of future recovery efforts. Future disaster recovery can be made more efficient 73. Importantly, is should be recognized that such a Recov- and effective in contributing towards longer term ery Framework would not replace a PDNA or other risk reduction by: (a) overcoming the inherent short- post-disaster assessment. The Recovery Framework is comings of institutions and governance structures in developed in a manner that it would follow PDNA, and treating recovery as a ‘developmental urgency’, and; would elaborate the findings of PDNA. (b) improving coordination and strategic harmony 74. Recovery Management and Monitoring. There is a across various national and subnational tiers of gov- need for: (a) establishing quality control and enforce- ernment and across recovery and regular develop- ment mechanisms for the implementation of recovery, ment institutions. The establishment of NDMA with (b) building capacities of national, subnational and a strong institutional mandate for all three of these local governments in the design and implementation functions sets the stage for operationalizing and of BBB-based resilient recovery interventions, and (c) streamlining the links between preparedness, recov- developing recovery program monitoring and evalu- ery and prevention. ation systems, including tangible indicators of the 72. Ex-Post Development of National Recovery Frameworks integration of DRR in recovery. The latter includes the can help ensure DRR in recovery. As we see emerging development and institutionalization of actionable clearly from the post-earthquake experience, recov- and measurable indicators to monitor progress of ery offers a unique window of opportunity to reduce implementation and achievement of recovery goals. future risk. People are more aware of risk, politi- Finally, governance and accountability systems cians are more motivated, and the funds are often should be put in place that permit greater account- available. Developing recovery frameworks at that ability between government, the affected population, time will help bring multiple stakeholders and their and the general public on recovery issues. competing or diverging priorities to one common and inclusive platform for recovery strategy develop- 30 Pakistan Earthquake 2005 The Case of Centralized Planning and Decentralized Implementation through ERRA A Snapshot of Good Practices and Lessons Learned ■■ With a large scale, multi-jurisdictional disaster such with processes to ensure centralization in order to as Pakistan’s 2005 earthquake, a “business as usual” ensure uniformity in reconstruction priorities and approach must be adapted for the extraordinary cir- policies across jurisdictions and programs. cumstances. Dedicated institutions, with legal man- ■■ Such agencies must also be accompanied by a clear date and political backing are necessary to implement exit and transitional strategy and sunset clause that successful recovery. is triggered: (a) upon either the substantial achieve- ■■ In such large scale disasters, the most viable insti- ment of major reconstruction targets, or (b) even ear- tutional option may be to consolidate reconstruction lier, if such an institution is only meant to provide into one agency that provides oversight, a single an initial impetus for the reconstruction program to point of coordination for national and international firmly take root and once the reconstruction program stakeholders, and adds additional capacity to imple- is on the path of effective and efficient delivery, in ment and expedite reconstruction projects. How- accordance with jointly agreed vision for reconstruc- ever in such a model, multi-agency and multi-tier tion that a post disaster country formulates. inclusion of public and private stakeholders is to be ■■ A clear legislative mandate is essential for any insti- ensured and implementation responsibilities have to tution tasked with overseeing reconstruction after be delegated to sub-national, or district and munici- a natural disaster. Whether existing legislation is pal levels. amended, new legislation is introduced or a mandate ■■ As noted above, decentralization in implementation is created through ordinances and government orders, should be followed. However, this should be balanced it should clearly codify the functions and authorities Country Case Study Series Disaster Recovery Framework Guide / May 2014 31 A Snapshot of Good Practices and Lessons Learned of the implementing institution. This mandate can ■■ Recovery work can be assisted by the formation of also enable the establishment of a dissolution date or village-level reconstruction committees, and through sunset clause for the institution so responsibility for the expansion of the network of community based national development can return to established insti- organizations. tutions as they were pre-disaster. ■■ Coordination between the public sector and civil soci- ■■ In keeping with the principle of decentralization, ety organizations is essential for success. Appropriate provincial/local level reconstruction agencies should coordination mechanisms should be institutionalized take the lead in the post-disaster reconstruction fol- rather than leaving them to ad-hoc arrangements. lowing localized, provincial level disaster events. ■■ The early development of a holistic prioritization Keeping in view the scale of disaster, necessary sup- strategy can help in the planning of a recovery strat- port should be provided by the national level recon- egy that ensures that overall reconstruction priorities struction body. are reflected across the many reconstruction pro- ■■ Post-disaster reconstruction should be utilized as an grams. opportunity to overcome pre-disaster gaps and short- ■■ The inclusion of international experts in the develop- comings, and to introduce disaster risk reduction. ment of priorities can be beneficial. They can provide ■■ Similarly, by linking post-disaster reconstruction to both sector-specific expertise as well as draw on other broader sectoral programs and priorities, recovery recovery experiences to recommend best practices. should be used as a means of furthering development ■■ Early recovery planning can greatly impact the suc- goals. cess of the donor conference. Presenting donors with ■■ A focus on livelihood generation, particularly for vul- a recovery plan that includes institutional arrange- nerable groups, is a key means of sustaining local ments and monitoring and evaluation procedures economy. Cash grants, by providing cash injections increases donor confidence, having a positive impact into the economy, are a good means of assisting in on contributions. livelihood support. ■■ Mechanisms for speedy procurement, as well as ■■ Detailed assessments conducted after the PDNA help streamlined and transparent tendering and contract inform policies and constitute a vulnerability map- award processes are essential in reconstruction. ping exercise that can assist future reconstruction ■■ Joint oversight mechanisms are useful for ensuring projects, and longer term developmental planning. financial transparency, and contribute to donor con- ■■ A focus on improved access to services as well as ser- fidence. vice delivery should go hand-in-hand with infrastruc- ■■ Robust internal monitoring and evaluation systems ture reconstruction. Sectors such as education, health can function as ‘eyes and ears’ for reconstruction and water and sanitation should be given equal atten- managers, and external technical audits serve to tion alongside transport and housing reconstruction. increase donor and public confidence. ■■ Multi-hazard risk factors should be considered in ■■ Local feedback and inclusiveness assists in service design and implementation, including seismic, land- delivery, standard setting, and in M&E evaluations. slide and flooding risks. 32 Pakistan Earthquake 2005 The Case of Centralized Planning and Decentralized Implementation through ERRA Pakistan Earthquake 2005 The DRF Guide will complement the Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) by using its outputs to help governments develop comprehensive, integrated, multi-sectoral recovery plans and management strategies. The DRF Guide addresses key elements such as: (a) Institutional framework for recovery; (b) Policy making and planning for recovery programs; (c) Costing and financing recovery programs, and; (d) Managing recovery and monitoring the delivery of results. Over time, the DRF is intended help improve government readiness for disaster recovery. By following the Guide, disaster recovery will be seen not as a short-term, remedial response, but an opportunity to build resilience and contribute to long-term development. The Guide is being developed as a completely practice-based tool with input from: (a) an International Advisory Group (IAG), composed of senior international experts with first-hand recovery management experience; (b) a Technical Working Group (TWG), including professionals from the World Bank, UNDP, EU, and other stakeholder partners with practical expertise in various aspects of recovery, and; (c) a series of national-level and thematic case studies that will synthesize various global recovery experiences. The stakeholder engagement process encourages government officials, civil society organizations, and private sector entities familiar with large-scale recovery efforts, to collaborate in the development and dissemination of the DRF Guide. The DRF Guide is scheduled to be launched at the Second World Reconstruction Conference.