The Multi-Stakeholder Review of Post-Conflict Programming in Aceh (MSR) was undertaken by the Aceh Peace-Reintegration Board (BRA), the National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS), AusAID, DFID, the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, UNDP, the USAID-SERASI program and the World Bank between May 2008 and December 2009 with IOM contributing in the initial phase. It builds upon recent efforts by BRA and its partners to better plan and coordinate post-conflict programming, based on a shared understanding and strategic vision. The MSR has engaged a wide range of government, international and local stakeholders.

Four years on from the Helsinki MoU, it provides a framework for future policies and programs to consolidate peace and development in Aceh. The MSR employs a comprehensive framework to identify post-conflict needs and issues in Aceh and ways to most effectively respond to them. It considers issues relating to livelihoods and the economy, politics, security and social cohesion, and governance and institutions. Within each of these areas, the report discusses existing programs, needs, challenges and constraints at the individual, community and macro levels. This allows for a consideration of the policies and programs that can build the foundations for sustainable peace and development in post-conflict Aceh.

The Conflict Affected

The conflict had negative impacts on most of Aceh’s population. The MSR estimates that there are 14,300 former Free Aceh Movement (GAM) combatants in Aceh. Over half of the former combatants can be found in the four most heavily conflict affected districts: Aceh Utara, Bireuen, Aceh Timur and Pidie. Nationalistic groups that opposed GAM during the conflict now come under the collective banner of Pembela Tanah Air (Defenders of the Homeland, PETA). Many of the former GAM fighters underwent re-education (binaan) by the Indonesian Government. After the MoU they formed their own organisation called Forum Komunikasi Anak Bangsa (Communication Forum of Sons of the Nation, FORKAB) to advocate for claims for assistance. Members of these groups have received assistance through BRA. Moreover, almost all of the 2,035 former political prisoners released after the MoU have received assistance, as have a number of prisoners released before the MoU.

Approximately 1.5 million people or 39 percent of the population consider themselves to be victims of conflict. Displacement, trauma, damage to property, disruption to primary livelihood source, and physical injury or illness are the most common forms of victimhood. Victims are concentrated in the four most heavily conflict affected districts plus Lhokseumawe.

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Women were affected by the conflict in a number of ways. A small number carried arms, approximately 680 were in GAM’s military structure, and 3,800 played a variety of supporting roles in the conflict. Many women were forced to take on the role of the primary provider for their families. Some witnessed the death of family members while others continue to suffer from the uncertainty of disappearance. An unknown number of women on both sides of the conflict were subject to sexual violence. While some women have shown remarkable strength, others are still traumatised. Stigma and a reluctance to openly address the issue are hampering effective responses to the problem.

Over 400,000 people were displaced by the conflict. While most have returned, between 45,000 and 145,000 people are still displaced, mostly in the four most heavily affected conflict districts. Returnees often face significant challenges upon return such as retrieving property, rebuilding relationships and finding work. IDPs and resettlers face issues of tension with host communities, access to resources and, again, employment.
The Cost of Conflict

The conflict exerted an immense toll on Aceh. The economic cost of the conflict is estimated to be Rp. 107.4 trillion (US$ 10.7 billion). This is almost twice the cost of damage and losses from the December 2004 tsunami. Economic losses due to the conflict were eight times greater than the cost of damages incurred. The provincial economy incurred 61 percent or Rp. 65.5 trillion (US$ 6.5 billion) of the total cost of conflict, while the cost to the national government was Rp. 41.9 trillion (US$ 4.2 billion).

The productive sector bore the brunt of conflict damage and loss. Agriculture and enterprise were particularly affected, heavily impacting on the lives of rural communities. The conflict damaged rice and other agricultural fields and killed livestock in nearly all districts. Over 50 percent of rural infrastructure in Aceh was damaged directly or indirectly to some degree as a result of the conflict. Almost 4,000 schools (two-thirds of the total in rural Aceh) were damaged. As of 2006, 33,000 houses were completely destroyed and another 77,000 had sustained heavy or moderate damage. The fighting also damaged 7,700 km of road and almost 2,200 bridges. The cost to the government of maintaining security during the conflict is estimated at Rp. 22.5 trillion (US$ 2.3 billion), or 21 percent of the total cost of conflict. Foregone tax and utilities revenues were also significant.

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Livelihoods and the Economy

Nearly all population groups are benefiting from Aceh's economic recovery since the end of the conflict—particularly from the resumption of agriculture and small-scale trade.

There has been a significant rise in employment levels among former combatants, with most now working; ex-combatants are now more likely to have jobs than the non-combatant population. Most former combatants and ex-political prisoners have returned to the occupations they held prior to joining the insurgency—mainly farming and agricultural wage labour, with others mainly performing non-agricultural daily wage labour.

Employment for Combatants and Civilians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Situation (%)</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women†</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ex-TNA (n=12024)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians (n=11794)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparing ex-TNA to Civilians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-TNA (n=29)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians (n=1237)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparing ex-TNA to Civilians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full time employment</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some part-time work</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Poverty Measures, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Female-headed (n=599)</th>
<th>Male-headed (n=3511)</th>
<th>Comparing Male to Female-headed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household assets (mean) (Rp. '000)</td>
<td>17,633</td>
<td>23,918</td>
<td>6,285**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meters-squared of land farmed by household (mean)</td>
<td>4,785</td>
<td>9,460</td>
<td>4,675***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of houses made of concrete (%)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to water from a clear or protected source (%)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average income in male/female-headed households for:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian men</td>
<td>13,900</td>
<td>18,600</td>
<td>4,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian women†</td>
<td>12,100</td>
<td>5,776</td>
<td>-6,322***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ARLS. ** Significant at 99%; *** Significant at 95%; * Significant at 90%  † Not representative of all Aceh

Much of the poverty reduction seen in Aceh is a result of the recent growth of the province’s economy. This growth is largely due to the massive influx of tsunami reconstruction aid. As the post-tsunami reconstruction period draws to a close, non-farm employment opportunities in the construction and service sectors are dwindling.

Although inflation has flattened, high living costs are impacting households’ ability to save and invest, and a high minimum wage is affecting employment generation through new investment. Despite a concerted effort by provincial and local governments and numerous donor-supported programs aimed at creating a conducive business climate, investment in Aceh remains minimal. The draft Aceh Green Policy framework employs a progressive approach to investment and development.

Politics, Security and Social Cohesion

Great progress has been achieved in reintegrating former combatants, political prisoners and returnees into social and political life in Aceh. However, the persistence of conflict-era identities and structures continues to thwart the full assimilation of some of these individuals into society.

Levels of violent conflict have dropped dramatically since the signing of the Helsinki accords. Moreover, in the first half of 2009, the number of incidents of violence fell from previous years. Crime rates are well below those of neighbouring North Sumatra province and a perceived rise in criminality in 2008 that was undermining public trust in the peace process, may have lessened with the successful elections and reduction in violent incidents. While this is encouraging, tensions over ongoing aid, mistrust to provide skills training or business development support to former combatants, political prisoners or conflict victims. Only a small number of former combatants or amnestied political prisoners have returned to school since the conflict ended.

In the medium to long term, strategies to promote general growth may be more effective in dealing with the needs of most conflict-affected people than targeted assistance programs. However, certain vulnerable population groups—especially IDPs/recent returnees, conflict widows and female-headed households—will continue to require carefully targeted assistance. Targeting of such groups should be based on indicators of vulnerability rather than conflict-era identity markers, and in most cases communities will be best placed to decide on who should benefit.

Violent Incidents and Deaths by Month (2005 - mid 2009)

Violent Incidents (excl. GAM vs Gul)  GAM vs Gul Violent Incidents  Deaths

Source: ACMU/APMU.
Vigilantism, disputes over government contracts, aid conflicts and domestic violence are the most prevalent forms of localised violence in post-conflict Aceh. Politically, it is still too early for the provincial and national governments to consider the establishment of two new provinces in Aceh’s mountainous interior and south-western regions. Power-sharing arrangements between Aceh and Jakarta are still to be solidly defined and currently peace is not sufficiently consolidated to handle such upheavals. The legitimacy of partition can be examined once peace is further consolidated. Moreover, the continued presence of conflict-era organisations such as the Aceh Transitional Committee (KPA), PETA and FORKAB, pose a challenge to political stability and security. Rising membership in these organizations perpetuates both conflict-era identities and pressure on the government for ongoing individual assistance.

Rural communities in Aceh are characterised by strong social capital and high levels of trust in local village-level leadership. In contrast, public trust in higher levels of government remains low. In highland areas inter-village and inter-ethnic relations are a source of tension, as are IDP/returnee relations with villagers throughout the province. Deeper reintegration of former combatants has yet to occur with limited close friendships with civilians.

**Closest Friends and Prospective Business Partners**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ex-TNA</th>
<th>KPA member</th>
<th>Conflict Victims</th>
<th>Conflict Returnee</th>
<th>IDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ex-TNA</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPA member</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Victims</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Returnee</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ARLS. Men only.
Question: Name five people whom you consider (...) to be your closest friends, and three people with whom you would start a business.

**Elections for heads of regional government and, more recently, for district, provincial and national members of parliament, were largely free and fair with relatively low levels of violence and high participation rates.** However, as in other parts of Indonesia, there were problems such as ‘money politics’ and intimidation in elections, which could undermine the process of establishing democratic governance in a still recovering Aceh.

**Governance and Institutions**

The Aceh peace process is led by the government and as such differs from many other post-conflict programs worldwide. This provides many opportunities; but there have also been limitations in the effectiveness of government programs and strategies.

A comprehensive and inclusive strategy across the government for consolidating peace in Aceh is still lacking although recent efforts by BRA in producing a draft ‘Comprehensive Action Plan’ for its work is a positive development. There is no effective and broad institutional structure to oversee the wider implementation of the peace process in the long term. Initial attempts to incorporate reintegration and post-conflict recovery and development programs into relevant line ministry activities have faltered.

The mandate of BRA is broad, contested and constrained, despite the issue of a new Governor’s Decree in June of this year. BRA’s performance is constrained by limited authority, lack of institutional consensus with Jakarta, overly ambitious planning, funding delays, inadequate staff capacity and organisational problems. Recent restructuring and internal attempts to clarify the agency’s function and authority, and a revised Decree due later in the year, are welcome and hopefully will improve BRA’s effectiveness.

There is no broad government-wide strategy being implemented for consolidating the peace process in Aceh. The initial government strategy of Presidential Instruction No. 15, 2005 while bold and innovative has not been fully nor systematically implemented, especially in regards to assistance. This has hampered the mainstreaming of conflict recovery planning and sensitivity across the government agencies and institutions. Despite coordination efforts and directives to action towards these agencies by the Coordinating Ministry for Politics, Legal and Security Affairs as the lead coordinating agency designated by the Instruction, these have not been completely translated into concrete actions. Lack of proper delegation and follow up has put pressure on BRA as the local agency tasked with overseeing the peace process.

International experience and expertise is not being effectively provided or utilised to support the peace process in Aceh. Most international agencies have formulated and implemented programs without adequate co-ordination with each other or with the government. More effort should put in to working with and supporting government-led implementation in the future.

Progress has been made in tackling corruption in Aceh with the Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction for the Region and Community of Aceh and Nias (BRR) having set new standards for the province. Recent provincial government initiatives to tackle corruption are also welcome and should be strengthened. However, during the conflict, Aceh had a reputation as one of the most corrupt provinces in Indonesia and predatory practices from the conflict period still continue to a degree. This is further compounded by limited local government capacity, another legacy of the conflict era.

The Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) are still cautious toward the activities and motives of KPA and GAM members. They are active in internal security roles taking an agressive interpretation of the clauses in the LoGA regarding the TNI’s role in ‘the maintenance, protection, and defense of the integrity and sovereignty of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia’. This risks alienating sections of the Acehnese public if overdone. Improved law enforcement is also crucial to the long-term success of the peace process. While the police’s record in solving crime has improved, there is still a need to develop its investigative capacity, overall professionalism and its relationship with communities. The legal system overall also requires ongoing attention to build its capacity and public faith in its institutions.

**The high levels of trust among rural communities in village government and customary institutions, these entities can play an important role in consolidating peace in Aceh, and need to be prioritised in peace-building, recovery and development programs.** Local government also represents a crucial locus for increased women’s participation in decision-making and peace-building.
Towards a Framework for Supporting Peaceful Development in Aceh

The MSR provides a number of recommendations that can serve as a basis for the development of future strategies to help consolidate peace and promote prosperity in post-conflict Aceh.

Livelihoods and Economy

**Individual Level**

1. The time for widespread individual targeting of reintegration assistance has passed. There is a need for both the government and donors to transition quickly to approaches aimed at improving community and general welfare.
2. That said, limited targeted assistance needs to continue for certain vulnerable groups such as female-headed households, displaced peoples, recent returnees, certain types of conflict victims, including those who suffered from sexual violence, and the elderly, along with potentially problematic groups such as unemployed or underemployed former combatants and youth in high conflict-intensity districts.
3. The criteria for further individually-targeted assistance need to shift from the MoU categories (former combatants, amnestied prisoners, and conflict victims) to other vulnerability measures. These should focus on:
   a. The most marginalised households and individuals, who are struggling to benefit from community-based and broader development approaches; and
   b. Security concerns, i.e., limited economic assistance to individuals who pose a security risk.

Identification of individuals should be done by communities, rather through conflict era structures, and should include benefits for the wider community. Labelling beneficiaries based on conflict-era identities should be avoided.

**Community Level**

1. Community-managed government programs such as PNPM/BKPG and donor programs that also coordinate and work with government should be continued and, if successful, expanded. Programs such as these can be useful in providing much needed:
   a. Small-scale infrastructure construction projects—including roads, bridges, irrigation, drainage, water and sanitation—which generate short-term employment and income opportunities, while providing badly needed infrastructure to reduce isolation and promote economic development in rural areas;
   b. Livelihood projects and small to medium-scale enterprise development, including provision of capital, skills development, value chain development, improving market access and strengthening of village micro-credit associations, and collective production and/or marketing groups. These programs have proven especially effective in providing income support for disadvantaged women in the community.
2. Developing partnerships between local government agencies and NGOs can be effective in improving quality, enhancing government legitimacy and building understanding.
3. Existing mechanisms such as PNPM/BKPG and the MUSRENBANG can be strengthened in terms of their contribution to consolidation of peace by building the capacity of facilitators and government officials for conflict-sensitive planning, strengthening mechanism to ensure marginalised groups are more fully included, and by linking community initiatives to complementary government and donor programs and projects. Additional components supported by donors or government to these existing mechanism that specifically aim to build peace such as socialization of peace process issues (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, assistance to conflict victims etc.) or conflict resolution training to village leaders will add peace consolidation value to these mechanism.

Macro Level

1. Programs and strategies are needed to promote investment and business development. A portion of Aceh’s special autonomy fund windfall and other public funds should be utilised for this.
2. Improvements in access to credit and modern financial services are needed to support investment and enterprise development in the province. This includes: loosening regulations to allow bank and other financial institution branch expansion and more flexible lending amounts to cover the needs of rural entrepreneurs and small-to-medium-sized enterprises; improving methods of assessing credit worthiness; further mentoring and capacity building of micro and small credit institutions; building partnerships between commercial and such credit institutions to develop more flexible lending products; and better promoting finance and business services in inland areas.
3. Support for business development services to improve accessibility, e.g. through government subsidies and partnerships with finance institutions, is recommended.
4. A more attractive business environment is needed to attract investment and counterbalance declining oil and gas revenues and tsunami reconstruction aid—in particular, there is a need to support growth in agriculture and agro-forestry, and to increase value adding within the province. Aceh Green should be supported and pursued as provincial government framework for investment and development that is innovative and supportive of the long-term peace process.
5. Major government investments are required in transportation, power, irrigation and other infrastructure, especially in areas with high levels of conflict damage and poverty.
6. Ongoing monitoring of the economic situation in Aceh can assist in devising effective development programs and regulatory frameworks.

Politics, Security and Social Cohesion

**Individual Level**

1. While the overall emphasis of post-conflict programming should change to broader development projects, some individually-targeted projects are needed for groups who pose a risk to peace (see above) or are a source of tension. These should focus on building capacity to enhance long-term earning power, breaking up disruptive social networks, and combining economic assistance with social support. When assisting individuals, there should be broader benefits for the community as well.
2. Programs to send vulnerable individuals overseas for work, or inter-province for skills training courses, have promise.
3. Domestic violence can be combated through both preventive and responsive measures including public awareness and education campaigns (especially those targeting boys and men), women’s empowerment, and support services for victims of domestic violence. This can include support for, and collaboration with, local and provincial women’s NGOs and CBOs and with local government.

**Community Level**

1. Community and business development activities can enhance social cohesion if they bring together people from different social groups. This may be applied to areas with displaced people and recent returnees, high numbers of former combatants and communities split politically during the conflict.
2. Village institutions and communities should be engaged in the implementation of village infrastructure and social and economic development programs to increase social cohesion and ensure effectiveness. Where possible, existing platforms for this should be used.
3. Village and local government leaders should be educated in conflict resolution techniques.
4. Increased women’s participation in village government and decision-making structures can significantly improve the equity and conflict-
sensitiveness of local initiatives and programs.

5. Constructing community meeting facilities can help build social cohesion and collective action capacity.

Macroscale

1. The provincial and national governments at this time should delay consideration of the establishment of new provinces until peace is more consolidated. Grievances can be addressed through increased government support for local development initiatives, infrastructure and improved service delivery in restive areas.

2. There is a need for continued monitoring of the security condition in Aceh in order to be able to respond quickly to emerging issues.

Governance and Institutions

Community Level

1. There is a need to support the further development of effective, accountable and transparent village government institutions and structures. This should include skills training and mentoring.

2. The implementation of provincial and district legislation on village governance should be accelerated.

3. The MUSRENBANG process can be strengthened and expanded with technical inputs and support from donors and by taking measures to ensure that grass-roots voices are heard and that decisions are conflict-sensitive.

Macroscale

1. BRA together with BAPPENAS and BAPPEDA should develop a framework and action plan for mainstreaming peace-building and conflict-sensitive programming throughout the provincial government.

2. District parliaments, NGOs, and accountability institutions such as ombudsmen.

3. The capacity of the provincial-level committee developing a proposed plan for the allocation of special autonomy resources should be strengthened—emphasising conflict-sensitive development, and incorporating the conflict-intensity index as a guide for strategy and program development.

4. Continued consensus building is needed among all parties involved in MoU and LoGA implementation. This includes simplifying and clarifying the various fora engaged in communication, coordination and planning.

5. Although TNI has a legitimate mandate based on the LoGA for maintaining, protecting and securing the unity and sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia, this needs to be done in a way that rebuilds trust with Acehnese especially in former GAM strongholds and areas of high conflict. Moreover, the spirit of the MoU limiting their role to external defence rather than internal security should be pursued as far as possible. Ongoing professionalization should also be continued.

6. Police skills and capacities to investigate crimes and arrest culprits need to be further developed. Local police in Aceh need more personnel, improved investigative skills, and better training beyond community policing programs.

7. While improvements have been made, there is still a need to increase government transparency and oversight. This includes assisting anti-corruption NGOs at the provincial and local levels, and reform and capacity-building of the legal system. More stringent procedures for contractors engaging in government infrastructure projects are necessary to ensure quality of work and transparency.

8. The research, development and analysis capacity of provincial and district governments need to be bolstered, to help ensure that development planning is based on accurate data.

9. International support for the peace process remains vital, but should shift from direct implementation to support for government and civil society-led initiatives within a comprehensive framework. International experience and expertise in developing and implementing strategies for conflict-sensitive service delivery and program design should form the basis of international capacity and institutional development support.