77425 Ending War, Building Peace Contribution of the national DDR program in DRC to peace in the african Great Lakes Region Yvan Conoir 2012 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 www.tdrp.net www.worldbank.org This study was produced under the Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP). The findings, interpretations, and conclusions herein are those of the authors only and do not necessarily reflect the views of the TDRP donors, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/the World Bank and its affiliated organizations, its Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. 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Cover Design and Text Layout: Duina Reyes Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program Ending War, Building Peace Contribution of the national DDR program in DRC to peace in the african Great Lakes Region May 2012 Yvan Conoir Table of Contents List of Abbreviation and Acronyms......................................................1 Executive Summary............................................................................... 3 1 A DDR Program within Complex Regional Dynamics................... 4 2 In DRC Demobilization Complements Security Sector Reform..... 9 2.1 Two Distinct Demobilization Phases....................................................................... 9 2.2 Demobilization and Security Sector Reform...........................................................10 3 Socio-economic Reintegration of Demobilized Ex-Combatants in DRC............................................................................................. 15 3.1 Transitional Safety Net............................................................................................15 3.2 Socio-Economic Reintegration within NDDRP – From Individual to Associative Mode..................................................................................................... 16 3.3 Social and Community Reintegration . ...................................................................18 4 Assistance to Vulnerable Groups.....................................................20 4.1 Women Associated to Armed Forces and Groups ..................................................20 4.2 War Wounded and Handicapped ............................................................................21 4.3 Children Associated to Armed Forces and Groups ................................................23 5 Relevance, Effectiveness and Impact of the NDDRP . .................26 ................................................................................................28 Annexes. Annex I. Map of DRC ..................................................................................................29 Annex II. Bibliography..................................................................................................30 Ending War, Building Peace — Contribution of the national DDR program in DRC to peace in the african Great Lakes Region iii List of Tables Table 1. Demobilization after the first phase of NDDRP (2004-2007)...............................10 Table 2. New Demobilization objectives of the NDDRP – “Recovery� Phase (2008-2009)................................................................................................................ 12 Table 3. Achievements of the Disarmament and Demobilization component – Recovery Phase (2009)......................................................................................................... 13 Table 4. Proportional representation of FARDC and demobilized armed groups (2009)............................................................................................................ 13 Table 5. Consolidated Demobilization figures of the NDDRP (26/Sept. 2011). ...............14 Table 6. Number of Demobilized supported in individual mode – Year 2010...................18 Table 7. Special projects in support of demobilized women developed by CARITAS Congo. ................................................................................................................. 21 Table 8. Number of War wounded to be demobilized in the Recovery Phase Objectives of the “Restart� Phase......................................................................................22 Table 9. Balance of support granted to war wounded (of Kinshasa)(2010).......................23 Table 10. CAAFG Statistics (25 Dec. 2007)..........................................................................25 .................................................27 Table 11. NDDRP Expenditure Allocated by Component. List of Graphics Graph 1. Overview of the MDRP (2009).............................................................................. 6 ................................................................... 7 Graph 2. Integrated Approach of the NDDRP. ................... 8 Graph 3. Governance of the NDDRP in Democratic Republic of the Congo. Graph 4. Mixing and recycling during the transition phase – 15 Brigades integrated (2006).................................................................................................................. 11 Graph 5. Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries won the support of most of the demobilized................................................................................................................... 16 Graph 6. Commitments of local authorities in support of NDDRP Demobilized (NDDRP Antennas) ........................................................................................................... 18 Graph 7. Two thirds of local communities support the reintegration process..................19 Graph 8. Main Motivations for Gender Demobilization (ex-FARDC, DRC).....................21 Graph 9. Geographic distribution of war wounded and handicapped through the territory of DRC (2007).......................................................................................................22 Graph 10. Representation of the children’s living environment, according to the Children’s DDR operational framework.............................................................................25 iv List of Abbreviation and Acronym ADF Allies Democratic Forces AfDB African Development Bank BUNADER National Office of Demobilization and Reintegration CAAFG Children Associated to Armed Forces and Groups CARITAS Catholic Church Development Branch CELPAY Payment system for the demobilized (Private Company) CIAT International committee supporting the transition CI-DDR Inter-ministerial DDR Committee CNDP National Congress for the Defense of the People CONADER National Demobilization and Reinsertion Commission CPA Child Protection Agency CRHP Rehabilitation Center for Physical Handicapped DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration DO Disarmament Operation DP Disarmament Point DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo EC Ex-Combatants EMG General Army Staff EUSEC European Security FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation FARDC Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo FDLR Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda FNL National Forces of Liberation (Burundi) GLR Great Lakes Region HDW Human Dignity in the World ICR Implementation Completion Report IDA International Development Association IU-NDDRP National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Implementation Unit IGA Income generating activities ILO International Labor Organization INPP National Institute of Professional Training INS National Statistic Institute Ending War, Building Peace — Contribution of the national DDR program in DRC to peace in the african Great Lakes Region 1 IU Implementing Unit IVO Identification, Verification and Orientation JCOC Joint Operations Coordination Center JOC Joint Operations Center LEAP Learning for Equality, Access and Peace Program LRA Lord’s Resistance Army MDRP Multi-donors Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program MDTF Multi-donors Trust Fund M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MDNAC Ministry of National Defense and Veterans MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the DR Congo MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilisation Mission in the DR Congo NDDRP National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program (PNDDR - French acronym) NGO Non Governmental Organization OC Orientation Center OCHA Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of United Nations OC Orientation Center OTC Orientation Transitional Center RC Regrouping Center SCF Save the Children Fund SMI Integrated Military Structure SSR Reinsertion Monitoring System STAREC Stabilization and Reconstruction Program TF Trust Fund TDRP Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program TSA Transitional Safety Net UNDP United Nations Development Programme UN United Nations UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund WAAFG Women Associated to Armed Forces and Groups WB World Bank WEC Wounded Ex-Combatants 2 Executive Summary T he National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NDDRP) Programme in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was implemented over a period of seven years (2004- 2011) with the World Bank’s support and funding. (2010 - September 2011) were implemented. In spring 2003, the Congolese authorities estimated the total number of armed combatants at 330,000 and the number of people to demobilize at 150,000 in- An additional phase, initiated in 2011, supported by cluding 30,000 children associated with armed forces the African Development Bank (AfDB) is still ongoing. and groups (CAAFG). An evaluation of the program The NDDRP had three objectives: 1) disarmament of funded by the World Bank, estimated that the number all combatants willing to be granted a status of “de- of economically and socially reintegrated demobilized mobilized� person; and 2) demobilization of all ex- people was close to 90,000 out of an estimated caseload combatants who met the conditions for a return to of 208,000 of which over 66,000 had opted for their civilian life through a downsizing process of armed integration within the national army while more than forces or groups; and 3) reintegrate the demobilized “in 33,000 CAAFG were reunited with their families and the social and economic practices of the community of reintegrated. Economic reintegration of demobilized their choice with opportunities and conditions similar ex-combatants represented four out of five demobi- to those of other members of the community�1. lized as recorded by the program. At the program’s con- To achieve these objectives, the DRC government ini- clusion, the implementing partners decided to support tially established a National Commission of Demo- the creation, legalization, and strengthening of demo- bilization and Reinsertion (CONADER, 2003), then bilized persons’ economic associations. This model of established the NDDRP (2004), and finally created economic and social reintegration developed by the a new NDDRP Implementation Unit (IU-NDDRP, NDDRP could serve as a model framework for future 2007). NDDRP was divided into three distinct phases, rehabilitation and reintegration processes in DRC as each capitalizing on the gains as well as the mistakes of well as in other countries. the past. In the early years of the regional Multi-coun- try Demobilization and Reintegration Program (2004- Finally, while the results were not as high as expected 2008) and after the end of the CONADER, a “Recovery in regard to the number of women as well as wounded phase� (2008-2010) followed by an “Extension Phase� and disabled veterans demobilized, the NDDRP can be lauded for successfully reaching and reintegrating a 1   National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program, highly significant number of CAAFG through special pp. 22-27. projects executed by different implementing partners. Ending War, Building Peace — Contribution of the national DDR program in DRC to peace in the african Great Lakes Region 3 1 A DDR Program within Complex Regional Dynamics D RC has been going through a series of suc- cessive wars starting with the first war from 1996 to 1998, followed by the so-called “First African World War� where no less than seven countries participated for several years in an open conflict over the enormous challenge in ensuring peace and stability. The various types of organized armed forces in the Congo included: ¡¡ Regular foreign armed forces: up to ten neighboring territory of the DRC. The conflict is estimated to have states had regular soldiers on DRC territory; cost about three to five million lives.2 Cease-fire agree- ¡¡ Foreign armed groups: a number of foreign ments in Lusaka (July 1999) put an end to the conflict. groups sought sanctuary in DRC including the Following the signing of the Comprehensive and In- FDLR, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the clusive Agreement of 20023, a transitional government FNL and the ADF5; was formed in late 2003, including the appointment of a president, Laurent Kabila, and four vice-presidents. ¡¡ Congolese armed forces: including the national The Comprehensive and Inclusive Agreement, the army, the Forces Armées Congolaises (FAC), and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, and the establishment of rebel signatories to the Global Accords including the UN Peacekeeping mission, MONUC, resulted in RCD-Goma, MLC, RCD-ML and a select few Mai a gradual return of relative security that allowed the Mai forces; realization of the first free multiparty elections on ¡¡ Congolese irregular armed groups: included local July 30, 2006 since independence in 1960. After two militia such as the Mai Mai forces as well as other rounds of voting, Mr. Joseph Kabila was elected Presi- armed groups that emerged during the continuing dent in November 2006. New elections were held in conflict in eastern Congo such as the FPI, FNI, November 2011, seeking to consolidate the democratic and the CNDP. process in DRC and contribute to a gradual return of peace and sustainable development.4 Under the Global Accords and subsequent peace treaties a multi-layered approach was established to Since the beginning of the peace construction process, push towards gradual demilitarization of an estimated violence, however, did not cease, particularly in eastern 300,000 armed forces in DRC. The legal framework Congo, and the Congolese parties that signed the and international support for the various armed forces accords and their international partners confronted an is outlined below:6 ¡¡ Regular foreign armed forces: from the Lusaka agreements in July 1999, to the Pretoria Agree- 2   On this topic, http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/MDRP_DRC_ FS_0309_Fn.pdf International Rescue Committee has estimated this figure to 5,4 million since 1998, see http://www.rescue.org/special-reports/ special-report-congo-y 5   Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda, Lord’s Resistance Army 3   http://www.congonline.com/DI/documents/Accord_global_et_ (LRA), Forces Nationales de Libération (Burundi) and Allies Defense Forces inclusif_de_Pretoria_17122002_signed.htm (Uganda). 4   ICR 2168, op. Quoted, para. 2. 6   ICR 2168, op. Quoted, para. 3. 4 ment between Rwanda and DRC in July 2002, the building issue, both nationally and internationally. Luanda Agreement between Uganda and DRC in September 2002, these forces were demarcated DRC’s NDDRP has occupied a prominent place in and withdrew from DRC territory by 2004, under the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration the monitoring of the Third Party Verification Program (MDRP), a regional program of the World Mechanism (South Africa) and the UN Peace- Bank set up to facilitate the disarmament, demobili- keeping Mission (MONUC); zation and reintegration of almost 350,000 ex-com- batants in Africa’s GLR. A total of seven countries in ¡¡ Foreign Armed Groups: no binding agreements the GLR, involved in a regional conflict rooted in the were ever signed and these have remained the DRC during the 1990s and early 2000s, participated priority of MONUC under its DDRRR program in MDRP: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic (disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reset- (CAR), Republic of the Congo (RoC), Rwanda and tlement and reintegration) for a decade supported Uganda. More than 40 national and internation- by the rapprochement between DRC and Rwanda al partners participated in the management of the in 2008; MDRP during its implementation (2002-2009), with a ¡¡ Congolese Armed Forces: as signatories to the $500 million funding from 13 donors who contributed Global Accords and numbering about 150,000 to a multi-donor trust fund, and International Develop- combatants these forces were the target popula- ment Association (IDA)7. A total of 279,263 combat- tion of the National Disarmament, Demobiliza- ants were demobilized through national programs and tion and Reintegration Program (NDDRP) of special projects supported by the MDRP, or 78% of the the Government financed by the World Bank and initial number of combatants expected for all country donor partners, and after July 2003, supported by programs.8 MONUC whose mandate was extended to include The overall objective of NDDRP was to help consolidate the demobilization of Congolese combatants (UN peace and to promote economic stability and sustainable Resolution 1493); development in the DRC and the GLR9. ¡¡ Congolese irregular armed groups: these were addressed in a haphazard way according to local In order to achieve its overall objective, the specific peace agreements over the decade. The Dar es objectives of the program included: Salaam peace accords of 2003 provided the frame- ¡¡ The demobilization and reintegration of 150,000 work for cessation of the Ituri conflict supported ex-combatants including 30,000 children in the by the Government with UNDP, USAID and the social and economic life of the country; and World Bank. Later agreements, including Goma in 2008 and 2009, provided for the CNDP and local ¡¡ Promoting the reallocation of Government ex- Mai Mai groups, which were primarily integrated penditure from military to social and economic into the national army, the FARDC. sectors. Throughout the years of war, the National Disarma- The three program components were the following:10 ment, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (NDDRP), both the result of the Cease-fire Agreement ¡¡ Disarmament: Disarmament is the act of voluntary as well as of the Global Inclusive Agreement of 2002, surrender of weapons by the combatants to the was a key player for facilitating the return to civilian competent military authority; life of thousands of men, women and children and was the largest DDR program in the sub-region of Central Africa and the Great Lakes Region (GLR). It benefited, 7   For more information on the MDRP, see the MDRP Final Report, 2010, at http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/MDRP_Final_Report_fn.pdf not often without problems, from the support of the 8   Ibidem, p. 23. World Bank as well as many other international donors and partners for whom the end of hostilities, disar- 9   For an in-depth study of the root and immediate causes of the conflict as well as its resolution, we would like to invite the reader to mament and demobilization as well as the social and consult para. 1 to 13 of the National DDR Program (NDDRP). economic reintegration of hundreds of thousands of 10   These definitions of the MDRP are different from the UN ex-combatants (ECs) were a major security and peace- standard definitions on what is D, D and R adopted in 2005. Ending War, Building Peace — Contribution of the national DDR program in DRC to peace in the african Great Lakes Region 5 Graph 1. Overview of the MDRP (2009)11 March 2009 73% Demobilization 379,875 77% Beneficiaries Reinsertion 318,991 Original Target 60% Reintegration 366,227 ¡¡ Demobilization: Demobilization is a specific of a new labour force (demobilized) in production and administrative act by which the soldier changes his the economy. military status to that of civilian; and11 At the beginning of the DDR process, domestic ¡¡ Reintegration: Reintegration is the process by governance in the DRC had its impact on the which the demobilized go back to the social and creation of the first National Commission for DDR economic practices of the community of their (CONADER, 12/2003 - 07/2007), the latter being choice in conditions and opportunities similar to representative of the national political transitional those of other community members. process (Inclusive Global Agreements). Each of the five branches of the CONADER, therefore, was Two components of assistance were provided by representative of the five actors and political powers NDDRP within the socio-economic reintegration at the head of the country including the Office of phase: the President and four Vice-presidencies, or the “One plus Four�. This political architecture was one of the ¡¡ Immediate/interim assistance-also called “transi- factors that generated slowness and inertia within the tional safety net�; and first institution responsible for DDR in DRC, the ¡¡ Assistance to the socio-economic development CONADER. Additionally, it is important to note the of communities that combined a diverse range of crucial role played by the Ministry of National Defense support services. and Veterans Affairs (MDNDAC), from the beginning up to the end of the process with MDNDAC primarily Eventually, the expected impacts of the program were: responsible for ensuring expected results of the whole (1) political stability and security in the country and the process. region through the disarmament and demilitarization of society, (2) capacity development of the demobilized The final element important for understanding the so s/he can take care of himself or herself, and DDR dynamics in DRC is its “integrated� approach, (3) poverty reduction as a result of the resumption of whereby the approach, strategy and expected outcomes economic and trade exchanges and the incorporation of DDR are conditioned by the security sector reform process in DRC as well as by the revitalization of local communities in the fight against poverty. The program 11   http://www.mdrp.org/programs_proj.htm relies on the principle of a “common core� between 6 Graph 2. Integrated Approach of the NDDRP11, 12 CIDDR UNDP • DDR Policy • NDDRP supervision • DDR/SSR CONADER JOCC SMI World Bank COMMON CORE 25 orientation centers • Regrouping None, except some • Sensitization partners (Angola, • Identification Belgium, South • Orientation Africa) World Bank Free choice 1213 CBR Reinsertion FARDC demobilization and the integration and restructuring of the army, mainly in terms of awareness and sensitization 12   CONOIR, Yvan and VERNA, Gérard, “DDR – Désarmer, Démobiliser et Réintégrer – Enjeux globaux, Défis humains�, Press of as well as in regard to the identification and regrouping the University Laval (Québec), 2006, p. 227; CBR, “Mixing� and Recycling of the ECs. Center. 13   CBR –Mixing “Brewing� and Recycling Center – Mixing - The structure of the Joint Operations Coordination “operation that involves mixing elements from FARDC units not yet Center (JOCC) has facilitated the achievement of mixed, the various armed groups and political-military movements, so as to form new homogeneous units� Recycling: “activity which provides basic the DDR/SSR component’s objectives by forming a and / or complementary military training for integration candidates after consultation forum including the representatives of the mixing, to inculcate them military values of the FARDC, “Joint Technical Commission for Peace and Security�, October 2008. General Army Staff (EMG), the Ministry of National Defence and Veterans, the European EUSEC, the MONUC and the Military Integration Structure (SMI). Ending War, Building Peace — Contribution of the national DDR program in DRC to peace in the african Great Lakes Region 7 Graph 3. Governance of the NDDRP in Democratic Republic of the Congo CIDDR Monit. Committe CONADER SMI MONUC JCOC EMG FARDC EUSEC MDNDAC Donors and CIAT Other organizations (World Bank/MDRP, (Unicef, UNDP, Embassies) OCHA, ILO...) Source: Integrated Military Structure (SMI). 8 2 In DRC, Demobilization Complements Security Sector Reform 2.1 Two Distinct Demobilization ment operations14 were taking place in Regrouping Centers (RCs) for fighters of Category 115 and in the Phases Disarmament Points (DPs) for the fighters of catego- Disarmament is the inspection, collection and disposal ries 2, 3 and 416, 17. of small arms, ammunition, explosives and heavy In practice, disarmament activities were held in two weapons in the hands of combatants. Under NDDRP, phases: (1) the pre-disarmament phase consisting of the the process was overseen by the Joint Operations identification and preparation of regrouping facilities Center (JOC) which meant that a disarmament opera- for combatants, sensitization and communication, the tion (DO) was composed of members of the SMI, the deployment of a joint disarmament team, security CONADER and MONUC. In 2004, it anticipated the and control of fighters in the RCs or DPs, and (2) the disarmament of 330,000 combatants of different forces, disarmament phase which included registration of movements and armed groups. Of these, 150,000, combatants and weapons / ammunition, the awarding including 30,000 children, were to be demobilized and of a Certificate of disarmament/checklist and the reintegrated into civilian life. In general, the disarma- gathering of deactivated firearms and ammunition presented by the candidates. Demobilization Criteria of Combatants Belonging to CONADER commissioned specialized agencies Armed Group not Administered by the FARDC to sensitize both the potential beneficiaries and the communities to which they returned on the content -- Provide evidence of membership in a movement and implications of PNDDR in order to manage or armed group; expectations and secure participation in the program.18 -- Physical identification of the fighter and by his military command; -- Present a personal weapon in working order and ammunition, or have access to a collec- 14   GRIP, Le désarmement, la démobilisation et la réinsertion des tive weapon, according to the ratios established combattants en R D Congo. Consulted September, 29, 2011, http://www. by region, or having been disarmed under an grip.org/bdg/g1054.html interim program and hold a Certificate of disar- 15   These ones are those whose movements signed the Lusaka Cease mament; Fire Agreement (ex-Government, RCD-Goma, MLC, RCD-ML, RCD-N) and of the Global and Inclusive Agreement (Maï- Maï). -- Be recognized as a fighter by the Registration and Verification Team; 16   Combatants of Category 2 were those who belonged to the movements signatories of the Dar-es-Salaam Agreements (May 2003, -- Ability to use an assault rifle and possibly other PUSIC, UPC, FNI/FRPI, FAPC, FPDC) and those of Category 3 types of weapons; is composed of combatants who did not sign any of the different -- Skills and basic military competencies; agreements. Last but not least, Congolese combatants outside of DRC as well as stand-alone or isolated combatants are within Category 4.  -- Membership and knowledge of the command 17   National Program, para 90 et alt.; GRIP, ibidem.  structure. 18   ICR 2168, op. Quoted, para 11. Ending War, Building Peace — Contribution of the national DDR program in DRC to peace in the african Great Lakes Region 9 Table 1. Demobilization after the first phase of NDDRP (2004-2007) Objectives Forecast Achievements Percentage Staff to address 300,000 19 191,254 20 63,75 % Staff to demobilize 120,000 105,509 21 87,92 % CAAFG 30,000 27,908 93,02 % Orientation Centers 22 18 82 % Demobilized physically installed22 105,509 88,019 83,42 % Contribution to the composition of a new Army 18 Brigades to constitute 15 Brigades to constitute 83 % Partners -- Identification Bio-ID Bio-ID 100 % -- Payment Safety Net Celpay Celpay Numbers reintegrated (2006/2007)23 120,000 53,172 44 % Number of reintegration projects 1920212223 33 projects In total, NDDRP presented of 118,458 weapons col- demobilization process. lected during disarmament operations. After disarma- ment, the SMI was responsible for transferring the At the end of 2007, therefore, the number of people combatants to orientation centers (OCs) managed by who had passed through the demobilization process NDDRP where combatants choose between either was estimated at 191,25424 out of which, excluding demobilization or integration within the army. At this CAAFG, just over two thirds (64.5%) of the adults stage, unlike the adult combatants who join the OCs (105,059) chose the path of demobilization and the rest to initiate the demobilization or integration processes, their integration into the national army. Over 50% of CAAFG are moved as soon as they are identified in the demobilized were concentrated in eastern DRC and order for child protection agencies (CPAs) to begin in the Province Orientale (late 2007)25. their coaching process. 2.2 Demobilization and Security After disarmament, the combatants transfer to an Sector Reform OC for the process of identification, verification, and orientation (IVO) which will help verify the status of ex- The demobilization component included the combatants. Those who are verified as ex-combatants establishment of and transport to demobilization are oriented towards integration into the DRC Armed centers of ex-combatants (including provisions for Forces (FARDC) or reintegration into civilian life. special target groups: separation of women and children from men, special care for children and consideration of Throughout CONADER’s seven years of existence, dependents). In addition, medical screening (including the greatest efforts were made to ensure the bulk of the HIV/AIDS counseling and voluntary testing and identification of special needs of women and children) was undertaken. Also included was the verification of 19   The original projection by the government of 330,000 staff was ex-combatants’ eligibility status, provision of identity later reduced to 300,000. 20   « Situation évolutive du PNDDR en chiffres, Identification au 26 septembre 2011 », MIS Department, NDDRP. 21   Ibidem 24   « Situation évolutive du PNDDR en chiffres, Identification au 26 septembre 2011 », MIS Department, NDDRP. 22   E.g. a demobilized person who is registered within a regional office of the NDDRP 25   Rapport global d’exécution du Programme national de désarmement, démobilisation et réinsertion (PNDDR), 012/CG/06, 23   Annual report 2010, op. quoted. décembre 2007, p. 19. 10 cards, collection of basic socio-economic data and pre- Graph 4. Mixing and recycling during the transition discharge orientation about civilian life and program Groupes phase – 15 brassésintegrated « Brigades » au sein (2006) benefits. Ex-combatants were then given a transport des FARDC (2006) allowance, a Transitional Safety Net (TSN), and facilitation of transport to the ex-combatants’ preferred GP-Masunzu area of return.26 0% GP-ITURI 2% Ex-Tigre At demobilization, operations were established within 1% the Project team to: (i) deploy and coordinate mobile RCD/KML Ex-FAZ demobilization teams; (ii) coordinate operations with 6% 1% MONUC and the principal coordination mechanism, Maï Maï 10 % Ex-Gouvernement the Integrated Military Structure (SMI); (iii) coordinate 43 % Ex-MLC transportation of limited number of ex-combatants; 15 % and (iv) coordinate with BIO-ID Technology (process ID cards) and Cellpay (to set up payment structures for ex-combatants). Reinsertion kits were adapted to the local context: instead of the $110 kit ($60 for trans- Ex-RCD 22 % port and $50 for reinsertion payments) plus a $30 bag, demobilized ex-combatants received $140 in cash. The number of payments to ex-combatants was revised to take into account difficulties in transportation and the group members to demobilize, resulted in the FARDC huge distances to reach beneficiaries: initially designed constituting only 15 of the 18 Brigades planned for a to provide $25 per month for 12 months, the NDDRP total of 49,012 enlisted personnel28. This has partially cut down the frequency of payments to six or less. In slowed one of the objectives of NDDRP to “build an Phase I (2004-2007), delays occurred between demo- army of the Republic that could guarantee stability and bilization and the launch of reintegration activities. security throughout the territory�29 as well as ensure The delay in reintegration support could have caused that “in 2006, all the Armed Forces of the Democratic unrest amongst the demobilized but CONADER staff Republic of the Congo would have been identified and intervened to manage potential and reassure benefi- integrated.�30 ciaries that benefits would be delivered. Most of these problems were largely ironed out and absent during The conclusion of the CONADER, in 2007, was Phase II (2008-2011). This was partly due to modifi- followed by the creation of a new and much lighter cations to the project design in the Phase II based on unit, the Implementation Unit (IU) - NDDRP, which lessons learned during implementation of Phase I. Not- worked and achieved better results in good intelligence withstanding these early teething problems, overall the with a limited number of operational partners31. Re- demobilization and reinsertion process was successfully integration support was provided through 12 imple- menting partners compared with 42 originally managed completed.27 In its first phase, the program registered a high interest for demobilization, but this had the effect of greatly 28   Report of the SMI, covering the period from August 22 to December 30, 2006. The mixed personnel were coming respectively retarding the formation of new integrated brigades from the Ex-Government (20,718), Ex-RCD (10,852), Ex-MLC (7,491), due to a lack of a sufficient number of candidates for Maï-Maï (4,674), RCD/KML (2,985), GP-Ituri (838), GP-Masunzu (75), Ex-Tigre (232), Ex-FAZ (426), for a total of 49,012 elements. This integration into the army. In some instances, the pro- disaffection is also linked to the de facto absence of a salary for the soldier pensity to demobilize represents almost all fighters. Ini- (which changed when salary and payment supervision through EUSEC was introduced) and particularly to the composition of the elements to tially, this disaffection on the part of former FARDC integrated: local armed groups, as opposed to standing army members, soldiers, as well as the high interest of former armed showed a tendency not to wish leave their area of operation (and home). 29   National DDR Program, para. 37.  30   “National Strategic Plan for the Integration of Armed Forces�, 26   ICR 2168, op. quoted, para 11. Ministry of National Defense and Veterans, Kinshasa, August 2005. 27   ICR 2168, op. quoted, para 27. 31   Final Independent Evaluation, NDDRP, Sept. 2011, pp. 108-113. Ending War, Building Peace — Contribution of the national DDR program in DRC to peace in the african Great Lakes Region 11 Table 2. New Demobilization objectives of the In 2009, the demobilization process, in military terms, NDDRP – “Recovery� Phase (2008-2009) “grew more powerful.� The number of Mobile Iden- tification Teams (MIT) grew from five to 14 and the “Recovery� Phase Adjusted Starting operations of identification exceeded revised targets set objectives objectives up by the new IU-NDDRP. Staff to be treated initially 98,703 combatants Additionally, in regard to the new adjusted targets of the FARDC 79,103 combatants 10,000 second phase, disarmament and demobilization results Armed groups 19,600 combatants have exceeded expectations: 142% ex-combatants Intermediate objec- 19,250 combatants tives (April 2009) treated, 164% being integrated (vs. target) and 119% demobilized (vs. target). The nature of the second de- Staff to be mobilization phase was very different from the first demobilized 35,700 demobilized with the number of actual end-treated group showing FARDC 23,000 demobilized 5,000 the predominance of the FARDC in the second phase Armed groups 12,700 demobilized of demobilization. The statistics show that the option of demobilization remained the most chosen with the CAAFG to free 3,000 3,000 ranks of armed groups in comparison to only a third Wounded ex- by the FARDC (less than twice in the first phase). combatants (WEC) 10,000 demobilized 1,000 to demobilize This reversal is explained by the fact that much more attention was paid to the FARDC personnel in the by CONADER32. The new IU-NDDRP combined a second demobilization phase compared to Phase 1. small number of professionals recognized for their One cannot exclude the idea that a number of FARDC understanding of technical and institutional issues of soldiers potentially did not wish to lose a certain number the DDR process in DRC and demonstrated a greater of benefits, rights or material incentives that they could effectiveness and efficiency than the old great “white keep receiving within the FARDC in contrast to the un- elephant�, CONADER which had limited flexibility certainties of a return to civilian life. In some instances, and was hardly operational33. in the context of an accelerated integration process, the option of demobilization was not offered. A similar In the second phase of the program, the new IU- phenomenon seems to explain the low rate of demobi- NDDRP started the operations of the “Recovery� lization of injured or disabled FARDC soldiers.34 phase (2008/2009) by initiating a new demobilization process on April 27, 2009 at Kokolo camp in Kinshasa. As of late 2011, the balance of integration figures within Phase I of NDDRP had faced long delays and short- the FARDC vs. demobilization within the NDDRP as comings with the setting up and management of the shown on table 3. OCs, a finding that justified the creation of integrat- ed mobile teams IU-NDDRP-SMI. Following a new The political and military decision to stop the de- assessment of the security situation in the East that an- mobilization process in DRC at the end of 2009 has ticipated an accelerated integration of armed groups, allowed some international actors, under the aegis the numbers were revised downward. Other strategic of MONUSCO, to continue limited DDR activities decisions have reoriented the program objectives to (of residual groups) in the context of the STAREC lower figures as well. program35 in eastern Congo. 34   Although it appears difficult to support, it is supposed that the number of war wounded did not really address the needs. Part of 32   Implementation Completion and Results Reports, Report the problem around that were due to a protracted legislation process No ICR2168, World Bank, March 2012. along with rivalry over responsibility for the target group at the central administration level. 33   For more information on how size affects effectiveness and efficiency in DDR programs, see Conoir Y., “David and Goliath – How 35   STAREC is the “Program for Stabilization and Reconstruction of Goliath’s failures generated David’s successes�, Consolidating Peace after areas emerging from armed conflict,� which has three basic components, Conflict: the Future of DDR Conference, World Bank, D.C., Jan. 24th at : security, social and humanitarian affairs and economic recovery, http://www.tdrp.net/Newsletter/eNewsletter_Feb2012.html. http://www.starec.cd/ 12 Table 3. Achievements of the Disarmament and Demobilization component – Recovery Phase (2009)36 Staff Adjusted objectives Achievements Number of women/WEC Rate of success Treated 10,000 14,196 1,046 women (7,4%) 142% Integrated 5,000 8,236 538 women (6,5%) 164% Demobilized 5,000 5,960 508 women (8,5%) 119% CAAFG freed 3,000 2,513 83% WEC Integrated 0 413 (25% of the group of WEC) WEC demobilized 1,000 1,239 (75% of the group of WEC) Number of MIT 8 14 175% Executing Partners 2 partners 2 partners Identification Bio-ID Technologies Bio-ID Technologies 100% Payment Safety Nets Celpay Celpay Beneficiaries of the 5,000 5,707 Safety Net (140US$) Table 4. Proportional representation of FARDC and demobilized armed groups (2009)37 Personnel Personnel integrated % Personnel demobilized % treated FARDC 12,762 8,155 63,9 4,607 36,09 Armed Groups 1,434 81 5,64 1,353 94,35 Total 14,196 8,236 58 5,960 42 % of Armed Groups 11 1 23 3637 In its entirety, the demobilization process could be ex-combatants were targeted. A total of 45,837 were characterized by the World Bank as “highly satisfacto- demobilized by the end of the first 14 months and ry� as 111,05338 were demobilized when 125,000 adult 102,014 by the end of the second year, thus more than originally planned for. An additional 5,994 were de- mobilized during Phase II and 31,738 CAAFG were 36   Report on the implementation of the component “Disarmament released. A total of 118,459 weapons were collected.39 and demobilization�, NDDRP-Extension Phase, 15/ 12/2009, p.5. 37 Final Independent Evaluation, NDDRP, Sept. 2011, p. 25.   38   The World Bank in its final report (No ICR2168) states that only 109,846 combatants were demobilized. The figures quoted here are the figures of the MIS Department of the Implementation Unit of the 39   ICR 2168, op. quoted, para 59. NDDRP at the time of the Final Independent Evaluation of the PNDDR (26/11/2011). Ending War, Building Peace — Contribution of the national DDR program in DRC to peace in the african Great Lakes Region 13 Table 5. Consolidated Demobilization figures of the NDDRP (26/Sept. 2011)40 EVOLUTION OF NDDRP FIGURES IDENTIFICATION (2011/Sept. 26th) Number Integration NDDRP Total Total CAAFG of guns Integration CAAFG NDDRP Total Total Treated treated Total withdrawn (Cumulative) (Cumulative) (Cumulative) 2004 151 3,177 2,435 5,763 3,177 151 2,435 5,763 2005 25,857 11,01341 43,402 80,272 14,190 26 008 45,837 86,035 2006 104,324 32,561 13,483 57,384 103,428 27,673 58 569 103,221 189,463 2007 8 215 1,838 2,061 27,888 58 577 105,059 191,524 2008 0 10 0 10 27,898 58 577 105,059 191,534 2009 14,224 8,236 3,135 5,862 17,233 31,033 66 813 110,921 208,767 2010 131 1 627 132 760 31,660 66 814 111,053 209,527 2011 4041 0 0 78 0 78 31 738 66 814 111 053 209 605 40 Ibidem, p.27.   41 CAAFG figures were put up to date by UNICEF. 14 3 Socio-economic Reintegration of Demobilized Ex-combatants in DRC W ith the technical, material, financial and institutional assistance of the program, the demobilized can seek to improve their situ- ation of social vulnerability and ensure economic self- Upon discharge from the OCs, demobilized combatants were provided support for a limited period following their return and transition to civilian life. It consisted of a basic needs kit to assist in the actual return and the first part of a Transitional Subsistence Allowance sufficiency. Reintegration support has, therefore, taken place in two phases: the delivery of a transitional safety (TSA) to sustain the ex-combatant and his or her family net to ex-combatants, and individual assistance for their until they had a chance to register for the reintegration socio-economic reintegration within communities. program in their area. A second and third installment of the TSA was paid once the ex-combatant registered During reintegration, the project established provincial in the chosen area of reintegration and started partici- offices, bringing the NDDRP closer to ex-combatants. pating in program activities.43 Local offices were able to react quickly to issues, thus mitigating potential volatile situations. Their presence 3.1 Transitional Safety Net was invaluable when working with host communities, The transitional safety net offered by NDDRP is which felt that the Government was directly involved divided into two parts. A first tranche of transitional with their issues. In Phase II, reintegration support was subsistence allowance ($140) enables the demobilized provided through 12 implementing partners compared to return home and begin a return to civilian life. The with 42 originally managed by CONADER, which second part, the “great safety net� of $300, aims, in allowed for more streamlined implementation and co- twelve monthly instalments, to support the person in ordination. Across both Phases, this working relation- his/her daily survival. ship not only met objectives but also had the effect of enhancing the capacity of local NGOs. During both A technical audit conducted in summer 2010 from a Phases there were criticisms about the size of the re- representative sample of 4,580 demobilized (or 4.9% of integration package, the duration of assistance, and the total population estimated in 201044) indicates that outreach and monitoring of activities, but this would be 83% of ex-combatants surveyed had received all of the no different to that expressed throughout the MDRP safety net proposed by the program, i.e., $440: ($140 for temporary allowances for subsistence and $300 for period, and the package in the DRC was relatively com- great safety net). Seventeen percent received only the parable to that elsewhere. A notable change in the re- small safety net of $14045. Taking into account the mul- integration component took place during the Phase II when ex-combatants were encouraged to join economic associations. Over 800 associations received support; 43   ICR 2168, op. quoted, para 11. and research indicated the positive role in terms of 44   In February 2010, the population of ex-combatants living within building social capital, as well as economic livelihoods, the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was estimated thus facilitating reintegration on both fronts.42 to 96,322 – Rapport de l’étude technique sur l’utilisation du filet de sécurité par les ex-combattants, realized by M. Séraphin Ngondo a Pitshadenge, Kinshasa, August 2010. 45   Report on the Technical Audit of the Safety Net by ex-combatants, 42   ICR 2168, op. quoted, para 28. Kinshasa, Aug. 2010, p. 5. Ending War, Building Peace — Contribution of the national DDR program in DRC to peace in the african Great Lakes Region 15 titude of problems with the delivery and payment of safety nets in DRC (no banking networks, difficulties in Graph 5. Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries won the support of most of the demobilized49 identifying beneficiaries communicating with them, and reaching them, etc.), this proportion may seem satisfac- Labor intensive tory. activities 3% In Phase I, it is estimated that on average 86.7% of ex- combatants received their TSA and that once systems were fully operational, this rate increased to 100% AGRIPEL carrying over into Phase II. A total of 107,974 ex- 41% IGA combatants who were demobilized by the Project 39% received reinsertion payments46. Ex-combatants used their safety nets in various ways47. Over half (54.16%) of the expenditures made with the safety net consisted of social spending (marriage, Job training health care, school fees, subsidies to satisfy the needs 4 17% 9 of the family, daily survival), with a particular emphasis on health spending and education (33.22%), in an equal manner from one region to the other. By order of for a total of 42 economic reintegration projects for a priority, social spending by ex-combatants is followed total of 68,457 ex-combatants (out of 105,50950) with by the acquisition of durable goods (piece of land, most of the demobilized choosing agriculture, live- commercial equipment, equipment for personal use) up stock and fishery over labor intensive or job training to 26.90%, start-up funds to run a commercial business projects. for a proportion of 14.35%, and leisure activities and After the first economic reintegration phase, the first entertainment (4.59%). survey conducted among the beneficiaries of the program, based on a reduced sample of demobilized, 3.2 Socio-Economic Reintegration revealed51 that “high percentages of demobilized within NDDRP – From Individual were well welcomed into the community (95%), to Associative Mode had good relationships with local authorities (95%) Economic reintegration support was provided to all ex- and were well included in the social activities of the combatants through the provision of agricultural and community (79%), leading to a conclusion of “excellent non-farm income-generating vocational and appren- social integration52.� In economic terms53, “68% of ticeship training, advisory services particularly for the the demobilized outside Ituri were able to support promotion of income generating activities (IGA) and themselves (35% in Ituri)54.� In the seven provinces, an basic start-up goods, and education and scholarships average of 75% of demobilized managed to meet their for minors.48 basic needs. Additionally, 39% felt they had an income superior to others in their community of reintegration, Socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants 71% of them participated in the economic life of their has proven to be more complex than anticipated. CONADER had gone through serious internal governance problems leading to its closure in 2007. 49   Ibidem, p.20. This affected the continuity of the reintegration 50   See Chart No 1 – “Staff to demobilize�. process, splitting the process into two distinct parts. At 51   Out of a total of 364 demobilized over seven provinces of DRC, the end of 2007, CONADER had approved funding Survey on the reintegration of ex-combatants, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Jan. to May 2007, conducted by the MDRP with the technical support of the CONADER, pp. 3, 9 and 10. 52   Ibidem. 46   ICR 2168, op. quoted, para. 59. 53   Ibidem. 47   Technical Audit (2010), op. quoted, pp. 46-49. 54   There were real differences in the management of DDR programs in DRC. Since 2003, UNDP – with the support of the MONUC – had 48   ICR 2168, op. quoted, para. 11. been the main DDR implementing agency. 16 community, and 65% of them saw an increase of their of financial allocations) and therefore, the program income. In addition, 62% used their “safety net� to start ensured sufficient technical support at the field level a business. A more recent survey55 points “to some 50% with equal enforcement throughout the life of the of ex-combatants having improved their livelihoods project. since they had been demobilized, with much of the balance having assimilated within their communities at At the end of the life cycle of individual reintegration the same levels of their community peers.� projects, the economic reintegration model showed limitations and all NDDRP stakeholders realized that Among the strong points of the economic reintegration the demobilized who had decided to regroup themselves of the demobilized in DRC, the implementing agencies with members of local communities had greater success of the program confirmed the initial choices and in economical terms. Therefore the last phase of World options made by most of the demobilized (80%). The Bank’s support to NDDRP was to support “sustainable availability of local training centers facilitated investing reintegration through human, technical and material in their experience although training such specific, capacity building of the demobilized, through their and sometimes difficult, target groups such as the ex- organization into associations of producers and the combatants and ensuring its long term sustainability can inclusion of members of host communities.�57 be problematic. The existence of kits which helped in quickly meeting the needs of demobilized in most of the NDDRP objectives in relation to the development of provinces also facilitated an easy local reintegration. economic reintegration in associative mode were to58: After the end of the Recovery phase (2008-2010), the ¡¡ Structure demobilized community members in six implementing partners of NDDRP had managed to sustainable association of producers; support almost all the remaining demobilized individuals ¡¡ Strengthen the quality of services granted to the to be reintegrated, e.g. 95% of the demobilized included associations through the provision of: in the conventions signed between NDDRP and the implementing partners. 1. Job training: quality of the training, duration, good combination between training and In total, four years after receiving their final payment, skills; it is believed that 75% of male and 69% of female ex- combatants were reintegrated into their communities 2. Professional Kit: common standard kit, and engaged in productive economic activities or strength, functionality, distribution period; schooling. Additionally, 80.7% of the demobilized benefited from reintegration assistance.56 3. Close monitoring: individual attention, follow- up documentation, support for the imple- The main weaknesses and resistance factors to a good mentation of micro projects; personal socio-economic reintegration were related to weak professional skills capacity of most of the 4. Technical support: quality of the coaches, demobilized in relation to their sector of reintegration. longer duration for support and monitoring. Other problems included the influx of demobilized in 5. Strengthen the technical, human and material certain sectors and the lack of training opportunities skills and capacities of the implementing for all businesses selected by the demobilized. More agencies and their contractors for an effective simply, some initial choices of demobilized did not and sustainable support of the associations always reflect real opportunities for community and so that they can guarantee their access to reintegration, thereby leading to multiple changes in the inputs. final orientation of the latter. At the structural or local levels, it often proved difficult to reach all beneficiaries In 2010, around 709 producers associations (implementation was often delayed by rough logistics grouping demobilized members and members of conditions, administrative delays or the late distribution local communities were coached and strengthened, 55   Bouvy, op. quoted, in ICR 2168, para. 56. 57   Ibidem. 56   ICR2168, op. quoted, para 60. 58   Annual Report 2010, p. 8. Ending War, Building Peace — Contribution of the national DDR program in DRC to peace in the african Great Lakes Region 17 Table 6. Number of Demobilized supported in individual mode – Year 2010 Expected figures Demobilized supported conventions/endorsements Ratio Reinsertion sector T. Fund IDA Total Trust fund IDA Total Job Training, CARITAS 7,000 6,180 13,180 5,385 6,180 11,565 88% AGRILIFISH ADEKOR 0 500 500 0 500 500 100% Job Training, IGA INPP 0 3,790 3,790 0 3,790 3,790 100% Job Training FAO 0 7,100 7,100 7,106 7,106 100% AGRILIFISH BIT 0 6,667 6,667 0 6,667 6,667 100% Job Training, IGA HDW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 AGRILIFISH Total 7,000 24,237 31,237 5,385 24,243 29,628 95% and 10,714 demobilized and 1,192 members of local communities were integrated into producers Graph 6. Commitments of local authorities in support of NDDRP Demobilized (NDDRP Liaison offices)60 associations benefiting from a collective capacity building process. Close proximity support of some weeks or even months was provided. At the end of the Help in identifying project, 821 associations were formed and an empirical Accesibility to demobilized employment of 7% research59 led by the Transitional Demobilization ex-combatants and Reintegration Programme (TDRP) indicated the 7% Facility access positive role of these associations in terms of building to land 29% social capital as well as economic livelihoods, and therefore, facilitating reintegration on both economic Safety during implementation and social fronts. Overall, economic reintegration was 21% successfully completed for the overwhelming majority of the ex-combatants.60 Community Awareness 14% Also, the local NDDRP Liaison offices noticed a level Positive perception and programme of involvement and positive engagement of local ownership 22% authorities vis-à-vis the NDDRP and the demobilized, one of the most important being facilitating access to land as shown on graph 6. 3.3 Social and Community Reintegration 61 59   Lemasle, Natacha (2011), “Les associations de combattants Social reintegration support through community level démobilisés en République démocratique du Congo: dynamiques locales et synergies internes: avantages et limites d’une approche collective à la programs promoting reconciliation and strengthening réintégration�, Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program (which succeeded the MDRP), www.tdrp.net 60   Bouvy (2011), PNDDR, Rapport d’évaluation des bénéficiaires du PNDDR – Perceptions communautaires sur le retour et la réinsertion des 61   Final Independent Evaluation, op. quoted, p. 103. The Graph was anciens combattants. designed with the support of the local liaison antennas of the NDDRP. 18 social cohesion through the provision of technical the community. Additionally, only a quarter of civilian advisory and outreach services was undertaken in most respondents believe that demobilized are more heavily communities receiving ex-combatants. Special programs involved in criminal activity than other members of for female, disabled and chronically ill ex-combatants the community (as opposed to 36% who think they were also implemented, albeit limited. Special assistance are rather less involved). Also, 70% of the respondents was also provided to children associated with armed recognize the participation of demobilized in commu- forces and groups with family tracing and reunification, nity work. While this is often decried as a motive of counseling, psychosocial care, facilitation of access jealousy, 80% say there is no discontent vis-à-vis the de- to education and skills training in communities of mobilized about the help or the support that they may settlement through the provision of goods and technical have received from NGO65 partners of NDDRP. advisory services. A number of special projects were set up to deal with vulnerable groups, three of which Two thirds of the respondents felt that the presence were related to reintegration activities: a Gender-based of demobilized in the community is a positive factor. Violence Trust Fund, a Social Action Fund and HIV/ Among the positive factors cited include their partici- AIDS supported projects.62 pation in community service (30% of respondents), bringing new experiences and skills (28%), their protec- Qualitative research conducted at the local level63 tend tion capacity and their role in the establishment of a to show that the return of ex-combatants have caused lasting peace (20%), dynamism and courage (12%), and a generalized feeling of fear within communities: nearly their capacity for integration (10%). half of the civilians (42%)64 admitted feeling some fear when former combatants started returning home, the In the contrary, despite relatively positive perceptions feeling being more pronounced with men than women. in general, meetings and relations between civilians and The fears expressed by civilians is mainly due to fears demobilized remain extremely rare, a sign of separation of aggression, misbehaviour, and mentality (68% of of the demobilized from the other civilians as well as a respondents), but also due to fears of increased insecurity certain indifference to people who seem to have lived and crime (armed robbery), in 32% of cases. Stigma of something “particular� in the past. Eighty percent of the demobilized also seems much more pronounced on respondents say they have never had to meet and talk in men than on women or children. 40% of respondents depth with demobilized. Only 10% of respondents said believe that male ECs are “different� while the rate they frequently meet with the demobilized and another drops to 25% in the case of women and children. 10% say they have had few encounters with them.66 Among respondents who say that the demobilized have had a different behaviour upon return, 30% cite Graph 7. Two thirds of local communities support the harassment and theft committed, 20% cite the fighting, reintegration process66 insults or arguments provoked by demobilized, while another 20% stressed their conflicting nature. Integration more or less succesfull In general, the degree of tolerance and consideration for the demobilized from the members of the commu- Important di culties 8% in the reintegration nity is relatively good and positive. For example some process 80% of the respondents felt that the community toler- 25% ates the demobilized without difficulties, 70% of those 67% surveyed believe that the demobilized are now part of 62   ICR 2168, op. quoted, para. 11. Good ownership of the reintegration 63   In 2011, the National Statistics Institute of DRC collected the process (paci c perceptions of some 3,625 ex-combatants and 722 community members cohabitation) throughout different provinces of the country, which constituted the most important field investigation ever realized with ex-combatants. Data analysis was made by consultants of the IDL Group, at the request of the IE-NDDRP. 65   Ibidem, p. 11. 64   Report of Evaluation of NDDRP beneficiaries - Community Perceptions about the return and reintegration of ex-combatants, Sept. 66   Data collected from local liaison offices of NDDRP, Final 2011, p.5. Independent Evaluation, op. quoted, , p.113. Ending War, Building Peace — Contribution of the national DDR program in DRC to peace in the african Great Lakes Region 19 4 Assistance to Vulnerable Groups 4.1 Women Associated to Armed in the demobilization and orientation camps. Owing Forces and Groups to the low number of women, there were no specific female activities, but female ex-combatants benefited The program aimed to mainstream gender issues. While from all aspects of the project. In December 2007, the program supported the reintegration of four out MDRP launched the Learning for Equality, Access and of five of the registered for demobilization, this ratio Peace Program (LEAP), which provided technical as- is lower when it comes to women. Slightly more than sistance to the Project, resulting in: (i) a greater un- three female ex-combatants out of five (67%) benefit- derstanding of vulnerability among ex-combatants and ted from the program’s reintegration projects. Finally, how to provide for additional assistance to the most only a quarter were able to benefit from the specific vulnerable (including enhanced social integration); programs launched by NDDRP to support female ex- and (ii) a gender action plan. In Phase II, a strategy combatants in its recovery phase67. NDRRP was target- document was developed in a joint effort with stake- ing any person involved in combat, who could prove holders, named “Women Associated with the Forces to be of Congolese nationality, to be an arms bearer and Armed Groups.� A budgetary provision was also or who held a certificate of disarmament and could made for a maximum of 10,000 female beneficia- demonstrate his or her membership in an armed force ries. LEAP funded six projects assisting women ex- or an armed group recognized by the government. De- combatants, implemented by Caritas. Generally, most mobilized women, therefore, needed to be in posses- women either preferred to stay in the army or simply sion of a weapon to be eligible. One could, therefore, self-reintegrate back into their communities and were define a female ex-combatant as one who was active in not interested in what the Project offered, resulting in combat through her membership in armed forces or a reallocation of funds.68 armed groups, had been recruited, was equipped with a weapon and had served in a particular function. This The recovery phase was an opportunity missed in many definition largely excludes all the women who, for one ways to rethink the gender component of NDDRP. reason or another, did not appear on any official lists of In Phase I, 3,478 female ex-combatants were demo- the armed forces or armed groups or who were part of bilized, representing 3% of the total number of ex- the armed forces or armed groups in support, adminis- combatants of which 1,520 benefited from reintegra- trative or service roles. tion assistance69.The objectives of the recovery phase were in favour of ensuring that “10,000 WAAFG A gender strategy was developed with CONADER in- received specific support70.� Eventually, the demobili- corporating gender into all aspects of demobilization and reintegration. There were separate spaces and kits 68   ICR2168, op. quoted, para. 31. 69   ICR2168, op. quoted, para. 62. 67   According to the data base of the NDDRP (Final Independent Evaluation of the NDDRP): Number of women demobilized registered: 70   Results Framework, Recovery Phase, Output P7.3. A contrario, 3,382; Number of women ex-combatants beneficiaries of at least one the Action Plan 2008 – 2009 does not register any activity in its Chapter 8 support from the NDDRP: 2,280; Number of women benefiting of the which was supposed to define “the implementation of a national strategy special support program of women ex-combatants: 860. in support of WAAFG�. 20 Table 7. Special projects in support of demobilized women developed by CARITAS Congo Total Total number of benefi- Total number Number of ciaries who received their SITE of women Channel support women to be individual package and supported supported collective support Agriculture, Livestock, Bakery, Soap making, Kalemie 200 200 200 Tailoring, Hairdressing Kinshasa 150 185 185 Agriculture, Tailoring Boma 150 4 4 Agriculture Agriculture, Livestock, Bakery, Cooking, Basket Bukavu 100 90 90 manufacturing Livestock, Cooking, Bakery, Basket manufac- Uvira 50 47 47 turing, Agriculture Bakery, Tailoring, Cooking, Hair cosmetic, Bakery, Bunia 200 200 200 Juice making Kisangani 150 150 150 Agriculture, Livestock, Bakery TOTAL 1 000 876 876 Source : Caritas Congo, 01/11/2011. Graph 8. Main Motivations for Gender Demobilization 4.2 War Wounded and Handicapped (ex-FARDC, DRC) At the outset, CONADER created a synergy with the Going back to school Social Action Fund which would take care of the disabled 4% ex-combatants. CONADER, therefore, did not have a Hardship of Health military life special program for the disabled. In 2007, CONADER 12% 32% organized a workshop to categorize physically and mentally disabled ex-combatants. When the Social Action Fund project concluded, CONADER had to Age (+50) design a special project for the disabled. However, most 16% disabled did not come forward for demobilization. One underlying problem lay in the failure of the legislative authorities to clarify the legal basis for compensation and the lack of transfer in responsibility from Defense Poverty to Social Affairs. In addition, being disabled in 36% Congolese society carries a stigma, which is lessened if one is disabled but in uniform.71 zation process of the recovery phase (Phase II) regis- tered only 1,046 women who chose to participate in the Therefore, in the early days of NDDRP (2006), the reintegration program in the military or in the socio- expected number of disabled and handicapped to economic reintegration process of NDDRP. benefit from some kind of specialized support was estimated at 9,000, of which the program identified The adoption of specific support programs for female 2,221 disabled. A total of 1,239 were demobilized, ex-combatants has also shown that a focused strategy, 262 (or 3% of estimated total) received reintegration with particular emphasis on the implementation of special projects, provided a better economic integration of the latter. 71   ICR2168, op. quoted, para. 32. Ending War, Building Peace — Contribution of the national DDR program in DRC to peace in the african Great Lakes Region 21 assistance and 347 received medical rehabilitation72. A ¡¡ Psychosocial support. total of 4,377 war wounded were registered, out of which 347 (7,9%) received psychosocial rehabilitation, The war-wounded and disabled ex-combatants did not accompaniment and vocational training (but no medical receive the attention that was expected in their favor, rehabilitation)73. both in terms of the number of war wounded demobi- lized and the attention they received at the national level The new NDDRP strategy towards these different as shown on Graph 9. groups is organized around: In 2009, a National Workshop recommended that the ¡¡ Awareness of the war wounded as well as of the government “create a specific structure in support of military hierarchy and their dependents; the disabled veterans demobilized�75 to “perform a con- 7 6 ¡¡ Demobilization-deployment of identification and orientation teams for issuing demobilization Conceptual definitions used by the PNDDR cards; -- War Wounded - Any adult or demobilized CAAFG ¡¡ Identification by the Medico-Social Commission, suffering from traumatic lesions (wounds or frac- confirming the diagnosis, evaluation of impair- tures) resulting from its participation in armed ment, definition of treatment, triage and referral forces. of demobilized war wounded to supporting -- Bearer of disability - all demobilized bearing scars centers for specific intervention (financial support of his injuries following his participation in hostilities. is limited from $700 to $1,000 per capita); These are injuries or sequels that lead to disabilities ¡¡ The reference to the medical facility in partner- and physical disabilities, sensory or mental limiting the chances of reintegration of these groups and to ship with the NGO selected by the IU-PNDDR justify their vulnerability to other demobilized. in charge of medical and psychological support. -- Chronically ill - The category of chronic diseases Services offered to the demobilized or CAAFG war (tuberculosis, leprosy, sleeping sickness and HIV / wounded or disabled ex-combatants are : AIDS is not supported by this strategy. ¡¡ Surgical repair; ¡¡ The physical therapy for a maximum of three Graph 9. Geographic distribution of war wounded and months; handicapped through the territory of DRC (2007)78 ¡¡ The provision of prostheses and wheelchairs as War Disabled Distribution of the NDDRP (2007) needed; and74 Province Orientale 9% Table 8. Number of War wounded to be demobilized in the Recovery Phase74 Nord Kivu 26 % Sud Kivu 12 % Bandundu Objectives of the Adjusted 1% Initial “Restart� Phase objectives Maniema Bas Congo 1% 4% Number to be treated Equateur 98,703 combatants 10,000 Kinshasa 14 % initially: 24 % Number to demobilize: 35,700 demobilized 5,000 Katanga 8% Kasai Occidental 0% War wounded to Kasai 10,000 demobilized 1,000 Oriental demobilize: 1% 72   IE-NDDRP report, Jan.-June 2009. 75   Atelier d’assistance aux blessés de guerre, 17-18juillet 2009, 73   Final Independent Evaluation, pp. 93-99. UE-PNDDR, Cassioppee, Kinshasa. 74   Quarterly Report, IU-NDDRP, July 2009, [N° 03/ADM/RDC/09], p.3. 76   Ibidem. 22 Table 9. Balance of support granted to war wounded (of Kinshasa) (2010) Adults CAAFG Sub- Expected Activities % Men Women Girls Boys total number Consultations by the Medical 199 5 0 0 204 600 34 Commission Consultations to the Rehabilita- 105 tion Center for Physical Handi- 5 0 0 110 600 19 (113 in 201177) capped (CRHP) Physiotherapy 24 0 0 0 24 Prosthetic Support 9 0 0 0 9 Orthopaedic assistance 6 0 0 0 6 Surgical procedures 19 0 0 0 19 Counselling 0 0 0 0 0 Reference to other specialized 67 3 0 0 70 structures Other type of assistance 36 2 0 0 38 TOTAL 166 7 7 tinuous monitoring of the disabled veterans referred 4.3 Children Associated to Armed to it�. NDDRP, as well as the Congolese government, Forces and Groups however, still lack a proper mapping of the target pop- ulations as an in-depth analysis of the needs of the Before the start of the demobilization process for adults, people injured and disabled by war as a result of the some initiatives to get children out of armed forces conflicts that have ravaged the country in 2011. There and groups had been undertaken, since 2001, with the is a mitigating argument as to why numbers were so low. predecessor of the CONADER, BUNADER80 and Respondents, who chose to stay in the army, when in- other specialized agencies. BUNADER and the Con- terviewed, said that there was resistance to demobilize golese army were facilitating contacts with high ranking due to the lack of pensions, coupled with the general military officials, in order to allow such demobiliza- feeling that at some stage in the future these would be tion. UNICEF played a role in the release of CAAFG made available to the FARDC78. since early 2003 and had received a specific mandate from UNDP81 to manage the initial DDR program for Finally, one unique convention has been signed in children in collaboration with the transitional govern- 200979 for the provision of medical care and rehabilita- ment. A management plan was developed for the im- tion that covered only 600 war wounded ex-combatants plementation of OCs across the country that would be in Kinshasa. The balance remains very small compared the entry point in the DDR program. The Cape Town to the magnitude of prospective cases of demobilized Principles were then embedded in the interim opera- disabled across the country. tional framework, including an expanded definition of 77   Source : Brother Musawa, Director CRHP. 80   BUNADER. 78   ICR2168, op. quoted, para. 62. 81   Before the creation of the PNDDR and the CONADER, UNDP 79   Final Independent Evaluation, p.99. has initiated DDR activities in support of the Government. Ending War, Building Peace — Contribution of the national DDR program in DRC to peace in the african Great Lakes Region 23 CAAFG.82 Once the demobilization of adult combat- support and clothing.85 ants started, each OC established in the country had set up a specific space where CPAs would work with During the first phase of the program, between 2004 children. and 2006, the socio-economic reintegration of children was part of the obligations stipulated in the agreements Within the specific space for children, CPAs conducted signed with the six partners in charge of the special child registrations as well as imparted information and projects for children. However, significant delays sensitization about the next steps to come. Agencies had occurred in starting the reinsertion initiatives. Several to proceed quickly in order to minimize the duration agencies rushed the organization of income generat- of the passage of the child within the demobilization ing activities since they were relatively easy and quick to structure. Once at the Orientation Transitional Center implement. These activities, however, were not always (OTC), freshly demobilized children were informed suitable for the reintegrated children as many of them about the next steps to come. The staff and CPAs were had no basic education or were illiterate and could not present to provide the children with attention. The innumerate. children then had to change and remove their clothing The situation was somewhat corrected in the second associated with their military life. They were given an Recovery phase, with more attention and resources entry kit (first in a series of three sets) with different devoted to socio-economic reintegration efforts. clothing, daily-use goods (cup, spoon, bowl, etc.) and Between January 2009 and June 2011, UNICEF and its hygiene products (soap, toothpaste, tooth brush, etc.). partners supported the socio-economic reintegration The World Food Programme (WFP) was supporting of 7,619 children (2,011 girls and 5,608 boys) released the OTCs with food aid for the CAAFG. Medical and from armed forces and groups. In June 2011, UNICEF social assessments were undertaken, and interviews and stated that “These figures taken together clearly demon- listening sessions were to be systematically organized strate that the activities have achieved 95% of its initial during the stay of the children in the center. Social as- objectives specified in the agreement signed between sessment allowed documenting the origin of the child UNICEF and IE-PNDDR in order to support the re- and obtaining the necessary information to begin integration of 8,000 Children. And that 27% of girls family tracking. Many children did not trust the process received reintegration support against 73% of boys are and altered information as to where their families could very encouraging figures and represent an overtaking be found. A number of family researches were delayed of efforts and standards of the operating players.�86 until the child provided more accurate or precise infor- Among them, 2,448 (including 483 girls) were sup- mation on his family.83 ported primarily in the context of their reintegration According to international standards and the DDR into school. According to the NDDRP database, the re- operational framework for children, child living in an maining 5,171 children reintegrated, received vocational OTC’s stay should not exceed three months. However, training or were supported with an income generating due to the complexity of family researches and because activity. UNICEF reports that “a clear preference toward income generating activities and that the children were of the insecurity prevailing in certain areas of reunifica- justifying it as (1) a willingness to quickly earn money tion, many children remained in the OTC well beyond from their income generating activity, (2) the immediate the period of three months. Upon leaving the OTC or needs they must meet with the power that comes with their foster family84, and before being reunited, children money now that the army and its symbols of power received an exit kit (the second kit in a series of three) no longer exist. This was also unfortunately coming including light equipment for food, transportation 82   Cape Town Principles and Best Practices on the Recruitment 85   NDDRP, Program Implementation Manual, revised version, July of Children into the Armed Forces and on Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa, http://www.unicef.org/emerg/ 2008, 36 pages. files/Cape_Town_Principles%281%29.pdf 86   UNICEF, Democratic Republic of the Congo, “Rapport Final 83   Final independent evaluation, op. quoted, p. 68. Projet pour la prévention du recrutement, l’encadrement transitoire et la réinsertion socio-économique des enfants impliqués dans les conflits armés 84   Children were placed within foster families where OTC would not en République démocratique du Congo�, PBA: SC/2009/0446, June, 2011, exist. 20 pages 24 Table 10. CAAFG Statistics86 (25 Dec. 2007)87 Total number of children benefiting of the reinsertion programme Total number of certified and Provinces Attending, or having Economically reintegrated, or in reunified children (CAAFG) attended school process of economic reintegration Bandundu 150 1 6 Bas Congo 537 5 2 Équateur 3,247 210 1,642 Kasaï oriental 488 86 208 Kasaï Occidental 262 4 28 Katanga 2,355 163 628 Kinshasa 170 148 Sud Kivu 4,980 312 1,133 Nord Kivu 6,736 2,078 2,329 Maniema 2,221 872 1,529 Oriental Province 9,448 2,335 3,009 Partial Total 6,066 10,662 TOTAL 30,594 16,728 8 7 8 8 Graph 10. Representation of the children’s living along the disappointment with certain child protection environment, according to the Children’s DDR agencies who found themselves unable to monitor the operational framework children who had moved with their families because of conflict and insecurity. Children living in uncertainty refused (perhaps rightly) to consider any other possibil- Children Armed and Forces Groups ity of reintegration.�89 Family Reunification 87   Child associated with armed force or armed group, See Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Options offeren to the child Forces or Groups (CAAFG) http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/ ParisPrinciples310107English.pdf Transitional Center Alternative living environment 88   CONADER Final Report, 2007, CAAFG Chapter. (Max. 3 months) (Max. of 12 months) 89   Ibidem. On-going Tracing and Family Individual Monitoring by NGO Reunification and/or local community Ending War, Building Peace — Contribution of the national DDR program in DRC to peace in the african Great Lakes Region 25 5 Relevance, Effectiveness and Impact of the NDDRP T hroughout NDDRP’s existence, expected to last three years, NDDRP saw its life stretching over seven years-the National DDR Program has comprehensively fulfilled its objectives in an the IU-NDDRP. Without reconsidering the underlying governance causes of the NDDRP restructuring, it is clear that the transition of a heavy superstructure to a small and light technical structure has influenced the often challenging political, security and operational coaching and monitoring and evaluation methodology context. Demobilization has achieved many of its of the project liaison offices on the field without being objectives, although the official decision to stop granted more authority and resources to perform the national process of demobilization in 2009 by their functions in an optimal way. Lack of awareness DRC’s Government questions the subsequent DDR and information activities in much of the country has initiatives that have been undertaken in eastern affected the course of the program in many places. DRC in 2011/2012. The reintegration process has, in Phase I program (CONADER), suffered from NDDRP succeeded mainly to work with partners various political and organizational hazards despite the having both national strategy and capacities. They have different methodological changes (from an individual demonstrated a strong sense of drive and initiative to reintegration mode to an associative one) that have adapt from a strategy focused on the individual reinte- strengthened the economic and social reintegration gration of the demobilized to a new strategy support- of most of the demobilized in a sustainable manner. ing reintegration in an associative or cooperative mode. Overall, the implementing agencies selected, later The methodological and programmatic transformation supported and supervised by the project, have achieved of individual reintegration into an associative mode has most of their objectives, particularly in the area of considerably raised the level of satisfaction of the ben- economic rehabilitation and social reintegration despite eficiaries. This approach should be a model for future significant constraints (logistical, temporal, geographical DDR programs in DRC, as well as in other countries. and financial) they have had to face. Given its initial objectives, NDDRP has definitely had The physical and social rehabilitation of injured and a positive impact on peace building in DRC, both in disabled veterans also remained marginal compared regards to the number of caseloads treated, the number to the initial objectives and was confined only to the of weapons collected as well as the number of demobi- national capital. The same applies to the attention paid lized returning to their home communities and actively to demobilized women, particularly in Phase I. Finally, contributing to social and economic activities, and the the objectives related to the research, identification, number of CAAFG getting out of armed groups. The reunification and reintegration of DRC CAAFG were work of NDDRP contributed strongly to the peaceful globally achieved. NDDRP, however, has not completely implementation of the 2006 elections and that the vast managed to consolidate and validate its data. majority of demobilized no longer considered using weapons as a political tool. NDDRP experienced a radical change of governance between the regime of CONADER and the creation of In conclusion, DRC’s national DDR Program treated 26 Table 11. NDDRP Expenditure Allocated by Component90 PHASE I PHASE II TOTAL Activities Actual % Actual % Actual % Demobilization 67,5 36,1% 2,1 4,4% 69,6 29,6% Reinsertion 43,8 23,5% 2,6 5,4% 46,4 19,8% Reintegration 21,1 11,3% 26,3 54,7% 47,4 20,2% Special Groups 2,3 1,2% 6,5 13,5% 8,8 3,8% Program Management 52,1 27,9% 10,6 22,0% 62,7 26,7% TOTAL 186,8 100,0% 48,1 100,0% 234,9 100,0% close to 210,000 ex-combatants demobilized more solidating peace, national reconciliation and economic than 111,000 of them, while allowing more than reconstruction of the country� was able to achieve these 31,000 CAAFG to leave the military ranks and to objectives in association and partnership with other recover a normal family and social life. NDDRP also national and international partners, participating in the allowed 89,000 demobilized individuals to be economi- recovery of the political, economic and social situation cally reintegrated in their host community, which rep- in DRC throughout the 2000s. Its overall satisfactory resents four out of five of the demobilized registered assessment, however, should not overlook the fact that by the program. Support for the creation, establish- a significant number of members of vulnerable groups ment and strengthening of economic associations of (women demobilized, wounded and disabled veterans, the demobilized constitutes a model of joint economic CAAFG or other “demobilized� to come) may still and social reintegration of NDDRP and should be a need special assistance for their physical, psychological lesson for future reinsertion/reintegration processes in or material rehabilitation in the future.90 DRC and in other countries. NDDRP, which aimed in reaching the goals of “con- 90   ICR2168, op. cité, Table A.1.2, Annexe I, p.27. Ending War, Building Peace — Contribution of the national DDR program in DRC to peace in the african Great Lakes Region 27 Annexes Annex I. Map of DRC 10°E 15°E 25°E 30°E CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBL IC SOUTH SUDAN To 5°N Ubang To Bangasso 5°N To i Kembe Bangui To Zongo Gbadolite BAS-UELE Juba Bondo Faradje NORD-UBANGI Uele Libenge Gemena Businga HAUT-UELE Titule DEM. REP. Buta Isiro Watsa Kibal i OF CONGO SUD- Aketi To Imese UBANGI Akula Lisala Pakwach Bumba ORIENTALE Wamba MONGALA C Mongbwalu Bunia U G ANDA angui Aruwimi ITURI on Banalia go n ga Bongandanga Lake . Lulo O ub Mts Basankusu TSHOPO Bafwasende Albert EQUATEUR Yangambi Beni ba É Q U AT E U R Kisangani Butembo Margherita Peak tum 0° Wanie Rakula (5,110 m) 0° Mbandaka Boende Mi CONGO Tsh uap NORD Lake GABON a Lubutu Edward Lake Lo KIVU Lua TS H UA PA L m m Bikoro Ikela i a lab om NORD- uil Victoria a ela L ak Lowa a Ul KIVU Goma To Ruhengeri Inongo i Lake Kivu nd Betamba Congo Yumbi i To MAI-NDOMBE Kalima Bukavu Kibuye RWANDA Kutu Kindu SUD Buna KIVU KINSHASA Bandundu Lukenie Lodja Uvira To KINSHASA CITY Kasa i MANIEMA SUD- Bujumbura uru SANKURU Kama BURUNDI BANDUNDU Mangai Sank MANIEMA KIVU Ilebo KINSHASA Bulungu KASAI Malela Lusambo Kasongo Kenge K W I LU KASA� Lulimba 5°S CABINDA BAS-CONGO ORIENTAL 5°S Kikwit Idiofa (ANGOLA) To KO N G O C E N T R A L Mbanza-Ngungu Luebo LO MAMI Kongolo a TANZA NIA Pointe- Boma KASAI Kananga g Kw Noire Mbuji- Luku Kalemie Lake KASA�- Mayi ilu ATLANTIC Matadi To Feshi OCCIDENTAL Kabinda Kabalo Tanganyika OCE AN Damba Tshikapa Ka sa ORIENTAL TANGANYIKA KWANGO LULUA Kw i Moba ang Mwene-Ditu i Manono am DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC o Lom KATANGA Luv ua OF CONGO Kapanga H AU T- LO M A MI . Pweto ts Kamina Lueo M SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS Lulua Lu ba PROVINCE CAPITALS* ANGOLA L Lake m Kilwa Mweru itu u lua Sandoa ra NATIONAL CAPITAL M Lubudi HAUT- 10°S RIVERS LUALABA KATANGA MAIN ROADS Kolwezi To 0 100 200 300 400 Kilometers Dilolo Likasi Luwingu ZAMBIA RAILROADS To Lake Lu Lucano lab Malawi a a PROVINCE BOUNDARIES** 0 100 200 Miles Lubumbashi I M A L AW INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. IBRD 33391R2 *The creation of 26 new Provinces was approved by the ratification of the 2005 Constitution, to take effect by February, The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information ZA MBIA Sakania JULY 2011 shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank To 2009. The existing 11 Province Capitals, shown with green circles, will retain their status, with the exception of Bandundu. Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any Kitwe Future Province Capitals are shown with white circles. endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. **The existing 11 Province boundaries and names are shown in dark green; future in light green. 25°E 30°E Ending War, Building Peace — Contribution of the national DDR program in DRC to peace in the african Great Lakes Region 29 Annex II. Bibliography International Labor Office gration Program (MDRP). Contrat No 7137037. BIT, 2011. Rapport d’activités du projet ARED II-Phase EBENGO-MBAKU, D.B., 2009. Rapport d’évaluation d’extension (juin-août 2011). Extension de la phase indépendante, Kinshasa, Projet d’appui à la réin- II du NDDRP; Projet de renforcement des ca- sertion économique durable des démobilisés en pacités techniques et matérielles des regroupe- RDC, BIT. ments d’ex-combattants et des membres des communautés d’accueil. 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