62255 2011 world development report Overview Conflict, Security, and Development 2011 world development report Conflict, Security, and Development 2011 world development report Conflict, Security, and Development Overview © 2011 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org All rights reserved 1 2 3 4 14 13 12 11 This document summarizes the World Development Report 2011. It is a product of the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this volume do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. 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All other queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to the Office of the Publisher, The World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA; fax: 202-522-2422; e-mail: pubrights@worldbank.org. Cover design: Heads of State Typesetting: Barton Matheson Willse and Worthington The manuscript for this overview edition disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. By analyzing the nature, causes, and consequences of violent conflict today, and the suc- cesses and failures in responding to it, this World Development Report aims to sharpen the discussion on what can be done to support societies struggling to prevent or grapple with violence and conflict. Some of the ground that the Report covers falls outside the World Bank’s traditional development mandate, a reflection of a growing international policy consensus that addressing violent conflict and promoting economic development both require a deeper understanding of the close relationship between politics, security, and development. In study- ing this area, the World Bank does not aspire to go beyond its core mandate as set out in its Articles of Agreement, but rather to improve the effectiveness of development interventions in places threatened or affected by large-scale violence. Foreword In 1944, delegates from 45 countries gathered at Bretton Woods to consider the economic causes of the World War that was then still raging, and how to secure the peace. They agreed to create the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the original institution of what has become the World Bank Group. As the delegates noted, “Programs of reconstruction and development will speed economic progress everywhere, will aid political stability and foster peace.” The IBRD approved its first loan to France in 1947 to aid in the rebuilding of that country. Over 60 years later, the “R” in IBRD has a new meaning: reconstructing Afghanistan, Bos- nia, Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan, and other lands of conflict or broken states. Paul Collier’s book, The Bottom Billion, highlighted the recurrent cycles of weak governance, poverty, and violence that have plagued these lands. Not one low-income coun- try coping with these problems has yet achieved a single Millennium Development Goal. And the problems of fragile states spread easily: They drag down neighbors with violence that overflows borders, because conflicts feed on narcotics, piracy, and gender violence, and leave refugees and broken infrastructure in their wake. Their territories can become breeding grounds for far-reaching networks of violent radicals and organized crime. In 2008, I gave a speech on “Securing Development” to the International Institute for Stra- tegic Studies. I chose the forum to emphasize the interconnections among security, gover- nance, and development, and to make the point that the separate disciplines are not well integrated to address the inter-related problems. I outlined the challenge: bringing security and development together to put down roots deep enough to break the cycles of fragility and conflict. As we are now seeing again in the Middle East and North Africa, violence in the 21st cen- tury differs from 20th-century patterns of interstate conflict and methods of addressing them. Stove-piped government agencies have been ill-suited to cope, even when national interests or values prompt political leaders to act. Low incomes, poverty, unemployment, income shocks such as those sparked by volatility in food prices, rapid urbanization, and inequality between groups all increase the risks of violence. External stresses, such as trafficking and illicit finan- cial flows, can add to these risks. The 2011 World Development Report looks across disciplines and experiences drawn from around the world to offer some ideas and practical recommendations on how to move beyond conflict and fragility and secure development. The key messages are important for all coun- tries—low, middle, and high income—as well as for regional and global institutions: First, institutional legitimacy is the key to stability. When state institutions do not adequately protect citizens, guard against corruption, or provide access to justice; when markets do not provide job opportunities; or when communities have lost social cohesion—the likelihood of violent conflict increases. At the earliest stages, countries often need to restore public con- fidence in basic collective action even before rudimentary institutions can be transformed. Early wins—actions that can generate quick, tangible results—are critical. v vi F O R E WO R D Second, investing in citizen security, justice, and jobs is essential to reducing violence. But there are major structural gaps in our collective capabilities to support these areas. There are places where fragile states can seek help to build an army, but we do not yet have similar resources for building police forces or corrections systems. We need to put greater emphasis on early projects to create jobs, especially through the private sector. The Report provides insight into the importance of the involvement of women in political coalitions, security and justice reform, and economic empowerment. Third, confronting this challenge effectively means that institutions need to change. Interna- tional agencies and partners from other countries must adapt procedures so they can respond with agility and speed, a longer-term perspective, and greater staying power. Assistance needs to be integrated and coordinated; multi-donor trust funds have proven useful in accomplish- ing these aims while lessening the burdens of new governments with thin capacity. We need a better handoff between humanitarian and development agencies. And we need to accept a higher level of risk: If legislatures and inspectors expect only the upside, and just pillory the failures, institutions will steer away from the most difficult problems and strangle themselves with procedures and committees to avoid responsibility. This Report suggests some specific actions and ways of measuring results. Fourth, we need to adopt a layered approach. Some problems can be addressed at the coun- try level, but others need to be addressed at a regional level, such as developing markets that integrate insecure areas and pooling resources for building capacity. Some actions are needed at a global level, such as building new capacities to support justice reform and the creation of jobs; forging partnerships between producer and consumer countries to stem illegal traffick- ing; and acting to reduce the stresses caused by food price volatility. Fifth, in adopting these approaches, we need to be aware that the global landscape is chang- ing. Regional institutions and middle income countries are playing a larger role. This means we should pay more attention to south-south and south-north exchanges, and to the recent transition experiences of middle income countries. The stakes are high. A civil conflict costs the average developing country roughly 30 years of GDP growth, and countries in protracted crisis can fall over 20 percentage points behind in overcoming poverty. Finding effective ways to help societies escape new outbursts or repeated cycles of violence is critical for global security and global development—but doing so requires a fundamental rethinking, including how we assess and manage risk. Any such changes must be based on a clear roadmap, and on strong incentives. I hope this Report will help others and ourselves in sketching such a roadmap. Robert B. Zoellick President The World Bank Group Contents Preamble 1 Part 1: The Challenge of Repeated Cycles of Violence 2 21st-century conflict and violence are a development problem that does not fit the 20th-century mold 2 Vicious cycles of conflict: When security, justice, and employment stresses meet weak institutions 6 Part 2: A Roadmap for Breaking Cycles of Violence at the Country Level 8 Restoring confidence and transforming the institutions that provide citizen security, justice, and jobs 8 Practical policy and program tools for country actors 16 Part 3: Reducing the Risks of Violence—Directions for International Policy 23 Track 1: Providing specialized assistance for prevention through citizen security, justice, and jobs 28 Track 2: Transforming procedures and risk and results management in international agencies 31 Track 3: Acting regionally and globally to reduce external stresses on fragile states 34 Track 4: Marshaling support from lower-, middle-, and higher-income countries and global and regional institutions, to reflect the changing landscape of international policy and assistance 35 Notes 39 References 44 Acknowledgments 53 Bibliographical Note 55 Contents of the World Development Report 2011 58 vii Overview VIOLENCE and FRAGILITY Preamble ing poverty in the past 60 years, areas char- acterized by repeated cycles of political and E fforts to maintain collective se- criminal violence are being left far behind, curity are at the heart of human their economic growth compromised and history: from the earliest times, their human indicators stagnant. the recognition that human safety For those who now live in more stable depends on collaboration has been a mo- neighborhoods, it may seem incomprehensi- tivating factor for the formation of village ble how prosperity in high-income countries communities, cities, and nation-states. The and a sophisticated global economy can coex- 20th century was dominated by the legacy ist with extreme violence and misery in other of devastating global wars, colonial struggles, parts of the globe. The pirates operating off and ideological conflicts, and by efforts to the coast of Somalia who prey on the ship- establish international systems that would ping through the Gulf of Aden illustrate the foster global peace and prosperity. To some paradox of the existing global system. How extent these systems were successful—wars is it that the combined prosperity and capa- between states are far less common than they bility of the world’s modern nation-states were in the past, and civil wars are declining cannot prevent a problem from antiquity? in number. How is it that, almost a decade after renewed Yet, insecurity not only remains, it has international engagement with Afghanistan, become a primary development challenge the prospects of peace seem distant? How is it of our time. One-and-a-half billion people that entire urban communities can be terror- live in areas affected by fragility, conflict, or ized by drug traffickers? How is it that coun- large-scale, organized criminal violence, and tries in the Middle East and North Africa no low-income fragile or conflict-affected could face explosions of popular grievances country has yet to achieve a single United despite, in some cases, sustained high growth Nations Millennium Development Goal (UN and improvement in social indicators? MDG). New threats—organized crime and This World Development Report (WDR) trafficking, civil unrest due to global economic asks what spurs risks of violence, why con- shocks, terrorism—have supplemented con- flict prevention and recovery have proven so tinued preoccupations with conventional war difficult to address, and what can be done by between and within countries. While much of national leaders and their development, secu- the world has made rapid progress in reduc- rity, and diplomatic partners to help restore a 2 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 stable development path in the world’s most clearly defined rebel movements, are known. fragile and violence-torn areas. The central If a dispute escalates and full-scale hostilities message of the Report is that strengthening ensue, an eventual end to hostilities (either legitimate institutions and governance to through victory and defeat or through a ne- provide citizen security, justice, and jobs is gotiated settlement) is followed by a short crucial to break cycles of violence. Restor- “post-conflict” phase leading back to peace. ing confidence and transforming security, The global system is largely built around this justice, and economic institutions is possible paradigm of conflict, with clear roles for na- within a generation, even in countries that tional and international actors in development have experienced severe conflict. But that in promoting the prosperity and capability of requires determined national leadership and the nation-state (but stepping out during ac- an international system “refitted” to address tive conflict), in diplomacy in preventing and 21st-century risks: refocusing assistance on mediating disputes between states and be- preventing criminal and political violence, tween government and rebel movements, in reforming the procedures of international peacekeeping in the aftermath of conflict, and agencies, responding at a regional level, and in humanitarianism in providing relief. renewing cooperative efforts among lower-, 21st century violence1 does not fit the middle-, and higher-income countries. The 20th-century mold. Interstate war and civil Report envisages a layered approach to ef- war are still threats in some regions, but they fective global action, with local, national, re- have declined over the last 25 years. Deaths gional, and international roles. from civil war, while still exacting an unac- Because of the nature of the topic, this Re- ceptable toll, are one-quarter of what they port has been developed in an unusual way— were in the 1980s (Feature 1, figure F1.1).2 drawing from the beginning on the knowledge Violence and conflict have not been ban- of national reformers and working closely ished: one in four people on the planet, more with the United Nations and regional institu- than 1.5 billion, live in fragile and conflict- tions with expertise in political and security affected states or in countries with very high issues, building on the concept of human levels of criminal violence.3 But because of security. The hope is that this partnership the successes in reducing interstate war, the will spark an ongoing effort to jointly deepen remaining forms of conflict and violence do our understanding of the links between secu- not fit neatly either into “war” or “peace,” or rity and development, and will foster practical into “criminal violence” or “political violence” action on the Report’s findings. (see Feature 1, F1.1–1.2 and table F1.1). Many countries and subnational areas now face cycles of repeated violence, weak gov- PART 1: THE CHALLENGE ernance, and instability. First, conflicts often are not one-off events, but are ongoing and OF REPEATED CYCLES OF repeated: 90 percent of the last decade’s civil VIOLENCE wars occurred in countries that had already had a civil war in the last 30 years.4 Second, 21st-century conflict and violence new forms of conflict and violence threaten are a development problem that development: many countries that have suc- does not fit the 20th-century mold cessfully negotiated political and peace agree- ments after violent political conflicts, such Global systems in the 20th century were as El Salvador, Guatemala, and South Africa, designed to address interstate tensions and now face high levels of violent crime, con- one-off episodes of civil war. War between straining their development. Third, different nation-states and civil war have a given logic forms of violence are linked to each other. and sequence. The actors, sovereign states or Political movements can obtain financing Overview 3 FEATURE 1 How violence is changing FIGU RE F 1.1 Deaths from civil wars are declining As the number of civil wars declined, the total annual deaths from these conflicts (battle deaths) fell from more than 200,000 in 1988 to fewer than 50,000 in 2008. 300,000 60 250,000 50 Number of countries in civil war Battle deaths in civil wars 200,000 40 150,000 30 100,000 20 50,000 10 0 0 1960 1968 1976 1984 1992 2000 2008 Total battle deaths per annum in all civil wars (minor and major) Total number of countries in civil war (minor and major) Sources: Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010; Lacina and Gleditsch 2005); Gleditsch and others 2002; Sundberg 2008; Gleditsch and Ward 1999; Human Security Report Project, forthcoming. Note: Civil wars are classified by scale and type in the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010; Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). The minimum threshold for monitoring is a minor civil war with 25 or more battle d a year. Low, high, and best estimates of annual battle deaths per conflict are in Lacina and Gleditsch (2005, updated in 2009). Throughout this Report, best estimates are used, except when they are not available, in which case averages of the low and high estimates are used. TA B L E F 1.1 Violence often recurs Few countries are truly “post-conflict.” The rate of violence onset in countries with a previous conflict has been increasing since the 1960s, and every civil war that began since 2003 was in a country that had a previous civil war. Violence onsets in countries with Violence onsets in countries with Number of Decade no previous conflict (%) a previous conflict (%) onsets 1960s 57 43 35 1970s 43 57 44 1980s 38 62 39 1990s 33 67 81 2000s 10 90 39 Sources: Walter 2010; WDR team calculations. Note: Previous conflict includes any major conflict since 1945. (Feature continued on next page) 4 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 FEATURE 2 How violence is changing (continued) F I G U R E F 1.2 Organized criminal violence threatens peace processes Homicides have increased in every country in Central America since 1999, including those that had made great progress in addressing political conflict—and this is not unique; countries such as South Africa face similar second generation challenges. 40 Absolute change in homicide rate 30 relative to 1999 20 10 0 –10 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 El Salvador Honduras Guatemala Belize Panama Nicaragua Costa Rica Sources: WDR team calculations based on UNODC 2007; UNODC and Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank 2007; and national sources. Note: Base year for homicide rate is 1999 = 0. How violence disrupts development F I G U R E F 1.3 The gap in poverty is widening between countries affected by violence and others New poverty data reveal that poverty is declining for much of the world, but countries affected by violence are lagging behind. For every three years a country is affected by major violence (battle deaths or excess deaths from homicides equivalent to a major war), poverty reduction lags behind by 2.7 percentage points. 65 (% of population living below $1.25 a day) 60 Poverty headcount 55 50 45 40 35 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 ff Countries affected by major violence ff Countries affected by minor violence Countries with negligible or no violence Sources: WDR team calculations based on Chen, Ravallion, and Sangraula 2008 poverty data (available on POVCALNET (http://iresearch.worldbank.org)). Note: Poverty is % of population living at less than US$1.25 per day. Overview 5 from criminal activities, as in the Democratic Attempts to contain violence are also Republic of Congo and Northern Ireland.5 extremely costly. For example, the naval Criminal gangs can support political violence operation to counter piracy in the Horn of during electoral periods, as in Jamaica and Africa and the Indian Ocean is estimated to Kenya.6 International ideological movements cost US$1.3–$2 billion annually, plus addi- make common cause with local grievances, as tional costs incurred by rerouting ships and in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Thus, the large increasing insurance premiums.16 Efforts by majority of countries currently facing vio- households and firms to protect themselves lence face it in multiple forms. Fourth, griev- against long-duration violence impose heavy ances can escalate into acute demands for economic burdens: 35 percent of firms in change—and the risks of violent conflict—in Latin America, 30 percent in Africa, and 27 countries where political, social, or economic percent in Eastern Europe and Central Asia change lags behind expectations, as in the identify crime as the major problem for Middle East and North Africa. their business activities. The burden is high- Repeated and interlinked, these conflicts est on those least able to bear the cost: firms have regional and global repercussions. The in Sub-Saharan Africa lose a higher percent- death, destruction, and delayed develop- age of sales to crime and spend a higher per- ment due to conflict are bad for the conflict- centage of sales on security than any other affected countries, and their impacts spill region.17 over both regionally and globally. A coun- No low-income fragile or conflict-affected try making development advances, such as country has yet achieved a single MDG. Tanzania, loses an estimated 0.7 percent of People in fragile and conflict-affected states GDP every year for each neighbor in conflict.7 are more than twice as likely to be under- Refugees and internally displaced persons nourished as those in other developing coun- have increased threefold in the last 30 years.8 tries, more than three times as likely to be un- Nearly 75 percent of the world’s refugees are able to send their children to school, twice as hosted by neighboring countries.9 likely to see their children die before age five, The new forms of violence interlinking and more than twice as likely to lack clean local political conflicts, organized crime, water. On average, a country that experienced and internationalized disputes mean that major violence over the period from 1981 to violence is a problem for both the rich and 2005 has a poverty rate 21 percentage points the poor: more than 80 percent of fatalities higher than a country that saw no violence from terrorist attacks over the last decade (Feature 1, figure F1.3).18 A similar picture were in nonwestern targets,10 but a study emerges for subnational areas affected by vi- of 18 Western European countries revealed olence in richer and more stable countries— that each additional transnational terrorist areas where development lags behind.19 incident reduced their economic growth by These repeated cycles of conflict and 0.4 of a percentage point a year.11 Attacks violence exact other human, social, and eco- in one region can impose costs all through nomic costs that last for generations. High global markets—one attack in the Niger levels of organized criminal violence hold Delta can cost global consumers of oil bil- back economic development. In Guatemala, lions in increased prices.12 In the four weeks violence cost the country more than 7 percent following the beginning of the uprising in of GDP in 2005, more than twice the damage Libya, oil prices increased by 15 percent.13 by Hurricane Stan in the same year—and The interdiction of cocaine shipments to more than twice the combined budget for Europe has increased fourfold since 2003,14 agriculture, health, and education.20 The av- with even areas such as West Africa now se- erage cost of civil war is equivalent to more riously affected by drug-related violence.15 than 30 years of GDP growth for a medium- 6 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 size developing country.21 Trade levels after Vicious cycles of conflict: When major episodes of violence take 20 years to security, justice, and employment recover.22 In other words, a major episode stresses meet weak institutions of violence, unlike natural disasters or eco- nomic cycles, can wipe out an entire genera- Internal causes of conflict arise from politi- tion of economic progress. cal, security, and economic dynamics.27 Yet it These numbers have human conse- is difficult to disentangle causes and effects quences. In highly violent societies, many of violence. Lower GDP per capita is robustly people experience the death of a son or associated with both large-scale political daughter before their time: when children are conflict and high rates of homicide.28 Youth late coming home, a parent has good reason unemployment is consistently cited in citi- to fear for their lives and physical safety. Ev- zen perception surveys as a motive for join- eryday experiences, such as going to school, ing both rebel movements and urban gangs to work, or to market, become occasions for (Feature 2, figure F2.2).29 Feeling more secure fear. People hesitate to build houses or invest and powerful is also cited as an important in small businesses because these can be de- motivator across countries, confirming exist- stroyed in a moment. The direct impact of ing research that shows that employment dy- violence falls primarily on young males—the namics have to do not only with income but majority of fighting forces and gang mem- also with respect and status, involving social bers—but women and children often suffer cohesion as well as economic opportunity. disproportionately from the indirect effects.23 Political exclusion and inequality affecting Men make up 96 percent of detainees and 90 regional, religious, or ethnic groups are asso- percent of the missing; women and children ciated with higher risks of civil war,30 (and are are close to 80 percent of refugees and those also cited in citizen surveys as a key driver of internally displaced.24 And violence begets conflict alongside poverty—see figure F2.1) violence: male children who witness abuses while inequality between richer and poorer have a higher tendency to perpetrate violence households is closely associated with higher later in life.25 risks of violent crime (table 1.1). Yet when security is reestablished and sus- External factors can heighten the risks of tained, these areas of the world can make the violence. Major external security pressures, greatest development gains. Several countries as with new patterns of drug trafficking, can emerging from long legacies of both political overwhelm institutional capacities (see Fea- and criminal violence have been among the ture 2). Income shocks can also increase risks fastest making progress on the MDGs:26 of violence. Work on rainfall shocks in Sub- Saharan Africa concludes that civil conflict • Ethiopia more than quadrupled access is more likely following years of poor rain- to improved water, from 13 percent of fall. Using rainfall variation as a proxy for the population in 1990 to 66 percent in income shocks in 41 African countries be- 2009–10. tween 1981 and 1999, Satyanath, Miguel, and • Mozambique more than tripled its primary Sergenti (2004) found that a decline in eco- completion rate in just eight years, from nomic growth of 5 percent increased the like- 14 percent in 1999 to 46 percent in 2007. lihood of conflict by half the following year.31 Corruption—which generally has interna- • Rwanda cut the prevalence of undernutri- tional links through illicit trafficking, money tion from 56 percent of the population in laundering, and the extraction of rents from 1997 to 40 percent in 2005. sales of national resources or international • Bosnia and Herzegovina, between 1995 contracts and concessions—has doubly per- and 2007, increased measles immuniza- nicious impacts on the risks of violence, by tions from 53 percent to 96 percent for fueling grievances and by undermining the children aged 12–23 months. effectiveness of national institutions and so- Overview 7 TA B L E 1.1 Security, economic, and political stresses Stresses Internal External Security • Legacies of violence and trauma • Invasion, occupation • External support for domestic rebels • Cross-border conflict spillovers • Transnational terrorism • International criminal networks Economic • Low income levels, low opportunity • Price shocks cost of rebellion • Climate change • Youth unemployment • Natural resource wealth • Severe corruption • Rapid urbanization • Ethnic, religious, or regional • Perceived global inequity and Justice competition injustice in the treatment of ethnic or • Real or perceived discrimination religious groups • Human rights abuses Source: WDR team. Note: This table, although not exhaustive, captures major factors in the academic literature on the causes and correlates of conflict and raised in the WDR consultations and surveys.33 cial norms.32 New external pressures from Institutional capacity and accountability are climate change and natural resource compe- important for both political and criminal tition could heighten all these risks.34 violence (see Feature 2).37 However, many countries face high un- • In some areas—as in the peripheral re- employment, economic inequality, or pres- gions of Colombia before the turn of the sure from organized crime networks but 21st century38 or the Democratic Republic do not repeatedly succumb to widespread of the Congo39 today—the state is all but violence, and instead contain it. The WDR absent from many parts of the country, approach emphasizes that risk of conflict and and violent armed groups dominate local violence in any society (national or regional) contests over power and resources. is the combination of the exposure to inter- • Most areas affected by violence face defi- nal and external stresses and the strength of cits in their collaborative capacities40 to the “immune system,” or the social capability mediate conflict peacefully. In some coun- for coping with stress embodied in legitimate tries, institutions do not span ethnic, re- institutions.35 Both state and nonstate institu- gional, or religious divides, and state insti- tions are important. Institutions include so- tutions have been viewed as partisan—just cial norms and behaviors—such as the ability as they were for decades prior to the peace of leaders to transcend sectarian and politi- agreement in Northern Ireland.41 In some cal differences and develop bargains, and of communities, social divisions have con- civil society to advocate for greater national strained effective collaboration between and political cohesion—as well as rules, laws, elite dominated states and poor commu- and organizations.36 Where states, markets, nities to address sources of violence. and social institutions fail to provide basic • Rapid urbanization, as occurred earlier security, justice, and economic opportunities in Latin America and today in Asia and for citizens, conflict can escalate. Africa, weakens social cohesion.42 Un- In short, countries and subnational ar- employment, structural inequalities, and eas with the weakest institutional legitimacy greater access to markets for firearms and governance are the most vulnerable to and illicit drugs break down social cohe- violence and instability and the least able sion and increase the vulnerability to to respond to internal and external stresses. criminal networks and gangs. 8 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 • Countries with weak institutional capacity conditions—the truth and reconciliation, were more likely to suffer violent social un- anti-corruption, and human rights commis- rest during the food shocks of 2008–09.43 sions that delivered so marvelously in some countries have not always worked in others. • Some states have tried to maintain stability There are gains from sharing knowledge, as through coercion and patronage networks, the Report makes clear—but only if adapted but those with high levels of corruption to local conditions. “Best-fit” institutions are and human rights abuses increase their central to the Report. risks of violence breaking out in the future (see Feature 2). Weak institutions are particularly im- PART 2: A ROADMAP portant in explaining why violence repeats FOR BREAKING CYCLES in different forms in the same countries or subnational regions. Even societies with OF VIOLENCE AT THE the weakest institutions have periodic out- COUNTRY LEVEL breaks of peace. South-central Somalia has had interludes of low conflict over the last Restoring confidence and 30 years based on agreements by small num- transforming the institutions that bers of elites.44 But temporary elite pacts, provide citizen security, justice, in Somalia and elsewhere, do not provide and jobs the grounds for sustained security and de- velopment unless they are followed by the To break cycles of insecurity and reduce the development of legitimate state and society risk of their recurrence, national reformers institutions.45 They are generally short-lived and their international partners need to build because they are too personalized and nar- the legitimate institutions that can provide a row to accommodate stresses and adjust to sustained level of citizen security, justice, and change. New internal and external stresses jobs—offering a stake in society to groups arise—a leader’s death, economic shocks, that may otherwise receive more respect and the entry of organized criminal trafficking recognition from engaging in armed violence networks, new opportunities or rents, or than in lawful activities, and punishing in- external security interference—and there fractions capably and fairly. is no sustained ability to respond.46 So the But transforming institutions—always violence recurs. tough—is particularly difficult in fragile situ- A focus on legitimate institutions does ations. First, in countries with a track record not mean converging on Western institutions. of violence and mistrust, expectations are History provides many examples of foreign either too low, so that no government prom- institutional models that have proven less ises are believed, making cooperative action than useful to national development, par- impossible—or too high, so that transitional ticularly through colonial legacies,47 because moments produce expectations of rapid they focused on form rather than function. change that cannot be delivered by existing The same is true today. In Iraq, the Coalition institutions.49 Second, many institutional Provisional Authority established commis- changes that could produce greater long- sions on every subject from tourism to the term resilience against violence frequently environment in parallel with struggling line carry short-term risks. Any important shift— ministries, and model laws were passed that holding elections, dismantling patronage net- had little relationship to national social and works, giving new roles to security services, political realities.48 Even transfers of organiza- decentralizing decision-making, empowering tional forms between countries in the South disadvantaged groups—creates both winners can be unproductive if not adapted to local and losers. Losers are often well organized Overview 9 FEATURE 2 High stresses and weak institutions = risks of violence Justice, jobs, and violence F I G U R E F 2.1 What are citizens’ views on the drivers of conflict? In surveys conducted in six countries and territories affected by violence, involving a mix of nationally representative samples and subregions, citizens raised issues linked to individual economic welfare (poverty, unemployment) and injustice (including inequality and corruption) as the primary drivers of conflict. 45 40 35 % survey respondents answering 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Poverty/ Conflict over External Ethnic conflict/ Injustice/ Other poor education resources/ aggression religion inequality/ scarce resources corruption Source: Bøås, Tiltnes, and Flatø 2010. F I G U R E F 2.2 What drives people to join rebel movement and gangs? The same surveys found that the main reasons cited for why young people become rebels or gang members are very similar—unemployment predominates for both. This is not necessarily the case for militant ideological recruitment (chapter 2). 50 46% 45 40 39.5% 35 % respondents 30 25 20 15% 13% 13% 15 8% 10 5 0 Rebel participation Gang participation Unemployment/Idleness Feel more secure/Powerful Belief in the cause/Revenge/Injustice Source: Bøås, Tiltnes, and Flatø 2010. 10 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT Jorge Montaño, Member, International Narcotics Control Board; former Ambassador of Mexico to the United States; WDR Advisory Council Member The role of external stresses Drug and human trafficking, money laundering, illegal exploitation of natural resources and wildlife, counterfeiting, and viola- tions of intellectual property rights are lucrative criminal activities, which facilitate the penetration by organized crime of the already vulnerable sociopolitical, judicial, and security structures in developing countries. In Central America, for example, several countries that regained political stability two decades ago are now facing the decay of the state, whose institutions lack the strength to face this onslaught. Transnational organized crime has converted some Carib- bean countries into corridors for the movement of illegal drugs and persons toward Europe and North America. Bolivia, Colom- bia, and Peru, continue to be the main global cocaine producers, while Mexico is facing an unprecedented wave of violence given its border with the largest immigrant, drug consumption, and arms producing market. West Africa has become the newest pas- sage of drugs coming from South America and destined for Europe. Several African countries suffer the illegal exploitation of their natural resources, while Asia is a hub for tons of opiates originating from Afghanistan. The unprecedented progression of organized crime could spell the collapse of many weak states as their institutions fall prey to the associated violence. The precari- ous economic development observed in many regions of the world provides a stimulus for consolidating these illegal activities, which will continue to thrive as a consequence of the impunity they encounter in developing countries. WDR Note: Weak institutions are a common factor in explaining repeated cycles of violence Building on previous work by Collier, Fearon, Goldstone, North, Wallis, and Weingast, and others, political scientists Jim Fearon and Barbara Walter used econometric techniques for the WDR to test whether general rule of law and government effective- ness, low corruption, and strong protection of human rights correlate with a lower risk of the onset and recurrence of civil war and of high homicides from criminal violence. Fearon finds that countries with above average governance indicators for their income level have a significantly lower risk of the outbreak of civil conflict within the next 5 to 10 years—between 30 to 45 per- cent lower—and that the relationship also holds true for countries with high homicides. This work confirms earlier directions in the policy community, such as the International Network for Conflict and Fragility’s emphasis on the links between peacebuild- ing and state-building. Measures of accountability are as important as measures of capacity in this calculation. Fearon finds that high levels of polit- ical terror in past periods increase the chances of current conflict. Walter finds that significant reductions in the number of political prisoners and extrajudicial killings make the renewal of civil war between two and three times less likely than in coun- tries with higher levels of human rights abuses. She notes, “A reasonable interpretation of these results is that greater repression and abuse by a government creates both grievances and signals that those governments (sic) are not dependable negotiating partners; suggesting that less coercive and more accountable approaches significantly decrease the risk of civil conflict.” Other measures of accountability also matter: measures of rule of law and corruption are as or more important than measures of bureaucratic quality. and resist change. Third, external stresses can transforming institutions accelerated consid- derail progress. erably in the late 20th century, with increases Creating the legitimate institutions that in citizen demands for good governance and can prevent repeated violence is, in plain lan- in the technologies that can help supply it. In- guage, slow. It takes a generation. Even the deed, making progress in a generation is ac- fastest-transforming countries have taken tually quite fast: progress at this speed would between 15 and 30 years to raise their institu- represent immense development gains for tional performance from that of a fragile state countries such as Afghanistan, Haiti, Liberia, today—Haiti, say—to that of a functioning and Timor-Leste today. institutionalized state, such as Ghana (table The basic framework of the WDR focuses 2.1).50 The good news is that this process of on what we have learned about the dynam- Overview 11 TA BLE 2.1 Fastest progress in institutional transformation—An estimate of realistic ranges The table shows the historical range of timings that the fastest reformers in the 20th century took to achieve basic governance transformations. Years to threshold at pace of: Indicator Fastest 20 Fastest over the threshold Bureaucratic quality (0–4) 20 12 Corruption (0–6) 27 14 Military in politics (0–6) 17 10 Government effectiveness 36 13 Control of corruption 27 16 Rule of law 41 17 Source: Pritchett and de Weijer 2010. ics of action to prevent repeated cycles of vi- transformation. Second is the priority of olence—both in the short term and over the transforming institutions that provide citi- time needed to reach a sustained level of resil- zen security, justice, and jobs. Third is the ience. Our knowledge of how to break these role of regional and international action to cycles is partial: the Report lays out lessons contain external stresses. Fourth is the spe- drawn from existing research, country stud- cialized nature of external support needed. ies, and consultations with national reformers. Institutional transformation and good Experiences from Bosnia and Herzegovina, governance, central to these processes, work Chile, Colombia, Ghana, Indonesia, Liberia, differently in fragile situations. The goal is Mozambique, Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, more focused—transforming institutions South Africa, and Timor-Leste amongst others, that deliver citizen security, justice, and jobs. are drawn on frequently in the Report because, When facing the risk of conflict and violence, while all of these areas still face challenges and citizen security, justice and jobs are the key risks, these societies have achieved consider- elements of protection to achieve human se- able successes in preventing violence from curity.51 The dynamics of institutional change escalating or recovering from its aftermath. are also different. A good analogy is a finan- These and the other experiences in the Report cial crisis caused by a combination of external also span a range of high-income, middle- stresses and weaknesses in institutional checks income and lower-income countries, a range and balances. In such a situation, exceptional of threats of political and criminal violence, efforts are needed to restore confidence in and differing institutional contexts, rang- national leaders’ ability to manage the crisis— ing from situations where strong institutions through actions that signal a real break with faced legitimacy challenges due to problems the past and through locking in these actions of inclusion and accountability to situations and showing that they will not be reversed. where weak capacity was a major constraint. Confidence-building—a concept used in There are some fundamental differences political mediation and financial crises but between fragile and violent situations and rarely in development circles52—is a prelude stable developing environments. First is the to more permanent institutional change in need to restore confidence in collective ac- the face of violence. Why? Because low trust tion before embarking on wider institutional means that stakeholders who need to con- 12 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 F I G U R E 2 .1 Moving from fragility and violence to institutional resilience in citizen security, justice, and jobs CITIZEN SECURITY, JUSTICE, AND JOBS EXTERNAL STRESS RE S TO TRANSFORMING RING CON RE FID S TO ENCE TRANSFORMIN RING CON IN RE S ST FID TU TO TRANSFORMING I R E NCE I NG TI ON GI CON S NS FID IT T UT E NC E IO IN NS ST TU I TI ON S VIOLENCE and FRAGILITY EXTERNAL SUPPORT AND INCENTIVES Source: WDR team. tribute political, financial, or technical sup- nance of society.54 A repeated process enables port will not collaborate until they believe space for collaborative norms and capacities to that a positive outcome is possible.53 But develop, and for success to build on successes confidence-building is not an end in itself. in a virtuous cycle. For each loop of the spi- Just as in a financial crisis, progress will not ral, the same two phases recur: building con- be sustained unless the institutions that pro- fidence that positive chance is possible, prior vide citizen security, justice, and an economic to deepening the institutional transformation stake in society are transformed to prevent a and strengthening governance outcomes. recurrence of violence. Just as violence repeats, efforts to build Confidence-building—Inclusive- confidence and transform institutions typi- enough coalitions and early results cally follow a repeated spiral. Countries that moved away from fragility and conflict of- The state cannot restore confidence alone. ten do so not through one decisive “make or Confidence-building in situations of violence break” moment—but through many transi- and fragility requires deliberate effort to build tion moments, as the spiral path in figure inclusive-enough coalitions, as Indonesia did in 2.1 illustrates. National leaders had to build addressing violence in Aceh or Timor-Leste in confidence in the state and to transform in- its recovery after the renewed violence in 2006 stitutions over time, as with the Republic of or Chile in its political transition. Coalitions Korea’s transitions in the security, political, are “inclusive-enough” when they include the and economic spheres after the Korean War, parties necessary for implementing the initial or Ghana, Chile and Argentina’s transitions stages of confidence-building and institutional from military rule, which included repeated transformation. They need not be “all-inclu- internal contests over the norms and gover- sive.”55 Inclusive-enough coalitions work in Overview 13 two ways: (1) at a broad level, by building na- ile situations, many reforms need a build- tional support for change and bringing in the up of trust and capacity before they can be relevant stakeholders, through collaboration successfully implemented. Getting the bal- between the government and other sectors of ance right between “too fast” and “too slow” society—as well as with regional neighbors, transformative action is crucial, and some donors, or investors, and (2) at a local level, by basic lessons emerge from successful country promoting outreach to community leaders to transitions. identify priorities and deliver programs. Inclu- First, prioritizing early action to reform the sive-enough coalitions apply just as much to institutions responsible for citizen security, criminal as to political violence, through col- justice, and jobs is crucial, as in Singapore’s laboration with community leaders, business, post-independence development (see Fea- and civil society in areas affected by criminal ture 3). Stemming illegal financial flows from violence. Civil society—including women’s the public purse or from natural resource organizations—often plays important roles trafficking is important to underpin these in restoring confidence and sustaining the initiatives. Pragmatic, “best-fit” approaches momentum for recovery and transformation, adapted to local conditions will be needed. as demonstrated by the role of the Liberian For example, Lebanon restored the electricity Women’s Initiative in pressing for continued needed for economic recovery during the civil progress in the peace agreement.56 war through small private-sector networks of Persuading stakeholders to work collab- providers, albeit at high unit costs.57 Haiti’s oratively requires signals of a real break with successful police reforms in 2004 to 2009 fo- the past—for example, ending the political or cused on ousting abusers from the force and economic exclusion of marginalized groups, restoring very basic work discipline.58 corruption, or human rights abuses—as well Second, focusing on citizen security, jus- as mechanisms to “lock-in” these changes tice, and jobs means that most other reforms and show that they will not be reversed. In will need to be sequenced and paced over moments of opportunity or crisis, fast and time, including political reform, decentral- visible results also help restore confidence ization, privatization, and shifting attitudes in the government’s ability to deal with toward marginalized groups. Systematically violent threats and implement institutional implementing these reforms requires a web and social change. State-community, state- of institutions (democratization, for example, nongovernmental organization (NGO), state- requires many institutional checks and bal- international, and state-private-sector part- ances beyond elections) and changes in social nerships can extend the state’s capacity to attitudes. Several successful political transi- deliver. Actions in one domain can support tions, such as the devolution that underpins results in another. Security operations can peace in Northern Ireland and democratic facilitate safe trade and transit, and the eco- transitions in Chile, Indonesia, or Portugal, nomic activity that creates jobs. Services deliv- have taken place through a series of steps over ered to marginalized groups can support per- a decade or more. ceptions of justice. More detailed approaches There are exceptions—where the exclu- to support inclusive-enough coalitions are sion of groups from democratic participation described in the section on practical policies has been a clear overriding source of griev- and programs for country actors below. ance, rapid action on elections makes sense; and where interests that previously blocked reform have diminished, as with post-war Transforming institutions that deliver Japanese or Republic of Korea land reform,59 citizen security, justice, and jobs fast action can take advantage of a window of There is a limit to the amount of change soci- opportunity. But in most situations, system- eties can absorb at any one time, and in frag- atic and gradual action appears to work best. 14 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT F E AT U R E 3 Country experiences of confidence-building and transforming institutions for citizen security, justice, and jobs Confidence building in South Africa Jay Naidoo, Chairman of Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition; former General Secretary, Congress of South African Trade Unions; Minister of Reconstruction and Development, South Africa; and Chairman of the Development Bank of South Africa; WDR Advisory Council Member (Abbreviated from WDR 2011, chapter 3) In South Africa, the “moment” of transition in 1994 was pre- In addition to successes, there were opportunities missed ceded by multiple transition points which required efforts which may be of use when other countries consider South from the protagonists to shift the debate and that gave cred- Africa’s experiences. This included too little attention to job ibility to the process. On the African National Congress (ANC) creation for youth and risks of criminal violence. It meant that Alliance side, this included the shift to a broader, more inclu- we did not fully address the critical need to ensure that the new sive approach, and the realization of the need to ensure generation who had not lived through the apartheid struggle incentives for the National Party and the white population. as adults were provided with a strong stake—and economic On the National Party side, this included the shift from think- opportunities—in the new democratic state. ing in terms of group rights and protection of minorities to There was also too much of an assumption that 1994 thinking in terms of individual rights and majority rule. Cer- marked the culmination of a process of democratization and tain signals which were perceived as irreversible (notably the reconciliation. Relatively little attention was given to what was unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and the suspen- meant by the transformation to a constitutional state; the con- sion of the ANC’s armed struggle) were critical in maintain- tinued role of civil society in deepening not just democratiza- ing trust between parties. After the 1994 elections, deliver- tion and accountability but also delivery. And there was a need ing a few early results—including maternal and infant for a deeper and more thorough ongoing debate on racism, healthcare and using community structures to improve inequality, and social exclusion. water supply—were important to maintain confidence in our new government. All politics is local and early attention to security, justice, and jobs George Yeo, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Singapore; WDR Advisory Council Member. (Abbreviated from WDR 2011, chapters 4 and 5) Successful efforts must begin at the local level. Without out a practical approach, new institutions cannot take root in emphasis on local results, citizens lose confidence in their the hearts and minds of ordinary people. For Singapore in the government’s ability to provide a better life. Actions to early years, the priority was on security, law and order, and restore security, create trust, generate employment, and creating favorable conditions for investment and economic provide services in local communities lay the foundation for growth. Confidence was everything. National Service was intro- national progress. It is not enough to deliver results in big duced within a year. Secret societies and other criminal activi- cities. In cases of ethnic and religious strife, where mutual ties were suppressed. Corruption was progressively rooted out. insecurity can feed on itself, a local authority that is seen to To promote investment and job creation, labor and land acqui- be fair and impartial by all groups is absolutely essential sition laws were reformed early. Against conventional wisdom before the process of healing and recovery can take place. in many developing countries at that time, we eschewed pro- This was Singapore’s experience when we had race riots in tectionism and encouraged multinationals to invest. Managing the 1960s. A trusted leader can make a decisive difference. the politics of change was always a challenge. It takes time to build institutions. Getting the urgent The key was winning the trust of the people. Institutions things done first, especially improving security and provid- which endure are sustained by the respect and affection of the ing jobs, helps people to feel more hopeful about the future. population. It is a process which takes at least a generation. Success then creates the condition for further success. With- Overview 15 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT F E AT U R E 3 Country experiences of confidence-building and transforming institutions for citizen security, justice, and jobs (continued) Colombia’s restoration of confidence in safe transit Marta Lucia Ramirez de Rincon, Director, Fundacion Ciudadania en Accion; former Senator and Chair of Security Commission, Colombia; former Defense Minister and former Foreign Trade Minister, Colombia; WDR Advisory Council Member (Abbreviated from WDR 2011, chapter 5) The challenge we faced in 2002 was preventing Colombia Meteoro aimed at restoring control of the roads and high- from becoming a failed state. This meant shielding our citi- ways across the country back from the illegitimate hand of zens from kidnapping and terrorism. It also meant protect- armed groups that inflicted fear in the population. The govern- ing our infrastructure, roads, and democratic institutions ment invited the Colombian population to drive their cars and against attacks by the guerrillas, the paramilitaries, and drug travel across the country without intimidation, while at the traffickers. These groups hijacked cars and kidnapped peo- same time launching a major military, intelligence, and police ple as they travelled across the country. Since this problem operation to protect the roads and ensure the safety of the had worsened in the years ahead of the 2002 elections, the population. Through this plan, the government sought to give government set the restoration of security in roads and people back their country and to reactivate trade and tourism. highways as a key priority on their agenda. It devised the Above all, this plan, implemented at the very early stage of the Meteoro program widely known as, “Live Colombia, travel new government, brought about a breakthrough in the resto- across it” (“Vive Colombia, Viaja por ella”). ration of trust and hope in the Colombian society. Do not confuse speed with haste in political processes Lakhdar Brahimi, former UN Special Representative of the Secretary General to Iraq and Afghanistan; WDR Advisory Council Member (Abbreviated from WDR 2011, chapter 5) It is important not to confuse speed with haste in political The options are not mutually exclusive—there is great processes: too hasty approaches can precipitate the oppo- worldwide demand for more inclusive and responsive gover- site effect from the one we seek to support. The interna- nance, and elections can be a crucial means to provide this. But tional community’s high hopes for Iraq’s 2005 experiment in their timing requires careful attention. Democratic traditions proportional electoral democracy produced a contest for have developed in most countries over a considerable period. power which increased rather than allayed sectarian vio- Democratization efforts today, similarly, require attention to lence and the constitution hastily produced later is proving historical heritages and existing political cleavages, and must difficult to implement. Similarly, the 2009 election in Af- be seen as an ongoing process of social transformation and the ghanistan proved to challenge rather than bolster perceptions development of a broad range of institutions that provide of institutional legitimacy in the immediate aftermath. checks and balances rather than an identifiable “event.” Democ- ratization does not start or end with elections. Addressing external stresses and already be present and the institutions to re- mobilizing international support spond to them are generally weak. If they are not addressed, or if they increase, they can de- External stresses, such as the infiltration of rail efforts at violence prevention and recov- organized crime and trafficking networks, ery. Far more so than in stable development spillovers from neighboring conflicts, and environments, addressing external stresses economic shocks, are important factors in therefore needs to be a core part of national increasing the risk of violence. In fragile situ- strategies and international supporting ef- ations, many of these external pressures will forts for violence prevention and recovery. 16 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 International assistance needs also differ citizen security, justice, and jobs. The Report in fragile situations. The requirement to gen- first presents the basic tools and then looks at erate rapid confidence-building results puts how to differentiate strategies and program- a particular premium on speed. The focus ming to different country circumstances, us- on building collaborative, inclusive-enough ing country-specific assessments of risks and coalitions and on citizen security, justice, opportunities. and jobs draws together a wider range of international capacities that need to work Political and policy signals to build in concert—for example, for mediation, hu- collaborative, inclusive-enough man rights, and security assistance, as well as coalitions humanitarian and development aid. Where the political situation is fragile and the capac- There is a surprising commonality across ity of local systems to ensure accountability countries in the signals that most frequently is weak, international incentives—such as build confidence and collaborative coali- recognition and sanction mechanisms—also tions (see Feature 4). They can include im- play a significant role. Take one of the smaller mediate actions in credible national or local West African countries that have recently appointments, in transparency, and in some had coups d’état. Local mechanisms to re- cases, the removal of factors seen as nega- solve the situation peacefully are limited, and tive, such as discriminatory laws. Security African Union (AU) and Economic Com- forces can be redeployed as a positive signal munity of West African States (ECOWAS) of attention to insecure areas, but also as a pressure to return to a constitutional path is sign that the government recognizes where critical. So regional and global recognition particular units have a record of distrust or for responsible leadership can play a role in abuse with communities and replaces them. strengthening incentives and accountability Measures to improve transparency of infor- systems at a national level. mation and decision-making processes can be important in building confidence, as well as laying the basis for sustained institutional Practical policy and program tools transformation. for country actors Signals can also be announcements of fu- ture actions—the selection of two or three The WDR lays out a different way of thinking key early results; the focus of military and about approaches to violence prevention and police planning on citizen security goals; recovery in fragile situations. It does not aim or setting approaches and timelines toward to be a “cookbook” that prescribes recipes— political reform, decentralization, or tran- each country’s political context differs, and sitional justice. Ensuring that political and there are no one-size-fits-all solutions. While policy signals are realistic in scope and tim- the choice of confidence-building measures ing and can be delivered is important in and institution-building approaches needs managing expectations—by anchoring them to be adapted to each country, a set of basic in national planning and budget processes tools emerging from experience can be the and discussing any external support needed basis for that adaptation. These core tools in advance with international partners. include the options for signals and com- When signals relate to future action, their mitment mechanisms to build collabora- credibility will be increased by commitment tive coalitions, demonstrating a break from mechanisms that persuade stakeholders that the past and building confidence in positive they will actually be implemented and not outcomes. They also include a description of reversed. Examples are Colombia’s and Indo- the programs that can deliver quick results nesia’s independent, multisectoral executing and longer-term institutional provision of agencies and third-party monitors, such as Overview 17 Feature 4 Core Tools RESTORING CONFIDENCE CITIZEN Signals: Future Signals: Commitment Supporting SECURITY, JUSTICE, policy and priorities Immediate actions mechanisms actions AND JOBS • Citizen security goals • Participatory processes • Independence of • Risk and priority EXTERNAL STRESS • Key principles and • Local security, justice, executing agencies assessments RE S realistic timelines for and development results • Independent third-party • Communicating costs TO R political reform, • Credible appointments monitoring of inaction ING TRANSFORMING CON decentralization, • Transparency in • Dual-key national- • Simple plans and FID RE S corruption, transi- expenditures international systems progress measures on TO ENCE RING TRANSFORMING tional justice • Redeployment of • International execution 2–3 early results CON RE IN FID S • Mix of state, commu- of one or more key TO security forces • Strategic ST E NCE R TU I NG TRANSFORMING I TI CON ON nity, NGO, and interna- functions communication FID S • Removal of discrimina- IN E NC E ST IT UT IO IN NS tional capacity tory policies ST TU I TI ON S VIOLENCE and EXTERNAL SUPPORT FRAGILITY AND INCENTIVES TRANSFORMING INSTITUTIONS Citizen security Justice Jobs and associated services Foundational reforms and ”best-fit” approaches CITIZEN SECURITY, Security sector reform: Justice sector reform: Multisectoral community empowerment JUSTICE, AND JOBS • Designed to deliver citizen independence and link to programs: combining citizen security, employ- EXTERNAL security benefits security reforms; strengthening ment, justice, education, and infrastructure STRESS • Capacity increases linked basic caseload processing; Employment programs: regulatory simplification to repeated realistic extending justice services, and infrastructure recovery for private-sector job performance outcomes drawing on traditional/ TRANSFORMING creation, long-term public programs, asset and justice functions community mechanisms expansion, value chain programs, informal sec- • Dismantling criminal Phasing anti-corruption tor support, labor migration, women’s economic TRANSFORMING networks through civilian measures: demonstrate empowerment, and asset expansion IN ST TU TRANSFORMING oversight, vetting and I TI ON S national resources can be Humanitarian delivery and social protection: IN budget expenditure ST IT UT IO used for public good before IN NS with planned transition from international ST TU I TI ON S transparency dismantling rent systems; VIOLENCE and FRAGILITY EXTERNAL SUPPORT • Use of low-capital systems provision AND INCENTIVES control capture of rents and for rural and community use social accountability Macroeconomic policy: focus on consumer price policing mechanisms volatility and employment Gradual, systematic programs • Phased capacity and • Political and electoral reform • Structural economic reforms such as accountability in special- • Decentralization privatization ized security functions • Transitional justice • Education and health reforms • Comprehensive anti- • Inclusion of marginalized groups corruption reforms CITIZEN SECURITY, JUSTICE, NATIONAL ACTION TO ADDRESS EXTERNAL STRESS AND JOBS EXTERNAL Citizen security Justice Jobs and associated services STRESS • Border cooperation • Coordinate supply and • Pooled supplementary administrative capacity • Military, police, and finan- demand-side responses • Cross-border development programming cial intelligence • Joint investigations and pros- ecutions across jurisdictions • Building links between formal/informal systems VIOLENCE and FRAGILITY EXTERNAL SUPPORT AND INCENTIVES FEASIBLE RESULTS INDICATORS TO DEMONSTRATE OVERALL PROGRESS Citizen security Justice Jobs and associated services Short • Violent deaths • Perception surveys by groups (eth- • Perceptions of whether term • Perception survey nic, geographical, religious, class) on employment data on increases/ whether their welfare is increasing opportunities are increasing decreases in security over time and in relation to others • Price surveys (for real income • Perception survey on trust in national implications) institutions and on corruption Longer • Victim surveys • Governance indicators refocused on • Household data on term outcomes and degree of progress employment and labor force within historically realistic timeframes participation • Household survey data on vertical and horizontal inequalities and access to justice services 18 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 the joint ASEAN-EU (Association of South- National program design to restore east Asian Nations–European Union) Aceh confidence and transform institutions monitoring mission.60 Sole or “dual-key” au- thority over one or more functions involving The core program tools that emerge from international agencies—as with the jointly different country experiences are deliber- run Governance and Economic Manage- ately kept small in number to reflect country ment Program in Liberia,61 the International lessons on focus and priorities. They are all Commission Against Impunity (CICIG) designed to be delivered at scale, in large na- in Guatemala,62 or when UN peacekeeping tional or subnational programs rather than missions have executive responsibility for small projects. They include multisectoral policing—is also a commitment mechanism programs linking community structures with when institutional capacity and accountabil- the state; security sector reform; justice re- ity are low. form; national employment policy and pro- Strong strategic communication on these grams; associated services that support citi- signals of change are always important— zen security, justice, and job creation, such as actions and policy changes cannot influence electricity and social protection; and phased behaviors unless people know they have approaches to corruption. They also include taken place and how they fit into a broader programs that can be crucial for sustained vision. Where the risks of crisis escalation are violence prevention: political reform, decen- not fully recognized by all national leaders, tralization, transitional justice, and education providing an accurate and compelling mes- reform where systematic attention is needed sage on the consequences of inaction can once early reforms in citizen security, justice, help galvanize momentum for progress. Eco- and jobs have started to make progress. nomic and social analyses can support this The top five lessons of what works in pro- narrative—by showing how rising violence gram design are: and failing institutions are causing national • Programs that support bottom-up state- or subnational areas to lag far behind their society relations in insecure areas. These neighbors in development progress; or by include community-based programs for showing how other countries that have failed violence prevention, employment, and as- to address rising threats have faced severe and sociated service delivery, and access to local long-lasting development consequences. The justice and dispute resolution. Examples WDR analysis provides some clear messages: are community policing in a wide range of • No country or region can afford to ignore higher-, middle-, and lower-income coun- areas where repeated cycles of violence tries, the Afghanistan National Solidarity flourish and citizens are disengaged from Program, and Latin American multisec- the state. toral violence prevention programs.63 • Unemployment, corruption, and exclu- • Complementary programs for institu- sion increase the risks of violence—and tional transformation in the priority ar- legitimate institutions and governance that eas of security and justice. Early reform give everyone a stake in national prosper- programs should focus on simple basic ity are the immune system that protects functions (such as criminal caseload pro- from different types of violence. cessing, adequate basic investigation, and arrest procedures); include civilian over- • Citizen security is a preeminent goal in sight, vetting, and budget and expenditure fragile situations, underpinned by justice transparency to dismantle covert or crimi- and jobs. nal networks; and link the pace of reform • Leaders need to seize opportunities before between the police and civilian justice sys- violence escalates or recurs. tems to avoid situations where increasing Overview 19 police capacity results in prolonged deten- reduction of impunity through vetting or tions or the release of offenders back into prosecutions. What is crucial here is that early the community without due process. results generate improvements in the morale of national institutions and set the right in- • “Back to basics” job creation pro- centives for later institution-building. grams. These programs include large-scale For example, if security forces are set community-based public works, such as targets based on the number of rebel com- those India and Indonesia use throughout batants killed or captured or criminals ar- the country, including in marginalized and rested, they may rely primarily on coercive violence-affected communities; private- approaches, with no incentive to build the sector regulatory simplification and ad- longer-term trust with communities that dressing of infrastructure bottlenecks (in will prevent violence from recurring. Targets particular, electricity, which is the number based on citizen security (freedom of move- one constraint for businesses in fragile and ment and so on), in contrast, create longer- violent areas); and access to finance and term incentives for the role of the security investments to bring producers and mar- forces in underpinning national unity and kets together, as in Kosovo’s and Rwanda’s effective state-society relations. Similarly, if coffee, dairy, and tourism initiatives.64 services and public works are delivered only • The involvement of women in security, through top-down national programs, there justice, and economic empowerment pro- will be few incentives for communities to take grams, such as the Nicaragua, Liberia, and responsibility for violence prevention or for Sierra Leone reforms to introduce female national institutions to undertake responsi- staffing and gender-specific service in the bility to protect all vulnerable citizens, men police force; and economic empowerment and women. A mixture of state and nonstate, initiatives in Nepal, which addressed issues bottom-up and top-down approaches is a of gender roles that had previously been better underpinning for longer-term institu- divisive in insecure areas through the pro- tional transformation. vision of finance and business training to Phasing transitions from humanitarian women’s groups.65 aid is also an important part of transform- ing institutions. In countries where current • Focused anticorruption initiatives that stresses overwhelm national institutional ca- demonstrate that new initiatives can be pacity by a large margin, national reformers well governed. Tools have included the often draw on international humanitarian use of private-sector capacity to monitor capacity to deliver early results. These pro- functions vulnerable to grand corruption, grams can be effective in saving lives, building as with Liberia’s forestry inspection and confidence, and extending national capacity. Mozambique’s customs collection, com- But a difficult trade-off occurs in deciding bined with social accountability mecha- on the time needed to shift these functions nisms that use transparent publication of to national institutions. For food programs, expenditure and community/civil-society this generally means phasing down deliver- monitoring to ensure funds reach their ies before local harvests and moving from intended targets.66 general distribution to targeted programs, Some of the early confidence-building re- in coordination with government social pro- sults that can be targeted through these pro- tection agencies where possible. For health, grams include freedom of movement along education, water, and sanitation, it means transit routes, electricity coverage, number of reducing international roles step-by-step businesses registered and employment days over time as the capacity of national or local created, processing of judicial caseloads, and institutions increases—as in the transition 20 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 from international to national health pro- in the headquarters of multilateral agencies vision in Timor-Leste, which moved from and donor countries. Actions on these issues international execution to government con- are discussed in Part 3 under Directions for tracting of international NGOs and then to International Policy. National leaders and government management.67 their partners on the ground cannot individ- ually determine these broader changes to the international system, but they can maximize Regional and cross-border initiatives the benefits of existing support. Societies do not have the luxury of trans- It helps when national leaders and their forming their institutions in isolation—they international partners in the field lay out need at the same time to manage external clear program priorities across the security, pressures, whether from economic shocks justice, and development domains. Country or trafficking and international corruption. experiences indicate that efforts need to fo- Many of these issues are beyond the control cus on only two or three rapid results to build of each nation-state to address, and the last confidence, and on narrowly and realistically section of the Report considers international defined institution-building. Priorities are policy to diminish external stresses. National better laid out in a very limited number of leaders may play a significant role in galva- clear programs—such as community-based nizing broad regional or global cooperation interventions in insecure areas, security and on issues such as trafficking, as well as bilat- freedom of movement on key roads—as in eral cooperation. Possible initiatives include: Liberia69 after the civil war and in Colom- • Openness to discuss both security and de- bia70 in the face of criminal violence in 2002. velopment cooperation across insecure Using the national budget process to decide border regions, based on shared goals of on priority programs coordinates messages citizen security, justice, and jobs rather and develops cooperation in implementa- than purely on military operations. Cross- tion between the security and development border development programming could ministries. simply involve special arrangements to National leaders can also produce bet- share lessons. But it could also move to- ter results from external assistance by being ward formal joint arrangements to design alert to the needs of international partners and monitor development programs in to show results and manage risks. Interna- insecure border areas and move toward tional partners have their own domestic specific provisions to help insecure land- pressures—to demonstrate that assistance is locked areas gain access to markets. not misused and to attribute results to their endeavors. A frank exchange on risks and re- • Joint processes to investigate and prose- sults helps to find ways to bridge differences. cute incidents of corruption that can fuel In Indonesia in the aftermath of the Tsunami violence, as Haiti and Nigeria have done and Aceh peace agreement, for example, the (with the United States and the United government agreed with donors that incom- Kingdom) to combat corruption and ing assistance would be “jointly branded” by money-laundering.68 These can build ca- the Indonesian Reconstruction Agency and pacity in weaker jurisdictions and deliver donors, with special transparency measures results that could not be achieved by one in place to enable both sides to show visible jurisdiction alone. results and manage risks while bolstering the legitimacy of state-society relations in the aftermath of crisis. A “double compact” Mobilizing international support between governments and their citizens and Some constraints in international support between states and their international part- come from policies and systems established ners, first proposed by Ashraf Ghani and Overview 21 Clare Lockhart, is another way of managing income, fragile countries. Direct measure- different perspectives on risk, the speed of ment of security improvements can also show response, and long-term engagement with rapid progress, but while data on violent national institutions—by making dual ac- deaths are fairly easy to collect, they are not countability of donor funds explicit.71 available for the countries that would benefit most from them: low-income, fragile states. Employment data needs to be upgraded. Monitoring results To evaluate the success of programs and Differentiating strategy and programs adapt them when problems arise, national to country context reformers and their international partners in country also need information on overall re- While there is a basic set of tools emerging sults in reducing violence, and on citizen con- from experience, each country needs to assess fidence in security, justice, and employment its circumstances and adapt lessons from oth- goals at regular intervals. For most develop- ers to the local political context. Each country ing countries, the MDGs and their associ- faces different stresses, different institutional ated targets and indicators are the dominant challenges, different stakeholders who need international framework. The MDGs have to be involved to make a difference, and dif- raised the profile of broad-based human de- ferent types of transition opportunities. The velopment and remain important long-term differences are not black and white but occur goals for countries facing fragility and vio- across a spectrum—each country will have lence. But they have drawbacks in their direct different manifestations of violence, different relevance to progress in violence prevention combinations of internal or external stresses, and recovery. They do not cover citizen secu- and different institutional challenges—and rity and justice. They move slowly, so they do these factors will change over time. But all not provide national reformers or their inter- countries face some aspects of this mix. The national partners with rapid feedback loops Report covers some of the most important that can demonstrate areas of progress and differences in country circumstances through identify new or remaining risks. the simple differentiation shown below. A useful supplement to the MDGs would National reformers and their country be indicators that more directly measure counterparts need to take two types of deci- violence reduction, confidence-building and sions in each phase of confidence-building citizen security and justice (Feature 4). Citi- and institutional reform, taking into account zen polling data, glaringly absent in many the local political context. First is to decide fragile and conflict-affected countries, could the types of signals—both immediate actions help fill this role.72 Middle- and higher- and announcements on early results and income countries use polling all the time longer-term policies—that can help build to provide governments with feedback on “inclusive-enough” collaborative coalitions progress and risks, but it is little used in low- for change. Second is to decide on the design Spectra of situation-specific challenges and opportunities Types of violence: Civil and/or criminal and/or cross-border and/or sub-national and/or ideological Transition opportunity: Gradual/limited to Key stakeholders: Internal versus external immediate/major space for change stakeholders; state versus nonstate stakeholders; low-income versus middle-high income stakeholders Key stresses: Internal versus external stresses; Institutional challenges: Degree of capacity, high versus low level of divisions among groups accountability, and inclusion 22 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 of priority programs to launch for institu- tutional deficits that permit repeated cycles tional transformation. of violence—and that successful approaches In differentiating political and policy sig- to address political, communal, and crimi- nals, the type of stresses faced and the stake- nal violence have much in common. But the holders whose support is most needed for mix of different types of violence does affect effective action make a difference. Where strategy. Inequality among ethnic, religious, ethnic, geographical, or religious divides have or geographical groups is important as a been associated with conflict, and the coop- risk for civil conflict—employment programs eration of these groups is critical to progress, and services would thus target equity and the credibility of appointments may rest on bridging opportunities among these groups. whether individuals command respect across But for organized criminal violence, inequal- group divides. Where corruption has been a ity between rich and poor matters more (ir- severe stress, the credibility of key appoint- respective of ethnic or religious identities). ments may rest on individuals’ reputation for Violence with strong international links— integrity. organized crime, international recruitment The type of transition moment also makes into ideological movements—requires great- a difference. At the end of the wars in Japan er international cooperation. and the Republic of Korea, the birth of the Country circumstances also make a differ- new nation of Timor-Leste, Liberia’s first ence for program design, requiring the “best post-war election, military victory in Nica- fit” to local political conditions. For exam- ragua, and in the aftermath of the Rwandan ple, multisectoral community approaches genocide, there was greater space for rapid can be effective in contexts as different as announcements of long-term political, so- Côte d’Ivoire, Guatemala, and Northern cial, and institutional change than exists to- Ireland—but more care would be needed in day for the coalition government in Kenya or Côte d’Ivoire and Northern Ireland to ensure other situations of negotiated reform. that these approaches were not seen as tar- Institutional capacity, accountability, and geted to one ethnic or religious group but, in- trust among groups also affect the choices and stead, as building bonds among groups. Both timetable of early policy announcements. In Colombia and Haiti are considering reform countries with institutions that are strong but in the justice sector, but accountability and have been viewed as illegitimate because they capacity problems are a bigger challenge in are exclusive, abusive, or unaccountable (as in Haiti, and reforms would have to be designed some transitions from authoritarian rule), ac- accordingly.75 For middle-income countries tion on transparency, participation, and jus- with strong institutions facing challenges of tice may be more important for short-term exclusion and accountability, lessons on pro- confidence-building than delivering goods gram design, successes, and missed oppor- and services. Where social cohesion is fac- tunities will come primarily from countries tionalized, time may be needed to build trust that have faced similar circumstances, such as between groups before wider reform is at- the democratic transitions in Latin America, tempted. In South Africa, for example, leaders Indonesia, Eastern Europe, or South Africa. wisely allowed time for constitutional reform So national reformers and their international and the development of trust between groups partners need to think through the political before the first post-Apartheid election.73 And economy for interventions and adapt pro- in Northern Ireland the devolution of secu- gram design to that context (Feature 5). rity and justice functions were delayed until Each country needs its own assessment trust and accountability increased.74 of risks and priorities to design the best-fit A core message is that the particular strategy and programs for its political con- manifestation of violence at any one time text. International assessment tools, such as is less important than the underlying insti- post-conflict/post-crisis needs assessments, Overview 23 can identify the risks and priorities. These as- they are held back by structures, tools, and sessments could be strengthened by: processes designed for different contexts and purposes. Specifically, while processes exist • Adapting assessments regularly and fre- to provide the kind of post-war assistance quently at different transition moments, typical of 20th century paradigms, there including when risks are increasing, not is little attention to helping countries that only after a crisis. struggle with prevention of repeated cycles • Identifying the specific characteristics of of political and criminal violence (Feature 6, transition opportunities, stresses, institu- figure 6.1) and with the challenges involved tional challenges, stakeholders, and the in transforming institutions to provide citi- institutions that provide citizen security, zen security, justice, and jobs. Internal inter- justice, and jobs. national agency processes are too slow, too fragmented, too reliant on parallel systems, • Identifying priorities from a citizen and and too quick to exit, and there are significant stakeholder perspective through focus divisions among international actors. groups or polling surveys, as South Africa The range of preventive tools in the inter- did in developing its reconstruction priori- national system has improved, with increases ties or as Pakistan did in assessing the in global and regional mediation capacity78 sources of violence in the border regions.76 and in programs that support both local • Considering explicitly the history of past and national collaborative efforts to mediate efforts, as Colombia did in reviewing the violence. Examples include the Ghana peace strengths and weaknesses of previous ef- committees supported by the UN Devel- forts to address violence in the early opment Programme (UNDP) and the UN 2000s.77 Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA)79 and the Inter-American Development Bank • Being more realistic about the num- (IADB) community projects for citizen se- ber of priorities identified and the time- curity. Such programs do often support ac- lines, as with the changes recommended tivities relating to citizen security, justice, and to the joint United Nations–World jobs, but they are not in the mainstream of Bank–European Union post-crisis needs diplomatic, security, or development think- assessment. ing. UN, regional, and NGO-sponsored me- diation has played a significant role in a range of cases—from AU-UN-ECOWAS mediation PART 3: REDUCING THE in West Africa to UN facilitation of Afghani- RISKS OF VIOLENCE— stan’s Bonn Agreement to nongovernmental DIRECTIONS FOR efforts such as the Centre for Humanitarian INTERNATIONAL POLICY Dialogue and the Crisis Management Initia- tive in Aceh.80 International action has delivered great ben- But these programs are still not delivered efits in improved security and prosperity. to scale. It is much harder for countries to get It is difficult to imagine how committed international assistance to support develop- leaders in post–World War II Europe, In- ment of their police forces and judiciaries donesia, the Republic of Korea, Liberia, than their militaries. International economic Mozambique, Northern Ireland, or Timor- development assistance is easier to obtain for Leste would have stabilized their countries macroeconomic policy, health, or education or regions without help from abroad. Many capacities than for job creation. UN police individuals working on fragile and conflict- capacity, doctrinal development, and training affected states are dedicated professionals have increased, but are not fully linked to jus- attempting to support national efforts. But tice capacities. While some bilateral agencies 24 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 FEATURE 5 Adapting community-level program design to country context Countries: Afghanistan, Burundi, Cambodia, • In Burundi, a lack of progress in overall decentralization and Colombia, Indonesia, Nepal, Rwanda difficulties in monitoring funds through community struc- tures meant responsibility for managing the funds remained T he basic elements of a post-conflict community develop- ment program are simple and can be adapted to a broad range of country contexts. All community programs under with NGO partners. • In Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program, NGOs also took on the initial responsibility for managing the funds state auspices consist, essentially, of a community decision- while councils were trained in bookkeeping, but within making mechanisms to determine priorities and the provision a year block grants were being transferred directly to the of funds and technical help to implement them. Within this councils. model is a great deal of variance that can be adapted to dif- ferent types of stresses and institutional capacities as well as • In Colombia, where the primary institutional challenges to different opportunities for transition. Three important were to bring the state closer to communities and overcome sources of variance are in how community decision-making is distrust between security and civilian government agencies, done, who controls the funds, and where programs reside funds are held by individual government ministries but ap- within the government. provals for activities are made by multisectoral teams in field Different stresses and institutional capacity and account- offices. ability affect community decision-making. In many violent • In Nepal, community programs show the full range: some areas, preexisting community councils either have been de- programs give primary responsibility for fund oversight to stroyed or were already discredited. A critical first step is partner NGOs; in other programs, such as the country’s to reestablish credible participatory forms of representation. large-scale village school program, community school com- In Burundi, for example, a local NGO organized elections for mittees are the legal owners of school facilities and can use representative community development committees in the government funds to hire and train their staff. participating communes that cut across ethnic divides. Simi- larly, Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program began with The type of transition moment affects how community village-wide elections for a community development coun- decision-making structures align with the formal government cil. But Indonesia’s programs for the conflict-affected areas administration. Many countries emerging from conflict will of Aceh, Maluku, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan did not hold new also undergo major constitutional and administrative reforms community elections. Community councils were largely in- just as the early response community programs are being tact, and national laws already provided for local, democratic, launched. Aligning community councils with the emergent village elections. Indonesia also experimented with separat- structures of government can be difficult. In Afghanistan’s ing grants to Muslim and Christian villages to minimize in- National Solidarity Program, for example, the Community tercommunal tensions, but eventually used common funds Development Councils, though constituted under a 2007 vice- and councils to bridge divides between these communities. presidential bylaw, are still under review for formal integra- Different institutional challenges also affect who holds the tion into the national administrative structure. In Cambodia’s funds. Programs must weigh the trade-offs between a first Seila Program, councils were launched under United Nations objective of building trust with the risks of money going miss- Development Programme (UNDP) auspices and then moved ing or the elite capture of resources, as shown in the following into the government’s newly formed commune structure. In examples: Rwanda, greater space for change after the genocide meant the councils could be integrated into the government’s decentral- • In Indonesia, where local capacity was fairly strong, subdis- ization plans from the start. trict councils established financial management units that are routinely audited but have full responsibility for all as- Source: Guggenheim 2011. pects of financial performance. Overview 25 provide specialized assistance for security and Commission survey of assistance to Cambo- justice reform, their capacities are relatively dia, more than 35 percent of all projects were new and underdeveloped in comparison with less than one year in duration, and 66 percent other areas. International financial institu- were less than three years. Despite the need tions and bilateral economic assistance tends for more consistent and sustained assistance, to focus primarily on growth rather than em- aid to fragile states is much more volatile ployment. Citizen security and justice are not than that to nonfragile states—indeed, more mentioned in the MDGs. than twice as volatile, with an estimated loss The programs described above all require in efficiency of 2.5 percent of GDP for recipi- linked action by diplomatic, security, and ent states (Feature 6, figures F6.2 and F6.3).85 development—and sometimes humanitar- Regional and global action on exter- ian—actors. Yet these actors generally assess nal stresses is a key part of risk reduction, priorities and develop their programs sepa- but assistance is still focused primarily at rately, with efforts to help national reformers the individual country level. Some innova- build unified programs the exception rather tive processes against trafficking combine than the rule. UN “integrated missions” and demand-side and supply-side incentives and various bilateral and regional “whole-of- the efforts of multiple stakeholders in de- government” and “whole-of-systems” initia- veloped and developing countries86—one is tives have emerged to address the challenge the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme of merging development, diplomatic, and to stem the sale of conflict diamonds.87 Yet a security strategies and operations.81 But dif- general principle of co-responsibility, com- ferent disciplines bring with them different bining demand-side and supply-side actions goals, planning timeframes, decision-making and cooperation between developed and de- processes, funding streams and types of risk veloping regions, is lacking. Existing efforts calculus.82 suffer from weakness and fragmentation Assistance is often slow to arrive despite in the financial systems used to “follow the efforts of the UN, the international finan- money” flowing from corrupt transactions. cial institutions, and bilateral donors to es- And they are constrained by a multiplica- tablish quick-disbursing and rapid deploy- tion of weak and overlapping multicoun- ment facilities. Aid is fragmented into small try endeavors rather than strong and well- projects, making it difficult for governments resourced regional approaches. Despite some to concentrate efforts on a few key results. exceptions—the Asian Development Bank In 11 fragile countries the Organisation and European Union long-standing regional for Economic Co-operation and Develop- programs, the UN Department of Political ment (OECD) surveyed in 2004, there was Affairs regional offices, and recent increases an average of 38 activities per donor, with in regional lending by the World Bank— each project an average size of just US$1.1 most development donors focus primarily million—too small for the most part to have on national rather than regional support. an impact on the challenges of institutional The international landscape is becoming transformation.83 Aid donors often operate more complex. The end of the Cold War had in fragile countries through systems parallel the potential to usher in a new age of consen- to national institutions—with separate proj- sus in international support to violence and ect units for development aid and with hu- conflict-affected areas. In fact, the last decade manitarian programs implemented through has seen an increase in complexity and con- international NGOs. Despite progress in ex- tinued coordination problems. The political, tending the time horizons of peacekeeping security, humanitarian, and development ac- missions and some types of donor assistance, tors present in each country situation have the system is constrained by a short-term fo- become more numerous. Legal agreements cus on post-conflict opportunities and high that set standards for responsible national volatility in assistance.84 In a recent European leadership have become more complicated 26 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 over time: the 1948 UN Convention Against corruption, and a lack of results in donor Genocide has 17 operative paragraphs; the programs. International actors need to be 2003 Convention Against Corruption has accountable to their citizens and taxpayers as 455. Within OECD countries, there are di- well as to partner country needs, and these vided views over the relative role of security expectations can be at odds (figure 3.1). and development assistance and over aid The slow progress in changing donor be- through national institutions. The increase havior comes from these underlying incen- in assistance from middle-income countries, tives. For example, undertaking small proj- with a history of solidarity support, not only ects through parallel systems, focusing on the brings valuable new energy, resources, and “form rather than function” of change (with ideas, but also new challenges in the differ- an emphasis on elections, model procurement ing views of international partners. WDR laws, and anti-corruption and human rights consultations frequently revealed divided commissions), and avoiding engagements in views among national actors, regional bod- riskier institution-building—all help donors ies, middle-income countries, and OECD to manage domestic expectations of results donors over what is realistic to expect from and criticism of failure. In today’s tight fiscal national leadership in improving governance, environment for many donors, the dilemma over what time period, and over the “forms” is becoming more prominent, not less. Do- versus the “functions” of good governance mestic pressures also contribute to divisions (elections versus broader democratic prac- among donors, since some donors face far tices and processes; minimizing corruption in more domestic pressure than others on cor- practice versus establishing procurement laws ruption, gender equity, or the need to show and anticorruption commissions). economic benefits at home from aid overseas. Dual accountability is at the heart of in- Accountability to taxpayers is a desirable facet ternational behavior. International actors of donor aid—but the challenge is to make know that faster, smarter, longer-term en- domestic expectations fit with the needs and gagement through national and regional realities of assistance on the ground. institutions is needed to help societies exit Multilateral responses are also constrained fragility. But as highlighted by the OECD by historical arrangements suited to more International Network on Conflict and Fra- stable environments. For example, the inter- gility,88 they are also acutely sensitive to the national financial institutions’ procurement risks of domestic criticism of waste, abuse, procedures were based on the assumption of FIGURE 3.1 The dual accountability dilemma for donors engaged in fragile and conflict environments Accountability National International actors actors Accountability Accountability Accountability Different perspectives of risks and results Domestic constituencies Domestic constituencies and governing boards Source: WDR team. Overview 27 FEATURE 6 Patterns of international assistance to violence-affected countries F I G U R E F 6.1 Uneven international support in West Africa—Post-conflict trumps prevention A one-off concept of progress and the difficulties of prevention have led to an excessive focus on post-conflict transitions. The amount of aid and peacekeeping assistance going to countries after civil war has ended greatly exceeds what is provided to countries struggling to prevent an escalation of conflict. 450 Total aid and peacekeeping expenditure 400 350 per capita (current US$) 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Liberia Sierra Leone Guinea Guinea-Bissau Togo T Global (highlighted (highlighted (highlighted (highlighted (highlighted average for period 2004 period 2000 period 2008) period 2002 period 2005 low-income to 2008) to 2003) to 2005) to 2008) countries West Africa, selected countries (2000 to 2008) Source: WDR team calculations based on OECD 2010d. F I G U R E F 6.2 Aid volatility increases with duration of FIGURE F6.3 Stop-go aid: Volatility in selected fragile violence states Over the last 20 years, countries that experienced longer periods of The four countries below provide an illustration. It was not uncommon fragility, violence, or conflict experienced more volatility in their aid. for total aid to Burundi, the Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Figure 6.2 shows that the coefficient of variance of net official develop- and Haiti to drop by 20 or 30 percent in one year and increase by up to ment assistance (ODA), excluding debt relief, is higher for countries that 50 percent the following year (humanitarian aid and debt relief, have experienced prolonged violence since 1990. This relationship, excluded from these statistics, would further increase the volatility). reflected by the upward trend line, is statistically significant and sug- gests that, on average, a country that experienced 20 years of violence 150 Annual % change in aid per capita experienced twice the volatility in aid of a country that did not experi- ence violence. Volatility of revenues has considerable costs for all 100 governments, but particularly so in fragile situations where it may derail reform efforts and disrupt institution-building. 50 1.4 0 Coefficient of variance of net ODA, 1.2 –50 excluding debt relief 1 0.8 –100 0.6 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 Burundi Central African Republic 0.4 Guinea-Bissau Haiti 0.2 Source: WDR team calculations based on OECD 2010d. 0 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 Number of years of high homicides, conflict, and fragility Low-income countries Linear (Low-income countries) Source: WDR team calculations based on OECD 2010d. 28 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 ongoing security, a reasonable level of state criminal violence require “outside the box” institutional capacity, and competitive mar- thinking, outside the traditional development kets. They thus have difficulty adapting to paradigm. Issues of citizen security and of situations where security conditions change grievances over justice and jobs are not pe- between the design and tendering of a proj- ripheral to “mainstream” development. They ect, where a small number of qualified gov- are in varying forms a problem for larger and ernment counterparts struggle to manage more prosperous countries facing subnational complex procurement documentation, and urban or rural violence, for countries emerg- where the number of qualified contractors ing from conflict and fragility that need to pre- prepared to compete and mobilize is very lim- vent recurrence, and for areas facing new or ited. Similarly, the UN Secretariat originally resurgent threats of social protest and instabil- developed procurement systems designed for ity. Strengthening the institutions that provide its function as a headquarters-based advisory citizen security, justice, and jobs is crucial to service and secretariat to the General Assem- prevention of violence and instability—such bly. But when peacekeeping operations were action is not a “magic bullet” that can prevent launched, these systems were extended with every episode of violence with certainty, but it relatively little adaptation, despite the differ- is crucial to changing the probabilities of vio- ence in contexts and objectives. lence, and to continuous risk reduction. To achieve real change in approaches that A key lesson of successful violence pre- can restore confidence and prevent risks from vention and recovery is that security, justice, recurring, international actors could con- and economic stresses are linked: approaches sider four tracks to improve global responses that try to solve them through military-only, for security and development as follows: justice-only, or development-only solutions will falter. A specialized suite of programs • Track 1: Provide more, and more inte- is needed in fragile environments, combin- grated, specialized assistance for citizen ing elements of security, justice, and eco- security, justice, and jobs—targeting pre- nomic transformation. But because these vention in both immediate post-conflict areas are covered by different international and rising risk situations. agencies, both bilaterally and multilaterally, • Track 2: Reform internal agency systems combined action under one overall pro- to provide rapid action to restore confi- gram framework is rare. A specialized suite dence and promote long-term institution- of combined security-justice-development building, in support of national efforts. programs needs to aim at a catalytic effect, supporting national collaborative efforts to • Track 3: Act regionally and globally on address these challenges. Changes in inter- external stresses. national agency approaches to support such • Track 4: Marshal support from lower-, programs would include (figure 3.2). middle-, and higher-income countries, • Moving from sporadic early warning to and global and regional institutions, to re- continued risk assessment wherever weak flect the changing landscape of interna- institutional legitimacy, and internal or tional policy and assistance. external stresses indicate a need for atten- tion to prevention and to capacities for peaceful reform processes. Track 1: Providing specialized assistance for prevention through • Simplifying current assessment and plan- citizen security, justice, and jobs ning mechanisms to provide countries with one process supporting national Security-development linkages apply in all planning that covers the political, justice, areas struggling to prevent large-scale po- security, humanitarian, and developmen- litical or criminal violence. Both political and tal areas. Overview 29 F I G U R E 3.2 Combined action across the security, development, and humanitarian spheres for external actors to support national institutional transformations CITIZEN SECURITY, JUSTICE, AND JOBS EXTERNAL STRESS RE S TO RIN G TRANSFORMING CON FID RE S TO ENC E RI NG TRANSFORMING CON RE FI D IN S TO IT ST E NCE RIN G TRANSFOR MING UT IO CON NS A NEW WAY OF DOING BUSINESS FI D IN ST E NC E TU I TI ON Moving from early warning to continuous IN S ST TU I TI ON S risk assessment VIOLENCE and FRAGILITY On budget support and technical assistance EXTERNAL SUPPORT AND INCENTIVES for citizen security and justice in joint teams Financing in support of collaborative, mediated agreements Unified planning processes diplomatic development State-community, state-NGO, state-private sector programs for service delivery and multi-sectoral security humanitarian violence prevention Humanitarian support for state protection systems Source: WDR team. • Shifting from the rhetoric of coordination local dispute resolution and justice to supporting combined programs for se- services, community policing, em- curity, justice, and local jobs and associated ployment and training, safe public and services, each within their respective man- trading spaces, and social and cultural dates and expertise. Two priorities for programs that promote tolerance. combined programs are— • Establishing facilities for mediators and ➢ Technical assistance and financing special envoys (internal and international) for security and justice reforms sup- to draw on greater seconded expertise ported by combined teams. Develop- from international agencies, both to in- ment agencies, for example, can sup- form transition arrangements and to gal- port measures to address budget and vanize resources for integrated activities expenditure processes in security and identified collaboratively by the different justice functions, while partners with parties to a conflict situation. This should security and justice expertise can con- include specific efforts to support the tribute to technical capacity-building, growing role of regional and subregional as was done in Timor-Leste in the run- institutions, such as AU and ECOWAS, by up to independence.89 providing them with specific links to de- velopment expertise. ➢ Multisectoral community programs that involve policing and justice as well • Considering when humanitarian aid as development activities, such as the can be integrated into national systems initiatives in Latin America to provide without compromising humanitarian 30 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 principles—building on existing good cies to invest in developing the requisite ca- practice by UNDP, UN Children’s Fund pacity and expertise. There are areas where, (UNICEF), World Health Organization at the request of government, the Bank and (WHO), World Food Program (WFP), other institutional financial institutions (IFIs) and others in combining humanitarian could consider playing a greater role in sup- delivery with capacity-building, using porting the developmental underpinnings of local personnel and community struc- violence prevention within their mandates— tures, and purchasing food locally. such as the links between public financial management and security sector reform and Implementing these programs would re- quire systemic changes in international capac- institution-building, legal administration, jus- ity. Citizen security and justice require new tice systems development and multisectoral and interlinked capacities to address repeated approaches at the community level that com- waves of political and criminal violence. The bine community policing and justice services starting point for deeper capacity in this area with social cohesion, developmental and em- is government investment in standby, pre- ployment creation programs. But the IFIs are trained personnel for a range of executive and not equipped to lead specialized international advisory police, corrections, and justice func- support in these areas. A clear lead within the tions. States will need police and justice re- UN system would help this effort. serves to respond effectively to contemporary Agencies with economic expertise need violence, drawing on retired personnel, active to pay more attention to jobs. National service volunteers, and formed police units in community-based public works programs some countries. Second, these capacities must should receive greater and longer-term sup- be trained, and able to deploy, under shared port in fragile situations, in recognition of the doctrine to address the challenges of coher- time required for the private sector to absorb ence presented by different national policing youth unemployment. Other priority pro- models. Increased investment through the grams for job creation include investments in UN and regional centers in the development supporting infrastructure, in particular, elec- of joint doctrine and pretraining of govern- tricity and transit. A third program cluster is ment capacities would increase effectiveness those that invest in skills and work experience; and reduce incoherence. develop links between producers, traders, and Third, linking military and policing assis- consumers; and expand access to finance tance with justice assistance is crucial, since and assets, for example, through low-income disconnects have been a pervasive source housing. Current international financial in- of problems in fragile situations. So is link- stitutions and UN initiatives focused on em- ing criminal justice assistance with help for ployment creation should explicitly address local justice services such as land and prop- the specific needs of areas affected by fragility, erty disputes.90 Fourth, it is important that conflict, and violence, recognizing that job new capacities provide a full range of services creation in these situations may go beyond to countries facing challenges—from co- material benefits by providing a productive responsibility for policing or justice functions role and occupation for youth, and evalu- authorized by the UN Security Council or re- ating and expanding the examples of best- gional institutions, to police units and judicial fit employment policies in fragile situations personnel provided at the request of govern- presented in this Report. Global employment ments but without a corresponding intrusive work should include re-focusing on the risks mandate from global or regional institutions, posed by youth employment. to advisory, financing, and training services. These approaches would help. But there Last, ownership for justice reform work is likely to be continued pressure from large should be clarified in the international struc- youth unemployed populations unless a more ture to enable multilateral and bilateral agen- significant international effort is launched. Overview 31 A bolder approach could draw together ca- • Base fiduciary processes on the real world pacities from development agencies, the pri- in fragile and violence-affected situations: vate sector, foundations, and NGOs in a new insecurity, lack of competitive markets, global partnership to galvanize investments and weak institutions. in countries and communities where high unemployment and social disengagement • Balance the risks of action with the risks of contribute to the risks of conflict. Focusing inaction. primarily on job creation through project fi- • Expect a degree of failure in programs that nance, advisory support to small and medium require innovation and engagement with businesses, training and work placement, and weak institutions in risky environments, guarantees, the initiative could also support and adapt accordingly. social and cultural initiatives that promote good governance, collaborative capacities in Donor risk management also relies pri- communities, social tolerance, and recogni- marily on headquarters controls rather than tion of young people’s social and economic “best-fit” delivery mechanisms adapted to roles. Private-sector capacities to draw on local conditions. This approach may man- would include large companies that trade and age donor risk, but it constrains real progress invest in insecure areas (creating links with in institution-building on the ground. An local entrepreneurs), as well as technology alternative is to embrace faster engagement companies that can assist with connectivity through national institutions, but vary the and training in remote insecure areas. ways aid is delivered to manage risks and re- sults. Some donors have a higher risk toler- Track 2: Transforming procedures ance and will be able to choose modes that go and risk and results management more directly through national budgets and in international agencies institutions; others will need greater over- sight or nonstate involvement in delivery. To implement rapid, sustained, and inte- Three complementary options: grated programs for citizen security, justice, and jobs, international agencies need inter- • Vary the oversight and delivery mecha- nal reforms. For the g7+ group of leaders of nisms when engaging through national conflict-affected and fragile states who have institutions. Oversight mechanisms to begun to meet regularly as part of the In- adapt to risk include shifting from bud- ternational Dialogue on Peacebuilding and get support to “tracked” expenditure Statebuilding, reforming internal agency through government systems,92 and from procedures, particularly procurement proce- regular reporting and internal control dures, was the number one suggestion for in- mechanisms to independent financial ternational reform.91 International agencies monitoring agents, independent moni- cannot respond quickly to restore confidence toring of complaints, and independent or provide deep institutional support if their technical agents. Variations in delivery budget, staffing, approval, and contracting mechanisms include community struc- procedures take months and set unrealistic tures, civil society, the private sector, the prerequisites for recipient institutional ca- UN, and other international executing pacity. International agency systems would agencies in delivering programs jointly require fundamental changes to implement with state institutions. these programs effectively, based on the fol- • In situations of more extreme risk, where lowing four principles (how to approach im- donors would normally disengage, have plementing these is covered in Feature 7): executive capacity supplement national • Accept the links between security and de- control systems, as with “dual key” mech- velopment outcomes. anisms, where international line manage- 32 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT F E AT U R E 7 Internal agency reform Quick action? Ghana helps restore electricity in Liberia Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, President of Liberia; WDR Advisory Council Member After the 2005 election in Liberia, the new government provided two generators that helped restore electricity in announced a 100-day plan that included the restoration of some urban areas. electricity to certain areas of the capital to help restore The Liberian experience points to two key lessons. First is confidence in the state and jumpstart recovery in economic the need for early consultation between national governments activities and basic services. With ECOWAS support, the and international partners on realism in delivering quick results Liberian government approached various donors to help, and demonstrating progress to local populations. Second is the since the new government lacked resources and institu- challenge of rigidities in donor systems unable to provide par- tional capacity for implementation. None of the traditional ticular types of assistance fast. In fact, the EU, USAID, and the donors, which included the United Nations, the World Bank, World Bank were able to provide other types of support (fuel, the African Development Bank, the European Union, and transmission line restoration) for the electricity system within USAID, were able to provide the generators needed for this the 100 days, but none of the donors were able to cover the endeavor within the desired timeframe under their regular specific need for generators. Indeed, there is a need to rethink systems. The Liberian government was eventually success- existing policies and processes, to modify what I call procedural ful in securing help from the Government of Ghana, which conformism for countries in crisis situations. WDR Note: Options for applying the WDR principles for internal agency reform in different contexts Accepting the Economic and social interventions in situations of insecurity can justifiably be designed to contribute links between to citizen security and justice outcomes (in the Liberia electricity program above, an increase in security and citizen trust in government would have been an appropriate measure of program success, rather development than the sustainability of the electricity provision). Security programs can also be designed to outcomes contribute to development outcomes (an increase in trade, for example). This would require agencies to use outcome measure outside their traditional “technical” domains and work together within the combined program frameworks described above. Base budget When insecurity is high, both the costs and benefits of interventions may change dramatically over and fiduciary a short period. This argues for greater flexibility in administrative budget and staff planning. In processes on program budgets, it implies careful sequencing wherein some programs will be more beneficial at a the real world: later date, but also placing high weight on speed (over some cost-efficiency and quality concerns) in insecurity, lack contracting where benefits to fast action are high. Where competitive markets are very thin and not of perfectly transparent, different procurement controls—such as pre-tendering internationally under variable competitive quantity contracts, or contracting processes that allow direct negotiations with knowledge of regional markets, and markets—can be appropriate. Where institutional capacity is insufficient, procedures need to be weak institutions distilled to the simplest level of due process, together with flexible mechanisms to execute some activities on behalf of recipient institutions. Balance risks of Outside the realm of natural disasters, international actors often tend to be more sensitive to the action with risks risk that their support will backfire into criticisms of wastage or abuses than to the risk that delays in of inaction their support will increase the potential for violence or derail promising reform efforts. Decentralizing greater responsibility and accountability to international staff on the ground can increase responsiveness to the risks of inaction. Transparent publication of achievements against target timelines for donor funds release and activities—and reasons for delays—would also help. Expect a degree Because returns to successful programs are high, international assistance can afford a higher failure of failure in rate in violent situations. This is not how most assistance works, however: donors expect the same programs in risky degree of success in risky environments as in secure ones. A better approach is to adapt private-sector environments, principles for venture capital investment to support for fragile and violence-affected situations: pilot and adapt many different types of approaches to see which work best; accept a higher failure rate; evaluate accordingly rigorously and adapt quickly; and scale up approaches that are working. Overview 33 ment capacity works alongside national ing in Nepal under the auspices of the Peace- actors and agency processes governed by building Commission.93 But the performance joint national and international boards. of multidonor trust funds is mixed, with Not all governments will wish to take up criticisms ranging from slowness to a lack of these options. Where they do not, using expectation management and mixed success local personnel and community struc- in working through national systems.94 The tures for delivering humanitarian, eco- combined security-justice-development pro- nomic, and social programs still main- grams and internal agency reforms described tains some focus on local institutional above would help to mitigate this risk. capacity, mitigating the brain-drain of lo- International agencies need to think care- cal skills overseas. fully about how to lengthen the duration of assistance to meet the realities of institutional • Increase the contingencies in budgets, transformation over a generation without under transparent planning assumptions. raising costs. For humanitarian programs in Where governance is volatile, development prolonged crises, building on existing initia- program budgets, as well as the budgets for tives to support local staffing, local purchases, political and peacekeeping missions, would and community-based delivery can increase benefit from greater contingency measures the impact on institution-building and lower so that activities and delivery mechanisms unit costs. For peacekeeping, there is potential can be adjusted when new risks and oppor- for greater use of more flexible arrangements, tunities emerge without disrupting overall including over-the-horizon security guaran- support. The planning assumptions for tees, where external forces outside the coun- such contingencies—for example, that ad- try either supplement forces on the ground ditional oversight mechanisms will be ad- during tense periods or extend the leverage opted if certain agreed measures of gover- of external peacekeeping after missions are nance deteriorate—should be transparent drawn down—as suggested in inputs to this to both recipient governments and the gov- Report from the AU and the UN Department erning bodies of international agencies. of Peacekeeping Operations. Better resourc- To achieve results at scale, pooling funds ing for mediation and diplomatic facilitation in multidonor trust funds is also an effective is also an easy win, since it is low cost and can option, since it provides recipient govern- reduce the probabilities of conflict. ments with larger single programs and inter- For development agencies, reducing the national partners with a way to support pro- volatility of flows to programs delivering re- grams that greatly exceed their own national sults in citizen security, justice, and jobs—or contribution. It can also be an effective way simply preserving social cohesion and human to pool risks, shifting the burden of respon- and institutional capacity—can increase im- sibility for risks of waste, abuse, or corrup- pact without increasing the overall cost. As al- tion from the shoulders of each individual ready described, volatility greatly reduces aid donor to the multilateral system. Multidonor effectiveness, and it is twice as high for fragile trust funds have delivered excellent results and conflict-affected countries as for other in some situations—funding, for example, a developing countries, despite their greater range of high-impact programs in Afghani- need for persistence in building social and stan through the Afghanistan Reconstruction state institutions. There are options for re- Trust Fund (ARTF) and the Law and Order ducing volatility, including providing thresh- Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), supporting old amounts of aid based on appropriate essential start-up and system maintenance modalities (as described by Advisory Council costs for the nascent Palestinian Authority member Paul Collier in chapter 9), topping under the Holst Fund in the mid-1990s in up aid allocations to the most fragile states West Bank Gaza, or serving as catalytic fund- when specific types of programs have demon- 34 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 strated the ability to deliver effectively and at actions alone are constrained in these cir- scale (as proposed in a recent working paper cumstances, and competition between gangs by the Centre for Global Development),95 and and cartels produces high levels of violence dedicating a target percentage of assistance in production and transit countries. Explor- to larger and longer-term programs in fragile ing the costs and benefits of different com- and conflict-affected states under the Devel- binations of demand- and supply-side mea- opment Assistance Committee framework. sures would be a first step to underpinning To close the loop on internal agency re- more decisive demand-side actions. forms, results indicators should be more Following the money—tracking illicit closely geared to priorities in fragile and financial flows—is at the heart of action violence-affected situations. The core tools against the illegal trafficking of drugs and for national actors and their international natural resources. For areas seriously affected counterparts include proposed indicators to by illegal trafficking and corruption, such better capture both short- and longer-term as Central America and West Africa, most progress, supplementing the MDGs (see Fea- countries have nothing approaching the ture 4). The use of these indicators by inter- national capacity needed to gather and pro- national agencies—across the diplomatic, cess information on sophisticated financial security, and aid divides—would increase the transactions, or to investigate and prosecute incentives for more integrated responses. offenders. Along with initiatives that help to support a global community to address cor- ruption issues, such as the International Cor- Track 3: Acting regionally and ruption Hunter’s Alliance and the Stolen As- globally to reduce external stresses set Recovery Initiative (STAR), the following on fragile states two key measures could help in this effort: Effective action against illegal trafficking • Strengthen the capacity to conduct strate- requires co-responsibility by producing and gic analysis of these flows in a critical mass consuming countries. To stem the far- of countries with the majority of global fi- reaching impact of illegal trafficking, it must nancial transfers. About 15 major financial be recognized that effective action by one markets and hubs play this role. Concerted country alone will simply push the problem efforts to strengthen the openness of fi- to other countries, and that regional and nancial centers and financial intelligence global approaches are needed. For traffick- unit capacities, as well as to proactively ing where the supply, processing, or retail analyze suspicious flows, and exchange in- markets are concentrated and easily moni- formation could greatly increase the global tored—such as diamond trafficking—inter- ability to detect illicit financial flows and to diction efforts combined with multistake- recover stolen assets. Global financial insti- holder producer and consumer campaigns tutions could also perform strategic analy- can be effective. In addition to the Kimber- sis and make it available to affected coun- ley Process for diamonds and the Extractive tries. To respect privacy, this could be based Industries Transparency Initiative, the new on shifts in aggregate flows rather than in- Natural Resource Charter and a recent dividual account information. World Bank/UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)/Food and Agri- • Expand commitments from developed culture Organization (FAO) initiative on states and financial centers to joint investi- standards for international land purchases gations with law enforcement authorities have similar potential. For drug trafficking, in fragile and violence-affected countries. the situation is complicated by highly frag- As part of this commitment, they could mented illegal production sites and process- also undertake capacity-building programs ing facilities. Supply-side and interdiction with law enforcement authorities in fragile Overview 35 states—as with the U.K.-Nigeria and U.S.- legitimacy of regional institutions, in com- Haiti examples above.96 bination with the technical and financial ca- pacity of global agencies. Delivered through Regional action can also target positive regional institutions in collaboration with opportunities. Donors could increase their global agencies, such an effort could adapt financial and technical support for cross- lessons from those initiatives that have al- border and regional infrastructure—and ready successfully pooled regional capacity. It various forms of regional administrative could also draw lessons from existing cross- and economic cooperation—giving priority border cooperation, such as the Greater Me- to violence-affected regions. Such support kong subregion,98 West Africa’s initiatives on could take the following forms: trafficking and economic integration,99 and • Cross-border development programming. the European Union’s programs100 for pre- International actors could support more viously conflict-affected border regions. It closely opportunities for cross-border ac- would support political initiatives of regional tivities that integrate action on citizen institutions (such as the African Union’s security, justice, and jobs. Even where Border Program101 and ASEAN’s subregional regional or cross-border political collabo- initiatives),102 with financial and technical ration is less well established, international expertise from global partners. support for cross-border programming Further research is also needed to track the may still be able to support and respond to impacts of climate change on weather, land bilateral government efforts, using devel- availability and food prices, each of which opment issues such as trade and transit can impact in turn on conflict risk. Current infrastructure or cross-border health pro- research does not suggest that climate change grams to support a gradual increase in itself will drive conflict, except perhaps where trust. Special financial provision for access rapidly deteriorating water availability cuts of fragile landlocked regions to markets, across existing tensions and weak institutions. as has recently been agreed upon by the But a series of inter-linked problems—chang- World Bank’s governing structures, is an- ing global patterns of consumption of energy other way to encourage developmental and scarce resources, increasing demand for cooperation across borders. food imports (which draw on land, water and energy inputs), and the repurposing of land • Shared regional administrative capacity. for climate adaptation—are increasing pres- Pooling subregional administrative capac- sures on fragile states. These warrant further ities can allow states to develop institu- research and policy attention. tional capabilities they could not manage on their own. There are already good ex- amples of shared courts in the Caribbean and shared central banking capacity in Track 4: Marshaling support from West Africa.97 While these initiatives take lower-, middle-, and higher-income time to establish, they supplement difficult countries and global and regional national institutional transformations and institutions, to reflect the changing merit assistance from regional and inter- landscape of international policy national development institutions. and assistance Rather than these somewhat incremen- The landscape of international assistance in tal approaches to specific cross-border ini- fragile and violence-affected countries has tiatives, international donors could take a changed in the last 20 years, with more aid larger step to finance regional approaches. and policy input from middle-income coun- The principle of such an initiative would be tries with a history of solidarity support. to build on the local political knowledge and Several regional institutions are also playing 36 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 a greater role in security and development Lomé Declaration in 2000, which established issues. Yet, discussions of global conflict and African standards and a regional response violence, the norms of responsible leadership mechanism to unconstitutional changes in to respond to it, and the shape of interna- government, has been associated with a re- tional assistance have been driven more by duction in coups d’état from 15 in the 1990s northern than southern actors. The Interna- to 5 in the 2000s;103 and, despite an increase tional Dialogue on Peacebuilding and State- in coups in the last five years, continental ac- building has been created to help address this tion to restore constitutional government has deficit. been consistently strong. The WDR team conducted wide-ranging Some modest actions could strengthen consultations with violence-affected coun- collaboration among higher-, middle-, and tries, regional policy makers, and regional lower-income countries on shared problems institutions, as well as with traditional do- of violence and development, both global nor partners. It found many areas of agree- and local, as follows: ment—such as the focus on institution- • Increase both South-South and South- building and governance and on citizen North exchanges. South-South exchanges security, justice, and jobs—but also some have enormous potential to provide rele- areas of difference. As described earlier, these vant capacity and lessons in current fragile differences included what it is realistic to and violence-affected situations.104 Low- expect in terms of responsible national lead- and middle-income countries that have ership in improving governance, and over gone through their own recent experi- what time period, and over the “forms” ver- ences of transition have much to offer to sus the “functions” of good governance. Per- their counterparts—as demonstrated in ceived double standards were also criticized this Report, where Latin American coun- by WDR interlocutors, who reflected a senti- tries offered perspectives on urban vio- ment that donor countries and organizations lence prevention and security and justice that have faced their own internal gover- reforms, China on job creation, India on nance challenges could approach shortcom- local public works and democratic prac- ings in fragile developing states with more tices, and Southeast Asian and African humility. Developed countries are not im- countries on community driven develop- mune to corruption, bribery, human rights ment in conflict areas. Yet South-North abuses, or failures to account adequately for exchanges are also important. While insti- public finances. So effective implementation tutional capacities differ, many northern of standards of good governance is also a and southern countries, provinces, and challenge in advanced countries, even more cities face some similar stresses. Program so when the international community has approaches—such as addressing traffick- played an executive government or security ing, reintegrating ex-gang members and role in violence-affected areas. disengaged young people, and fostering Lack of concerted support for the norms tolerance and social bonds among com- of responsible leadership is a concern, be- munities that are ethnically or religiously cause progress in global norms is crucial for divided—will have lessons relevant for reducing the risk of violence. Regional and others. Such exchanges would increase global standards, as well as recognition and understanding that the challenges of vio- sanction mechanisms in constitutionality, lence are not unique to developing coun- human rights, and corruption, have pro- tries and that developing countries are not vided support and incentives for national alone in struggling to find solutions. reformers, particularly where the capacity of the domestic system to provide rewards • Better align international assistance be- and accountability is weak. For example, the hind regional governance efforts. When Overview 37 regional institutions take the initiative, cial in light of recent social protests that as with the AU on constitutionality or demonstrate strong grievances and expec- ASEAN in certain conflict and natural di- tations over governance change—that were saster situations (Feature 8), they have not picked up by standard analyses of secu- great comparative advantage in traction rity and of development progress. Indicators with their member states. The potential are needed that focus on whether countries convening role of regional institutions was are on track to make institutional and gov- also widely recognized in WDR consulta- ernance improvements within the realistic tions by higher-, middle-, and lower- generational timeframes that the faster re- income country interlocutors alike. Sup- formers have achieved, and how citizens porting regional platforms to discuss the perceive trends in the legitimacy and per- application of governance norms is an ef- formance of national institutions across the fective way to increase ownership. Adopt- political security and development domains. ing clearer structures to discuss responses The indicators presented in Feature 4 would to major improvements or deteriorations be a simple way, as Louise Arbour suggests in governance (such as coups d’états) (Feature 8), to compare progress, stagna- among bilateral and multilateral actors tion or deterioration. Ensuring that such would also improve information-sharing indicators measure outcomes rather than and the potential for coordinated respons- just the form of institutions (laws passed, es, without creating unacceptable binding anti-corruption commissions formed) is obligations on international actors.105 also important to ensure that they encour- age rather than suppress innovative national • Expand initiatives to recognize responsi- action and that they foster learning among ble leadership. While there is always a role low-, middle-, and high-income country for frank and transparent criticism, ap- institutions. The UN Peacebuilding Com- proaches from the North that are seen as mission, which brings together fragile states, disproportionately focused on criticism donors, troop-contributing countries, and in fragile situations can be divisive. Initia- regional bodies, has unexploited potential tives such as the Ibrahim Prize for African to advise on better tracking of progress and leadership could be emulated to recognize risks, and realistic timelines for governance leaders in different roles (for example, transformation. ministers who have a lasting impact on At the beginning of this overview, we corruption or military leaders who im- asked how piracy in Somalia, continuing vio- plement successful security sector reform). lence in Afghanistan, new threats from drug Multistakeholder initiatives such as the trafficking in the Americas, or conflict aris- Extractive Industries Transparency Initia- ing from social protests in North Africa can tive could consider provisions to recog- happen in today’s world. The short answer nize individual leaders or leadership is that such violence cannot be contained teams who have improved the transpar- by short-term solutions that fail to generate ency of resource revenues and expendi- the institutions capable of providing people tures, whether in governments, civil soci- with a stake in security, in justice, and in eco- ety, or companies. nomic prospects. Societies cannot be trans- More focused and realistic expectations of formed from the outside, and they cannot the timetables for governance improvements be transformed overnight. But progress is would also help bridge gaps in perspectives possible with consistent and concerted effort among countries receiving international as- by national leaders and their international sistance, their middle- and higher-income partners to strengthen the local, national, international partners, and global and re- and global institutions that support citizen gional institutions. This is particularly cru- security, justice, and jobs. 38 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT F E AT U R E 8 Regional initiatives and norms and standards ASEAN experience in crisis prevention and recovery Surin Pitsuwan, Secretary-General ASEAN; WDR Advisory Council Member There are many conflicts simmering in the ASEAN landscape. vening role, and the technical capacities of other partners. Our But the region is not totally without its own experiences work in support of recovery after Cyclone Narghis was sup- in mediation and conflict resolution. ASEAN has played an ported by technical teams from the World Bank, and performed important role in endeavors. The ASEAN Troika in the Cam- in conjunction with the United Nations. In the Aceh Monitoring bodian conflict of 1997–99, the Timor-Leste peace-keeping Mission, we worked jointly with colleagues from the European operation of 1999 onward, the Aceh Reconciliation of 2005, Union who brought valuable technical knowledge. and the Myanmese Cyclone Nargis catastrophe of May 2008 The third is that the more operations of this type that we were cases of mediation and eventual resolution where the undertake, the more our capacity builds. In Timor-Leste, long regions and some ASEAN member states have made valu- years of joint-military training and exercises between the Phil- able contributions and learned lessons from the process. It ippines, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand, and supported by has always been like putting pieces of a diplomatic jigsaw partners outside the region such as the US, paid off. The troops together, weaving tapestry of peace, improvising the best on the ground could communicate, cooperate, and conduct modality and pattern from the available and suitable materi- joint operations without any delay—but their experiences in als at hand. Timor-Leste also added to their capacity. In Myanmar, ASEAN’s One important lesson for us is that our ASEAN structures role meant drawing on personnel from many of our member can play an important political convening role when there states, such as Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand, who have are sensitivities with member states. There was a higher level extensive experience of managing post-disaster recovery, and of mutual confidence between Indonesia and of the ASEAN also building capacity within our Secretariat. Linked to long- states participating in the Timor-Leste operation. We got term programs of capacity-building with some of our donor around the rigid principle of “non-interference” by offering partners, these experiences make us more ready to face new troops under a joint-command with an “ASEAN” military challenges in future. The cumulative results of these efforts in leader taking an active leadership role. And Indonesia made managing political conflicts and natural disaster relief have it easier for all ASEAN Partners by issuing an invitation to helped ASEAN in enhancing its capacity to coordinate our come and assist. In Myanmar, ASEAN played a central role in development cooperation strategies. We have learned to con- the dialogue with the Government after Cyclone Nargis, tain sporadic violence and tension in the region and would not helping to open up the affected areas, where over 130,000 allow them to derail our community development efforts aim- men, women and children had died and many more faced ing at common security and sustainable prosperity for our traumatic conditions, to international aid. people. A second lesson is that we can find useful combinations of capacity between our local knowledge and political con- All the recommendations of this Report collectively—and as equal partners. Real have at their heart the concept of shared global change requires a strong rationale. But a dual risk. Risks are evolving, with new threats to rationale exists: fragility and violence are stability arising from international organized major obstacles to development and are no crime and global economic instability. The longer confined to poor and remote areas landscape of international power relations or cityscapes. This past decade has seen the is also changing, as low- and middle-income increasing penetration of instability in global countries increase their share of global eco- life—in terrorism, an expanding drug trade, nomic influence and their contributions to impact on commodity prices, and the rising global policy thinking. This shift requires a numbers of internationally mobile refugees. fundamental rethink of the approaches of Breaking cycles of repeated violence is thus international actors to manage global risks a shared challenge demanding urgent action. Overview 39 REFLECTIONS FROM ADVISORY COUNCIL MEMBERS: 2011 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT Reaffirming consensus on international norms and standards—the role of regional organizations Louise Arbour, President, International Crisis Group; former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; WDR Advisory Council Member Whether based on universal values, such as the sanctity of In the justice sector, for instance, uniformity of institutional human life, or on international legal rules, there are some models and procedures may obscure radical differences in the universally accepted norms—reflected in the Charter of the actual delivery of justice. But the adjudication of disputes United Nations and other international instruments. based on principles of fairness, impartiality, transparency, These norms are not self-implementing, and, because integrity, compassion, and, ultimately, accountability can take they include the right to cultural diversity, their interpreta- many forms. tion must reflect local, national, and regional diversity. The In their assistance to development, international actors resistance to the exportation of “Western values” might be must resist the exportation of form over substance and accept no more than the rejection of a foreign way of expressing a the regionalization of norms that enhance, rather than impede, particular norm, rather than a rejection of the norm itself. their true universal character. In the same spirit, regional actors Regional institutions can bridge the distance between must translate, in a culturally relevant way, international norms universal norms and local customs. Those customs or prac- and repudiate nonconforming practices. tices must conform, in substance, to the core international And all must concede that the standards set by universal principles from which the international community derives norms are aspirations. Measures of performance should reflect its cohesion. Otherwise cultural diversity can simply over- either progress, stagnation or regression, in a given country, ride, and undermine, the international framework. toward a common, universal ideal. Notes 1. The World Development Report 2011 defines organized violence as the use or threat of physical force by groups, including state actions against other states or against civilians, civil wars, electoral violence between opposing sides, communal conflicts based on regional, ethnic, religious, or other group identities or competing economic interests, gang-based violence and organized crime, and international, nonstate, armed movements with ideological aims. Although these are also impor- tant topics for development, the WDR does not cover domestic or interpersonal violence. At times, violence or conflict are used as shorthand for organized violence, understood in these terms. Many countries address certain forms of violence, such as terrorist attacks by nonstate armed movements, as matters that are subject to their criminal laws. 2. Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Database (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010; Lacina and Gleditsch 2005); Sundberg 2008; Gleditsch and Ward 1999; Human Security Report Project, forthcoming; Gleditsch and others 2002. 3. Countries affected by fragility, conflict, and violence include those countries with: (1) homicide rates greater than 10 per 100,000 population per year; (2) major civil conflict (battle deaths greater than 1,000 per year (as defined in the from 2006 to 2009), (3) UN or regionally mandated peace- building or peacekeeping missions; and (4) low-income countries with institutional levels in 2006–09 (World Bank’s CPIA less than 3.2), correlated with high risks of violence and conflict. See Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Database (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005; Harbom and Wallensteen 2010); UNDPKO 2010b; UNDP 2010c; World Bank 2010e. 4. For discussions of the trends in civil war onset and termination see Hewitt, Wilkenfeld, and Gurr 2010; Sambanis 2004; Elbadawi, Hegre, and Milante 2008; Collier and others 2003. 5. Demombynes 2010; UNODC 2010a. 40 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 6. Leslie 2010; Harriott 2004, 2008; International Crisis Group 2008b; Ashforth 2009. 7. Bayer and Rupert 2004. While Baker and others 2002 found that the effect of conflict is equivalent to a 33 percent tariff barrier. For an updated discussion of the methodology for determining growth effects of conflict and theory and new analysis based on primary and secondary neighbors, see De Groot 2010; Murdoch and Sandler 2002. 8. U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2009; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2008. 9. Gomez and Christensen 2010; Harild and Christensen 2010. 10. Global Terrorism Database 2010; National Counter Terrorism Center 2010; WDR team calculations. 11. Gaibulloev and Sandler 2008. 12. Davies, von Kemedy, and Drennan 2005. 13. WDR team calculations based on Europe Brent spot price FOB (dollars per barrel) reported by the U.S. Energy Information Administration 2011. 14. UNODC 2010b. 15. UNODC 2010b. 16. Hanson 2010; Bowden 2010. 17. World Bank 2010d. 18. WDR staff calculations based on Chen, Ravallion, and Sangraula 2008 poverty data (available on POVCALNET, http://iresearch.worldbank.org). 19. Narayan and Petesch 2010. 20. UNDP 2006. 21. For an overview of costs of conflict and violence, see Skaperdas and others 2009. Specific estimates of the economic costs associated with conflict are found in Hoeffler, von Billerbeck, and Ijaz 2010; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Cerra and Saxena 2008; Collier, Chauvet, and Hegre 2007; Riascos and Vargas 2004; UNDP 2006. 22. Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig 2008. 23. UNICEF 2004; UNFPA 2002; Anderlini 2010a. 24. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action 1995; Women’s Refugee Commission 2009; UNICEF 2004. 25. American Psychological Association 1996; Dahlberg 1998; Verdú and others 2008. 26. WDR team calculations. 27. Theories of the causes of conflict are explored in chapter 2 of the main text. Of the literature dis- cussed there, selected recommended readings include: Gurr 1970; Hirshleifer 1995; Skaperdas 1996; Grossman 1991; Fearon 1995; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Satyanath, Miguel, and Sergenti 2004; Blattman and Miguel 2010; Keefer 2008; Besley and Persson 2009, 2010; Toft 2003; Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2007; Arnson and Zartman 2005. The linkages among political, security, and economic dynamics are also recognized in the policy circle. See Zoellick 2010b. 28. For relationship between income inequality and the risk of civil conflict see Fearon 2010a. For re- lationship between income inequality and criminal violence see Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Lederman 2002a, 2002b; Messner, Raffalovich, and Shrock 2002. 29. Fearon 2010b; Bøås, Tiltnes, and Flatø 2010; Neumayer 2003; Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Lederman 2002a, 2002b; Messner, Raffalovich, and Shrock 2002; WDR team calculations. 30. Stewart 2010. 31. Satyanath, Miguel, and Sergenti 2004. 32. For the relationship between institutional weakness and violence conflict, see Fearon 2010a, 2010b; Johnston 2010; Walter 2010. 33. In addition, there are structural and incremental factors that increase conflict risk. Among these are features of the physical terrain that make rebellion easier. These features do not cause war in the common sense of the word, they simply make it more possible. Mountainous terrain has been shown to increase risks, by increasing the feasibility of rebellion. Neighborhood matters too: there are both negative effects from proximity to other wars or countries with high rates of violent crime and illicit trafficking and positive effects from being in a neighborhood largely at peace. See Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008; Gleditsch and Ward 2000; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Overview 41 Goldstone 2010. On the effects of neighborhood on civil wars, see Hegre and Sambanis 2006 and Gleditsch 2007. 34. McNeish 2010; Ross 2003. 35. This follows recent literature on statebuilding, notably North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009; Dobbins and others 2007; Fukuyama 2004; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 2005, 2006. This learn- ing is reflected in recent policy documents as well: OECD 2010a, 2010g, 2011. 36. Institutions are defined in the WDR as the formal and informal “rules of the game,” which include formal rules, written laws, organizations, informal norms of behavior, and shared beliefs—as well as the organizational forms that exist to implement and enforce these norms (both state and non- state organizations). Institutions shape the interests, incentives, and behaviors that can facilitate violence. Unlike elite pacts, institutions are impersonal—they continue to function irrespective of the presence of particular leaders, and therefore provide greater guarantees of sustained resilience to violence. Institutions operate at all levels of society—local, national, regional, and global. 37. Fearon 2010a, 2010b; Walter 2010. 38. Arboleda 2010; WDR team consultations with government officials, civil society representatives and security personnel in Colombia, 2010. 39. Gambino 2010. 40. A 2010 meeting of Anglophone and Francophone delegates in Kenya, convened by UNDP, coined the phrase “collaborative capacities” and further defined the institutions relevant to prevention and recovery from violence as “dynamic networks of interdependent structures, mechanisms, resources, values, and skills which, through dialogue and consultation, contribute to conflict prevention and peace-building in a society.” UN Interagency Framework for Coordination on Preventive Action 2010, 1. 41. Barron and others 2010. 42. World Bank 2010m; Buhaug and Urdal 2010. 43. See Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro 2010. Food protests data are from news reports; governance effectiveness data are from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010a. 44. Menkhaus 2006, 2010. 45. For the role of institutions in economic growth and development, see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005. Also see Zoellick 2010b. 46. North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009. 47. For the impact of colonialism on the development of modern-day institutions in former colonized countries, see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001. 48. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 2009. 49. According to Margaret Levi, “Trust is, in fact, a holding word for a variety of phenomena that enable individuals to take risks in dealing with others, solve collective action problems, or act in ways that seem contrary to standard definitions of self-interest.” Furthermore, Levi notes that “At issue is a cooperative venture, which implies that the truster possesses a reasonable belief that well-placed trust will yield positive returns and is willing to act upon that belief.” Braithwaite and Levi 1998, 78. 50. Pritchett and de Weijer 2010. 51. The interlink between security and development has been debated under the notion of human security, which encompasses freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity. By putting the security and prosperity of human beings at the center, human security addresses wide range of threats, both from poverty and from violence, and their interactions. While acknowl- edging the importance of human security and its emphasis on placing people at the center of focus, this Report uses the term “citizen security” more often to sharpen our focus more on freedom from physical violence and freedom from fear of violence. The hope is to complement the discussion on the aspect of freedom from fear in the human security concept. Building on the Commission on Human Security 2003 report, the importance of human security has been recognized in the UN General Assembly 2005 resolution adopted at the 2005 World Summit, the UN General Assembly 2009 report, and UN General Assembly 2010 Resolution, as well as in other fora such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, G8, and World Economic Forum. See Commission on Human Security 2003; UN General Assembly 2005b, 2009b, 2010. 52. “Confidence-building” in mediation terminology means building trust between adversaries; in a financial context, the term “confidence” denotes trust by market actors that governments are adopt- 42 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 ing sound policies and will be capable of implementing them. The WDR defines the term as building trust between groups of citizens who have been divided by violence, between citizens and the state, and between the state and other key stakeholders (neighbors, international part- ners, investors) whose political, behavioral, or financial support is needed to deliver a positive outcome. 53. On building trust and changing expectations, see Hoff and Stiglitz 2008. 54. Bedeski 1994; Cumings 2005; Kang 2002; Chang and Lee 2006. 55. See Stedman 1996; Nilsson and Jarstad 2008. On elite bargains, political settlements and inclusion, see Di John and Putzel 2009. 56. Anderlini 2000. 57. World Bank 2008f, 2009d; Republic of Lebanon Ministry of Environment 1999. 58. UNDPKO 2010a. 59. For Japanese land reforms, see Kawagoe 1999. For Korean land reforms, see Shin 2006. 60. Braud and Grevi 2005. 61. The Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP), introduced in the run-up to the 2005 elections in Liberia, provides “dual key” authority in the areas of revenue earn- ing and expenditure. Jointly managed by the government and the international community, it was designed specifically to reassure a skeptical population and donors that years of official looting and corruption were over and that services would be reliably delivered. Dwan and Bailey 2006; Govern- ment of the Republic of Liberia Executive Mansion 2009. 62. To combat corruption and crime, Guatemala created the International Commission against Im- punity, known by its Spanish acronym, CICIG, through an agreement with the UN in 2007. Its mandate is to “support, strengthen, and assist institutions of the State of Guatemala responsible for investigating and prosecuting crimes allegedly committed in connection with the activities of illegal security forces and clandestine security organizations.” See UN 2006a. 63. For Afghanistan National Solidarity Program, see Beath and others 2010; Ashe and Parott 2001; UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and UNOHCHR 2010. For Latin American multi-sectoral vio- lence prevention programs, see Alvarado and Abizanda 2010; Beato 2005; Fabio 2007; International Centre for the Prevention of Crime 2005; Duailibi and others 2007; Peixoto, Andrade, and Azevedo 2007; Guerrero 2006; Llorente and Rivas 2005; Formisano 2002. 64. For India, see India Ministry of Rural Development 2005, 2010. For Indonesia, see Barron 2010; Guggenheim 2011. For Kosovo, see Grygiel 2007; Institute for State Effectiveness 2007. For Rwanda, see Boudreaux 2010. 65. For Nicaragua, see Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007. For Nepal, see Ashe and Parott 2001. 66. For Liberia, see Blundell 2010. For Mozambique, see Crown Agents 2007. 67. For the Timor-Leste health programs, see Rohland and Cliffe 2002; Baird 2010. 68. Messick 2011. 69. Giovine and others 2010; 70. Guerrero 2006; Mason 2003; Presidencia República de Colombia 2010. 71. Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, in Fixing Failed States, analyze the issue of establishing legitimacy and closing the sovereignty gap in fragile and conflict-affected states through the lens of “double compact.” The double compact focuses on the “network of rights and obligations underpinning the state’s claim to sovereignty . . .” and refers first to the “compact . . . between a state and its citi- zens . . . embedded in a coherent set of rules, and second, “between a state and the international community to ensure adherence to international norms and standards of accountability and trans- parency.” Ghani and Lockhart 2008, 8. 72. Agoglia, Dziedzic, and Sotirin 2008. 73. WDR consultation with former key negotiators from the ANC Alliance and the National Party in South Africa 2010. 74. Barron and others 2010. 75. WDR team consultation in Haiti, 2010; UNDPKO 2010a. 76. For South Africa, see Kambuwa and Wallis 2002; WDR consultation with former key negotiators from the ANC Alliance and the National Party in South Africa 2010. For Pakistan: World Bank and ADB 2010. Overview 43 77. WDR team consultations with government officials, civil society representatives and security per- sonnel in Colombia 2010. 78. These tools include UNDPA’s mediation unit; AU and other regional mediation capacity; “track II mediation,” such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. 79. Ojielo 2007; Odendaal 2010; UNDPA 2010a. 80. Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), a Finnish independent nonprofit organization, works to re- solve conflict and to build sustainable peace. In 2005, CMI Chairman, former Finnish President Ahtisaari facilitated a peace agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement in Aceh, Indonesia. See Crisis Management Initiative 2011. 81. For UN “integrated missions,” see Eide and others 2005. For “whole-of-government” approaches, see OECD-DAC 2006; DFID 2009, 2010. For “whole-of systems” approaches, see OECD-DCA 2007a. For regional tools, see African Union 2006, 2007b. 82. Stewart and Brown 2007. 83. OECD-DAC 2008. 84. OECD-DAC 2010a. 85. A recent study examined the cost to countries of aid volatility, which induces volatility into govern- ment revenues and development programs. The loss in efficiency from volatility of net ODA was more than twice as high for weak states than strong states, at 2.5 versus 1.2 percent of GDP (see Kharas 2008). 86. Trafficking is intrinsically regional and global in nature, with knock-on impacts between produc- ing, transit, and consuming countries. Colombia’s actions against drug cartels affect Central Amer- ica, Mexico, and even West Africa; California’s recent policy debate on legalizing drugs potentially impacts producing countries. Similar effects happen with other commodities: restraints on logging in one country can increase demand in other countries that do not have similar policies, bringing with it increased vulnerability to corruption and violence. 87. The Kimberley Process is jointly undertaken by civil society groups, industry, and governments to stem the flow of “conflict diamonds” used to fuel rebellions in countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo. The process has its own diamond certification scheme imposing extensive requirements on its 49 members (representing 75 countries) to ensure that the rough diamonds shipped have not funded violence. See Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 2010. 88. OECD-DAC 2010a. 89. WDR team consultation with country team in Timor-Leste in 2010. 90. UNOHCHR 2006. 91. The g7+ is an “independent and autonomous forum of fragile and conflict affected countries and regions that have united to form one collective voice on the global stage.” The g7+ was established in 2008 and includes: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, the Demo- cratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Nepal, the Solomon Islands, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, and Timor-Leste. See International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 2010. 92. A practical example of this type of shift is Ethiopia in 2005, when government and donors agreed to move from regular budget support to a program of transfers to local and municipal governments. The program included measures to ensure that all regions of the country, irrespective of how they had voted in elections, received continuing central government support. 93. See Garassi 2010. For Afghanistan, see Atos Consulting 2009. For West Bank and Gaza, see World Bank 1999a. For Nepal, see UNOHCHR 2010; Government of Nepal, UNDP, and UNDG 2010. 94. See OECD 2010i; Scanteam 2010. 95. Gelb 2010. 96. Messick 2011. 97. See Favaro 2008, 2010. 98. The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) countries (Cambodia, China, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam) have implemented a wide-ranging series of regional projects covering transport, power, telecommunications, environmental management, human re- source development, tourism, trade, private sector investment, and agriculture. The GMS is rec- ognized as having enhanced cross-border trade while reducing poverty levels and creating shared interests in economic stability and peace. 44 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 99. West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI) is a joint program among the UNODC, UN Office for West Africa, UN Department of Political Affairs, and INTERPOL to combat problems of illicit drug traf- ficking, organized crime, and drug abuse in West Africa. The initiative comprises a comprehensive set of activities targeting capacity-building, at both national and regional level, in the areas of law enforcement, forensics, border management, anti-money-laundering, and the strengthening of criminal justice institutions, contributing to peacebuilding initiatives and security sector reforms. 100. The “Euroregion” began as an innovative form of transborder cooperation (between two or more states that share a common bordering region) in the late 1950s. With the purpose of stimulating cross border economic, sociocultural and leisure cooperation, the Euroregion model grew, and was boosted through the creation of a common European market and recent democratic transitions. There are currently more than one hundred Euroregions spread across Europe, and the model has in recent times been replicated in eastern and central European territories. Cooperation has not been without problems in areas previously affected by conflict, but there are good examples of cross-border developmental, social and security programs that involve areas where ethnic minori- ties reside across several states or in areas that have suffered the trauma of interstate and civil war in the past. See Greta and Lewandowski 2010; Otocan 2010; Council of Europe 1995; Council of Europe and Institute of International Sociology of Gorizia 2003; Bilcik and others 2001. 101. Recognizing that insecure borders have been recurrent hosts to conflict, the African Union estab- lished the African Union Border Program in 2007 to delimit and demarcate sensitive border ar- eas and promote cross-border cooperation and trade as a conflict prevention tool. The program consists of four components. First, it pursues both land and maritime border demarcation since less than a quarter of Africa’s borders have been formally marked and agreed, and disputes are likely to continue with future discoveries of oil. Second, it promotes cross-border cooperation to deal with itinerant criminal activities. Third, it supports cross-border peacebuilding programs. Fourth, it consolidates gains in the economic integration through the regional economic communities. Its first pilot project was launched in the Sikasso region in Mali and in Bobo Dioualasso in Burkina Faso—bringing together local, private, and public actors to strengthen cooperation. See African Union 2007a. 102. ASEAN has played an important role in mediation and conflict resolution in the Southeast Asia re- gion. Examples include its assistance in the Cambodian conflict of 1997–99, the Timor-Leste peace- keeping operation of 1999 onward, the Aceh Reconciliation of 2005, and the Myanmese Cyclone Nargis catastrophe of May 2008. 103. WDR team calculations based on dataset in Powell and Thyne, forthcoming. 104. Of the different forms that South-South cooperation has taken, technical assistance has been the most common. Although many technical assistance projects focus on economic and social devel- opment, countries in the Global South have also developed specialized capacities in post-conflict peacebuilding. Examples include South Africa’s support to build structural capacities for public service through peer learning with Burundi, Rwanda, and Southern Sudan. Cooperation among 45 municipalities in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras helps to manage regional public goods such as water in the Trifinio region. The African Development Bank also has a specific facility for South-South cooperation in fragile states. See also OECD 2010e. 105. 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Zoellick, Robert. 2010. “Keynote Speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies Sixth Global Strategic Review Conference.” International Institute for Strategic Studies, Washington, D.C. Acknowledgments This Report has been prepared by a core team led by Sarah Cliffe and Nigel Roberts and comprising Erik Alda, David Andersson, Kenneth Anye, Holly Benner, Natalia Cieslik, Ivan Crouzel, Markus Kostner, Daniel Maree, Nicholas Marwell, Gary Milante, Stephen Ndegwa, Nadia Selim, Pia Simonsen, Nicholas van Praag, Suranjan Weeraratne, and Nikolas Win Myint. Bruce Jones served as a Senior External Advisor to the team and made major contributions as did James Fearon, Jack Goldstone, and Lant Pritchett. Bruce Ross-Larson was the principal editor. World Development Report 2011 is co-sponsored by Development Economics (DEC) and the Operations Policy and Country Services (OPC). The work was conducted under the general guidance of Justin Yifu Lin in DEC and Jeffrey Gutman and Joachim von Amsberg in OPC. Caroline Anstey, Hassan Cisse, Shahrokh Fardoust, Varun Gauri, Faris Hadad-Zer- vos, Ann Harrison, Karla Hoff, Phillip Keefer, Anne-Marie Leroy, Rui Manuel De Almeida Coutinho, Alastair McKechnie, Vikram Raghavan, and Deborah Wetzel also provided valu- able guidance. The WDR team extends a special thank you to the World Bank’s Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Group (OPCFC) and the Global Expert Team on Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries (FCS GET) for their extensive inputs and feedback throughout the WDR development process. An Advisory Council comprised of Madeleine Albright, Louise Arbour, Lakhdar Brahimi, Mohamed Ibn Chambas, Paul Collier, Nitin Desai, Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, Mar- tin Griffiths, Mohamed “Mo” Ibrahim, H.E. Paul Kagame, Ramtane Lamamra, Shivshankar Menon, Louis Michel, Jorge Montaño, Jay Naidoo, Kenzo Oshima, Surin Pitsuwan, Zeid Ra’ad Al-Hussein, Marta Lucía Ramírez de Rincón, H.E. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Dmitri Trenin, Wu Jianmin, and George Yeo provided extensive and excellent advice. World Bank President Robert B. Zoellick provided guidance and comments. Many others inside and outside the World Bank contributed with comments and inputs. The Development Data Group contributed to the data appendix and was responsible for the Selected World Development Indicators. The team benefitted greatly from a wide range of consultations. Meetings were held in Afghanistan, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Mexico, Nepal, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, the United Kingdom, the United States, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. The team wishes to thank participants in these workshops, videoconferences, and online discussions, which included policy makers, government officials, and representatives of nongovernmental, civil society and private sector organizations. The team would like to acknowledge the generous support of the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the European Union, the Government of Australia, the Government of Canada, the Government of China, the Government of Denmark, the 53 54 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 Government of Finland, the Government of Germany, the Government of Japan, the Govern- ment of Mexico, the Government of the Netherlands, the Government of Norway, the Gov- ernment of Sweden, the Government of Switzerland, the Government of the United Kingdom, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the United Nations. The team also wishes to acknowledge the tireless support of the WDR Production Team: Jessica Ardinoto, Nga (Ty) Lopez, Bertha Medina, Brónagh Murphy, and Jason Victor. The resource management support of Irina Sergeeva and Sonia Joseph is also much appreci- ated as well as the excellent production, publishing, translation, and dissemination sup- port provided by the Office of the Publisher and GSDTR, with special thanks to Mary Fisk, Stephen McGroarty, Nancy Lammers, Santiago Pombo-Bejarano, Denise Bergeron, Janet Sasser, Cecile Jannotin, and Hector Hernaez for their contributions. Debra Naylor and Gerry Quinn provided design and graphics expertise. We also thank Ivar Cederholm, Jean-Pierre Djomalieu, Sharon Faulkner, Vivian Hon, Gytis Kanchas, Rajvinder (Dolly) Kaur, Alexan- der Kent, Esabel Khoury, Nacer Megherbi, Thyra Nast, Jimmy Olazo, Nadia Piffaretti, Carol Pineau, Jean Gray Ponchamni, Swati Priyadarshini, Janice Rowe-Barnwell, Merrell Tuck- Primdahl, and Constance Wilhel for their kind support to the team. Many thanks as well to Jeffrey Lecksell for expert production of map graphics. We appreciate the efforts of the World Bank’s New York Office, including Dominique Bichara and Tania Meyer, as well as colleagues who assisted with WDR consultations worldwide—including those in the World Bank offices in Afghanistan, Belgium, China, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Mali, Mexico, Nepal, Pakistan, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sudan, Timor-Leste, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. Bibliographical Note This report draws on a wide range of World Bank documents and on numerous outside sources. Background analysis was contributed by: Beatriz Abizanda, Aga Khan Development Network, Nathalie Alvarado, Sanam Naraghi-Anderlini, Matthew Andrews, Jairo Arboleda, Paul Arthur, Claus Astrup, Alexandra Avdeenko, Kathryn Bach, Mark Baird, Patrick Barron, Peter Bartu, Christina Biebesheimer, Arthur G. Blundell, Morten Bøås, Saswati Bora, James Boyce, Henk-Jan Brinkman, Tilman Brück, Rex Brynen, Iride Ceccacci, Brian Center, Pinki Chaudhuri, Asger Christensen, James Cockayne, Blair Glencorse, Tara Cooper, Maria C. Correia, David Craig, Christopher Cramer, Martha Crenshaw, Olivia D’Aoust, Victor A.B. Davies, Pablo de Greiff, Alex de Waal, Dimitri F. De Pues, Frauke de Weijer, Christopher Delgado, Gabriel Demombynes, Deval Desai, Peter Dewees, Sinclair Dinnen, Le Dang Doanh, Barry Eichengreen, Gregory Ellis, Sundstøl Eriksen, FAFO, Alexander Evans, Doug Farah, Edgardo Favaro, James D. Fearon, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, Hedda Flatø, Shep- ard Forman, Paul Francis, Anthony Gambino, Esther Garcia, Scott Gates, Alan Gelb, Luigi Giovine, Jack A. Goldstone, Margarita Puerto Gomez, Sonja Grimm, Jean-Marie Guehenno, Scott Guggenheim, Debarati Guha-Sapir, Paul-Simon Handy, Bernard Harborne, Niels Harild, Emily Harwell, Håvard Hegre, Cullen S. Hendrix, Anke Hoeffler, Karla Hoff, Rich- ard Horsey, Fabrice Houdart, Yasheng Huang, Elisabeth Huybens, Inter-American Develop- ment Bank, Syeda S. Ijaz, Horst Intscher, Kremena Ionkova, Michael Jacobson, Prashant Jha, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Michael Johnston, Patricia Justino, Tarci- sius Kabutaulaka, Gilbert Khadaglia, Anne Kielland, Robert Krech, Christof P. Kurz, Sarah Laughton, Constantino Lluch, Norman V. Loayza, Clare Lockhart, Megumi Makisaka, Alex- andre Marc, Keith Martin, Omar McDoom, Mike McGovern, John-Andrew McNeish, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Kenneth Menkhaus, Richard Messick, Ministry of Rural Development of India, Nadir Mohammed, Hannah Nielsen, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, David Pearce, Mary Porter Peschka, Nicola Pontara, Douglas Porter, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Portugal, Monroe Price, Habib Rab, Clionadh Raleigh, Martha Ramirez, Anne Sofie Roald, Paula Roque, Narve Rotwitt, Caroline Sage, Yezid Sayigh, Mark Schneider, Richard Scobey, Jake Sherman, Syl- vana Q. Sinha, Judy Smith-Höhn, Joanna Spear, Anna Spenceley, Radhika Srinivasan, Frances Stewart, Håvard Strand, Scott Straus, Nicole Stremlau, Naotaka Sugawara, Deepak Thapa, Åge Tiltnes, Monica Toft, Robert Townsend, Bakary Fouraba Traore, Keiichi Tsunekawa, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Department of Peacekeep- ing Operations (UNDPKO), the United Nations Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA), Bernice van Bronkhorst, Philip Verwimp, Joaquin Villalobos, Sarah von Billerbeck, Henriette von Kaltenborn-Stachau, Barbara F. Walter, Jusuf Wanandi, Xueli Wang, Clay Wescott, Teresa Whitfield, Alys Willman, Michael Woolcock, Michael Wyganowski, Kohei Yoshida. Background papers for the Report are available either on the World Wide Web at www.worldbank.org/wdr2011 or through the World Development Report office. The views expressed in these papers are not necessarily those of the World Bank or of this Report. 55 56 WO R L D D E V E LO P M E N T R E P O RT 2 0 1 1 Many people inside and outside the World Bank gave comments to the team. Valuable com- ments, guidance, and contributions were provided by Patricio Abinales, Ségolène Adam, James W. Adams, Douglas Addison, Ozong Agborsangaya-Fiteu, Sanjeev S. Ahluwalia, Ahmad Ahsan, Bryant Allen, Noro Andriamihaja, Edward Aspinall, Laura Bailey, Bill Battaile, Ferid Belhaj, Eric Bell, Christina Biebesheimer, Anna Bjerde, Brian Blankespoor, Chris Blattman, Edith H. Bowles, Mike Bourke, Sean Bradley, Cynthia Brady, Anne Brown, Gillie Brown, Colin Bruce, Paola Buendia, Roisín de Burca, William Byrd, Charles Call, Otaviano Canuto, Michael Car- nahan, Francis Carneiro, Paloma Anos Casero, Mukesh Chawla, Judy Cheng-Hopkins, Fantu Cheru, Punam Chuhan-Pole, Laurence Clarke, Kevin Clements, Cybèle Cochran, Colombia’s Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP), Daniele Conversi, Louise Cord, Pamela Cox, Jeff Crisp, Geoffrey Dabelko, Beth Daponte, Monica Das Gupta, Elisabeth David, Martin David, John Davidson, Scott Dawson, Shanta Devarajan, James Dobbins, Joost Draaisma, Gregory Keith Ellis, Ibrahim Elbadawi, Obiageli Kathryn Ezekweli, Kene Ezemenari, Judith Fagalasuu, Oscar Fernandez-Taranco, Ezzedine Choukri Fishere, Cyprian F. Fisiy, Ariel Fiszbein, Robert L. Floyd, Verena Fritz, Francis Fukuyama, Ivor Fung, Varun Gauri, Madhur Gautam, Germany’s Deutscher Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Coralie Gevers, Indermit S. Gill, Chiara Giorgetti, Giorgia Giovannetti, Edward Girardet, Jack Goldstone, Kelly Green- hill, Pablo de Greiff, Scott E. Guggenheim, Tobias Haque, Bernard Harborne, David Harland, Jenny Hedman, Joel Hellman, Bert Hofman, Virginia Horscroft, Elisabeth Huybens, Elena Ianchovichina, Patchamuthu Illangovan, Sana Jaffrey, Martin Jelsma, Emmanuel E. Jimenez, Hilde Johnson, Mary Judd, Sima Kanaan, Alma Kanani, Phil Keefer, Caroline M. Kende-Robb, Homi Kharas, Young Chul Kim, Mark Kleiman, Steve Knack, Sahr Kpundeh, Aart Kraay, Keith Krause, Aurélien Kruse, Arvo Kuddo, Sibel Kulaksiz, Julien Labonne, Tuan Le, Theodore Leggett, René Lemarchand, Anne-Marie Leroy, Brian Levy, Esther Loening, Ana Paula Fialho Lopes, Chris Lovelace, Andrew Mack, Charles Maier, Sajjad Malik, David Mansfield, Alexandre Marc, Roland Marchal, Ernesto May, Alastair McKechnie, Dave McRae, Pratap Mehta, Piers Merrick, Jeffrey Miron, Peter Moll, Mick Moore, Adrian Morel, Edward Mount- field, Robert Muggah, Izumi Nakamitsu, Eric Nelson, Carmen Nonay, Antonio Nucifora, Liam O’Dowd, the OECD/International Network on Conflict and Fragility (OECD/INCAF), Adyline Waafas Ofusu-Amaah, Patti O’Neill, Robert Orr, Marina Ottaway, Phil Oxhorn, Kiran Pandey, Andrew Parker, Martin Parry, Borany Penh, Nadia Piffaretti, Nicola Pontara, Rae Porter, Ben Powis, Giovanna Prennushi, Gérard Prunier, Vikram Raghavan, Bassam Rama- dan, Peter Reuter, Joey Reyes, Dena Ringold, David Robalino, Michael Ross, Mustapha Rouis, Jordan Ryan, Joseph Saba, Abdi Samatar, Nicholas Sambanis, Kirsti Samuels, Jane Sansbury, Mark Schneider, Colin Scott, John Sender, Yasmine Sherif, Janmejay Singh, David Sislen, Edu- ardo Somensatto, Radhika Srinivasan, Scott Straus, Camilla Sudgen, Vivek Suri, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), Almamy Sylla, Stefanie Teggemann, Thomas John Thomsen, Martin Tisné, Alexandra Trzeciak-Duval, Anne Tully, Carolyn Turk, Oliver Ulich, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Peter Uvin, Manuel Vargas, Antonius Verheijen, Thierry Vircoulon, M. Willem van Eeghen, Axel van Trotsenburg, Juergen Voegele, Femke Vos, Tjip Walker, John Wallis, El Ghassim Wane, Dewen Wang, Achim Wennmann, Alys Willman, Andreas Wimmer, Susan Wong, Rob Wrobel, Tevfik Yaprak, and Philip Zelikow. We are grateful to persons in locations across the world who participated and provided comments. In addition, we thank guest bloggers and members of the public who committed on our blog: http://blogs.worldbank.org/conflict/. Despite efforts to compile a comprehensive list, some who contributed may have been inadvertently omitted. The team apologizes for any oversights and reiterates its gratitude to all who contributed to this Report. Contents of the World Development Report 2011 Foreword Framework and Structure Glossary Methodological Note Abbreviations and Data Notes Overview PART ONE: The Challenge 1 Repeated Violence Threatens Development 2 Vulnerability to Violence PART TWO: Lessons from National and International Reponses 3 From Violence to Resilience: Restoring Confidence and Transforming Institutions 4 Restoring Confidence: Moving Away from the Brink 5 Transforming Institutions to Deliver Security, Justice, and Jobs 6 International Support to Building Confidence and Transforming Institutions 7 International Action to Mitigate External Stresses PART THREE: Practical Options and Recommendations 8 Directions for National Action 9 New Directions for International Support Bibliographical Note References Selected Indicators Selected World Development Indicators Index 58 Four easy ways to order Phone: Mail: Online: Fax: +1-703-661-1580 or P.O. Box 960 www.worldbank.org/publications +1-703-661-1501 1-800-645-7247 Herndon, VA 20172-0960, USA World Development Report 2011 PRICE QTY TOTAL Conflict, Security, and Development Paperback: (ISBN 978-0-8213-8439-8) SKU 18439 US$26.00 Hardcover: (ISBN 978-0-8213-8500-5) SKU 18500 US$50.00 Prices vary by country, as World Bank Publications offers geographical Subtotal discounts on its titles. Please visit publications.worldbank.org/discounts Within the U.S. (prepaid orders): $8 per order + $1 per item. Geographic discount* Outside the U.S.: • Nontrackable airmail delivery--US$7 per order + US$6 per item. Delivery time is 4-6 weeks. Shipping and handling** • Trackable couriered airmail delivery--US$20 per order + US$8 per item. Delivery time is 2 weeks. 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ECO-AUDIT Environmental Benefits Statement The World Bank is committed to preserving Saved: endangered forests and natural resources. • 40 trees The Office of the Publisher has chosen to • 13 million Btu of total print World Development Report 2011: energy Overview on recycled paper with 50 per- • 3,813 pounds of net cent postconsumer fiber in accordance greenhouse gases with the recommended standards for paper • 18,363 gallons of usage set by the Green Press Initiative, a waste water nonprofit program supporting publishers • 1,115 pounds of in using fiber that is not sourced from solid waste endangered forests. For more information, visit www.greenpressinitiative.org. With more than 1.5 billion people living in countries affected by conflict, the World Development Report 2011 (WDR) looks into the changing nature of violence in the 21st century. Interstate and civil wars characterized violent conflict in the last century; more pronounced today is violence linked to local disputes, political repression, and organized crime. The Report underlines the negative impact of persistent conflict on a country’s or a region’s development prospects, and notes that no low-income, conflict-affected state has yet achieved a single Millennium Development Goal. The risk of major violence is greatest when high levels of stress combine with weak and illegitimate national institutions. Societies are vulnerable when their institutions are unable to protect citizens from abuse, or to provide equitable access to justice and to economic opportunity. These vulnerabilities are exacer- bated in countries with high youth unemployment, growing income inequality, and perceptible injustice. Externally driven events such as infiltration by foreign combatants, the presence of trafficking networks, or economic shocks add to the stresses that can provoke violence. The WDR 2011 draws on the experiences of countries that have successfully managed to transition away from repetitive violence, pointing to a specific need to prioritize actions that build confidence between states and citizens, and develop institutions that can provide security, justice, and jobs. Government capacity is central, but technical competence alone is insufficient: institutions and programs must be accountable to their citizens if they are to acquire legitimacy. Impunity, corruption, and human rights abuses undermine confidence between states and citizens and increase the risks of violence. Building resilient institutions occurs in multiple transitions over a generation, and does not mean converging on Western institutional models. The WDR 2011 draws together lessons from national reformers escaping from repetitive cycles of violence. It advocates a greater focus on continuous preventive action, balancing a sometimes excessive concentration on post- conflict reconstruction. The Report is based on new research, case studies, and extensive consultations with leaders and other actors throughout the world. It proposes a toolkit of options for addressing violence that can be adapted to local contexts, as well as new directions for international policy intended to improve support for national reformers and to tackle stresses that emanate from global or regional trends beyond any one country’s control. 32561