THE POWER OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
Transforming Resources into Assets for Growth

COUNTRY CASE STUDY

Sierra Leone: PIM in a Donor-Dependent Post-Conflict Economy

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This case study is one of a number of country cases in the Public Investment Management Series. The country case studies accompany the volume, “The Power of Public Investment Management: Transforming Resources into Assets for Growth”, World Bank (2014), and apply a common methodology to assess PIM systems globally.
This chapter summarizes earlier work conducted for a Public Expenditure Review (PER) in 2009–10 (World Bank 2010) and subsequent presentations and discussions with Sierra Leonean authorities. While some of the issues raised in this chapter have been addressed, new issues have been arising due to sharply increased domestic spending on infrastructure. An addendum to the chapter summarizes these issues.

Sierra Leone is a small, fragile, post-conflict state on the coast of West Africa. When it emerged from its long civil war at the beginning of 2002, there were many pressing needs for recovery and reconstruction. As a consequence, Sierra Leone was one of the largest beneficiaries of foreign aid as a share of GDP and aid per capita. Projects focusing on reconstruction of basic infrastructure and on capacity-building for reestablishment of core government functions featured prominently in the Government’s development budget. The post-conflict infrastructure gap was quite large. More than 340,000 houses were completely destroyed and almost a million more needed rehabilitation. Over 65 percent of school buildings were damaged or burnt down, and over 76 percent of the primary health care infrastructure needed rehabilitation or reconstruction. Hospitals barely functioned outside of those in the three major towns, and district administration effectively ceased in all but a few government-controlled areas in the country. Water facilities, many already in disrepair, were rendered unusable by the dumping of cadavers, and sanitation facilities had collapsed. Roads deteriorated to the point of impassability, thus further cutting off already isolated communities.

As peace was consolidated, the level of external assistance has gradually declined from 15.5 percent of GDP in 2002 to 5.2 percent of GDP in 2008 as donors phased out their post-conflict allocations and the nation’s GDP expanded rapidly. However, social indicators remain very poor: Sierra Leone was ranked 180th out of 182 countries in the 2008–09 UN Human Development Index.

The fiscal stance of the country was successfully adjusted in response to the reduction in net external assistance. Overall fiscal balance improved from −8.3 percent of GDP in 2002 to −2.0 percent in 2007, mainly through a gradual reduction in the GDP shares for recurrent consumption and interest payments. The revenue effort was very low by international standards, with an average of only 11 percent of GDP collected between 2006 and 2008. Tax revenues are derived mainly from import duties. The country’s exports are heavily reliant on minerals, diamonds in particular, although bauxite, iron, gold, and rutile are also prominent.

Sierra Leone’s economic outcomes were seriously affected by the global economic downturn. The terms of trade fell by almost 7 percent for 2009, exports fell substantially, and real GDP growth was estimated to have declined to 4.0 percent. Fiscal expenditures in 2009 came under pressure from unanticipated spending needs, including additional costs associated with delays in completing the Bumbuna Hydroelectric Project (continued fuel imports being among these), payments to an additional private power provider, and additional counterpart funds to key road
projects. As a result, the overall fiscal balance was estimated to have worsened to \(-4.4\) percent of GDP.

Looking ahead, the Government seeks to restore a high rate of real growth and poverty reduction through increased public and private investment. *An Agenda for Change, Second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for 2008–12* (PRSPII, GoSL 2008) set out a vision of high economic growth driven by increased public investment. Specifically it set a minimum goal of \(7\) percent of GDP to be invested by Government on infrastructure alone, with additional amounts for other investments. The targets for public investment relied on high levels of external project assistance. Cumulative external financing over the period 2010–12 was expected to cover almost three-quarters of total public investment. In recent years, however, actual external project support has been less than \(60\) percent of the target level.

The Government does not operate a capital investment budget; rather it maintains a development budget that seeks to record most externally financed projects, Government contributions to those projects, and expenditures on the Government’s own projects. The development budget thus captures a mix of recurrent and capital spending. External donors provided \(80\) percent of the financing for the development budget between 2003 and 2009. To date, the role of the Parliament in selecting or monitoring projects has been minimal: the process is heavily donor-driven. The case study in this chapter is based mainly on work done for the 2009–10 *Public Expenditure Review* (World Bank 2010).

**Recent Trends in Development Spending**

The composition of projects appearing in the approved budget has changed over time in line with Sierra Leone’s post-conflict transition. Projects related to immediate post-conflict needs dropped from \(30\) percent of budgeted development spending in 2003 to \(3\) percent the next year and \(1\) percent thereafter (see table X.1). Spending on social services had been roughly \(22\) percent of the total development budget for 2003–05, but dropped sharply in 2006–07 to make room for increased spending on governance related projects. Spending on traditional infrastructure projects (as distinct from post-conflict reconstruction) almost doubled in value between 2003 and 2004 to a dominant share of \(44\) percent of the total and has been generally rising since.

**Table X.1: Planned Development Budget Spending, 2002–08**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
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<th>2007</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of projects (planned)</strong></td>
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<td>70</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of projects (% of total)</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Productive sector</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Post conflict priorities &amp; security sectors</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community development</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
By the time of the 2007 elections, some aspects of infrastructure provision, in particular, the Bumbuna Hydroelectric Project, had become the object of political competition. Key political parties sought to portray themselves as the best hope of urban swing voters in Freetown and the provinces as they sought electricity, waste removal, and uncongested roads. By 2008, infrastructure took up more than half the development budget (54 percent). Budgeted spending for community development attracted slightly higher shares from 2004 onward, when the Local Government Act was adopted. Support for the productive sectors such as agriculture has fluctuated without a clear trend between 7 and 17 percent of total development budget spending. Support for capacity-building has also fluctuated, ranging between 2 and 7 percent of total budgeted development spending. Parallel trends can be seen in project counts by category. It is noteworthy that infrastructure attracted the highest number of projects per year, averaging 25 percent of the total.

**Table X.2: Development Budget Spending, 2003–09**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As a share of GDP</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>A. External financing</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Domestic financing</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As a share of total government spending</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. External financing</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Domestic financing</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As a share of total</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and World Bank staff calculations.

Public investment proxied by actual spending from the development budget, fluctuated over time, from 5 percent of GDP in 2003 and 2004 to 6 percent of GDP in 2005, 3 percent in 2007, and 7 percent in 2009 (see table X.2.) Expenditures were unusually low in 2007 due to macroeconomic
constraints and distractions prior to the elections held in that year. Expenditures rose in 2008 due to the completion costs of the Bumbuna Hydroelectric Project, and they then rose further in 2009 due to construction and road work, much of it financed from domestic contributions to the development budget. When expressed as a share of total government spending, the development budget increased from 18 percent of the total in 2003 to 31 percent in 2009. Expressed as a share of total investment, the development budget accounted for an average of 48 percent. Most of the development budget was financed by the Government’s external development partners. The contribution from domestic resources remained at about 1 percent of GDP (aside from 2009, in which it was 2 percent of GDP), or just under a quarter of total development spending.

The composition of external aid has changed substantially in the last several years. The main sources of external assistance in 2006 and 2007 were budget support and project disbursements in almost equal measures. By contrast, project disbursements substantially outpaced budget support in 2008 and 2009 and continued in this fashion through 2012. Project disbursements in 2008 were 4.9 percent of GDP, compared to budget support worth 2 percent of GDP. In 2012, actual project support was 5.2 percent of GDP and budget support was 2 percent of GDP.

Aid receipts have been highly volatile, which has complicated expenditure management. One way to measure the volatility of aid is to compute the ratio of the standard deviation in aid flows to the average aid flow, referred to as the coefficient of variation. Between 2002 and 2008, the coefficient of variation in revenues was a low, non-volatile 0.05. By contrast, the coefficient of variation in project disbursements (grants and loans) over the same period was a moderately volatile 0.2. The coefficient of variation in budget support disbursements was 0.44, more than twice the volatility seen in project aid.

On average, deviations from programmed budget support explain roughly 57 percent of the budgetary deviations in discretionary primary expenditures, even though many other variables, such as revenues and domestic financing, were also important in specific years. The programmed timing and amounts of budget support are routinely deviated by wide margins. For example, in 2007 and 2008, on average, 16 percent of the programmed budget support was expected in the first quarter, 55 percent by mid-year, and 62 percent by the end of the third quarter. The corresponding outturns were only 4 percent (by the end of Q1), 4 percent (Q2), and 34 percent (Q3), with the full year outturn being only 63 percent of budget.

This unpredictability complicates expenditure management. For the first three quarters, Government authorities were faced with a choice of reducing expenditures or gambling that they can borrow domestically and repay in the fourth quarter when aid receipts were expected to appear.

The Government targeted increased development budget expenditures in spite of the global crisis. The 2010 Budget Speech (MOF 2010a) set out an aggressive expansion to 9.6 percent of GDP in 2010, 10.2 percent of GDP in 2011, and 10.4 percent in 2012. Half the expansion was to come from higher domestic contributions, primarily directed toward construction projects, which
increased from 1.3 percent of GDP in 2008–09 to 2.8 percent of GDP for 2010–12. The share of public investment in total spending was expected to increase by 14 percentage points, from an average of 26 percent of the total for the period 2005–09 to 40 percent of the total between 2010 and 2012. Domestic financing was expected to increase from average 1.3 percent of GDP in 2007–08 to 2.8 percent for 2010–12. External project financing was expected to grow from an estimated 6 percent of GDP in 2009 to 7.6 percent by 2012. With the exception of 2008, however, actual development spending almost always fell short of the budget targets, largely due to lower than expected external project financing.

**Institutional Mapping**

The main modality by which PIM is implemented in Sierra Leone is through central Government ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs). Local councils account for only a small share of public investment. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) do occasionally make large public investments, notably for power, water, and roads, and the Government does make loans in support of these investments from time to time.

As yet, there are very few public-private partnerships (PPPs), and no bundled “resources for infrastructure” projects. The PRSPII indicates the Government would like to enter into more PPPs, and the Government is considering a stronger legal framework to support this. The need to do so is evident; for example, in late 2007 the National Power Authority (NPA) entered a contract with an independent power provider that it could not sustain. The total value of the contract was estimated at US$65 million, or 3 percent of GDP, and the Government was required to pay US$6 million in extra-budgetary payments in 2009 and another US$6 million in 2010 to exit the contract.

The key stakeholders, defined as those who make public investment decisions, include the Office of the President, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), the local Government authorities, the implementing ministries, and the donors. In theory, the legal framework should regulate the roles and authorities of these stakeholders. In reality, the laws and regulations are incomplete and only partially observed.

The President and his direct advisors are playing a key role in the strategic orientation of public investment and monitoring project implementation. The President has also taken a very active role in driving implementation of his “Agenda for Change,” as set out in the PRSPII (GoSL 2008). He introduced performance agreements with each of the ministers with specific indicators and targets understood to be derived from the PRSPII. The Strategic Policy Unit (SPU) in the President’s Office actively monitors performance of ministers and their MDAs against the performance agreements. The SPU has six senior, highly experienced advisors (with sector-specific responsibilities), supported by four policy analysts. The SPU holds regular meetings with Project Implementation Units (PIUs) in MDAs to discuss progress on individual projects, and it attempts to resolve bottlenecks and improve cross-agency coordination. The SPU also makes occasional site visits to verify reported progress on projects. It has been actively promoting the preparation of sector development plans to facilitate implementation of the PRSP; for example, it is currently working on a Roads Sector Plan.
Elsewhere in the bureaucracy the key player is MoFED. In 2008 the Ministry of Finance (MoF) was combined with the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development (MoPED), creating MoFED. This was the third time that a merger of the two ministries has been attempted in recent decades, this time successfully. After the merger, former MoPED staff remained physically in their old building some distance from the rest of MoFED until 2009. There were difficulties in reconciling the relative seniority of the former Head of Planning in the new combined structure, and little was done to integrate the former MoPED staff structurally and functionally until recently.

The key PIM institutional unit within MoFED is the Central Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (CPM&E) Department. This department had its origins in the Central Planning Unit (CPU) in the former MoPED, which was meant to appraise all projects, central and local. This department suffered a decline in capacity over a number of years, having lost skilled staff to higher paying positions in Project Implementation Units (PIUs). Frustration among government leaders and donors at its lack of progress in coordinating preparation of PRSPII resulted in that responsibility being transferred on the authority of the President’s Office to the Development Assistance Coordination Office (DACO) in the Vice President’s Office. DACO was subsequently transferred from there to MoFED in 2009. DACO has responsibility for maintaining the Development Assistance Database, a database of donor-funded development projects. This is documented in DACO (2007).

Line ministries and their numerous donor-funded PIUs also play an important role in PIM. The PIUs are staffed by contractors who are paid at rates that are multiples higher than civil servants. In general, line ministries play more of an implementation role rather than a policy role, and have weak project planning and appraisal capacity (although there are one or two exceptions, such as the Ministries of Health and Agriculture).

Parliament plays only a minor role in considering the Development Budget when it is presented each year, due to capacity constraints (members of the Finance Committee have no offices or support staff), the lack of information on development spending they routinely receive from the executive, and a tendency to focus on constituency impacts rather than the national picture.

On the donor side, the four major donors—UK Department for International Development, the European Union, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank—provide varying combinations of budget support, sector support, and project funding. A range of other bilateral donors, including non-traditional donors such as China, also provide some support. Some other donors are non-resident and operate through NGOs.

The laws and regulations guiding investment decisions by the central Government are defined in the Constitution, the Government Budgeting and Accountability Act (GBAA) of 2005 (GoSL 2005a) and the Financial Management Regulations (FMR) 2007 (MOF 2007). The Constitution (Section 112, subsection 1) stipulates that the Minister of Finance is responsible for preparing and submitting to Parliament an estimate of public revenues and expenditure for the
next financial year, including development expenditure. The GBAA (section 42:2) and the 2007 FMR (section 2) charge the vote controller to ensure sound evaluation of projects and maintain records to show achievements of budgeted activities and projects. The FMR also require that estimates of capital works which extend over one year show the anticipated expenditure for the next financial year, the revised estimates (if any) for the works, the total amount actually expended so far as the accounts are complete, the total amount likely to be expended up to the beginning of the next financial year, and the source of funds and the anticipated year of receipt of funds for each capital works.

In terms of the broader public financial management (PFM) environment in which PIM takes place, a sustained program of reforms has been implemented since 2003, as summarized in Box X.1. By mid-2007, the adoption and implementation of these reforms placed Sierra Leone’s fiduciary arrangements almost on par with the regional average. This achievement contrasts strongly with the steep erosion in capacity in the years leading up to and during the civil war. However, a pressing issue with regard to the PFM legal framework is its implementation. Not all procedural requirements are being met, particularly with regard to budget execution.

**Box X.1: Key Reforms in Public Financial Management, 2004–08**

- Local governments, with local government elections, were reestablished after the war through the adoption and implementation of the Local Government Act (2004), with regulations issued in 2005.

- The Public Procurement Act of 2004 replaced a wasteful centralized procurement regime with a decentralized procurement system based on the principles of competition, transparency, and accountability.

- A weak legal foundation for fiduciary standards was strengthened by the GBAA in 2005 (GoSL 2005a) and by the adoption of new FMR in 2007 (MOF 2007).

- The Accountant General Department was strengthened by the appointment of a qualified Accountant-General and eight professional accountants after years of low capacity.

- The Annual Public Accounts and their audits were brought up to date after years of delays, and the quarterly publication of unaudited accounts has become a normal, routine procedure.

- The old centralized software for financial management was replaced with a new, decentralized system (IFMIS) that should both empower MDAs and increase their accountability.

- The capacity for external audit was strengthened by enhanced terms and conditions of service for the Office of the Auditor-General and by new recruitment and training.

The legal framework does not specify arrangements for strategy and priority setting, cost-effectiveness, or accountability, although it does set out institutional responsibilities and financial management requirements for investment projects. Specifically, there is no requirement that the
Cabinet set out priorities or strategies for public investment, globally or at the sector level. There are no requirements that formal standards or criteria be established for use when deciding to accept or reject a project, nor identification of institutional responsibilities for such decisions. Finally, little is required from MDAs or donors with regard to public investment purpose, monitorable outcome and progress indicators, or implementation requirements beyond financing. The net result is that the Government is not well equipped to reject low priority projects, reject projects that are not up to standards, or monitor progress towards clearly defined objectives.

In such circumstances, the formation of the development budget tends to be dominated by the two strongest actors: the donors and the Office of the President. In fact, these two actors tend to both select and monitor projects while the line ministries implement them and MoFED merely records the transactions, all to be discussed in the next sections. Most donor-financing is reported in budget documents, although some donor projects are off-budget, as are many projects implemented by NGOs.

**Performance of the PIM System**

This section provides an analysis of how the PIM system has been functioning against the eight must-have features and diagnostic indicators discussed in Chapter 2.

**Investment Guidance and Preliminary Screening**

In theory, the PRSP can provide high-level strategic guidance for public investment. In practice, in the immediate post-conflict phase in Sierra Leone most investment projects were largely donor-driven and most were selected in response to urgent post-conflict reconstruction needs. The Interim-PRSP established at war's end (GoSL 2001) and the subsequent first full PRSP (GoSL 2005) were used primarily as a means to attract as much donor support possible, thus deliberately avoiding any overt prioritization across or within sectors.

By contrast, the second PRSP was originally drafted with a specific call for prioritization in favor of infrastructure. Subsequent feedback from donors concerned about the continuing poor performance in the social sectors convinced the authorities to set out a more balanced approach with four priority areas: transport, energy, agriculture, and human development. PRSPII includes detailed goals to be achieved in each sector, along with notional cost estimates. Its use as a tool to guide the development of projects is limited, however, because it lacks clearly defined sector policies and programs that do not exceed realistic levels of external assistance which are accompanied by monitorable progress indicators and baselines.

An Aid Policy introduced in 2009 established a screening committee for proposed projects and sought donor cooperation in aligning project proposals with priorities set out in the PRSP II and various sector strategies. Some key sectors, however, had not developed adequate strategies at the close of 2009. In some cases, Government supported projects could have been handled by the
private sector, for example, the rehabilitation of sawmills and the distribution of tractors and seed rice.

**Formal Project Appraisal**

A project appraisal system is in place. According to instructions in recent budget call circulars (MoF 2010b), it is the responsibility of the requesting agencies to prepare an appraisal of each project based on a project appraisal template provided by MoFED. Their findings are then sent to MoFED for review. The appraisal template asks MDAs to justify the need for proposed project spending in terms of basic consistency with Government policy and strategic guidelines. The template also requires detailed technical and costing estimates based on previous similar project performance and market value for materials, respectively. The requesting MDAs are also asked to justify the proposed project as the most effective modality to implement the related policies.

In practice, only a small proportion of project proposals are carefully appraised, and the capacity for good project appraisal in Sierra Leone is limited. Agreement by a donor to finance a project is tantamount to the project being included in the budget—subject to the project conforming to Government priorities as they are understood, and any required counterpart financing being affordable. The incentive to maintain adequate project appraisal capacity is reduced in aid-dependent countries like Sierra Leone, since major donors generally conduct their own in-depth appraisals.

In Sierra Leone too, the quality of domestically financed investment projects is often low. MDA budget submissions typically lack well-specified and well-justified project proposals. MDAs are not required to indicate the future recurrent cost impacts of development projects on their budgets. There is also only limited appraisal by Local Council Planning Officers of projects to be financed from Local Council Development Grants (see GOSL 2006.) While these grants currently fund small-scale activities, the size of projects was expected to increase and some selected appraisal by the local planners would have been desirable.

Project appraisal capacity was reduced over time as staff from planning units of MDAs (ministries, departments, and agencies), originally allocated there from MoPED, have joined donor financed PIUs, attracted by the much higher salaries. Some important line ministries, such as the Ministry of Public Works, Housing and Infrastructure, had no planning unit or planning staff (for example, the planning function related to road maintenance was transferred to the Sierra Leone Road Authority when it was established as an autonomous entity). The Ministry of Education had one staff member in its planning unit (although there is a large number of staff in its PIUs). There may be improvements in the future: The Public Sector Reform Unit in the Office of the President is preparing an implementation plan based on the recommendations contained in a number of Management and Functional Reviews for key MDAs. Among these recommendations is the suggestion that Policy and Planning Units should be established in key line ministries.

Weaknesses in project appraisal are of considerably less concern in a country where major donors generally conduct in-depth project appraisal. However, for a number of reasons, a sound
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PIM system requires independent capacity by the Government to appraise individual donor-funded projects. The reasons for this are as follows: (1) to ensure that full account is taken of domestic conditions and capacity constraints, local impacts, and prospective developments of which donors may not be fully aware; (2) possible interactions between projects that require some adjustment to project design, such as sequencing or phasing of implementation; (3) donors are most focused up to the point of physical completion and handover of a project, whereas the Government has to operate and maintain the assets so as to deliver public services for many years more; and (4) some donor assistance is in the form of budget support, effectively creating a reliance on domestic appraisal capacity.

In addition, some donors are willing to finance development projects, but do not themselves develop and appraise the projects. In fact, some donors have expressed clear interest in providing financing to Sierra Leone but have not done so because there are no projects that have been developed by the Government to a sufficient stage (such as a feasibility study). The lack of capacity in MDAs and in MoFED to develop projects at least to feasibility stage means that Sierra Leone has been missing out on significant additional financing from these sources.

**Independent Review of Appraisal**

Responsibility for independent review of appraisal lies with the Central Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation (CPM&E) Division in MoFED. The reliance by MDAs on donors to conduct project appraisal is repeated in MoFED. Indeed, interviews with various officials suggest that staff in the former MoDEP often did rely on the appraisals done by the donors, irrespective of their quality.

The CPM&E Division has a staff establishment of around 20, but its staffing was only 10 civil servants, plus three local technical assistants. The civil servants all had degrees but none had an engineering degree or a similar technical background. The staff had inadequate resources and they lacked motivation, due in part to the very large gap between their remuneration and that of LTAs in MoFED and the PIUs. The division is marginalized within MoFED, and seems unclear of its role.

There would be many benefits to building the capacity for independent Government review of donor-appraised projects. Such review of individual project appraisals is desirable to counter the clear empirical tendency to “optimism bias” among those preparing projects (both donors and MDAs)—that is, the tendency for project proposals to systematically overestimate the benefits and underestimate the costs of projects.

The Government also needs to analyze whether the overall portfolio of individual projects constitutes a well-designed program, as well as to ensure that the counterpart costs and future recurrent cost impacts are affordable. Aggregating projects across donors to form an overall “program” may reveal concerns about the sectoral allocation, regional distribution, overall impact on vulnerable groups, or affordability and sustainability. While the major donors now coordinate closely at a strategic level and align their project portfolios with the PRSPII priorities, this is less
true of some other donors, and there is significant activity by NGOs outside the donor coordination framework.

Project Selection and Budgeting

Sierra Leone’s development budget continues to include projects with recurrent elements, despite Government efforts to redefine the development budget as a capital investment budget and to better integrate this budget with the recurrent budget. Currently the formation of the development budget is done separately from the recurrent budgets for personnel and for goods and services. There are two main reasons for this method: (1) donors and the Government are not well informed about total recurrent costs because they have not worked out a way to monitor the distinction between recurrent and capital costs financed from project disbursements and (2) there are no formal requirements to consider the implications of project entry for the wage bill or for demands for goods and services—whether in the year of entry, during implementation, or after project completion.

The guidance provided to MDAs regarding the inclusion or prioritization of investment projects in the development budget is insufficient. The budget call circular (MOF 2010b), normally issued in June or July, provides ceilings for each MDA for the coming year and indicative ceilings for the following two years as guidance. However, the MDAs do not respect the ceilings because they are usually later revised significantly, and because the BCC is issued before Cabinet endorsement of the Budget Framework Paper and before the macroeconomic and fiscal forecast is finalized. Consequently, MDAs treat the BCC as an initial form-filling exercise and a bid for resources that they know will be allocated later.

Heavy dependency on donors for public investment brings an additional complication for budget formulation. Most donor agencies do not have strong incentives to make the distinction between recurrent and capital costs associated with their project proposals and, even when such information is available, they do not have strong incentives to seek Government assurances that recurrent obligations will be adequately financed over the full lifespan of the new capital assets resulting from their investments. This is because the performance of the donor agencies is more often measured in terms of number of projects completed and project funds disbursed, rather than results on the ground.

The Government of Sierra Leone has long intended to make the transition from a development budget to an investment budget in which operations and maintenance costs associated with projects are included in the recurrent budget. The authorities made a substantial investment in a new computerized management information system that should facilitate such a transition. The World Bank team recommended that the authorities insert specific amendments into the GBAA and FMR that would mandate the clear identification of recurrent activities financed from project aid, as well as the identification of recurrent implications of capital investments and that they back this with a comprehensive program of training.
Project Implementation

Until 2008 the development budget was consistently underspent. As table X.3 shows, part of the problem may have been overly optimistic targets for project loans and grants. These progressively came down over several years to the point where actual spending exceeded the intended targets in 2008 and in the 2009 target for domestic development.

Table X.3 Development Budget Outturns, 2003–09

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget category</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actual as share of planned (%)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Project loans and grants</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Domestic contribution</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and staff calculations.

Almost all projects suffer delays beyond the initial estimated time. Examples include the reconstruction of the treasury building, construction of an office for the Vice President, and building of the Waterloo-Kent road. Table X.4 shows that two implementing agencies stand out with especially low spending rates: the Ministry of Education and the Road Authority. Each displays average annual spending rates well below the weighted sample average of 13 percent (and the unweighted average of 18 percent).

Table X.4 Project Implementation Status, 2003–08

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Projects</th>
<th>Number of Projects</th>
<th>Amount (US$)</th>
<th>Undisbursed (US$)</th>
<th>Financing Utilized (%)</th>
<th>Average Rate of Spending per Year (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Forestry</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>101,942,800</td>
<td>78,893,560</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power and Water</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>109,030,000</td>
<td>48,402,992</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>81,184,432</td>
<td>31,768,667</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat’l Comm. for Social Action</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>76,925,121</td>
<td>9,521,719</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone Road Authority</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>122,375,000</td>
<td>112,112,268</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance and Economic Dev’t</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>39,653,878</td>
<td>3,927,243</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Sanitation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>59,500,000</td>
<td>25,111,892</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone Water Company</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9,245,000</td>
<td>5,594,323</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the President</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>763,260</td>
<td>613,260</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>48,142,594</td>
<td>15,674,571</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and World Bank staff calculations.

Notes:

a. From a sample of 61 projects. Some sectors and donors were omitted.
Most of the delays were traced to poor or nonexistent procedures, low capacity, and inadequate funding. In the case of domestically financed projects, the failure to ensure adequate resources was the key reason for delays. In the case of donor-financed projects, delays in completing projects were due to lack of counterpart funding, rigid project effectiveness conditions, the complex nature of some project designs, slow processing of withdrawal application forms, delays in procurement, issues related to contract management, and weak capacity in the implementing agencies. These problems generally reflect weak implementation capacity within the MDAs. Project delays often result in significant cost escalation. Some of these issues are discussed in the next section.

Anecdotal evidence of numerous abandoned projects was widespread. Reasons given for abandoning projects were changing political priorities of a new Minister, interruptions to funding, and corruption. This situation suggests serious weaknesses in project reporting and monitoring, as well as a lack of mechanisms to adjust project funding during implementation.

The 2004 Procurement Act requires each MDA to produce a detailed procurement plan, while the 2007 Financial Management Regulations require that these plans be submitted along with the budget requests from each MDA. The Budget Bureau reviews and approves or rejects each plan from central Government MDAs in consultation with the National Public Procurement Authority (NPPA). Some of the requirements associated with procurement plans have been met quite successfully. By early 2009, 25 major MDAs and all 19 local councils had produced their own plans compared to just 9 large MDAs in 2006.10

However, most MDAs provide their procurement plans several months after submitting their budget requests, rather than simultaneously as the FMR requires. Only 50 percent of procurement expenditure in 2006 and 49 percent in 2007 was for planned items. Only 59 percent of procurements used the planned procurement modality (competitive bidding or sole source procurement) in 2006; this share fell to 40 percent in 2007 due mostly to contract splitting. In 2006 approximately 29 percent of the number of contracts over the small purchase thresholds were awarded on the basis of open competition, that is, following international or national competitive bidding.11 In 2008 the share was 69 percent, showing a significant improvement over the 2006 baseline. However, aside from donor-funded projects, only minimal progress was achieved toward transparency obligations. The result is the vast majority of goods and services procured through the recurrent budget go unadvertised, contract awards typically go unpublished, and quarterly reports from the NPPA are also generally missing or unpublished.

While the NPPA trained many mid-level and senior Government staff to serve as procurement officers, it was clear that this was not sufficient to produce good results, because officers after training are often transferred to other jobs. The NPPA examined various solutions including the creation of an independent cadre of procurement officers. The President announced in 2012 that such a cadre would be created. In addition, under the Public Procurement Act, procurement committees within each ministry or agency are mandated to "review and approve
evaluation reports and contract award recommendations.” In spite of this, some ministries have reportedly attempted to overrule the recommendations of their Procurement Committees.

It was evident at the time that the mainstream project reporting arrangements had broken down, and ad hoc arrangements sprung up as a consequence. Quarterly progress reports from PIUs were regarded as unreliable. As a consequence, a number of agencies had become involved in monitoring progress in implementation. In 2009 the Multilateral Donors Section in MoFED initiated a more systematic and intensive effort to monitor project progress, including frequent site visits. As noted earlier, the Strategic Policy Unit in the Office of the President also conducts regular project monitoring meetings with PIUs and makes occasional site inspection visits. Also in use are mechanisms involving regular donor oversight and regular progress meetings with PIUs in which the CPM&E Division in MoFED participates.

Donor dependency combined with delays in counterpart funding can cause substantial harm to project implementation. As noted, the budget process tends to underestimate counterpart funding requirements. And the budgeted counterpart funds are not always provided because programmed revenues and grants often fall short. The consequence is that all but the most favored projects end up getting far less than they actually need, which in turn can trigger a substantial reduction in external financing since projects are often geared at a ratio of 3 to 1. The outcome in 2007 is a good example: shortfalls in counterpart funds led to steep reductions in actual disbursements relative to budget targets. The best solution to the problem of resource uncertainty is to try to get a better match of recurrent spending and all domestic contributions to the development budget with domestic revenues.

Donor reliance on PIUs for project implementation can also create problems. In the 2010 Budget Speech (MOF 2010a), the Minister of Finance criticized the PIUs for delayed execution of projects, and indicated that MoFED was stepping up its project monitoring and undertaking a critical assessment of PIUs. The concern was that PIU managers, seeking to maintain access to high donor paid salaries, tend to delay project completion or even arrange for continued funding after a project has been physically completed.

Finally, donor dependency can create situations where there are multiple systems of project implementation and reporting that can undermine the Government's mainstream institutions. For instance, different donors have their own project implementation manuals, impose their own procurement standards and regulations, require technical supervision and sign-off by foreign consultants rather than the Ministry of Works, and require reporting in their own formats. The cumulative impact is that there are no national (or MDA-specific) project implementation manuals and no standardized reporting templates, and the ability of the implementing ministries to fulfill their respective procurement and technical functions is compromised.

**Project Adjustment**

There are no formal mechanisms to trigger a review of a project’s continued justification during project implementation.
Facility Operations

The long-run operation and maintenance of capital assets is frequently a problem in Sierra Leone. Once an investment is complete, donors typically hand over assets in good condition and fit for purpose. However, complaints arose that some locally supervised construction projects for schools and other facilities had been of poor quality. Although the initial quality of operation of assets, whether roads or hospitals, is generally acceptable, the quality of operation generally deteriorates over time.

Part of the problem is poor awareness on the part of each Ministry of all the assets in place that need adequate funding. Asset registers are infrequently updated and generally incomplete. Another part of the problem is insufficient funding for operations and maintenance. Given the lack of information at the appraisal and budget formation stages regarding recurrent funding requirements, it is not surprising that maintenance funding is especially inadequate. Overall allocations to maintenance fell from 1.6 percent of the total in 2006 to 1.4 percent of the total in 2008, while the actual shares were smaller, falling from 1.1 percent of the total in 2006 to 0.9 percent in 2008. This low spending creates problems. Expenditures on new vehicles, for example, are almost certainly higher than necessary: many MDAs were given allocations to operate their vehicles without any corresponding allocations for maintenance. Within the health sector, spending on the maintenance of buildings, equipment, and vehicles was very small, accounting for an average of only 0.4 percent of total spending 2006–08. None of the hospitals spent anything on maintenance in 2008. A parallel point can be made with regard to staffing requirements: there is a general lack of qualified technical staff to operate and/or oversee the operations of the various facilities and other capital assets of the Government.

Project Evaluation

While in Government many units are titled “monitoring and evaluation,” in fact virtually no systematic domestic evaluation by Government MDAs has been taking place. While the Economic Affairs Department (EAD) within MoFED has a mandate to monitor projects, it does not have the capacity to do so, nor does it have a mandate for evaluation. The GBAA and FMR do not require ex-post evaluation. Moreover, the general lack of documented project objectives, projected timelines, and appraisal analysis makes it almost impossible to assess whether a completed project has achieved its intended objectives and whether the objectives were met on time at the approved cost. Ex-post project evaluation is usually done only for externally funded projects, where it is required by the financing institutions, and it is normally carried out by those institutions’ staff or consultants hired by them. To remedy this situation, the authorities may want to consider amending the GBAA and FMR to require ex-post reviews of key projects, whether conducted by appropriate MDAs or by the donors. They would also need to back this requirement with strong efforts to improve the quality of project appraisal and record keeping.
Conclusions, Achievements, and Challenges

Donor dependency has multiple consequences for PIM. Governments like the Republic of Sierra Leone may seek to cast their nets as widely as possible to encourage the widest range of donors to contribute to any sectors that are of interest: prioritization is secondary to fundraising. Capacity to appraise projects may be desirable, but the incentive to pursue capacity-building is minimized when donors conduct and finance their own appraisals. The leadership within MoFED has well understood the need to identify the recurrent requirements for operations and maintenance and replace the development budget with an investment budget, yet donors have little incentive to provide the necessary information.

Donor rules requiring counterpart funding—while understandable to signal ownership and burden-sharing—can magnify the impact of resource shortfalls because aid is often geared at ratios of 3 to 1 or more. Project implementation can be slowed when donor-financed PIU managers fear that project completion means the end of their above-average salaries.

Finally, there is almost no domestic evaluation of project outcomes by Government MDAs. Ex-post evaluation of projects is usually done only for externally funded projects where it is required by the financing institutions, and it is normally carried out by their staff or consultants hired by them.

While challenges exist for all eight of the “must haves,” the binding constraints on PIM system performance at the margin would appear to be weak project appraisal prior to selection in the budget, and weak monitoring of actual performance in implementing projects. Of these two, the fastest gains can probably be achieved through more intensive and systematic review of project implementation, given the length of the PIM cycle and the large proportion of the development budget taken up by already-approved projects. This could help to significantly improve the speed and quality of implementation and project completion. It would also help to identify the key problems in implementation and to produce the pressure and impetus needed to strengthen these elements. The lessons learned could then be fed into improving the design of new projects.

On the other hand, the weaknesses in the planning stage of the PIM cycle are particularly important to address, given the intended significant increase in the scale of development spending under the PRSPII. Weaknesses in project appraisal, independent review of appraisal, and project selection and budgeting are of less concern when the bulk of development spending each year is committed to ongoing (already approved) projects. This has been the case to an extent in recent years. However, the intention to scale-up spending on key areas of public investment points to the strategic importance of strengthening capacity in these areas.

The Government also appears to be missing out on some additional aid due to its inability to develop solid project proposals for consideration by some donors. In addition, developing appraisal capacity could help to identify projects that should be halted during implementation because cost increases or other changes during execution undermine the justification for the project.
The Government amended the GBAA (2005) in 2011 to require the preparation of a rolling public investment program (PIP) with the annual budget. To be selected into the PIP, a project must have been subject to appraisal and must meet specific financing criteria; selection into the PIP would be a pre-condition for inclusion in the budget. The authorities were also considering revising the FMR to require that the BCC include an expenditure ceiling for the development budget and provide more specific guidance about the criteria for project entry into the budget. Specific information to be requested by the BCC could include well-developed cost estimates, including operating and maintenance requirements for inclusion in the recurrent budget; domestic counterpart funding requirements; a procurement plan for the project; an annually updated financing plan; and evidence that ongoing projects are making satisfactory progress against approved targets.

Finally, there is a pressing need for a sound policy and management framework to be put in place for PPPs. Experience in Sierra Leone has already demonstrated the magnitude of the risks these instruments can create for Government. A PPP Act was drafted in 2013 but had not been adopted at the time of this writing.

Such changes could signal the Government’s commitment to reform and could strengthen MoFED’s hand in dealing with MDAs. The introduction of a PIP has the potential to significantly improve the quality of investment planning, provided it is well designed and duly implemented. It can help the Government to more pro-actively manage the allocation of donor-financing, and, provided it is tightly connected to the PRSP, could be a useful tool to help “populate” the PRSP with well-designed projects. A PIP can also help develop a more forward-looking approach to public investment, contributing to a better Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) and thereby to enhanced overall fiscal control and sectoral allocation—provided the PIP is tightly integrated under and fully consistent with the MTEF.

Reforms of the legal framework would need to be accompanied by significant capacity-building efforts. This would include restructuring the CPM&E and Economic Affairs departments within MoFED, recruiting new management and additional professional staff, and providing in-country training on project appraisal and project implementation. Substantial technical assistance would be required to help MoFED successfully implement the PIP.

A major effort would also be required to build capacity in MDAs. While the initial focus might be on building capacity in MoFED, efforts should commence in parallel to build capacity in MDAs, starting with those that are key to the PRSP II, as well as in local council planning offices. In the medium term a substantial effort is likely to be required to institutionalize the capacity in Sierra Leone for training in project appraisal, implementation and monitoring and evaluation. The ongoing effort to reform the PIUs and launch effective civil service reform will doubtless be critical to the overall capacity building objective.
Addendum

By 2011, none of the recommendations made above had been rejected by the authorities, and two had been partially implemented. Amendments to the Government Budgeting and Accountability Act (2005) were tabled in October 2010 to reintroduce the concept of a public investment program and to tighten up the criteria for entry of new projects into the budget. This welcome change was backed by the issuance of supporting regulations in June 2012. With regard to capacity, MoFED added a few new staff to the EAD. This first step needs to be followed by a program of sustained training, not only for EAD but for other units inside MoFED and inside the line ministries.

Recent fundamental policy changes have overshadowed the incremental changes described above. In particular, the Government sought to sharply increase its investments in new infrastructure throughout the country and chose to do so mainly from domestic rather than donor financing. Specifically, the domestic contribution to the development budget in 2010 increased to a peak of 45 percent from only 24 percent in 2009. As a consequence, the domestic contribution grew to 3 percent of GDP in 2010 from 2 percent in 2009. Expressed as a share of total government spending, the domestic contribution grew to 17 percent in 2010 from 7 percent in 2009. These shares have declined slightly in 2011 and 2012 from their 2010 peak but they remained well above the 2007-09 shares. This expansion was part of the reason why the overall fiscal deficit worsened from 3.2 percent of GDP in 2009 to 5.0 percent of GDP in 2010 and an estimated 5.6 percent of GDP in 2012.

Addendum to Table 2: Development Budget Spending, 2007-12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As a Share of GDP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. External Financing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Domestic Financing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As a Share of Total Government Spending</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>A. External Financing</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Domestic Financing</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>As a Share of Total Investment a/</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Financing as a Share of Total Dev.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and World Bank staff calculations.
Notes: Actual spending on the development budget. Some totals do not sum due to rounding.
a. The Government share in total investment fell in 2010 as private investments in iron ore projects accelerated.

In addition, there appears to have been some institutional fragmentation of responsibilities for the PIP that took place in 2010. If not addressed, this fragmentation could pose a risk to the fiscal stance as well as the quality of public investment. There may therefore be merit in reviewing the current situation on the ground with a view to consolidating the institutional arrangements for
PIP. In this context, as suggested in the conclusion to the chapter, the binding constraints on PIM system performance continue to be weak project appraisal prior to selection in the budget, and weak monitoring of actual performance in implementing projects.

These changes do not take away from the messages in this chapter concerning donor roles and responsibilities, but rather they add to the urgency of addressing the parallel point made here with regard to building domestic-capacity for the entire PIM cycle, from planning to evaluation to financing, project supervision and contract management. In this context, it is important to ensure that MoFED serve as a full partner in the process rather than merely serving as financier.
Notes

1. The chapter also draws on the December 2007 Public Financial Management Performance Assessment Report (RoSL 2008); comments in the second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSPII, GoSL 2008) on experience implementing PRSPI (GoSL 2005b); the 2010 Budget Speech (MOF 2010a); and a number of other government documents and interviews with officials and donors (see References).

2. See World Bank (2010) Table 4.2. Some of these projects had begun as early as 2000, before the formal declaration of the war’s end.

3. The estimates that follow are from the Sierra Leone National Recovery Strategy Assessment of December 2003 (GoSL 2003).

4. The standard deviation is a measure of how dispersed data are around a mean (average). For data with a normal distribution, one standard deviation above and below the mean will capture 68 percent of all observations; two standard deviations above and below the mean will capture 95 percent of all observations.

5. Under Sierra Leone’s program with the IMF, domestic borrowing targets have been adjusted upward when budget support falls short of the targeted level. The 2009–10 Public Expenditure Review (World Bank 2010) discusses additional options, including a better alignment between revenues and expenditures, multi-year commitments from donors, the use of an appropriate fiscal rule, and the use of a stabilization fund.

6. The most substantive of these has been the construction and operation of the Bumbuna Hydroelectric Project. The terms of the partnership are not fully transparent and have evolved over time. By end-2012, there were no laws or regulations that set out clear lines of responsibility for service delivery, financing, and risk-sharing.

7. Sierra Leone received a total score on 28 PEFA indicators of 52, compared to the regional average of 60. This score is arrived at by giving 4 points for an A, 3.5 for a B+, 3 for a B, etc., down to 1 for a D. The maximum score on 28 indicators is 112. See the Sierra Leone External PEFA Assessment, Final Report (GoSL 2007). The regional average is calculated from the most recent PEFA scores from 17 countries.

8. This is an oversimplification. MoFED does maintain an Economic Affairs Department, inherited from the old Ministry of Development and Planning, that is meant to process loan withdrawal applications and monitor projects. At the time of this writing, the department did not have the capacity to effectively fulfill its mandate.

9. An example is the UK technical assistance to the armed forces. While the Sierra Leonean authorities indicated that there are many such projects in several sectors, they were not able to provide any data that would allow an analysis of their magnitude, composition, or impact.
10. There are about 74 MDAs, 19 local councils, and 24 public enterprises. The majority of procurement expenditure is now brought within NPPA supervision.


12. Evaluation is defined here as the attempt to demonstrate an empirical connection between government spending (or other intervention) and impacts on the community, such that there is a basis for claiming that government spending (or intervention) “caused” the change in outcomes.

References


COUNTRY CASE STUDY: SIERRA LEONE

PIM in a Donor-Dependent Post-Conflict Economy

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COUNTRY CASE STUDY: SIERRA LEONE

PIM in a Donor-Dependent Post-Conflict Economy

World Bank, 2010. From the assessment of procurement indicator PI#19, with revision for correct thresholds. Data received in December 2009.

Evaluation is defined here as the attempt to demonstrate an empirical connection between government spending (or other intervention) and impacts on the community, such that there is a basis for claiming that government spending (or intervention) "caused" the change in outcomes.