The PRS as Entry Point for Improving Governance in Fragile States
A Case Study

Vincent Fruchart
The PRS as Entry Point for Improving Governance in Fragile States
A Case Study

Vincent Fruchart
# Table of Contents

Executive Summary .................................................................................................................................................. iv

1. Background to the Issue Note .......................................................................................................................... 1
   Action and Learning Program on governance .................................................................................................. 1
   Lessons from SDV-DFID program .................................................................................................................... 1
   The governance support program in Côte d'Ivoire .......................................................................................... 2
   Methodological issues ..................................................................................................................................... 3

2. On Governance and Development .................................................................................................................. 4
   Political economic framework ......................................................................................................................... 4
   Operational perspectives on governance ......................................................................................................... 5
   Is "good governance" a good development strategy? ...................................................................................... 7
   Governance work in neo-patrimonial and fragile states .................................................................................. 9

3. PRSP, Development, and Governance ........................................................................................................ 11
   A brief history of poverty reduction strategies .............................................................................................. 11
   Two perspectives on PRSP and development ................................................................................................. 11
   PRSP in fragile and conflict settings – prior findings ..................................................................................... 13

4. PRS Support: the Practice ............................................................................................................................ 15
   Governance support and external agency ........................................................................................................ 15
   Support to PRS elaboration ............................................................................................................................ 16
   Support to monitoring and evaluation systems ............................................................................................ 17
   Learning and perspectives ............................................................................................................................... 18
   Next step: ....................................................................................................................................................... 20

Annex I: Journal of Support Activities in Côte d'Ivoire ...................................................................................... 21
   Background .................................................................................................................................................... 21
   Institutional Framework for Monitoring and Evaluation ............................................................................. 22
   Facilitation of Policy Matrix Process ........................................................................................................... 22
   PRS Monitoring and Evaluation System ........................................................................................................ 24
   Organizational development ........................................................................................................................... 25

ANNEXE II: COTE D'IVOIRE PRSP 2009 – SECOND SECTION, CHAPTER 3 .................................................... 26
   3.4 Cadre institutionnel de suivi de la mise en œuvre du DSRP ................................................................. 26
   3.5 Les processus de suivi de la mise en œuvre de la SRP ........................................................................ 33
   3.6 chronogramme et plan de finalisation des matrises d'action du dsvp .................................................. 36

ANNEX III: POLICY MATRIX FOR JUSTICE – as of March 2010 ..................................................................... 38
Executive Summary

The Issue Note discusses the rationale for, and presents the initial results of an innovative method of governance support conducted through the preparation and implementation of Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) in fragile states. The experiment was conducted in the context of an Action and Learning Program on governance in fragile and conflict-affected countries.

The Note first examines the political economic framework prevailing in fragile states, and particularly the neo-patrimonial dynamics which structure political agents behavior, as they have been studied, notably, by Chabal and Daloz; Douglass North, John Wallis and Barry Weingast; and Margaret Levi.

It is suggested – on operational grounds – that governance support, which has focused mostly on democracy or 'good governance' issues, adopt a third perspective and focus also on the capacity of a state to develop and implement policies, in part because this domain is often politically less sensitive and thus more amenable to intervention.

This recommendation is based in part on the results of research carried out by the Agence Française de Développement on the relationship between economic development and institutions; the research shows that the variables explaining the dynamics of economic 'take-off' correspond for the most part to the institutional function of “coordination of actors and expectations”.

On the basis of these analyses, the Note argues that the PRS may represent a promising entry point for governance support work, notably because PRS preparation and implementation involves teams of dedicated national technocrats whose interests are at variance with those of the political class, which, in this domain, often practices an attitude of benevolent indifference.

The Note looks at the relatively brief history of PRSs and notes that they have been reviewed from a classical economics perspective: whether the PRSs' proposed policies 'got it right.' It argues that an institutionalist perspective, on the other hand, will rather look at the institutional processes from which the PRSP is developed, and concludes that PRS support will be more effective if it is focused on issues of methodology and process facilitation rather than analytics.

The last chapter describes, in operational terms, the type of PRS support that has been provided through the experiment in the Côte d'Ivoire case: methodological support and process facilitation were provided for the preparation of the PRS policy matrices and the design of its monitoring and evaluation system.

It concludes by proposing a set of results that can be monitored to assess the impact of this type of approach – not only for governance in the meaning of the capacity of a state to develop and implement policies, but also for governance in its broader, more traditional meaning.
1. Background to the Issue Note

**Action and Learning Program on governance**

The governance support intervention described in this Issue Note is a key element of an Action and Learning Program on governance in fragile and conflict-affected countries (FCS), which has been implemented by SDV and received funding from the French Government. The overall objective of this Action and Learning Program has been to identify ways in which governance approaches and tools for intervention may need to be adapted to better fit FCAC situations, and to propose possible new modes of governance support in these specific contexts.

Several activities have been undertaken in the context of this Program. First, a review of international experience of governance reform in FCS was undertaken. Second, Côte d’Ivoire was selected as a case study for a governance support intervention, to be followed by a study of – third – access to justice and security in Central African Republic. The objective of the governance intervention in Côte d’Ivoire has been to provide support to the Government at a critical juncture, while further testing the possibility of using the PRS as an entry point for improving governance in fragile and conflict-affected countries; this is the topic of this Issue Note.

It is of note that seeds for this governance support intervention were planted by an earlier analytical and technical-assistance program jointly undertaken by the World Bank’s Social Development Department (SDV) and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID). The SDV-DFID program had focused on how fragile and conflict-affected countries could develop effective poverty reduction strategies, and whether PRS could be designed in a way that could help to stem violence and build peace in these contexts.

**Lessons from SDV-DFID program**

The program, which concluded in 2008, focused on the particular challenges to effective poverty reduction in 13 different fragile and conflicted-affected countries. It began with a retrospective study of PRS lessons in nine of the countries and later provided technical assistance to PRS planning in six countries to strengthen the focus on conflict challenges and to gather further lessons on how best to do it. In that context, interventions were organized in Burundi, Central African Republic and Haiti to support PRS preparations with a focus strictly on issues related to reconstruction and violence prevention.

The main outputs of the limited interventions (two to three months in each case) conducted in the three countries have been thought-through matrices for a few strategic sectors, which had been produced by national stakeholders and which the Government could actually use as a road map. In one case the output has also included a coherent institutional framework for PRS implementation and monitoring and evaluation. In addition, there have also been results in terms of increased ownership of the strategy by the Government, or at least by some senior civil servants in the Government, as well as capacity building and knowledge transfer.

One of the main lessons drawn from the experience was that, rather than providing substantive support on the content of the strategy, it was more effective to offer methodological support and work with the national PRSP teams, providing

---

1 French Trust Fund for Post-Conflict Governance Framework (TF 070861), Coopération Française – Ministère des Affaires Étrangères.
2 “Governance, Fragility and Conflict, Reviewing International Governance Reform Experiences in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries”, by Ozong Agborsangaya-Fiteu, World Bank, October 2009.
methodological tools, process facilitation, training, coaching, and strategic and organizational advice. It had been observed that in these countries, government staff have little experience in rigorous policy planning and are often unfamiliar with the tools necessary for elaborating and setting up the PRSs' implementation and monitoring instruments (logical framework, implementation mechanisms, monitoring and evaluation systems, indicators, etc.).

There are naturally constraints and costs associated with this type of intervention: it requires facilitators with a good grasp of poverty reduction issues and policies, with effective interpersonal and group facilitation skills, and an understanding of learning processes. It also calls for patience while letting the national staff manage the process at its own pace; it is labor intensive; and it functions best on a long term basis. In many ways, this support is hard to manage within the existing structures of development assistance, which may explain why it has been scarce. However, the conclusion reached with these experiments is that this methodological assistance fills a crucial gap, and helps governments develop a fundamental link in their dialogue with both internal and external stakeholders, meaning a coherent, manageable and effective PRS on the basis of which all agents can organize and coordinate.

The program in Côte d'Ivoire was an experiment to test whether this new support approach, which had been used with a narrow focus and for only a very limited time in the three countries of the DFID program, could be successfully extended in its scope and its reach.

**The governance support program in Côte d'Ivoire**

The governance support program in Côte d'Ivoire was modeled operationally on the three country interventions mentioned in the previous section, but with a major difference: rather than lasting only two to three months, it was scheduled to last about a year (actually, the program was still going on as this Note was being prepared, Côte d'Ivoire politics having acted as a break on the process).

The governance support consisted of technical assistance provided to the team in charge of preparing the PRS and setting up its monitoring and evaluation system (see a detailed account of the intervention in Annex I). The technical assistance took the form of:

i. providing advice, background information and framing for the various technical aspects of the PRS to the people in charge of preparing the document;
ii. facilitating the design by staff of the institutional framework for PRS monitoring and evaluation;
iii. facilitating multi-stakeholders workshops convened for the elaboration of the PRSP policy matrices;
iv. training government staff in the workshop facilitation process;
v. organizing and facilitating internal workshops to streamline the draft policy matrices, to help identify outcome indicators, priorities and costs and improve the coherence of strategies and actions;
vi. providing organizational advice and managerial coaching to the head of the PRS team to improve work flow and processes; and
vii. providing assistance for the design of the computer-based information system which is to be the backbone of the PRS's monitoring and evaluation system.

The intervention, which started in the fall 2008 and was to end in June 2009, was extended at the demand of the head of the PRSP team – a request which demonstrated client's buy-in and interest for the proposed governance support. The contract extension has been financed by the Government, with moneys drawn from a LICUS Trust Fund with World Bank approval. Of course, the intervention did not unfold as initially planned; political constraints were the main determinants of the intervention's unfolding, not the consultant's own plan.
After two years, the most tangible results are: i/ an institutional framework for monitoring and evaluation, which was included in the PRSP and then was the object of an implementation decree; ii/ an initial set of 34 sectorial policy matrices developed on the basis of the PRS general strategy (as presented in the expository section of the PRSP) which has been later reduced to a set of 13 priority sectors; iii/ a matrix of outcome indicators designed to follow the PRS implementation's results; iv/ a design for the information treatment system which is to be the primary tool for the PRS monitoring and information; v/ staff trained in planning process facilitation and in the identification of result indicators.

**Methodological issues**

What has been the governance effect of this program? An implicit assumption of this program is that a relatively small intervention (one consultant), applied at a specific moment and at a well-identified entry point, can result in noticeable changes over the medium to long term – a principle that has been demonstrated theoretically in complex system and network modeling. However, if this argument may have theoretical merits, it is in practice difficult to come up with evidence to document the intervention's actual results in terms of governance (particularly in the absence of a third party evaluation).

The expected governance result was, and is, a strengthening of the Government's policy planning and implementation capacity. There are, however, several important difficulties in assessing these results:

- There are limitations relative to the field: the intervention's own domain – governance in a conflict-affected country – does not lend itself easily to measuring and evaluating. It is hard to know the counter-factual: what would have been, and what would have happened, if there had been no intervention;
- Indicators for evaluating processes or institutions, and especially an institution as broad as a policy planning system, are not well identified and generally rely on subjective information and perceptions.
- Lastly, the impact span of technical assistance intervention in the institutional field is measured in years, many more years than the Program itself lasted (evaluating governance interventions, when it can be done, only makes sense on a medium/long term perspective).

However, if there are no measurable result indicators on governance improvement presented in this Issue Note, chapter 4 presents a series of signposts or markers of change that may be expected from this approach.

Chapter 2 discusses the political-economic framework of governance intervention in fragile states, explore three different operational perspectives on governance, and provides a rational for this intervention, drawing in particular from a recent AFD study on governance and development strategy.

Chapter 3 examines the relationships between Poverty Reduction Strategy and the dynamics of development from two contrasting perspectives, and presents recent findings on the experience of PRS elaboration in fragile states.

Chapter 4 presents the methodology adopted for the intervention, and concludes by presenting the various types of governance outcomes that may be expected from this type of intervention.
2. On Governance and Development

This chapter opens with a discussion of the political-economic framework which structures the constraints for governance intervention in fragile states. Then, it identifies three different operational understandings of governance, and suggests adopting the third – a government's capacity to develop and implement policies. This choice is explained on the basis of an AFD study which explores the relationship between governance and economic development.

**Political economic framework**

The approach adopted for this governance support program in Cote d'Ivoire is grounded in a set of political-economic assumptions about governance in Africa cogently described by Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz. We will briefly discuss their perspective in this section, as it has a direct bearing on the strategy adopted in our program; we may note that their monograph is, in many ways, an illustrative case study of the Limited Access Order model proposed by Douglass North et al.

Chabal and Daloz's main goal is to make sense of the current political dynamics at play in Africa, and their interaction with the development process (or lack thereof), starting with the basic assumption that what may not look rational from a first-world perspective does actually proceed from rationality, but within different bounds. They posit that Africa is caught in an acute crisis, characterized by “the failure of economic development, political instability, societal divisions, violence, crime and civil war.” The fact that in 2009 seventeen African countries were eligible to the African Development Bank's Fragile States Fund certainly does support the authors' stark observation.

The thrust of the argument is that “in contemporary Africa politics turns on the instrumentalization of disorder,” but a disorder which is to be understood as “a different order, the outcome of different rationalities and causalities.”

“Our [...] conclusion is that there prevails in Africa a system of politics inimical to development as it is usually understood in the West. The dynamics of the political instrumentalization of disorder are such as to limit the scope for reform in at least two ways. The first is that, where disorder has become a resource, there is no incentive to work for a more institutionalized ordering of society. The second is that in the absence of any other viable way of obtaining the means needed to sustain neo-patrimonialism, there is inevitably a tendency to link politics to realms of increased disorder, be it war or crime. There is therefore an inbuilt bias in favour of greater disorder and against the formation of the Western-style legal, administrative and institutional foundations required for development.”

Their explanatory model – the instrumentalization of disorder – represents a specific type of neo-patrimonial regime, and it has the virtue of making sense of the violence that has too often accompanied African politics over the last two decades.
This neo-patrimonial, ‘disorder-based’ regime is not an aberration or, as some scholars might assert, a neo-colonial construct. This type of regime does not represent a radical break with other types of political regimes, including modern democracy, if we frame this analysis within a rational actor model focused on the exercise of power. The behavior of African politicians is structurally the same as that of their American, Chinese, Northern European or Latin-American counterparts: they may be viewed as rational, self-interested actors who are attempting, through bargaining, to maximize wealth and power (be it for its own sake or for ‘larger’ purposes, such as fostering development or world peace – this choice will be defined by their personal utility function). The differences in forms are a function of institutional constraints and historical path, not of nature.

What we have, then, is a rational actor model, such as the one Margaret Levi has proposed in her Predatory Theory of Rule, which can model African neo-patrimonial regimes as well as European Union bargaining:

“The distribution of bargaining power across the agent and subject population is unequal and variable. The ruler’s policies will be more favorable toward those on whom he depends and more exploitative of those on whom he does not. Moreover, because each set of actors has a stake in the nature of the state’s policies, conflict tends to emerge over important policy questions. State rulers, often in coalition with state agents or a particular faction of the subject population, compete with subjects in dividing up society’s wealth. They further compete with members of their own coalition for state revenue. Subjects fight each other for what is left.”

The framework briefly sketched above does provide a rationale for some of the features and strategic choices that were adopted for the intervention. Thus, the government is not a unitary actor – on the contrary, it is structured by competing classes or groups and the intervention must target the group best able to achieve the intervention’s goals while at the same time deflecting antagonistic interests. In such a setting there is of course no neutral external agent.

**Operational perspectives on governance**

The World Bank Governance and Anti-corruption Strategy, approved by the Board on March 21, 2007, defines governance as the manner in which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to shape public policy and provide public goods and services. This definition is broad and indeed encompasses most of the uses which are being made of the notion of governance in development.

This definition has been parsed further in World Bank working documents; governance is generally identified as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised for the common good, and it includes: (i) the process by which those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced; (ii) the capacity of government to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies; and (iii) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.

The term governance connotes a multitude of meanings, depending on the study’s focus, the author’s own a priori, as well as the goal and strategy being pursued. In the context of this Issue Note, we focus mostly on the notions of governance that may shape development agencies’ policies and intervention, with the goal of buttressing the institutions of a country emerging from crisis or civil war.

From that operational perspective we have identified three specific meanings for governance in the context of...
international development intervention. The two more common acceptations are: (i) governance as 'democratic governance', i.e. the extent to which a governing system exhibits the main features of a formal democratic system, from fair electoral processes (for purpose of elite turnover and political accountability) to rule of law, and (ii) governance as 'good governance', i.e. low levels of corruption, contract enforcement, transparency and effective accountability mechanisms. We will first discuss these two meanings, and then turn to a third.

From an operational perspective, these first two meanings present serious challenges in terms of possible, concrete intervention in the context of fragile states. The first and most important challenge is normative: in an international system of nation-states grounded in a shared notion of national sovereignty, on what grounds might an external actor intervene in a country's governance? Scholars such as Paul Collier have suggested that the international community adopt the notion of a right to intervene on issues as sensitive as the provision of justice, mostly on the ground that dysfunctional state systems impose negative externalities on their neighbors and on the international system. However it is difficult to imagine, in the medium term, that this notion would actually be adopted as an international norm.

Effectiveness presents a second important operational challenge. Interventions to shape democratic and good governance present a challenge that cannot actually be solved through the use of technical means. For instance, fair election processes depend less on the adoption of "neutral" vote counting techniques than on the (internationally constrained) intentions of the political actors. The protracted electoral saga of Côte d'Ivoire is but a case-book study in the impotence of external actors when faced with a national political establishment whose main interest lies in an indefinite postponement of 'fair' elections.

In the context of 'good governance', one may also ask what is the viability of interventions that attempt to inject the impersonal and formal norms characteristic of modern “Weberian” political structures into a system of power characterized by neo-patrimonial relationships, as is the case in most African countries and in Côte d'Ivoire in particular. North, Wallis, Webb and Weingast remark that in fragile states

"attempts to remove corruption, create impersonal rule of law, and institute competitive electoral democracy can destabilize a basic limited access order (LAO) and generate broad resistance. (...) Another problem is the possibility that the dominant coalition in a LAO may adopt the institutions proposed by an international donor without fundamentally changing the way the society operates."13

Within these two understandings of governance (democratic or 'good'), the operational issue is not so much about finding the right tools (leadership training, legal reform, judicial capacity building, election monitoring, etc.), as it is of eliciting the necessary political will and building the appropriate incentive systems to generate structural changes. The failure of the international community in getting actual results in Côte d'Ivoire and elsewhere on these two fronts is a good illustration of the stark difficulties these approaches present.

This is the main reason why a third meaning for governance is explored and used in the context of this case study: Governance understood as the capacity of a state system to elaborate and effectively implement development policies (and notably a poverty reduction strategy), in particular by coordinating the expectations and actions of social and economic agents. This type of governance has been identified as an important factor of development by recent research

12 "Limited access orders (...) solve the problem of violence by using the political system to create and allocate rents, arising from arrangements such as government contracts, land rights, monopolies on business activities, and entry to the restricted job markets. (...) In contrast, open access orders solve the problem of violence through open access and competition. (...) In open access orders the state has the monopoly of violence." In "Limited Access Orders: Rethinking the Problem of Development and Violence," Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, Steven B. Webb and Barry R. Weingast, 8 June 2009, p. 2 – The paper is the outcome of work which received financial support from the World Bank Research Committee.
13 Idem, p. 15-6
conducted by Agence Française de Développement, and our hypothesis is that this understanding present venues for designing interventions that may have a positive impact on governance – directly in the context of its restricted meaning and indirectly in the broader and more commonly used acceptations (i.e. democratic or “good”).

Is “good governance” a good development strategy?

This 2008 study, published by Agence Française de Développement, re-examines the notion of “good governance” – as commonly understood by international development agencies over the last decade – and its possible role in the economic development of these agencies’ clients. The AFD study is based principally on an empirical analysis of indicators from its Institutional Profiles database, on the basis of which it then proposes “fragments of a theoretical analysis.” What interests us most here are the results of this empirical analysis, which has been built on economic and institutional data covering 85 countries and 90% of the world population over the period 1990-2004 (see the presentation of this database in AFD, Working paper 46).

The AFD database has been devised to investigate the relationship between institutions and development, using the term ‘institution’ in the meaning developed by Douglas North: a set of formal and informal rules that govern the behavior of individuals and organizations. Formal rules include constitutions, laws and regulations and political systems, while informal rules refer to social norms, values and beliefs. In this context, institutions structure the incentives that affect behaviors and provide a framework for economic exchanges (North, 1990).

The database was built on a questionnaire that comprised 356 basic variables focusing on the issue of enforcement and compliance with rules; these variables were then aggregated into a set of 132 indicators. Through statistical analysis, using Principal Component Analysis, two axes of dispersion of the institutional variables emerge (capturing 45.1% of total variance): 1/ the degree of depersonalization and formalization of their social regulation systems (34.9% of total variance); and 2/ the relative weight of the State in economic, political and social regulations.

The 85 countries of the study are spread along the first axis in an ordered fashion: farther to the left of the axis are the countries where trust and confidence in the application of rules is built on interpersonal relations and follow informal rules (developing countries such as Yemen, Egypt, Uzbekistan, Cameroon, Vietnam, etc.), and farther to the right are the countries where this trust and confidence is the result of the formalization of rules and impersonal relationships (mostly Northern European countries). In the first group, trust is distributed along narrow, particularistic networks, whereas in the second, trust distribution tends towards universality (i.e., I don't need to know your kins to enter with you into a contract, which I know will be enforceable according to impersonal norms).

The formalization and impersonalization of rules (institutions) translate into what is assumed in the notion of ‘good governance’, and statistical analysis shows that the World Bank governance indicators map themselves onto the indicators representative of this notion of formalization and impersonalization of rules. However, AFD and WBI data show that if “good governance” is strongly correlated with a high level of development – i.e. high level of income, it is not correlated with a path of growth defined as mid to long term high levels of economic growth. This means that if good governance (explained by impersonal and formal rules) indeed accompanies high level of development, it may not be the factor leading to that status.

17 Meisel and Ould-Aoudia (2006) do compare the WBI governance indicators with their own set of indicators, and WBI has also adopted some of the AFD indicators in the computation of its own indicators.
Meisel and Ould-Aoudia suggest that there might well be a circular causality underlying the relationship between ‘good governance’ and high level of economic development. The examples of China, India, Korea, etc. show that you can indeed experience economic “take-off” without showing the levels of ‘good governance’ that are generally suggested to accompany advanced economic development, while at the same time countries with similar level of governance (Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Venezuela, etc.) have not managed to get their economy to take off. What the AFD results suggest is that ‘good governance’ may not be the way to achieve economic growth.

Dividing their sample set into three subsets of countries – ‘developed’, ‘converging’ (China, Vietnam, etc) and ‘diverging’ (most sub-Saharan countries, Nepal, Haiti, etc.) – Meisel and Ould-Aoudia have identified a cluster of institutional variables which do differentiate converging and diverging (developing) countries, and which may thus explain the dynamics of economic “take-off” (whereas the ‘good governance’ indicators do indeed differentiate developed countries from converging countries). These variables correspond for the most part to the institutional function\(^ {18} \) of “coordination of actors and anticipations.”

\[^{18}\] This is one of nine institutional functions that the AFD study has identified for its research on the relationship between institutions and economic development. These nine functions are: i/ political institutions; ii/ safety, law and order; iii/ functioning of administration; iv/ market’s operating freedom; v/ coordination of actors and anticipations (consideration of the future); vi/ security of transactions and contracts; vii/ regulation and corporate governance; viii/ openness to the outside world; and ix/ social cohesion and mobility.
The specific variables that constitute this function of coordination of actors and anticipation are: (i) the elites' priority (preference) for development; (ii) consultation to bring out common interests; (iii) authorities' strategic vision; (iv) society's aptitude for innovation; (v) capacity of the political authorities; (vi) technological environment of non-financial firms; and (vii) coordination between ministries and public authorities.

Two other variables are associated with this process of emergence: quality of public goods (basic education and healthcare) and security of agricultural property rights and contracts, the latter being the only variable that fits in the “good governance” paradigm.

Thus, in the view of Meisel and Ould Aoudia, the state's ability to focus on “the functions of coordinating actors and providing a secure basis for their anticipation” is what brings countries into the economic take-off phase; once they have achieved this emergence, they can avail themselves of the means to develop institutions that are characteristic of “good governance” and thus similar (in institutional effect, if not in form) to institutions found in economically developed countries.

**Governance work in neo-patrimonial and fragile states**

This Issue Note provides a response to an operational question: how to support governance in countries where the political establishment must be considered as a negative constraint, and where the actual interests of the political class (as contrasted to its *professed* interests) and the interests of the international community are at odds.

A common strategy on the part of the international community has been to identify, within a country or society, the social or interest groups whose interests are not aligned with the interests of the political establishment, and provide them with external support. This approach has been amply developed over the last two decades, when, despairing of national bureaucracies, the international community has focused a fair share of its attention and of its funding on Non Governmental Organizations. In the case of this governance support program, the strategy has been to focus the international community's attention onto sub-groups within the government's own civil service structure.

In such a context, the PRS represents a very promising entry point, for a series of reasons:

i. the PRS is a national project, and it almost automatically receives the formal, if not vocal support of the politicians, who understand full well that this is a perfect vehicle for obtaining international aid (and thus rents);

ii. the PRS, however, is a planning process which requires technical know-how and actual interest for the intricacies of policy making, and hence politicians are quite happy to let the civil servants/technocrats develop the PRS;

iii. our experience has shown that government staff enrolled in the preparation of their country's PRS constitute, in their great majority, a group of dedicated and visionary civil servants who have mostly their country's and fellow

---

21 "Behind the ostensible consent to the institutional transformations being advocated and the superficial adoption of numerous imported formal rules, the resistance of the elites and of societies takes the form of the bypassing of these written rules and institutions: by-passing of democratic processes (for example, the role of parliaments and audit bodies in sub-Saharan Africa); bypassing of the rules of good governance (for example, adopting anti-corruption schemes that are not applied); bypassing of trade liberalization measures; privatisation, etc." Meisel and Ould-Aoudia, p. 21.
22 In one meeting we attended in a certain country, where national technocrats were discussing the preparation of the PRSP with the Vice-President, this Vice-President's adviser for international aid lost his patience and asked: "When will you give us the document, so that we can go and do our marketing?"
citizens' best interest at heart; 
iv. the intervention of the international community around the PRS is often welcomed by policy makers, given the general understanding that the PRS is the main instrument for the dialogue with the government on its development policies; 
v. it is in the interest of the international community to strengthen that instrument as it is the main, and best, tool for aid coordination available today.

23 There must be a self-selection process at work here: staff working on PRSP preparation or implementation are usually technically competent, work very long hours with no or little hope of financial rewards, and know that they will never be thanked for their dedication. At the same time, they find themselves in a rare, strategic position.
3. PRSP, Development, and Governance

A brief history of poverty reduction strategies

Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS), introduced by the World Bank and the IMF in 1999, are now the most common type of development strategies, currently implemented in some 65 poor countries. In principle developed by the countries themselves, they also provide the basis for most donor assistance strategies, including those of the World Bank. Although the PRSs follow a few shared principles they come in a variety of shapes. They have in common that their elaboration and implementation are the responsibility of the country’s government, involve consultations with the country’s population, are based on assessments and diagnoses of the poverty in the country, cover a period of 3-5 years, and are discussed with donors as well as the Boards at the World Bank and the IMF. Problems in applying another key principle – that the economic and social priorities in each country’s PRS need to respond to the specifics of the country context – have limited the effectiveness of PRSs, especially in conflict-affected countries:

Of the countries that have developed their PRS, about 20 have experienced a major violent conflict less than 10 years before starting a PRS. Other PRS countries are considered fragile and at risk of violent conflict. Some of the world’s most fragile and conflict-affected countries, including Myanmar, Somalia and Sudan, have yet to embark on such a process, either because large-scale violence is still ongoing or because the countries’ governments are not interested in engaging with the international community on these issues.

In most poor countries, the development and implementation of PRSs are hindered by weak organizational capacity in government and the private sector, and by dependence on donors for finance and expertise, which undermines country ownership. In fragile states, these challenges are augmented by weak public institutions, the predominance of elite-driven or neo-patrimonial governments, and questionable political will and legitimacy to address deep-seated problems underpinning poverty. Conflict-affected countries, which are usually both poor and fragile, face perhaps the most difficult challenges of all, adding divisions between groups, militarization of society, and violence rooted in conflict as well as in crime to the problems. And crucially, many of the societal factors that drive violence in these countries are closely related to poverty.

Two perspectives on PRSP and development

One may look at PRSPs from two main angles: 1/ from the perspective of classical economics, which chooses to focus on the causal relationships between specific policies and achievements in economic development; 2/ from the perspective of institutional economics, which emphasizes the importance of processes and institutions in fostering economic development. A way to differentiate how these two schools differ in their apprehension of the PRSP is to use a geographical analogy: the institutional economist concerns itself with the upstream aspects, the institutional factors that will make the elaboration of a proper strategy and document possible; the classical economist has rather a downstream focus, looking at the appropriateness of the policies being proposed in terms of economic models of development and at their analytical coherence.

Most, if not all, studies and analyses of PRSs have adopted the classical economics' perspective, assuming that, with the

---

PRS, the government will in effect strive to identify and implement a set of optimal policies, i.e. policies which will have the greatest impact on its society and economy in terms of development and poverty reduction. It is thus important to get the set of policies “right”, by identifying the main factors of under-development and, from there, the appropriate strategies to address them.

In order to “get it right,” countries have been encouraged to organize large scale consultations with their citizens so as to better understand the context and the drivers of poverty as well as the population's expectations; they are also expected to undertake macro-economic and sectoral analyses to identify the most important drivers of growth and, from there, the optimal policies. The international community has been standing ready to provide advice, analysis and experts to the governments to “get it right,” and in that perspective the PRSP is submitted to the scrutiny of the World Bank and IMF boards. If the PRSP has the “right” policies, and if funding is made available, the country is expected to set itself on the path of development – this is, at least, the theory.

The institutional perspective pays attention to processes and planning capacity, rather than to the economic or methodological orthodoxy of development strategies and their attending set of macro-economic or sectoral policies. In the institutionalist perspective, what matters is not providing expert, specialized analysis or assessments in the preparation of PRSPs; rather, it argues that, in order for a country to produce a coherent PRSP (and even more so in the case of fragile and conflict-affected countries), what is required is process and methodology-oriented support and technical assistance. It is important that the country assumes entirely by itself the content – analyses, objectives, priorities, strategies – of its PRS, but to get there, it needs to get support on the ways and means to do it.

The argument, here, is that the substance of the PRSP is a function, first but not exclusively, of its institutional process. It may be necessary to point to this simple fact: PRS elaboration is, in essence, an exercise in complex policy planning – the kind of exercise on which multilateral development institutions, with their own sophisticated process management, spend considerable resources (human, financial, managerial, etc.). In this context, it is Utopian – some hard line critics may say malicious – to expect weak bureaucracies, with generally very little or no actual experience in planning, to produce adequate PRSPs entirely on their own. For the PRS to become an actual factor of development, i.e., a vector for well targeted investments and efforts, an effective policy planning apparatus will first have to be put in place.

If we consider the institutional case as a theoretical model, then its falsifiable (Popperian) hypothesis will be that if a fragile state or a country lacking in capacity is not provided with adequate process support, then its PRSP’s coherence and policy planning value will be very weak. Given the fact that in general these countries have received little or no process and methodological assistance, it should be expected that, over the last decade, their PRSPs have generally been weak, unfocused or even inappropriate documents.

There is no conclusive evidence at this point – not because the hypothesis is wrong, but because there has been no actual assessment of the value of the PRS Initiative over the last seven years (there was a small flurry of studies and evaluations in 2003-04). There are, however, anecdotal evidence in favor of our hypothesis, most of which cannot be found in official evaluations. Many development economists – the very ones who are supposed to use them – often (privately) dismiss PRSPs as nothing more than copy-and-paste jobs produced by specialized, UN or WB-funded international consultants

26 Experience, and many discussions with PRSP national staff, have shown that there is actually a fair amount of distrust toward any substantive input coming from the BWIs, which might well be an outcome of the SAPs. There is a wide variance between what is said in official meetings and what is then said in the government's offices where the PRSP is being prepared. Actually, a great deal of effort is spent on second-guessing what would be the “appropriate” strategy to put forward in the PRSP in order to maximize – not its actual impact – but its fund-raising ability.

27 "Joint Staff Assessments (JSAs) of PRSPs by the Bank and Fund have not adequately performed the many tasks expected of them. The clarity, candor, and comprehensiveness of the assessments have been uneven, with scope for improvement even in "good practice" cases." In "The Poverty Reduction Strategy Initiative – Findings from 10 Country Case Studies of World Bank and IMF Support," World Bank Operations Evaluation Department and IMF Independent Evaluation Office, 2005. P. 7.
applying one size-fits-all analyses and recommendations. Anecdotal evidence can be found in the content of the PRSPs policy matrices, which often turn into long “shopping lists” with no actual strategic and operational value.

**PRSP in fragile and conflict settings – prior findings**

One of the very first documents to address the issue of PRSP preparation in fragile and conflict-affected countries was a 2003 briefing note from the Overseas Development Institute. Echoing the political economic analysis presented in chapter 2, it warned against the possibility that PRS become entwined in the countries' rent-seeking mechanisms, stating that “conflict-affected countries often become engaged in the PRSP process not because of a primary concern with poverty reduction but because of the financial access (and legitimacy) that it provides. The hard reality is that countries can engage in preparing a PRSP without necessarily being committed to either poverty reduction or an end to conflict.”

Only a couple of studies have been done by PREM and SDV in recent years on PRSs in fragile and conflict-affected countries, and both have focused primarily on the value and adequateness of their analyzes and strategies, and particularly the ways in which they addressed the nexus between poverty and conflict factors.

The SDV study focused mostly on the policy content of the PRSPs (including the poverty analysis), and on the participation process which is to lead into the PRSP elaboration per se (popular participation – mostly through local consultations of stakeholders – has from the inception been a PRSP core requirement). However, the study did acknowledge the issue of government capacity: “Capacity limitations were discerned on the part of governments managing the PRS process. These included limited in-country experience with the country-driven model, and a belief across the less-integrated parts of governments that the PRS was a technocratic exercise undertaken to fulfill donor requirements.”

The PREM analysis sounds a cautionary note on the issue of requiring fragile and conflict-affected countries to produce a PRSP to access funding from the International Development Agency (IDA): “...[PRSP’s] usefulness in fragile states, including those just emerging from conflict, has been questioned.” The Note goes on to explain that,

> “Where the government’s commitment, legitimacy, and functionality are in serious question, and when the government appears motivated mainly by access to international assistance rather than development, conflict resolution, or poverty reduction, donors should consider temporary or partial strategic disengagement in preference to being seen as rewarding illegitimate governments or reducing domestic pressures for change.”

Without denying the merits of the argument, we want to point out that this assessment does not take into account the capacity building opportunity offered by providing support to the PRSP’s elaboration, and more particularly to the preparation of priority action matrices as well as the setting up of a viable monitoring and evaluation system.

---

28 PRSP Briefing Note 6, National Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSPs) in Conflict-Affected Countries in Africa, Overseas Development Institute, London, March 2003, p.5.
29 A World Bank draft study by Nora Dudwick and Adam Nelsson: Poverty Reduction Strategies in Conflict-Affected Countries – A Stocktaking of What We Know, PRMPR, May 2008 was turned into a PREM Note: “A Stocktaking of PRSPs in Fragile States”, PREM Note Number 127, November 2008; Another World Bank study, carried out by SDV: “Toward a Conflict-Sensitive Poverty Reduction Strategy – A Retrospective Analysis”, Second Edition, June 1, 2007, Social Development Department (SDV).
32 PREM Note, p. 3.
33 By support we do not refer to the traditional funding and consultant provision, but rather a support in the form of technical assistance on processes and methodology in the technical phases of policy matrix preparation and building up a monitoring and evaluation system.
working hypothesis has been that, over time, this support may actually help counterbalance the government's negative behavior.

These warnings should not imply postponement of all poverty reduction planning; rather, as has been suggested in a recent SDV Issue Note, “they highlight the need for PRSs (...) to be initially modest, focused, and manageable. Effective strategy, in a fragile or conflict-affected state, will include, besides constant attention to conflict factors, adherence to five guiding principles: i/ Realism; ii/ transparent prioritization; iii/ context specificity; iv/ flexibility; and v/ concreteness.” These suggestions appear particularly sensible in the light of the experience with the PRSP in Côte d'Ivoire, which also shows the limits of the exercise (at least within the bounds of a single PRSP – medium and long term observations, over the course of several PRSPs, would probably show otherwise).

In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, the issue of realism in the identification of needs was a particularly sensitive one, and the object of a protracted argument between two opposed agendas, which may be explained by the will to attract different constituencies. One side, the 'lean camp', argued for the necessity of ensuring the document's credibility vis-à-vis international partners – with the rationale that reasonable, realistic propositions would demonstrate the government's managerial capacity and thus availing the possibility of larger international funding. On the other side, the 'generous camp', argued for the inclusion of all sectors and all activities of the state under the PRSP, in a bid for control of the investment and budgetary processes (thus buying clients among ministries and politicians to offset the weak political position of the PRS team in an environment that was highly politicized, where the PRSP had no strong political patron, and where it was viewed only as an opportunistic instrument – particularly for reaching the HIPC-Initiative).

The initial outcome of this confrontation was a set of 34 sectoral policy matrices (including sport, culture, etc.), whose total estimated cost for a five year period amounted to about $28 billions – the gap, it was suggested, would be financed by international partners. However, as time passed, and the constraints and realism of the budgetary process loomed larger, there has been a reversal of rhetoric and practice, and for the 2011 budget discussions the PRSP team prepared policy matrices that are contained within a set of 13 priority sectors (instead of the initial 34) and were calibrated to more or less fit within the expected investment envelop.

It must be emphasized here that this debate between the two camps was a direct outcome of the technical assistance, the 'lean' position being defended, at the inception of the process, almost exclusively by the international consultant. However, as trust built up between the consultant and ministerial staff, that lean position gained increasingly more converts (or, at the very least, credibility and consideration).

---

34 “Effective Poverty Reduction Strategies in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries: Lessons and Suggestions”, by Fruchart, Wam and Webster, SDV, September 2009.

35 One may want to reflect on the fact that no one, among the highest levels of the administration – which it must be noted, has long had the reputation for being among the best in the region – would find this expected cost plainly surreal (or, at least, would dare say so in a public setting).
4. PRS Support: the Practice

**Governance support and external agency**

The theoretical – or principled – international development community's position for governance support is one in which the country's political establishment decides to embark on a path of governance reform, either by its own volition or within a system of negotiated constraints (as in structural adjustments), and receives help from the international community on the basis of established "good practice" or theoretical insights on the "right" development path (insights which are always the locus of intense debates and broad disagreements).

In many fragile states, generally characterized by the neo-patrimonial nature of their political system, the elite in power has a vested interest in either keeping the existing system as is, or in twisting it further to make it more responsive to its own wants (particularly if this elite is coming into power after having been kept out of the rent system by the previous regime). In such a case, the interests and behavior of the governing elite will most likely be at variance with what the international community will consider as proper or appropriate governance. In this kind of ecology any external, governance-focused intervention led by an international actor is bound to run into overt or, more likely, passive opposition and corrosion.

For these reasons, designing a traditional governance support intervention in a fragile state is a challenging proposition; however, more technical, circumscribed and politically less visible approaches (such as the computerization of public finance systems) are easier to 'sell'. This is the type of approach advocated here, but the domain of intervention
suggested – support to PRSP elaboration – is novel, as is the mode of intervention itself: rather than providing content or substance, in the form of experts’ reports, comments, analyzes, etc., the idea is to provide methodological advice and process facilitation to accompany the PRS elaboration as well as the design and implementation of its monitoring and evaluation systems. The dynamics of the overall experiment – strengthening technical capacity to balance the dysfunctional political influences – are captured in the graph above.

The method presented here was developed and tested in four fragile or post-conflict states: Burundi, Central African Republic, Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire. The Côte d'Ivoire experiment, which lasted much longer than the previous three, is presented in more details in Annex I. Two main aspects of these interventions will be presented below: the support provided for the elaboration of the PRS policy matrices, and the support provided for strengthening the PRSP monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.

**Support to PRS elaboration**

The support is aimed at the highest echelon of the Government's planning apparatus, and comes after the Government has already undertaken the participatory consultation of the population, and initial poverty-focused analyzes have been conducted (poverty profile, etc.). The facilitation of the PRS elaboration itself is structured in two steps, i/ scoping workshops and ii/ policy matrix work groups. These two steps represented a new approach to policy planning for the four national teams; indeed, in spite of their centrality, the policy matrices had been considered – until the intervention – as the least important part of the whole process, to be undertaken only after having written a presentation of the strategies to be pursued by the PRSP (which, in itself, reflects a twisted planning logic).

**Scoping workshops**

Each workshop is organized around a specific theme: security sector reform, education, infrastructure, etc., (the more restricted the scope, the better), and the ideal option is to invite the key stakeholders, which fall roughly into three categories: i/ Government officials and expert civil servants; ii/ civil society and private sector representatives with good technical expertise; iii/ international experts working in the country for an international organization (financial institutions or INGOs).

The purpose of the scoping workshops is to arrive at a general consensus on the most important issues to be addressed by the PRS, as well as on the main possible strategies to be pursued. By using a World Café setting, with very specific research questions provided by the facilitator, the participants have been able to identify poverty reduction and development issues in very specific and concrete terms, as well as general strategies. One of the main benefits of this format is that all participants are actively involved in the process and, as a result, the workshops generate a very high level of energy, and trigger creative thinking. The results of the workshops are then mined and exploited by smaller and more selective policy matrix workgroups.

It should be clear that, even though these scoping workshops are participatory in nature, they do not replace the traditional, bottom-up participatory consultations that are part of the earlier PRSP preparation process. On the contrary, it is best that these workshops build on the output of the participatory consultations held in the initial stages of PRS elaboration.

**Policy matrix work groups**

Each policy matrix work group is focused on a specific sector or topic (justice reform, agriculture, Government capacity

---

This method, which was developed about 15 years ago and is now widely used in multinational corporations and even the Pentagon, has accommodated on some occasions up to 1,000 participants (although we would not want to go that far).
building, etc.), and the group members are drawn from the set of participants in the workshop (although it is possible to add outsiders). It is important that Government officials or high level civil servants be part of the group, along with other experts (national and international) and representatives of the main civil society service providers. The ideal group size is about 12 people, and it is important to have as much variety as possible in the profile of the people invited and/or volunteering.

People participating in these groups were generally not used to discussing the nitty-gritty of policy making, and the groups were not able to proceed without the intervention of a skilled facilitator. The initial working sessions were usually fraught with tension and arguments between various stakeholders (working groups always included ministry staff, civil society and NGO representatives, and sometimes international organization staffs), who have not sat at the same table for maybe a decade, and many hours are spent by the participants in learning the basic skills of dialog.

The discussion proceeds through a Socratic dialogue led by the facilitator, dialog which helps the group to identify strategies and actions that will constitute the government's response to the issues identified by the scoping workshops. The facilitator is present only to help the process move along, and must never get entangled in providing substantive input him/herself. The objective of the work group is to build policy matrices structured in terms of global objectives (one or several), intermediary (or specific) objectives, and strategies and actions that are feasible within the PRS time horizon and overall financial constraints. The actions, being specific, can be costed, as well as fitted with output indicators (and strategies with outcome indicators).

The benefits of this process, in terms of governance, are an increased ownership of the document by the Government (or at least by some senior civil servants in the Government), as well as some capacity building and knowledge transfer. In Côte d'Ivoire all PRSP staff were trained and coached into facilitating work sessions by themselves. All staffs, even the more intimidated, successfully led work sessions. This result proves that the approach can be implemented successfully on a large scale with national staff guided by a single international consultant.

The intervention of a neutral, process-focused facilitator also represents an opportunity to change the dynamics between government officials and the community of donors, in part because the PRSP exercise, instead of being perceived as an imposed peniun, is now perceived as a joint, cooperative endeavor (this was the approach used by Jean Monnet in the work sessions for the elaboration of the European Coal and Steel Community). The confrontation of ideas between government's and donors' staff during the workgroup sessions allows for the clearing up of sometimes previously strained relationships and the dispelling of (many) distorted perceptions.

**Support to monitoring and evaluation systems**

The main long term impact expected from the type of PRS support intervention described here is a (re)building of the government's capacity to identify, plan and implement policies. The most important tool in policy planning is an effective, reliable and viable monitoring and evaluation system, which will provide the government with the feedback data necessary to improve policy definition and policy results. Such tools often exist in the government's administrative

---

37 The facilitator ought to be knowledgeable about the logic of poverty reduction strategies (for his own credibility), adept at manipulating the logical framework structure, and trained to manage group dynamics.
38 The Socratic method, or dialogue, is a dialectical process which aims at helping the counterpart to discover by him/herself, through a series of pointed questions, the solution to a specific problem or quandary. In this instance, the questions usually first revolve around the identification of the issue, and then of the possible means through which, concretely, a solution could be devised. A great deal of the questioning is about "who is going to do what, how, when, and for exactly what purpose," and about the general feasibility of the proposed solutions. A leitmotiv question is: "And, in very concrete terms, how are you going to do that?" The method, in its general form, is usually practiced in law schools, and at the Harvard Business School.
structure, but generally as ghosts rather than effective data collectors.\textsuperscript{39}

In Côte d’Ivoire the intervention came early enough to help the national team design the institutional framework for the PRS monitoring and evaluation system. The work was carried out with three senior staffs of the PRSP team with help of the facilitator, with the occasional visit of a UNDP staff. Work sessions were organized around a flip chart, and, starting from an initial draft, the design process was conducted, or rather prodded, through the socratic method of inquiry; this meant that the facilitator never offered any direct substantive advice, but mostly pointed to possible incoherence, lack of information, etc. and generally played the role of a naïve outsider. The result was a well-designed institutional blueprint for the M&E system, prepared and written up by Ministry of Planning staff, presented with great details in the PRSP itself (see Annex II), and later turned into a decree.\textsuperscript{40}

In the cases of Burundi and Central African Republic, support was provided for the preparation of a Results Matrix, which could be presented to the donor community in the context of the PRS evaluation (for HIPC Initiative purposes), and could also be used as a dashboard to help guide government planning.

This Results Matrix consists of 40 to 60 outcome indicators covering all the main areas of intervention of the PRS (with at least one indicator for each of the main PRS objectives). The main objective of the exercise is to identify indicators that can be computed without too much difficulty, for which data bases are known to exist, and that provide a pertinent feedback on the results of the policies and actions undertaken in the context of the PRS implementation.

In Burundi the international consultant teamed up with a national consultant, and provided support in the initial phase to help develop the general framework as well as initiate and train teams of sectorial government staff (in education, health, etc.) in identifying appropriate indicators (these sessions provided the opportunity to simultaneously train the national consultant). The sessions with the sectorial experts followed a process similar to the policy matrix workgroup approach, but were more limited in duration. After each sectorial group had gone through one session of training, the process was taken up by the national consultant, who organized meetings with the government staff to pursue the identification of the indicators. After a couple of months work, a validation workshop was organized, during which the indicators that had been collected by the national consultant were assessed, and sometimes completed or modified.

\textbf{Learning and perspectives}

The main lesson to be drawn from these experiments is that, from an operational perspective, the PRS may be used as an entry point to provide governance support in fragile states: The assistance provided to the national PRS teams proved to be productive (policy matrices, result matrices, and institutional frameworks were produced with a level of quality that was generally unexpected), but also generated a profound interest on the part of the national teams, which all requested that the support be extended\textsuperscript{41}. The approach also elicited strong interest on the World Bank side, on the part of the staff who were immediate witnesses of the process and in tow cases attempted to get additional funding to support the process further.

The type of support provided – methodological and process oriented rather than issue focused – also proved very successful: the national teams, which were used to the traditional form of assistance, did vote with their feet, requesting the extension of the support described in this document. Furthermore, the experiments confirmed the validity and

\textsuperscript{39} It may be argued that a PRSP monitoring and evaluation system will most likely encounter the same fate over time, except for the fact that external funding may give leverage to the international community to ensure that this system remains viable.

\textsuperscript{40} PRSPs are viewed as binding documents, since they have to be approved by the government before being sent off to the WB and IMF boards.

\textsuperscript{41} This was not possible in Burundi, CAR or Haiti, for lack of funding. In Côte d’Ivoire it was possible because of the availability of a LICUS trust fund which availed the government the means to hire the international consultant.
viability of the approach: validity in the sense that it adapted to a variety of institutional settings and culture; viability in the sense that this is a fairly low cost intervention, and in the sense that indeed the methodology and the facilitation technics do get transmitted to local staff.

The question that remains to be answered is: How effective is this approach in terms of governance, not only governance as capacity to define and implement development policies, but also in the broader acceptance of the term? As it has been argued earlier, given the time frame within which institutional change can be registered, it is still very early to point to clear results (and particularly since, in the case of Côte d'Ivoire, the initial calendar of intervention has been subjected to frequent delays brought by political uncertainties). However, a frame of expected results can be proposed for the type of intervention that has been described here, and which one may expect to observe, provided that time conditions are met.

In terms of governance understood as capacity to develop and implement development policies, a PRS intervention (process and methodologically focused) may bring the following results:

In terms of products:
- a restricted set of PRS policy matrices that more or less fit within existing budget and funding constraints, have well defined priorities and are coherent with the government's overall objectives;
- a matrix of outcome indicators that allow for an effective monitoring and evaluation of the PRS implementation;
- a coherent and effective monitoring and evaluation system for PRS activities;
- ministerial staff trained in workshop facilitation, result indicators identification and monitoring and evaluation techniques and processes;

In terms of outcomes (within a variable time frame that may extend over two or three PRSP cycles):
- a budget process that is becoming increasingly more PRS focused;
- a greater transparency in policy implementation and budget execution, particularly at the local level;
- a more effective policy planning process at the ministerial level, with a more effective setting of priorities;
- a greater alignment of donor interventions with government's poverty reduction priorities;
- a more effective coordination of donor interventions in terms of development and poverty reduction;
- a more open dialog between national stakeholders, including the population at large;
- a better articulated vision for government action, and, ultimately, a greater commitment of the political class to development.

However, PRS support may have results that go further than simply enhancing the state's capacity to elaborate and implement policies – it may also have an impact on some features of governance as understood in its more traditional acception, notably:
- greater transparency and, ultimately, greater predictability of budget execution;
- a greater connection between the center and the regions on issues of policy implementation;
- a greater ownership by local authorities of development activities;
• a civil society more aware of, and better included in the policy making process;
• better articulated and laid-out governance reform (justice, security, etc.) in the context of PRS policy matrices;
• more effective monitoring process of governance reform efforts

In the context of Côte d'Ivoire, in spite of the multiple delays, evidence that some of these results may be obtained are starting to surface. The initial set of 34 sectorial matrices has been reduced to a more manageable subset of 13 priority sectors, and these matrices themselves are revisited so as to fit within a credible budget envelop; local (or regional) PRS monitoring committees have been set up and already put to contribution in the elaboration of the first report on PRS implementation (for the year 2009); a matrix of outcome indicators – designed to follow the PRS implementation's impact – is in the process of being finalized. The main interrogation is whether these initial results will translate into long term, sustainable results, which only time will tell.

Next step:
There is a very large potential area for this type of intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa. In that perspective, the next step will be the scaling up of the approach through the creation of a regional pole with high level support experts able to enter into a long term dialog with national PRSP teams on a methodological rather than substantive level. UNESCO and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs are already experimenting with this model in the context of education in Western Africa with the Pôle de Dakar. This, of course, will require the vision and the support of a strong international organization able and willing to pursue a long term governance support strategy in fragile states.
Annex I: Journal of Support Activities in Côte d'Ivoire

Background

Côte d'Ivoire has experienced a series of political and military crises from 1999 (December 24th, with the military coup against President Henri Konan Bédié) to 2007 (March 4th, signature of the Ouagadougou Peace Accord), and has since been muddling through an endless post-crisis phase (national elections, which were to have been held by October 31st, 2006, have since been postponed every year with clock-work regularity). The World Bank re-engaged in Côte d'Ivoire in 2008 with a $308 million grant to clear Côte d'Ivoire's arrears and provide budget support.

The implementation of the Governance Support Program for Côte d'Ivoire started in October 2008, when the preparation of the PRSP was already well engaged: lessons had been drawn from the implementation of the 2002 Interim PRSP, the Government had already held consultations with local stakeholders in all 10 Pôles de Développement, a poverty analysis had been completed, and the writing of the first (expository) section of the document was already underway.

The proper sequencing of planning, at that point, had gotten off-track. After the stakeholder consultations had been held and the poverty analysis completed, planning logic would have called for sectoral ministry staff to sit down with the PRSP preparation team (usually staff from the Ministry of Planning – as is the case in Côte d'Ivoire) to elaborate the policy matrices through a logical framework process, which requires discussing problems, PRSP objectives and their corresponding result indicators, strategies, constraints, opportunities and means. Once the main features of the Poverty Reduction Strategy have been translated into operational programs and projects, then the expository section can be prepared. That would be the logical path.

In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, a different path was followed; after the poverty analysis had been partially completed, the expository section was prepared at the occasion of vast workshops which brought together sectoral ministry staff with the PRSP team, with the document being written collectively in sessions that could bring together up to twenty people. If the process was far from being effective or efficient, it had the benefit of bringing the poverty reduction agenda front and center for the sectoral ministries, which were not used to planning through this focus.

The goal of the government was to complete the PRSP preparation by January 2009, so as to be able to present the document before the date marking the reassessment of Côte d'Ivoire's eligibility to the HIPC Initiative; this reassessment was widely expected to translate into the exclusion of Côte d'Ivoire from the process, as its macro-economic data would then place it outside the threshold points. In early March 2009 the government approved the final document and sent it to the World Bank and the IMF. Yet, the document was incomplete, as it had no policy matrix to present, but the Government was given a preferential treatment and allowed to send only the expository section, under the condition that the policy matrices be completed in the following months. One year later, these policy matrices are yet to be validated.

---


43 A PRSP is a document composed of two large sections: i/ an expository section which presents the country's socio-economic background, presents an analysis of poverty, and identifies a set of policies and strategies to boost economic development down a path that is best susceptible to reduce poverty; ii/ a set of sectoral policy matrices which present in detail the general and intermediary objectives, the strategies, and the priority actions that will help reach results defined by outcome and impact indicators (to be identified with a reference base and a target value).

44 As has been the case in other fragile states where a PRSP has been prepared.

45 The workshops were held in a large hotel in a resort town just far enough from Abidjan to make it inconvenient to commute, thus holding the participants 'hostage' for several days not to mention the appeal of free meals and per diems).

46 So as to beat the HIPC Initiative deadline.
At its inception in October 2008, the governance support's objectives were two-fold: i/ Provide methodological assistance for identifying the institutional mechanism necessary to ensure a proper monitoring and evaluation of PRSP activities; and ii/ facilitate the preparation process of the policy matrices.

**Institutional Framework for Monitoring and Evaluation**

The work on the M & E institutional framework was carried out with three senior staffs of the PRSP team, with the occasional visit of a UNDP staff. Work sessions were organized around a flip chart, and, starting from an initial draft, the research work was conducted, or rather prodded, by the technical assistant using a socratic method of inquiry (which meant that the facilitator never offered any direct substantive advice, but mostly pointed to possible incoherence, lack of information, etc. and generally played the rôle of a naïve ignorant). The PRSP staff, not used to this approach, remained guarded in the first sessions, but slowly warmed up to the method to finally embrace it (particularly in view of the final results, which they said not to have expected).

The operational implications of the system were further researched and worked out in the first half of 2009, with only a single PRSP staff and using the same inquiry approach. This work provided the basis for the elaboration of the information management system (see section below).

Outcome: The blueprint produced in these sessions was included in the PRSP and served as a basis for the decree instituting the Secrétariat Technique Permanent (STP) du DSRP. It also laid the groundwork for the design of the information management system. Furthermore, the work sessions allowed for the build-up of trust between the PRSP team senior staff and the technical assistant, and also gave the assistant technical credibility and insights in the workings of the PRSP team and of the government more generally.

However, the functionality of the framework has not yet been demonstrated, as the STP has still not received the budget necessary for its set-up (more than a year after presentation of the PRSP to the WB and IMF boards and the official start of PRSP implementation).

**Facilitation of Policy Matrix Process**

The preparation of the policy matrices (priority strategies and actions, result indicators) was initially planned for early 2009, but was postponed several times by the PRSP Coordinator, for reasons which were never stated out. As this work needed to involve senior staff from all sectoral ministries, it is likely that the reasons for the postponement had to do with government's bureaucratic politics (or actually, it sometimes seemed, the second-guessing of those). The work finally started in May 2009, with a first trial run with the Ministry of Justice.

The design and facilitation of the workshop was left entirely to the initiative of the technical assistant. One of the main expected outcomes was the training of PRSP senior staff in the facilitation method (described in Annex I), so as to obtain a multiplying effect in ulterior implementation. The work meetings were held in a conference room at the Ministry of Justice, and lasted several weeks (with two or three three-hour meetings a week). The meetings were attended by senior Ministry staff (General Directors), representatives of legal profession associations (lawyers, court clerks, prison staff, etc.), representatives of civil society organizations involved in Justice issues, and staff of international organizations (ONUCI and European Union in particular). Initial meetings were facilitated exclusively by the consultant, with PRSP staff being progressively coached into facilitating the discussions themselves.

---

47 See the PRSP corresponding section in Annex II.
The planned output of the workshops was a full policy matrix which would identify poverty reduction relevant issues, general and intermediary objectives to address them, strategies, actions, costs and result indicators, in essence following a classical logical framework approach. The objective was to make this policy matrix realistic, specific, concrete, and implementable.

Bureaucratic politics derailed the process as early as the opening session, when the criteria for policy identification and selection proposed by the technical assistant were immediately countered by the PRPS coordinator. Whereas the consultant explained that policies ought to be selected in function of their relevance with the overall poverty reduction objective, and constrained by the expected funding envelop (in the name of realism and managerial credibility vis-à-vis the international community), the PRSP coordinator on the contrary insisted that all the needs of the Ministry of Justice be included in the action matrix, arguing that the PRSP was poised to become the government's single funding source (with the gap financed by international institutions).

This fundamental opposition48 played itself out during the whole elaboration of the policy matrices, in all sectors, only to be solved a year later at the occasion of the 2011 budgetary conference.49 A form of compromise was found with the introduction of a three level priority system: 'A' for strategies or actions to be undertaken by the government (even in the case of a complete absence of external support and funding); 'B' for strategies or actions that will be undertaken with the funding or support made available by Côte d'Ivoire's international partners; 'C' for strategies or actions that will be undertaken in the case of an unexpected windfall. Since the ministries have no priority setting system, this exercise often proved difficult and laborious and had to be done at the occasion of special sessions (the Ministry staff proved unable to carry this task on its own).

The initial working sessions were fraught with tension and arguments between the various stakeholders, who had not sat at the same table for maybe a decade, and many hours were spent by the participants in learning the basic skills of dialog (this did not come as a surprise, as the same phenomenon has occurred in all the countries where this process has been held). The same phenomenon occurred in all sectors (working groups always included ministry staff, civil society and NGO representatives, and sometimes international organization staffs). These sessions, it can be argued, provided a framework for participation that was at least as fruitful as the public consultations that had been conducted the year before, and technically more informative.

As old conflicts, old suspicion and misgivings were slowly lifted, the work on the justice policy matrix proceeded, with many discussions being held on methodological issues such as the difference between output, outcome and impact indicators, criteria for priority setting, or the distinctions between strategy, action and activities. No one in the room had actually ever been exposed to such a broad-based discussion of policy issues, nor to the intellectual discipline of identifying specific, concrete actions in relation to result indicators with a determined target value.50 In the end several senior Ministry staff thanked the PRSP team for the opportunity that had been afforded them to better understand and practice the planning process.

48 As the consultant's only political capital was his perceived technical competence and knowledge of international community positions, there was no possibility to take another course. This however offered a rhetorical way out, and the consultant kept stating that this was not his own position, but simply a representation of the international community's. As often in politics, the two sides continued to collaborate while remaining on their respective positions.

49 Most likely the Coordinator's position was driven by the perceived strategic necessity for the PRSP organization to become one of the main budget players, a perception built in part on the observed level of dysfunction in the government's budget setting processes. We may also note that the PRSP staff in their majority adopted the consultant's approach (as reported to the consultant in private conversations), but never acted upon it.

50 Whatever planning had been undertaken previously in the Ministry had been done by a small group of insiders, sometimes 'guided' by international consultants with little pedagogical skill or interest.
The output of these sessions with the Ministry of Justice is presented in Annex III; the result is relatively far off the mark that had been set as a goal, but the matrix does exhibit some good qualities. The set of global objectives is comprehensive and poverty focused, and the break down in strategies and actions is very specific and concrete; however, the matrix is one very large 'Christmas tree' whose total cost could not be estimated, as the Ministry simply did not have a unit able to carry out a precise costing (which says a lot about the country's planning capacity). Whatever costing can be found in the matrix is nothing more than the result of not very educated guess work.

After this trial run, a full-fledged effort was planned to elaborate all the matrices of the PRSP (which ended with 29 sectoral matrices), and a hotel in a resort town was booked for several months to proceed with the work away from the distractions of Abidjan. The workshop followed the format used for the Ministry of Justice, and initial sessions were facilitated by the TA. All PRSP staff were trained and coached into facilitating work sessions entirely by themselves and were paired so as to avoid, in particular, early burn-out, as this facilitation method is extremely demanding in terms of attention and focus. All staffs, even the more intimidated, successfully led work sessions, calling on the technical assistant for support when they hit a snag. This result proves that the approach can be implemented successfully on a large scale with national staff guided by a single international consultant.

This process remained on track as long as the international consultant was present; however, as soon as he left (for a three week leave), the PRSP Coordinator re-organized the process in a two-tiered system topped by a vetting committee which he directed. As a result, the work on the matrices lost its focus and the work slowed down significantly (according to conversations with PRSP staff and consultant's observations upon return), while the Coordinator had put himself in position to act as a gate-keeper for all planned government investments for the PRSP duration. After three months of work, the final output was a series of bloated policy matrices whose total estimated cost was running at $28 billions for 5 years, and covering indiscriminately 29 sectors (including culture, sport, tourism, etc.)\(^{51}\). However, they also presented – although in a diminished fashion – some of the positive traits of the Justice matrix. These matrices were never officially published.

Two months after this policy planning marathon, the PRSP staff worked on the matrices to bring back some coherence and focus to the document, re-assessing all the strategies and actions in terms of their expected impact on the well-being of poor populations and also in terms of their adequacy with the overall strategies presented in the expository document. The matrices were then left dormant, until a couple of weeks before the beginning of the government 2011 budgetary discussions, when it became clear that, in order to obtain some credibility within the government, the PRSP had to present realistic, poverty focused policy matrices for that year. This work is currently [May 2010] under way by the PRSP staff, with methodological support from the technical assistant to set objective, strict criteria of selection.\(^{52}\) The same exercise will be organized for the preparation of the donor conference which will be called to discuss their participation to the PRS effort over the next three years.

**PRS Monitoring and Evaluation System**

The setting up of the monitoring and evaluation system (M & E) has progressed only very slowly. The work started at the end of 2009 with two young, technically-savvy staff of the PRSP on the design of the information management system necessary for a detailed monitoring and evaluation of PRS activities (and either integrated in the government's yearly budget or in the international community development programs). The design method was the same as for the

\(^{51}\) The matrices were all-inclusive, providing for all types of investments, including the renewal of computers in the ministries.  

\(^{52}\) The work requires bunching together for 13 priority sectors the matrices that had been designed for 2009, 2010 and 2011, screening the result against the executed 2009 budget and the planned 2010 budget, stripping away all the actions that did not present a clear poverty focus and then setting three levels of priority, in order to obtain a set of proposed policy matrices that would have a chance to fit into the expected investment envelop.
institutional framework, although this time the consultant was more involved in the design itself, given the complexity of the system and lack of experience of the staff. See graph presenting PRS information flows in Annex IV.

The work was then stopped, as the staff was dispatched onto different, un-planned tasks. After five months the work has resumed but is faced with the challenge of finding the appropriate funding (setting up the computer-based system, which will require some basic equipment but most importantly the writing up of proprietary software, will cost between $150 and $200,000). At this juncture, the dysfunctions in the management of the PRSP organization have become a serious and hard to fix impediment to getting the wanted result.

**Organizational development**

Early in the intervention, it became apparent that the PRSP organization suffered from serious managerial dysfunctions, which went further than the usual performance issues generally observed in fragile states bureaucracies. These were most manifest in the discontent of the staff – who were retained on one, three or six month contracts, paid three times a year, and never had had a single week of vacation in all their time in the organization, which could be as long as seven years – and the mirrored discontent of the Coordinator about staff performance. They also manifested themselves in the highly un-predictable changes of direction in the organization's activities, in the impossibility of assigning staff to a regular occupation, in the general lack of communication between senior staff, etc.

Operating in these circumstances has been of course highly problematic, and after several months it became clear that the governance support had to include some organizational development work.\(^53\) In this case, the main issue laid squarely with the Coordinator, who has an impressive track record of achievements in the government, but who also had some serious managerial shortcomings.\(^54\) The Coordinator has a unique capacity for eliciting support and summoning to his workshops some of the government's most senior staffs, as well as for keeping the PRSP project afloat in the midst of perfect indifference from all sides. He also has exhibited a fierce dedication to the completion of the PRSP project, going as far as personally borrowing money from loan-sharks in order to pay the expense of his workshops. On the flip side, his lack of skills for the day-to-day running of an organization, and his sometimes abrasive communication style, have led to a chaotic, frustrating operation (for instance, staff regularly go out and buy printing paper out of their own pocket).

This is of course the most delicate area in which to intervene, as success in such cases depends almost solely on the trust garnered by the consultant and his inter-personal skills. As the program was extended, and as the Coordinator asked to the World Bank that the technical assistance be prolonged, it became possible for the consultant to play more of an adviser rôle and to progressively develop a form of organizational coaching with the PRSP Coordinator. What this will achieve is impossible to know, the only sign of success, as often in consulting practices, being the renewal of contracts, or the testimony of people in the organization (who, in this case, will never be willing to broach the topic, for cultural reasons).

\(^{53}\) The same recommendation could always be made in the case of fragile states bureaucracies, but this one has been a highly idiosyncratic case.

\(^{54}\) It appeared that these were in great part the consequence of the Coordinator's fairly unusual career track.
3.4 Cadre institutionnel de suivi de la mise en œuvre du DSRP

1. Le système institutionnel d’appui à la mise en œuvre et de suivi-évaluation de la Stratégie de Réduction de la Pauvreté (SRP) doit être appréhendé et analysé dans le cadre plus général de la mise en œuvre des politiques de développement de l’État et de la fonction assignée au DSRP dans ce contexte.

2. Le DSRP, préparé avec la participation de la population, est un instrument de planification qui sert à focaliser l’attention et l’action de l’État et des partenaires au développement sur les politiques que le Gouvernement entend mettre en œuvre pour impulser une croissance économique plus forte et mieux orientée vers la réduction de la pauvreté. Le DSRP identifie les objectifs, les stratégies et les actions que le Gouvernement entend poursuivre dans ce but sur les court et moyen termes.

3. Le DSRP s’inscrit, pour la Côte d’Ivoire, dans le cadre plus large de l’initiative de pardon de la dette (Initiative PPTE). En outre, il doit servir à orienter les politiques de soutien des partenaires internationaux, notamment à travers la Table Ronde qui doit, au début de l’exercice, permettre d’identifier les financements nécessaires à la réalisation de la SRP.

4. Le DSRP représente donc un engagement de l’État envers la population et aussi un outil qui permet aux partenaires au développement de mieux aligner leur soutien et leurs actions sur la stratégie poursuivie par le Gouvernement. Dans ce cadre, il est particulièrement important que la plus grande transparence possible soit assurée quant à la mise en œuvre de la SRP – non seulement pour que la population puisse bien juger de l’action du Gouvernement, mais aussi pour que les partenaires internationaux aient suffisamment une bonne visibilité quant à l’impact de ces stratégies et l’utilisation faite de leur soutien.

Rôle du système institutionnel d’appui à la mise en œuvre et de suivi-évaluation de la SRP

5. Le rôle du système institutionnel d’appui à la mise en œuvre de la SRP est donc de veiller à ce que les activités identifiées dans les matrice de politique du DSRP soient, année par année, inscrites dans les plans d’activité sectoriels des différents ministères, financées par des lignes budgétaires clairement identifiées, et enfin, qu’elles soient effectivement exécutées par les différentes structures de l’État ou les partenaires responsables. Le système institutionnel d’appui à la mise en œuvre de la SRP doit donc veiller, année par année, à ce que l’action de l’État et des partenaires reste bien alignée sur, et en cohérence avec les stratégies définies dans le DSRP. Il doit dans ce cadre apporter une assistance technique aux différents acteurs Gouvernementaux pour que ceux-ci soient effectivement en mesure de remplir efficacement leur rôle.

6. Pour assurer une bonne mise en œuvre de la SRP, il est par ailleurs nécessaire d’avoir un outil de suivi-évaluation performant qui soit plus particulièrement focalisé sur les activités entreprises dans le cadre de la SRP, de manière à assurer une bonne transparence des politiques et des actions, et aussi de manière à pouvoir corriger, si nécessaire, les dysfonctionnements opérationnels. Ce système de suivi-évaluation, qui est fondé sur, ou à tout le moins relié aux systèmes de collecte des données de l’État, doit être autonome dans son fonctionnement.

Caractéristiques du système institutionnel d’appui à la mise en œuvre et de suivi-évaluation de la SRP

7. De manière à pouvoir bien remplir son rôle, le système institutionnel d’appui à la mise en œuvre et de suivi-évaluation de la SRP doit remplir un certain nombre de conditions fonctionnelles, qui vont par ailleurs déterminer son point d’ancrage dans le système Gouvernemental : i/ il doit avoir suffisamment d’autorité, et de
légimité, pour pouvoir interagir efficacement avec les différentes structures ministérielles en charge de la planification, de la budgétisation et de la collecte des données, ainsi qu’avec les partenaires internationaux ; ii/ il doit être localisé de manière à avoir un accès facile et être proche des circuits décisionnels du cycle budgétaire, ainsi que des circuits de collecte et de traitement des données ; iii/ il doit être sous la tutelle d’un Ministre pleinement engagé derrière la logique et les problématiques définies par le DSRP.

8. Le bon fonctionnement de ce système est un exercice délicat qui consiste à être à la fois l’avocat de la SRP (et donc, dans un certain sens, le représentant de ses différentes parties prenantes, et plus particulièrement des populations pauvres), tout en étant, en même temps, l’agent de suivi de sa bonne mise en œuvre. Il doit, pour cela, être proche des systèmes centraux de l’État, avec lesquels il doit travailler dans un esprit de collaboration et de coordination, mais aussi proche de la base, c’est-à-dire des autorités locales, des services décentralisés, et des associations ou groupements représentants les différents groupes d’intérêt de la nation. Pour être efficace, par ailleurs, ce système doit être flexible, pragmatique, suffisamment autonome, et constitué par un personnel professionnel et très qualifié.

9. De ce qui précède, un cadre institutionnel de pilotage du DSRP est mis en place. Il comprend trois organes essentiels : (i) Le Comité National de Pilotage (CNP) ; (ii) Le Comité National de Supervision (CNS) ; et (iii) le Secrétariat Technique Permanent de suivi de la SRP (STP-SRP). Les tâches de chaque organes seront précisées dans des termes de référence.

**Le Comité National de Pilotage (CNP)**

10. Le Comité National de Pilotage (CNP) est l’organe décisionnel du cadre institutionnel de suivi de la SRP et est présidé par le Premier Ministre.

**Mission**

11. Il est chargé de (i) ajuster/corriger les orientations stratégiques de la SRP en s’assurant de la cohérence avec les politiques sectorielles (ii) examiner et approuver le plan annuel de mise en œuvre de la SRP (iii) entériner le budget annuel de la SRP, (iv) approuver le rapport annuel de suivi de la mise en œuvre de la SRP et (v) fournir les arbitrages nécessaires en dernière instance.

**Membres**


**Fonctionnement**

13. Le Secrétariat de cet organe est assuré par les deux membres représentant le Comité National de Supervision de la SRP. Le Comité National de Pilotage se réunit au moins deux fois par an et organise une réunion annuelle avec les partenaires au développement.
**Le Comité National de Supervision (CNS)**

14. Le CNS supervise les activités du Secrétariat Technique Permanent de Suivi de la SRP (STP-SRP), prépare les décisions du Comité de Pilotage et sert de cadre de dialogue intersectoriel.

**Mission**

15. Il a pour mission de (i) examiner le plan annuel de mise en œuvre de la SRP préparé par le STP, (ii) examiner le budget annuel de la SRP, (iii) approuver le plan de travail et le budget du STP, (iv) examiner le rapport annuel de suivi de la mise en œuvre de la SRP et de (v) faire les arbitrages opérationnels et techniques nécessaires pour assurer la cohérence entre les plans sectoriels et les actions de la SRP.

**Membres**


**Fonctionnement**

20. Le Comité National de Supervision se réunit au moins une fois par trimestre. Son secrétariat est assuré par le Secrétariat Technique Permanent de Suivi de la SRP (STP-SRP).

- *Secrétariat Technique Permanent de suivi de la SRP (STP-SRP)*

21. Il est l’organe technique opérationnel du suivi/évaluation de la mise en œuvre et rend compte au CNS. Il anime le processus participatif de coordination autour de la SRP entre les parties prenantes auxquelles il peut fournir un appui technique. Il est aussi chargé de suivre et d’analyser la cohérence entre les politiques sectorielles et la SRP. Le Secrétariat Technique Permanent de suivi de la SRP est directement rattaché au Cabinet du Ministre en charge du Plan et du Développement.

**Mission**

22. Il est chargé de (i) élaborer le rapport annuel de suivi de la mise en œuvre de la SRP, (ii) préparer le plan annuel de mise en œuvre de la SRP ; (iii) veiller à l’intégration des activités de la SRP dans le budget annuel de la SRP en coordination avec les ministères sectoriels et la Direction du budget, (iv) suivre la mobilisation des ressources pour le financement de la SRP ; (v) préparer les réunions du Comité National de Supervision, (vi) coordonner les
activités des comités régionaux et des coordonnateurs sectoriels, (vii) gérer les audits sur les réalisations de la SRP et les objectifs prévus, (viii) assurer la communication et la diffusion des informations relatives à la SRP, (ix) coordonner les plans de renforcement des capacités des comités régionaux et des collectivités territoriales, (x) coordonner la révision de la SRP à mi parcours et préparer les DSRP suivants et (xi) harmoniser les cadres de coopération et d’interventions des partenaires au développement avec la SRP (notamment pour leurs besoins en suivi et évaluation).

Membres

23. Le STP-SRP est dirigé par un Directeur Général. Celui-ci est appuyé dans sa tâche par une équipe d’experts:

- Un expert en suivi et évaluation chargé d’assurer le contrôle de qualité des travaux du STP et responsable de la production des rapports et de la coordination avec les partenaires. Il est aussi chargé de diriger l’analyse des écarts entre les valeurs cibles et les valeurs observées, de proposer des mesures correctives et d’identifier les responsables de la mise en œuvre de ces mesures ;
- Un expert statisticien-informaticien chargé de l’élaboration et de la gestion de la base de données. Il est aussi chargé de la mise en place et du fonctionnement des bases de données au niveau régional ; il doit mettre à la disposition des responsables du STP toutes les informations et données indispensables au bon déroulement de leurs activités ;
- Un expert chargé de suivi du cycle budgétaire (SIGFIP, SIGBUD, etc.) et des dépenses relatives à la mise en œuvre. Il est chargé de veiller à la production des états financiers relatifs à la mise en œuvre de la SRP ;
- Un expert en information et communication chargé de faire circuler les informations entre les différents responsables du STP d’une part et d’autre part entre le STP et les parties prenantes de la SRP (lettre d’information, bulletin mensuel, site web, séminaires, etc.) ;
- Un expert en planification chargé de l’élaboration du plan annuel de la SRP et de la coordination avec le CDMT et le PIP, ainsi que du suivi des plans sectoriels et de la coordination des coordonnateurs sectoriels et de l’harmonisation des cadres d’intervention avec les partenaires ;
- Un expert chargé de coordonner et de superviser le travail des dix chargés de suivi au niveau régional ;
- Dix chargés du suivi de la SRP au niveau des pôles de développement ;
- Un expert chargé du renforcement des capacités des parties prenantes sectorielles ou territoriales et responsable des relations avec l’INS ;
- Un(e) assistant(e) de direction chargé(e) de : l'organisation du secrétariat du CNS, l'organisation et suivi du planning de travail du STP ;
- Un comptable ;
- le personnel d'appui composé de deux (2) chauffeurs.

Fonctionnement


25. Le STP-SRP collabore avec les différentes institutions prenant une part active dans la mise en œuvre de la SRP (voir graphique 1)

- *Les Comités Régionaux*

26. Un Comité régional est formé dans chacun des dix pôles de développement (voir tableau 1).
Les Comités Régionaux sont autonomes vis à vis des structures centrales. Ils servent à renforcer le dialogue régional et constituent un cadre de concertation entre les différents acteurs au niveau régional.

**Mission**

Il ont pour mission de suivre la mise en œuvre du DSRP au niveau régional et de délibérer et émettre des avis et recommandations sur la mise en œuvre du DSRP au niveau régional (ciblage et priorisation des actions, interventions, etc.).

**Membres**

Les Comités Régionaux comprennent :
- Les Préfets de Région (représentants du Gouvernement). Le préfet de la capitale économique du pôle de développement préside le Comité Régional ;
- Les chargés de suivi de la SRP au niveau régional. Ils assurent le secrétariat du Comité Régional, préparent les rapports régionaux d’avancement et les transmettent au STP-SRP ;
- Les Directeurs Régionaux des Ministères et le Directeur Régional de l’INS qui rendent compte au Comité Régional de la mise en œuvre de la SRP ;
- Les représentants des collectivités locales : deux représentants par conseil général, un représentant par commune ;
- Deux représentants des ONG, deux représentants des autorités religieuses et coutumières, deux représentants des opérateurs du monde rural, deux représentants des associations des femmes, deux représentants des jeunes, deux représentants du secteur privé, deux représentants des médias (radio et presse écrite) ;
- Trois représentants régionaux des partenaires techniques et financiers.

**Fonctionnement**

Les Comités Régionaux se réunissent chaque trimestre et le Coordonnateur Régional SRP assure le Secrétariat de ce Comité.

**Tableau 17 : Les régions d’ancrage des Comités Régionaux de suivi de la mise en œuvre de la SRP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N°</th>
<th>Pôles de développement</th>
<th>Capitale économique</th>
<th>Régions</th>
<th>Départements concernés</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>Yamoussoukro</td>
<td>Lacs, N’zi-Comoé</td>
<td>Yamoussoukro, Toumodi, Tiébissou, Dimbokro, Bongouanou, Daoukro, M’Bahiakr, Bocanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Centre -Est</td>
<td>Abengourou</td>
<td>Moyen Comoé</td>
<td>Abengourou, Agniblekrou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Centre -Nord</td>
<td>Bouaké</td>
<td>Vallée du Bandama</td>
<td>Bouaké, Béoumi, Dabakala, Sakassou, Katiola,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Centre -Ouest</td>
<td>Daloa</td>
<td>Haut Sassandra, Fromager et Marahoué</td>
<td>Daloa, Issia, Vavoua, Gagnoa, Oumé, Bouaflé, Zuenoula, Sinfra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nord</td>
<td>Korhogo</td>
<td>Savanes</td>
<td>Korhogo, Boundiali, Tengrela, Ferkesedougou,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Nord -Est</td>
<td>Bondoukou</td>
<td>Zanzan</td>
<td>Bondoukou, Bouna, Tanda, Nassian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Nord -Ouest</td>
<td>Odienné</td>
<td>Denguélé, Bafing et Worodougou</td>
<td>Odienné, Samatiguila, Minignan, Madinani, Touba, Mankono, Seguela,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ouest</td>
<td>Man</td>
<td>Montagne, Moyen Cavally</td>
<td>Man, Danané, Biankouma, Kouibly, Zouhan Hounien Bangolo, Duekoué, Guiglo, Blolequin, Touplepleu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
31. Dans les pôles de développement constitués de plusieurs régions administratives, le Comité Régional sera présidé par le Préfet de la capitale économique du pôle de développement.

- Développements futurs

32. A l'échelon Départemental, du District et des Communes, conformément au cadre de décentralisation et de déconcentration des compétences de l'Etat, des Comités seront envisagés au regard de l'expérience avec les Comités régionaux au fur et à mesure de la mise en œuvre du DSRP.

- Les Coordonnateurs sectoriels SRP


34. Les coordonnateurs sectoriels sont chargés d’assurer la cohérence entre le travail de suivi du STP et le travail de suivi des directions de planification sectorielles. Ils participent aux travaux d'élaboration de plan annuel de mise en œuvre de la SRP et de coordination avec les plans sectoriels. Ils s'assurent de la réalisation effective des activités de la SRP dans leur secteur.

35. Les missions des Coordonnateurs sectoriels seront appuyées par le STP-SRP. Les Coordonnateurs sectoriels se réunissent deux fois par an par axe stratégique.

- Les Chargés de Suivi de la SRP au niveau Régional

36. Ils sont les représentants du STP-SRP et sont rattachés à la Direction Régionale du Plan de chacun des dix (10) pôles de développement. Ils assurent le suivi de la mise en œuvre des activités de la SRP et le secrétariat du Comité Régional.

37. Ils travaillent avec les services chargés des statistiques des Directions des Administrations déconcentrées, les Directions Régionales de l’INS, les agents en charge du suivi des activités dans les collectivités territoriales, les ONG, et les partenaires au développement pour la centralisation, la compilation et la mise en forme des données statistiques relatives à la mise en œuvre de la SRP. Ils gèrent au niveau régional la base de données de la SRP. Ils préparent les missions de supervision des équipes du STP et celles menées conjointement avec les Administrations centrales et les autres partenaires. Ils élaborent les rapports mensuels de terrain qu’ils transmettent au STP-SRP et au Comité Régional SRP.

38. Ils rendent compte au DG du STP-SRP et collaborent avec le DR Plan, en particulier pour le renforcement des capacités de la Direction Régionale.
CADRE INSTITUTIONNEL DE SUIVI DE LA SRP

COMITE NATIONAL DE PILOTAGE

COMITE NATIONAL DE SUPERVISION (CNS)

SECRETARIAT TECHNIQUE PERMANENT DE SUIVI DE LA SRP (STP-SRP)

COORDONNAT EURS DE SUIVI REGIONAUX SRP

COORDONNAT EURS SECTORIELS

COMITES REGIONAUX

DGP (DPIP, DCCE, DP), DBE, BNP, INS, DPM, ANARREC etc.
Principes directeurs du système institutionnel d’appui à la mise en œuvre et de suivi évaluation de la SRP

39. Le DSRP ne représente pas la totalité de l’action du Gouvernement ; il s’agit au contraire d’un sous-ensemble spécifique des politiques Gouvernementales, le sous-ensemble des politiques économiques, sociales ou institutionnelles qui ont été identifiées comme pouvant avoir un impact particulier sur le développement économique et la réduction de la pauvreté.

40. La mise en œuvre de la Stratégie de Réduction de la Pauvreté sera toujours régie par les principaux principes directeurs suivants qui ont été largement approuvés par les acteurs : la proximité, le faire-faire, la transparence, la participation, l'équité, la célérité, la subsidiarité, la complémentarité et la synergie.

41. en vertu du principe de proximité, les lieux de décision concernant la mise en œuvre des interventions relatives à la Stratégie de Réduction de la Pauvreté doivent être le plus proche possible des bénéficiaires et de leur lieu de résidence en vue d’assurer un meilleur ciblage des interventions ;

42. en vertu du principe du faire-faire, l’État reconnaît que la mise en œuvre de la Stratégie de Réduction de la Pauvreté n’est pas l’affaire seulement des instances officielles et administratives, mais également celle des collectivités locales, des acteurs de la société civile et du secteur privé ;

43. en vertu du principe de transparence, il conviendra de mettre en place aux différents niveaux d’intervention, une série de mécanismes garantissant la visibilité et le contrôle, de façon à établir l’équilibre entre responsabilité et autonomie;

44. en vertu du principe de participation, les bénéficiaires des projets et programmes de pauvreté doivent être associés à toute décision les concernant personnellement ;

45. en vertu du principe d’équité, il convient de garantir l’égalité de droits et de responsabilités dans l’implication des différentes parties prenantes en prenant en compte les différences de genre, les inégalités sociales ainsi que les spécificités régionales et locales dans le pilotage et l’exécution du DSRP et dans les différents domaines d’activités de lutte contre la pauvreté ;

46. en vertu du principe de célérité, il conviendra d’adopter des procédures qui assurent à la fois la rapidité et la transparence dans les décaissements, la passation et l’exécution des marchés ;

47. en vertu du principe du subsidiarité, la mise en œuvre sera organisée en responsabilisant les acteurs intervenant aux différentes échelles administratives du niveau local au niveau national en fonction des avantages comparatifs en terme d’efficacité, de ciblage, d’économie d’échelles, etc.

48. en vertu du principe de complémentarité et de synergie, la stratégie doit viser la combinaison efficiente des moyens et des ressources en vue d’optimiser les résultats

3.5 Les processus de suivi de la mise en œuvre de la SRP

Suivi / Evaluation

Activités préalables

- Elaboration des matrices de suivi (identification des indicateurs d’intrants, de produits, de résultats et d’impact)

Intrants (Moyens financiers, humains, matériels dégagés pour la mise en œuvre du DSRP) :

Produits (résultat des actions ou des activités mis en œuvre pour la réalisation des objectifs):

Les indicateurs seront identifiés par le STP-SRP avec la collaboration des Directions de planification des Ministères et des partenaires techniques (mars 2009)

Résultat (Mesure le degré de réalisation des objectifs intermédiaires):

Impacts (Mesure le degré de réalisation des objectifs globaux et de réduction de la pauvreté)

La matrice d’indicateurs sera finalisée par le STP-SRP (mars 2009)
Les indicateurs identifiés seront mis en cohérence avec les besoins en suivi et évaluation des partenaires. Une base de données sera élaborée pour renseigner tous les indicateurs identifiés.

- **Identification des sources d’information**

  L’identification des bases de données nécessaires pour renseigner les indicateurs sera assurée par le STP-SRP en collaboration avec les Directions en charge de la planification, Centre de Recherche et l’INS.

  Les activités de la Stratégie Nationale de Développement de la Statistique (SNDS), nécessaires au suivi de la SRP, seront mises en œuvre avec l’appui du STP-SRP, en vue de permettre la désagrégation des matrices au niveau régional pour la fin 2010.

  Le STP-SRP va explorer les possibilités de collaboration avec l’Inspection Générale de l’État en vue de la production de rapports d’inspection et d’audit.

  Le STP-SRP devra planifier et commanditer des enquêtes de type QUIBB (Questionnaire Unifié des Indicateurs de Base sur le Bien être) nécessaires pour mesurer l’impact des politiques sectorielles. Le STP-SRP identifiera et indiquera le montant et les sources de financement nécessaires.

  Le STP-SRP supervisera l’évaluation des systèmes et outils de suivi et évaluation des Direction en charge du suivi évaluation dans les Ministères.

  Le STP élaborera avec les Comités Régionaux un plan de renforcement du suivi évaluation au niveau local en faisant usage d’outils d’évaluation participative (comme le citizen report card).

- **Mise en place du système et de procédures de collectes de données (Avril 2009)**

  Le STP-SRP va préparer le chronogramme de ses activités en veillant à ce qu’il soit en adéquation avec les besoins du chronogramme Gouvernemental. Ensuite, il élaborera un manuel de procédures/cahier de charges.

**Activités récurrentes**

La périodicité de collecte des données pour le calcul des indicateurs sera de six mois pour les indicateurs d’intrants ; annuelle pour les indicateurs de produits et quinquennale pour les indicateurs d’impact.

Le rapport annuel de suivi de la mise en œuvre sera élaboré pour permettre sa publication au mois de Mars (NB : soumission du premier rapport au CNS au 14ème mois après le démarrage de la mise en œuvre de la SRP et au CNP le 15ème mois).

Un rapport semestriel (en juillet et décembre) d’exécutoire budgétaire de la SRP sera élaboré pour veiller à sa conformité avec les plans annuels de mise en œuvre.

- **SIGFIP (Système Intégré de Gestion des Finances Publiques)**

  Le STP-SRP, en coordination avec le SIGFIP, suivra l’exécution des décaissements relatifs aux activités du plan annuel de mise en œuvre de la SRP. A cet effet, un rapport mensuel de suivi des décaissements/dépenses de la SRP sera produit et suggérera, si nécessaire, les corrections requises.

**Appui à la mise en œuvre**

**Activités préalables**

- **Publication du décret/arrêté de création du cadre institutionnel de mise en œuvre (en particulier le CNS, le STP-SRP et les Comités Régionaux) janvier 2009 ;**

- **Elaboration du premier budget du STP-SRP et son approvisionnement (investissement et fonctionnement-janvier 2009) ;**

- **Mettre en place les mécanismes nécessaires à la circulation de l’information relative à la SRP ;**

Elaboration et mise en œuvre d’un plan de communication, entre autres, le site Web du DSRP, une lettre
d’information bimestrielle, séminaires de sensibilisation et de formation pour les parties prenantes (société civile, médias, Gouvernements locaux, etc.).

- **Etablir un cadre de coopération et Coordination entre le STP-SRP et les Organisations de la Société Civile (OSC) impliquées dans les actions de développement.**

Ce cadre de coopération et coordination sera initié par le STP-SRP dans l’optique, à terme, que ce cadre soit géré par les OSC.

**Activités récurrentes**

- **Allocation du budget du STP-SRP (janvier 2009)**
- **Elaboration du plan annuel de mise en œuvre de la SRP**

Le STP-SRP identifiaera les apports financiers des partenaires pour les années à venir de manière à prendre en compte les contreparties du Gouvernement dans le budget. Cela devra se faire à partir du mois de mai pour l’année suivante.

Il devra se réunir avec les différents responsables de planification des ministères sectoriels et ensuite avec les structures chargées de la programmation des investissements publics (PIP) et des investissements locaux pour permettre la production des plans annuels de mise en œuvre de la SRP par secteur.

Il procédera ensuite à la finalisation du plan annuel de mise en œuvre (octobre) en fonction des arbitrages des conférences budgétaires.

Il s’assurera enfin que la matrice d’actions Gouvernementales contient les activités prévues dans le plan annuel de mise en œuvre de la SRP (janvier).

- **Appui au processus d’élaboration des plans sectoriels (à moyen terme) et leur mise en cohérence avec la SRP**

Il s’agira de faire un bilan et une analyse avec les responsables de la planification des différents ministères sectoriels. Le STP-SRP coordonnera avec la Direction Générale du Budget l’élaboration des CDMT sectoriels pour les ministères qui disposent d’un plan sectoriel. Pour ceux qui n’en ont pas, le STP-SRP établira un calendrier d’élaboration de leur plan sectoriel.

- **Appui pour le renforcement de capacité des agents impliqués dans la mise en œuvre de la SRP**

Le STP-SRP identifiera les besoins en termes de renforcement de capacité au niveau régional et les sources d’appui possibles (Direction de passation des marchés, Direction Générale de la Population et du renforcement des capacités, Cellule de renforcement des capacités du Ministère de l’Economie et des Finances, Secrétariat de la Bonne Gouvernance et de Renforcement des Capacités, partenaires internationaux, etc.)

Il initiera un programme pilote de l’initiative de résultats rapides sur certains secteurs (Rapid Results Initiative) avec l’appui de l’Institut de la Banque mondiale.

- **Sensibilisation des parties prenantes à la mise en œuvre de la SRP (Directeurs de Cabinet, Coordonnateurs sectoriels, Comités Régionaux, etc.) sur le processus de planification et de suivi de la SRP.**

Le STP-SRP organiera une rencontre annuelle avec chaque groupe de parties prenantes et fera circuler les informations à travers sa lettre d’information.

- **Organisation des tables rondes de concertation Gouvernement/Partenaires Opérationnels**

Le STP-SRP organiera et supervisera des réunions de coordination et de planification des actions des ministères et des partenaires notamment le UNDAF, 10ème FED, etc., avec une fréquence semestrielle.
Liaison avec le cadre budgétaire

Etapes de l’élaboration du budget

Le STP-SRP collaborera avec les différentes structures impliquées dans l’élaboration du budget pour veiller à l’intégration des activités de la SRP dans le budget de l’État (ci-dessous le cycle de préparation budgétaire avec en gras les étapes où le STP-SRP intervient).

i. **Elaboration du Cadre budgétaire (DPSB/DBE+ STP-SRP)** (Mars) et son adoption par le Conseil des Ministres (Avril)

ii. **Elaboration du PIP (DGP/DBE+STP-SRP)** (Avril)

iii. Communication aux Ministères des enveloppes budgétaires: Détermination des enveloppes budgétaires (DBE) (Avril) et lettre de Cadre (Cabinet du 1er Ministre et DPSB) (Mai)

iv. **Confection des propositions budgétaires par les Ministères : Ventilation des enveloppes budgétaires (DAAF et Administrateurs de Crédits délégués+STP-SRP)** et saisie des répartitions des crédits dans le SIGBUD (Mai- Juin)

v. Retour des propositions budgétaires des Ministères (DAAF) (Juillet)

vi. **Conférences budgétaires (DGBF/DGP+STP-SRP)** (Juillet- Août)

vii. Examen du projet de budget par le Conseil des Ministres (Cabinet du Ministre chargé de l’Economie et des Finances) (Septembre)

viii. Finalisation des documents budgétaires (DGBF) (Septembre)

ix. Edition des documents budgétaires (DGBF/Ministère de la Fonction Publique) (Septembre)

x. Dépôt des documents budgétaires à l’Assemblée Nationale (Cabinet du Ministère chargé de l’Economie et des Finances) (Octobre)

3.6 **chronogramme et plan de finalisation des matrices d’action du dsrcp**

**Objectif/résultat :** Élaborer et mettre au point des matrices d’actions prioritaires du DSRP par secteur donc par axe stratégique et finalement désagréger ces actions par pôle de développement - région – département et communes en précisant les indicateurs de suivi (produit et résultat, avec leurs valeurs cibles), de manière à permettre un calcul des coûts du DSRP.

**Date butoir**

fin Mars 2009.

**Processus :**

*En préalable, identification des équipes* qui travailleront sur la préparation des matrices ;

Ces équipes seront organisées par secteur ou par objectif global (les axes stratégiques sont trop larges pour permettre un travail efficace).

La taille de chaque équipe n’excédera pas douze personnes.

Composition des équipes : Présidé par un membre du STP-SRP, elle comprendra des responsables de la Direction Générale du Budget et des Finances, des membres de la DPIF, des Coordonnateurs Sectoriels du DSRP et 2 ou 3 personnes de son Ministère de tutelle, un ou deux experts internationaux spécialisés dans le domaine venant de la communauté des bailleurs en Côte d’Ivoire, et, suivant les cas, si possible des experts de la société civile, de l’université, du secteur privé (l’idée étant de créer des groupes assez divers pour qu’il y ait une plus grande créativité dans le travail).

viii. A la fin Décembre, tous les participants éventuels devront avoir été contactés et, si possible, avoir fait connaître leurs dates de disponibilité (au moins pour le premier mois), pour permettre la préparation
d'un calendrier de travail provisoire pour les trois mois suivants.

ix. **Organisation des ateliers** : le plus efficace est d'organiser des ateliers d'une journée maximum pour chaque équipe, mais répétés toutes les semaines ou deux semaines, sur une période de deux à trois mois.

x. **Décomposition du travail** : a/ identification des actions constituant la stratégie de mise en œuvre de chaque objectif intermédiaire; b/ identification des indicateurs de produit et de résultat; c/ définition des valeurs cibles des indicateurs, avec une désagrégation régionale si possible; d/ établissement des coûts des actions par les ministères; e/ vérification/validation des matrices désagrégées au niveau régional (concomitamment avec le travail initial de mise en place des Comités Régionaux); f/ établissement des priorités.

xi. **Durée** : Il faut compter que l'élaboration de la matrice d'actions pour chaque secteur (ou objectif global), y compris les indicateurs et leurs valeurs cibles, requerra au minimum trois jours de réunion.

xii. **Méthodologie** : La réflexion se fera à partir de l'analyse des problèmes du DSRP, du cadre logique, des plans sectoriels des ministères et des programmes des bailleurs. La méthode de travail suggérée est celle utilisée au cours de la préparation du cadre institutionnel, c'est-à-dire essentiellement un questionnement (maïeutique) par l'expert en méthodologie venu apporter un appui au Secrétariat Technique Permanent.

xiii. Un sous-objectif de ce travail est de former (sur le tas) les experts du STP à cette méthode.

**Remarques d'ordre général** :

La fin de ce travail devrait coïncider avec le démarrage des travaux d'élaboration budgétaire du Gouvernement, et devrait donc permettre d'intégrer sans trop de difficultés les activités du premier plan annuel de mise en œuvre (2010) dans la préparation du PIP, du budget, etc.

Ce travail servira de base pour la préparation, ensuite, de la Table Ronde des Donneurs, qui devrait en principe être organisée avant le mois de juin 2009.

Ce travail se fera en même temps que la mise en place du cadre institutionnel du DSRP (décrets de mise en place des Comités et du STP, financement, identification des experts du STP, localisation des bureaux, achat du matériel, etc.).
ANNEX III: POLICY MATRIX FOR JUSTICE – as of March 2010

SUIVI DE LA MISE EN ŒUVRE DU DSRP PLAN D'ACTIONS PRIORITAIRES

SECTEUR DE LA JUSTICE

IMPACT DU DSRP : Rétablissement et raffermissement des fondements de la République

Problème: Les populations ne bénéficient pas d'une justice accessible, équitable et de qualité

Objectif général: Garantir l'Etat de droit

Impact : La confiance entre les justiciables et leur justice est restaurée

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Promouvoir une justice indépendante</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Mise en place des hautes juridictions et du Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature, organes garantissant l'indépendance de la justice</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2 2010</td>
<td>2 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.2 Préparer le projet de loi organique relative à la Cour de Cassation  
25 0 25 3 2010 3 2010

1.3 Préparer le projet de loi organique relative à la Cour des Comptes  
0 3 2010 3 2010

1.4 Préparer les projets de loi organique relative au Conseil d’Etat  
25 0 25 3 2010 3 2010

1.5 Adopter le projet de loi organique relative au Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature  
3 2010 3 2010

1.6 Adopter le projet de loi organique relative à la Cour de cassation  
4 2010 4 2010

1.7 Adopter le projet de loi organique relative à la Cour des Comptes  
4 2010 4 2010

1.8 Voter la loi organique relative au Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature  
4 2010 4 2010

1.9 Voter la loi organique relative à la Cour de Cassation  
5 2010 5 2010

1.10 Voter la loi organique relative à la Cour des Comptes  
5 2010 5 2010

1.11 Voter la loi organique relative au Conseil d’Etat  
5 2010 5 2010

1.12 Promulguer la loi organique relative au Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature  
5 2010 5 2010

1.13 Promulguer la loi organique relative à la Cour de Cassation  
6 2010 6 2010

1.14 Promulguer la loi organique relative à la Cour des Comptes  
6 2010 6 2010

1.15 Promulguer la loi organique relative au Conseil d’Etat  
6 2010 6 2010

1.16 Construire et équiper les locaux des hautes juridictions (Conseil Constitutionnel, Cour de Cassation, Cour des Comptes, Conseil d’Etat) et du Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature à Yamoussoukro  
2650 0 400 900 1350 0

2.1 Construire les bâtiments du Conseil Constitutionnel  
550 0 100 225 225 3 2010 3 2010

2.2 Construire les bâtiments de la Cour de Cassation  
550 0 100 225 225 3 2010 3 2010

2.3 Construire les bâtiments de la Cour des Comptes  
550 0 100 225 225 3 2010 3 2010

2.4 Construire les bâtiments du Conseil d’Etat  
550 0 100 225 225 3 2010 3 2010

2.5 Équiper le Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature en matériel bureautique et logistique  
90 0 90 8 2012 12 2012

2.6 Équiper le Conseil Constitutionnel en matériel bureautique et logistique  
90 0 90 8 2012 12 2012
2.7 Equiper la Cour de Cassation en matériel bureautique et logistique 90 0 90 8 2012 12 2012
2.8 Equiper la Cour des Comptes en matériel bureautique et logistique 90 0 90 8 2012 12 2012
2.9 Equiper le Conseil d'État en matériel bureautique et logistique 90 0 90 8 2012 12 2012

Prendre les textes modifiant et complétant le statut de la Magistrature 120 0 120 0 0 0
3 3.1 Préparer le projet de loi modifiant et complétant la loi portant statut de la Magistrature 20 0 20 4 2010 4 2010
3.2 Adopter le projet de loi modifiant et complétant la loi portant statut de la Magistrature 20 0 20 4 2010 4 2010
3.3 Voter la loi modifiant et complétant le statut de la Magistrature 20 0 20 5 2010 5 2010
3.4 Promulguer la loi modifiant et complétant le statut de la Magistrature 20 0 20 6 2010 6 2010
3.5 Préparer le projet de décret d'application de la nouvelle loi portant statut de la Magistrature 20 0 20 7 2010 8 2010
3.6 Prendre le décret d'application de la nouvelle loi portant statut de la Magistrature 20 0 20 7 2010 8 2010

Prendre une loi modifiant et complétant la Constitution en ses articles 104, 105 et 106 relatifs au Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature 80 0 80 0 0 0
4 4.1 Préparer le projet de loi modifiant et complétant la Constitution en ses articles 104, 105 et 106 relatifs au Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature 20 0 20 7 2010 8 2010
4.2 Adopter le projet de loi modifiant et complétant la Constitution en ses articles 104, 105 et 106 relatifs au Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature 20 0 20 7 2010 8 2010
4.3 Voter la loi modifiant et complétant la Constitution en ses articles 104, 105 et 106 relatifs au Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature 20 0 20 9 2010 9 2010
4.4 Promulguer la loi modifiant et complétant la Constitution en ses articles 104, 105 et 106 relatifs au Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature 20 0 20 9 2010 9 2010
Total Programme 1

|                      | 2925 | 0  | 675 | 900 | 1350 | 0 |

PROGRAMME 2: Rapprochement et facilitation de l'accès au service de la Justice

Stratégie 2 : Sensibilisation à l'application du droit et au respect des procédures de justice

5
Organiser des sessions d'échanges et d'informations avec les personnels de justice sur l'application du droit

6
Organiser des sessions d'échanges et d'informations avec les personnels de justice sur l'application du droit

Objectif spécifique 2 : Faciliter l'accès aux services de justice pour tous

Stratégie 3 : Rapprochement des services de la justice des justiciables

Ouvrir les juridictions déjà créées mais non fonctionnelles :
- Cours d'appel d'Abengourou, de Korhogo et de Man ;
- Tribunal de première Instance d'Abobo, San Pedro, Port-Bouet ; Section de Tribunaux de Guiglo, Ferkessédougou, Issia, Bocanda, Sinfra, Tiébissou, Zuenoula, Mankono, Dabakala, Tengrela, Biankouma, Béoumi, Yamoussoukro

|                      | 35872 | 400 | 4682. | 1129 | 1286 | 2575 |

7
Construire la Cour d'Appel d'Abengourou

7.1 Construire la Cour d'Appel de Korhogo

7.2 Construire la Cour d'Appel de Man

7.3 Equiper la Cour d'Appel d'Abengourou

7.4 Equiper la Cour d'Appel de Korhogo

7.5 Equiper la Cour d'Appel de Man

7.6 Equiper le TPI d'Abobo

7.7 Construire le TPI de Port-Bouët

7.8 Construire le TPI de San-Pedro

7.9 Equiper le TPI d'Abobo

7.10 Equiper le TPI de Port-Bouët

7.11 Equiper le TPI de San-Pedro

7.12 Construire la section détachée du tribunal de Guiglo

7.13 Construire la section détachée du tribunal de Ferkessédougou

7.14 Construire la section détachée du tribunal d'Issia

7.15 Construire la section détachée du tribunal de Bocanda

7.16 Construire la section détachée du tribunal de Tiebissou

7.17 Construire la section détachée du tribunal de Yamoussoukro
7.18 Construire la section détachée du tribunal de Zuenoula 450 o 25 6 2010 4 2012
7.19 Construire la section détachée du tribunal de Mankono 450 o 25 6 2010 4 2012
7.20 Construire la section détachée du tribunal de Dabakala 450 o 25 6 2010 4 2012
7.21 Construire la section détachée du tribunal de Tengrela 450 o 25 325 6 2010 4 2012
7.22 Construire la section détachée du tribunal de Biankouma 450 o 25 325 6 2010 4 2012
7.23 Construire la section détachée du tribunal de Béoumi 450 o 25 325 6 2010 4 2012
7.24 Construire la section détachée du tribunal de Yamoussoukro 450 o 25 325 6 2010 4 2012
7.25 Construire la section détachée du tribunal de Sinfra
7.26 Equiper la section détachée du tribunal de Guiglo 0 9 2011 12 2011
7.27 Equiper la section détachée du tribunal de Ferkéssedougou 0 65 6 2012 10 2012
7.28 Equiper la section détachée du tribunal de Issia 0 65 6
7.29 Equiper la section détachée du tribunal de Bocanda 0 65 6 2012 10 2012
7.30 Equiper la section détachée du tribunal de Tiebissou 0 65 6 2012 10 2012
7.31 Equiper la section détachée du tribunal de Zuenoula 0 65 6 2012 10 2012
7.32 Equiper la section détachée du tribunal de Mankono 0 65 6 2012 10 2012
7.33 Equiper la section détachée du tribunal de Dabakala 0 65 6 2012 10 2012
7.34 Equiper la section détachée du tribunal de Tingrela 0 65 6 2012 10 2012
7.35 Equiper la section détachée du tribunal de Biankouma 0 65 6 2012 10 2012
7.36 Equiper la section détachée du tribunal de Béoumi 0 65 6 2012 10 2012
7.37 Equiper la section détachée du tribunal de Yamoussoukro 0 65 6 2012 10 2012
7.38 Equiper la section détachée du tribunal de Sinfra 0 65 5 2010 11 2010

Ouvrir les centres de détention déjà créés mais non fonctionnels : les 2 prisons de haute sécurité Abidjan et Man ; établissements pénitentiaires de Guiglo, Ferké, Issia, Bocanda, Sinfra, Tiébissou, Zuenoula, Mankono, Dabakala, Tingréla, Biankouma, Béoumi, Yamoussoukro, Abobo, Yopougon, Port-Bouet

8.1 Construire un établissement pénitentiaire à Guiglo 2500 o 300 734 734 734 6 2010 6 2013
8.2 Construire un établissement pénitentiaire à Ferkessédougou 2500 o 300 734 734 734 6 2010 6 2013
8.3 Construire un établissement pénitentiaire à Issia 2500 o 300 734 734 734 6 2010 6 2013
8.4 Construire un établissement pénitentiaire à Bocanda 2500 o 300 734 734 734 6 2010 6 2013
8.5 Construire un établissement pénitentiaire à Abobo 4500 o 450 1350 1350 1350 6 2010 6 2013
8.6 Construire un établissement pénitentiaire à Tiebissou 2500 o 300 734 734 734 6 2010 6 2013
8.7 Construire un établissement pénitentiaire à Zuenoula 2500 o 300 734 734 734 6 2010 6 2013
8.8 Construire un établissement pénitentiaire à Mankono 2500 o 300 734 734 734 6 2010 6 2013
8.9 Construire un établissement pénitentiaire à Dabakala 2500 o 300 734 734 734 6 2010 6 2013
8.10 Construire un établissement pénitentiaire à San-Pedro 2500 o 450 1350 1350 1350 6 2010 6 2013
8.11 Construire un établissement pénitentiaire à Tengrela 2500 o 300 734 734 734 6 2010 6 2013
8.12 Construire un établissement pénitentiaire à Biankouma 2500 o 300 734 734 734 6 2010 6 2013
8.13 Construire un établissement pénitentiaire à Béoumi 2500 o 300 734 734 734 6 2010 6 2013
8.14 Construire un établissement pénitentiaire à Sinfra 2500 o 300 734 734 734 6 2010 6 2013
8.15 Construire un établissement pénitentiaire à Yamoussoukro 2500 o 300 734 734 734 6 2010 6 2013
8.16 Construire un établissement pénitentiaire à Port-Bouët 4500 o 450 734 734 734 6 2010 6 2013
8.17 Construire une prison de haute sécurité à Abidjan 8100 o 600 734 734 734 6 2010 5 2013
8.18 Construire une prison de haute sécurité à Man 4500 o 450 1350 1350 1350 6 2010 6 2013
8.19 Equiper l'établissement pénitentiaire de Guiglo 6 1013 12 2013
8.20 Equiper l'établissement pénitentiaire de Ferkessédougou 6 1013 12 2013
8.21 Equiper l'établissement pénitentiaire d’Issia 6 1013 12 2013
8.22 Equiper l'établissement pénitentiaire de Bocanda 6 1013 12 2013
8.23 Equiper l'établissement pénitentiaire d'Abobo 6 1013 12 2013
8.24 Equiper l'établissement pénitentiaire de Tiebissou 6 1013 12 2013
8.25 Equiper l'établissement pénitentiaire de Zuenoula 6 1013 12 2013
8.26 Equiper l'établissement pénitentiaire de Mankono 6 1013 12 2013
8.27 Equiper l'établissement pénitentiaire de Dabakala 6 1013 12 2013
8.28 Equiper l'établissement pénitentiaire de San-Pedro 6 1013 12 2013
8.29 Equiper l'établissement pénitentiaire de Tengrela 6 1013 12 2013
8.30 Equiper l'établissement pénitentiaire de Sinfra 6 1013 12 2013
8.31 Equiper l'établissement pénitentiaire de Béoumi 6 1013 12 2013
8.32 Equiper l'établissement pénitentiaire de Biankouma 6 1013 12 2013
8.33 Equiper l'établissement pénitentiaire de Yamoussoukro 6 1013 12 2013
8.34 Equiper l'établissement pénitentiaire de Port-Bouët 0 900 6 2013 12 2013
8.35 Equiper la prison de haute sécurité d’Abidjan 0 1620 6 2013 12 2013
8.36 Equiper la prison de haute sécurité de Man 0 900 6 2013 12 2013

9 Réhabiliter, étendre et équiper les 3 sections érigées en TPI de Adzopé, Divo et Dimbokro 1437 0 1437 123 0 0
9.1 Réhabiliter la section du TPI de Adzopé 275 o 275 5 2010 2010
9.2 Réhabiliter la section du TPI de Divo 275 o 275 5 2010 2010
9.3 Réhabiliter la section du TPI de Dimbokro 275 o 275
9.4 Construire des bureaux supplémentaires pour la section du TPI de Adzopé 204 o 204 11 2010 2011
<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>Construire des bureaux supplémentaires pour la section du TPI de Divo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>Construire des bureaux supplémentaires pour la section du TPI de Dimbokro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>Equiper la section du TPI de Adzopé</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>Equiper la section du TPI de Divo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>Equiper la section du TPI de Dimbokro</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Stratégie 4 : Amélioration de l'accès financier à la justice**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Réviser la tarification des actes de justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>Faire une étude en vue de la modification des décrets de 1975 et 1976 relatifs aux frais de justice en matière civile et pénale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>Inscrire des crédits provisionnels pour l'assistance judiciaire au budget de l'Etat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>Préparer un texte de loi relatif à la mise en place d'un fonds d'assistance judiciaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>Adopter le projet de loi relatif à la mise en place d'un fonds d'assistance judiciaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>Voter la loi relative à la mise en place d'un fonds d'assistance judiciaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>Promulguer la loi relative à la mise en place d'un fonds d'assistance judiciaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>Préparer le projet de décret d'application de la loi relative à la mise en place d'un fonds d'assistance judiciaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>Prendre le décret d'application de la loi relative à la mise en place d'un fonds d'assistance judiciaire</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Redynamiser l'assistance judiciaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>Sensibiliser et vulgariser les procédures d'admission à l'assistance judiciaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>Préparer le projet de décret modifiant le décret relatif à l'assistance judiciaire auprès de tous les TPI, définissant notamment les modalités et critères d'accès à l'assistance judiciaire, avec une attention particulière au ciblage des besoins</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
femmes et des enfants vulnérables

Prendre un décret modifiant le décret relatif à l'assistance judiciaire auprès de tous les TPI, définissant notamment les modalités et critères d'accès à l'assistance judiciaire, avec une attention particulière au ciblage des femmes et des enfants vulnérables

11.3

Stratégie 5 : Vulgarisation du langage et des procédures judiciaires

12 Sensibiliser la population à ses droits

12.1 Organiser des campagnes de vulgarisation des lois et procédures favorisant l'accès à la justice

12.2 Créer les centres juridiques d'information et d'accueil dans toutes les XXXX juridictions

12.3 Equiper les centres juridiques d'information et d'accueil dans toutes les XXXX juridictions

12.4 Doter en personnel (??) les centres juridiques d'information et d'accueil dans toutes les XXXX juridictions

12.5 Apporter un appui (??) aux services décentralisés de la CNDH-CI

12.6 Appuyer les services d'écoute, d'orientation et d'assistance fournis par les ONG et les Collectivités Territoriales

13 Renforcer les capacités des interprètes de justice

13.1 Faire une étude pour identifier les besoins

13.2 Développer et mettre en œuvre un plan de formation initiale et continue des interprètes de justice

13.3 Préparer le projet de décret définissant un statut des interprètes de justice

13.4 Prendre un décret définissant un statut des interprètes de justice

Total programme 2

95416 400 12614 2681 2892 21816
PROGRAMME 3: Modernisation et renforcement des capacités des services de Justice

Objectif spécifique 3 : Promouvoir une justice de qualité

Stratégie 6: Modernisation et renforcement des capacités des services de la justice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14</th>
<th>Construire et équiper l'Institut National de Formation Judiciaire (INFJ) à Yamoussoukro</th>
<th>22370</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>4350</th>
<th>4350</th>
<th>4350</th>
<th>7720</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>Construire les bâtiments de l'INFJ à Yamoussoukro</td>
<td>19000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4350</td>
<td>4350</td>
<td>4350</td>
<td>6 2010 4 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>Equiper les bâtiments de l'INFJ à Yamoussoukro</td>
<td>3370</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4350</td>
<td>3370</td>
<td>3370</td>
<td>6 2013 12 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>Préparer le projet de décret modificatif portant création et organisation de l'INFJ pour faciliter le recrutement des acteurs de justice</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>Prendre le projet de décret modificatif portant création et organisation de l'INFJ pour faciliter le recrutement des acteurs de justice</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>Organiser les concours d'accès à l'INFJ</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>Accroître le budget de fonctionnement de l'INFJ de XX %</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Former le personnel (magistrats, greffiers, personnel penitentiaire, personnel de l'éducation surveillée) de la justice

| 15.1 | Recruter 50 magistrats par an sur 3 ans | 0 |
| 15.2 | Recruter 100 greffiers par an tous cycles confondus sur 3 ans | 0 |
| 15.3 | Recruter 300 agents pénitentiaires par an sur 3 ans | 0 |
| 15.4 | Recruter 10 maîtres conseillers d'éducation surveillée | 0 |
| 15.5 | Recruter 25 maîtres d'éducation surveillée par an sur 3 ans | 0 |
| 15.6 | Former 50 magistrats par an sur 3 ans | 0 |
| 15.7 | Former 100 greffiers par an tous cycles confondus sur 3 ans | 0 |
| 15.8 | Former 300 agents pénitentiaires par an sur 3 ans | 0 |
| 15.9 | Former 10 maîtres conseillers d'éducation surveillés | 0 |
| 15.10 | Former 25 maîtres d'éducation surveillée par an sur 3 ans | 0 |
| 15.11 | Affecter 50 magistrats par an sur 3 ans | 0 |
| 15.12 | Affecter 100 greffiers par an tous cycles confondus sur 3 ans | 0 |
| 15.13 | Affecter 300 agents pénitentiaires par an sur 3 ans | 0 |
| 15.14 | Affecter 10 maîtres conseillers d'éducation surveillés | 0 |
| 15.15 | Affecter 25 maîtres d'éducation surveillée par an sur 3 ans |
| 16 | Construire et équiper 3 salles d'audiences à Abidjan et une salle d'audience à Grand Bassam | 8610 | 0 | 4050 | 3560 | 1000 | 0 |
| 16.1 | Construire 3 salles d'audiences à Abidjan | 7000 | 0 | 3500 | 3500 | 6 | 2010 | 12 | 2011 |
| 16.2 | Construire une salle d'audience à Grand Bassam | 100 | 0 | 100 | 6 | 2010 | 12 | 2010 |
| 16.3 | Equiper 3 salles d'audiences à Abidjan | 1450 | 0 | 450 | 1000 | 9 | 2010 | 6 | 2012 |
| 16.4 | Equiper une salle d'audience à Grand Bassam | 60 | 0 | 60 | 2 | 2011 | 4 | 2011 |
| 16.5 | Réhabiliter et équiper les TPI et sections détachées existants | 0 | 130 | 3689 | 200 | 0 | 0 |
| 17.1 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Dabou | 0 | 120 | 3 | 2010 | 9 | 2010 |
| 17.2 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Tiassalé | 0 | 120 | 3 | 2010 | 9 | 2010 |
| 17.3 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Aboisso | 0 | 206 | 3 | 2010 | 9 | 2010 |
| 17.4 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Bongouanou | 0 | 120 | 3 | 2010 | 9 | 2010 |
| 17.5 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Grand Bassam | 40 | 40 | 9 | 2007 | 9 | 2010 |
| 17.6 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Toumodi | 0 | 320 | 200 | 3 | 2010 | 6 | 2010 |
| 17.7 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Oumé | 0 | 120 | 3 | 2010 | 4 | 2010 |
| 17.8 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Plateau | 0 | 1993 | 3 | 2010 | 9 | 2010 |
| 17.9 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Yopougon | 20 | 650 | 3 | 2010 | 9 | 2010 |
| 17.10 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Daloa | 0 | 3 | 2010 | 9 | 2010 |
| 17.11 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Agboville | 0 | 3 | 2010 | 9 | 2010 |
| 17.12 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Adzopé | 0 | 3 | 2010 | 9 | 2010 |
| 17.13 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Soubré | 0 | 3 | 2010 | 9 | 2010 |
| 17.14 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Sassandra | 40 | 99 | 2007 | 6 | 2010 |
| 17.15 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Tabou | 0 | 3 | 2010 | 9 | 2010 |
| 17.16 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Sinfra | 0 | 2010 |
| 17.17 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Lakota | 0 | 3 | 2010 | 9 | 2010 |
| 17.18 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Gagnoa | 0 | 3 | 2010 | 9 | 2010 |
| 17.19 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Abengourou | 0 | 3 | 2006 | 6 | 2010 |
| 17.20 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Bouaflé | 30 | 6 | 2009 | 6 | 2010 |
| 17.21 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Man | 0 | 3 | 2010 | 9 | 2010 |
| 17.22 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Bouaké | 0 | 3 | 2010 | 9 | 2010 |
| 17.23 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Korhogo | 0 | 3 | 2010 | 9 | 2010 |
| 17.24 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Bouna | 0 | 3 | 2010 | 9 | 2010 |
| 17.25 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Odienné | 0 | 3 | 2010 | 9 | 2010 |
| 17.26 | Réhabiliter le TPI de Boundiali | 0 | 3 | 2010 | 9 | 2010 |
17.27 Réhabiliter le TPI de Touba
17.28 Réhabiliter le TPI de Danané
17.29 Réhabiliter le TPI de Séguela
17.30 Réhabiliter le TPI de Katiola

18 Informatiser le système judiciaire

18.1 Réaliser une étude sur l'informatisation du système judiciaire
18.2 Mettre en œuvre les recommandations de l'étude sur l'informatisation du système judiciaire
18.3 Mettre en réseau les juridictions et le Ministère de la Justice et des Droits de l'Homme
18.4 Former le personnel à l'utilisation des outils informatiques

19 Rendre opérationnel l’Inspection Générale et Renforcer les capacités en management du personnel de l’Inspection Générale des Services judiciaires et pénitentiaires, des Chefs de cours et de juridictions ainsi que des Magistrats de l’Administration Centrale

19.1 Doter l’Inspection Générale de personnel
19.2 Doter l’Inspection Générale de moyens logistiques et matériels
19.3 Former le personnel de l’Inspection Générale en management
19.4 Former les chefs de juridictions et les magistrats de l’administration centrale en management

20 Renforcer les capacités du Centre National de Documentation Juridique (CNDJ), de la Direction des Etudes, de la Législation et de la Documentation (DELD) en matière de collecte, de traitement et de diffusion de la jurisprudence et de la règle de droit

20.1 Renforcer les capacités de collecte, traitement et diffusion du CNDJ
20.2 Renforcer les capacités de collecte, traitement et diffusion de la DELD
20.3 Diffuser la jurisprudence auprès de toutes les juridictions
20.4 Diffuser le Journal Officiel de Côte d’Ivoire auprès des
<p>| | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>20.5</strong></td>
<td>Créer XXX bibliothèques auprès des juridictions</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>20.6</strong></td>
<td>Formuler un plan national sur les Droits de l'Homme</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>21</strong></td>
<td>Créer et ouvrir des tribunaux de commerce rattachés aux ressorts territoriaux des 3 Cours d'appels existantes</td>
<td>1270</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Préparer le projet de loi portant création des tribunaux de commerce rattachés aux ressorts territoriaux des Cours d'Appel d'Abidjan, de Daloa et de Bouaké</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adopter le projet de loi portant création des tribunaux de commerce rattachés aux ressorts territoriaux des Cours d'Appel d'Abidjan, de Daloa et de Bouaké</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voter la loi portant création des tribunaux de commerce rattachés aux ressorts territoriaux des Cours d'Appel d'Abidjan, de Daloa et de Bouaké</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promulguer la loi portant création des tribunaux de commerce rattachés aux ressorts territoriaux des Cours d'Appel d'Abidjan, de Daloa et de Bouaké</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>21.1</strong></td>
<td>Construire le tribunal de commerce rattaché au ressort territorial de la Cour d'Appel d'Abidjan</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>21.2</strong></td>
<td>Construire le tribunal de commerce rattaché au ressort territorial de la Cour d'Appel de Daloa</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>21.3</strong></td>
<td>Construire le tribunal de commerce rattaché au ressort territorial de la Cour d'Appel de Bouaké</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>21.4</strong></td>
<td>Equiper le tribunal de commerce rattaché au ressort territorial de la Cour d'Appel d'Abidan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>21.5</strong></td>
<td>Equiper le tribunal de commerce rattaché au ressort territorial de la Cour d'Appel de Daloa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>21.6</strong></td>
<td>Equiper le tribunal de commerce rattaché au ressort territorial de la Cour d'Appel de Bouaké</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>21.7</strong></td>
<td>Renforcer les capacités des acteurs de justice en charge du contentieux commercial</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>21.8</strong></td>
<td>Créer et ouvrir des tribunaux administratifs et des Cours d'Appel administratives rattachés aux ressorts territoriaux des circonscriptions judiciaires</td>
<td>2640</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1161</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Préparer le projet de loi portant création des tribunaux

22.1 administratifs à Abidjan, Bouaké, Daloa, Abengourou, Korhogo et Man
Adopter le projet de loi portant création des tribunaux

22.2 administratifs à Abidjan, Bouaké, Daloa, Abengourou, Korhogo et Man
Voter la loi portant création des tribunaux administratifs à

22.3 Abidjan, Bouaké, Daloa, Abengourou, Korhogo et Man
Promulguer la loi portant création des tribunaux

22.4 administratifs à Abidjan, Bouaké, Daloa, Abengourou, Korhogo et Man

22.5 Construire le Tribunal Administratif d'Abidjan 450 0 236 214 5 2011 3 2013
22.6 Construire le Tribunal Administratif de Bouaké 350 0 185 167 5 2011 3 2013
22.7 Construire le Tribunal Administratif de Daloa 350 0 185 167 5 2011 3 2013
22.8 Construire le Tribunal Administratif d'Abengourou 350 0 185 167 5 2011 3 2013
22.9 Construire le Tribunal Administratif de Korhogo 350 0 185 167 5 2011 3 2013
22.10 Construire le Tribunal Administratif de Man 350 0 185 167 5 2011 3 2013
22.11 Equiper le Tribunal Administratif d'Abidjan 90 0 90 4 2013 9 2013
22.12 Equiper le Tribunal Administratif de Bouaké 70 0 70 4 2013 9 2013
22.13 Equiper le Tribunal Administratif de Daloa 70 0 70 4 2013 9 2013
22.14 Equiper le Tribunal Administratif d'Abengourou 70 0 70 4 2013 9 2013
22.15 Equiper le Tribunal Administratif de Korhogo 70 0 70 4 2013 9 2013
22.16 Equiper le Tribunal Administratif de Man 70 0 70 4 2013 9 2013
22.17 Renforcer les capacités des acteurs de justice en charge du
contentieux administratif

23 Prendre des textes modifiant le code de procédure civile,
commerciale et administrative

23.1 Préparer le projet de loi portant modification du Code de
procédure civile, commerciale et administrative 5 0 5 3 2011 5 2011
23.2 Adopter le projet de loi portant modification du Code de
procédure civile, commerciale et administrative 5 0 5 3 2011 5 2011
23.3 Voter la loi portant modification du Code de procédure civile,
commerciale et administrative 5 0 5 3 2011 5 2011
23.5. Promulguer la loi portant modification du Code de procédure civile, commerciale et administrative

Total programme 3

PROGRAMME 4: Mise en conformité du système pénitentiaire

Stratégie 7 : Mise en conformité du système pénitentiaire avec les standards internationaux

24 Construire et équiper les Maisons d'Arrêt et de Correction (MAC) de Sinfra, d'Aboisso, de Tabou et de Lakota

24.1 Construire la Maison d'Arrêtet de Correction (MAC) de Sinfra

24.2 Construire la Maison d'Arrêtet de Correction (MAC) de Aboisso

24.3 Construire la Maison d'Arrêtet de Correction (MAC) de Tabou

24.4 construire la Maison d'Arrêtet de Correction (MAC) de Lakota

24.5 Equiper la Maison d'Arrêtet de Correction (MAC) de Sinfra

24.6 Equiper la Maison d'Arrêtet de Correction (MAC) de Aboisso

24.7 Equiper la Maison d'Arrêtet de Correction (MAC) de Tabou

24.8 Equiper la Maison d'Arrêtet de Correction (MAC) de Lakota

25 Réhabiliter et équiper les Maisons d'Arrêt et de Correction de Bongouanou, de Grand-Bassam et d'Abidjan (ou Tabou ??) et Bouaké

25.1 Réhabiliter la Maison d'Arrête de Correction de Bongouanou

25.2 Réhabiliter la Maison d'Arrête de Correction de Grand Bassam

25.3 Réhabiliter la Maison d'Arrête de Correction d'Abidjan ou Tabou

25.4 Réhabiliter le camp pénal de Bouaké

26 Doter les établissements pénitentiaires de 40 véhicules pour le transport des prisonniers

27 Développer une politique globale de réinsertion des détenus et une politique alternative à la détention pénale

27.1 Réaliser une étude pour l'émergence d'une politique globale de réinsertion et d'alternative à la détention pénale

27.2 Mettre en œuvre les recommandations de l'étude pour l'émergence d'une politique globale de réinsertion et
d'alternative à la détention pénale

27.3 Préparer un projet de décret de transformation de la ferme de Saliakro (Dimbokro) en maison de correction à milieu ouvert

27.4 Prendre le décret de transformation de la ferme de Saliakro (Dimbokro) en maison de correction à milieu ouvert

27.5 Modifier l'arrêté n°406 MJ/DAP du 21 mai 1969 portant classement des établissements pénitentiaires

27.6 Réhabiliter la ferme de Saliakro

28 Créer des jardins, des champs et des ateliers pour les établissements pénitentiaires

28.1 Créer XXX ateliers dans les établissements pénitentiaires

28.2 Développer des partenariats avec les ministères techniques d'éducation/formation

29 Améliorer le traitement des personnes en détention

29.1 Appliquer l'arrêté de 1952 fixant la ration journalière du détenu (Préciser la nature de l'arrêté)

29.2 Affecter XXX personnel de santé (préciser la catégorie et le nombre) auprès de l'administration pénitentiaire

29.3 Accroître les crédits de prise en charge des soins de santé des détenus

29.4 Mettre en place des mécanismes d'information et de contrôle de tous les prélèvements indus

30 Améliorer le fonctionnement de l'administration pénitentiaire

30.1 Former le personnel de l'administration pénitentiaire

30.2 Doter en matériel l'administration pénitentiaire

30.3 Elaborer les projets de décret portant réglementation des établissements pénitentiaires

30.4 Prendre le décret portant réglementation des établissements pénitentiaires

Total programme 4

<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14 365 197 6 930 4 995 2 115 2 000
PROGRAMME 5: Amélioration du traitement des groupes vulnérables

Stratégie 8 : Amélioration du traitement des groupes vulnérables, notamment les conditions des mineurs et des femmes, par la justice

31. Renforcer les capacités des acteurs de la justice en charge des affaires concernant les mineurs victimes ou délinquants et les femmes victimes de violence

31.1 Former les acteurs de la justice en charge des affaires concernant les mineurs victimes ou délinquants et les femmes victimes de violence

31.2 Faire un état des lieux du cadre légal en matière de justice juvénile, son contenu et sa mise en œuvre

31.3 Procéder aux reformes nécessaires en vue de sa mise en conformité avec les standards internationaux

32. Construire un centre d'observation des mineurs en conformité avec les standards internationaux à Abidjan

32.1 Construire un centre d'observation des mineurs en conformité avec les standards internationaux auprès des autres TPI

32.2 Construire XXX nouveaux centres alternatifs à la détention agréés par le Ministère

32.3 Equiper XXX nouveaux centres alternatifs à la détention agréés par le Ministère

33. Réhabiliter le centre de rééducation de Dabou

34. Créer des sections séparées pour les mineurs, en conformité avec les standards internationaux

34.1 Renforcer les services sociaux auprès des tribunaux pour enfants (personnel par nature et par catégorie)

34.2 Renforcer le crédit des services sociaux auprès des tribunaux pour enfants (de combien ?)

34.3 Renforcer les mécanismes de contrôle judiciaire de placement des enfants privés de soutien parental ????

34.4 Renforcer les capacités des acteurs de la justice en matière de lutte contre les violences faites aux femmes
Réhabiliter XXX sections séparées des femmes (nombre et localités)

Etablir un partenariat avec les collectivités territoriales et les ONG pour favoriser l'accès des femmes à la justice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total programme 5</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL JUSTICE</td>
<td>150076</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>33238</td>
<td>4346</td>
<td>39270</td>
<td>32376</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL : Mise en place des Hautes Juridiction et du Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature</td>
<td>2925</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1350</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL: Rapprochement et facilitation de l'accès au service de la Justice</td>
<td>95416</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>12614</td>
<td>2681</td>
<td>2892</td>
<td>21816</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL: Modernisation et renforcement des capacités des services de Justice</td>
<td>37370</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>13019</td>
<td>10752</td>
<td>6883</td>
<td>8560</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL: Mise en conformité du système pénitentiaire</td>
<td>14365</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>6930</td>
<td>4995</td>
<td>2115</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL: Amélioration du traitement des groupes vulnérables</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>