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IEG Independent Evaluation Group

CLR Review

Independent Evaluation Group

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1. CAS Data

Country: Tanzania	
CAS Year: FY11	**CAS Period**: FY12 – FY15
CLR Period: FY12 – FY16	**Date of this review:** March 6, 2018

2. Ratings

	CLR Rating	IEG Rating
Development Outcome:	*Moderately Satisfactory*	*Moderately Unsatisfactory*
WBG Performance:	*Good*	*Fair*

3. Executive Summary

i. This review of Tanzania's Completion Report of the World Bank Group's (WBG) Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) covers the period of the original CAS, FY12-15, and the Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report (CASPR), FY14-16. The CAS period was extended at CASPR to allow the WBG to work with the new administration in preparing the next Country Partnership Framework (CPF).

ii. Tanzania is a low-income country with a GNI per capita of US$900 in 2016. During the CAS period, the economy grew steadily at 6.7 percent annually compared with an average of 3.5 percent for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Yet, a recent IMF program review report (January 2018) underscores that recent signs of weakening economic activity coexist with large infrastructure gaps, a business climate that has worsened, budget payment arrears in part owing to the electric utility's (TANESCO) financial difficulties, and problems with tax collections, administration, and policy. Governance indicators on the efficiency and transparency in public management did not improve during the CAS period. Moreover, in the 2018 Doing Business report, Tanzania ranks 137 out of 190 countries, which compares less favorably with its SSA neighbors and reveals weak private sector competitiveness. Hence, sustained reforms to enhance budget credibility and implementation as well as to improve the business climate are needed to achieve strong growth led by the private sector as intended by the government.

iii. Based on the international poverty line, 48.8 percent of the population lived in poverty in 2012. The national poverty headcount for the mainland declined from 34.4 percent in 2007 to 28.2 percent in 2012 largely due to a decline in urban poverty while rural poverty remains high. Human development also remains a challenging area. While Tanzania's Human Development Index improved from 0.392 in 2000 to 0.521 in 2014, with some gains in education indicators, the country was unable to achieve half of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

iv. The FY12-15 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) was aligned with priorities in the government's five-year strategy (MKUKUTA II) and the concurrent Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction (MKUZA II). The CAS had three strategic pillars and one cross-cutting theme: (i) promote inclusive and sustainable, private sector-led growth; (ii) build infrastructure and deliver services; (iii) strengthen human capital and safety nets, and (iv) promote accountability and governance. Following the 2014 CASPR, the three pillars and the cross-cutting theme were consolidated into two strategic clusters to align with the corporate twin goals: (a) productive investments for growth of labor-intensive industries and job creation; and (b) programs that target

CLR Reviewed by:	Peer Reviewed by:	CLR Review Manager/Coordinator
Anis A. Dani, IEGEC Consultant **Takatoshi Kamezawa** **Senior Evaluation Officer, IEGEC**	**Juan José Fernández-Ansola,** **IEGEC Consultant**	**Pablo Fajnzylber, Manager, IEGEC** **Lourdes Pagaran** **CLRR Coordinator, IEGEC**

reduction of extreme poverty and improvements in quality of social services. However, the CASPR retained the same 11 objectives covering 10 sectors, and adjusted some of the indicators. The CASPR intended a more focused set of WBG interventions to address implementation challenges, yet the number of lending operations approved in the two fiscal years following the CASPR – 15 operations over FY15-16 – was similar to that for the period preceding it – 16 over FY12-14. The new commitments following the CASPR accounted for 56% of the total new commitments over the CAS period. In effect, the CAS program remained broadly unchanged in substance and was not more focused after the CASPR than before.

v. During the CAS period, the Bank approved a total of $3.33 billion in new lending for 31 operations, compared with US$2.6 billion at the start (or 28 operations). The lending portfolio composition changed significantly as the program progressed. During the previous CAS period (FY07-11), investment project financing (IPF) accounted for 78 percent of lending commitments while the remainder was allocated to development policy financing (DPF). During the period of the CAS under review, the distribution of lending commitments reflected the reduced prominence of IPFs (54 percent) and the increased importance Program-for-Results (PforR) operations (27 percent). Sector DPFs accounted for 19 percent of commitments, compared to a 22 percent of PRSCs during the previous CAS (FY0711). Taken together, DPFs and PforRs accounted for close to half of the lending volume. New lending included seven sector DPFs ($640 million) and five PforR operations ($897 million), with the remaining 19 operations being IPFs. IFC had net commitments of US$174.6 million. MIGA reinsured coverage to an agricultural investor in FY14 with total gross exposure of $28.9 million. IDA delivered 23 ESW pieces and 26 technical assistance products. IFC approved fourteen new AS projects in the financial, agricultural, and energy sectors, and in investment climate reforms.

vi. The overall development outcome of WBG support is rated as *Moderately Unsatisfactory.* Under Focus Area I, Tanzania made good progress on increasing access to electricity—with uneven results on service quality and sustainability—and some progress on improving management of natural resources and improving road conditions. However, there was limited progress in increasing productivity and commercialization of agriculture and improving financial intermediation. The WBG also was unable to achieve its objective of improving the business environment, improving access to and quality of water and sanitation services, and improving access to other transport services related to air and rail. Under Focus Area II, there was good progress on improving access and quality of education and in the rapid scaling up of conditional cash transfers under the access to safety nets objective. While there was some improvement in access to and quality of health services, the large volume of donor support for the health sector and increased access to health facilities was expected to bring better results. The reduction in MMR has slowed and remained high compared to other neighboring countries. The public works dimension of the safety nets program also lagged, and there is limited evidence of progress on improving efficiency and transparency in public management.

vii. WBG performance is rated as *Fair*. The initial CAS design was broadly aligned with the government's development strategy, and the lending program was largely supported well by ESWs, especially in education and water. The Policy Notes prepared for the new government in 2015 provided the basis for dialogue with the government in key priority areas. The Bank coordinated closely with development partners through sector working groups, and shared with partners a pooled funding mechanism to reduce transaction costs. Average portfolio quality at exit during the program was better than its comparators. The WBG displayed flexibility in the use of lending instruments and by extending the CAS. At the same time, the WBG program could have been more focused and selective, especially with respect to lending. The CASPR adjusted the pillars to align with the WBG's corporate goals, but it did not revise the CAS objectives. Changes in the results framework—which remained weak at closure—did not alter its substance, and several interventions lacked credible links with CAS objectives. At progress report stage, program implementation was slow owing to institutional challenges faced by sector ministries using pooled funding mechanisms. Yet, discounting these challenges, lending was scaled up further following the progress report and lending instruments were diversified. The rapid shift to new lending instruments, such as PforRs, could test constrained institutional capacity. Moreover, IEG's project ratings deteriorated towards the

end of the CAS period, especially for operations using pooled funding (including agriculture and basic health services). Overall, risks to the program were identified; in some instances, however, they were not sufficiently elaborated and risk mitigation measures proved inadequate, as in the case of political and governance risks. There is no evidence of joint Bank-IFC projects, and opportunities to collaborate were missed in the power and financial sectors. Despite extending the CAS by a year, the preparation of the CPF was delayed by at least another 18 months beyond the CAS expiration. Finally, the pooled funding mechanism with development partners proved challenging for sector implementing agencies owing to multiple fiduciary and reporting requirements.

viii. IEG agrees with the CLR lessons identified in the CLR: (i) about realism regarding the government's absorptive capacity; (ii) the need to pilot, monitor and refine programs before scaling them up and to understand and take account of the political economy when designing the country program; (iii) the importance of knowledge products in strengthening the policy dialogue; (iv) the necessity to select lending instruments that are suitable to the country and sector context, and (v) the need for a strong M&E and a realistic results framework.

ix. IEG underscores the relevance of CLR lessons (i), (ii) and (iv), and elaborates them further as follows:

- First, Bank programs need to be tailored to existing capacities and to commit firmly to capacity building that helps effective program implementation. Tanzania's PforR's—which intend to leverage co-financing from other donors while lowering administrative demands on the country—contain capacity-building components. IEG's early evaluation of the PforR instrument[1] includes a caution that is worth heeding in the country. While capacity building is an important part of PforRs, specific capacity goals need to be defined clearly and implementation of capacity-building programs delivered in a timely manner.
- Second, design and implementation of reform programs require a good understanding of the political economy of reform irrespective of financing modalities. In Tanzania, the shift from PRSCs to sector DPFs intended to improve the effectiveness of Bank interventions for reforming specific sectors. However, underperformance of the recently closed DPO operations in energy suggests that the Bank's limited understanding of political economy and governance risks in power sector reform led to over-ambitious objectives (medium to long-term measures) and limited ability to respond to implementation challenges.

x. IEG adds another lesson:

- The WBG should seize on opportunities to exercise selectivity. In Tanzania, the large number of development partners in the country provided an opportunity to be more selective and avoid stretching WBG resources across a large number of sectors. In practice, based on government demand, the Bank moved well beyond the sectors in which it had agreed to take the lead at the beginning of the CAS period. This may have affected its overall achievement of development results, as reflected in the fact that development outcomes were weaker in the sectors in which the WBG had not initially agreed to take the lead under the CAS.

4. Strategic Focus

Relevance of the WBG Strategy:

1. ***Congruence with Country Context and Country Program***. Tanzania is a low-income country with a GNI per capita of US$900 in 2016. Based on the international poverty line, 48.8 percent of the population lived in poverty in 2012. The national poverty headcount for the mainland declined from 34.4 percent in 2007 to 28.2 percent in 2012 largely due to a decline in urban poverty, while rural poverty remains high. Access to education has improved, and progression to secondary school surged from 20

[1] Independent Evaluation Group, *Program-for-Results: An Early-Stage Assessment of the Process and Effects of a New Lending Instrument*, Washington D.C.: World Bank Group, 2016.

percent in 2000 to almost 60 percent in 2012 (*SCD*, 2017). Although Tanzania's Human Development Index improved from 0.392 in 2000 to 0.521 in 2014, with gains in some education indicators, the country did not achieve half of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), including goals related to eradicating extreme poverty and hunger, improving maternal health, improving environmental sustainability, and some of the gender equality indicators. Rural access to water and sanitation remains very limited.

2. In the 2018 Doing Business Report, Tanzania's ranking of 137 is significantly below its Sub-Saharan neighbors—Kenya (80), Rwanda (41) and Uganda (122). Annual economic growth was 6.7 percent during the CAS period—strong compared with 3.5 percent for Sub-Saharan Africa—driven by construction, services, and basic manufacturing. But recent signs of weakening economic activity coexist with large infrastructure gaps and a business climate that has worsened. Human development, increased investment in infrastructure, as well as improving governance and the business environment remain key imperatives. The government reflected these imperatives in its development plans (MKUKUTA II and MKUZA II). The FY12-15 CAS was aligned with the priorities in the government's five-year strategy (MKUKUTA II) and the Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUZA II), and thus broadly consistent with country challenges and cognizant of Tanzania's growth constraints.

3. The CAS had three pillars and one cross-cutting theme: (i) promote inclusive and sustainable, private sector-led growth; (ii) build infrastructure and deliver services; (iii) strengthen human capital and safety nets, and (iv) promote accountability and governance. At CAS progress report stage, the WBG country program pillars were consolidated to two to align with the twin corporate goals while keeping the original 11 objectives covering 10 sectors. The two strategic clusters were: (i) productive investments for growth of labor-intensive industries and job creation; and (ii) programs that target reduction of extreme poverty and improvements in quality of social services. To maintain its relevance to the country and operational context, the CASPR added new operations in agriculture/agro-business, energy and extractives, and transport and trade, as well as two DPOs on business environment, and open government and public finance.

4. ***Relevance of Design***. The combination of lending and analytical work was expected to underpin the achievement of program objectives by supporting reforms across the focus areas and helping in the dialogue with the government. ESWs made important contributions to the program by deepening sector knowledge and fostering policy dialogue. However, some interventions were not directly contributing to the achievement of the CAS objectives and outcomes. For instance, the CLR lists eight IDA operations and four IFC operations supporting the first program objective, on constraints for doing business and financial intermediation. In fact, only one of these interventions directly focuses on the business environment (the Business Environment and Industry Development for Jobs DPO), and it was approved at the end of FY16—too late to have meaningful impact on the CAS objective. The agricultural commercialization objective was supported by a long list of interventions, but these were not focused on diversification and commercialization of agriculture—the primary focus of the objective.

Selectivity

5. The CAS was selective with three focus areas, and later consolidated into two to align with the WBG's corporate twin goals. However, selectivity was more limited within each area of focus: the 11 objectives covering 10 sectors resulted in a fragmented program that tested the weak institutional capacity of the government. The large number of development partners in Tanzania would have allowed the WBG to be more selective, with the Bank concentrating on areas where it had agreed to take the lead or where there was a strong potential for achieving development results based on its comparative advantage and the presence of strong government demand.[2] The CASPR provided an opportunity to adjust the country program, but changes were cosmetic and simply regrouped the CAS objectives around the WBG corporate goals and some changes in indicators. Following the CASPR (dated June 3, 2014), new lending commitments did not decelerate: 48 percent of the operations

[2] In the original CAS the Bank had agreed to take lead on energy, water, health, public sector reform, environment, and macro-economic management.

approved during the CAS period and 56 percent of the respective commitments occurred in FY15-16. This went counter to the CASPR intention to address slow program implementation through more focused lending. In fact, there was no real effort to make the program more selective and focused. A challenge for the next Bank program will be to identify fewer priorities that are more transformative, and can help build Tanzania's ability to mobilize the private sector to supplement public investments and reduce significantly the number of poor people (about 12 million are still below the national poverty line—same as in 2007—according to the SCD).

Alignment

6. The program was broadly aligned with WBG's corporate goals, particularly following the CAS progress report. At the CASPR, the adjustments in the first strategic cluster aimed at increasing productivity and growth of labor-intensive industries and job creation, which would contribute to shared prosperity. The adjustments in the second cluster—which combined human development and governance objectives—aimed to reduce extreme poverty by increasing incomes and enhancing access of the poor to quality social services. The increased investment in conditional cash transfers during the latter part of the CAS period increased the efficacy of safety nets to reduce poverty.

5. Development Outcome

Overview of Achievement by Objective:

7. For this review, and in line with the terminology of the Shared Approach, the Strategic Clusters are treated as Focus Areas, and the CAS outcomes are labeled as objectives.

Focus Area I: **Productive Investments for Growth of Labor-Intensive Industries and Job Creation**

8. This focus area had seven objectives : (1) address constraints for doing business and improve financial intermediation; (2) increased productivity and commercialization of agriculture; (3) increased sustainability and improved management of natural resources, including natural gas; (4) increased access, quality and sustainability of electricity; (5) increased access to and quality of transport services; (6) increased access to and quality of water and sanitation services; (7) improved access to and management of urban services.

9. ***Objective #1.*** **Address constraints for doing business and improve financial intermediation.** This objective was supported by the Private Sector/MSME Competitiveness Project (FY06), the Financial Sector Support Project (FSSP—FY06), the Business Environment and Industry Development for Jobs DPO (FY16), and a TA on public-private partnerships completed in FY14. IFC contributed to the increase in the use of formal and semi-formal financial products through its investment and advisory services, and support to microfinance institutions and its client banks to increase lending for microfinance and SMEs. It also assisted the mobile financial services industry through its ongoing AS project in Tanzania by supporting the creation of a set of interoperable standards. The objective had two indicators: (i) reduction in number of days to start a business; and (ii) increase in the proportion of adults that use financial services provided by formal and semi-formal financial service providers.

10. On the first indicator, the CLR reports on actions initiated by the Government in 2012 to facilitate business start-ups by reducing requirements to obtain a business license, and customs reforms to facilitate trade across borders. However, these efforts had very little effect on the indicator: the number of days to start a business changed marginally from 29 in 2011 to 26 in 2016, against a target of 10 days. The indicator was *Not Achieved*.

11. On the second indicator, the CLR reports that the proportion of adult population with access to formal and semi-formal financial services increased in the mainland from 15.9 percent in 2009 to 57.4 percent in 2013, and in Zanzibar from 14.7 percent in 2009 to 37 percent in 2013. IEG could not verify this information. The FSSP ICRR reported that the proportion of adults using formal and semi-formal financial institutions increased from 11 percent in 2006 to 17 percent in 2013 (versus the target of 22 percent in 2016). The 2013 World Bank's Enterprise Survey indicates that only 18.5 percent of firms in

Tanzania used the formal banking system to finance investments. In addition, a conventional measure of financial intermediation shows that the ratio of financial sector claims to the private sector was virtually unchanged at around 14-15 percent during 2013-17 (*IMF Seventh Review Under the Policy-Support Instrument, January 16, 2018)*. On balance, and based on various data sources, this indicator was *Partially Achieved*.

12. In sum, with no progress on the first indicator and partial progress on the second, this objective was *Partially Achieved*.

13. ***Objective #2.*** **Increased productivity and commercialization of agriculture.** This objective was supported by the Agriculture Sector Development (ASDP)(FY06), the Accelerated Food Security (FY09), the Eastern Africa Agricultural Productivity (FY09) and the Expanding Rice Production projects (FY15). The most significant intervention was the ASDP that closed in October 2016 and was rated *Unsatisfactory* by IEG. The objective had one indicator: crop yields for maize and rice in target areas. A second indicator to measure commercialization was dropped at CASPR stage, although the objective was unchanged.

14. Maize yields increased marginally. The CLR reports that maize yields increased to 2.30 tons/hectare in 2015 from a baseline of 1.12 tons/hectare in 2009. However, the previous CASCR (FY11) reports that maize yields had already reached 2.1 tons/ha in 2010. Moreover, independent research from 2015 indicates that maize production quantity and area harvested in Tanzania have risen only slightly, while yields have remained constant or declined.[3] The CLR reports that rice yields increased from 1.73 tons per ha to 2.74 tons/ha, less than the revised target of 3.5 tons/ha for 2016.[4]

15. IFC supported existing clients in manufacturing, agribusiness, and the service sector (MAS) through a $30 million project in FY13. One of IFC's agri-business clients engaged 36,000 farmers in FY12, but the impact on commercialization of the sector is limited. The CLR reports that commercialization of agriculture is incipient: majority of farmers were not selling any of their harvest and less than 10 percent of the country's livestock were being marketed. A weak business environment had discouraged development of the agricultural value chain.

16. In sum, there was negligible progress on maize yields and some increase in rice yields. However, these measures are based on specific Bank project areas, and yields vary substantially from project to project. Thus, IEG cannot validate the aggregate CLR yield data. There is no evidence on commercialization of agriculture. The objective was *Partially Achieved.*

17. ***Objective #3.*** **Increased sustainability and improved management of natural resources, including natural gas.** This objective was supported by the Sustainable Management of Mineral Resources Project (FY09) and its additional financing (FY15), the First and Second Power and Gas DPOs (FY13/ FY14), the Energy Sector Capacity Building Project (FY13), and the Lake Victoria Environmental Management Support Project Phase II (FY09).

18. The objective had three indicators: (i) improvement in Tanzania's policy ranking as a mining investment destination, (ii) amount of on-shore proven natural gas reserves; and (iii) area brought under improved land use and range land management practices in targeted catchments.

19. On the first indicator, Tanzania's ranking in the Policy Perception Index published by the Fraser Institute improved slightly from the 61st percentile in 2009 to 58th percentile in 2015, enough to meet the target of 2-3 points/places improvement by 2015. On the second indicator, the available evidence indicates proven on-shore reserves of 1.187 TcF as of December 2016 against the 3.5 Tcf target for 2016. Investment in exploration has been subdued owing to slow domestic demand growth, decline in global energy prices, and slow reform progress in the upstream regulatory and policy framework. On the third indicator, the December 2015 ISR for the Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project

[3] Aylward, C. and P. Biscaye, "*Maize yield trends and agricultural policy in East Africa*," EPAR Technical Report No. 310, University of Washington: Evans School of Public Policy and Governance, November 20, 2015.

[4] The previous CASCR (FY11) reports that rice yields had already reached 1.79 tons/ha in 2010, which is higher than the baseline of 1.73 tons/ha used in the CAS (FY12-16).

Phase II reports that 7,111hectares have been brought under sustainable land management practices, exceeding the target of 2,000 hectares.[5]

20. In sum, there was progress on the perception index indicator, the second indicator was not met, and the third indicator on natural resources and the environment was met. On balance, this objective was *Mostly Achieved.*

21. ***Objective #4.*** **Increased access, quality and sustainability of electricity.** This objective was supported by the Tanzania Energy Development and the Access Expansion Project (TEDAP) (FY08), the Backbone Transmission Investment Project (FY11), and the Rusumo Falls Hydroelectric Project (FY13), and the First and Second Power and Gas Sector DPOs (FY13/ FY14).

22. This objective had four indicators: (i) number of people provided with access to electricity by household connections; (ii) improvements in service quality as measured by voltage accessible to households; (iii) availability of high voltage transmission infrastructure; and (iv) improvement in TANESCO's operational efficiency as measured by increase in collection in targeted areas.

23. As of September 2016, 689,573 people were provided access to electricity by household connections (from a baseline of 34,200 people in 2010), exceeding the target of 252,000 people in 2016. On the second indicator, end-user voltage of 220 volts—the same target that the previous CAS expected for FY12—was achieved from a 2010 baseline of 190 volts. Despite the increased voltage, additional information on service quality suggests that while the number of power outages has decreased, the target for cumulative power outages linked to malfunctions in the subsystems was only partially achieved.[6] On the third indicator, the CLR reports that the target of 225 km of new transmission infrastructure in northern Tanzania was achieved notwithstanding significant delays owing to different fiduciary rules of development partners (AfDB and EIB).

24. On the fourth indicator, the CLR reports that TANESCO's collection efficiency improved from 70 percent in 2010 to 93.5 percent by September 2016. Yet, collection efficiency is only one measure of operational efficiency and sustainability, and other measures suggest a reversal. The ICR for the First and Second Power Sector DPOs reports that TANESCO's accounts payable increased by 88 percent in FY2016/17 over the 2012 baseline, against a target of a significant reduction. Taken as a whole, TANESCO's financial situation is affecting adversely both its operational efficiency and sustainability. In addition, the IMF reports that TANESCO has large arrears to gas and electricity suppliers (0.7 percent of GDP in early 2016), and that financial sustainability of TANESCO has not been achieved (IMF Article IV Staff Report, 2016).

25. In sum, there was good progress on access to electricity by household connections, but uneven results on service quality and sustainability. On balance, this objective was *Mostly Achieved.*

26. ***Objective #5.*** **Increased access to and quality of transport services.** This objective was supported by the Transport Sector Support Project (TSSP) (FY10), the Inter-Modal and Rail Development Project (FY14), the Second Central Transport Corridor Project (FY08) and its FY13 additional financing, and the Southern Africa Trade and Transport Facilitation Program (FY13).

27. The objective had four indicators: (i) passenger volume at Kigoma, Tabora and Bukoba airports, (ii) number of daily slots available for third party block trains between Dar es Salaam and Isaka Terminal; (iii) number of TEUs shipped by direct project beneficiaries; and (iv) roads in good and fair condition as a share of total classified roads. The CLR reports that except for road transport, the targets for all three indicators related to air and rail transport were not met. The latest ISR for the TSSP reports that 86 percent of roads are in good and fair condition, well above the target of 70 percent. However, sustainability is at risk due to insufficient funding for road maintenance.

[5] The target for this indicator was changed at CASPR stage from 45,000 hectares to 2,000 hectares.
[6] ICR for the Backbone Transmission Investment Project (FY11).

28. In sum, there was good progress on roads in good and fair condition, but sustainability is at risk, while there was no progress on the first three indicators. This objective was *Partially Achieved*.

29. ***Objective #6.*** **Increased access to and quality of water and sanitation services.** This objective was supported by the Water Sector Support Project (FY07), the Zanzibar Urban Services Project (FY11). The objective had two indicators: (i) number of people with access to clean and safe water, and (ii) proportion of rural population with access to improved sanitation. The CLR reports that as of June 2015, 17.2 million people in rural areas had access to clean and safe water against a target of 22.5 million by 2016, but access was affected by a high non-functionality rate of water supply facilities. For the second indicator, the CLR reports that the share of rural inhabitants with access to improved sanitation was 12 percent in 2015, well below the target of 35 percent. WDI reports an even lower figure of 8.5 percent. According to the CLR, sanitation remains largely underfunded with responsibility divided across multiple institutions that are not coordinated.

30. In sum, there was limited progress on access to clean and safe water; and no progress on access to improved sanitation. On balance, this objective was *Not Achieved.*

31. ***Objective #7.*** **Improved access to and management of urban services.** This objective was supported by the Strategic Cities Project (FY10) and the Dar es Salaam Metropolitan Development Project (FY15). This objective had two indicators: (i) people with access to improved public transport services; and (ii) proportion of waste collected and disposed at landfill compared to total waste produced in target areas. The CLR reports that about 840,000 people had access to improved public transport by July 2016, exceeding the target of 543,721 in 2016. No progress has been reported on the second indicator since the landfill only became operational in 2017.

32. In sum, there was good progress on improving public transport services, but no progress on waste collection. On balance, this objective was *Partially Achieved*.

33. IEG rates the outcome of WBG support to Focus Area I as *Moderately Unsatisfactory.* Tanzania made good progress on increasing access to electricity—with uneven results on service quality and sustainability—and some progress on improving management of natural resources and improving road condition. However, there was limited progress in increasing productivity and commercialization of agriculture and improving financial intermediation. The WBG was unable to achieve its objective of improving the business environment, improving access to and quality of water and sanitation services, and improving access to other transport services related to air and rail.

Focus Area II: **Programs that Target Reduction of Extreme Poverty and Improvements in Quality and Delivery of Social Services**

34. Focus Area II had four objectives: (i) improved access to and quality of education; (ii) improved access to and quality of health services; (iii) improved access to safety nets; and (iv) improved efficiency and transparency of public management.

35. ***Objective #8.*** **Improved access to and quality of education.** This objective was supported by the Zanzibar Basic Education Improvement Project (FY07), the Secondary Education Development Program II (FY10), the Education Program for Results (EPforR) (FY15) and the Zanzibar Improving Students Prospects Project (FY16). This objective had three indicators: (i) students enrolled in secondary school in Zanzibar; (ii) completion rates at O level (lower secondary education); and (iii) number of primary schools conducting Student Teacher Enrichment Program (STEP).

36. The CLR reports that the target (97,530) for secondary enrollment of boys and girls in Zanzibar had been achieved, but the numbers provided in the CLR could not be verified. The PAD for the FY16 project reports that 89,685 students were enrolled in secondary school in 2016, lower than the numbers reported in the CLR. The CLR acknowledges that enrollment rates at secondary levels were lower than expected because of the government's decision to retain the policy of an examination requirement in lower grades. The completion rates at O level reached 33.6 percent by mid-2016, compared to the target of 39 percent in 2015. As of November 2015, there were 10,447 primary schools conducting STEP, compared to the target of 5,000 in 2018.

37. In sum, there was good progress on access and quality indicators albeit the information on secondary enrolment could not be verified. On balance, this objective was *Mostly Achieved.*

38. ***Objective #9.*** **Improved access to and quality of health services.** This objective was supported by the Basic Health Services Project (FY12), the Strengthening Primary Health Care for Results program (PforR) (FY15), and a Health Financing Policy Note (FY12). The objective had one indicator: the proportion of births taking place at health facilities as a proxy of births attended by skilled health workers. A second indicator for this objective on malaria prevention was dropped at CASPR stage. The FY12 project is the most significant intervention supporting this objective which was financed by IDA and other donors through pooled funding. IEG rated the outcome of this project as *Moderately Unsatisfactory* which proved to be complex in design and implementation.

39. The CLR reports that the proportion of births at health facilities increased from 51 percent in 2008 to 63 percent in 2015, compared to the target of 67 percent. Supplemental information from the ICR review of the FY12 Basic Health Services Project showed that the percentage of births at a health facility reached 62.4 percent in October 2016. The May 2017 ISR of the FY15 Strengthening Primary Health Care for Results project indicates that such percentage reached 65.3 percent in April 2017, showing progress when compared with the 58.3 percent 2012 baseline. Despite progress in the proportion of attended deliveries at health facilities, the reduction in maternal mortality ratio (MMR) has slowed (from 483 per 100,000 in 2011 to 398 per 100,000 in 2015), compared to previous years when it declined from 842 in 2000 and 687 in 2005 (*World Development Indicators, 2017*). MMR in Tanzania remains relatively high at 398 (per 100,000 live births) in 2015, compared to 319 in Ghana, 343 in Uganda, and 353 in Ethiopia in the same year.

40. Taking into account both access and quality of health services, this objective was *Mostly Achieved.*

41. ***Objective #10.*** **Improved access to safety nets.** This objective was supported by the Second Social Action Fund (FY05), the Social Action Fund III (FY12), and the Social Safety Nets (FY16). It had two indicators: (i) beneficiaries of conditional cash transfers; and (ii) beneficiaries of public works programs. Bank support enabled a rapid scaling up of conditional cash transfers which reached 4.89 million beneficiaries by January 2016 from a baseline of 6,000 people in 2010, exceeding the target of 4.2 million people in 2015. As of December 2015, the labor intensive public works program, added 55,137 beneficiaries, or less than half of the projected additional people to reach the target of 350,000 beneficiaries.

42. On balance, this objective was *Mostly Achieved*.

43. ***Objective #11.*** **Improved efficiency and transparency of public management.** This objective was supported by the Performance Results and Accountability Project (FY08) and the programmatic DPO series Open Government and Public Finance Credit (FY16). This objective had four indicators: (i) share of ministries, departments, and executive agencies (MDAs) using performance management systems; (ii) share of development projects that are selected using the Public Investment Manual; (iii) full and timely implementation of census and surveys in the Inter-censal Survey Calendar; and (iv) increased public access to budget documents and transparency.

44. The CLR reports progress on the third indicator, while the three other indicators were not achieved. This objective is rated as *Not Achieved*.

45. IEG rates the outcome of WBG support under Focus Area II as *Moderately Unsatisfactory.* There was good progress on improving access and quality of education and the rapid scaling up of conditional cash transfers under the access to safety nets objective. While there was some improvement in access to and quality of health services, the large volume of donor support for the health sector and increased access to health facilities was expected to bring better results. The reduction in MMR has slowed and remained high compared to other neighboring countries. The public works dimension of the safety nets program also lagged, and WBG has made no progress in improving efficiency and transparency in public management.

Overall Assessment and Rating

46. The overall development outcome of WBG support is rated as *Moderately Unsatisfactory. O*nly 5 out of 11 objectives were mostly achieved, with another 4 being partially achieved, and two not achieved. Under Focus Area I, Tanzania made good progress on increasing access to electricity—with uneven results on service quality and sustainability—and some progress on improving management of natural resources and improving road conditions. However, there was limited progress in increasing productivity and commercialization of agriculture and improving financial intermediation. The WBG also was unable to achieve its objective of improving the business environment, improving access to and quality of water and sanitation services, and improving access to other transport services related to air and rail. Under Focus Area II, there was good progress on improving access and quality of education and the rapid scaling up of conditional cash transfers under the access to safety nets objective. While there was some improvement in access to and quality of health services, the large volume of donor support for the health sector and increased access to health facilities was expected to bring better results. The reduction in MMR has slowed and remained high compared to other neighboring countries. The public works dimension of the safety nets program also lagged, and WBG has made no progress on improving efficiency and transparency in public management.

Objectives	CLR Rating	IEG Rating
Focus Area I: Productive Investments for Growth of Labor-Intensive Industries and Job Creation	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Objective 1: Address constraints for doing business and improve financial intermediation	*Mostly Achieved*	*Partially Achieved*
Objective 2: Increased productivity and commercialization of agriculture	*Mostly Achieved*	*Partially Achieved*
Objective 3: Increased sustainability and improved management of natural resources, including natural gas	*Mostly Achieved*	*Mostly Achieved*
Objective 4: Increased access, quality and sustainability of electricity	*Achieved*	*Mostly Achieved*
Objective 5: Increased access to and quality of transport services	*Partially Achieved*	*Partially Achieved*
Objective 6: Increased access to and quality of water and sanitation services	*Not Achieved*	*Not Achieved*
Objective 7: Improved access to and management of urban services	*Partially Achieved*	*Partially Achieved*
Focus Area II: Programs that Target Reduction of Extreme Poverty and Improvements in Quality and Delivery of Social Services	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Objective 8: Improved access to and quality of education	*Achieved*	*Mostly Achieved*
Objective 9: Improved access to and quality of health services	*Mostly Achieved*	*Mostly Achieved*
Objective 10: Improved access to safety nets	*Mostly Achieved*	*Mostly Achieved*
Objective 11: Improved efficiency and transparency of public management	*Not Achieved*	*Not Achieved*

6. WBG Performance

Lending and Investments

47. At the beginning of the CAS period, total IDA commitments were $2.57 billion. New lending commitments—planned and unplanned—during the CAS period amounted to $3.33 billion. The major recipients of new lending commitments were in five areas including from social protection, transport, health, and education. During the CAS period, six trust fund (TFs) grants were approved in FY15-16 for

a total of $69.1 million. Four of these TFs (total of $66 million or 96 percent of the TFs) were to support the Strengthening Primary Health Care for Results PforR.

48. The lending portfolio composition changed significantly as the program progressed. During the previous CAS period (FY07-11), investment project financing (IPF) accounted for 78 percent of lending commitments while the remainder was allocated to development policy financing (DPF). During the period of the CAS under review, the distribution of lending commitments reflected the reduced prominence of IPFs (54 percent) and the increased importance Program-for-Results (PforR) operations (27 percent). Sector DPFs accounted for 19 percent of commitments, compared to a 22 percent of PRSCs during the previous CAS (FY0711). Taken together, DPFs and PforRs accounted for close to half of the lending volume. New lending included seven sector DPFs ($640 million) and five PforR operations ($897 million), with the remaining 19 operations being IPFs. IFC had net commitments of US$174.6 million. MIGA reinsured coverage to an agricultural investor in FY14 with total gross exposure of $28.9 million. IDA delivered 23 ESW pieces and 26 technical assistance products. IFC approved fourteen new AS projects in the financial, agricultural, and energy sectors, and in investment climate reforms.

49. The shift in lending instruments is notable in two ways: First, the shift *from PRSCs to sector DPO*s: The lessons from IEG's Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) for the Tanzania PRSCs led to a shift away from broad PRSC budget support to sector DPFs in the hopes of increased implementation effectiveness. Results from a recent ICR for the First and Second Power and Gas Sector DPOs indicate that moving to sector DPOs is not sufficient to achieve success unless there is full commitment to the DPO objectives from both the central government and the implementing ministry (see ICR page 38).[7] Second, the shift *from IPF pooled-funding to PforRs*: Projects financed by pooled-funding were affected by delays owing to design complexity and to the additional administrative burden from multiple fiduciary systems of different financing partners. The Bank adopted the PforR instrument in several sectors—education, health and rural electrification—to leverage significant co-financing from other donors, while relying on borrower systems to avoid the multiple requirements of basket funds. It is relatively early to assess the effectiveness of the PforR instrument in Tanzania. While the changes in portfolio composition illustrate the Bank's flexibility—and search for solutions in a difficult program implementation environment—the rapid shift to new lending instruments could test Tanzania's constrained institutional capacity.

50. During the CAS period, Tanzania's portfolio performance at exit was better on average than Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) Region and the Bank. IEG outcome ratings for the closed Tanzania portfolio averaged at 69.2 percent *Moderately Satisfactory (MS) or better* by number of projects, compared to the global average of 70.7 percent and slightly better than the 65.4 percent average for the SSA. In commitment volume, Tanzania had an average outcome rating of 87.1 percent *MS or better*, compared to SSA (72.4 percent) and the Bank (82.6 percent). The risk to development outcome measured as percent with moderate or lower risk is better for Tanzania (38.5 percent) than for SSA (33.1 percent) by number of projects but below the Bank average (44.5 percent). At the same time, two projects that were implemented during the CAS period and exited the portfolio in the outer year (FY17)—the Agricultural Sector Development project and the Basic Health Services Project—were rated by IEG as Moderately Unsatisfactory and Unsatisfactory, respectively. Both projects used pooled funding, were deemed ambitious, overly complex in design, and not aligned with government capacity.

51. During the CAS period, the average portfolio at risk (18.5 percent) was lower than the SSA (21.6 percent) or the Bank average (20.7 percent). The disbursement ratio was higher for Tanzania (29.0 percent) compared to the SSA average (22.2 percent). The CLR acknowledges slow implementation leading to delays in 65 percent of the projects that needed extension, sometimes due to delays in funding by other partners or due to procurement delays. However, these factors do not seem to be captured in the portfolio at risk ratings which may suggest some over optimism in ratings.

[7] Independent Evaluation Group, *Tanzania: Implementation Completion and Results Report for the First and Second Power and Gas Sector DPO,* Washington D.C.: World Bank Group, December 21, 2017.

52. IFC's net commitments stood at US$174.6 million, a slight increase from US$158.9 million net commitments from the previous CAS period (FY07-11). The largest project was IFC's $60 million investment in a power plant during FY16. IFC's short-term trade finance guarantee accounted for 16.1 percent of total IFC net commitment for US$28 million in the FY12-FY16 CAS period.

53. During the review period, IEG validated five Expanded Project Supervision Reports (XPSRs) of IFC investment projects. All five projects had development outcome ratings of *Mostly Unsuccessful* or worse. The poor development outcome ratings reflect the difficult business environment in Tanzania. Sharp declines in global commodity prices also negatively affected IFC's investments in the mining sector. IFC's MSME AS program was also validated and, an independent third party reported no evidence of impact. In FY14, MIGA reinsured coverage provided by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to an agricultural investor with total gross exposure of $28.9 million.

Analytic and Advisory Activities and Services

54. During the CAS period, IDA delivered 23 Economic and Sector Work (ESW) products, and 26 Technical Assistance (TA) pieces, which is higher than planned. Major ESW products included a Country Economic Memorandum (CEM) in FY14, Poverty Assessment in FY15, one PEFAR in FY12 and four Public Expenditure Reviews (PER), as well as a set of Policy Notes (FY12). These core diagnostics (CEM, Poverty Assessment, PERs) underpinned the Bank's dialogue with the government. The Bank also prepared Policy Notes for the new Government in FY16 that were well received both by the government and donor partners and provided the basis for engaging the new government on key priority issues. There were also policy notes on education that were published and widely disseminated. In addition, the sector work on education and water contributed to the sector dialogue and influenced the Bank's strategy in the work. While the analytical work largely informed WBG engagements and supported the policy dialogue, in some instances in the energy sector ESWs suffered from lack of client demand or capacity to engage.

55. IFC approved 14 new AS projects for the financial sector, agricultural sector, investment climate reforms, and initiatives such as Lighting Africa in Tanzania. Some AS projects supported existing IFC clients, while others helped to establish the regulatory framework of the respective industries. To support the mobile financial services industry in Tanzania, one AS project worked with the regulator to develop a set of industry-agreed interoperable standards for mobile financial services among mobile network operators in the country. Subsequently, the Bank of Tanzania reported a substantial increase of transfers between different mobile wallets solutions in the country. IEG validated two Project Completion Reports (PCRs) of AS projects during the review period and both were assigned ratings of Mostly Successful on development effectiveness.

56. The experience in Tanzania suggests the need for strategic selection of IFC's engagement in the country. All five IFC's investment operations were unsuccessful in realizing development objectives. In contrast, the two AS projects were Mostly Successful. With one of the AS projects, IFC played the role of an honest broker among mobile companies and helped Tanzania become the first country in Africa to achieve full mobile money interoperability in 2016. This indicates that in some contexts, AS projects are able to leverage more change than investment projects.

Results Framework

57. The CAS results framework reflected some good practices, but there were significant shortcomings. The original CAS results framework broadly reflected a logical chain from government goals, major issues and obstacles to CAS objectives, and the WBG program interventions that would contribute to achieving the CAS objectives. The framework also contained baselines and targets. In many instances, however, the WBG's interventions were not directly contributing to the CAS objectives and outcomes. For instance, objective #1 had two outcome indicators with 13 supporting program interventions (seven Bank operations, four IFC and two TFs) and seven operations in the pipeline; yet, such interventions had little effect on reducing the number of days to start a business.

58. Moreover, the bar was set too low for some objectives by using the same baseline values as in the previous CAS (for example for crop yields in objective #2) in a context of significant financing from both IDA and donor partners. An example is the Agricultural Sector Development project which had

total program financing of $474.40 million financed through pooled funding—*Unsatisfactory* IEG outcome rating. Moreover, many targets were project-level objectives, and thus not appropriate to measure the broader program-level objectives. During the CASPR, the results framework was adjusted, but the changes were not sufficient to address shortcomings in the original CAS. Of the seven new indicators added, five were not achieved by the end of the program. In addition, the CASPR dropped one of two indicators—each on commercialization of agriculture and health—but maintained the overall objectives in both areas. Although several projects had gender implications, the results framework did not give gender much prominence, both in terms of monitoring and of reporting of beneficiaries.

Partnerships and Development Partner Coordination

59. Tanzania has a well-established coordination mechanism among 37 donors at the time of the CAS through sector working groups and financing modalities through pooled/basket funds, budget support, and the PER process. While the previous CAS (FY07-11) was prepared as a Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania, the current CAS relied more on partnerships in sector programs initially implemented through sector-wide approaches (SWAPs). The World Bank was the lead partner on three sector working groups and three thematic working groups and contributed to the pooled funding in PSD, agriculture, water, electrification and healthcare. Pooled funding for sector programs was adopted to reduce transaction costs. In practice, however, multiple fiduciary and reporting requirements of different donors proved challenging for sector implementing agencies. The difficulties of managing basket funds led the Bank to shift toward PforRs with co-financing from other development partners. The use of country systems for PforRs made feasible the use of a common set of systems for donors.

Safeguards and Fiduciary Issues

60. Of the 12 operations validated by IEG,10 triggered environmental and social safeguard policies in the governance, social development, environment and natural resources, social protection and labor, agriculture, water and the education practices. The Implementation Completion Reports (ICRs) indicated satisfactory or moderately satisfactory compliance with the triggered policies, with adequate preparation and disclosure of the policy instruments. However, some issues affected performance during implementation. Both the CLR and the CASPR noted that operations were affected by inadequate institutional capacity at the local level. Knowledge and skill gaps in environmental and social safeguards was a critical challenge reported in all ICRs. Safeguard issues in local government and governance projects included delays in document processing and payment of compensation for Project Affected Persons (PAPs), inadequate coordination and engagement with affected populations, and weak safeguards monitoring. The Bank organized technical workshops and practical training for government staff and implementing agencies to strengthen local level safeguards capacity. The ICRs report that by the project's end, all PAPs had been fully compensated and local capacity had improved. No safeguards complaints were brought to the Inspection Panel during the CPS period.

61. At the project level, the application of the Indigenous Peoples policy (OP 4.10) was a contentious issue in Tanzania. While the Bank was revising its Environmental and Social Framework (ESF), the Bank agreed in the interim to adopt an alternative approach that includes preparing social assessments to analyze the needs of vulnerable and marginal communities and propose measures for engagement and participation in Bank financed projects. The CASPR of June 2014 committed the Bank to undertake a review in about 18 months to assess adherence to the commitments made by the government. The CLR does not provide any information on the status of this commitment.

62. According to the Vice Presidency for Integrity (INT), there were two investigations by INT during the review period. One was a substantiated case in the Transport Support project (FY10), which was a misrepresentation by the contractor, and the other was unsubstantiated in the Accelerated Food Security Project (FY09). In addition, INT had two complaints regarding IFC investments.

Ownership and Flexibility

63. The alignment of the CAS with the government strategy is an indication of country ownership. The CASPR was also intended to support the government's "Big Results Now" (BRN) initiative launched in 2013 to accelerate delivery of selected priority results. In practice, although the BRN

intended to leverage private investment, the private sector continues to be hampered by constraints in the business environment, financial markets, and infrastructure. In the energy sector, the WBG responded to the public utility's (TANESCO) need for financial support through the Power and Gas Sectors DPOs but the interventions were insufficient to overcome government inaction in key reform areas, such as payment arrears collections.[8]

64. The WBG displayed flexibility in the use of lending instruments and by extending the CAS. Yet, preparation of the CPF was delayed by at least another 18 months beyond the CAS expiration. To help the government overcome the problems faced using pooled funding, the Bank shifted to PforRs as the lending instrument of choice for programs with significant donor co-financing that involve a mix of service delivery and sector reforms. Building on lessons from PRSC implementation, the Bank also moved away from general budget support (PRSCs) to more targeted support of reforms through sector DPOs.

WBG Internal Cooperation

65. The CAS described the IDA and IFC support for Tanzania as complementary, especially in support of the business environment and the agriculture sector. However, the results framework did not fully capture IFC's role. There is no evidence of joint Bank-IFC projects, and opportunities to collaborate were missed in the power and financial sectors. The emphasis on mobile banking—while useful— was not complemented by efforts to address key constraints for increasing access to finance for businesses. The February 2017 Systematic Country Diagnostic for Tanzania discusses the role and potential collaboration of WBG institutions in greater detail. In particular, three of the four priorities for structural transformation—business environment, power sector, and financial inclusion—offer opportunities for joint or coordinated Bank-IFC support to Tanzania.

Risk Identification and Mitigation

66. The CAS appropriately identified the following risks: (i) weakening public financial management (PFM) performance; (ii) the negative impact of hydrocarbon development on governance, fiscal discipline, and public investments; (iii) weak implementation capacity at local government level; (iv) risk of increasing inequality; and (v) exogenous risks, such as weather and international food and fuel prices. The CASPR identified additional risks, especially the potential political risk from constitutional reform and the 2015 elections, and macro-fiscal risks from the government's changing fiscal stance. The risk assessment correctly anticipated the risks that materialized, including weak PFM, local implementation capacity and adverse weather, as well as the political economy risk to reforms. The CLR noted that the prolonged drought which led to a shutdown of hydropower plants in late October 2015 could not have been anticipated, but the effects on the financial health of TANESCO could have been highlighted as a risk, and mitigating measures put in place. However, governance and political economy risks to the program were not sufficiently elaborated, and had an adverse impact on program outcomes as noted in the recently completed ICR for DPO for Power and Gas.[9]

67. The key risk mitigation measure was to build government capacity through continued Bank-authorities collaboration and technical assistance. Other measures involved front-loading in lending to contain the impact of the 2015 elections and to work closely with the IMF to monitor macro and fiscal stability, and adjusting the Bank program as needed. To address governance challenges, the CASPR committed to strengthen local level implementation capacity on fiduciary and safeguard issues, and proposed to incorporate beneficiary feedback to enhance demand-side social accountability. The adverse effect of governance and political economy risks on the WBG program suggests that the risk mitigation measures in these areas were insufficient.

[8] See IEG's Implementation and Completion Report for the First and Second Power and Gas Sector DPO (FY18).
[9] See page 15 of IEG's Implementation and Completion Report for the First and Second Power and Gas Sector DPO (FY18).

Overall Assessment and Rating

68. WBG performance is rated as *Fair*. The initial CAS design was broadly aligned with the government's development strategy, but it could have been more focused and selective, especially with respect to lending. The lending program was largely supported well by ESWs, especially in education and water. The Policy Notes prepared for the new Government in 2015 provided the basis for dialogue with the government in key priority areas. The CASPR adjusted the pillars to align with the WBG's corporate goals, but it did not revise the CAS objectives. Changes in the results framework—which remained weak at closure—did not alter its substance, and several interventions lacked credible links with CAS objectives. At progress report stage, program implementation was slow owing to institutional challenges faced by sector ministries using pooled funding mechanisms. Yet, discounting these challenges, lending was scaled up further following the progress report and lending instruments were diversified. Portfolio quality at exit was better than its comparators. IEG project ratings, however, deteriorated towards the end of the CAS period, especially for operations using pooled funding (including agriculture and basic health services). Governance and political economy risks to the program were not sufficiently elaborated, and their adverse effects on the WBG program suggests that the risk mitigation measures in these areas were insufficient. There is no evidence of joint Bank-IFC projects, and opportunities to collaborate were missed in the power and financial sectors. The WBG displayed flexibility in the use of lending instruments and by extending the CAS. Yet, preparation of the CPF was delayed by at least another 18 months beyond the CAS expiration. Finally, the Bank coordinated closely with development partners through sector working groups, and shared with partners a pooled funding mechanism to reduce transaction costs. The pooled funding mechanism proved challenging for sector implementing agencies owing to multiple fiduciary and reporting requirements.

7. Assessment of CLR Completion Report

69. The CLR provides adequate information on the country context and the assessment broadly followed the CAS/CASPR results framework and the Shared Approach. It provides good insights by highlighting the influential pieces of analytical work, collaboration with development partners and incorporation of lessons from the previous CAS in the design and implementation of the CAS under review. The CLR was generally candid in highlighting shortcomings in addressing the cross-cutting issues on gender and governance and issues, noting the supply driven nature of some ESWs, and identifying areas where the Bank's supervision could be improved. The CLR did not discuss the significant shift of the portfolio by lending instruments, and the potential implications for institutional capacity and results. While the CLR provides an adequate descriptive analysis of CAS outcomes, the evidence of WBG contribution to these outcomes is weak, and in some cases, could not be validated.

8. Findings and Lessons

70. IEG agrees with the CLR lessons identified in the CLR: (i) about realism regarding the government's absorptive capacity; (ii) the need to pilot, monitor and refine programs before scaling them up and to understand and take account of the political economy when designing the country program; (iii) the importance of knowledge products in strengthening the policy dialogue; (iv) the necessity to select lending instruments that are suitable to the country and sector context, and (v) the need for a strong M&E and a realistic results framework.

71. IEG underscores the relevance of CLR lessons (i), (ii) and (iv), and elaborates them further as follows:

- First, Bank programs need to be tailored to existing capacities and to commit firmly to capacity building that helps effective program implementation. Tanzania's PforR's—which intend to leverage co-financing from other donors while lowering administrative demands on the country—contain capacity-building components. IEG's early evaluation of the PforR

instrument[10] includes a caution that is worth heeding in the country. While capacity building is an important part of PforRs, specific capacity goals need to be defined clearly and implementation of capacity-building programs delivered in a timely manner.

- Second, design and implementation of reform programs require a good understanding of the political economy of reform irrespective of financing modalities. In Tanzania, the shift from PRSCs to sector DPFs intended to improve the effectiveness of Bank interventions for reforming specific sectors. However, underperformance of the recently closed DPO operations in energy suggests that the Bank's limited understanding of political economy and governance risks in power sector reform led to over-ambitious objectives (medium to long-term measures) and limited ability to respond to implementation challenges.

72. IEG adds another lesson:

- The WBG should seize on opportunities to exercise selectivity. In Tanzania, the large number of development partners in the country provided an opportunity to be more selective and avoid stretching WBG resources across a large number of sectors. In practice, based on government demand, the Bank moved well beyond the sectors in which it had agreed to take the lead at the beginning of the CAS period. This may have affected its overall achievement of development results, as reflected in the fact that development outcomes were weaker in the sectors in which the WBG had not initially agreed to take the lead under the CAS.

[10] Independent Evaluation Group, *Program-for-Results: An Early-Stage Assessment of the Process and Effects of a New Lending Instrument*, Washington D.C.: World Bank Group, 2016.

Annex Table 1: Summary of Achievements of CPS Objectives – Tanzania

Annex Table 2: Tanzania Planned and Actual Lending, FY12-FY16

Annex Table 3: Analytical and Advisory Work for Tanzania, FY12-FY16

Annex Table 4: Tanzania Grants and Trust Funds Active in FY12-16

Annex Table 5: IEG Project Ratings for Tanzania, FY12-16

Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for Tanzania and Comparators, FY12-16

Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for Tanzania and Comparators, FY12-16

Annex Table 8: Disbursement Ratio for Tanzania, FY12-16

Annex Table 9: Net Disbursement and Charges for Tanzania, FY12-16

Annex Table 10: Total Net Disbursements of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid for Tanzania

Annex Table 11: Economic and Social Indicators for Tanzania, 2012 – 2016

Annex Table 12: List of IFC Investments in Tanzania

Annex Table 13: List of IFC Advisory Services in Tanzania

Annex Table 14: IFC net commitment activity in Tanzania, FY12 - FY17

Annex Table 15: List of MIGA Activities in Tanzania, 2014-2017

Annex Table 1: Summary of Achievements of CPS Objectives – Tanzania

	CAS FY12-FY16: Focus Area I: *Productive Investments for Growth of Labor-Intensive Industries and Job Creation*	Actual Results	IEG Comments
Major Outcome Measures	1. CPS Objective: Address constraints for doing business and improve financial intermediation		
	Business Environment Indicator 1: Number of days to start a business Baseline: 29 in 2011 Target: 10 in 2016	Various operations contributed to Indicator 1 including : the Financial Sector Support Project (P099231, FY06, closed FY13, IEG: MS) that supported the strengthening of the business environment including improving access to financial services; the Private Sector/ MSME Competitiveness Project (P085009, FY06, see last ISR: MS of July 2017) that supports sustainable conditions for enterprise creation and growth. The July 2017 ISR: MS of project P085009 reports that the number of days needed to formally start a business was reduced from 35 in 2006 to 26 in December 2016. Other operations that contributed to this indicator are the Business Environment and Industry Development for Jobs DPO (P150009, FY16) supporting cost reduction for doing business. as well as Technical Assistance (TA) on public-private partnerships (PPP) (the Support to PPP Central Agencies, FY14, completed); the Building PPP Institutional Support in Tanzania, PPIAF, FY14, ongoing) and a Country Economic Memorandum, P127087, was delivered in FY14, see report). According to the Doing Business reports for 2011 and 2016, the number of days needed to start a business in Tanzania declined from 29 in 2011 to 26 in 2016 and in 2017. Partially Achieved.	At CASPR, Focus Area 1 was changed from "*Promote Inclusive, Sustainable and Private Sector-led Growth*". At CASPR, the CPS objective was changed from "*Improved business environment and financial intermediation*". At CASPR, the target date for this indicator was changed from 2013 to 2016.
	Indicator 2: Proportion of adult population that uses financial services provided by formal and semi-formal financial service providers: Baseline: 11% in 2008 Target: 22% in 2016	The operations that contributed to this Indicator are reported under Indicator 1. The IFC SME lines of credit and Direct Trade Finance Facility also contributed to Indicator 2, as well as the Africa Credit Bureau Program (P569788). IEG: MS for the Financial Sector Support Project (P099231, FY06, closed FY13) indicates that the proportion of adult using formal and semi-formal financial institutions increased from 11% to 17% between 2006 and 2013. Data presented in the Program Document for the Business Environment	At CASPR, the target date for this indicator was changed from 2013 to 2016. With a total exposure of US$54 million, IFC helped CRDB Bank PLC to extend loans to SMEs. CRDB's outstanding loan portfolio is US$1.4 billion, which includes nearly $429 million in

	CAS FY12-FY16: Focus Area I: *Productive Investments for Growth of Labor-Intensive Industries and Job Creation*	Actual Results	IEG Comments
		and Industry Development for Jobs DPO indicates that, according to the 2013 World Bank' Enterprise Survey, only 18.5% of firms in the country used the formal banking system to finance investments. Data from FinScope 2013 indicates that between 2009 and 2013 the number of people with access to financial services in the mainland increased from 15.9% to 57.4% (from 9.2% to 13.9% for bank products and from 6.7% to 43.5% for non-bank formal products) and that the number of people in Zanzibar using formal products increased from 14.7% to 37% (from 8.5% to 11.5% for bank products and from 6.2% to 25.5% for non-bank formal products). More recent FinScope data is not available. Achieved.	SME loans. IFC made a small contribution to help its clients in extending microfinance loans and SME loans.
	2. CPS Objective: Increased productivity and commercialization of agriculture		
	Productivity Indicator: Crop yields in target areas (tons per hectare) for (i) maize and (ii) rice Baseline: (i) 1.12; (ii) 1.73 in 2009 Target: (i) 2.20; (ii) 3.50 in 2016	The Agricultural Sector Development (P085752, FY06, IEG: U); the Accelerated Food Security (P114291, FY09, IEG: MS); the Eastern Africa Agricultural Productivity (P112688, FY09, IEG: MS); supported this objective, and the Expanding Rice Production projects (P144497, FY15) continues to do so. Mostly Achieved. (i) Maize: The CLR reports that maize yields increased from 1.12 tons/ha in 2009 to 2.3 tons/ha by 2015. . According to IEG: MS for project P114291, maize yields increased from 0.33 tons/acre (or 0.81 ton ha) to 0.93 tons/acre (or 2.3 tons per ha) by 2014 in the project targeted areas. The ICRR for project P112688 does not report data for maize yield. However, taking the 2010 data from the CPSCR as the baseline, progress was limited during the FY12-16 CAS period. Partially Achieved. (ii) Rice: The CLR reports that rice yields increased from 1.73 tons/ha to over 2.74 tons/ha in 2015. According to IEG: U for project P085752, rice paddy production increased from an average of 1.47 tons/ha	At CASPR, the target date for this indicator was changed from 2015 to 2016 The baseline reported for this indicator is the same as the baseline reported in the last CAS period FY07-11 (see last IEG CPSCR Review), which reported good progress with maize yields of 2.1 tons/ha in 2010. Indicator (ii) for commercialization was dropped: "*Commercialization: Households participating in outgrower operations supported by SAGCOT increase their farmgate prices by 25% by 2015 [TBD*]".

	CAS FY12-FY16: Focus Area I: *Productive Investments for Growth of Labor-Intensive Industries and Job Creation*	Actual Results	IEG Comments
		in 2010 to 3.42 tons/ha July 2014 in the areas covered by irrigation schemes. According to IEG: MS for project P114291, rice paddy yields increased from 0.74 tons/acre (1.83 tons/ha) in 2009 to 1.11 tons/acre by 2014 (2.74 tons/ha). Additional data in ISRs varies enormously across project areas from a reported rice yield of 4.8 tons/ha for project P112688, by December 2015 to an average of 1.8 tons/ha in project P144497, as of May 2017. Finally, the last ISR: MS (June 2017) of project P144497 reports average rice paddy yields of 1.80 tons/ha, as of May 2017. Not validated.	(i) The numbers for maize yields can be reconciled with the CLR which reports that maize yields increased to 2.30 tons/hectare as of 2015 by converting tonnage per acre to tons/ha (2.25 tons/ha) in the project areas. (ii) The conflicting information reported in the various project documents does not permit validation of the reported increase in rice yields.
	3. CPS Objective: Increased sustainability and improved management of natural resources, including natural gas		
	Mining Indicator 1: Improvement in Tanzania's policy ranking as a mining investment destination in Fraser Institute Survey: Baseline: 44/72 in 2009 Target: 2-3 points/places in 2015	The Sustainable Management of Mineral Resources Project (P096302, FY09) and its additional financing (FY15) support the Government's capacity to manage the mineral sector. The last ISR: MS of June 2017 reports progress in the time to process mineral rights and more transparency, with the annual publication of mining sector revenue. According to the 2015 Fraser Institute Survey, Tanzania ranked 63/109 (58th percentile) in 2015, compared to 44/72 in 2009 (61st percentile, see the 2010 Fraser Institute Report) for the Policy Perception Index. The last ISR: MS of project P096302 also reports that, as of June 2016 the country ranked 48/71 (68th decile for policy ranking). Achieved.	At CASPR, "Including natural gas" was added in the name of the CPS Objective. At CASPR, the target date was changed from 2014 to 2015.
	Gas Indicator 2: Amount of on-shore proven natural gas reserves (Tcf) Baseline:1.0 in 2012 Target: 3.5 in 2016	The First and Second Power and Gas DPO (P143645, FY13 and P145254, FY14) and the Energy Sector Capacity Building Project (P126875, FY13) aiming at strengthening the capacity of the government to develop the natural gas sector (see last ISR: MS), supported this indicator The ICR: MU for P143645/P145254 indicates that, as of December 2016, there	This indicator was added at CASPR.

	CAS FY12-FY16: Focus Area I: *Productive Investments for Growth of Labor-Intensive Industries and Job Creation*	Actual Results	IEG Comments
		were 1.187 Tcf of proven on-shore natural gas reserves. Partially Achieved.	
	Natural Resources and Environment Indicator 3: Area brought under improved land use and range land management practices in the targeted catchments (cumulative hectares): Baseline: Nil in 2010 Target: 2,000 in 2015	The Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project Phase II (P100406, FY09) supported this indicator. According to the December 2015 ISR: S, 7,111 hectares of land have been brought under sustainable land management practices in the targeted areas, as of November 2015. Achieved.	At CASPR, the target date was changed from 2013 to 2015 and the target was changed from 45,000 hectares The project supporting this project was restructured and target changed downwards due to institutional capacity constraints.
	4. CPS Objective: Increased access, quality and sustainability of electricity		
	Access Indicator 1: Number of people provided with access to electricity by household connections: Baseline: 34,200 in 2010 Target: 252,500 in 2016	The Energy Development and Access Expansion Project - TEDAP (P101645, FY08) supported this indicator. According to the ISR: MU of April 2017, as of September 2016, 689,573 people were provided with access to electricity by household connections. Achieved.	At CASPR, this objective was moved from Focus Area II to Focus Area I. At CASPR, the target date was changed from 2015 to 2016.
	Quality Indicator 2: Improvements in service quality as measured by voltage accessible to households: Baseline: 190 volts in 2010 Target: >218 volts in 2016	The TEDAP supported this indicator. According to ISR: MU of April 2017, the end user voltage was 220 volts as of September 2016. Achieved.	At CASPR, the target date was changed from 2015 to 2016 and Indicator B was added.
	Indicator 3: Availability of high voltage (400 kV, double circuit) transmission infrastructure in Northern TZ: Baseline: 0 km in 2014 Target: 225 km in 2016	The Backbone Transmission Investment Project (P111598, FY11) supported this indicator. According to the ICR: S, 225km of transmission lines have been constructed in the North of the country (Singifa to Shinyanga section) as of December 2016. However, as reported in the ICR, in spite of significant reduction in power outages and improvement in service quality, the supply system remains vulnerable to outages. Achieved.	
	Sustainability Indicator 4: Improvement in TANESCO's operational efficiency as measured by increase in collection efficiency in targeted areas	The TEDAP supported this indicator. According to the ISR: MU of April 2017, there collection efficiency has increased to 93.53%, as of September 2016. Additional information from the ICR: MU for P143645/P145254 indicates that	

	CAS FY12-FY16: Focus Area I: *Productive Investments for Growth of Labor-Intensive Industries and Job Creation*	Actual Results	IEG Comments
	Baseline: 70% in 2010 Target: 95% in 2015	TANESCO's accounts payable increased by 88% from 2012 to 2016/17, and the 2016 IMF Article IV Consultation indicates that the financial sustainability of TANESCO has not been achieved yet, considering the company's large amount of arrears to gas and electricity suppliers, estimated at 0.7% of the GDP in early 2016 (about USD 300 million). Mostly Achieved.	
	5. CPS Objective: Increased access to and quality of transport services		
	Access Indicator 1: Passenger volume at Kigoma, Tabora and Bukoba airports Baseline: 78,399 in 2009 Target: 104,000 in 2014	The last ISR: S (June 2017) of the Transport Sector Support Project (P055120, FY10) reported that passenger volume at airports had slightly increased to 70,424 passengers as of January 2017 – no progress was reported as of June 2015, a date similar to the target date, as per the June 2015 ISR: S. Not Achieved.	At CASPR, this objective was moved from Focus Area II to Focus Area I.
	Indicator 2: Number of daily slots available for third party block trains between Dar es Salaam Port and Isaka Terminal Baseline: 0 in 2013 Target: 2 in 2017	The last ISR: U (June 2017) of the Inter-Modal and Rail Development Project (P127421, FY14) reports no progress for the indicator related to the number of daily slots available for third party block trains between Dar es Salaam Port and Isaka Terminal. Not Achieved.	Indicator added at CASPR. The activity has not started.
	Indicator 3: Number of TEU's shipped by direct project beneficiaries. Baseline: 308 in 2014 Target: 1,000 in 2017	The last ISR: U (June 2017) of the Inter-Modal and Rail Development Project (P127421, FY14), reports no progress for the indicator related to the number of TEU's shipped by direct project beneficiaries. Not Achieved.	Indicator added at CASPR. The activity has not started.
	Quality Indicator: Roads in good and fair condition as a share of total classified roads Baseline: 66% in 2009 Target: 70% in 2014	The June 2015 ISR: S of the Transport Sector Support Project (P055120, FY10) reported that 88% of the roads of the total classified roads were in good condition, as of June 2014 – the last ISR: S (June 2017) reports a share of 86% as of January 2017. Achieved.	
	6. CPS Objective: Increased access to and quality of water and sanitation services		
	Access	The Water Sector Support project (P087154, FY07) supported this indicator. As reported in IEG: MS, 9.2 million rural	At CASPR, this objective was moved

	CAS FY12-FY16: Focus Area I: *Productive Investments for Growth of Labor-Intensive Industries and Job Creation*	Actual Results	IEG Comments
	Indicator: Number of rural population with access to clean and safe water Baseline: 15.2 million people Target: 22.5 million rural people by 2016	people gained access to water supply by December 2015.). According to the 2015 Water Status Report, about 21.5 million people in rural areas of the mainland had access to water supply. However, according to WBG data, Tanzania's rural population was about 37.78 million in 2016 and about 45.5% of the rural population (17.20 million people) had access to improved water sources, as of 2015 (and about 36.6% of the rural population – 6.30 million- used basic drinking water services). Partially Achieved.	from Focus Area II to Focus Area I. At CASPR, the baseline and target for this indicator were modified from "*Baseline: 58.7% in 2010* *Target: 65% in 2015".*
	Quality Indicator: Proportion of rural population with access to improved sanitation Baseline: 23% in 2010 Target: 35% in 2015	The Water Sector Support project (P087154, FY07) supported this indicator. As reported in IEG: MS, by December 2015 about 5.15 million people (both rural and urban) obtained access to improved sanitation. According to the 2015 World Development Indicators, only 8.5% of the rural population had access to improved sanitation facilities. Not Achieved.	
	7. CPS Objective: Increased access to and management of urban services		
	Access Indicator: People with access to improved public transport services Baseline: Nil in 2010 Target: 543,721 in 2016	The Strategic Cities Project (P111153, FY10), supported this indicator. As reported in the ISR : S of December 2016, 839,998 people had access to improved public transport services as of July 2016. Achieved.	At CASPR, this objective was moved from Focus Area II to Focus Area I and the target date was changed from 2015.
	Outcome (ii): Management Indicator: Waste collected and disposed at landfill compared to total waste produced in target areas: Baseline: 28% in 2010 Target: 58% in 2016	As reported in the ISR : S of December 2016 of the Strategic Cities Project (P111153, FY10), no progress was recorded as of July 2016 in relation to the share of waste collected and disposed at landfill compared to total waste produced in target areas – as of March 2017, this share reached 32% (see the June 2017 ISR:S). Not Achieved.	At CASPR, the target date was changed from 2015 to 2016.

	CAS FY12-FY16: Focus Area II: *Programs that target reduction of extreme poverty and improvements in quality and delivery of social services*	Actual Results	IEG Comments
Major Outcome Measures	8. CPS Objective: Improved access to and quality of education		
	Access Indicator: Students enrolled in secondary school in Zanzibar (Zanzibar Basic Education) Baseline: Boys: 37,723 and Girls: 42,285 in 2010 Target: Boys: 48,250 and Girls: 49,300 in 2013	The Zanzibar Basic Education Improvement Project (P102262, FY07) supported this objective. IEG: MU and Management: MU report on the pupil/classroom ratio that decreased from 83/1 at baseline to 58/1 at the end of the project and that the target was set on the basis of the expected increased enrollment numbers although the ICRR indicates that the attribution of this decrease to project activities is unclear. However, these reports do not mention the absolute number of students enrolled in secondary schools in Zanzibar. The PAD for the Zanzibar Improving Students Prospects Project (P153277, FY16) reports that "currently (….) around 89,685 students are enrolled in secondary schools" (2016) – this is lower than the information presented in the CLR (110,230 secondary school students) and the target (97,550 students in total). Mostly Achieved.	At CASPR, Focus Area 2 was changed from "*Build Infrastructure and Deliver Services*" and the objectives of former Focus Area 3 were consolidated into Focus Area 2.
	Quality Indicator 1: Completion rates at the O level (lower secondary education) Baseline: 22% in 2011 Target: 39% in 2015	Mostly Achieved. Indicator 1: The Secondary Education Development Program II (P114866, FY10) supported this objective. According to Management: MS, completion rates at the O level reached 33.6% as of June 2016. Mostly Achieved.	
	Indicator 2: Number of primary schools conducting Student Teacher Enrichment Program (STEP) Baseline: 0 (2013) Target: 5,000 (2018)	Indicator 2: the Education Program for Results (EPforR) (P147486, FY15 and its additional financing P162470, FY17) supports government reforms such as the implementation of the STEP. The last ISR: S (June 2017) does not present a related indicator since, as reported in the Project Paper for the Additional Financing, more than 10,000 primary schools carried STEP and the target was taken out at project restructuring. The activity was completed, as indicated by the November 2015 mid-term review, in a total of 10,447 primary schools. Achieved.	Indicator 2 was added at CASPR.

	CAS FY12-FY16: Focus Area II: *Programs that target reduction of extreme poverty and improvements in quality and delivery of social services*	Actual Results	IEG Comments
	9. CPS Objective: Improves access to and quality of health services		
	Indicator: Proportion of births taking place at health facilities as a proxy of births attended by skilled H/Workers Baseline: 51% in 2008 Target: 67% in 2015	The Basic Health Services Project (P125740, FY12), supported this indicator. IEG: MU reports that the baseline was 58.4% in 2012 and the share of births attended in a health facility reached 62.4% at the end of the project (December 2015). According to the March 2016 ISR: S of the Strengthening Primary Health Care for Results Project (P152736, FY15), as of March 2016, 63% of births took place at health facilities. Recent information from the May 2017 ISR: S indicates that this share reached 65.30% by April 2017. Compared to the 2012 baseline limited progress was achieved during the CAS period. Partially Achieved.	At CASPR, the target date was changed from 2012 to 2015. At CASPR, outcome (ii) "*Proportion of mothers in each LGA who received two doses of preventative intermittent treatment for malaria during last pregnancy (Basic Health Services project*)" was taken out.
	10. CPS Objective: Improved access to safety nets		
	Indicator 1: Beneficiaries of conditional cash transfers Baseline: 6,000 in 2010 Target: 4.2 million in 2015	IEG: S of the Second Social Action Fund (P085786, FY05, closed FY13), reports that 28,480 people benefited from conditional cash transfers supported by the program. The Productive Social Safety Net Project (P124045, FY12) also supported this objective. The January 2016 ISR: S reported 4.89 million direct project beneficiaries of social safety net projects, as of December 2015. The most recent ISR: S (October 2017), reports more than 5 million beneficiaries as of June 2017. Achieved.	At CASPR, the target was changed from "22,582 in 2013".
	Indicators 2: Beneficiaries of public works Programs Baseline: 217,315 (men: 114,124, women: 103,191) in 2010 Target: 350,000 (men: 175,000, women: 175,000) in 2015	According to the January 2016 ISR: S of the Productive Social Safety Net Project (P124045, FY12), 55,137 people benefited from the public work programs (24,812 men and 30,325 women) as of December 2015. Partially Achieved.	At CASPR, the target was changed from "*238,635 (men: 124,900, women: 113,735) in 2013*".
	11. CPS Objective: Improved efficiency and transparency of public management		
	Efficiency Indicator 1: Share of MDAs use performance management	Not Achieved. Indicator 1: According to IEG: MU for the Performance Results and Accountability	Prior to the CASPR, Objective 11 was part of a Focus Area IV.

	CAS FY12-FY16: Focus Area II: *Programs that target reduction of extreme poverty and improvements in quality and delivery of social services*	Actual Results	IEG Comments
	system (PMS) to enhance service delivery Baseline: 62% in 2010 Target: 85% in 2016 Indicator 2: Share of development projects that are selected using the Project Investment Manual Baseline: 0% in 2014 Target: 40% in 2016	Project – APL II (P092898, FY08, closed FY13), as of 2010, 62% of the MDAs used PMS to enhance service delivery– however, the ICRR rated "modest" the efficacy of the PDO in relation to enhanced capacity and performance of MDAs and "negligible" for enhanced accountability of MDAs. As reported in the CLR, the APLIII was not approved and the use of PMS was not tracked. Not Achieved. Indicator 2: The Program Document of the Open Government and Public Finance Management DPO (P133798, FY15) incorporated Indicator 2 as the Government had approved a Project Investment Manual (PIM) for 2015/2016 as a prior action and presented a 100% objective for 2017. However, the only available ISR:S, of November 2015 does not report data for this indicator and the CLR reports that the development of the Manual was delayed and not applied in projects as anticipated. Not Achieved.	At CASPR, the target date for Indicator 1 was changed from 2013 to 2016 and Indicator 2 was added.
	Transparency Indicator 1: Full and timely implementation of census and surveys specified in the Intercensal Survey Calendar 2012-2022	Partially Achieved. Indicator 1: The Development of a National Statistical System for Tanzania project (P107722, FY11) supports this objective. Indicator 1 was one of the PDOs of project P107722 and considered various surveys such as Integrated Business Survey, Survey of Industrial production, Agriculture Census… (see PAD). The November 2016 ISR: S indicates that between 2012 and 2015 various surveys were prepared and concluded. In addition, as of September 2016, more than 154,000 establishments have been updated, the Final Statistical Business Register (SBR) report was in place and 23 surveys had been implemented (the project target was 18) through the implementation of the Tanzania Statistical Master Plan 2009-2014. Mostly Achieved.	At CASPR, Indicator 2 was added.

	CAS FY12-FY16: Focus Area II: *Programs that target reduction of extreme poverty and improvements in quality and delivery of social services*	Actual Results	IEG Comments
	Indicator 2: Increased public access to budget documents and transparency Baseline:47% in 2012 (OBI) Target: 60% in 2016	Indicator 2: the Open Government and Public Finance Management DPO (P133798, FY15) supports this indicator. However, the only available ISR:S, of November 2015, does not report progress for the indicator « *Percentage of Access to Information requests granted as a share of total requests* ». In addition, data from the Open Budget Index reported a score of 46% for 2015, which indicates that the Government provides the public with limited budget information. Not Achieved.	

Annex Table 2: Tanzania Planned and Actual Lending, FY12-FY16

Project ID	Project name	Lending Instrument Type	Proposed FY	Approval FY	Closing FY	Proposed Amount	Proposed Amount	Approved IDA Amount	Outcome Rating
Project Planned Under CPS/PLR 2012-2016						CPS	CPSPLR		
P112762	PRSC9 - 1st of Series	Dev Pol Lend	2012	2012	2013	75.0		100.0	IEG: MS
	Pension Fiancing Reform DPO 1		2012			150.0			
	Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor		2012			60.0			
	Transport Sector Support Project (FY11 Standby)- AF		2012			60.0			
P124114	Central Transport Corridor II - AF	Investment	2012	2013		30.0		100.0	
P124045	Social Action Fund III	Investment	2012	2012	2020	220.0		220.0	LIR: S
P125740	Basic Health Services Project	Investment	2012	2012	2017	100.0		100.0	IEG: MU
P127241	Emergency Railroads Rehabilitatio (TZ-Intermodal & Rail Development Project)	Investment	2012	2014	2020	150.0		300.0	LIR: U
	Natural Gas TA		2012			15.0			
**	Rusomo Falls Hydro - IDA and/or PRG [regional]		2012			27.0			
**	Regional Lake Conservation & Development Project		2012			15.0			
P110836	PRSC 10	Dev Pol Lend	2013	2013	2014	75.0		75.0	IEG: MS
P146700	Water Sector	Investment	2013	2014		250.0		44.9	
P123134	Dar es Salaam Metropolitan Development Project (1st phase)	Investment	2013	2015	2021	75.0		300.0	LIR:: MS
P118152	Local Government II ('TZ-Urban Local Govt Strengthening (ULGSP)	P4R	2013	2013	2019	190.0		255.0	LIR: MS
	ASDP-2		2013			280.0			
	Singida Wind - PRG		2013			25.0			
**	SA Trade & Transport (N-S Corridor) [regional]		2013			35.0			
P120536	PRSC 11	Dev Pol Lend	2014	2014	2015	75.0		85.0	IEG: MS
P147486	Higher Education (TZ-Education Program for Results)	P4R	2014	2015	2018	120.0		122.0	LIR: S
	Secondary Education APL2		2014			150.0			
**	Ruhudji Hydro - IDA (US$100 million) & PRG (US$25 million)		2014			125.0			
	PRSC 12		2015			75.0			
	Transport Sector Support II		2015			180.0			
	Pension Financing Reform DPO 2		2015			120.0			
	Unallocated					123.0			
P150009	Business Environment and Industry Development for Jobs	Dev Pol Lend	2015-2016	2016	2017		50.0	80.0	
	Agriculture and Agro-business		2015-2016				295.0		

Project ID	Project name	Lending Instrument Type	Proposed FY	Approval FY	Closing FY	Proposed Amount	Proposed Amount	Approved IDA Amount	Outcome Rating
	Energy and Extractives		2015-2016				385.0		
	Transport Infrastructure and Trade		2015-2016				130.0		
	Urbanization in Dar es Salaam and Zanziba		2015-2016				350.0		
	Climate Resilient Sustainable Growth		2015-2016				50.0		
P149464	Technical/Vocational and Higher Education	Investment	2015-2016	2015			135.0	15.0	
P151838	Social Safety Nets	Investment	2015-2016	2016			210.0	200.0	
P152810	Quality of Basic Education Services (TZ-Educt'n & Skills for Productive Jobs)	P4R	2015-2016	2016	2021		120.0	120.0	LIR: MS
	Quality of Basic Health Services		2015-2016				25.0		
P133798	Open Government and Public Finance	Dev Pol Lend	2015-2016	2015	2016		100.0	100.0	LIR: S
Total Planned						2,800.0	1,850.0	2,216.9	
Unplanned Projects during the CPS and PLR Period									
P126875	TZ-Energy Sector Capacity Building Prj	Investment		2013	2019			21.5	LIR: MS
P132780	TZ-Accelerated Food Security Project AF	Investment		2013				25.0	
P132838	TZ:Third Additional Financing for ASDP	Investment		2013				30.0	
P143645	TZ First Power and Gas Sector DPO	Dev Pol Lend		2013	2014			100.0	LIR: MU
P145254	TZ-Second Power and Gas Sector DPO	Dev Pol Lend		2014	2015			100.0	LIR: MU
P145971	TZ Private Sector Comp. Project Addl Fin	Investment		2014				60.2	
P148974	Tanzania Strategic Cities Project AF	Investment		2014				50.0	
P151124	TZ Sustainable Mgmt of Mineral Res AF	Investment		2015				45.0	
P151220	TZ-Housing Finance Project AF	Investment		2015				60.0	
P152736	TZ-Strengthening PHC for Results (FY15)	P4R		2015	2020			200.0	LIR: S
P125728	TZ-SAGCOT Investment Project	Investment		2016	2022			70.0	LIR: MS
P153277	TZ-Zanzibar Improving Student Prospects	Investment		2016	2022			35.0	LIR: MS
P153781	TZ-Rural Electrificatn Expansn Progr-SUF	P4R		2016	2023			200.0	LIR: S
P155392	TZ-Zanzibar Urban Additional Financing	Investment		2016				55.0	
P155759	TZ- Judicial Modernization Project	Investment		2016	2021			65.0	LIR: MS
Total Unplanned								1,116.7	
Total Planned and Unplanned, FY12-FY16								3,333.6	
On-going Projects during the CPS and PLR Period				Approval FY	Closing FY			Approved Amount	Outcome Rating
P107722	TZ- NEAS STATCAP	Investment		2011	2018			30.0	LIR: S

Project ID	Project name	Lending Instrument Type	Proposed FY	Approval FY	Closing FY	Proposed Amount	Proposed Amount	Approved IDA Amount	Outcome Rating
P111155	TZ-Zanzibar Urban Services Project	Investment		2011	2019			38.0	LIR: MS
P111598	TZ- Backbone Transmission Investm.(FY11)	Investment		2011	2017			150.0	LIR: S
P116666	TZ-PRSC 8 (5th and last in 2nd series)	Dev Pol Lend		2011	2013			115.0	IEG: MU
P125824	TZ-TEDAP AF	Investment		2011				27.9	
P126206	TZ: TSSP Additional Financing	Investment		2011				59.0	
P055120	TZ-Transport Sector Support Project			2010	2017			270.0	LIR: S
P111153	TZ-Strategic Cities Project	Investment		2010	2020			163.0	LIR: S
P114866	TZ-2ndary Educ. Dev. Program II (FY10)	Investment		2010	2017			150.0	LIR: MS
P117242	TZ-Housing Finance	Investment		2010	2018			40.0	LIR; MU
P117260	TZ:Additional Financing - TEDAP	Investment		2010				25.0	
P096302	TZ-Sustainable Mgt of Min.Resources TAL	Investment		2009	2019			50.0	LIR: MS
P114291	TZ : Accelerated Food Security Project	Investment		2009	2014			160.0	IEG: MS
P092898	TZ-Performance Results & Accountability	Investment		2008	2013			40.0	IEG: MU
P098496	TZ-Sci.&Tech. High Educ. Prog-Ph.1 (FY08	Investment		2008	2016			100.0	IEG: MS
P101645	TZ-Energy Development & Access Expansion	Investment		2008	2018			105.0	LIR: MU
P103633	TZ-Second Central Transport Corridor	Investment		2008	2017			190.0	LIR: MS
P087154	TZ-Water Sector Support SIL	Investment		2007	2016			200.0	IEG: MS
P102262	TZ-Zanzibar Basic Educ. SIL (FY07)	Investment		2007	2014			42.0	IEG: MU
P070544	TZ-Accountability,Transparency&Integrity	Investment		2006	2012			40.0	IEG: MU
P082492	TZ-Marine & Coastal Env Mgmt SIL (FY06)	Investment		2006	2013			51.0	IEG: MU
P085009	TZ-Private Sector/MSME Competitiveness	Investment		2006	2019			95.0	LIR: MS
P085752	TZ-Agr Sec Dev (FY06)	Investment		2006	2017			90.0	IEG: U
P099231	TZ-Financial Sector Support	Investment		2006	2013			15.0	IEG: MS
P100314	TZ-Tax Modernization Project	Investment		2006	2012			12.0	IEG: MS
P099738	TZ-Loc Govt Supt SIL-Supplemental (FY06)	Investment		2006	2012			98.0	IEG: MS
P070736	TZ-Loc Govt Supt SIL (FY05)	Investment		2005	2012			52.0	IEG: MS
P085786	TZ-Soc Action Fund 2 SIL (FY05)	Investment		2005	2013			150.0	IEG: S
P069982	Regional Trade Fac. Proj. - Tanzania	Investment		2001	2013			15.0	
Total On-going								2,572.9	

Source: Tanzania CPS and PLR, WB Business Intelligence Table 2b.1, 2a.4 and 2a.7 as of 3/1/17
**LIR: Latest internal rating. MU: Moderately Unsatisfactory. MS: Moderately Satisfactory. S: Satisfactory. HS: Highly Satisfactory.*
***Regional Project not included on this table*

Regional Projects		Approval FY	Closing FY	Approved Amount	Outcome Rating
P075941	Rusomo Falls Hydro - IDA and/or PRG [regional]	2014	2021	113.3	LIR: MS
P100406	Regional Lake Conservation & Development Project	2009	2017	32.5	LIR: S
P120370	SA Trade & Transport (N-S Corridor) [regional]	2013	2019	210.0	LIR: S
P125375	Ruhudji Hydro - IDA (US$100 million) & PRG (US$25 million)		DROPPED	200.0	
	Total			555.8	

Note: Approved amount was based on PAD

Annex Table 3: Analytical and Advisory Work for Tanzania, FY12-FY16

Proj ID	Economic and Sector Work	Fiscal year	Output Type
P124787	MTDS Tanzania Follow Up	FY12	General Economy, Macroeconomics, and Growth Study
P126837	TZ Policy Notes Series	FY12	Not assigned
P096088	TZ PEFAR 2011	FY13	Public Expenditure Review (PER)
P133409	TZ Economic Note	FY13	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P143803	Port Study	FY13	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P127087	TZ CEM FY13	FY14	Country Economic Memorandum (CEM)
P133379	TZ Public Expenditure Review 2012	FY14	Public Expenditure Review (PER)
P143238	Consumer Protection	FY14	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P146584	Tanzania Economic Update	FY14	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P147091	Tanzania PER	FY14	Public Expenditure Review (PER)
P148689	Tanzania Gas Economic Policy Note	FY14	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P127165	TZ:Building Blocks= National CC Strategy	FY15	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P145914	Tanzania Hydropower Assessment Sustainab	FY15	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P148501	Tanzania Poverty Assessment	FY15	Poverty Assessment (PA)
P151530	Economic Update	FY15	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P155102	Tanzania Second DeMPA	FY15	Debt management Performance Assessment(DeMPA)
P146149	TZ-Options for Contribution of Serengeti	FY16	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P147119	Tanzania EGR	FY16	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P151531	TZ-Policy Notes for New Government	FY16	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P152601	TZ-Poverty Assessment Follow-up	FY16	Poverty Assessment (PA)
P155544	Tanzania PER 2014 ESW	FY16	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P156919	Tanzania PER 2014	FY16	Public Expenditure Review (PER)
P156957	Economic Update	FY16	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
Proj ID	**Technical Assistance**	**Fiscal year**	**Output Type**
P099436	TZ PPP & Capital Markets TA	FY12	Technical Assistance
P127400	TZ: ICT Policy	FY12	Technical Assistance
P129133	Tanzania Reform Plan	FY13	Technical Assistance
P128781	Tanzania EITI	FY14	Technical Assistance

P133296	Tz: Programmatic Governance	FY14	Technical Assistance
P133455	Tanzania Education Reform Compact	FY14	Technical Assistance
P143882	Tanzania CP diagnostic	FY14	Technical Assistance
P127515	TZ Finance Leasing - Legal and Regulator	FY15	Technical Assistance
P129440	TZ Islamic Banking - Legal and Regulator	FY15	Technical Assistance
P129675	Tanzania EITI CSO Support	FY15	Technical Assistance
P129858	TZ M&A - Legal and Regulatory Framework	FY15	Technical Assistance
P132058	Rural Sanitation Supply and Demand	FY15	Technical Assistance
P132059	Enabling Sanitation Performance Review	FY15	Technical Assistance
P133077	Tanzania Petroleum Sector Reform	FY15	Sector or Thematic Study/Note
P146235	Serengeti Geospatial Support System	FY15	Technical Assistance
P146946	Pension Reform	FY15	Technical Assistance
P148454	Tanzania MTDS Follow-up	FY15	Technical Assistance
P153597	TZ-Policy dialogue on gas sector	FY15	Technical Assistance
P133587	TZ-PPP activities	FY16	Technical Assistance
P145463	TZ-Strengthening DRR Comm. Capacity	FY16	Technical Assistance
P146393	StAR - Tanzania Country Engagement	FY16	Technical Assistance
P149532	TZ-Systems Based Approach for the PSSN	FY16	Technical Assistance
P149695	TZ-Sustainable Rural Water Supply	FY16	Technical Assistance
P150130	TZ-Health Financing for UHC	FY16	Technical Assistance
P150227	Tanzania PER 2014 TA	FY16	Technical Assistance
P153730	Public Procurement Reform	FY16	Technical Assistance

Source: WB Business Intelligence 3/1/17

Annex Table 4: Tanzania Grants and Trust Funds Active in FY12-16

Project ID	Project name	TF ID	Approval FY	Closing FY	Approved Amount	Outcome Rating
P158448	Tanzania Mainland Household Budget Survey	TF A2331	2016	2018	2,300,000	
P153781	TZ-Rural Electrification Expansion Program	TF 19390	2016	2017	760,000	
P152736	Strengthening Primary Health Care for Results	TF A1567	2016	2020	4,500,000	LIR: S
	Strengthening Primary Health Care for Results	TF A0261	2015	2020	20,000,000	
	Strengthening Primary Health Care for Results	TF A0270	2015	2020	40,000,000	
	Strengthening Primary Health Care for Results	TF 16540	2015	2016	1,585,000	
	Total				69,145,000	

Source: Client Connection as of 3/1/17
*** IEG Validates RETF that are 5M and above*

Annex Table 5: IEG Project Ratings for Tanzania, FY12-16

Exit FY	Proj ID	Project name	Total Evaluated ($M)	IEG Outcome	IEG Risk to DO
2012	P070544	TZ-Accountability,Transparency&Integrity	28.9	MODERATELY UNSATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2012	P070736	TZ-Loc Govt Supt SIL (FY05)	147.5	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	MODERATE
2012	P100314	TZ-Tax Modernization Project	13.0	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	MODERATE
2012	P112762	TZ PRSC-9 (1st in a 3rd series)	99.7	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2013	P082492	TZ-Marine & Coastal Env Mgmt SIL (FY06)	51.9	MODERATELY UNSATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2013	P085786	TZ-Soc Action Fund 2 SIL (FY05)	224.5	SATISFACTORY	MODERATE
2013	P092898	TZ-Performance Results & Accountability	30.0	MODERATELY UNSATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2013	P099231	TZ-Financial Sector Support	15.7	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	MODERATE
2014	P102262	TZ-Zanzibar Basic Educ. SIL (FY07)	43.6	MODERATELY UNSATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2014	P114291	TZ: Accelerated Food Security Project	183.7	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2016	P087154	TZ-Water Sector Support SIL	251.7	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	SIGNIFICANT
2016	P098496	TZ-Sci.&Tech. High Educ. Prog-Ph.1 (FY08	108.2	MODERATELY SATISFACTORY	MODERATE
		Total	1,198.4		

Source: AO Key IEG Ratings as of 10/24/17

Annex Table 6: IEG Project Ratings for Tanzania and Comparators, FY12-16

Region	Total Evaluated ($M)	Total Evaluated (No)	Outcome % Sat ($)	Outcome % Sat (No)	RDO % Moderate or Lower Sat ($)	RDO % Moderate or Lower Sat (No)
Tanzania	1,198.4	12	87.1	66.7	42.5	41.7
AFR	20,347.2	396	72.4	65.4	40.9	33.1
World	115,500.0	1,344	82.6	70.7	55.4	44.5

Source: WB AO as of 10/24/17

Annex Table 7: Portfolio Status for Tanzania and Comparators, FY12-16

Fiscal year	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Ave FY12-16
Tanzania						
# Proj	25	21	22	27	29	25
# Proj At Risk	6	3	3	4	7	5
% Proj At Risk	24.0	14.3	13.6	14.8	24.1	18.5
Net Comm Amt	2,700.7	2,715.8	3,179.6	3,908.9	4,203.2	3,342
Comm At Risk	731.4	254.4	317.0	591.7	1,019.6	583
% Commit at Risk	27.1	9.4	10.0	15.1	24.3	17.4
AFR						
# Proj	627	566	620	643	659	623
# Proj At Risk	127	128	138	136	144	135
% Proj At Risk	20.3	22.6	22.3	21.2	21.9	21.6
Net Comm Amt	40,416.8	42,649.1	49,142.6	54,586.3	59,033.9	49,166
Comm At Risk	6,504.6	14,310.8	16,548.2	16,000.3	18,949.8	14,463
% Commit at Risk	16.1	33.6	33.7	29.3	32.1	29.4
World						
# Proj	2,029	1,964	2,048	2,022	1,975	2,008
# Proj At Risk	387	414	412	444	422	416
% Proj At Risk	19.1	21.1	20.1	22.0	21.4	20.7
Net Comm Amt	173,706.1	176,202.6	192,610.1	201,045.2	220,331.5	192,779
Comm At Risk	24,465.0	40,805.6	40,933.5	45,987.7	44,244.9	39,287
% Commit at Risk	14.1	23.2	21.3	22.9	20.1	20.4

Source: WB BI as of 3/2/17

Annex Table 8: Disbursement Ratio for Tanzania, FY12-16

Fiscal Year	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Overall Result
Tanzania						
Disbursement Ratio (%)	25.0	30.1	33.9	37.9	19.1	29.0
Inv Disb in FY	374.0	417.5	395.0	428.0	212.6	1,827.2
Inv Tot Undisb Begin FY	1,493.5	1,386.8	1,166.5	1,130.0	1,115.1	6,291.9
AFR						
Disbursement Ratio (%)	21.4	22.5	23.1	24.5	19.6	22.2
Inv Disb in FY	5,260.3	5,652.1	6,143.9	6,473.2	5,572.5	29,102.1
Inv Tot Undisb Begin FY	24,595.0	25,175.9	26,540.4	26,463.6	28,377.1	131,152.0
World						
Disbursement Ratio (%)	20.8	20.6	20.8	21.8	19.5	20.7
Inv Disb in FY	21,048.2	20,510.7	20,757.7	21,851.3	21,149.6	105,317.6
Inv Tot Undisb Begin FY	101,234.3	99,588.3	99,854.3	100,336.7	108,594.4	509,608.0

** Calculated as IBRD/IDA Disbursements in FY / Opening Undisbursed Amount at FY. Restricted to Lending Instrument Type = Investment.*
AO disbursement ratio table as of 3/2/17

Annex Table 9: Net Disbursement and Charges for Tanzania, FY12-16

Period	Disb. Amt.	Repay Amt.	Net Amt.	Charges	Fees	Net Transfer
FY12	503,699,883.7	7,721,612.0	495,978,271.7	-	26,523,538.7	469,454,733.0
FY13	613,052,192.7	8,498,252.5	604,553,940.2	-	28,672,891.0	575,881,049.2
FY14	637,724,482.1	11,522,178.1	626,202,304.0	-	32,775,429.6	593,426,874.4
FY15	630,091,039.7	20,345,199.5	609,745,840.2	-	36,896,658.2	572,849,182.0
FY16	430,180,609.0	24,662,777.9	405,517,831.1	-	39,266,321.4	366,251,509.7
Report Total	2,814,748,207.1	72,750,020.0	2,741,998,187.1	-	164,134,838.9	2,577,863,348.3

World Bank Client Connection 3/1/17

Annex Table 10: Total Net Disbursements of Official Development Assistance and Official Aid for Tanzania

Development Partners	2012	2013	2014	2015
All Donors, Total	2822.23	3433.58	2648.73	2580.47
DAC Countries, Total	1763.58	1952.31	1454.86	1444.68
Australia	8.82	12.1	5.78	5.68
Austria	1.44	1.54	2.77	0.95
Belgium	22.79	13.34	16.36	12.11
Canada	112.8	163.68	85.79	82.73
Czech Republic	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.01
Denmark	111.19	88.63	70.71	41.37
Finland	35.02	45.24	54.22	29.04
France	24.52	7.99	21.86	26.3
Germany	109.73	75.08	52.12	93.15
Greece	0.03	..	..	..
Ireland	44.77	43.56	33.13	31.59
Italy	6.1	6.59	4.96	4.81
Japan	147.91	196.87	113.98	94.84
Korea	50.64	56.87	79.84	71.29
Luxembourg	0.2	0.01	0.07	0.17
Netherlands	29.75	10.11	0.6	..
New Zealand	0.21	0.59	0.83	0.75
Norway	92.62	99.45	71.81	47.68
Poland	0.38	0.61	0.21	0.46
Portugal	0.07	0.07	0.01	0.01
Slovak Republic	..	0.02	0.01	..
Spain	1.58	0.43	1.01	0.43
Sweden	116.27	125.42	54.07	103.46
Switzerland	34.93	31.37	30.5	32.31
United Kingdom	250.02	237.83	245.19	312.98
United States	561.78	734.88	509.01	452.55
Multilaterals, Total	1042.72	1470.15	1184.21	1135.73
EU Institutions	132.7	106.7	99.02	122.64
International Monetary Fund, Total	-3	109.99	-27.59	-61.18
IMF (Concessional Trust Funds)	-3	109.99	-27.59	-61.18
Regional Development Banks, Total	130.88	203.57	181.01	213.32
African Development Bank, Total	130.88	203.57	181.01	213.32
African Development Bank [AfDB]	0.77	..	..	0.1
African Development Fund [AfDF]	130.11	203.57	181.01	213.21
United Nations, Total	66.2	50.93	44.13	58.85

Development Partners	2012	2013	2014	2015
Food and Agriculture Organisation [FAO]	..	0.42	..	..
International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]	0.21	0.45	0.63	0.31
IFAD	18.83	8.4	2.79	5.66
International Labour Organisation [ILO]	0.33	0.51	0.85	0.67
UNAIDS	1.12	0.99	1.36	1.02
UNDP	7.94	11.35	8.34	7.7
UNFPA	4.12	4.2	4.52	4.53
UNHCR	13.02	..	..	13.02
UNICEF	14.56	19.07	20.38	21.89
WFP	4.64	3.96	3.83	1.79
World Health Organisation [WHO]	1.43	1.59	1.41	2.25
World Bank Group	535.29	697.09	605.8	580.94
World Bank, Total	535.29	697.09	605.8	580.94
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [IBRD]	..	..	..	..
International Development Association [IDA]	535.29	697.09	605.8	580.94
International Finance Corporation [IFC]	..	..	..	..
Other Multilateral, Total	180.66	301.88	281.84	221.16
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa [BADEA]	5.02	8.76	3.81	6.4
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization [GAVI]	46.86	46.38	86.01	43.58
Global Environment Facility [GEF]	4.14	7.17	7.62	6.14
Global Fund	119.84	235.7	182.76	155.51
Nordic Development Fund [NDF]	1.21	0.2	0.25	4.96
OPEC Fund for International Development [OFID]	3.59	3.66	1.39	4.58
Non-DAC Countries, Total	15.93	11.11	9.66	0.06
Hungary	..	..	0.01	0.01
Israel	0.14	0.09	0.02	0.03
Kuwait (KFAED)	-3.59	-0.57	8.34	-2.83
Malta	..	..	0.02	0.05
Romania	..	..	0.01	0.01
Russia	0.07	3.37	1.37	1.37
Thailand	0.01	0.12	0.08	0.18
Turkey	0.48	1.42	1.72	0.35
United Arab Emirates	18.81	6.68	-1.91	0.89

Source: OECD Stat, [DAC2a] as of 3/24/17

Annex Table 11: Economic and Social Indicators for Tanzania, 2012 – 2016

Series Name						Tanzania	SSA	World
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Average 2012-2016		
Growth and Inflation								
GDP growth (annual %)	5.1	7.3	7.0	7.0	7.0	6.7	3.5	2.6
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	1.9	4.0	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.4	0.7	1.4
GNI per capita, PPP (current international $)	2,240.0	2,370.0	2,500.0	2,610.0	2,740.0	2,492.0	3,445.1	15,133.6
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$) (Millions)	770.0	840.0	920.0	910.0	900.0	868.0	1,638.0	10,612.9
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	16.0	7.9	6.1	5.6	..		4.9	2.5
Compositon of GDP (%)								
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)	33.2	33.3	31.0	31.1	31.1	31.9	17.7	3.9
Industry, value added (% of GDP)	23.3	24.2	25.0	26.1	27.2	25.2	25.5	27.9
Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)	43.6	42.5	44.0	42.9	41.8	42.9	56.7	68.2
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP)	30.6	30.5	32.6	34.5	17.5	29.1	20.5	23.5
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP)	16.7	16.9	19.8	23.2	5.6	16.4	17.9	24.8
External Accounts								
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	21.3	17.7	19.4	21.6	17.6	19.5	28.3	30.1
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	33.1	31.1	29.8	26.3	19.2	27.9	31.4	29.6
Current account balance (% of GDP)	(9.6)	(11.3)	(10.4)	(7.3)	..	-9.6		
External debt stocks (% of GNI)	30.1	29.9	30.2	34.1	..	31.1		
Total debt service (% of GNI)	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.8	..	0.5	1.8	
Total reserves in months of imports	3.6	3.9	3.7	3.7	..	3.7	5.0	13.2
Fiscal Accounts /**								
General government revenue (% of GDP)	15.7	15.5	14.9	14.5	15.9	15.3		
General government total expenditure (% of GDP)	19.8	19.4	17.9	17.8	19.6	18.9		
General government net lending/borrowing (% of GDP)	(4.1)	(3.9)	(3.0)	(3.3)	(3.8)	-3.6		
General government gross debt (% of GDP)	29.2	30.9	33.8	36.9	39.0	34.0		

Series Name						Tanzania	SSA	World
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Average 2012-2016		
Health								
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	62.5	63.3	64.1	64.9	..	63.7	59.1	71.6
Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months)	92.0	91.0	97.0	98.0	97.0	95.0	73.0	85.3
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	14.0	14.5	15.0	15.6	..	14.8	29.2	66.7
Improved water source (% of population with access)	45.5	45.5	45.5	45.5	..	45.5	54.5	83.4
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)	38.8	37.6	36.2	35.2	..	37.0	58.9	33.2
Education								
School enrollment, preprimary (% gross)	33.6	32.3	32.0	31.8	..	32.4	20.6	46.5
School enrollment, primary (% gross)	90.1	86.8	83.7	81.7	..	85.6	98.0	105.1
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)	34.2	32.3	..	..	..	33.3	42.2	75.5
Population								
Population, total (Millions)	49,082,997	50,636,595	52,234,869	53,879,957	55,572,201	52,281,324	979,225,765	7,269,320,589
Population growth (annual %)	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	2.8	1.2
Urban population (% of total)	29.5	30.2	30.9	31.6	32.3	30.9	37.2	53.4
Poverty								
Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of pop)							41.8	11.5

Source: DDP as of 9/14//17
**International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2017*
*** Estimates starts after FY15*

Annex Table 12: List of IFC Investments in Tanzania
Investments Committed in FY12-FY17

Project ID	Cmt FY	Project Status	Primary Sector Name	Greenfield Code	Project Size	Original Loan	Original Equity	Original CMT	Loan Cancel	Equity Cancel	Net Loan	Net Equity	Net Comm
33719	2017	Active	Finance & Insurance	G	1,500	-	1,500	1,500	-	-	1,500	1,500	1,500
33972	2017	Active	Construction and Real Estate	G	42,800	17,500	-	17,500	-	-	17,500	-	17,500
37374	2017	Active	Agriculture and Forestry	G	2,913	2,913	-	2,913	-	-	2,913	-	2,913
39198	2017	Active	Finance & Insurance	G	100	100	-	100	-	-	100	-	100
39405	2017	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	24,000	24,000	-	24,000	-	-	24,000	-	24,000
34240	2016	Active	Oil, Gas and Mining	E	185,000	60,000	-	60,000	-	-	60,000	-	60,000
37979	2016	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	579	-	579	579	-	-	579	579	579
34292	2015	Closed	Electric Power	G	7,000	3,375	-	3,375	3,375	-	-	-	-
35868	2015	Active	Oil, Gas and Mining	G	4,571	1,573	2,631	4,204	-	-	4,204	2,631	4,204
35990	2015	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	531	-	527	527	-	42	527	485	485
36013	2015	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	37,700	-	15,000	15,000	-	9,171	15,000	5,829	5,829
36255	2015	Active	Oil, Gas and Mining	G	929	-	787	787	-	-	787	787	787
31696	2014	Active	Finance & Insurance	G	5,587	4,500	-	4,500	-	-	4,500	-	4,500
33595	2014	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	15,000	15,000	-	15,000	-	-	15,000	-	15,000
33608	2014	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	40,000	34,000	-	34,000	-	-	34,000	-	34,000
33769	2014	Active	Accommodation & Tourism Services	G	77,700	21,800	-	21,800	-	-	21,800	-	21,800
34257	2014	Closed	Finance & Insurance	E	-	169	-	169	-	-	169	-	169
35323	2014	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	2,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
32444	2013	Active	Electric Power	G	4,000	4,000	-	4,000	-	-	4,000	-	4,000
33118	2013	Closed	Finance & Insurance	E	3,000	3,000	-	3,000	-	-	3,000	-	3,000
33182	2013	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	6,899	-	6,899	6,899	-	-	6,899	6,899	6,899
33362	2013	Active	Finance & Insurance	G	3,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
33742	2013	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	485	-	485	485	-	-	485	485	485

Project ID	Cmt FY	Project Status	Primary Sector Name	Greenfield Code	Project Size	Original Loan	Original Equity	Original CMT	Loan Cancel	Equity Cancel	Net Loan	Net Equity	Net Comm
33973	2013	Active	Agriculture and Forestry	E	30,000	30,000	-	30,000	-	-	30,000	-	30,000
27649	2012	Closed	Finance & Insurance	G	4,000	4,000	-	4,000	-	-	4,000	-	4,000
29062	2012	Closed	Oil, Gas and Mining	G	14,047	-	4,838	4,838	-	9	4,838	4,830	4,830
30725	2012	Active	Oil, Gas and Mining	G	2,810	-	1,706	1,706	-	-	1,706	1,706	1,706
31405	2012	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	202	-	202	202	-	-	202	202	202
32362	2012	Closed	Oil, Gas and Mining	E	2,081	-	2,081	2,081	-	-	2,081	2,081	2,081
32448	2012	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	299	-	299	299	-	-	299	299	299
			Sub-Total		518,733	225,930	37,535	263,465	3,375	9,222	260,090	28,313	250,868

Investments Committed pre-FY12 but active during FY12-17

Project ID	CMT FY	Project Status	Primary Sector Name	Greenfield Code	Project Size	Original Loan	Original Equity	Original CMT	Loan Cancel	Equity Cancel	Net Loan	Net Equity	Net Comm
27694	2011	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	4,500	4,500	-	4,500	-	-	4,500	-	4,500
28574	2011	Active	Oil, Gas and Mining	E	230,776	40,000	10,000	50,000	-	-	50,000	10,000	50,000
29969	2011	Active	Education Services	E	2,000	2,000	-	2,000	-	-	2,000	-	2,000
30226	2011	Active	Oil, Gas and Mining	E	11,114	-	9,652	9,652	-	-	9,652	9,652	9,652
27746	2010	Active	Oil, Gas and Mining	G	25,151	-	7,629	7,629	-	1,746	7,629	5,884	5,884
29382	2010	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	259	-	259	259	-	-	259	259	259
29927	2010	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	15,000	8,309	-	8,309	-	-	8,309	-	8,309
27922	2009	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	189	-	189	189	-	-	189	189	189
25692	2008	Active	Accommodation & Tourism Services	E	24,583	11,000	-	11,000	-	-	11,000	-	11,000
25770	2008	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	2,982	2,223	785	3,009	861	-	2,148	785	2,148
25391	2007	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	6,000	45,746	-	45,746	-	-	45,746	-	45,746
9626	2001	Active	Finance & Insurance	E	35,569	-	10,000	10,000	-	5,998	10,000	4,002	4,002
			Sub-Total		358,124	113,778	38,516	152,294	861	7,744	151,433	30,772	143,689
			TOTAL		876,857	339,708	76,051	415,759	4,236	16,965	411,523	59,086	394,558

Source: IFC-MIS Extract as of 6/30/17

Annex Table 13: List of IFC Advisory Services in Tanzania

Advisory Services Approved in FY12-17

Project ID	Project Name	Impl Start FY	Impl End FY	Project Status	Primary Business Line	Total Funds, US$
600415	Lighting Africa Tanzania	2017	2019	ACTIVE	CAS	4,040,353
601448	WFP Tanzania	2017	2019	ACTIVE	MAS	543,600
602050	Bank M Tanzania	2017	2018	ACTIVE	FIG	103,000
602105	Aikba DFS MCF	2017	2019	ACTIVE	FIG	825,176
601114	WFP Supply Chain	2016	2020	ACTIVE	MAS	1,720,000
601290	Tanzania Livestock MIRA	2016	2020	ACTIVE	TAC	2,100,000
600192	Tanzania Minigrids (SREP)	2015	2020	ACTIVE	CAS	4,900,000
600381	Tanzania Credit Reporting Project - Phase 2	2015	2018	ACTIVE	FAM	645,000
600759	Zanzibar Distribution	2015	2018	HOLD	CAS	590,357
577527	Tanzania IC Program	2014	2017	CLOSED	TAC	558,310
599512	Tanzania MFS Scheme Rules	2014	2018	ACTIVE	FIG	3,460,673
600155	CRDB TANZANIA	2014	2016	CLOSED	FIG	394,532
599202	AccessBank Tanzania TA	2013	2018	ACTIVE	FIG	1,943,280
599285	Biotrade Africa - Support to UEBT	2013	2015	CLOSED	MAS	520,318
	Sub-Total					22,344,599

Advisory Services Approved pre-FY12 but active during FY12-17

Project ID	Project Name	Impl Start FY	Impl End FY	Project Status	Primary Business Line	Total Funds, US$
575787	AMSMETA BOA Tanz	2011	2016	CLOSED	FIG	1,100,142
569788	Africa Credit Bureau Program 2 - Tanzania	2010	2013	CLOSED	A2F	520,384
562150	AMSMETA DTB Tanz	2009	2012	CLOSED	A2F	717,784
	Sub-Total					2,338,310
	TOTAL					24,682,909

Source: IFC AS Data as of 6/30/17

Annex Table 14: IFC net commitment activity in Tanzania, FY12 - FY17

		2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Total
Financial Markets		4,514,341	10,424,851	35,652,617	32,512,830	(8,597,088)	25,562,844	100,070,395
Trade Finance (TF)		7,530,162	5,620,905	2,970,658	9,698,566	2,260,780	10,434,544	38,515,614
Agribusiness & Forestry	Primary Production & Commodity Processing	-	30,000,000	-	-	-	2,912,752	32,912,752
	Forest & Wood Products	-	(13,000,000)	-	-	-	-	(13,000,000)
Tourism, Retail, Construction & Real Estates (TRP)	Property (Construction & Real Estate)	-	-	(10,000,000)	-	-	17,500,000	7,500,000
	Tourism	-	-	21,800,000	-	-	-	21,800,000
Oil, Gas & Mining	Oil and Gas	-	-	-	-	60,000,000	-	60,000,000
	Mining	8,562,058	(33,715,257)	3,184,471	7,145,953	1,011,511	(139,806)	(13,951,071)
Infrastructure	Transportation & Warehousing	(6,962,229)	-	-	-	-	-	(6,962,229)
	Electric Power	-	4,000,000	-	-	-	-	4,000,000
Other CTT Sectors	Other CTT Sectors	-	-	-	3,375,000	(3,375,000)	-	-
Total		13,644,331	3,330,498	53,607,745	52,732,348	51,300,203	56,270,334	230,885,460

Source: IFC MIS as of 10/4/17

Annex Table 15: List of MIGA Activities in Tanzania, 2014-2017

ID	Contract Enterprise	FY	Project Status	Sector	Investor	Max Gross Issuance
12353	Silverlands Tanzania Limited	2015	Active	Agribusiness	United States	29
Total						29

Source: MIGA 10/4/17