;, , Africa's Development Crisp: .. , : E , -1 _ __ - i-:, -a &-. . Agriculture Stagnation, . , J$w ._.--.-- li Population Explosion, and Environmental Degradation by Robert S. McNamara Global Coalition for Africa Washington, D.C. April 1991 This statement substantially revises and updates an address on the same subject, which, at the invitation of General Olesegun Obasanjo, the former President of Nigeria, I presented to the Africa Leadership Forum, June 21, 1990, in Ota, Nigeria. I am deeply indebted to the staff of the World Bank - in particular, to Kevin Cleaver, Fran~ois Falloux, Maria Cristina Germany, lshrat Husein, Satya Yalamanchili, Gerard Rice -and to Roy Stacy of the Global Coalition for Africa, for assistance in preparing this paper. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. The Extent of the Crisis and Its Impact on Social and Economic Development Introduction The Situation Today A Multifaceted Crisis Signs of Hope 11. Agricultural Stagnation. Population Explosion, and Environmental Degradation The Nexus Agricultural Performance Population Growth Environmental Degradation The Vicious Cycle Ill. Targets and Action Programs Transforming Agriculture Slowing Population Growth Protecting the Environment IV. A Strategy for Sustainable and Equitable Growth A Long Road A Strategic Agenda Continued Adjustment People-Sensitive Development Africa's Entrepreneurs Regional Integration Building African Capacities The Question of Governance Donors' Responsibility V. Conclusion: Commitment to Action within a Global Coalition Endnotes Annex: A Comparison of Present Levels and Preliminary Targets for Agriculture, Population, and the Environment Figure iii Tables Table 1. Basic indicators 2. Selected economic indicators and projections, 1965- 1998 3. GN P per capita and G DP growth rates, 1965-1990 4. Land use, 1965-1987 5. Arable land per capita and fuelwood supply, 1965-2000 6. Population and food security, 1990-2020 7. Performance of agricultural sector, 1965-1988 8. Food security, 1965-1988 9. Crude birth and death, infant and child mortality rates, 1965.1 990 10. Population growth and fertility rates, 1965-1990 11. Population estimation to the year 2030 and stabilization levels 12. Contraceptive prevalence levels required to achieve 50 percent cut in fertility, 1990-2000 13. Demand for contraception 14. Comparative strength of family planning programs in developing countries, 1989 15. Fertility rates and desired family size 16. Environmental indicators 17. Wildlife habitat loss 18. Current account balances, 1970-1989 19. External public debt and debt service ratios, 1970- 1989 20. Amortization payments, 1980-1 989 21. Debt, amortization, and interest payments, 1989 22. Net financial transfers, 1980-1989 23. Gross disbursements of official development assistance, 1989 24. OECD official development assistance, 1989 25. Required gross disbursements including debt relief, 1991-1993 I. THE EXTENT OF THE CRISIS AND ITS IMPACT ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Introduction This report addressesthefundamental developmentchallenge that faces this generation of Africans.' The manner in which thischallenge is met will shape the world of future generations. In 1983, the Economic Commission for Africa, in its report "ECA and Africa's Development 1983-2008," stated: "The picture that emerges from the analysis of the per- spective of the African region by the year 2008, under the historical trend scenario, is almost a nightmare....Firstly, the potential population explosion would have tremen- dous repercussionson the region's physical resourcessuch as land and theessential social services: education, health, housing, nutrition, water, etc. At the national level, the socio-economic conditions would be characterized by a degradation of the very essence of human dignity. The rural population, which would have to survive on intoler- able toil, will face an almost disastrous situation of land scarcity-whole families would have to subsist on a mere hectare of land. Poverty would reach unimaginable di- mensions...." Eight years have elapsed since that report was published. What has happened in the intervening period? Put very bluntly, the situation has worsened. Africa is a continent in crisis, and there is little reason to believe that current development programs will reverse the adverse trends. The situation five years from now will be worse, not better, unless more resolute steps are taken. The Situation Today A child born today in Sub-Saharan Africa faces a bleak set of statistics. The odds are one in 10 that he or shewill not live more than 1 one year (Table 9); the odds are one in 20 that the child's mother will die giving birth. The child born today in Sub-Saharan Africa can expect to live for only 51 years - 25 years less than children in the high-income countries and 12 years less than in India and China (Table 1). The newborn African child enters a world in which one person in five does not receive enough food to lead a productive, healthy life. There is only one doctor for every 24,000 people, compared with one for every 470 people in the high-income countries. Bythetimethechild born today is 23, if present population growth continues, Sub-SaharanAfrica's population will havedoubled. When the child is 45, it will have quadrupled. And all this will occur in a region where many people are already poorer than they were 30 years ago; where there is mass unemploy- ment and widespread malnutrition; and where the number of people living in absolute poverty is expected to expand by over 75 million within the next decade. The African child comes into a land in the midst of an unprec- edented crisis. Or, as Nigeria's Chinua Achebe has so poignantly described it, into a land where Things Fall Apart. A Multifaceted Crisis Sub-Saharan Africa unquestionably poses the greatest develop- ment challenge facing the planet today. The problems are deep- seated and multifaceted. Poverty. A fundamental problem is poverty. Of the more than 1 billion people living in the developing world on less than $370 per year (compared to per capita income in the United States of $20,000). over 16 percent live in Sub-Saharan Africa. By the year 2000, it is projected that the region will account for 32 percent of the world's poor. While incomes of most of the world's poor - those living in East and South Asia - rose in the 1980s. they fell in Sub-Saharan Africa. While infant mortality, school enrollment rates, and other indicators have continued to improve for most of the developing world, they havestagnated or declined for the poor of Africa. By the year 2000, child mortality is projected to fall to around 30deaths per thousand in East Asia; in Sub-SaharanAfrica, it will still hover around 135 per thousand - the highest in the world. Most regions in the developing world are expected to achieve universal primary school enrollment by the end of this decade. Su b-Saharan Africa is the exception. Economic Growth. A major cause of the deep incidence of poverty in Africa has been economic and political mismanagement in the face of adverse external conditions. This mismanagement has led to inefficiency, low productivity, meager returns on invest- ment, and extremely low rates of economic growth. On average, for the three decades since 1960, economic growth in Sub- Saharan Africa has barely kept ahead of population growth. And in the 1980s, per capita income declined by around 20 percent. Today, this region of 45 countries and 530 million people has a total GNPof less than $150 billion -the same as a small European country like Belgium, which has only 10 million people. Agriculture. Agricultureis the backboneof Sub-Saharan Africa's economy. The mass of Africa's peoplestill dwell in villages and earn their living cultivating family farms of between five and 15 acres. Although Africa's agriculture has grown overthe last threedecades by about 2 percent a year, it has not kept up with population growth (Table 7). Population. The population is expanding at a rate rarely, if ever, seen in any large region in human history, about 3.1 percent a year (Table 10). In the nineteenth century, as the European nations industrialized and developed, their populations doubled over a period of 90 years. African populations are currently doubling in about 23 years. Sub-Saharan Africa now has twice the population it had in 1965 and more than five times the population it had at the beginning of the century. The population is projected to increase nearly sixfold before it stabilizes (Table 1 1). Environment. 'This pressure of people, combined with tradi- tional agricultural practices, is causing environmental degradation 3 at an alarming pace -desertification, deforestation, soil erosion, destruction of vegetative cover, and biodiversity loss. The major problem is not industrial pollution but, rather, depletion of Africa's natural resource base, which poses a major threat to both present and future generations. There are other economic indicators of the African crisis: Sub-Saharan Africa's debt has risen 28-fold since 1970 and now stands at about $1 60 billion - roughly 12 percent more than its GNP. Relative to GNP, this makes Sub-Saharan Africa the most heavily indebted region of the world. The region's terms of trade have dropped by 10 percent in the latter part of the 1980s. More seriously, Africa's share in world markets has fallen by half since 1970. Sub-Saharan Africa now accounts for less than 2 percent of all world trade, placing the region at the very margin of the global economy. Net financial transfers2to Sub-Saharan Africa (in current dollars unadjusted for inflation) declined from an average of around $13 billion in the early 1980s to $7 billion in the mid-1980s, before rising again to $12 billion a year at theend of thedecade (Table 22). Private transfers, includingdirect investment, dropped from around $3.9 billion in 1980 to a net negative transfer of several hundred million dollars a year by 1989. Since the North-South dialogue of the mid-1970s and the Brandt Report of 1980 -which pushed for a more equitable distribution of international resources - the atmosphere for aid and investment in Africa has chilled. There is also the risk that historic events in Eastern Europe and the need for reconstruction in the Gulf may divert future capital flows from Africa. Signs o f Hope The general picture is gloomy. As with any general picture, however, it does not tell the whole story. Since the UN Special Session on Africa in 1986, a substantial number of Sub-Saharan countries, including Nigeria, have embarked on programs of economic reform. 4 These programs, often subsumed under the phrase "structural adjust- ment," have been extremely difficult and painful but absolutely essential. Policies have been introduced that, if continued and strengthened, have the potential for rekindling growth, revitalizing agriculture, and increasing Africa's competitiveness. The adjustment process has been far from perfect. There have been heavy costs aswell as benefits, losers as well as winners. The process needs to be refined. But it surely needs to be pursued if Africa is not to be left further and further behind. Policy reform isone sign of hope for Africa. So, too, is the fact that, despite the general climate of aid fatigue, the donor community increased its disbursementsto Sub-Saharan Africa in the latter part of the 1980s in response to the region's own efforts to bring about a turnaround. Net official development assistance(0DA) flows3to Sub- Saharan Africa increased, on average, by about 3 percent a year in real terms during 1985-89. 'the region's share in worldwide net ODA disbursements increased from 26 percent in 1980-81 to around 36 percent in 1988-89. The World Bank, which is an important catalyst for increased assistance to Africa, has called for a 4 percent real annual increase in gross ODA for the rest of this decade. Financial resources are particularly important for countries undergoing adjustment since absorptive capacity for both aid and investment resources should expand. Still, this isan ambitious target. But lower levels of assistance are not likely to provide enough fuel to allow for even modest per capita income growth. There are no quick or easy solutions to Sub-Saharan Africa's problems. Only by laying out long-term, 20- or 25-year "indicative" development programs for each country, and for the region as a whole, can the problems be tackled in a systematic and realistic way. The programs must address the fundamental determinants of eco- nomic and social advance, and they must show for each country, for the short, medium, and long terms, the rates of progress that need to be achieved in each of the basic measures of human welfare. To register even a modest improvement in the quality of life, the Sub-Saharan economies must raise their rate of GDP growth from less 5 than 2 percent per annum, the level of the 1980s, to at least 4-5 percent ayear (per capita incomegrowth rateswould need to rise from -1.2 percent to + 1 or 2 percent). During the next decade, expansion of agricultural output will be the foundation of growth. And this will require that the relationship among agricultural technologies, popu- lation growth, and preservation of the environment -a relationship that will bea critical long-term issue-receive far more emphasis than in the past. I turn to this subject now. II. AGRICULTURAL STAGNATION, POPULATION EXPLOSION. AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION The Nexus Africa must grapple with three major trends that have deeply affected its past development and that will largelydetermine its future prospects: agricultural stagnation, explosive population growth, and degradation of its natural resource base. The majority of the people of Sub-Saharan Africa depend on the land for their living. But the land'scapacity to produce is ebbing away under the pressure of rapidly growing numbers of people who do not have the wherewithal to put back into the land what they take from it to survive. Resource-poor farmers, in effect, mine the land to produce their crops and feed their livestock. They are too poor to add organic or inorganic fertilizer, or undertake soil and water conserva- tion. Astheland'svegetativecover- trees, shrubs, grasses-shrinks, its already fragile soils lose the capacity to nourish crops and retain moisture. Consequently, agricultural yieldsfall, and the land becomes steadily more vulnerable to the naturally variable rainfall, turning dry spells into droughts and periods of food shortage into famines. This vicious cycle spins in different ways and at different speeds in different places. There are important country variations. A few countries have performed moderately well in agricultural develop- ment (Kenya, Cameroon, and Zimbabwe are examples), while others have performed extremely poorly (Table 7). Some countries have very high population growth rates (Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya, and C6te d'lvoire have populations growing at over 3.5 percent a year: Table 6 10). Others have more modest rates (for example, Chad and Mauritius have populations growing at below 2.5 percent). The nature of environmental degradation also varies from countryto country. Some countries, such as those in the Sahel, Namibia, and Botswana, face serious desertification. Others in coastal West Africa are witnessing rapid destruction of their tropical forests. Some countries -such as Madagascar, Lesotho, and Mauritius - suffered important environ- mental degradation including alarming deforestation, soil erosion, and loss of biodiversity, but they have prepared and are implementing national environmental action plans to stop such degradation. Despitethesevariationsamong countries, the basiclinkagesamong agricultural stagnation, population growth, and environmental deg- radation are common to the region. And this linkage poses a critical threat to Africa's development in the 2 l s t century. The following indicates what has been happening in each of the three areas. Agricultural Performance Agriculture is absolutely essential today, and will continue to be essential in the foreseeable future, to Sub-Saharan Africa's growth and development. It contributes 34 percent of GDP, 40 percent of exports, and 70 percent of employment. It is by far the largest sector of almost all African economies. It is the sector on which the vast majority of Africans depend for their well-being and livelihood. If Africa is to meet its food requirements and generate the financial resources needed for its overall development programs, it simply must improve -and improve dramatically- its agricultural performance. The magnitude of this task comes into focus when one considers that, over the last 25 years, agricultural production in Africa rose by only about 2 percent a year - below the current average population growth rate of about 3.1 percent (Tables 7 and 10). Per capita food production has declined; food imports are increasing at about 5 percent peryear; and food aid hasexpanded at nearly6 percent ayear. Yet, despite the growth in food aid and food imports, about 100 million Africans are malnourished, and Africans on average consume fewer calories than people in other parts of the developing world (Table 8). Famines in several African countries in the 1980s have been one of the most graphic indications of the growing inability of Africa to feed itself. 7 This failureof African agriculture hasalso choked off thecontinent's earning potential in the global economy. During the 1960s, Africa's agricultural exports grew at nearly 2 percent a year. Since then, they have declined sharply - by more than 3 percent a year. As a result, Africa's share of world exports for most of its major agricultural commodities has fallen. Between 1970 and 1984, for example, Africa's world market share for three main agricultural exports - coffee, cocoa, and cotton - shrank by 13, 33, and 29 percent respectively. The implications are substantial: if Sub-Saharan coun- tries had maintained their 1970 market share of non-oil primary exports, their export earnings would have been $9-10 billion a year higher in 1986-87. The difference is approximately equal to the region's total annual debt service payments in this period. The decline in agriculture has been caused by many factors. A fundamental one has been the failure to modernize African agricul- tural practices. Farming methods, such as shifting cultivation, that served Africa well when i t s population was small are proving disastrous as the numberof peoplegrows. Underthetraditional "slash and burn" agriculture, a farmer clears a plot of land, burns the felled trees, and cultivates the land for two or three years until the soil begins to lose its fertility. Then the farmer leaves that land to fallow and clears another plot. Bushesand treesgradually reestablish themselveson the abandoned land. In six to 15 years, they restore its nutrients, and a farmer can start over. That process takes about four times more land than if the farmer worked one plot, maintained its fertility, controlled its weeds, and intensified its production. Moreover, with each burning, some nutrientsare lost into theair or washed away, and valuable wood goes up in smoke. Now, as the population grows, farmers are forced to shorten the fallow periods. Soil erosion increases and fuelwood becomes scarce. As a substitute, people burn animal dung and crop residues, further denying nutrients to the soil. They also walk farther to fuelwood, spreading the destruction. Major results of this vicious cycle are low agricultural productivity and environmental damage. In addition to poor farming methods, Africa's agricultural perfor- mance has been affected by bad weather, including severe droughts 8 in 1972-73 and 1983-84, and by poor project design and imple- mentation. Aid projects and government programs in Africa have had an appalling failure rate. One in every two World Bank agriculture projects in East Africa has failed -against one in five in Asia. Projects have been overambitious; not sufficiently focused on farmers' real needs, constraints, and capacities; and, most importantly, notattentive enough to the overall policy deficiencies governing the agricultural sector. In many African countries, agriculture has suffered from a combination of overvalued exchange rates, confiscatory pricing and marketing policy, and excessive regulation of private investment in agricultural marketing, including farm input supply and credit. The failure of African agriculture partly reflects the low priority accorded to farming by Africa's post-Independencepolicymakers and governments. Policies keeping farm prices and retail food prices low encouraged labor and capital to flow into cities and resulted in a rapid expansion of imported foods to satisfy the needs of the growing population. Subsidized imported cereals have come to be preferred by urban consumers to locally produced root, tuber, millet, and sorghum. Governments also ignored the development of viable agricultural research and extension systems, which are one basis of long-term technological improvement of agriculture. While many Asian countries gave priority to agriculture and allo- cated up to 25 percent of their budgets to that sector in the 1970s. the median for Africa was 7.6 percent. Is it any wonder, then, that Africa's share of exports in the world market has dropped by 50 percent since 1970, and agricultural growth per capital has been negative? Population Growth As Africa's agriculture was declining, her population was growing -exponentially. The situation is unique. Whereas in Asia and Latin America better health care and extension of education have been accompanied by falling population growth, in Africa generally the reverse has been true. In 1960, African population growth rates were not high in relation to those of Asia and Latin America (2.5 percent per annum versus 2.5 percent and 2.9 percent respectively). Today, Asia'sand LatinAmerica's !3 have fallen t o 2.1 and 2.5 percent, respectively, but Africa's has risen to 3.1 percent. Sub-Saharan Africa's total fertility rate in 1990 (the average number of children born t o women in their childbearing years) is roughly equivalent t o 6.5. It has remained at this level since 1965 (Table 10); in other low-income countries, i t has declined -for example, in India from 6.2 in 1965 t o 4 in 1990, and from 6.4 t o 2.3 in China from 6.4 t o 3 over the same period. Even if fertility fell tomorrowto two children per Sub-SaharanAfrican family, the region's population would continue t o expand for the next 60 t o 70 years. If fertility rates drop by 50 percent by2030, the region's population will reach 1.5 billion in that year (Table 11). No region of the world has ever managed t o develop satisfactorily with this rate of population growth. Forty-five percent of Africa's population is below the age of 15. Each year, Africa'sschool-age population increases by5 million. There is a corresponding increase in the number of minds t o be trained, mouths t o be fed, health services t o be provided -all just t o maintain the existing and already disgracefully low levels of education, nutri- tion, and health. Nearly half of those who will enter the labor force in the next three decades are already born. Even in the best-case scenario, about 350 million new workers will be looking for jobs between now and the year 2020. This exceptional demographic surge will be accompanied by mas- sive pressures for migration - both national and regional -creating social and political tension. Most of the migrants are likely to settle in the expanding urban centers, creating megacities. By 2020, there will probably be 30 African cities with more than a million inhabitants. Several, including Lagos, can be expected t o exceed 10 million - requiring vast sums t o provide even the most basic infrastructure and services. Yet, many Africans remain t o be persuaded of the imperative of smaller families. They continue t o see land as abundant and labor as scarce. It is an increasingly false perception. As Sub-Saharan Africa's population hasgrown, theamount of arableland available per person has declined: from an average of 0.5 hectare in 1965 t o 0.3 hectare in 1987. In some countries, the pressure of population on arable agricultural land and other natural resources is already intense -for example, in much of the Sahel, Burundi, western Cameroon, Kenya, and Rwanda (Table 5). Other countrieswill soon face similar situations. In Nigeria, for example, at the present rate of population growth, arable land per capita will decline from the current level of 0.3 hectare to 0.1 9 hectare bytheyear 2000. Thiswould bring arable land scarcity to about the same level as that of Rwanda and Somalia (0.2 hectare) today. It is truethat someareasarestill underpopulatedand could support larger numbers. Where possible, governments should encourage people to move to areas of high agricultural and economic potential. However, the pace of population growth is going to make it difficult to finance and adequatelysupportsuch programs, and the availability of unused cultivable land is increasingly constrained. This underlines the fundamental point: the urgency of curbing Africa's population explosion is not due to the present size of the population but rather to theaccelerated and increasinglyunmanageable rate of increase. In short, population growth is running ahead of the ability of economies and agricultural sectors to expand, swamping Africa's development effort. An African child is seen as blessing itsfamily's past aswell as future. Heor sheis onetwig on thevast African treeof life. In African societies, as in many others, children remain the surest and strongest source of prestige. Moreover, in poor, primarily agricultural African societies, there are economic incentives to have children. They provide farm labor and support their parents in old age. And, especiallywhen infant mortality rates have been traditionally very high, there is an incentive to have many children to ensure that some survive. Even given these cultural and economic considerations -and we are talking here about the most private and personal decision made by human beings - the demographic choice facing Africa can no longer bedeferred. Africa has todecidewhether to fill its landsquickly with many ill-fed, unhealthy, uneducated, unemployed people; or to space its children so that they and the society as a whole have a better chance of a much better life. The choice has to be made now because exceptionally high population growth is already compromising eco- nomic growth and familywelfare-and isjeopardizing Africa'sfuture development. No other continent's destiny has been so shaped by population growth as has Africa's in the late twentieth century. The demographic consequences of procrastination and delay are inexorable. For example, as is illustrated below, if Nigeria were to begin to introduce now those policies that would permit it to achieve replacement-level fertility by the year 201 0 (instead of the year 2035, as is projected in Table 1I), its population would level off at about 324 million instead of 580 million. Similarly, were Ghana and Kenya to reach replacement level fertility in 2010, these populations would ultimatelystabilizeat40 million and 72 million respectively, instead of 63.2 and 148.4 million as projected in Table 11. Population size scenarios a (popubtion in rnillio~u) Ultimate Ultimate population population size Diflbmnce due hpulation size i f NRR= 1 i f NRR= 1 in to delay in in 1990 in 2010 p a r indicatd maching NRR= 1 Pop Year P o p Pmemt of 1990 Country Population Population ktion NRR=1 ktion population Nigeria 117 321 580 2035 259 221 Kenya 24 73 148 2040 75 313 Ghana 15 40 63 2030 23 153 Notc NRR is net reproduction rate. a. Effect on ultimate population size of reaching N R R = l in Years 2010, 2040, and 2035 respectively. Soum World Bank estimates. Environmental Degradation One of the most serious long-term threats posed by Sub-Saharan Africa's extraordinarily rapid population growth rate is to the region's environment. Like the population explosion, which was largely ignored until it began to translate into food shortages, the threats to Africa's environment tended to pass unnoticed until they began to affect agricultural yields. Except wheredegradationhas been dramatic -as in the enormousgully erosions of Ethiopia's highlands- annual losses of soil and tree cover are often imperceptible to the casual observer. And when they are perceived, stopping thedrain of natural resources may be as complicated as the African environment itself, entailing long years of investment in tree planting, soil conservation, complicated agroforestry, and introduction of organic matter into soils. So much damage has been done that reversing the process will be impossible in many areas. Therefore, conservation now is vital. The environment consists of intricate ecological systems. Trees and grass, for example, not only provide food (treecrops),fuel, and fodder but also build soil fertility, prevent erosion, provide water catchment, ameliorate climate changes, and provide wildlife habitats. These systems are the very underpinnings for human welfare and survival. Data on Africa's environment are scarce and unreliable. Even so, some disturbing trends may be discerned. Trees are being cut down 30 times as fast as they are being replaced (Table 16); as many as 80 million Africans have serious difficulty finding fuelwood (their main source of energy). In some countries, such as Ethiopia, topsoil losses of as much as 290 tons per hectare per year have been reported; and many of Africa's unique plant and animal species have been or are being driven to extinction. The most pressing problems are the high rate of loss of vegetative cover (resulting from a combination of deforestation, overgrazing, and slash and burn cultivation), loss of soil fertility, and soil erosion. In 1980, there were approximately 660 million hectares of forest and woodland in Sub-Saharan Africa. Approximately 3.2 million hectares of this were lost each year of the 1980s, and the rate is accelerating. On the other hand, reforestation amounted to only 90 thousand hectares per year during the 1980s (Table 16). Soil erosion and reduction of soil fertility are even more widespread. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) estimates that about 80 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa's drylands and rangelands - about 1500 million hectares - show significant signs of desertification (meaning extreme loss of vegetative cover). In many places, environmental damage has already reached crisis point. In the Sahel, for example, expanding populations and accel- erated deforestation have triggered a cascading decline in biological and economic productivity and have created what is now the world's largest area threatened by desertification. Hardship is widespread as people seek refuge in the cities. The Sahel's urban populations have 13 quadrupled in the past 20 years. Pollution in these areas and their growing demand for raw materials (such as fuelwood), in turn, accelerate deforestation and environmental degradation. And so the vicious cycle spins on. The Sahelian example highlights what is happening, in varying degrees, throughout Sub-Saharan Africa: forests are being cut down, croplands turned into deserts, species of flora and fauna lost, and water and air polluted. What must be emphasized is that these are losses not just to the present generation, but to future generations as we1I. The Vicious Cycle It must also be recognized that this environmental degradation does not occur in isolation. Its causes and consequences are broad and deep, and it is inextricably linked to Africa's growth and devel- opment. The land, in a fundamental sense, is Africa's basic capital - its patrimony. If this capital isconsumed or destroyed through overuse and misuse, it will have the same effect as a company carelessly depleting its financial assets: in the end, Africa, too, will be out of business. In a speech to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 1985, former President of Tanzania Julius Nyerere made the following point: "Until thelast few years, Africa regarded environmental concern as an American and European matter. Indeed, there was a tendency to believe that talk of the environ- ment was part of a conspiracy to prevent modern devel- opment on our continent. Nowwe have reached the stage of recognizing that environmental concern and develop- ment haveto belinked together if thelatter isto be real and permanent." He was right to stress the link between the environment and economic development. Without proper care for the environment, development is not sustainable. And the links between environment, 14 population, and agriculture are particularly critical. Within Sub-Saharan Africa's 21 million square kilometers, water and land resources hold much potential for agricultural growth. But this ecology is all too easily damaged. Eighty percent of the soils are fragile; 45 percent of the land is too dry to support rainfed agriculture; and average rainfall varies from year to year by an enormous 30 to 40 percent. Without appropriatecareand attention, the African environ- ment will suffer irreversible damage. The costs will be enormous. The old Swahili proverb, "Do not borrow off the earth for the earth will require its own back with interest," expresses a fundamental truth. Africa's environmental degradation has already left its mark in a number of measurable ways: O n wildlife and plant life: The World Resources Institute esti- matesthat 64 percent of original wildlife habitat in Sub-Saharan Africa has been lost (Table 17). This is directly caused by deforestation, desertification, and other human activity. Many plants and animal species have become extinct in Africa, and some of the best known, including the rhinocerosand the gorilla, are in danger of extinction in the future. Onfuelwood: Thereareseverefuelwooddeficitsin thesavannah regions of West, Central, and East Africa, and in the arid areas of the Sahel, southeastern, and southwestern Africa. On wateravailability: Thereis lesswater for human consumption and irrigation because of reduced rainfall, more rapid run-off, and less absorption of water into theground. Asa result, as water tables drop, wells dry up and must be dug deeper. O n livestock-carrying capacity: It declines due to decreasing vegetation on which livestock can feed. O n crop yields: They decline as the result of top soil and nutrient losses on croplands. And on arable land: The FA0 estimates that, without effective conservation, more than 16 percent of Africa's rainfed cropland could be lost by the year 2000. How can this potentially catastrophic situation be reversed? Only by a combination of a reduction in population growth, improved agricultural performance, and better environmental management. I suggest the following targets and action programs for each of these areas. Ill. TARGETS AND ACTION PROGRAMS Transforming Agriculture Transforming Africa's agriculture and expanding its productive capacity is a fundamental requirement. To achieve food security, food production will have to grow at about 4 percent a year - above the current 3.1 percent population growth rate. Beyond that, to raise incomes and help finance Africa's import needs, the production of export crops must grow by no less than 4 percent a year. Thus, while recognizing the variability among countries, Africa must set its overall target for long-term agricultural growth no lower than 4 percent a year -over twice the rate achieved in the 1980s (Table 7). Given the past performance, this will be no easy task. How can it be achieved? Productivity is the key. The scope for expanding agricultural production in Africa is great, although it varies from country to country. To meet the 4 percent output growth target will require an annual increase in labor productivity of about 1.5 percent, with the rural labor force growing at about 2.5 percent. Since the area under cultivation cannot be expanded by more than 0.5 percent a year without adverse environmentalconsequences (the average rate of the past two decades was 0.7 percent a year), land productivity must rise by a substantial 3.5 percent a year. 'the4 percent growth rate for African agriculture is ambitious, but not impossible. Cameroon, Cate d'lvoire, and Kenya all have achieved that much or more for extended periods. Additional countries, including Tanzania, Togo, and Burkina Faso, have agricultural growth rates approaching this level, Until recently, these countries were regarded as very poor agricultural performers. Several other countries - Ethiopia, Sudan, Zaire. Mozambique, and Zambia, to name the largest - have great potential due to large areas of cultivable land, 16 and their agriculture could grow very rapidly. At thesame time, it has t o be acknowledged that a few countries - including several in the Sahel -have such a weak natural resource base that they are unlikely t o reach the 4 percent growth rate target. The overseas markets on which much of African agriculturedepends will remain highly competitive. Long-term price trends are not projected to improve much. Nevertheless, African countries can diversify their production and seek out specialty markets - in off- season fruits and vegetables, for instance. Indeed, diversification to reducedependencyon a relativelyfew primarycommoditiesisessential. Diversification crops, especially fruits and vegetables, have consider- able potential. Greater regional cooperation can also help to expand trade within Africa in agricultural products, especially food. There is considerable scope for import substitution in agricultural products such as meat, cereals, and vegetable oils. In addition, productivity improvements - cutting input costs per unit of output - will be critical t o maintain Africa's competitiveness, including the competi- tiveness of its traditional products, such as coffee, cocoa, rubber, and palm oil. Some of the new biotechnologies for plant propagation and breeding hold enormous potential in this regard and may well result in dramatically different patternsof agricultural production and trade. We are living in an era of worldwide biotechnological discovery analogous to that of Columbus and Magellan. Africa cannot afford t o misstheseopportunities. To succeed, Africa must tap into networks of international agricultural research, including that undertaken by private enterprises and universities. African countries cannot depend exclusivelyon narrow government agricultural research establishments to develop improved agricultural technologies. Despite wide variations across the continent, there is surprising commonality in the kinds of policies and actions needed to stimulate growth in Africa's agricultural sector. There are seven priorities. To achieve the growth target, all African countries will need to: (a). Create an enabling policy environment; (b). Harness new technolo- gies; (c). Build and maintain rural infrastructure; and (d). Ensure food security. These strategic objectives require: (e). Building African capacity to manage agriculture at all levels; (f). Explicitly bringing women into the agricultural development process; and ( g ) . Doing all of the above in a way that conserves the environment. (a) An enablingpolicy environment for agriculture means allowing prices to move flexibly in response to changing market conditions. It means turning over input supply, marketing, processing, and export- ing largely to individual entrepreneurs and reducing administrative controls. It means promoting credit at realistic interest rates through homegrown financial institutions including commercial banks and cooperative and credit banks managed by the rural population (as alreadyexist, for example, in Benin, Cameroon, Burundi, and Rwanda). It means strengthening protection of land tenure to increase security of ownership, therebyencouraging investment in land improvements. There is much evidence that the African farmer, like farmers every- where, will respond to incentives. In recentyears, increased production of maize in Zimbabwe, coffee in Guinea, cotton in Benin, Togo, and Tanzania, cocoa in Ghana, food in Nigeria, and groundnuts in the Gambia can be attributed in large part to policy reform directed at making private farming and agroprocessing profitable, along with an appropriate macroeconomic framework. (b) Harnessing technologies requires an emphasis on improved agricultural research, directed increasinglyto developing technologies that are environmentally benign. This, in turn, calls for rehabilitating national research institutions (for example, through the Special Pro- gram of African Agricultural Research and through investment projects within cooperating African countries); expanding the role of inter- national research centers (monitored by the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research); establishing multi-country research networks to pool research efforts on specific topics; and bringing industrial country and private sector agricultural research into Africa. The core of any new research strategy must be to coordinate and apply the entire battery of research undertaken and to make it more responsive to farmers' needs. The linkage to the farmer is undertaken largelythrough agricultural extension. An effective method of extension is the "training and visit" system. Agricultural extension workers visit farmers on a regular schedule, not only bringing technical messages 18 to farmers but also helping farmers t o experiment with technical innovations, observing best farmer practice, and feeding backfarmers' questions to researchers. The job of national researchers is to mobilize their own and other resources to provide responses to farm-level issues. In a number of countries, the "training and visit" system has already led to substantially improved yields - of rice, maize, and coffee in Kenya and CBte d'lvoire, for example, and of cassava and maize in Nigeria. The Green Revolution in Asia occurred largely on irrigated lands. Weshould not expect a Green Revolution-type breakthrough in Africa - because of the limited land presently under irrigation and the limitation on itsexpansion in the future. Irrigation should beexpanded to the extent feasible, but improving the productivity of African agriculture will require many separate efforts focused primarily on rainfed conditions. The key is to adapt new technologies (rainfed and irrigated) that offer a reliable return. Farmers at the margin will invest scarce cash and labor only in surefire success. The new breed of cassava developed by the International Institute for Tropical Agricul- ture (IITA) in lbadan is an excellent example of a low-cost technology that doubles yields at little additional cost. It has been spreading spontaneously among Nigerian farmers. Hybrid maize in Kenya and Zimbabwe and improved cottonvarieties in West Africa areadditional examples of successful new technologies widely introduced in Africa in the last decade. These efforts need to be replicated on a vast scale. (c) The third priority isprovidingruralinfrastructure, including rural roads, market development in rural towns, rural water supply, irriga- tion, and drainage. It is over such infrastructure that expanded supplies of farm products, farm inputs, and consumer goods for farmers will flow. Without this infrastructure, these goods will not flow, or will flow in lower volume. The infrastructure needs to be developed and maintained through a combination of (a)/ planning and investment by responsible government line agencies (public works departments, rural water supply departments, municipal coun- cils); and (b)/investment by privateindividuals, cooperatives, and local communities (for small-scale irrigation and drainage, rural water, local market construction, and maintenance of rural roads). (d) Strategies to improve food security put first priority on employ- ment and income generation for the poor. In rural areas, this 19 translates into measures to stimulate agricultural growth that involve all of the farming population, including the poor. Investment in rural infrastructure, built and managed by rural people, targeted to the poor, are important elements of food security strategies. Often, infrastructure construction can be done by people in exchange for food. Development of handicrafts, small industry, and food market- ing activities in rural areas provides income and hence contributes to food security. Finally, nutrition interventions, targeted particularly to vulnerable groups, especially women and children, are important for assuring food security. (e) Building African capacity to manage agriculture is an i mperative that runs through all levels of African agriculture: to produce better- trained policy analysts, economists, researchers, extension agents, and farmers, and to strengthen rural institutions such as farmers' associations, cooperatives, and women's groups. Some capacity building will be undertaken in formal education and vocational training. Some will be done for farmers through agricultural exten- sion. (f) Women must be accordedpriority in any program to modernize agriculture since about 80 percent of the food grown in Africa is grown by women. Indeed, the African woman's triple burden - childbearing and rearing, farm production, and household manage- ment (including the responsibilityfor food, fuel, and water supply) - is a central element affecting decisions that relate to population growth rates, choice of agricultural technology, and, thereby, to environmental degradation. Improvingthe condition of women -by increasing their access to education, as well as to credit, agricultural training, and extension services -would have a positive impact on agricultural development as well as on decisions on family size. There has been a great deal of discussion about promoting the role of women in Africa but, as yet, little evidence of significant change in their roleor status. Afar morecomprehensiveandsustained approach is needed. (g) Modernization of Africa's agriculture must be achieved in an environmentally sustainable manner. Numerous simple technologies are available to African farmers that would expand crop yields while maintaining soil fertility, without shifting cultivation from one area to 20 another. These technologies include terracing, alley cropping, agroforestry, water-spreading, use of surface mulches and appropri- ate fertilizers, and integrated livestock and crop management. In addition, increased use of chemical inputs, genetic engineering, and simple mechanization (such as animal-drawn implements) can have high impact and are not environmentally destructive at levels likely to be applied in Africa for manyyears. The simple use of animal traction is estimated to reduce farm labor requirements by 30 to 40 percent, with an apparently positive impact on reduced family size. Water harvesting in Burkina Faso is another example of a simple but highly successful new technique introduced at thecommunity level. Most of these technologies fit perfectly the objectives of a sustainable agricul- ture. They increasethe productivityof the land and, for the most part, need little capital. In his book, The Greening of Africa, Paul Harrison cites example after example of environmentally benign agricultural technologies that can be applied at the local level and often at relatively low cost. That these improved agricultural technologies have not been introduced on a wide scale is largely due to the lack of incentive or profitability for the farmer to introduce improved technology of any kind. Moreover, where uncultivated land was available for clearing, it was usually cheaper and more profitable for the farmer to open up new land rather than use more labor or more risky, less known agricultural methods. The low profit and high risk to the farmer of innovation and of intensive cultivation have been major causes of the widespread failure of agricultural development in Africa -and major causes of environmental degradation. This reality leads back, of course, to the strategy for agricultural development described above, particularly incentives and policy frameworks. Policies must beestablishedthat permit farmers to make a profit from sustainable agricultural methods and that, conversely, ensure they will lose money if they use environmentally destructive methods. In the final analysis, the entire battery of recommendations listed above, including investment in rural infrastructure, capacity building, better targeting of women, and ensuring food security, will have to be undertaken if agriculture is to grow at a 4 percent rate on a sustainable basis. What would be the cost of meeting the sustainable agricultural production targets for Africa? Public investment in the agriculture sector already amounts toabout $2.4 billion perannum. Forty percent of this total is aid-financed. An additional $2.5 billion is invested in agriculture each year by private and community investors. But only a portion of this total investment goes to the types of sustainable agricultural practices mentioned previously. If a larger portion were redirected to them, the total investment in agriculture required to meet the target growth rates would not need to increase by more than 4 percent a year. Productivity gains to labor and land would permit the African population to both feed itself and increase income, without greatly increasing farmed area. Such gainswould assist in turning thecurrent vicious cycle of agricultural stagnation and environmental degrada- tion into one of growth with less destruction of the land. Moreover, improvedagricultural incomes(especiallyin conjunction with improved education and health care) should help further encourage smaller families - thus helping to reduce pressure on the environment, allowing some much-needed healing to take place. This, in turn, should stimulate additional agricultural productivity. Realization of this cycle of growth and conservation will be enor- mously difficult, requirirlg radical changes in government policies and a renewed commitment by the international community. But of greatest importancewill be the synergy of millions of African farmers acting individually and in their own self-interest to modernize and sustain the region's agricultural development. Slowing Population Growth The positive impact of modernizing African agriculture will be offset if population growth continues at explosive rates. A minimum target would be for Africa to follow the pace of fertilitydecline already achieved by other developing countries. This would mean reducing the average population growth rate to about 2 percent a year within the next 30-35 years. Even under this scenario, the Sub-Saharan population of 532 million in 1990 would increase to over 1.5 billion by 2030 and would not level off until it reaches 3 billion (Table 11). 22 Moreover, in the African context, the 2 percent target is highly ambitious and would require a reduction in the total fertility rate from about 6.5 children per woman in 1990 (Table 10) to about 3.2 by 2025-30. How can this be achieved? First, I should point out that progress in reducing fertility rates has been made in recent years by a few African countries. Four countries -Zimbabwe, Kenya, Botswana, and Mauritius- haveincreased their contraceptive prevalence rates and are witnessing declines in fertility. Theseaccomplishments provide learning experiences for other African countries despite the economic, cultural, and ethnic diversities that must be recognized. Second, the solutions to Africa's population problems have to be uniquely African and must be found by Africans themselves. Therefore, stronger local commitment to the problem is important. In the 1980s, a growing number of African countriescame to recognize the urgency of action and began to develop national population policies and programs. By the end of that decade, seven countries had developed family planning policies, and another 20 were in the process of developing them. How did the four countries mentioned above slow down their fertility rates? Table 9 shows that Zimbabwe hasa relatively low infant mortality rate (44 per thousand as compared to 103 per thousand for the region as a whole), and Table 1 indicates that educational opportunities havespreadto largesegmentsof Zimbabwe's population -about 75 percent of its adult population is literate. In addition to these very important factors that facilitate acceptance of small family norms, Zimbabwe implemented a robust population program backed by political commitment and budget allocations to support an infra- structure of clinics and rural services. 'The program distinguishes itself by providing quality family planning services through effective com- munity-based outreach. The staff are well trained, highly motivated, and provide counselling and services that fit clients' needs. Since the late 1960s, the contraceptive prevalence rate in Zimbabwe has increased almost ninefold - from 5 percent to an estimated 43 percent in 1988, 36 percent of which consists of modern methods. Total fertility rate has dropped from over 7 to 5.0 during the past 10 years. Recently, Kenya, known for one of the highest fertility rates in the world, also has made progress. The latest demographic surveys reveal 23 a decline in total fertility from 7.7 in 1984 to 6.9 in 1990 (Table 10). Kenya has a national population program with a growing involvement of nongovernmental organizations, community groups, and the private sector. Even voluntary surgical contraception is attracting growing numbers of clients. Since the 1970s, the contraceptive prevalence rate has increased sixfold - from 5 percent in the mid- 1970s to almost 30 percent in 1990. The population growth of over 4 percenta year in the 1980s-growth that contributed tounemploy- ment and other social and economic hardship - is being reduced, although still too slowly. A relatively low infant mortality rate and moderately high literacy rates with strong pressure on parents to assume many of the costs of educating their children may have contributed to this decline in fertility. In Botswana, the high per capita incomeiscombinedwith a strong health infrastructure to provide high-qualityfamily planning services. About 80 percent of the population lives within 15 kilometers of health clinics that provide integrated maternal and child health and family planning services. Consequently, between 1984 and 1988, the total fertility rate declined from 6.5 to 5.0. During this same period, the contraceptive prevalence rate doubled from 16 to 33 percent. Mauritius is a unique case, as its infant mortality rate is as low as 21 per thousand, and the adult literacy rate is 83 percent. These indicators are comparable to some of the more successful Asian countries. Mauritius's living standard is high, and the population program is well established. The total fertility rate has been reduced from over 6 in the 1950s to 2.2 in 1986 and is below replacement level today. These "success stories" stand in stark contrast to other African countries where, on average, onlyan estimated 1 1 percent of couples use contraceptive methods, including both modern and traditional, compared with over 80 percent in China and 38 percent in India (Table 12). Demand for contraceptives in Africa, except in the four countries mentioned above, is low compared to countries in Asia and Latin America, as shown by recently completed Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). In most of the Latin American and Asian countries where surveys were conducted, the demand for contraceptives ap- proximates the level in developed countries (Table 13). In all of the Sub-Saharan African countries except Kenya, demand for contracep- tives for spacing exceeds that for limiting births. By contrast, in most of the countriesof Asia and Latin America, limiting births is the primary reason for family planning. However, it is clear that substantial unmet need for contraception exists in Africa and that this need provides a good basis t o expand population programs. At present, most population programs in Africa areweakcompared t o programs in the developing countries of Latin America and Asia (Table 14). Although a report of the strength of family planning programs in Sub-Saharan Africa shows that the number of countries ranked as "Very weak or none" declined from 28 in 1982 t o seven in 1989, onlysixcountriesin that year had "Strong or moderatelystrong" programs. Sub-Saharan Africa: strength of family planning programs, 1982,1989 (number of countries) Strong Moderate Weak Very weak or none Total Source: W. Parker Mauldin and John A. Ross. 1991. 'Family Planning Programs: Efforb and Results. 1982-1989.'' Paper for 1991 Population Association of America meeting (unpublished). Another indicator of the magnitude of the family planning problem is desired familysize. In the countries in Africa for which DHS data are available, desired family size far exceeds the fertility rate target of 3.1 (Table 1 5). To reach this target by 2025-30, desired family size must be cut almost in half, and over 50 percent of African coupleswill need t o use contraception. Achieving these targets will require an intensive effort by African countries and greater and more enlightened support from the international community. The programs need t o be com- prehensive. They must focus on underlying conditions of fertility decline, generate public commitment, strengthen management, and provide quality family planning services. 25 First, let me comment on underlying conditions. Population poli- ciesshould seek to affect the factors that underliefamilysizedecisions. This means expanding basic education and reducing infant mortality. Basic education, especiallyforgirls, will elevate the marriage age - a key determinant of fertility. Recent DHS data show that increases in age at marriage have played an important part in fertility rate decline in Africa. Parents need to be encouraged to placea high value on their children's education. This can provide a strong incentive to reduce family size in the interest of improving children's quality of life, as demonstrated by Kenya's experience. Men play an important role in family-size decisions, particularly in Africa. A change in their attitude toward basic education is therefore crucial. Reduction in infant mortality is another essential element of the underlying conditions. Professor Ali Mazrui has emphasized that improvements in well-being and health are essential to lowering birth rates. "Death is a more regular visitor than the doctor to most African homes," he has said. Fears about survival continue to shape decisions about bearing children, and health in Africa is still far worse than in most other parts of the developing world. Reducing the death rate in Africa must, therefore, be a major part of a program to reduce the birth rate. Better family planning can also serve as a cornerstone for improved health care and reduced infant and maternal mortality rates. Despite decreasing mortality rates, almost a third of all maternal deaths in the world still occur on the African continent. (The risk of pregnancy- related death faced by an African woman is about one in 21, compared with one in 54 for Asia and one in 10,000 for a woman in Europe.) International research has shown that the risks of death to both mother and infant are much higher when the mother is under 20 or over 35, when births are closely spaced, or when the mother has already had more than three children. Thus, thefertilitytrends behind Africa's rapid population growth also contribute to its tragic death toll among mothers and infants. Second, generating public and political consensus and commit- ment is the key to program success. It is evident from successful programs that strong political and public commitment leads to effective implementation of policies. Without it, they are little more than rhetoric. Understanding the consequences of rapid population growth is important for generating commitment and consensus. Political and community leaders must be sensitized to the economic and environ- mental consequences of rapid population growth. Population issues should be elevated and integrated into country policy and planning processes by governments and donors. Ministers of Finance and Planning who deal with resource allocation and macroeconomic issues should provide strong support to population programs. If there is to be a strong commitment in Africa to reducing the desired family size, much more information is needed about the reasonsfor the continued strong demand for largefamilies. Country- specific studies should be carried out by interdisciplinary groups including anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, demogra- phers, and economists. Based on such studies, action could then be initiated to motivate couples to use contraception. This strategy should specifically focus on younger age groups and men - often neglected in existing programs. Involvement of donors t o provide adequate resources for these efforts will be essential. A high-level African Population Advisory Committee already exisk4 It would un- dertake this task. Third, equipping population programs with sound management will be a major challenge of the 1990s. As I mentioned earlier, a number of African countries have developed or are developing population policies. These policies will need to be translated into effectively implemented national population programs. Monitorable targets for each country including indicators of the availability and quality of services, information and motivation efforts, contraceptive prevalence rates, and fertility rates should be set. Mechanisms for monitoring these targets should be established. An Africa Technical Committee to help countries establish their national population programs and to evaluate their results should be set up, perhaps as an arm of the Population Advisory Committee. Similarly, funds for training Africans in population program management and for carrying out associated operational research would help improve the pro- grams. Fourth, provision of high-quality family planning services is critical for programs. As we have seen, DHS data indicate that demand for such services already exists in several countries. Between 13 and 32 percent of currently married women in Ghana and Kenya respectively want no more children even at ages 25-29, and the percentage of women wanting no more children goes up with age (Figure 1). These figures provide evidence of an existent demand and show a need to expand family planning services so that women can obtain the means with which to implement theirfertilitydecisions. Servicesalso must be extended to men - who are often ignored - so that families can make theappropriate choices regarding male or female contraception. The key word is "quality." Easy access to contraceptivesthat are in line with the clients' desires has been responsible for the success of family planning programs in Latin America and Asia. Research indicatesthat even a small number of satisfied contraceptiveacceptors will provide the basis for program expansion. Newer developments in contraceptive technology such as Norplant provide wider choices to clients. Community-based distribution and social marketing of con- traceptives provide low-cost alternatives to extension of clinics. This is a difficult agenda, but, if it is vigorously pursued, Africa can achieve a population growth rate of 2 percent a year by 2025-30. The record in Asia and Latin America clearly shows how effective family planning programs can be. The World Bank estimates that about 40 percent of the decline in fertility throughout theworld between 1965 and 1975 can be traced to the expansion of such programs. Direct government and donor intervention has changed demographic his- tory in other developing regions. The same can happen in Sub- Saharan Africa. What would it cost? Present aid levels for family planning in Sub- Saharan Africa are about $100 million per year. To meet the targets indicated previously, aid would need to be increased to $650 million per annum by theyear 2000. As for the costs to individual countries, based on recent experience in Zimbabwe and Botswana, annual allocations of no more than 0.6 to 0.8 percent of GNP would allow countries to put in place substantial family planning programs. Not only are these costs modest, they would be more than offset by the savings in education and health budgets and food imports that lower fertility would bring. One imponderable in this whole scenario is the AlDS pandemic. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that, out of an estimated world total of 10 million persons infected by the HIV virus, more than 5 million areAfricans. It hasalreadyspreadwith frightening speed through thecentral African countriesofzaire, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia. How will AlDS affect Africa's population growth rate? We do not know for sure at this point. There are as many as 2.5 million infected women and 500,000 infected children in Sub-Saharan Africa. At least 50,000 Africans have died of the disease since it emerged in the late 1970s. WHO projects that, by 1992, an additional 1.5 million African women and 500,000 African children will be infected with HIV, and over 1 million Africans will have developed AIDS. While we do not know the full extent of the AlDS plague, a t the moment, evidence is scant that Sub-Saharan Africa's population growth rate will fall significantly as a direct result of the disease. The costs of treating AlDS cases will be high, of course, as will be the impact on a critical group of productive people aged between 20 and 40. However, it would be wrong at present to view AlDS as some macabre Malthusian solution to Africa's population problems. The message remainsclear: unlesseffectivepopulation planning measures are taken, and taken now, overall population growth rates in Africa will remain unsustainably high. Protecting the Environment Reducing the population growth rate and increasing the produc- tivity and sustainability of agriculture will be the two most effective means of protecting Africa's environment. But these measures alone will not besufficient. Aspecificand extensiveaffirmativeenvironmental action program will also be required. 'The main causes of Africa's environmental problems are complex and interconnected. There are no panaceas. As President Nyerere said, "conservation" was long resented in Africa as a colonial imposi- tion on rural people. Indeed, it was used as a springboard for nationalist opposition during the pre-Independence period. Over the last decade, attitudes toward environmental protection have been changing in Africa - as in the rest of the world. The time has come for these changing attitudes to be backed by action programs and resources. Even if there are no panaceas, even if our knowledge is incomplete, we must strive to address the problem. First, natural resource management must be seen from both a "production" and a "protection" perspective. It is not enough to argue that land, water, and other natural resources should be conserved for their intrinsic value or beauty. As they are being protected, ways must be found to make them productive. The essence of sustainability is this combination of productivity and protection. Ultimately, planting thetreesand protectingthevegetation, terrac- ing the fields, and applying mulch to worn-out soils will have to be done by Africa's rural people - and they will make that effort only when they see a clear advantage in it for themselves. The single most important advantage will be increased production. As indicated previously, natural resource use can be greatly improved and pro- tected through the introduction of sustainable land, water, and livestock technologies - such as agroforestry techniques and high- yielding crops and fertilizers. This leads us back to the policy dimension. The basic link between economic policy management at the national level and sound natural resource use at the local level should be clearly understood. African farmers are excellent economists. If they are given the right prices for using environmentally sustainable crops and technologies, they will not only make the right economic decisions, they will make the right decisions on natural resource management as well. Widespread tree-planting, for example, will occur only when wood prices are made attractive to growers. In many countries, the price of 30 wood is far below the economic cost of producing it. Wood fuels priced realisticallywould encourage conservation and, in the process, stimulate demand for other appropriately priced alternative energy supplies. One important way to do this is to reduce "open-access" land tenure, which would eliminate access to free wood. Prices of fuelwood would then increase, stimulating planting of fuelwood by landowners, reduced use by consumers, and, eventually, substitution of other fuels. Areas under trees in Africa should expand at the rate of at least 1 percent per annum in order to maintain wood and building supplies and to replenish the natural resource base. This is more likelyto occur when a good market price is available to stimulate planting. This target represents a major undertaking (Table 16). Deforestation is currently taking place at a rate of about 0.5 percent per annum, and more than two-thirds of Africa's wilderness areas are already estimated to have been destroyed. As a matter of policy, every country should be encouraged to prepare and implement its own national environmental action plan - backed with sufficient staff, institutional and financial resources, and political support. These plans would set targets as well as design the criteria for specific environmental actions - biological importance, level of degradation, productive potential, and population pressures. As with population planning, governmentsshould use every available method of communication - public and private- to emphasize the importance of these plans. Strictures on environmental management, however, cannot be imposed from on high, particularly in the rural areas. Top-down programs will fall apart as soon as the governments lose interest or funds. Thus, the local people must understand, and be fully involved in, the design and implementation of environmental policies and programs. In turn, these policies must takeaccount of local traditions, cultures, and needs. This requires a major effort to involve local populations in design and implementation of area-specific programs. And again, since women are principal players in smallholder farms in Africa - and thus make many of the decisions regarding natural resource use-they must bespecificallytargeted and assisted as a part of this process. Earlier approaches to environmental management in Africa were based on environmental impact assessments of individual projects 31 and on investment in programs such as pollution abatement, affores- tation, or water management. These approaches are useful but inadequate. The project-by-project approach tends to address the symptoms, rather than thecauses, of environmental problems. Future strategies should look beyond projects to the broader policy issuesand explicitly recognize intersectoral links and intergenerational concerns. To thisend, a growing numberof African countriesare now preparing National Environmental Action Plans that aim to attain sustainable growth through multi-sectoral activities including family planning, improved land security, environmentally sound agricultural technolo- gies, and improved range and livestock management. Since many of the environmental issues facing these different countriesaresimilar, increased regional cooperation and coordination - in terms of sharing experience, technologies, and institutional mechanisms -could greatly facilitate natural resource management on the continent. Some environmental issues demand a regional approach. Pest control, wildlife protection, watershed and river basin management, joint crop forecasting, and livestock diseasecontrol are all issues that can be adequately addressed only on a regional basis. The success of the Onchocerciasis Control Program in Africa -set up in 1974 to eradicate river blindness - demonstrates the potential of regional cooperation in tackling a common problem. Enormous leaps have been made in weather and other environ- mental forecasting. Through satellite photography and agrometeorology, the probability of drought, levels of rainfall, and harvest yieldscan be predicted with an improving degree of accuracy. The key is for African governments to get together to acquire these technologies and share their benefits. Donors, of course, havea role to play in helping to preserve Africa's patrimony. The concept of the global village is now a reality. Desertification and deforestation in Africa are increasingly of world- wide concern, just as the heavy pollution coming from industrial countries is of concern to Africa. The global impact of environmental trends in Sub-SaharanAfrica can beexpected to command increasing attention in the future, as environmental issues become increasingly prominent in world affairs. 32 Sub-Saharan Africa is endowed with an abundance of wild plants and animals. It is home to hundreds of thousands of species of a global total estimated to be between 10 and 50 million. Madagascar; the Congo Basin, particularly Zaire and Cameroon; the Tai Forest of C6te d'lvoire; and the Montane forests of East Africa are among the most biologically diverse areas of the world. For example, more than 6,000 flowering plants, 106 different birds, and half the world's chameleon species are found only on the island of Madagascar. The disappearance of Africa's natural treasures has implications beyond the extinction of species. It means the loss of genetic material for future development of crops, medicines, and industrial products - which, of course, has implications beyond Africa. This threat presents an opportunity to mobilize international resources to help save Africa's environment. Saving Africa's environment, however, should not be presented simply as a matter of donors giving aid to African recipients. We are talking about the "global commons" here and of the benefits that will accrue to all of us - industrial and developing countries alike - by preserving Africa's patrimony. The issue, therefore, is not so much one of aid but of cost-sharing. And since the industrial countries have greater ability to pay, they should shoulder the larger part of the burden - at least until most African countries can get back on the path of sustained economic growth. Donors currently provide about 8500 million a year to Africa for environmental activities. This is totally inadequate. In Madagascar alone, the World Bank has put the cost of continued environmental degradation at between 81 80 and 8300 million a year. The cumu- lative loss to Nigeria of continued water contamination, deforestation, and soil erosion is much higher. These costs need to be shared between African countries and donors - and the current level of resource transfer from donors is not up to the task. External environmental assistance to Africa should be increased on an annual basis in line with the vast need. In addition, resourcetransfersshouldbe used much moreeffectively. The ongoing preparation of tropical forestry action plans could be expanded within the framework of National Environmental Action Plans. This effort could be greatlyassistedthrough improved environ- mental information systems based on new mapping and remote sensing technologies. Such systems are being developed in a few countries in Africa, including Nigeria and Uganda. There are early encouraging signs that the donor community is willing to respond to Africa's environmental crisis. In the two African countries - Madagascar and Mauritius - that have designed envi- ronmental"investment plans" to support their national environmental "action plans," donors have oversubscribed both programs. Fur- thermore, several projects of biodiversity conservation cum develop- ment are about to be financed by the newly established Global EnvironmentFacility(GEF).Although thecostsof theseaction programs are substantial, the international community appears to have realized that the costs of inaction may be even greater. We must remember that the costs of environmental degradation are not always immediately apparent; some costs take years or decades to appear. Moreover, traditional measures of economic well- being, such as per capita GNP, fail to capture them. Indeed, because of the fundamental link between environment and development, measurement of national income accounts should begin to include a calculation of natural resource depletion. This point was implicit in the 1987 report of the World Commission on Environment and Development entitled "Our Common Future." That report focused on theimportanceof "sustainabledevelopment," which it defined as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising theability of future generations to meet their own needs." During one of the Commission's hearings, the chairman, Mrs. Gro Harlem Brundtland, then Prime Minister of Norway, said, "Until recently, conservation of the environment was perceived as something external to the development process." In actuality, she explained, "Environmental protection and development, far from being in conflict, are in fact closelyinterdependent, locally, nationally, regionally and globally." Soils, water, forests, thegene pool, and other natural resources are economic assets that can generate a flow of future income - for Africa and the rest of the world. Trading a decline in this long-term source of wealth for a temporary economic gain is a bargain likely to lead to bankruptcy. The choice that must be made concerning Africa's environment does not lie in the future: it is here and now. IV. A STRATEGY FOR SUSTAINABLE AND EQUITABLE GROWTH A Long Road The road to sustainable growth is long. Many African countries made a dash for "modernization" in the 1960s. However, the strategies were, at worst, misconceived; at best, not based on sustainable targets and objectives. The failure was not Africa's alone but also that of the international donor community, which did not fully understand the problems, focus on the priorities, nor help design projects and programs consonant with Africa's agroclimatic condi- tions or its economic, social, cultural, and political contexts. Are Africa's problems intractable? They certainly have not been handled successfully - by myself and others - in the past quarter century. But surely we will not accept that they cannot be solved in the future. The action required must start within Africa. In this respect, in the past five years or so, there has been one great sea change for the better: African governments and institutions are coming to the realization that the primary responsibility for Africa's future rests in its own hands. I certainly subscribe t o this view. But I would add that Africa also needs sustained and increased external support- more than is now in prospect- if it is t o overcome its development crisis. In addition, Africans and donors must con- stantly bear in mind that this isa long-term endeavorthat must extend over decades. There are no shortcuts t o success. A Strategic Agenda As I indicated earlier, to register even a modest improvement in the quality of life, the Sub-Saharan economies must raise their average annual rates of economic growth to at least 4-5 percent per annum. Allow me to outline a strategic agenda - drawn in part from the 35 World Bank's long-termperspectivestudy, "Sub-SaharanAfrica: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth" - designed to achieve this. Let us assume - because it is a sine qua non -that the linkage of weak agricultural production, rapid population growth, and environ- mental degradation will be addressed through the kinds of parallel action programs that I have alreadysuggested in order to achieve the target of 4 percent annual growth in agriculture. This target is of particular importance because it implies rising productivityof land and labor, which is essential if sustainable farming practices are to be adopted. This high rate of agricultural growth is also important because it will drive the rest of the economy. Industry could then be expected to grow in the near to medium term by 4-5 percent a year - gradually rising to 7-8 percent - consistent with experience in other developing regions. What else is required? Continued Adjustment First, the process of economic policy reform and adjustment must continue. In everything from exchange rate management to invest- ment in education and agriculture, the lessonsof failed or inadequate policies in Africa stand out. One of the most telling indicationsof poor policy frameworks has been Africa's declining competitiveness in world markets. Certainly, the external environment has not been kind to Africa with the fall in commodity prices, oil shocks, and high interest rates. But a hostile external environment is not the main reason for Africa's poor economic performance. The region's disappointing GDP growth has resulted more from the low level and low efficiency of investment than from anything else. Gross investment levels in Africa have declined from over 20 percent of GDP in the 1970s to around 15 percent today (compared to 22 percent in India and 38 percent in China in 1987). Even more disturbing, the incremental output generated by this investment has dropped dramatically from 31 percent of investment in the 1960s to 2.5 percent in the 1980s. This free-fall contrasts sharply with the experience of South Asia, the only other region with a comparable income level. To meet the GDP growth target, investment levels must rise from 15 percent of GDP to about 25 percent. This will require a dramatic increase in domestic savings, which declined from 18 percent of GDP in 1972 to 13 percent in 1987. Savings rates must increase to 18 percent by the end of the decade and to 22 percent by 2020. Contributing to the low productivity of investment are higher costs for almost everything - higher investment costs, higher labor costs, and higher utility and transport costs - 50 to 100 percent higher on average than comparable costsin South Asia. These high costs result partly from Africa's particular circumstances: difficult topography, widely dispersed settlements, and fragile soils. But more directly, the explanation lies in poor public resource management, inefficient bureaucracies, overvalued currencies, and inappropriate policy incen- tives. Together, these have weighed down the efforts of entrepre- neurs and private operators in Africa by adding greatly to the cost of doing business and reducing profitability, whether it be in agriculture or industry. Simply put, Africa is not competitive. Moreover, the going will onlyget tougher. Theworld is in the midst of a new technological age- driven by rapid advances in information systems, in the biological sciences, and in materials research. High- speed, low-cost information processing and communications are transforming the way the world does business. Good market intel- ligence, flexible production structures, adaptable pricing mechanisms, and a fast response t o new opportunities are what give firms and farmers an edge. Africa is going to have to adjust in order to improve the efficiency of investment and hold its own in the world. As I stated previously, the latter part of the 1980s has seen a beginning of this process. About 30 Sub-Saharan countries have adopted economic reforms, and some fragile but positive results are emerging. The major overhaul of Nigeria's exchange rate and trading system since 1986, for example, has helped reverse the previous downward trend in GDP. Ghana's strong performance - a GDP growth rate of about 5 percent a year over the past six years - also testifies to the value of the reforms that began in 1983. And the nine member countries of the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) - benefiting from reforms as well as good weather - recently achieved the first positive growth in per capita income for that subregion in a decade. Preliminary figures for 1990 indicate that African countries under structural adjustment (the Special Program of Assistance countries) grew at 3.8 percent com- pared to a -2.5 percent annual growth rate registered by non reforming IDA countries. Growth of GDP, 1981-90 (pwcent per year based on constant 1987 US$) SPA countries 0.9 3.8 3.8 Other IDA countries ' 2.4 2.5 -2.5 IBRD borrowers, except Nigeria 4.2 4.0 0.0 Nigeria -4.6 2.3 5.2 All SubSaharan countries * 1.8 2.7 1.5 Non-African developing countries 2.9 4.6 2.4 a. Preliminary estimate. b. Special Program of Assistance countries at the end of 1990 (excludes Somalia and Zaire; includes Zam bia). c. Excludes Equatorial Guinea. Comoros, and Djibouti. d. Excludes Angola. e. Exdudes Angola, Equatorial Guinea. Comoros, and Djibouti. Source: World Bank. I emphasize again that these are only preliminary results from the first steps down a very long road. The adjustment process must not only continue, but continue to evolve. Economic reform must be better phased and implemented. Policy change must be more responsive to long-term development priorities and to the needs of vulnerable groups affected by transitional costs. The international effort now under way to trackand target these objectives- the Social Dimensionsof Adjustment project -is a useful starting point for this process. But adjustment must also be more adequately funded by donors as it moves nations away from the centralized, bureaucratic, slow-moving patterns of the past onto faster and firmer paths of growth. The adjustment process can be improved, but it cannot be avoided. There is no alternative. People-Sensitive Development Within theadjustment programs, a high priority must be placed on investment in people as both the means and ends of long-term 38 development.The quality of human resource development programs in Africa needs to be improved but, thereis no escaping it, thequantity of resources being applied must also increase. A realistic goal would be to double expenditures for human resource development from present levels to reach 8-10 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa's GDP within the next decade. The three-part aim of such investments would be to ensure food security, primary education, and health care for all Africans within the next generation, by the year 2020 at the latest. Any future development strategy for Africa must be "people-sensitive" and include a new commitment to develop the continent's greatest source of potential: its men, women - especially its women -and its children. Africa's Entrepreneurs Constraints and excessivecontrolsonthe growth and development of Africa's entrepreneurs and business people also need to be relaxed. Private small- and medium-scaleenterprises, especially in the informal sector, can bea potentstimulusforgrowth in Sub-SaharanAfrica. The creativity of small, local enterprises and organizations working at the grass roots must be encouraged and promoted. Foreign direct investment can also bean important source of both capital and know- how, as other regions have learned to their great benefit. Much more should be done to create an enabling environment that can foster privatesector dynamism in Africa and make it a strong ally in the long- term development effort. Regional Integration Even with a dynamic private sector, it must be acknowledged that some African countries are too small to achieveeconomiesof scaleand survive on their own in the global marketplace - especially in a marketplace increasingly dominated by "blocs" of countries from Western Europeor North America. Africancountries need to cooperate much more with one another, and even integrate economically, in order to survive and prosper. African leaders have long recognized the need for closer regional ties. Yet little has been done, in practical terms, to move from words to deeds. lntraregional trade, for example, has hardly grown in 20 39 years and remains at a dismally low 5 percent of all African trade. Expanded intraregional trade would help overcome feast and famine surges and shortages in food supplies. It would also give industries that have been too long protected in markets that are too small more space in which to find their competitive bearings. Cooperation could also enhance efficiency in high-level manpower training and technol- ogy research. The benefitsof regional cooperation, expanded trade and markets, and shared resources are real. But they require more than lip service. Economic policies and tariffs need to be harmonized; political and bureaucratic obstacles to the movement of capital, labor, and goods across Africa need to be removed. All of these will require more political will and more decisive action than African governments have shown in the past. Building African Capacities A single concept cuts across all the items on Africa's strategic development agenda: the imperative of building local African capaci- ties. Whether in agriculture, industry, education, or natural resource management, Africa lacks the necessary skills and well managed public and private institutions for long-term, sustainable growth. Despitesome$4 billion spenton technical assistanceeveryyearand despite the presence of nearly 100,000 foreign "experts" in Sub- Saharan Africa - more than at Independence- the record clearly shows a crippling shortfall in indigenous African capacities. This deficit must be overcome. The challenge to help build long-term African capacity is an acid test for both African governments and the donor community. Tradi- tional technical assistanceapproachesshould be radically reappraised and reorientedtoward strengtheningAfrican institutions. Theobjective must be to transfer skills and achieve self-sustaining improvements in African capacities. Capacity building isa priority to be included in every development activityin Africa. It should bea major focus for the 1990s and into the Zlst century. Again, however, progress will take time. A determined and sustained effort over several decades is required. 40 The Question of Governance Capacity building is a crucial element of improved administrative and political structures in Africa -better governance. This isa highly sensitive issue. Outsiders should not attempt to impose on African countries any particular political system. This decision is theirs alone. However, there is a palpable popular demand for more accountable systemsof governance. Donors, too, want to see a politicalenvironment that encourages effective resource allocation - rather than a system that allows for wasteful spending and widespread corruption. Unless there is better governance, there will be political unrest and a further draining of international goodwill away from Africa -goodwill that is essential if donor support for Africa is to be mobilized and retained. Outlays that do not go for development are not just wasted: they deprive needysectorsand programsofvital support. Onearea of great potential savings is military spending, which, in the mid-1980s. approximatedAfrica'saverageexpenditureson education. Themilitary- social imbalance is further reflected in the fact that annual public expenditures on health have, according to the Economic Commission for Africa, equaled less than one-third of military outlays. Imagine what it would mean to social welfare in Africa, with all its positive multiplier effects, if real savings could be realized in defense spending and in other nonproductive expenditures. Imagine also what it might mean in termsof freeing African governments' budgetary resourcesto tackle the problems of agriculture, population, and environment that I have already emphasized. The price tag for nonproductive expenditures and for poor gover- nance in Africa has become increasingly visible and can no longer be ignored. Adeep political malaisestymiesaction in manycountries; the citizenry sees theeliteas self-serving and clinging to political power for their own gain. Onlysixout of more than 150 national leadersin post- colonial Africa havevoluntarilyhanded over power. Thegreat majority has preferred to use the tired justification that more political freedom would intensify tribal rivalries. I would argue that, if anything, the mismanagement and failureof the old political order hasexacerbated internal divisions. African governments must improve upon their past records and rally their people for development. Regardless of whether African countries decide to choose one- party or multi-party systems, some basic foundation stones are required by all societies in order to offer people participation in the life of their nations and galvanize them for thedevelopment effort. These foundations include a free press, open debate, meritocracy in the civil service, an independent judiciary, institutional pluralism, and trans- parency in the making of government policy. Political leaders must become far more willing to subject themselves to public scrutiny, without accusing critics of disloyalty or subversion. The winds of change are again beginning to blow through Africa. And the peoples of Africa are increasinglyimpatient with the old ways. Through its recent economic changes, Africa has started up the path of economic reform. Some basic political reforms are now required. Donors' Responsibility General Obasanjo recently remarked that African leaders "have squandered 30years." Heemphasized that "...unlessAfrica takes the lead in helping itself, nobody will rush to our help," but he also questioned Western actions that only compound Africa's economic and political marginalization. In the next few years, Europe is projected to provide far more assistance on a per capita basis to Poles and Hungarians than to Africans. Central Americans and Israelis will receive far more financial assistance per capita from the United States than will Africans. Japan will provide far more attention to Asians than to Africans. In this politicized lottery that passes for the development assistance process, Africans could end up being penalized for the expansion of the frontiers of freedom elsewhere. That would be a deplorable response to the African crisis. Just as Africa's leaders must live up to their development respon- sibilities, so, too, must donors. To help achieve the 4.5 percent GDP growth target, as I have said, total investment in Sub-Saharan Africa will need to rise from 15 percent of GDP at present to 25 percent by the year 2000, and the domestic savings rate must increase from 12 percent today to 18 percent in 10 years' time. But even if such an 42 increase in domestic savingsis realized, it will beinsufficient to support the required investment levels. An increase in external financial assistance, beyond that now in prospect, is essential. Net transfers (including all forms of financing) would need to be about 9 percent of GDP by the year 2000, compared to about 7.6 percent in 1986-89. This will require an increase in official development assistance of at least 4 percent per year in real terms. ODA per year (excluding technical cooperation) would rise from 89.8 billion in 1986-89 to 822 billion in 2000 (in current dollars). As part of the financial assistance program, donors need to put in place debt-relief mechanisms that would prevent the region's debt- service payments from exceeding current levels: about 89 billion a year. At a minimum, this means an extension of the "Toronto terms" - reduced interest rates, extended maturities, and outright debt cancellation - for the poorest countries to the highly indebted middle-income African countries, such as IVigeria and C6te d'lvoire. Donors need to get realistic about Africa'sdebt because it is impeding the entire development effort. Providing the resources that Africa needs to overcome its devel- opment problems is a huge challenge to the donor community- but also a huge opportunity. I mentioned at the outset that the outlook for the subcontinent is bleak and that there is, at present, little sign that the adverse trends are reversing. If, however, the required levels of assistance can be provided, and used to backeffectiveactions, then I believe that Africa's downward spiral can be turned around. This is a vision worthy of the cost: a vision of self-reliant economies and healthy and skilled peoples; of countries with well maintained, functioning infrastructure and dynamic business centers; of food security for all and substantially increased life expectancy; and of an Africa that not only holds its own in the world but also makes an important and positive contribution. V. CONCLUSION: COMMITMENT TO ACTION WITHIN A GLOBAL COALITION The greatest risk to Africa's future is loss of hope. However bleak thecurrent situation may appear, thedeterioration islargelyof human origin and can yield only to human remedy. How African leaders and 43 challenge will reveal much about the human prospect in Sub-Saharan Africa over the remainder of this century and into the next. Can we doubt that radical action and unprecedented partnerships are re- quired to resolve the African crisis? The continent's future and the future of every African child born today are at stake. Many of the solutions are long-term, but there is also an urgency to strengthen the kinds of policiesandaction programs that will make a difference, and to do so now. Since I addressed these problems in Nigeria at the Africa Leadership ForumonJune 21,1990, some of the recommendationsto action that I urged at that time are coming to pass. In particular, the Global Coalitionfor Africa has been established. With membershipfrom both African nations and the donor community, it will provide an informal mechanism for developing internationalconsensus and action where they are now lacking. It will track trends in the key development sectors and provide a mechanism for evaluating progress. What is needed now are concrete demonstrations of joint problem- solving as part of a shared future, for the problems are global in their dimensions and implications. A future that is more secure for Africa means a future more secure for this interdependentworld, for this all- too-fragile lifeboat we call Earth. Endnotes 1. Throughout this paper, "Africa," when used, is an abbreviation for Sub- Saharan Africa. 2. Net financial transfers equal disbursements minus debt service after adjusting debt service for debt relief. 3. Net ODAflows equal grossODA(gross disbursementsofconcessional loans and grants) less amortization on concessional loans after debt relief. 4. The African Population Advisory Committee, consisting of 16 high-level individuals such as ministers, implementers, and intellectuals interested in population issues, was formed in 1989 by multilateral donors to develop an Agenda for Action to Improve Population Program Implementation. Annex Sub-Saharan Africa: food consumption, agriculture, population, and the environment Annual agricuhural Ddity prcduction Annual population per capita growth rates growth rates calorie brcmt) @erren0 consumption Target TJfM TJf9d Country 1980-88 1990-2020 1980-88 2020 1988 2010 Sub-Saharan Africa 1.8 4.0 3.2 2.3 2.095 2.400 Sahelian countries Burkina Faso Chad Mali Mauritania Niger Coastal West Africa Benin Cape Verde Cote d'lvoire Ga mbia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Liberia Nigeria Senegal Sierra-Lmne Togo Central Africa forest zone Angola NA 4.0 2.5 2.5 1,880 2,400 Cameroon 2.4 4.5 3.2 2.4 2.028 2,400 Central African Rep. 2.6 4.5 2.7 1.8 1.949 2,400 Congo 2.0 4.5 3.5 2.7 2,619 2.700 Equatorial Guinea NA 4.0 1.9 1.7 NA 2.400 Gabon NA 4.0 3.9 2.4 2,521 2.600 Zaire 3.2 5.0 31 2.0 2.163 2,400 Northern Sudanian Djibouti NA 3.0 3.0 2.1 NA 2,400 Ethiopia -1.1 3.0 2.9 3.0 1.749 2.200 Somalia 3.9 3.0 3.0 2.5 2,138 2.400 Sudan 2.7 4.0 3.1 1.8 2,208 2.400 Comparison India 2.3 NA 2.2 2.238 China 6.8 1.3 2,630 Note: NA indicates not available. Projection methodology is discussed on the following page. a. Defined as percent who do not have adequate food all the time. b. A negative number means deforestation as percent of total forested area per year. 46 Sources: Tables 1 t o 22. Popubtion Reforestation Wilderness food rates per Total land area to insecure ' year under c m p total area (percent) (percen0 (~ercen 0 (percen0 Minimum Target Target target Minimum 1980-81 2020 1980s 1990-2020 1987 2020 Present target Annex Sub-Saharan Africa: food consumption, agriculture, population, and the environment (cont.) Annual agricukural Daily production Annual population per capita growth rates growth rater calorie @rceotJ (percent, consumption Target Target Target 198088 1990.2020 198088 2020 1988 2010 East Africa mountain and temperate zones Burundi 3.1 3.0 Kenya 3.3 4.0 Lesotho 1.8 3.0 Madagascar 2.2 4.0 Malawi 2.7 4.0 Rwanda 0.3 3.0 Swaziland 3.9 4.0 Ta nza n ~ a 4.0 4.0 Uganda -0.3 4.5 Zambia 4.1 5.0 Zimbabwe 2.5 4.5 Other South East Africa Botswana -5.9 2.0 Comoros NA 3.0 Mozambique -0.8 4.0 Mauritius 4.0 5.0 Projection Methodology 1. The target agricultural growth rates reflect what 1 s achievable in the long term from an agrc- climatic perspective. The targets ~mplygood agricultural policy and investment of the type described in the text. 2. The target population growth rates were established as d~scussed in Table 11. They reflect the projeded outcome in each country of theachievement of a reduction in the total fertility rate by almost 50 percent by 2020-25. Target 2020 derived from theaverage of population growth rates between 2015-2020 and 2020-2025. 3. Minimum target calorie consumption was arbitrarily set to equal the present average in all the world's low-income countries. 4. The target percentage of the foodinsecure population is based on a subject~ve judgment about the possiblity of reducing food insecurity in each country given the present numbers involved, the target agricultural growlh rate. and the available new land for cultivation. 5. The reforestation target for each country was set at the target rate for Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Only where there are large areas under forest in Central Africa was the target rate reduced. Source: World Bank demographic estimates and projections (preliminary 1991 revision). Population Refomtation Wikkmess food rate5 per Total land area to insecure ' year under crops total area (percent) (percent, (percent, (percent, M~nlrnum Target Target target Minimum 1988 2020 1980s 1990-2020 1989 2020 Present target 6. The target percentage of land under crops was determined on the basis of available wilderness, forest, and other uncultivated land for cultivation, given the constraint imposed by the need to expand forests by 1.0 percent per year, to reduce wilderness land by the minimum possible, and a judgment about the agro-climatic possib~ltties for agricultural intens~fication.A country with much wilderness, much land available to re-forest, and difficult agricultural conditions (Ethiopia, for example) will have to expand cultivated area. Rwanda, on the other hand, has virtually no wilderness and limited forest. It cannot afford toexpand cultivated area at all. 7. The minimum target wildernessarea was arrived atas that remaining after the maximum allowable increase in cropped area was taken out. The objective is to maintain as much wilderness area as possible subject to the realit~es of expanding crop area with a best effort at agricultural intensification. Note: The targets are indicative only, reflect~ng the magnitude of the effort required in each country. Table 1. Sub-Saharan Africa: basic indicators Primary school Area GNPper enrollment Adult Population (thous. capita Life (percentage illiteracy (millions) sq. km) (US$) expectancy o f age group) (age IS+) -- Country Mid-1988 1980s 1988 1965 1988 1965 1987 1985 Sub-Saharan Africa 464.1 22.240 330 43 51 44 68 53 - - Low-income economies 408.9 18.370 269 42 50 38 64 54 Benln Burk~na Faso Burund~ Central Afrlcan Rep Chad Cornoros Equatorla1Gulnea Eth~op~a Garnbla. The Ghana Gu~nea Gu~nea-Blssau Kenya Lesotho L~berla Madagascar ma law^ Mall Maur~tanla Mozarnb~que N~ger N~ger~a Rwanda SBo Torn6 and Pr~nc~pe S~erra Leone Sornal~a Sudan Ta nza n ~ a Togo Uganda La1re Lambla Middle-income economies 55.2 3.870 783 47 54 81 97 48 Angola 9.4 1,247 290 Botswana 1.2 582 1.016 Cameroon 11.2 475 1.010 Cape Verdi 0.4 4 680 Cdte d'lvoire 11.2 322 770 Congo, Peoplr!'s Rep. 2.1 342 910 Djibouti 04 23 930 Gabon 1.1 268 2.970 Maurltlus 1.1 2 1.800 Senegal 7.0 197 650 Seychelles 0.1 0 3.790 Swaziland 0.7 17 810 Llm babwe 9.3 391 650 Source: World Bank Table 2. Sub-Saharan Africa: selected economic indicators and projections 1965- Indicators 80 1989 1990 Percentage Growth rates Real GDP Population Real GDP per capita Real consumption per capita Export volumes (GNFS) Import volumes (GNFS) Percentage Shares of GDP Gross domestic investment Gross domestic savings Real resource balance Current account balancec Exports (GNFS) Elasticities Import to GDPe 1.3 -6.4 0.9 2.7 1.1 0.7 GDP t o industrial countries' GNP ' 1.4 0.3 1.0 1.O 1.O 1.3 Memorandum items Gross domestic savings to GDP India 16.3 18.6 17.2 16.8 17.9 19.6 China 28.7 36.6 38.7 39.5 39.6 38.4 Population growth in Industrial countries 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 Real GNP growth in ~ndustrialcountries 3.7 2.8 3.3 2.7 1.4 3.0 World trade volume growth 6.1 3.6 7.0 5.7 5.8 6.3 Note: Constant price Creal') series use 1980 as base year. a. Projections based on target growth of 4 percent per annum. b. Unadjusted for changes in terms of trade. c. Current account balances include official transfers. d. Average for 1970-79. e. Row 6 divided by row 1. 1. Row 1 divided by row 16. Source: World Bank. Table 3. Sub-Saharan Africa: GNP per capita and GDP growth rates GNP per capita, average COP, average annual growth rate annual growth rate 1965- 1973- 1980- 1965- 1980- Country 73 80 89 80 89 1990' Sub-hharan Africa 3.0 0.1 -1.4 4.8 1.8 1.5 Low-income economies 3.1 0.3 -1.4 1.4 2.1 Benin Burkina Faso Burundi Central African Rep. Comoros Chad Equatorial Gu~nea Ethiopia Gambia, The Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Malt Mauritania Mozambique Niger Niger~a Rwanda Sdo Tome and Principe Slerra Leone Somalia Sudan Tanzania Togo Uganda Zaire Zambia Middle-income economies 1.9 -1.2 -1.3 2.7 0.0 - -~ Angola 1.1 -9.8 .. Botswana 9.3 7.3 6.2 14.2 11.3 Cameroon -0.4 5.7 0.7 5.1 3.2 -1.2 Cape Verde .. 7.3 3.2 Congo. People's Rep. 4.2 1.1 0.3 6.3 3.9 -0.1 Cbte d'lvoire 4.5 1.2 -3.0 6.8 0.9 -6.1 Djibouti Gabon 4.9 -1.2 -2.8 9.5 1.2 Mauritius 0.8 3.9 4.9 5.2 6.4 6.3 Senegal -0.8 -0.5 0.0 2.0 3.1 4.4 Seychelles 2.6 4.5 1.7 3.4 Swaziland 5.8 0.3 0.6 Zimbabwe 2.6 -2.0 -1.1 5.0 2.5 3.0 India 1.5 1.6 3.7 3.6 5.6 4.4 China 4.9 3.8 8.6 6.4 9.7 4.7 53 a. Estimates and projections. Source: World Bank. Table 4. Sub-Saharan Africa: land use Land use as a percentage of total land Cropland Pasture Country 1965 1980 1987 1965 1980 1987 Sub-Saharan Africa 6 7 7 27 27 27 Low-income economies 6 7 7 26 26 26 Benin Burkina Fax, Burundi Central African Rep. Comoros Chad Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Gambia, The Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mall Mauritania Mozamb~que N~ger Nigeria Rwanda Sao Tomb and Principe Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan Tanzania Togo Uganda Zaire Zambia Middle-incomeeconomies 7 7 29 29 29 Angola 3 3 3 23 23 23 Botswana 2 2 2 74 78 78 Cameroon 12 15 15 19 18 18 Cape Verdi 10 10 10 6 6 6 Congo. People's Rep. 2 2 2 29 29 29 C6te d'lvoire 8 10 11 9 9 9 Djibouti 9 9 9 Gabon 1 2 2 20 18 18 Mauritius 51 58 58 4 4 4 Senegal 23 27 27 30 30 30 Seychelles 19 19 22 Swaziland 8 11 10 78 64 68 Zimbabwe 5 7 7 13 13 13 lnd~a 55 57 5 4 China 11 11 31 31 54 a. Refers onty to areas larger than 4.000 square kilometers. W~ldermsarea is defined as land kftin ib natural state without any transformation by human action. These areas may partly include forests, pasturesand other lands as classified by FAO. Land use as a percentage of total bnd Wilderness area as Forest Other Total bnd percent of area (000 ha) total bnd area 1965 1980 1987 1965 1980 1987 1987 1985 44 43 43 30 31 31 124,670 26 2 2 2 23 18 18 56,673 63 59 55 53 10 12 14 46,540 3 0 0 0 84 84 84 403 0 64 63 62 5 6 7 34,150 42 60 31 20 22 50 59 31,800 16 0 0 0 91 91 91 2,318 0 78 78 78 2 2 2 25.767 35 34 31 31 12 7 7 185 35 31 31 12 12 12 19,253 11 19 19 19 63 63 59 27 8 6 6 6 19 16 1,720 0 52 52 52 30 29 29 38,667 0 20 . 22 20 17 297.319 1 12 14 46 .. 44 932.641 20 55 Source: FAO: and the World Rerource Institute and International lmtrtute for Environment and Development (in colbboration with UN Environment Rogramme). Wodd Resources 1988-89.1988, Table 5. Sub-Saharan Africa: per capita arable land and fuelwood supply Per capita Fuehoodsupply de- arable land area mand ba;ance (million (hectares) cubic meters) ' Country 1965 1980 1987 20mb 1980 2000 Sub-hharan Africa 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.22 Low-income economies Benin Burkina Faso Burundi Central African Rep. Comoros Chad Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Gambia, The Ghana Gutnea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritan~a Mozambique Niger Nigeria Rwanda Sdo Tome and Principe Sierra Leone Somal~a Sudan Tanzania Togo Uganda Zaire Zambia Midd leincome economies Angola 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.28 Botswana 1.9 1.5 1.2 0.70 Cameroon 1.O 0.8 0.6 0.43 Cape Verdi 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.08 Congo. People's Rep. 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.22 C6te d'lvoire 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.20 Djibouti Gabon 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.35 Maurit~us 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.09 Senegal 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.51 Seychelles 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.08 Swaziland 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.16 Zimbabwe 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.21 India 56 China a. Fud wood wpptpdemand babnce defined as increare in Sack of fuelwood in the )ear minus total utilization of fudwood in that year. b. 1987 arable land areas have been divided bythe propcted population of theyear 2000. burre: FAO. Table 6. Sub-Saharan Africa: population and food security, 1990-2020 Scenarios 1990 2000 2010 2020 Car0 l Population (rnlllions of persons, with fertil~ty at current levels) 500 700 1,070 1,500 F w d production (rntrne at current trend growth rate of 2 percent a year) 90 110 135 165 Food consumption (mtme with constant per capita consumption) 100 140 205 300 F w d gap (rntme) 10 30 70 135 Carp II Population (as in Case I) 500 700 1,020 1,500 Food production (mtme at 4 percent annual growth) 90 135 200 300 F w d requirement (as in Case I) 100 140 205 300 F w d gap (as in Case I) 10 5 5 0 Care Ill Population (millions of persons, with total fertility rate d ~ l i n ~ by n g25 percent by 2020) 500 690 960 1,305 F w d production (mtme at 2 percent of annual growth) 90 110 135 165 F w d requirement (mtrne) 100 138 193 261 Food gap (rntme) 10 28 58 60 Care l V Populat~on (millions of persons with total by 50 percent to 3.3 by 2020) fertility rate d ~ l i n i n g 500 680 885 1.1 10 Food production (mtme at 4 percent annual growth) 90 135 200 300 F w d requirement (rntme) 100 160 220 300 F w d gap (mtme) 10 25 20 0 Note. Mtme is millions of tons of maize equivalent. Source: World Bank. Table 7. Sub-Saharan Africa: performance of agricultural sector Agriculture's Agricultural GDP, percentage Percentage average annual share i n o f irrigated growth (percent) GDP land' - - Country 1965-73 1973-80 1980-88 1988 1984-86 Sub-Saharan Africa 2.2 -0.3 1.8 34 Low-income economies 2.2 0.0 1.5 38 Benin Burkina Faso Burundi Central African Rep. Comoros Chad Equatorial Guinea Ethiop~a Gambia, The Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho L~beria Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mozambique Niger Nigeria Rwanda 580 Tomb and Principe Slerra Leone Somalia Sudan Tanzan~a Togo Uganda Za'ire Zarn b ~ a Middle-income economies Angola Botswana Cameroon Cape Verdi Congo. People's Rep. C6te d'lvoire Djibouti Gabon Mauritius Senegal Seychelles Swaziland Zimbabwe 58 India Ch~na a. lnigated land as percentage of arable and permanentcmp land Crop Yields - - - - - - - - Cereals Roo& and tubers Fertilizer -- consumption Percentage change Percentage change ( 1 00 glha) kglha compared to kglha compared to b. Fenilizer consumption In terms of plant nutrients per hectare of arable land. Source: World Bank; FAO. Table 8. Sub-Saharan Africa: food security Population facing Percentage o f Per capita daily calorie food insecurity population facing supply (calories) (millions) food insecurity Country 1980/81 1980/81 1965 1988 Sub-Saharan africa 98 Low-income economies 95 30 2,079 2,076 Benin 1 Burkina Faso 2 Burundi 1 Central African Rep. 1 Comoros Chad 2 Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia 15 Gambia, The 0 Ghana 4 Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya 6 Lesotho Liberia 1 Madagascar 1 Malawi 1 Mall 3 Mauritania 0 Mozambique 6 Niger 2 Nigeria 14 Rwanda 1 SBo Tomb and Principe S~erra Leone 1 Somal~a 2 Sudan 3 Tanzania 7 Togo 1 Uganda 6 Zaire 12 Zambia 3 Middle-income economies 3 - - - Angola 1.897 1,880 Botswana 2,019 2.201 Cameroon 1 9 2,079 2,028 Cape Verdi 1,766 2,717 Congo, People's Rep. 0 27 2,259 2,619 C8te d'lvoire 1 8 2.359 2,562 Dpbout~ Gabon 0 7 1,881 2.52 1 Mauritius 0 9 2.271 2.748 Senegal 1 21 2.479 2,350 Seychelles 1,735 2.219 Swaziland 2,100 2,578 Zimbabwe 2.105 2.132 India 2.111 2,238 China 1.926 2,630 60 p~ N o t e Food wurity is defined as access to enough food for an active and heakhy life. In measuring thls. the min~mum daity cabrie requirement to meet the energy needs of an average heahhy person, as calculated by the World Heahh Organization for each country, is taken into account. Calorie supply ac petrentage Average annual cereal im- Index of per capita food of minimum requirement a parts (thousands of tom) pmduction ( 1 979-8 1 = 100) 1988 1974 1988 196466 1 987-89 101 5.261 2.985 94 113 111 6.033 15.5i7 81 128 a. Minimum daii calorie requirements have been calculated by the WHO for each country. Per capita daily calorie supply data of 1988 have been divided by the requirement. Source: World Bank, The Challengp of Hunger in Africd - A Cat to M i o n . September 1988:FAO. Table 9. Sub-Saharan Africa: crude birth and death, infant, and child mortality rates, 1965, 1990 Child mortalily CN& binh Crude &arh lnfanr nwrtdily (underage 5) rareper 1,000 rareper 1.000 per 1.000 per 1.000 p&dfion ppu/dti~n /k b k h ~ /k bah5 Count + , 1965 1990 1965 1990 1965 1990 1%5 1990 Sub-hharan Africa 48 47 23 15 160 103 261 154 Low-income economies 49 47 23 16 165 107 269 160 Benin Burkina Faso Burundi Central African Rep. Comoros Chad Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mozambique Niger Nigeria Rwanda Slo Tomb and Principe Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan Tanzania Togo Uganda Zaire Zambia Middleincome economies Angola Botswana Cameroun Cape Verde Congo. People's Rep. Cdte d'lvoire Djibouti Gabon Mauntius Senegal Seychelles Swaziland Zimbabwe 62 India Chinla Source: World Bank. Table 10. Sub-Saharan Africa: population growth and fertility rates, 1965-1 990 Average annual gmwth Total fertility o f popubtion (percent) rate Country 1965-80 1980-88 1988-90 1965 1990 Sub-Saharan Africa 2.7 3.2 3.1 6.6 6.5 Low-income economies Benin Burkina Faso Burundi Central African Rep. Comoros Chad Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Gambia Ghana Guina Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho L~bbria Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mozambique Niger Nigeria Rwanda SBo Tomb and Principe . Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan Tanzania Togo Uganda Zaire Zambia Middle-income economies Angola Botswana Cameroun Cape Verde Congo, People's Rep. C6te d'lvoire Djibouti Gabon Mauritius Senegal Seychelles Swaziland Zimbabwe India China a. Total fertility rate (TFR) is the average number of children who would be born alive to a woman (or group of women) during her lifetime if she were to pass through her childbearing years conforming to the age-spec~fic fertility rates of a given year. Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1990; data for 1988-90 "Average annual population growth" and 1990 "Total ferblity rate" were derived from the 1991 rwlslon of World Bank demographic estimates and projections. Table 11. Sub-Saharan Africa: population estimates and projections based on targeted decline of 50 percent in total fertility rate by 2030 Population size Hypothetical size (millions) of stationary population ' Country 1980 1990 2020 2030 (millioru) Sub-Saharan Africa 380.1 532.0 1.233.2 1,539.6 3.039.7 Angda Benin Botswana Burkna Faw, Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde Central African Rep. Chad Comoror congo, people's Rep. C6te dd'lwire Djibouti Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Gabon Gambia. The Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Leroth~ Liberia Madagawar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius Mozambique Namibia N qer Nigeria Reunion Rwanda Y o Tome and Rincipe Seychelb Sierra Leone bmalia South Africa Sudan Swazland Tanzania Tog0 Uganda Zaire Zambia Zimbabwe lndta China a. Pmjection assumes that a 50 percent of decl'im in the total fenilii r a e from the 1985 level will be anained during 2025-30. These pmjMions asurrne thaf Ihe pace of decline in the hrmre will be significantb higher than has h i i o been ohmed. Annual population growth Assumed year @ercenV Total fertility rate of reaching Net Reproduction 19W95 2020-25 2025-30 19W95 2020-25 2025-2030 Rate = 1 ' 3.02 2.24 1.99 6.24 3.60 3.10 2055 b. Evm whm the Nct ReprodK(ion Rate (NRR) reack one, t k + s n W n n such that the number of ~amcnin, or yet to enter. their c h i l d k k q ysan giva riu to total births ereeding t k total rumber of deaths. The poplbtion, t - e , will hcrease la a furthcr conridcrab* period before reaching its hypometical stationary M.All countria a e pqected to reach statioMry population near the end of the 22d century. Source: World Bank. pnliminay 1991 elion of demographicatinate, and projections. Table 12. Sub-Saharan Africa: required contraceptive prevalence rates for achieving population projections in Table 11. Estimatedcontraceptive prevalence rat- @ercent, ' Country 1990 2020 2025 2030 - Angola 4.0 30.9 34.9 38.8 Botswana 35.8 63.5 68.1 72.8 Burkina Fax, 7.0 36.2 41.0 45.7 Burundi 12.5 46.9 52 1 57.2 Cameroon 7.9 42.4 47.6 52.6 Chad 6.1 35.2 39.9 44.4 Cote d'lvoire 7.8 41.7 46.8 51.7 Ethiopia 4.6 27.6 31.9 36.4 Ghana 16.8 53.8 59.7 65.7 Guinea 7.4 48.7 55.2 61.6 Kenya 28.1 63.6 72.1 78.8 Liberia 11.3 49.8 56.5 63.4 Madagascar 6.7 49.2 56.3 63.4 Malawi 4.9 30.7 34.6 38.5 Mali 7.0 29.6 33.4 37.2 Mozambique 4.6 36.4 41.2 45.8 Niger 5.0 24.1 27.2 30.1 Nigeria 9.2 49.5 56.0 62.4 Rwanda 13.5 39.7 44.4 49.1 Senegal 14.2 42.0 46.5 50.9 Somalia 5.7 33.4 38.3 43.2 Sudan 10.6 47.8 54.2 60.7 Tanzania 11.9 47.6 53.1 58.5 Togo 36.9 63.3 67.2 71.0 Uganda 7.2 40.1 45.7 51.4 Zaire 5.3 41.4 47.8 54.5 Zambia 8.2 41.7 47.6 53.5 Zimbabwe 45.8 72.8 77.3 81.9 All Sub-Saharan African countries 10.8 45.3 50.5 55.5 India 37.7 64.2 61.4 64.8 China 81.2 85.0 82.6 82.8 a. The estimated contraceptive prevalence rates (CPR) were derived by applying Bongaarts' model to available country-specific information including data on CPR. contraceptive mix, and proportion married, with assumptions on likely changes. (For countries without such informa- tion. proxy data from countries with a similar socio-cultural background were utilized.) The C P R estimates refer to the percentage of women aged 14-49 using contraception (both modern and traditional). For lndia and China, they refer to married women aged 15-44. Countries in the above table are selected on the basis of the size of population (over 5 million) an@or availability of Demographic and Health Surveys ~nformation.Phase I (Oct.1984-Sept. 1989). Source: World Bank Estimates: Demographic and Health Suwys of Resource Development/ Macro System. Inc.. Columbia, MD. Table 13. Demand for contraception and its components for currently married women ~ - - Demand for contraception Unmet nee& For For For For Countries Total spacing limiting Total spacing limiting Sub-Saharan Africa Botswana Burundi Ghana Kenya Liberia Mali Togo Uganda Zimbabwe North Africa EgYPt Morocco Tunisia Asia Indonesia Sri Lanka Thailand Latin American and the Carribean Bolivia Brazil Colombia Dominican Rep. Ecuador Guatemala Meaco PeN E l Salvador Trinidad and Tobago Note: All figures except the last column with selected countries are percent of currently married women. ~ o t ademand l t includes method failures, current use, and unmet need. ~ n m eneeds include non-use among women who would like to regulate their fertility. Percent of demand satisfied is the proportion of current use to total demand. Source: Charles F. Westoff, and Luis H. Ochoa. 1991. Unmet Need and the Demand for Family Planning. DHS Comparative Studies No. 5, Columbia. MD: Institute for Resource Dwelopment. Current use Percent of demand satisfied for For for For Total spacing limiting Total *pacing limiting Table 14. Developing countries by strength of family planning programs, 1989 Very w a k Strong Moderate Weak or none Bangladesh Algeria Afghanistan Argentina Botswana Ch~le Angola ' Bhutan China Colombia Benin * Cambodia El Salvador Costa Rica Bolivia Chad ' India Cuba Brazil Gabon ' Indonesia Dominican Rep Burkina Fa= Iraq Korea. Rep. Ecuador Burundi ' Cbte d'lvoire ' Meaco Egypt Cameroon ' Kuwait Sri Lanka Ghana Central African Rep. ' Lao, PDR Taiwan Guatemala Congo Liberia ' Thailand Guyana Ethiopia ' Libya Tunisia Honduras Guinea Malawi ' Vietnam Iran Guinea-Bissau Myanmar Jamaica Haiti Namibia Kenya Jordan Oman Korea, PDR Lesotho Saudi Arab Lebanon Madagascar ' Somalia ' Malays~a Mali ' Sudan ' Mauntlus Mauritania ' U.A.E. Morocco Mozambique ' Nepal Niger Pakistan Nigerii ' Panama Papua New Guinea Peru Paraguay Philippines Rwanda ' South Africa Senegal ' Singapore Sierra Lmne ' Trin. & Tobago Syria Venezuela Tanzania Zambia ' Togo Zimbabwe Turkey Uganda ' Uruguay Yemen Zaire Average score 53 Maximum possible score 120 Note: Program effort scores were divided into four groups: strong: 80+; moderate: 55-79; weak: 25-54; very weak or none: 0-24. Sub-Saharan African countries Source: W. Parker Mauldin and John A. Ross. "Family Planning Programs: Efforts and Results, 1982-1989' (1991). Table 15. Total fertility rates and desired family size for all women and currently married women, age 15-49 Desired fami& size Total fertility Mean, Mean, women Country DHS Year rate all women in union Botswana Burundi Ghana Kenya Liberia Mali Nigeria-Ondo State Senegal Togo Uganda Zimbabwe a. Based on 0-4 years prior to survey. b. Data based on b~rths to women aged 1544. c. Data available only for 0-6 years pnor to survey. Source: Demographic and Health Surveys, Phase I (Oct. 1984-Sep. 1989), Institute of Resource DevelopmenVMacro System. Inc., Columba. MD. Table 16. Sub-Saharan Africa: environmental indicators Fuehvaod and charcml Foresf and Debmstatan. 1980s Relbresta- Annual d b n d lion, 1980s production Percentage 1980s Thousand (thousad nhousand incease nhousand Percent hecrams hecrams cubic meters) since Counrry hecramzl peryear peryear peryear) 1984-86 1974-76 Sub-hharan Africa 658.314 0.5 3.259 91 369.531 NA Low-income economies 485,080 0.5 2.368 72 333.361 NA Benin Burkina Fax, Burundi Central African Rep. Comoros Chad Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mozambique Niger Nigaria Rwanda SAo Tome and Principe Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan Tanzania Togo Uganda Zare Zambia Middle-income economies 173,234 0.5 891 19 36,170 NA Angola 53.600 0.2 84 0 3,903 34 Botswana 32.560 0.1 20 1,107 46 Cameroon 25.620 0.4 110 1 9,134 30 Cape Verde 0 Congo, People's Rep. .. 0.1 22 2 1.585 29 C6te d'lvoire 9.834 5.2 510 3 7.970 45 Djibouti 106 .. Gabon 20,575 0.1 15 2,525 15 Mauritius 0 1 14 -36 Senegal 11,045 0.5 50 2 3.505 33 Seychelles Swaztland 74 .. 0 5 560 20 Zimbabwe 19.820 0.4 80 5 5,867 41 Note: Refers only to areas larger than 4.000square kilometers. NA indicates not available. Source: World Bank, Sub-Saharan Afr~car From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, 1989. Table 16. Sub-Saharan Africa: environmental indicators (cont.) l l ~ mrwdwd: CdsntiR area and m w m : swr- a n d padvcrion Wikmes swrage a n n d marine catch @holMndcubicmter$ ara Par*agC Percentape Furentage of totd Lerglh 1983-85 incmse chsnpc r i m M a m a cbattlinc @housdnd since county 1984-86 1974-76 1985 &mJ meCriCtonsl1974-76 Sub-Saharan Africa 40,126 NA NA 25,006 1.198 NA Low-income economies 26.430 NA NA 18,957 691 NA Benin Burkina Fax, Burundi Central African Rep. Comoros Chad Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mozambique Niger Nigeria Rwanda Sao Torn4 and Principe Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan Tanzania Togo Uganda Zaire Zarn bia Middleincome economies Angola 997 -8 26 1.600 78 Botswana 73 49 63 Cameroon 2.702 71 3 402 32 Cape Verde 0 965 11 Congo, People's Rep. 849 49 42 169 20 Cbte d'lvoire 4,030 -19 16 515 67 Djibouti 0 314 0 Gabon 1,484 -6 35 885 49 Mauritius 5 -72 NM 177 11 Senegal 546 37 11 531 235 Seychelles 49 1 4 Swaziland 1,663 -10 0 Zirn babwe 1,347 55 0 72 Note: NM indicates not meaningful; NA indicates not available. Source: World Bank. Sub-Saharan AFrica: Fmm Cruu to Sustainable Gmwth. 1989. Table 17. Sub-Saharan Africa: wildlife habitat loss in Afrotropical nations, 1986 Orgiml wWIMIife habitat Amount (square remaining Loss Country kilometers) (square kilometers) (percenv Angola 1.246.7 760.9 39 Benin 115.8 46.3 60 8otswana 585.4 257.6 56 Burkina Faso 273.8 54.8 80 Burundi 25.7 3.6 86 Cameroon 469.4 192.4 59 Central African Rep. 623.0 274.1 56 Chad 720.8 173.0 76 Congo 342.0 174.4 49 Cbte d'kroire 318.0 66.8 79 Djibouti 21.8 11.1 49 Equatorial Guinea 26.0 12.8 51 Ethiopia 1,101.0 30.3 70 Gabon 267.0 173.6 35 Gambia 11.3 1.2 89 Ghana 230.0 46.0 80 Guinea 245.9 73.8 70 Guinea-Bissau 36.1 8.0 78 Kenya 569.5 296.1 48 Lesotho 30.4 9.8 68 Liberia 111.4 14.4 87 Madagascar 595.2 148.9 75 Malawi 94.1 40.4 57 Mali 754.1 158.3 79 Maur~tania 388.6 73.9 81 Mozambique 783.2 36.8 57 Niger 566.6 127.9 77 Nigeria 919.8 230.0 75 Rwanda 25.1 3.2 87 Senegal 196.2 35.3 82 Sierra Leone 71.7 10.8 . 85 Somalia 637.7 376.2 41 Sudan 1.703.0 O 51 1. 70 Swaziland 17.4 7.7 56 Tanzania 886.2 505.1 43 Togo 56.0 19.0 66 Uganda 193.7 42.7 78 Zaire 2,335.9 1,051.1 55 Zambia 752.6 534.3 29 Zimbabwe 390.2 171.7 56 Total 18,737.4 6.765.3 64 - - Namibia 823.2 444.5 46 South Africa 1,236.5 531.7 57 Note: Habitat is a place or type of site where a plant or animal naturally or normally lives and grows. The Afrotropical realm is defined as all of the continent south of the Sahara Desert, including the island of Madagascar. Therefore, data for Mauritania. Mali. Niger. Chad, and Sudan cover only parts of these countries. Comoros, Seychelles. SBo Tome and Principe. Mauritius. Rodrigws, Reunion, and the extreme southeastern corner of Egypt are not included. Some: World Resource Institute and International Institute for Environment and Development (in collaboration with UN Environment Programme), WorW Retourcet 1988-89, 1988. Table 18. Sub-Saharan Africa: current account balances Current account annual awrage Share o f GNP (milfions of US$) (percent) Country 197072 1979-81 1986-89 1970-72 1979-81 1986-89 Sub-bharan Africa -1,259 -7.531 -6,440 -2.8 -4.0 -4.3 Low-income economies -981 -4,650 4,017 -2.6 -3.0 -3.9 Benin Burkina Faso Burundi Central African Rep. Comoros Chad Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Gambia, The Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mozambique Niger Nigeria Rwanda Slo Tome and Principe S~erra Leone Somalia Sudan Tanzania Togo Uganda Zaire Zamb~a - - Middleincome economies -278 -2.881 -2.423 -4.2 -9.3 -5.4 Angola Botswana Cameroun Cape Verde Congo. People's Rep. Cbte d'lvoire Djibouti Ga w n Mauritius Senegal Seychelles Swaziland Zimbabwe India -353.3 -1.897 -6.906 -0.6 -1.2 -2.7 Chtna -1 12.3 898 4.582 -0.1 0.3 -1.4 74 a. Includes all official transfers. Source: World Bank. World Debt Tables 1990-91. Table 19. Sub-Saharan Africa: total external debt and debt service ratios (US$millions) Percentage o f GNP Country 1970 1980 1989 1970 1980 1989 Sub-Saharan Africa 5,678 56,201 146,988 13.8 28.2 97.3 Low-income economies 4.606 41.592 110.011 16.7 26.4 99.3 Benin Burkina Faso Burundi Central African Rep. Comoros Chad Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Gambia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho Llberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Moza m bique Niger N~geria Rwanda Y o Tomb and Principe Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan Tanzan~a Togo Uganda Za~re Zam bia Middle-incomeeconomies - - - Angola Botswana Cameroon Cape Verde Congo, People's Rep. CBte d'lvo~re Djlbouti Gabon Mauriitius Senegal Seychelles Swaziland Zimbabwe India China Note: Includes publu and private non-governmental. IMF, and. except for 1970. shm-term debt. Source: World Bank. WorldDebt Tables 1990-91 Total debt Debt service payments as per capita a percentage of exports ($US) of goods and sentices Table 20. Sub-Saharan Africa: amortization payments (US5 million9 Amortization (after rescheduling) Country 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1989 Sub-bharan Africa 2.998 3.399 5.235 5.828 5.085 4.738 Low-income economies 1.758 2,144 Benin 6 9 Burkina Fax, 11 8 Burundi 4 3 Central African Rep, 7 3 Comoros 0 0 Chad 5 1 Equatorial Guinea 2 3 Ethiopia 17 36 Ga mbia 0 11 Ghana 100 45 Guinea 78 59 Guinea-Bissau 3 2 Kenya 216 277 Lmtho 3 5 Liberia 18 19 Madagascar 33 39 Malavi 34 44 Mali 9 4 Mauritania 26 20 Mozambique Niger 57 158 Nigeria 241 833 Rwanda 3 3 SAo Tome and Principe 1 2 Sierra Leone 49 14 Somalia 11 10 Sudan 130 131 Tanzania 88 57 Togo 27 20 Uganda 33 47 Zaire 277 85 Zambia 269 196 Middlcincome economies 1.240 1,255 Angola Botswana 6 4 Cameroon 131 199 Cape Verde 0 0 Congo. People's Rep. 55 123 Cbte d'lvoire 558 608 Djibouti 2 2 Gabon 286 193 Mauritius 19 39 Senegal 135 28 Seychelles 0 0 Swaziland 8 12 Zimbabwe 40 47 India China Note: Excludes short-term debt. Source. World Bank, Worfd Debt Tabks 1990-91 Table 21. Sub-Saharan Africa: debt, amortization, and interest payments, 1989 (US$ millions) Commercial Debt and &bt Worm bonds and Other Private sem'cepayments Bsnk BC ottRrprivdte muhi- non- Sub-Saharan Africa IMF Gmup lateral gudranteed lateral guaranteed Total - Debt outstanding and disbursed Low income 5.343 17,088 44,727 22,827 7,473 2,087 99,545 Other 1,037 4.314 11,366 7.627 2,436 4.656 31,438 Total 6.380 21.402 56.094 30.454 9.909 6.744 130,982 India 1,566 19,136 13,707 21.405 528 1,478 57,820 China 908 4,6W 6.173 26.108 157 0 37.950 - - Amortization Low income 1.003 425 412 619 248 97 2,804 Other 307 234 11 1 464 132 686 1.934 Total 1.310 659 523 1,083 380 784 4.738 India 1.008 450 567 579 17 309 2,930 China 79 62 406 1.932 1 0 2.481 Interest payments Low ~ncome 206 422 500 1,006 165 70 2,370 Other 77 272 242 216 113 284 1,204 Total 283 693 742 1.223 279 354 3.574 lndia China Note: Excludes short-term debt. a. After debt relief. b. Including short-term debt, this would be USS146.9 billion -as shown in Table 19. Source: World Bank, WorM Debt Tabks 1990-91. Table 22. Sub-Saharan Africa: net financial transfers, 1980-1 989 (US$ millions) To Low-income Africa IMF World Bank Group Other multilaterals Bilateral loans Commercial banks Other private loans ODA grants ' ODA tech. cooper. grants Total 8,750 9,418 To other countries IMF World Bank Group Other multilaterals Bilateral loans Commercial banks Other prlvate loans ODA grants ' ODA tech. cooper. grants Total To Sub-Saharan Africa IMF World Bank Group Other multilaterals Bilateral loans Commercial banks Other private loans ODA grants ' ODAlech, cooper. grants Total Direct investment (DAC) Total net transfer 12.514 Plus debt service (after debt relief ) 5,274 Less direct investment 1,000 Total gross disbursements 16,788 (of which OECD bilateral ODA) (4.991) To India IMF 1,010 1,824 -307 -965 -1.443 -1,192 World Bank Group 639 1,153 748 676 1.516 942 Other multilaterals 37 58 25 7 131 57 Bilateral loans -87 -247 -77 27 79 459 Commercial banks 347 -40 56 298 -309 453 Other private loans -15 320 920 541 130 -646 ODA grants 648 455 583 596 722 756 ODA tech, cooper. g r a m 151 172 172 226 316 332 Total 2,730 3.695 2.120 1,406 1,142 1.161 Direct investment (DAC) 79 72 19 118 91 Note. Excludes short-term debt. a. Techn~cal cooperation grants are not included. 79 b. Not separately available for low-income and other countries. c. Data for 1989 are not yet available; this is an approximation. Source: World Bank. World Debt Tabks 1990-91, and OECD, Geographical Distribution o f Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 1991 (unpublished). Table 22. Sub-Saharan Africa: net financial transfers, Total To China IMF World Bank Group Other multilaterals Bilateral loans Commercial banks Other private loans ODA grants' ODA tech. cooper. grants Total Direct investment (DAO Total 1,688 128 739 5,413 5,645 Table 23. Sub-Saharan Africa: gross disbursements of official development assistance, 1989 Ratio o f Per capita dubutsements Disbursements disbutsements to GNP Country flJSS milliond WSS) (percent, Sub-Saharan Africa 14,035.1 29 8.9 Low-income economics 11,403.6 27 10.3 Benin Burlrind Faso Burundi Central African Rep. Comoros Chad Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Ga mbia Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Moza mbique Niger Nigeria Rwanda SBo Tome and Principe Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan Tanzania Togo Uganda Zaire Zambia Middleincome economies Angola Botswana Cameroon Cape Verde Congo. People's Rep. C6te d'tvoire Djibouti Gabon Mauritius Senegal Seychelles Swaziland Zimbabwe India 1,736.9 2 0.7 China 2,145.2 2 0.5 81 N o t e ODA figures in this table reflect donor records and therefore are not comparable to figures underlying Table 26. which reflect recipient records. The 114.0 b~lliontotal 1989 ODA for Sub-Saharan Africa in this table would compare with 19.8 billion for average 1987-89 in Table 26; unrecorded technical assistance, which amounted to about 13.4 billion in 1989, accounts for most of the difference. Source: World Bank; OECD, GeographicalDistribution of Financial Flows to Developing Table 24. Sub-Saharan Africa: OECD official development assistance, 1989 Sub-Saharan Gross Africa Ratio o f ODA dubursements share in to Sub-Saharan to Sub-Saharan Africa total ODA Africa to donor GNP OECD country (US$ millionsl (percenu (percentl Australia 66 9.3 0.02 Austria 41 16.3 0.03 Belgium 214 58.5 0.14 Canada 446 27.5 0.08 Denmark 30 1 53.4 0.30 Finland 222 50.9 0.20 France 3.170 49.3 0.33 Germany. Fed. Rep. 1,036 27.0 0.09 Ireland 12 63.2 0.04 Italy 1,084 46.4 0.13 Japan 1,151 14.6 0.04 Netherlands 494 30.1 0.22 New Zealand 1 1.3 0.00 Norway 285 O 51 . 0.32 Sweden 464 36.3 0.25 Switzerland 151 35.5 0.08 United Kingdom 73 1 45.4 0.09 United States 765 10.0 0.01 Total bilateral 10,634 (8,718) 28.2 (39.4)b 0.08 (0.1 5) Total multilateral 3,401 Total 14,035 Note: Bilateral official development assistance; excludes contributions through multilateral institutions. a. Includes technical cooperation grants. b. Figures in parentheses exclude Japan and the USA. Sources: OECD, Geographical Distribution o f Financial Flows, 199l(unpublished); World Bank. Table 25. Sub-Saharan Africa: Required gross disbursements including debt relief, 1991-1993 (annual average, US$ millions) Balance o f payments support Project financing - World Bank Total ODA Others Debt relief and IMF Other IDA-only countries Benin Burkina Faso Burundi Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Comoros Dj~bout~ Equatorial Guinea Eth~opia Gambia. The Ghana Guinea Guinea-Bissau Kenya Lesotho bberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mozambique Niger Rwanda Sao Tome and Principe Senegal Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan Tanzania Togo Uganda Zaire Zambia Other countries Angola Botswana Cameroon Congo CBte d'lvoire Gabon Mauritius Nigeria Seychelles Swaziland Zimbabwe All Sub-Saharan Africa Note: The totals do not include countnes for which information is not available. a. Gross disbursements basis. Figures are not directly comparable to OECD grant information in Table 2 2 . b. Includes nonconcessional loans and direa investment. c. Includes rescheduling by Paris Club. London Club, and other creditors; cancellation of ODA debt, and debt buybacks. Flgures are net of moratorium charges on reschedulings. d. Primarily support for adjustment programs but includes emergency relief and general budgetary support. C-..--. tA#-.lA m--L Table 26. Sub-Saharan Africa: prospective gross disbursements including debt relief, 1991-2000 (annual average, US$ billions) 1987-89 1991-93 1994-2000 All Sub-Saharan Africa 26.5 29.8 28.2 Gross loan disbursements - non-ODA 5.9 2.8 5.2 - ODA 4.3 5.5 ' 7.2 - Official transfers ODA 5.5 7.6 ' 10.4 Direct foreign investment 1.5 1.2 1.7 Debt relief ' 7.3 a 9.4 0.5 Other 2.0 0.9 Residual gap 0.0 2.4 3.2 IDA-only countries 14.5 20.1 22.9 Gross loan disbursements - non-ODA 1.8 0.8 1.1 - ODA 3.8 4.2 7.0 Official transfers - ODA 5.3 7.4 10.5 Direct foreign investment 0.1 0.2 0.3 Debt relief 2.6 a 6.0 1.1 Other 0.9 Residual gap 0.0 1.5 2.9 Other countries 12.0 9.7 5.3 Gross loan disbursements - non-ODA 4.1 2.0 4.1 - ODA 0.5 1.3 0.2 - Official transfers ODA 0.2 0.2 -0.1 Direct foreign investment 1.4 1.O 1.4 Debt relief 4.7 a 3.4 -0.6 Other ' 1.1 Residual gap 0.0 1.B 0.3 All Sub-Saharan Africa 26.5 29.8 28.2 Direct foreign investment 1.5 1.2 1.7 ODA grants 5.5 7.6 10.4 Debt relief 7.3 * 9.4 0.5 IMF 0.9 0.9 World Bank Group 2.5 2.8 3.1 Other multilateral 1.3 1.5 1.9 Bilateral 2.3 2.5 3.2 Commercial banks 1.9 0.8 1.5 Other private 1.3 0.7 2.7 Other ' 2.0 Residual gap 0.0 2.4 3.2' Note: The projections in this table for 1991-93 and 1994-2000 reflect a "mean' between high and low estimates of external financial flows. a. These projected ODA increases from $9.8 billion in 1987-89 to $13.1 billion in 1991-93 assume additional countries will undertake adjustment programs. b. Figures exclude technical cooperation grants, which. for all SubSaharan Africa, amounted to $3.5 billion in 1987-89. c. Preliminary. d. Net of moratorium debt service on rescheduled debt; assumes continuation of Paris Club terms in effect in 1990. e. Additional short-term loans, use of reserves, and accumulation of arrears. f. Includes IMF disbursements. Source: 1987-89: World Bank files; 1991-2000: World Bank estimates and Jorge Culagovski, Wctor Gabor. Maria Cristina Germany, and Charles P. Humphreys, "African Financing Needs in the 1990s: A World Bank Symposium" (forthcoming). Figure 1: Proportions of married women desiring no more children by age group '"I 0 Ghana IBurundi IKenya 1Togo IEk~mm 0 Zimbabwe