Public Public Disclosure SUSTA I Disclosure Authorized East Public and Pac i fic Public Disclosure NABLE Developm ent Authorized As i a Disclosure Authorized R egion Authorized D i s March 2011 c u s s i o n Community-Driven Experiences from East Asia P a p e 61225 and Conf lict-Affected Areas r Development in Post-Conf lict s Election of local project officials, Aceh Community-Driven Development in Post-Conflict and Conflict-Affected Areas Experiences from East Asia Background Paper for the 2011 World Development Report March 2011 Patrick Barron © 2011 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / THE WORLD BANK 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433, U.S.A. Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org/eapenvironment/sea-asia E-mail: feedback@worldbank.org All rights reserved. March 2011 This volume is a product of the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank. 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For permission to photocopy or reprint any part of this work, please send a request with complete information to the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA, telephone 978-750-8400, fax 978-750-4470, www.copyright.com. All other queries on rights and licenses, including subsidiary rights, should be addressed to the Office of the Publisher, The World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA, fax 202-522-2422, e-mail pubrights@worldbank.org. Photo credits: Cover photo by the World Bank team, Mindanao, the Philippines; all other photos by the World Bank team, Aceh, Indonesia. iii CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS v 1. INTRODUCTION 1 2. CONFLICT AND CDD IN EAST ASIA 3 2.1 A Picture of violent Conflict in East Asia and the Pacific 3 2.2 CDD projects in violence-affected areas 6 3. CHALLENGES, AIMS, AND CAUSAL MECHANISMS 11 3.1 (Post) Conflict Challenges and CDD Aims 11 3.2 Mechanisms 14 4. THE IMPACTS OF CDD IN POST-CONFLICT AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED AREAS 17 4.1 Dealing with Economic Deprivation 17 4.2 Promoting stability 19 4.3 Strengthening Institutions 22 5. CONCLUSIONS 25 REFERENCES 27 FIGURE 1 The Theory of CDD in Conflict-Affected and Post-Conflict Areas 12 TABLES 1 Examples of Current Conflict Contexts in East Asia 5 2 Some CDD projects in violent conflict-affected East Asia 7 3 Estimated unit cost savings of CDD approach 19 4 Development Conflicts and Their Impacts in Indonesia 21 Community Theater Peace Program in Aceh v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS T he author thanks Sean Bradley, Gillie Brown, sion are the responsibility of the author alone. As a World Sarah Cliffe, Scott Guggenheim, Bert Hofman, Bank Sustainable Development Department Discussion Sana Jaffrey, Mary Judd, Markus Kostner, Julien Papers series document, this paper is intended to stimu- Labonne, Dave McRae, Adrian Morel, Andrew late further discussion on the topic. Any comments in Parker, Ben Powis, Susan Wong, and Rob Wrobel for relation should be directed to the author, Patrick Barron, providing comments on drafts of this paper. This docu- Nuffield College, Oxford University—patrick.barron@ ment, however, does not represent the official views of nuffield.ox.ac.uk, and copied to Sean Bradley of the the World Bank Group and any errors of fact or omis- World Bank—sbradley@worldbank.org. Aceh women reading Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding to end the civil conflict 1 1. iNTRODUCTiON C ommunity-driven development (or CDD) proj- hesion, and eroding institutions. The result can be a vi- ects are now a major component of World Bank cious cycle of deprivation and insecurity from which it is assistance to many developing countries. While difficult to emerge. Doing development in such contexts varying greatly in size and form, such projects aim is extremely hard. Even where violence has not escalat- to ensure that communities have substantive control in ed, localized conflict may provide the sparks for future deciding how project funds should be used.1 The propo- fires, and development programs can become implicated nents of CDD believe that giving beneficiaries the pow- in cycles of violence. er to manage project resources will lead to more efficient and effective use of financial resources. It is also claimed CDD is viewed by its proponents as an appropriate ve- that project-initiated participatory processes can have hicle for alleviating poverty and enhancing security in wider ‘spillover’ impacts, building local institutions and such environments. Effective CDD projects can dis- leadership, enhancing civic capacity, improving social re- tribute resources quickly and to remote, rural areas. In lations and boosting state legitimacy. devolving decision-making they can can operate in areas with security risks and help ensure resource distribution Given these claims, it is unsurprising that CDD projects is fair and popularly accepted. Programs may also have are increasingly utilized in areas affected by localized or peace-building impacts: incentivizing forms of collective escalated violent conflict and in post-conflict areas. Such action that can work across conflict divides; contributing places face multifold challenges. In areas with pervasive to local institution building; and strengthening vertical localized violence, there are risks that conflict may esca- society-state linkages. CDD is increasingly viewed as a late. In higher conflict and post-conflict areas, poverty useful mechanism for preventing the emergence of vio- levels are usually high and welfare outcomes low. The lence and to continue channeling development aid in its stability and social cohesion necessary for development wake (World Bank 2006). The World Bank has devel- is frequently lacking, as are strong and legitimate insti- oped an approach for conflict-affected and post-conflict tutions to manage conflict and address poverty. violent areas that utilizes CDD alongside support to supply- conflict is more likely to (re)emerge in such areas, lead- side reforms and outcomes that cannot be achieved at a ing to further impoverishment, undercutting social co- community level.2 1. Projects usually involve the provision of block grants to localities; communities, sometimes competing with each other, propose any project within a more-or-less open menu and then have decision- 2. See Cliffe, Guggenheim, and Kostner (2003) for a summary. making power over which projects should receive support. Local Ghani and Lockhart (2008) discuss the model with particular choice usually extends to procuring goods and project mechanisms reference to Afghanistan. That country’s National Solidarity aim to ensure that a wide section of the population (including Programme (or NSP) is probably the largest CDD program working marginalized groups) participates. in areas of severe conflict. 2 C D D i N P O S T- CO N F L i C T A N D CO N F L i C T- A F F E C T E D A R E A S This paper briefly reviews the World Bank’s experience what factors—related to project design or to the con- of using CDD in conflict-affected and post-conflict text in which programs are operating—have affected areas of the East Asia and Pacific region.3 The region performance? This paper provides a framework for as- has been at the forefront of developing large-scale sessing the impacts of CDD projects in post-conflict CDD programming including high profile ‘flagships’ and conflict-affected areas.5 It tries to unpack the po- such as the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) tential causal channels through which projects may in Indonesia and the Kapit Bisig Laban Sa Kahirapan– have their desired, or other, impacts. It then looks at the Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Ser- evidence on whether and how projects have achieved vices (KALAHI-CIDSS) project in the Philippines. As these outcomes, focusing on a range of recent and cur- of 2007, CDD constituted 15 percent of the lending rent projects in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and portfolio in East Asia compared with 10 percent glob- Timor-Leste. The analysis summarizes results, draws on ally (World Bank 2007a: 2).4 Many of East Asia’s CDD comparative evidence from other projects in the region projects have operated—consciously or not—in areas af- and elsewhere, and seeks to identify factors that explain fected by protracted violent conflict. CDD has also been variation in outcomes and project performance. The pa- used as an explicit mechanism for post-conflict recovery per concludes with a short summary of what we know, in Mindanao in the Philippines and in Timor-Leste, and what we don’t, and potential future directions for re- for reintegrating conflict victims in Aceh, Indonesia. search and programming. How successful have such efforts been? Through what mechanisms have projects had impacts (or not)? And 5. The paper builds upon previously published reviews and studies, 3. The paper refers to the countries in the EAP region as East Asia. including papers on CDD in East Asia (World Bank 2007a) and in Conflict-affected areas include both areas with pervasive localized Conflict-Affected Countries (World Bank 2006), project reports and violence and with larger-scale violent conflict. documentation, evaluations, and the personal experiences of some of those who have worked on CDD programming in the region. It 4. Mansuri and Rao (2004: 2) argue that World Bank lending for should be noted upfront that the quality of evidence on different CDD has been rising and estimate that globally by 2003, US$7 projects varies massively. For some projects, notably KDP/PNPM in billion had been lent for such projects. Indonesia, a large amount of research has been conducted. For others, findings cited in this paper are more anecdotal. 3 2. CONFLiCT AND CDD iN EAST ASiA 2.1 A Picture of Violent Most deadly is Mindanao where over 120,000 have been killed in fighting since the 1970s with two separatist Conflict in East Asia and the groups (the MNLF and MILF) seeking independence (Schiavo-Campo and Judd 2005). While a peace deal Pacific with the MNLF, which resulted in the Autonomous I Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), has generally ntra-state violent conflict of varying forms and lev- held, an agreement between the national government els impacts most countries in the region.6 Conflict- and the MILF has not been reached and fighting con- related fatalities are slight compared to many other tinues in parts of the island, including with a radical regions in the world, in part because violent conflicts separatist Islamic group, Abu Sayyaf (ICG 2008). In have often been localized.7 Over recent years, violence Mindanao and elsewhere in the country, there have also levels have also de-escalated in a number of the major been battles between the military and the armed wing of conflicts in the region. Nevertheless, a number of states the Communist party, the New People’s Army (Plough- are struggling with large-scale armed violence and/or shares 2009). are struggling to emerge from violent conflict. Local- ized forms of violence—destructive, as well—also affect Myanmar’s post-independence history has been marked large swathes of the region. by numerous violent conflicts between different groups and the state, with every significant ethnic group in re- Large-scale armed violent conflicts volt at some point or other (ICG 2004: 12). Some of these groups have signed peace agreements, but violent The current large-scale armed conflicts in the region are conflict continues in many border areas. sub-national insurgencies in Mindanao in the Philip- pines, Myanmar’s border areas, and southern Thailand. violent conflict in southern Thailand is prevalent in the historically contested Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and 6. There have been no inter-state wars in the region in the past Songkala provinces. Around 4,000 lives have been lost decade. Tensions exist between North and South Korea, and since 2004 with violence intensifying in 2009 (ICG small disputes have taken place between a number of countries (e.g. between Thailand and Cambodia and between Malaysia and 2009a; Pathan 2009). Much of the violence is local- Indonesia over disputed territory). Yet, by and large, these have not ized—local-level grievances meld with the broader nar- escalated into larger-scale violence. rative of ethno-national separatist contention, leading to 7. According to the Geneva Secretariat for Armed violence (2008: varying patterns of unrest. 16), there were 5,410 direct conflict deaths in East and Southeast Asia between 2004 and 2007. This figure, which includes only reported deaths from conflicts that have killed at least 100 people, is 3 percent of the global total. 4 C D D i N P O S T- CO N F L i C T A N D CO N F L i C T- A F F E C T E D A R E A S ‘Post-conflict’ areas Cambodia, which subsided somewhat in the early 1990s with the arrival of a UN mission, has had impacts that Many other areas in the region have experienced recent shape society and politics to the present day. large-scale violent conflict. While such places are cur- rently considered ‘post-conflict’, many are experiencing challenges in maintaining peace.8 Worldwide, risks of Localized violence violent conflict resumption in such areas remain high.9 Across East Asia, persistent localized violence is com- Even where large-scale violent conflict does not re-occur, mon. Conflict is an inevitable outcome of processes of new forms of violent conflict and crime often emerge social, political and economic change (Polanyi 1944, (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008). Bates 2000); where effective institutions are not in place to manage these pressures, conflict can become vio- In Timor-Leste, for example, widespread violence re- lent. Such violent incidents tend to be much smaller in emerged in May 2006 leading to large-scale displace- scale—involving fewer actors and with smaller impacts ment and the return of international security person- per incident. Yet, collectively, localized violence can have nel from Australia and New Zealand. Localized gang significant human security impacts and can cause chal- violence involving youth is also prevalent. In the words lenges for the operation of CDD and other develop- of one assessment, “Timor-Leste currently offers an ment projects. enabling environment for violence and crime” (World Bank 2007b: 3). The spread and scope of such violence is less well docu- mented than the larger-scale conflicts discussed above. A number of Indonesia’s regions are emerging from pro- In the southern Philippines, rido, or family feuds, some- tracted violence. The fall of Suharto’s New Order gov- times escalate into inter-community violence. A total of ernment in 1998 was accompanied by inter-communal 1,266 rido cases occurring between the 1930s and 2005 violence in the Maluku Islands, Central Sulawesi and have been documented, with around 5,000 killed and parts of Indonesian Borneo killing around 8,000 people thousands displaced (Torres 2007). Many areas in the (varshney, Tadjoeddin and Panggabean 2008); these vi- Philippines have a problem with localized political vio- olent conflicts had largely de-escalated by 2002 through lence; in late November 2009, 57 men and women, in- a combination of policing and military operations and cluding supporters of a rival to the incumbent mayor of informal domestic peace settlements. In Aceh, where a Maguindanao province and journalists, were killed in a three-decade separatist conflict resulted in almost 30,000 brutal massacre as they were on their way to register his deaths, a 2005 peace agreement has held (MSR 2010). candidacy for an upcoming election (ICG 2009b). Other ‘post-conflict’ areas in the region include Bou- In Indonesia, ‘routine’ violence also appears to be rife gainville in Papua New Guinea, where a separatist up- (Mansoob Murshed, Tadjoeddin and Chowdhury 2009; rising in the late 1980s and 1990s led to 10,000-15,000 Barron and Sharpe 2008). Welsh (2008: 481), for ex- deaths. In the Solomon Islands, ethnic violence broke out ample, records over 5,500 victims from vigilante lynch- in the late 1990s displacing tens of thousands. In 2003 ings in just four provinces between 1995 and 2004. In an Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solo- some areas, such as Papua, routine violence mixes with mon Islands (RAMSI) arrived to try to help consolidate and accentuates other forms of contention, including peace. If one goes further back, large-scale violence in separatism. Other countries, such as Papua New Guinea, experi- 8. I use the term ‘post-conflict’ to signify areas where large-scale violent unrest has reduced signficiantly. Of course, conflict, and ence high levels of localized tribal conflict. Xinjiang and indeed violence, is often still present in many of these areas. Tibet in China has experienced long-running sporadic 9. Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom (2008) find that countries separatist uprisings (Dwyer 2005). emerging from civil war face a 40 percent chance of conflict resumption within ten years. EXPERiENCES FROM EAST ASiA 5 Varying contexts variation not only exists between countries. Within states, some areas are affected by violence while others There is thus immense diversity in the forms that vio- remain relatively peaceful. Significant violence, for ex- lence has taken in the region. In some areas, large-scale ample, is taking place in southern Thailand and political violence has focused on challenging the sovereignty competition has turned violent in Bangkok and other of the central state. In others, violence has been inter- urban areas. Yet other parts of the country remain largely communal, although often driven by underlying politi- unaffected. Even locally, conflict conditions and impacts cal tensions. In some places, security responses or peace can vary massively. And conflict conditions vary over settlements have formally ended violence. In others, time; ebbing and flowing violence patterns makes it hard unrest continues. In some ‘post-conflict’ areas, forms of to characterize the conflict environment in a particular localized violence have emerged, with the potential for locality. Table 1 provides an overview of conflict condi- large-scale violence to reoccur, while others are (relative- tions in the four countries considered in this paper.10 ly) peaceful. In many areas that have not been affected by large-scale armed violence, local violent conflicts are 10. The lack of information on localized violence in most countries common and may provide the seeds for future larger- should be noted. By and large conflict studies, by scholars and scale unrest. practitioners alike, have tended to focus on large-scale escalated Table 1 Examples of Current Conflict Contexts in East Asia Country Large-scale violence (ongoing) Large-scale violence (ended) Localized violence Indonesia - Aceh: Common across most provinces. – separatist violence ended by peace Forms include land conflict and settlement, 2005 vigilante violence. In some places (such as Papua) this is linked to Maluku Islands, C Sulawesi, W and broader unrest. C Kalimantan: - inter-communal violence greatly reduced by peace agreements and/ or security responses, 2001-2002 Philippines Mindanao: Mindanao: Politically-related violence, and - Government vs. MILF - Government vs. MNLF rido feuds particularly prominent Government vs. Abu Sayyaf and deadly Group National: - Government vs. NPA Thailand South: - Bangkok/urban areas: - Government vs. separatist - Political unrest group Timor-Leste - National: - Isolated gang violence in parts - Post-referendum violence (1999) of Dili and some districts - Isolated incidents relating to Dili: development projects - Widespread riots and street - Domestic violence thought to be violence (2006); regular youth gang widespread and election-related violence (2007), often connected to land disputes 6 C D D i N P O S T- CO N F L i C T A N D CO N F L i C T- A F F E C T E D A R E A S 2.2 CDD projects in violence- KDP ran in Aceh from 1998 during a period of intense separatist insurgency and counter-insurgency. After a affected areas 2005 peace agreement, a new local government agency, the Badan Reintegrasi Aceh (BRA), was established to Most countries in the region have, or have had, World support the reintegration of former rebel combatants Bank-supported CDD programs. As of late 2006, there and conflict-affected civilians. One resulting program were 17 active CDD programs in East Asia.11 The cur- was BRA-KDP which adapted the KDP model to pro- rent and pipeline portfolio includes CDD projects in vide US$22.7 million of government money to conflict Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Laos, Mongolia, the Phil- victims in one round of grants. With separate programs ippines, PNG, the Solomon Islands, Thailand, Timor- to support them, ex-combatants were excluded from Leste, and vietnam. benefitting. Despite having the same open menu as regular KDP, communities chose to use most funds for Many of these projects are operating in areas that are private goods. This was a result of communities view- affected by violent conflict. This paper focuses on a se- ing BRA-KDP as providing compensation for conflict lection of current and recent CDD operations in four hardships, of the widespread need for capital following countries—Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and the conflict’s end, and of messages from BRA’s leader- Timor-Leste (Table 2).12 ship that individual assistance should be prioritized. An explicit aim of the project is to support social cohesion at the local level. A planned second round, covering the re- indonesia maining villages in Aceh, did not happen after a change of leadership at BRA. The Kecamatan Development Program (KDP), recently re-titled the National Community Development Program (PNPM-Mandiri to use its Indonesian acronym), is the Philippines largest CDD project in the world. Starting in the im- mediate aftermath of the 1998 Asian Financial Crisis, A range of CDD projects operate concurrently in the the program has scaled-up to cover every rural village in Philippines. The largest is the US$ 182.4 million KA- Indonesia. By 2011, the cumulative budget for the pro- LAHI-CIDDS. Launched in 2002, KALAHI is active gram will be over US$ 3 billion. KDP/PNPM was not in the 42 poorest provinces (out of 80) in the country. initially intended to be a ‘conflict project’. Yet its roll-out Within each province, the poorest 25 percent of munic- coincided with a wave of large-scale violence that fol- ipalities participate. Though it was not specifically de- lowed the fall of the New Order government and KDP signed for conflict-affected areas, given the widespread found itself utilized as a mechanism for reconstruction, nature of violence in the Philippines, KALAHI operates development and sometimes peace-building in high in many areas affected by conflict in Mindanao and else- conflict areas. Most project funds are used by commu- where. KALAHI follows similar procedures to KDP/ nities for local infrastructure—roads, bridges, irrigation PNPM, with communities free to choose how to spend channels, etc. funds. Most resources are used for small-scale public in- frastructure (roads, water systems, productive facilities, health stations, etc.). violence at the expense of examining local violence. Indonesia is the exception where a comprehensive dataset is currently being built recording incidents of both large-scale and smaller-scale violent Two other CDD projects operate in Mindanao and have incidents. a more explicit peace-building focus. The ARMM So- 11. Adapted from the project list in World Bank (2007: 2-3). That document lists 42 projects. However, in many of these CDD is just cial Fund for Peace and Development (ASFP) operates in a small element of expenditures. Many of the projects listed are the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, which also different phases of the same project. The seventeen projects are was created in 1989 after the signing of a peace agree- distinct and at least 75 percent of expenditures are for CDD. ment with the MNLF. The project began in mid-2003 12. Note that not all CDD operations in each of these countries are reviewed. The paper picks a selection of operations that are being and around two-thirds of the project’s US$ 40.6 million implemented in different types of conflict contexts. EXPERiENCES FROM EAST ASiA 7 Table 2 Some CDD projects in violent conflict-affected East Asia Cost (US$ Project Timeline million) Conflict Context Objectives Indonesia KDP/PNPM-rural 1998 - 3,000.0 (by Varying conflict dynamics in Villagers to benefit from improved 2011) different areas, and at different socio-economic and local governance times. Has operated during conditions through the provision periods of large-scale violence, of investment resources to support in post-conflict areas, and in productive proposals developed by places where local violence is communities, using a participatory rife. planning process. BRA-KDP mid 2006 – 23.0 Implemented in post-conflict To assist conflict-affected communities mid 2007 Aceh soon after signing of to improve their living conditions peace agreement. Provided through the provision of small assistance to conflict victims projects that accord with their needs. (but not ex-combatants) as Secondary: (a) to overcome mistrust part of the Government’s in government that is a result of the reintegration program. conflict; (b) to improve relations between different conflict-affected groups. Philippines KALAHI-CIDDS February 182.4 Varies by area. Some areas To support the GoP in strengthening 2002 – May (e.g. Mindanao and NPA local communities’ participation in 2010 strongholds) experience large- barangay governance, and developing scale violence. Other areas their capacity to design, implement have localized violence. and manage development activities that reduce poverty. To avoid overlap with the ARMM Social Fund, the KALAHI does not operate in the ARMM. ARMM Social May 2003 40. 6 (21 In theory, a peace agreement To foster sustainable development in Fund – May 2010 for CDD) ended violence in the ARMM the ARMM through reducing poverty (with plans + further area. In reality, continuing and supporting mechanisms for the for 3 year 30.0 add’l fighting in some areas. promotion of a peaceful and safe extension) financing environment in the conflict-affected in pipeline areas therein. Mindanao April 2006 – 50.0a Sporadic but deadly violent Communities of violence-affected Trust Fund – Dec 2015 conflict across many project areas, IDPs and rebel returnees Reconstruction areas. benefit from the visible restoration and Development of some basic services of their choice Program (MTF and sustained by Local Government –RDP) Units (LGUs). Intermediate objectives: (a) Above groups have satisfactorily decided on, planned and implemented sub-projects of their choice; (b) LGU capacity for project planning, resolving conflicts, project implementation and seeking resources for projects improved; (c) Local implementing partners, including the BDA, have achieved sufficient implementing capacity to work with LGUs and local groups. (continued) 8 C D D i N P O S T- CO N F L i C T A N D CO N F L i C T- A F F E C T E D A R E A S Table 2 Some CDD projects in violent conflict-affected East Asia (continued) Cost (US$ Project Timeline million) Conflict Context Objectives Timor-Leste Community March 2000 18.55 Implemented as part of To strengthen local-level social capital Empowerment – March recovery response after to build institutions that reduce Program (CEP) 2004 massive post-referendum poverty and support inclusive patterns violence. of growth. Youth July 2008 – 2.1 Designed in the aftermath of To promote youth empowerment Development December the 2006 crisis. and inclusion in development by Project 2011 expanding the capacities of and opportunities for youth groups to initiate and participate in community and local development initiatives. Thailand Community October 2.6 Working in areas affected by To develop alternative and Approaches in 2007 – June on-going insurgency in the effective community approaches Conflict Situation 2012 south. to local development which create (CACS) “space” and opportunity for increased interaction within and among communities and between communities and the state apparatus in the effort to promote trust building in the conflict-affected areas of Yale, Narathiwas, and Pattani. Note: a. The total projected value of the Mindanao MDTF is US$50 million, of which an estimated US$12 million had been committed as of May 2010. are used for community development assistance.13 Ad- menting partners. As of December 2009, the MTF had ditional financing of US$ 30 million for another three funded projects in 43 conflict-affected municipalities.14 years is planned. The project is implemented by the ARMM government and a major focus of the project is Thailand on building that body’s capacity and legitimacy. World Bank-supported CDD programming has been The Mindanao Trust Fund Reconstruction and Develop- more limited in Thailand. The Social Investment Fund ment Program (MTF-RDP) provides reconstruction ran from 1998 to 2001 but did not focus on conflict and rehabilitation assistance to conflict-affected areas in issues. In April 2009, the second phase of a State and Mindanao. The program is starting with CDD support. Peacebuilding Fund (SPF) pilot project began, financing In the absence of a peace agreement between the MILF CDD activities in nine villages in the conflict-affected and the Government, violent conflict is frequent in many south, which will eventually increase to 36 villages in project areas. The first phase of the project has focused three provinces.15 Block grants to communities are ac- primarily on building the local institutional capacity of the Bangsamoro Development Authority (BDA), the 14. The second phase of the program, which focuses on providing development arm of the MILF, and other local imple- assistance to communities, was meant to begin after the signing of a MILF-GoP peace agreement. In the absence of this, there have been discussions among participating donors to remove the phasing from the MTF (Social Impact Inc. 2009). 13. Other funds are used for strategic regional infrastructure and institutional strengthening. 15. The first phase involved a conflict study to aid design of the EXPERiENCES FROM EAST ASiA 9 companied by a ‘peace-building partnership fund’ that ponent of the international post-conflict recovery re- provides small grants to civil society organizations work- sponse. Over three phases, US$ 18.55 million was pro- ing on peace issues. vided, a large sum for a country of less than one million people. CEP-3 finished in early 2004. Timor-Leste The Youth Development Project began in mid-2008 and The Community Empowerment Program (CEP) was ini- is expected to run until the end of 2011. Its genesis and tiated in late 1999 in the immediate aftermath of the design stem from an assessment of the challenges fac- massive destruction that followed the referendum on ing Timorese youth in the aftermath of the 2006 crisis independence. Building on the KDP model, which had (World Bank 2007b). That report identified youth vio- operated before independence, CEP was a major com- lence as a (potential) major barrier to development. The resulting project combines support to the Government’s national youth strategy with CDD block grants targeted operation. This initial phase was funded by the Post-Conflict Fund, at young people. In the first round, the most popular use which was the precursor of the SPF. of grants was for sporting facilities. Community Theater Peace Program in Aceh 11 3. ChALLENGES, AiMS, AND CAUSAL MEChANiSMS T he eight projects have a range of objectives, are of the social and institutional bases necessary for the man- varying sizes, and are being implemented in very agement of development in non-violent ways are often different contexts. The goals of CDD projects, the eroded by violence. challenges they face, and the mechanisms through which they have impacts will differ depending on the This creates particular development challenges that context in which they are working. Yet underlying each CDD projects aim to address. There are a number of project is a common logic of how aid can contribute to mechanisms through which projects may have impacts. development and peace-building in the face of violence This section provides an outline of (post) conflict chal- and contestation. This section seeks to flesh out the as- lenges, the aims of CDD projects, and potential causal sumptions that underlie the design of such projects as a mechanisms. The level of challenge will likely vary by means of providing a framework to help understand the the degree of violence. These are summarized in Figure 1 impacts they have. (next page). Development is more difficult in areas affected by, or emerging from, violent conflict.16 violent conflict im- pacts on economic and social life and the institutions 3.1 (Post) Conflict Challenges that govern it. This creates a complex set of challenges. Economic deprivation is likely to be higher in areas and CDD Aims experiencing larger-scale violence.17 Yet channeling re- sources into areas with serious divisions can trigger new Economic deprivation conflicts, which may turn violent, as groups compete and incumbent elites resist challenges to their power.18 And Economic development needs are typically greater in ar- eas that have been affected by large-scale violence. Civil wars, for example, on average lead to annual GDP re- 16. There is a vast literature on development challenges in conflict- ductions of 2-2.2 percent;19 incomes are reduced by 15 affected and post-conflict areas. Useful starting points include Collier (2009) and Call and Wyeth (2008). percent and the proportion of people living in poverty 17. One of the few econometric findings on the ‘causes’ of civil war increases by one-third (Moser 2006). More localized that is robust across different studies is that poor countries are more violence can also have significant economic impacts. The at risk. See, Kalyvas (2008). cost of lost productivity from criminal violence outside 18. A long-standing strand of social theory has posited that conflict, sometimes violent, is likely during times of rising incomes (e.g. Polanyi 1944, Moore 1966, Skopcol 1979; Cramer 2006). Historically, as Bates (2000) has observed, while poverty is associated 19. Estimates differ in scale. See: Collier (1999); Hoeffler and with violence, violence and prosperity also go hand in hand. Reynal-Querol (2003); Restrepo et al. (2008). 12 C D D i N P O S T- CO N F L i C T A N D CO N F L i C T- A F F E C T E D A R E A S Figure 1 The Theory of CDD in Conflict-Affected and Post-Conflict Areas Economic deprivation CHALLENGES IN CONFLICT SETTINGS Institutional weaknesses Instability PROJECT AIMS Improved public Improved social More e ective and infrastructure, services relations and cohesion responsive institutions and more private assets MECHANISMS Better matching resources Greater participation in Demand for more with needs civic life and improved responsive institutions Improved e ciency relations Improved citizen-state Better maintenance More accepted relations Ability to work in high resource distribution Common platform for con ict areas Mechanisms for programming defusing problems of warzones, for example, is estimated at US$ 95-163 percent of public buildings (Rohland and Cliffe 2002: billion (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008). 1). The war in Aceh damaged over 4,000 schools, two- thirds of those in the province, 7,700 km of road and There are multiple sources of economic impact includ- almost 2,200 bridges (MSR 2010). Infrastructure that ing reductions in human capital (through impacts on the is damaged or deteriorating due to lack of maintenance education system, forced migration and a brain drain, is less likely to be repaired in conflict-affected areas, in etc), weak government institutions, and distortions in part because of security risks, in part because conflict the tax system, all of which has an impact on private often erodes the capacity of local government institu- sector investment and growth (World Bank 2009). tions to do so. CDD projects do not have an impact on these macro- violent conflict can also lead to a reduction in the pri- level determinants of growth. Rather, economic gains are vate assets of ordinary civilians. Most directly, private likely to be through the provision of public infrastruc- homes are destroyed, livestock and crops die, people ture, the replacement of basic assets, and the capital nec- leave possessions behind when they are displaced, and essary for private asset replacement and accumulation. economic retraction limits job opportunities and savings. Infrastructure investments are often needed to replace People may also sell productive assets to cover short- assets destroyed in conflicts. In Timor-Leste, for exam- term needs. Accessing credit also often becomes more ple, violence around the 1999 referendum destroyed 70 difficult as banks and other credit providers become less EXPERiENCES FROM EAST ASiA 13 likely to lend or only lend at higher rates (Nagarajan and cohesion requires a particular focus on those who par- McNulty 2004). In many CDD projects, funds are used ticipated in war.23 for saving and loans schemes or to provide one-off cash transfers to households. This may help individuals’ and Many CDD projects thus have a specific goal of en- families’ recovery. hancing the relations between different groups. In areas affected by conflict, it is often claimed that CDD holds potential to encourage new forms of collaboration across instability conflict divides, which can improve trust and make com- Lack of security is a barrier to development, both di- munities less prone to fresh violence.24 In post-conflict rectly—through limiting basic freedoms—and indi- Aceh (as well as Rwanda), CDD has also been used rectly through its instrumental impacts on welfare. De- to target particular conflict-affected groups. However, velopment projects in areas affected by violent conflict CDD projects may also inadvertently accentuate vio- typically aim to both support development despite the lence, in particular in areas marked by horizontal group conflict and to affect the social and economic bases that divisions, if competition over project resources cannot make an area conducive to violence. be contained. One way to do this is by attempting to reconfigure social institutional weaknesses and society-state relations. violent conflict has social impacts.20 Where different groups previously co-existed A third set of challenges relates to the impact of violent side by side, war tends to accentuate markers of social conflict on the capacity and legitimacy of institutions difference such as ethnicity, religion, class or political af- at multiple levels. violent conflict tends to occur where filiation.21 Large-scale displacement, all too often a re- institutions are weak; it can also further weaken institu- sult of conflict, can change the composition of villages, tions leading to a vicious cycle of economic retrench- leading to new tensions and negatively impacting on lo- ment and new violence (Bates 2008). Indigenous civil cal problem-solving capacity.22 Trust in others is often society institutions, which may substitute for the state diminished. This can result in barriers to collective ac- in a conflict setting, can also be negatively affected by tion with people unwilling to participate for fear that violence as local informal leaders are co-opted or their others will shirk responsibility. While these processes legitimacy eroded. are likely to be most marked for large-scale violence, and particularly, where conflicting parties live side-by-side, Rebuilding institutions in violence-affected or post-con- localized violent conflict can lead to serious social divi- flict areas can be difficult. Institutions may not be deemed sions at the local level. legitimate; communities may have lost confidence in the ability and willingness of leaders and structures to act During and after violence, particular groups may also be in their collective interests. Institutional capacity also disruptive of social life. Programs to ‘reintegrate’ com- erodes with population flight, the war economy distorts batants are based on the premise that long-term social skills accumulation, and reduced fiscal resources impacts the functioning of institutions. 20. Colletta and Cullen (2000) map the ways in which violent If institution building is particularly important in such conflict transforms social capital and how this affects prospects for contexts, the aid effort can undermine it. Where aid peacebuilding and development. agencies deliver services that were previously provided 21. See, for example, Kalyvas (2006) who argues that group affiliation and differences are in large part a product of violent conflict rather than a cause of it. 23. On difficulties ‘reintegrating’ ex-combatants, see Muggah (2009) and Colletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer (2003). 22. Cernea and Guggenheim (1993) highlight how large-scale involuntary resettlement as a result of dam construction can create 24. This claim is reflected in the project appraisal documents for new needs and break down local institutional structures that were most of the projects examined in this paper. For more general claims, used to manage problems. see World Bank (2006). 14 C D D i N P O S T- CO N F L i C T A N D CO N F L i C T- A F F E C T E D A R E A S by the state, they can undercut state legitimacy or cause expressed as a set of hypotheses, which will be evaluated the state to move its resources and energies to fighting in the next section. The following briefly outlines these wars (Pendergast 1996). Skilled locals may leave their hypotheses.25 jobs in the civil service or universities to work at much higher wages for aid agencies (Ghani and Lockhart improved local public infrastructure and 2008). more private assets CDD projects typically aim to improve local institu- H1. CDD results in a better matching of project re- tional performance by creating a common platform for sources with local needs. Aid ineffectiveness is often a coordination and planning for development investments result of the wrong things being supplied. Project staff at the local level and by increasing demand for ‘good may not understand the needs of those they are trying governance’, by improving citizen-state relations. At the to assist. Giving recipients control over project resources same time, however, in establishing or supporting ser- may reduce information asymmetries leading to an al- vice delivery systems that run in parallel to government location of project resources that fit with local needs.26 line ministries, they have the potential to undermine the legitimacy of the latter. H2. CDD is more efficient because it reduces unit costs. Because communities are in control of project Aid approaches and CDD goals funds, they have greater incentives to ensure they are used efficiently. This may create bottom-up accountabil- In post-conflict and violence-affected areas, donors have ity of those involved in project procurement or financial traditionally developed separate projects for dealing management, limiting corruption. This may mean that with security and development needs: capacity building CDD resources go further than those spent through programs to improve institutions; peace-building pro- other approaches. grams to improve social cohesion; and economic recov- ery programs to repair conflict-affected infrastructure. H3. CDD projects are more likely to be maintained CDD approaches differ in that they seek to use one in- than other projects. Community members may value tervention to address all three areas at the local level. the projects completed through CDD funding because Successfully addressing one goal is seen as indirectly of perceived greater ownership. This may make it more contributing to the others: potential economic gains likely for communities to contribute towards maintain- from participation in projects, for example, incentiv- ing public goods than for other projects where they have ize collaborative decision-making that may lead to im- less say. In areas affected by violent conflict, communi- provements in inter-group relations; more participation ties may take steps to ensure CDD-financed buildings in the local public sphere may increase the demand for are not destroyed. responsive institutions; and improved institutions may lead to quicker and better economic recovery and better H4. CDD can work more effectively in high violence management of tensions. As such, CDD programs aim areas than other projects. CDD projects may rely less to provide one mechanism through which to address a on ‘outsiders’ than other development approaches. Pro- range of local needs. curement can be done locally, and planning (including facilitation) can be delegated to locals. This may make it possible for projects to continue operating in high 3.2 Mechanisms 25. These are generated from a number of World Bank publications, especially Mansuri and Rao (2004), Barron et al. (2004), Chase and Woolcock (2005), World Bank (2006), World Bank (2007a) and Implicit in the ‘theory’ of CDD are a number of claims Barron, Diprose and Woolcock (2006, 2007). about the program’s impacts and how performance is 26. This draws on work on the importance of local knowledge in superior to other ways of addressing goals. These can be decision-making, such as Scott (1998) and Chambers (1999). EXPERiENCES FROM EAST ASiA 15 conflict areas. CDD projects may also be more likely to proposals funded, they may be more accepting if they reach people in rural violent conflict-affected areas than have been involved in the process of decision-making. other post-conflict approaches that are often capital- Community-based targeting can also ensure that those centric. most in need receive benefits. H7. CDD provides mechanisms for defusing project- improved social relations and cohesion related conflicts. CDD projects typically have mecha- H5. CDD increases participation in civic life beyond nisms for dealing with project-related problems such the project leading to improvements in trust between as complaints systems and locally stationed facilitators. different (conflicting) groups. Well-facilitated CDD This may defuse any latent tensions, limiting escalation projects involve participation from across the commu- and associated social impacts. nity. Involvement at various stages in programs may im- prove the inter-group relationships, through the promo- More effective and responsive institutions tion of collective action that operates across groups. This in turn may lead to improvements in trust that mitigate H8. CDD creates demand for more responsive insti- violent conflict.27 tutions. CDD projects typically aim to provide an alter- native template for how state project-related functions H6. CDD results in wider acceptance of project re- can be performed. If beneficiaries are happy with the source distributions, limiting project-related con- CDD process, they may demand that other projects and flict. Development resources can exacerbate destructive services are delivered in similar ways or following similar conflict.28 Aid, of all types, creates ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, principles. and in the process can lead to conflict that (at times) turns violent.29 Where state systems are weak, the most H9. CDD increases interactions between state officials vulnerable may not receive aid. CDD projects typically and villagers improving trust between them. If CDD aim to create consensus within communities on how re- incentivizes more responsive actions from government, sources are allocated. Even when people do not get their it may lead to increases in the perceived legitimacy of the state, in the process eroding a driver of conflict. 27. This is implicit in the work of varshney (2002) on riots in H10. CDD creates a common platform for planning India. He argues that the presence of institutionalized associational interaction across ethnic groups limits the potential for violence and resource allocation improving coordination. Post- incidence and escalation. conflict areas often receive large amounts of aid from 28. See, for example, Anderson (1999) and Uvin (2002). numerous agencies. Coordination can be weak, between aid agencies and with government. CDD projects of- 29. In some conflict areas, aid has inadvertently supported one side to the conflict, such as assistance to refuges in Congo and Tanzania, fer the potential for common cross-sectoral planning at some of which was used to arm rebel groups (see MSF 1994 and the local level, in the process improving coordination Kaldor 1999). Such cases are extreme. Yet elsewhere, some people will benefit from aid and others will not, unleashing processes of between actors. contention that have the potential for escalation. Village prioritization process, Aceh 17 4. ThE iMPACTS OF CDD iN POST-CONFLiCT AND CONFLiCT-AFFECTED AREAS 4.1 Dealing with Economic scaled-up to a nationwide program, and KALAHI cov- ers more than half of the provinces in the Philippines; Deprivation they operate in some conflict-affected and post-conflict A areas, but also in others where violence is not a signifi- nalysis of the different CDD operations shows cant problem. Unfortunately, data is not disaggregated that, by and large, they are effective at addressing by region, making it difficult to assess whether positive sources of economic deprivation that lie within impacts also hold in higher conflict areas.32 communities, and that this can impact poverty levels. Projects can have such impacts across the range Evidence is more limited for high violence and post- of conflict contexts, including in areas where large-scale conflict areas, but does suggest that CDD projects can violence is occurring and in places with deep social divi- have economic impacts in these environments. Assess- sions. ments of the Community Empowerment Program in Timor-Leste note that the CEP built infrastructure The evidence of economic impacts is strongest for that matched local needs, and that projects, in particular KDP/PNPM. Alatas (2005) shows that the first phase those financing water supply and irrigation, were likely of KDP had positive impacts on communities’ income, to address poverty. However, no data was collected that compared with matched control areas, and that these allows for the measurement of poverty impacts (Conway increases are greater over time. KDP-2 resulted in per et al. 2003).33 BRA-KDP, which operated in post-con- capita consumption gains among poor households that were 11 percent higher in project areas than matched however, a mid-term assessment showed average economic rates control locations; the proportion of households mov- of return of 20 percent for the project (Araral 2006). (For KDP, ing out of poverty was 9.2 percent higher; and vulner- average ERR is 53 percent—Torrens 2005). The project’s mid-term evaluation report also found that in treatment locations, 60 percent able households were 4.5 percent less likely to fall into of households reported their households were accessible all year poverty (voss 2008).30 Evaluations of KALAHI also round after one round of the program, compared to 44 percent at baseline. However, there is little evidence of significant differences in suggest positive economic impacts, although the qual- welfare outcome indicators between treatment and control locations ity of evidence is somewhat lower.31 PNPM has been (Asia-Pacific Policy Center 2007: 4). The midterm was field after just one cycle (out of three) of the project, and only one-third of the treatment villages actually received a project in this round. 30. Both studies utilized rigorous ‘difference of difference’ 32. There is some evidence of impacts in high conflict areas. Barron assessments, which match treatment and control sub-districts, with et al. (2010), for example, note the effects of KDP in North Maluku data collected before and after implementation. Unfortunately such where large-scale ethno-religious violence occurred. See also National evaluations are rare for other projects in the region. Management Consultants (2002). 31. As the KALAHI is only completing its first phase of 33. The otherwise critical report of the Independent Evaluation implementation a full impact evaluation has not yet been completed; Group (2006) acknowledged the success of the project in building a 18 C D D i N P O S T- CO N F L i C T A N D CO N F L i C T- A F F E C T E D A R E A S flict Aceh, resulted in a strong set of welfare gains: pov- given consensus on the need for local infrastructure erty declined by 11 percent more in villages that received such as village-to-market roads in post-conflict areas the program compared with similar villages that did not (e.g. World Bank 2009), it is clear that the types of proj- (Barron et al. 2009). Given that almost 90 percent of ects financed tend to be appropriate.36 The experience funds were used for purchasing private goods, this sug- in Aceh shows strongly how giving communities choice gests that CDD projects can be an effective mechanism over project money can lead to effective use of funds. for distributing one-off cash transfers in emergency sit- Despite pressures from some facilitators to use funds for uations (Morel, Watanabe and Wrobel 2009). However, public goods, communities most often chose to distrib- for almost all of the projects, components that focused ute funds in cash. These funds then were often used to on providing credit have been less successful. help clear land that could not be farmed during the con- flict. The result was a doubling of usable land for conflict Evidence from the two Mindanao projects is far more victims in areas that received the BRA-KDP program limited. The project performance report for Phase 1 (Morel, Watanabe and Wrobel 2009). of the Mindanao Trust Fund contains no information on economic impacts (Social Impact Inc. 2009).34 The That said, it is important to recognize the limitations of ARMM Social Fund post-project assessment provides CDD projects in promoting growth in violence-affected only anecdotal evidence. It finds, for example, a 6.3 per- and post-conflict areas. The types of local infrastructure cent greater decline in the proportion of households in typically financed by CDD projects are unlikely, on their project area Lanao del Sur experiencing reduced food own, to lead to large-scale sustainable poverty reduction; consumption than in control locations. But the evalu- CDD alone is not able to undertake the vast infrastruc- ation does not provide data on this indicator for other ture reconstruction often needed in post-conflict areas. project areas (ARMM Social Fund 2009). CDD projects, however effective, can be only one com- ponent of an economic response in high conflict and Through which mechanisms are projects having eco- post-conflict areas.37 nomic impacts? Is it a result of better matching of proj- ect resources with local needs? This is a difficult hypoth- The evidence is also reasonably strong that per unit costs esis to test given the inherent subjectivity of needs. Yet a are typically substantially lower for CDD projects than few claims can be made and empirically supported. for others. Table 3 provides data from the KALAHI and KDP/PNPM, the only two of the projects considered First, for all the projects for which there is evidence, that collected systematic data on input costs. community members tend to be content with the use of the funds and usually feel that funds were spent more These savings are consistent with those reported for effectively than in other development projects.35 Second, CDD projects in other conflict-affected contexts. A project in Kosovo, for example, was able to build and re- large amount of infrastructure and creating short-term employment rapidly, although it also questioned the long-term appropriateness of the infrastructure that was built (IEG 2006: 12-13). to the project (Social Impact Inc. 2009: 5). Supervision reports and aide memoires from CEP paint a similar picture. 34. This may be because poverty reduction is not part of the project’s development objective. However, other project documentation does 36. One critique of CEP is that the infrastructure it financed was note that the Fund’s impact will be in part through its impact on often not directly productive (IEG 2006). The same critique has growth and development (World Bank 2007d: vi). been made of BRA-KDP, where communities often chose to rebuild community centers and prayer halls, and could be leveled against the 35. In Aceh, 88 percent of recipients felt that both BRA-KDP and Youth Development Program in Timor, which is financing mainly KDP funds were spent on the most important needs (Barron et al. sports facilities. However, financing such things may help to build 2009). The ARMM SF assessment (2009: 27) notes that “all FGD community cohesion. participants and key informants commend the process undertaken by the ASFP in terms of subproject selection and implementation 37. This seems obvious yet it is sometimes forgotten by advocates … They said that this is the first time they encountered a project of community-driven approaches. It is also a point neglected by the that seek [sic.] meaningful involvement of the community members Independent Evaluation Group in its criticisms of CEP for not being at all phases of the project.” The MTF-RDP report notes initial able to rebuild large amounts of Timor’s infrastructure after the community skepticism followed by strong community commitment referendum violence. EXPERiENCES FROM EAST ASiA 19 in places with serious social divisions, even within com- Table 3 Estimated unit cost savings of CDD munities. KDP kept going in most of the high conflict approach areas when violence was at its highest (National Man- KALAHI-CIDDS agement Consultants 2002). In Aceh, the program oper- (%) KDP (%) ated throughout martial law when most other projects Roads and bridges 8 – 59 323 pulled out. In Central Kalimantan, Poso, Maluku and Water supply 71-76 36 North Maluku, where large-scale ethnic or religious vio- Health centers 44 - lence took place, there were temporary suspensions but the program was able to re-start after a short period. Irrigation - 24 The three Philippines projects have managed to keep Source: World Bank (2007c). going in challenging environments in Mindanao and elsewhere, although the ‘quick response’ component of ARMM was very slow in part because of security con- ditions (ARMM Social Fund 2006). The Thai pilot is habilitate schools 19 percent cheaper than other projects able to work despite suspicions and tensions locally. In that did not have significant community participation Timor-Leste, the independent evaluation of CEP con- (World Bank 2006: 8). cluded that it was able to work more quickly than other projects.41 Supervision reports from all projects note the Data on the maintenance of CDD-financed local in- challenges but also the resilience of projects (and their frastructure is limited. None of the projects considered facilitators). In many cases, other development projects collects time series data on infrastructure maintenance.38 have had to pull out. A number of the supervision mission reports for CEP and the projects in the Philippines note concerns about maintenance. There is limited evidence from elsewhere that projects with community participation and own- 4.2 Promoting stability ership are maintained more effectively.39 It has been claimed that communities in Afghanistan are more like- To what extent are CDD projects effective as a mecha- ly to actively protect buildings financed by the National nism for limiting violent conflict and instability? Expe- Solidarity Programme than other buildings during con- rience shows that CDD projects alone do not affect the flict.40 But it is hard to find conclusive evidence of this. likelihood that areas will experience violent conflict, at least in the short run. However, there is some evidence Finally, can CDD projects work more effectively in high that over time they can improve levels of trust and in- conflict areas than other projects or move into recent teraction, which may lead to resilience against local level post-conflict areas more quickly? Again, there is little violence. formal comparative evidence on the degrees to which different types of programs can work during periods of Few studies have been undertaken that have sought to large-scale violence. The evidence does show that CDD directly assess the impacts of CDD programs on levels programs can operate even in areas of high conflict and of violence.42 Barron, Diprose and Woolcock (2006) use reports of violent conflicts in local newspapers in two 38. World Bank (2007: 26-27) reports “mixed evidence that CDD approaches produce sustainable O&M [operations and maintenance] systems” based on a review of projects in Cambodia, vietnam, Philippines, and Indonesia. 41. “The overall evaluation of the poverty impacts of the CEP program is that it reached all villages of Timor with funds for 39. See Khwaya’s (2001) study of projects in Pakistan, cited in projects that addresses [sic.] basic poverty issues, and that it did so Mansuri and Rao (2004). within a shorter time than any other efforts being made following the emergency situation in early 2000” (Conroy et al. 2003: 13). 40. From discussions in Kabul, September 2007. The same has been claimed for infrastructure financed through the Poverty Alleviation 42. A new study is assessing the impact of the KALAHI-CIDDS Fund in Nepal. program on conflict but results are not yet available. 20 C D D i N P O S T- CO N F L i C T A N D CO N F L i C T- A F F E C T E D A R E A S “medium level” conflict provinces to assess the impact of is unclear how common this is and whether there are KDP. They find little evidence of a project effect.43 The any systematic differences with non-project areas.45 ARMM Post-Project Review also found little evidence of positive impacts drawing on survey results. While Three studies on the social impacts of KDP, the KA- local disputes declined in both treatment and control LAHI and BRA-KDP provide more concrete evidence. areas, the greater decline was found in control areas In two provinces of Indonesia, Barron, Diprose and (ARMM Social Fund 2009: 53-54). An interim evalu- Woolcock (2006) find that across a range of different ation of Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Programme identity cleavages, KDP significantly contributed to finds no evidence that NSP affects the prevalence of improvements in inter-group relations. Where villages village disputes or tribal feuds, or the probability of a had the program for longer, these impacts were greater. village suffering an attack (Beath et al. 2010). A 2004 There was also great variation in changes based on local USAID report cited in World Bank (2006: 35) argues conditions and (more importantly) on the performance that there is no evidence from anywhere of CDD im- of local facilitators. pacting on broader political violent conflicts. The KALAHI study found that the project changes The lack of such observed impacts should not be surpris- social dynamics and practices in villages, but that these ing. It is difficult to envision through what mechanisms impacts are not uniformly positive or negative. Labonne projects could affect sources of tension that are exog- and Chase (2008) report that the project leads to general enous to the communities in which the projects work.44 increases in trust, but that it results in declining trust in Indeed, claims that CDD projects are a “solution” to vio- neighbors and a decline in collective action.46 They argue lent conflict should be viewed with suspicion (Barron, that trust is a function of repeated interaction. Build- Diprose and Woolcock 2007). ing roads (a major component of KALAHI expendi- tures) improves trust with those in other villages; but Yet projects may indirectly contribute to stability in the such projects do not increase trust within communities long-run through their effect on aspects of social rela- as villagers already interact with each other (Labonne tions such as trust, inter-group collective action, and lo- and Chase 2010). cal participation. This may make local level violent con- flict less likely and communities more robust to outside BRA-KDP in Aceh is a particularly interesting exam- violence. There is some evidence of impact although, un- ple given its focus on supporting post-war village-level fortunately, it is all-too-often anecdotal. Project reports from the Youth Development Project in Timor-Leste, 45. The assessment of the Mindanao Trust Fund (Social ARMM Social Fund, Mindanao Trust Fund and Com- Impacts Inc. 2009: iv) is illustrative: “The process of starting and implementing a CDD project appears to provide one such munity Empowerment Project all cite examples of com- opportunity for community members to work and solve common munities working together across conflict divides, but it problems together. For example, focus group participants in a case study reported that the project at least partially addressed the root cause of the conflict because it promoted better understanding, cooperation and a sense of closeness among citizens. In another case study, focus group participants reported, nine months after project completion, that the Muslims, Christians and Indigenous People were united and sustained good relationships. And in another case 43. violent conflicts were more likely in areas that had received study, focus group participants also noted that internal community KDP in one province (NTT) and slightly less likely in another (East relations had improved, including between Christians and Muslims.” Java). Deaths were greater in KDP areas for both. The authors argue There is no comparison with control areas, or account of the that this does not show that the project is making areas more prone frequency with which such changes were observed across project to violence, as there are systematic differences between areas that locations. have received the project and those that have not—i.e. the former areas are in general poorer—that may be correlated with violent 46. This is a particularly incongruous finding given that collective conflict risk (Barron, Diprose and Woolcock 2006, chapter four). action is a cornerstone of CDD operations. The finding however, may reflect different understandings for the word bayanihan in the 44. This is one of the bases of Li’s (2007) critique of KDP. She Philippines. It was used by researchers to mean collective action for argues that in focusing on reshaping communities, it ignores broader development purposes, but in many areas of the Philippines, it has a power relations that keep people subservient and that are the real somewhat different connotation—meaning either an act of charity or drivers of revolt and violence in the post-Suharto era. an act that is obligated as part of community solidarity building. EXPERiENCES FROM EAST ASiA 21 reintegration. The evidence for improvements in social Projects of course may be as likely to cause conflict as to cohesion is weak (Barron et al. 2009). Levels of social resolve it. This is particularly true for CDD projects that acceptance of returning groups, reported social tensions, involve explicit competition over finite resources. Project divisions and conflict and community efficacy are similar reports shows that this is rarely a problem in areas where between villages that received the program and villages large-scale violent conflict is not active. Even in ‘fragile’ that did not. There is evidence that BRA-KDP resulted villages, in post-conflict areas such as Aceh and Maluku, in lower levels of acceptance of ex-combatants by con- project-related processes rarely lead to violence.49 Where flict victims. The authors hypothesize this may be a re- escalated violence is ongoing the ability of projects to sult of the project ‘empowerment’ effect, whereby com- operate in ways that generate consensus over resource munities felt more able to stand up to ex-combatants prioritization is more limited. In Thailand, two block who tried to steal money from the program. It could also grants were provided to different ‘communities’ within be that relations with ex-combatants were diminished one village (Local Development Initiative 2010). when they tried to capture funds from the program.47 The limited positive impacts on social relations may be The KDP study found that in areas of localized violent a result of the program only running for one year (the conflict, villagers broadly accepted the outcomes of proj- KDP study found that such impacts were much stronger ect processes, even when they ‘lost’, because they had in years three and four of a program) and because the opportunities to participate in decision-making. Only program provided mainly private goods, which involved where corruption or malfeasance occurred did project- less cooperative work.48 related conflicts escalate (Barron, Diprose and Woolcock 2006). The study also showed that KDP-related conflicts were far less likely to escalate into violence than were 47. BRA-KDP funds were not for ex-combatants who were to be targeted by other programs. However, problems with other conflicts related to other development projects (Table reintegration programs meant that community funds often arrived 4). The reasons for this included the presence of effec- before assistance to ex-combatants. This led to some ex-combatants trying to capture funds from the program. This may have increased tive complaints channels to defuse tensions before they resentment from communities. Interestingly, where communities escalated. chose to provide some assistance to former fighters, improvements in relations were greater (Morel, Watanabe and Wrobel 2009). Yet while grievance systems are part of all the CDD 48. Evidence from elsewhere is also limited. The most rigorous study to date involved a randomized assessment of a small CDD projects considered in this paper, in most projects they project in Liberia, which found that program processes can enhance are acknowledged as not working effectively. One of the collective action. Using a field experiment, Fearon, Humphreys and Weinstein (2009) find communities that received the program contribute 9 percent more of their own resources for community public goods. The NSP interim evaluation found increased social 49. Evidence from post-genocide Rwanda, for example, shows that interaction on some measures (such as inter-village connections divided communities can work together to decide on the allocation of among women) but found no evidence of improved trust between public goods (Cliffe, Guggenheim and Kostner 2003). On how this villagers (Beath et al. 2010). process worked in North Maluku, Indonesia, see Barron et al. (2010). Table 4 Development Conflicts and Their impacts in indonesia Number of Type of Number of violent conflicts Properties program conflicts (% violent) Fatalities Injuries damaged KDP 42 1 (2%) 0 2 0 Other 713 36 (5%) 4 38 11 Government Other Program 19 1 (5%) 0 1 0 Source: Barron, Diprose and Woolcock (2006: 57). 22 C D D i N P O S T- CO N F L i C T A N D CO N F L i C T- A F F E C T E D A R E A S most commonly cited problems in supervision mission such as the ARMM Social Fund have a formal role for reports is that complaints handling systems are not op- local government staff. erating as intended (if at all). Clearly this is an area that needs attention. The evidence shows mixed impacts from different pro- grams.51 The KALAHI mid-term evaluation finds that in places that received the project, there is now great- er attendance at (non-project) village assemblies and 4.3 Strengthening participation in development planning compared with Institutions control locations (Asia-Pacific Policy Center 2007). Labonne and Chase (2008: 19-20) find that participa- The CDD projects considered in this paper typically tion in non-project meetings increased by 20 percent in aimed at promoting institutional change at two levels. treatment areas compared to control locations after one At the community or inter-community level, projects cycle of the program. Importantly, this also appeared to have the objective of creating new avenues for citizen- lead to some changes in the behavior of officials: elected state interaction, and generating bottom-up demand for village officials met more often with villagers in KALA- better governance from local officials. At a higher level, HI areas than in the control locations. In villages that many of the projects aim to consolidate (or reform) na- received funds from the project, trust towards local offi- tional or regional state institutions and to help facilitate cials increased by 10.7 percent. Decisions that affect the coordination amongst the different actors involved in village were also increasingly made during village assem- providing development and reconstruction assistance. blies as a result of the project, controlling for baseline Many of the CDD projects considered appear to be values. Community and local leader preferences were leading to institutional changes at the local level. Macro equally represented in community proposals (Labonne impacts are less clear, in part because in complex transi- and Chase 2009). tional environments they are hard to measure. Barron, Diprose and Woolcock (2006) report similar The goals for strengthening institutions at the commu- results for KDP. They find that there has been a “posi- nity level are largely similar for each of the projects con- tive reconfiguration of citizen-state relations at the local sidered, but approaches differ. CDD projects typically level”, helping to democratize village life. Fifty percent provide a model for accountable decision-making in the more villagers reported that more marginalized groups hope that community satisfaction with ‘doing things dif- were coming to (non-project) village meetings than in ferently’ results in demand for changes in the way other the past, compared to matched control areas. The Phil- non-project related decision-making occurs. In some ippines and Indonesia findings fit with results from the cases, this involves working closely with existing formal interim evaluation of NSP in Afghanistan that finds power structures; in others, more explicit attempts are that the project leads to an increase in the frequency of made to reengineer local institutional structures. For village meetings and villagers’ attendance.52 example, in Timor-Leste, CEP excluded village chiefs from decision-making roles in projects;50 other projects 51. One reason for this may be that institutional impacts are more difficult to measure than economic impacts. Methodological 50. Those involved in the project at the time point out that when approaches, such as household surveys, suitable for understanding CEP was first implemented there was a lack of clarity on who exactly economic and poverty effects may be less suitable for measuring village leadership was. Often within villages, there were several cognitive and behavioral effects in the non-economic realm. people who felt they were in charge, each of whom was trying to establish (or maintain) a power base at the local level. Formal leaders 52. NSP is found to improve male villagers’ perceptions of tended to be different people to traditional leaders, who held much government and to increase interactions between villagers and de facto power. In a rapidly transitioning environment, the project officials, but it does not make villagers more accepting of state chose not to support village heads in order to avoid playing in to taxation or jurisdiction over local crimes. NSP also increases the power struggles taking place, and to avoid consolidating any one number of functioning local councils and increased attendance at model, when these struggles were still playing out. Comments from village meetings. But it does not affect villagers’ perceptions of the Gillie Brown, former task team leader of CEP. quality of local governance (Beath et al. 2010). EXPERiENCES FROM EAST ASiA 23 In contrast, other projects had greater difficulties in Third, project design is important. CDD projects often affecting such change. The mid-term review for the face a difficult dilemma. They seek to support behavioral ARMM Social Fund notes: “the ASFP investments and cognitive changes at the local level—the empower- were apparently unable yet to instill in the minds of most ment aim. Yet they are only likely to be successful if they people the local government’s capability in confronting involve existing local elites who may be resistant to such rising poverty, in delivering basic services like those in changes (Powis 2007). There are inherent trade-offs and education and health, or in establishing meaningful getting them right will, in part, dictate a program’s im- linkages with capitalists/industrialists” (ARMM Social pact.54 Maintaining support at higher levels is impor- Fund 2006: 38). An evaluation of BRA-KDP showed tant: both BRA-KDP and CEP were closed before their that the project had no impact on citizen-state relations planned duration because of a lack of support from gov- (Barron et al. 2009). The impacts of CEP on the practic- ernment agencies in Banda Aceh and Dili. What works es of local elites were limited by the exclusion of village in one place will not in another. Perhaps the most im- chiefs from project decision-making councils (Chopra portant lessons are (a) to ensure that there is flexibility and Hohe 2004). This led to resistance from elites and to alter a project’s institutional arrangements over time, undermined the legitimacy of the project fora. as project experience grows, and (b) to undertake con- tinuous consensus building, making it clear how a well Which factors caused variation in impacts? Three spring functioning project can serve the interests of local politi- out. First, is the length of time projects have worked cians, civil servants and other elites. Both of these objec- in an area. Barron, Diprose and Woolcock (2006), for tives require extensive and continuous supervision and example, show that the governance impacts associated management attention. This is particularly important in with KDP increase over time, with villages that have had areas prone to, or affected by, violent conflict. Unfortu- the project for three or more years far more likely to see nately, supervision tends to be seriously under-funded. changes in local political behavior. Projects like BRA- Task team leaders are often in charge of multiple proj- KDP involved only one cycle of assistance; it is unsur- ects or based at a distance from where they operate. This prising that this does not change governance practices, limits the ability to address emerging problems, seize which have evolved over decades or longer. opportunities, and learn from experiences. Second, and related, the quality of project facilitation is Where local flexibility and widespread consensus-build- a key factor. Within projects, there appears to be massive ing were achieved, for example in PNPM which has variation in local institutional impacts. In part this is a expanded across all of Indonesia, there has been scope result of varying local contexts; where an environment for projects to influence broader political dynamics. is “conducive” to change; projects are more likely to act Community-based approaches, which channel resources as a catalyst (Barron, Diprose and Woolcock 2007). Yet down and preferences on developmental priorities up, equally important is the ways in which facilitators en- now characterize the broader suite of Indonesia’s anti- gage with local leaders and communities. This is not just poverty programs. While causality is difficult to prove, a function of their capacity (e.g. for community mobi- KDP/PNPM may have shifted the way that the gov- lization and conflict mediation). The “positionality” of ernment thinks about poverty and development issues, facilitators is also important; in Afghanistan, for ex- and have played a role in changing the ways in which ample, facilitators prove to be more effective when they citizen-state accountability is structured. are from the same tribe as the communities they work in.53 Supervision reports for a number of the projects show successes against the odds where facilitators have 54. See Chopra and Hohe (2004: 299-303) who identify different worked hard with local communities and leaders. options for participatory intervention by the degree of “social engineering” they undertake. Sometimes choices are dictated by political imperatives. CEP, for example, was under pressure from Timorese leaders to exclude those who had been village chiefs during the Indonesian occupation from decision-making roles (Cliffe, 53. Thanks to Rob Wrobel for this observation. Guggenheim and Kostner 2003: 9). 24 C D D i N P O S T- CO N F L i C T A N D CO N F L i C T- A F F E C T E D A R E A S Ultimately such shifts should translate into improved the control of the project and its designers and support- vertical relations between citizens and higher-level in- ers; in the absence of broader buy-in from national gov- stitutions, an important change in areas that are, or have ernments to the principles of CDD-type programming, been, affected by violent unrest. In areas of separatist vio- project effects in this area are likely to be limited. lence (such as Aceh, Mindanao, and southern Thailand) conflict cleavages are not just between different social Finally, CDD projects offer the potential of providing groups but also between citizens and the state. Yet such a mechanism for coordinating the approaches and pro- changes are slow and hence often hard to observe. And grams of different donors and government at the local in areas where national governments have not embraced level. This is extremely important in post-conflict areas, the widespread use of CDD approaches, or where other where often hundreds of agencies are providing assis- government actions undermine community trust, these tance. CDD programs offer a common channel through impacts are not likely to eventuate. Documentation for which different agencies can provide funds; alternatively, projects such as the southern Thailand pilot, BRA-KDP CDD programs can be used for developing a common and the ARMM Social Fund is explicit about the goal local needs assessment, which different donors (and of improving state-society relations. But in the absence governments) can use to coordinate their assistance. of broader processes of reform, these goals are perhaps There is little evidence, however, of this happening sys- over-ambitious. tematically. Other donors provide funds through KDP in Indonesia and Aceh and the two Mindanao projects. It is hard to see how CDD projects could alone affect Yet more projects worked through separate delivery sys- these dynamics, at least in the short-term. Community tems. A rare example of effective collaboration amongst perceptions of the state are likely to be a function of donors and government was the delivery of public infor- state performance in a range of areas, including service mation materials related to the peace process through delivery, impartial provision of security and justice and, the KDP network in Aceh. Yet when it came to provid- in many poor areas, the equitable provision of public ing reintegration assistance, other development agencies sector jobs (Barron 2010). Recognition of local cultural preferred to use their own mechanisms and the needs and religious practices is also often important. Altering identification generated by the program did not impact perceptions thus requires more extensive changes in the the programming of other agencies (Barron and Burke way the state functions. Government commitment to 2008). reform is more important than the design and function- ing of any one program. CDD projects may play a role Ownership of programs by national and local govern- in the longer-run: they have the potential to shape at- ments is key if better coordination is to happen. At a na- titudes to reform. This has been the case in Indonesia, tional level, PNPM has been fairly successful at harmo- where more than ten years into KDP/PNPM, decision nizing donor assistance under one umbrella. This only on other government resources are now made based happened because PNPM became the cornerstone of on bottom-up processes. As government officials real- the government’s stated policy framework, and because ize CDD-type mechanisms provide a useful means to the government was strong enough to insist donor’s distribute resources in ways that consolidate their po- played game. Where the government was weaker, as in sitions, they are often increasingly supportive of them, Timor-Leste, it was impossible to harmonize donor ap- and this may help shape norms that can have powerful proaches and hence programs. effects. But such virtuous cycles are not entirely under 25 5. CONCLUSiONS C DD projects can be an effective mechanism for to violent conflict over project resources. Key here is the dealing with local drivers of poverty in areas af- performance of complaints systems and local facilitators. fected by violent conflict. The projects reviewed in Unfortunately, a quick assessment of project supervi- this paper have had positive impacts on welfare, sion reports show consistently that training, complaint although more rigorous evidence would be desirable. units and monitoring and supervision are the elements They tend to be cost effective. There is little evidence on of CDD operations that tend to receive the least atten- improved maintenance, but the trend towards commu- tion. In areas experiencing larger-scale violence, capacity nity contributions would lead us to expect that projects tends to be more limited, only increasing the importance may be more likely to be maintained than others. Fur- of having these things in place. In higher violence areas, ther, the projects considered have been able to have such larger supervision and monitoring budgets will be nec- impacts in a range of conflict environments, including essary to ensure projects function well. areas experiencing large-scale armed violence. Yet it is also important to note the limitations of CDD projects: CDD projects, when designed well, can also have in- alone, they cannot transform the economies of conflict- stitutional effects at the local level. Impacts on ver- affected and post-conflict areas. This requires invest- tical linkages between citizens and the government ment in larger-scale infrastructure and policy responses take much longer and are only likely if accompanied to promote growth. CDD is only part of a strategy for by broader processes of reform. In some cases, such as development in (post)conflict areas. PNPM in Indonesia, CDD approaches have affected to some extent politics at a national level and, as a result, There is little evidence that CDD affects aggregate lev- have potential of contributing to a strengthening of the els and impacts of violent conflict, whether it is localized social compact in the longer-run. But where (potential) violence or larger-scale violent unrest. However, when improvements from CDD projects are not linked to projects work well, and are in areas for a number of years, larger changes in accountability between society and the they can have indirect conflict impacts, affecting social state, such impacts will be less. As such, it is unclear how relations and behavior in ways that may make commu- small-scale projects (such as the Thailand pilot) will seri- nities more robust to dealing with local problems. This ously impact upon the main drivers of conflict. Efforts may prevent future conflict escalation. This has relevance to utilize CDD projects as a mechanism for coordina- both in areas affected by localized violence and in those tion of development aid have also been less than suc- experiencing larger-scale violent conflict, where master cessful in most cases. conflict narratives often belie the local nature of tensions (Kalyvas 2006). There is also evidence that projects may CDD is thus no ‘magic bullet’ response to conflict. Most be less likely than other development approaches to lead of the CDD programs discussed do not have an explicit 26 C D D i N P O S T- CO N F L i C T A N D CO N F L i C T- A F F E C T E D A R E A S conflict resolution aim. But the evidence does suggest lytic work and a large investment in supervision. One-off that CDD projects can support poverty reduction, help conflict or social assessments will rarely provide infor- build social cohesion at the local level and strengthen mation of the types necessary for projects that operate local institutions. Importantly, CDD projects have been in dynamic environments. What a well-designed CDD able to do this in places where violence rages, in com- operation looks like will vary between areas; and under- munities that are divided, and in weak institutional en- standing of local conditions is essential for designing vironments. Broader impacts are contingent on higher effective programs. Yet as important as up-front analy- level political support and processes of change. Main- sis is ensuring that there are continuous flows of infor- taining, or generating, wide-ranging political support is mation—on challenges faced and successes achieved— thus extremely important. Who to get on-board will dif- which can allow for programs to be re-designed as they fer from area to area; understanding this is particularly go along. This is particularly important given that CDD important in conflict-affected areas. CDD projects need operations such as the KALAHI, KDP/PNPM, and to be conceived as part of broader governance reform CEP cover(ed) large territories with very different con- strategies aimed at improving institutional performance ditions in different areas, and that conditions change and accountability relations. This requires understanding frequently in conflict-affected areas. deeply the (often local) political economies that shape patterns of conflict and violence and development out- A final conclusion relates to the quality of existing evi- comes. dence on CDD impacts, how these are achieved, and sources of variation in performance. Most of the proj- Both project implementation and context are important. ects considered in this paper are not collecting basic The context can be conceptualized at multiple levels: vil- information that allows for an assessment of impacts.55 lages within an area affected by one conflict share a com- Strategies for generating ongoing information on both mon context, but more localized factors—such as the project performance and on the contexts in which they quality of leadership, historical memories of conflict and are working is lacking for most projects. CDD projects local identity cleavages—also shape the context. Projects have an amazing resource in the networks of facilitators can have local level effects in places where the context is stationed in villages. Projects need to develop strategies not “conducive” (e.g. in divided communities). But they to utilize these for data collection to provide real-time will only do so if project design is built on a clear under- information on local conditions and to allow for re- standing of local realities and constraints. (Projects have sponses to be adapted as local conditions change. had mixed success here, largely a function of the level of investment in analytic work to understand local condi- tions and of levels of supervision and monitoring). 55. Mansuri and Rao (2004) provide a comprehensive review of independent and peer reviewed evaluations of CDD operations. But These will change over time, so the ability to adapt ap- very few of these are of projects in East Asia, or of projects operating proaches is important. 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Torres, Wilfredo Magno (2007). Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao. Manilla: The Asia Foundation. Girls in Aceh with peace poster Sustainable Development Department East Asia and Pacific Region THE WORLD BANK 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433, USA Telephone: 202 473 1000 Facsimile: 202 522 1666 Internet sites: www.worldbank.org/eapsocial