Research & Policy Briefs From the World Bank Malaysia Hub No.1, March 2016 The Middle-Income Trap: Myth or Reality? Greg Larson, Norman Loayza, Michael Woolcock The “middle-income trap” may be a myth. Nonetheless, it provides impetus for policymakers to reassess their strate- gies based on productivity improvement once the traditional sources of economic growth have lost their strength. Introduction either low-wage countries that dominate mature industries or The story of economic growth is one of many narratives. Over high-income countries that dominate innovative, high- the last 70 years, growth has occurred in all regions of the technology industries. world, many low-income countries have developed rapidly, This narrative grew popular as a useful shorthand to and millions of people have been lifted out of poverty. describe the preoccupations of policymakers in middle- Standard growth theory predicts that poorer countries will income countries, particularly in the fallout of the global tend to grow faster and “catch up” to rich countries. However, financial crisis. In 2009, for example, Malaysian Prime Minis- relatively few countries have reached high-income status, and ter Najib Razak announced in a speech: “We have become a income growth across many countries has been variable and successful middle-income economy, but we cannot and will volatile. In recent years, policymakers in slower-growing not be caught in the middle-income trap; we need to make middle-income countries have become preoccupied with the the shift to a high-income economy or we risk losing growth notion that they are stuck in a “middle-income trap.” Much momentum in our economies and vibrancy in our markets.” In has been debated about this so-called trap—from whether it the years since, the nature and risks of the trap have been actually exists to the types of policies that might help coun- hotly debated by economists, business leaders, media tries escape it. pundits, and those in high-level policy circles. This note considers the most relevant literature and contends that, even if the “middle-income trap” is myth, it What does the empirical evidence suggest? provides impetus for policymakers to reassess their strategies Latin America and the Middle East seem to provide compel- once the traditional sources of economic growth have dimin- ling empirical support for the phenomenon of a middle- ished. Middle-income countries must find drivers of produc- income trap, as many economies in both regions have tivity, innovation, and competitiveness while strengthening remained at middle-income levels for four or five decades. the economic fundamentals that foster and stabilize growth. Indeed, out of 101 middle-income countries in 1960, approxi- mately 13 became high-income by 2008 based on per capita Reaching high-income levels is challenging, with a strong income level relative to the United States: Equatorial Guinea; likelihood of growth slowdowns along the way. But stagnation Greece; Hong Kong SAR, China; Ireland; Israel; Japan; Mauri- is not inevitable, and middle-income countries must have tius; Portugal; Puerto Rico; Republic of Korea; Singapore; patience to manage the transition responsibly, avoid pitfalls, Spain; and Taiwan, China. (Figure 1 tells a more optimistic and promote new opportunities. story, as discussed below.) A growing body of research and analysis has sought to examine why so few middle-income What is a middle-income trap? countries have transitioned to high-income status and the The concept of a middle-income trap was first coined by policy approaches that can be pursued to enable more of Indermit Gill and Homi Kharas, comparing a general phenom- them to do so. Analyses vary considerably, however, and in enon observed in regions like Latin America and the Middle many cases come to opposite conclusions. East to the possibility of slowdowns in East Asia’s emerging Some studies support the existence of a middle-income economies (Gill and Kharas 2007). Their account describes trap by finding empirical evidence that growth slowdowns are how rapid growth from low-income to middle-income more likely at middle-income levels. An analysis of all growth levels—fueled by cheap labor, basic technology catch-up, and slowdowns between 1960 and 2005, for example, suggests the reallocation of labor and capital from low-productivity that they are more likely to occur in middle-income countries sectors like traditional agriculture to export-driven, high- than in low- or high-income countries (Aiyar et al. 2013). productivity manufacturing—is often followed by lower There is also evidence that rapidly growing economies tend to growth. As the rural labor force shrinks and wages rise, the slow down significantly when they reach middle-income factor accumulation that once propelled high growth eventu- levels, often near the per capita income levels of $10,000- ally loses strength. Unless new sources of economic growth 11,000 and $15,000-16,000 in 2005 PPP-adjusted dollars are found, a country may find itself unable to compete with (Eichengreen, Park, and Shin 2014). To explain this evidence, Affiliation: All authors are affiliated with the Development Research Group, the World Bank. Objective and disclaimer: Research & Policy Briefs attempt to synthesize existing research and data to shed light on a useful and interesting question for policy debate. Research & Policy Briefs carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank Group, its Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The Middle-Income Trap: Myth or Reality? some growth models suggest the existence of The “trap” literature is further complicated by lack of any low-productivity equilibria in middle-income countries, methodological or definitional consensus. As of yet there is no characterized by low shares of capable workers in highly- established definition for what the middle-income trap is or skilled activities (Agénor and Canuto 2015). how it should be explored. Most studies define it based on Meanwhile, other evidence questions the existence of a income levels—but the choice of using relative versus trap altogether. Close examination of countries’ transitions absolute income, or of setting specific income thresholds to between income levels, for example, finds that per capita identify the upper and lower bounds of middle-income status, incomes have grown steadily in the majority of countries, can often produce divergent conclusions. Similarly, there is no both since 1960 and in recent times (figure 1). This does not consensus on what length of time would constitute a trap. suggest a trap-like pattern and casts doubt on the notion that Most studies rely on cross-country growth regressions using high growth was a temporary phenomenon of any particular data typically limited to the postwar period of roughly 1960- era. While the process of convergence is often painfully slow, 2005, which may limit the literature’s historical relevance (see the transition from middle- to high-income does not on box 1). Some studies seek to address these issues with average take longer than other transitions (Im and Rosenblatt enhanced rigor, but there is often a degree of arbitrariness in 2014). Likewise, comparing today’s middle-income stagnators the parameters used, and at times it seems that methodologi- with countries that have reached high-income status suggests cal and definitional choices are driven by the goals of the that “escapees” have simply always grown faster, even at research or the characteristics of the countries or regions lower income levels (Bulman, Eden, and Nguyen 2014). These being assessed. countries’ higher growth patterns may be explained by other underlying factors, such as rapid industrial transformation, Does the concept of a “trap” help or hinder low inflation, stronger exports, better quality education, or effective policy? reduced inequality. The debate around the middle-income trap offers no quick or Figure 1: Little evidence of a trap The graph on the left compares countries’ absolute GDP per capita in 1960 to that of 2010, showing that the majority of countries across all regions (though fewer in sub-Saharan Africa) experienced growth during this period, as they are above the 45-degree line representing zero growth. The graph on the right finds a similar pattern in recent times, comparing 1985 and 2010 absolute GDP per capita levels. The shaded area, indicating upward transitions from lower to higher income levels, dispels the notion of a trap. From a sample of 91 countries for which data is available, 41 transitioned to higher income levels during the 1960-2010 period. Of these transitions, 27 were middle-income (e.g., countries that transitioned from lower middle- to upper middle-income status or from upper middle- to high-income status). Additionally, many of these transitions occurred relatively recently, during the 1985-2010 period. East Asia & Pacific Europe & Central Asia Latin America & Caribbean Middle East & North Africa South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Industrialized, WDR-1978 GDP per capita in constant 2005 USD $. Regions are based on the WB classifications considering all income levels. The income threshold definitions are the following ones: (1) Low-income: GDP per capita of less than $1,000; (2) Lower middle-income: GDP per capita between $1,000 and $4,000; (3) Upper middle- income: GDP per capita between $4,000 and $12,500; (4) High-income: GDP per capita above $12,500. Source: WDI, March 2016. Fabian Mendez-Ramos collaborated on producing these graphs. 2 Research & Policy Brief No.1 Box 1: History’s income trap India began to rise (Spence 2011). A long-run historical The debate on growth stagnation in middle-income countries standard for explosive per capita GDP growth has been relies on analysis of a relatively short span of economic estimated at 4.2 percent, as at this rate a country would have history. In the very long run, growth stagnation has been the gone from the lower bound in 1870 to the U.S. level in 1960 historical norm (Kremer 1993, Maddison 2007). Income (Pritchett 1997). Since 1960, many lower-income and growth prior to the Industrial Revolution was almost nonexis- middle-income countries have achieved this pace—but many tent, driven primarily by world population growth. Beginning others have not, and worldwide income growth has been around 1800 there was a “great divergence” as growth from heterogeneous and volatile. In seeking to answer what productivity exploded, first in European countries and their accounts for economic growth and technological progress in offshoots and then in Japan. The end of the 20th century saw the contemporary era, it is useful to remember that the world the beginning of a “great convergence,” as growth in industri- remains in a period of historically unprecedented economic alized nations steadily slowed and countries like China and growth. easy solutions to the problem of slow growth. However, as income countries (e.g., improving the quality of education, one of the most salient issues in middle-income countries enhancing regulatory effectiveness) may require rather differ- today, the concept has undeniable power to influence policy- ent capabilities than those that got them to middle-income makers. This can be both productive and unproductive. status in the first place (e.g., sound macroeconomic manage- On one hand, the specter of being mired in a trap can ment, provision of basic infrastructure). encourage desperate policymaking. Focusing on a small number of escapees may inspire efforts to maintain unrealisti- Lessons from the larger literature on long-run growth cally high growth rates. When growth wavers, there may be These findings echo the wider literature on the determinants immediate pressure to revise policies, and during periods of of economic growth, in particular the view that growth does growth, important reforms may be postponed or dismissed. not occur randomly; rather, it responds to the quality of public The classic example is large public expenditure in pursuit of policies and institutions, as well as the effort and entrepre- short-run growth performance, as seen in some Latin Ameri- neurship of the private sector. Despite debate over which can countries where subsidies to ineffective projects led to policies are most important, there is agreement that govern- increased corruption and eventual economic slowdown. It ment action (or inaction) can and does affect growth (Solow remains to be seen whether China faces similar dangers, 1956, Romer 1990, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004). The litera- though the relative dynamism of its private sector may help it ture finds at least four fundamental ingredients of long-run avoid a similar fate. growth, which are especially relevant to countries in middle- On the other hand, the middle-income trap notion may be income transition. When these ingredients are absent, slow useful for shaping policy discussions on the particular growth or growth reversals should not be surprising. challenges faced by middle-income countries. Transitioning to First, it is difficult to achieve high growth without strong high-income status is rare and difficult, and requires different macroeconomic stabilization policies. Sound fiscal, monetary, growth strategies than the ones that propel countries out of and financial policymaking supports long-run economic low-income levels. When growth related to factor accumula- growth by helping countries control inflation, avoid crises, tion declines, countries must find new sources of growth and strengthen resilience to cyclical volatility. based on productivity improvement. Second, strong institutions and rule of law are essential to Despite inconsistencies, the literature agrees that growth growth. The quality of governance—including public sector slowdowns are primarily productivity slowdowns, and efficiency, control of corruption, effective legal systems and suggests a range of policies and country characteristics enforcement of contracts, and civil and political rights—are all associated with increased productivity and innovation. These strongly correlated with economic growth (North 1990; include prudent macroeconomic regulation, strong institu- Mauro 1995; Barro 1996; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson tions to encourage private sector development, investment in 2005). Likewise, an overburdening government that imposes infrastructure, and regional integration (Aiyar et al. 2013); high taxes, distorts markets, or interferes ineffectively in the larger shares of exports in high-technology products and economy weakens the private sector and leads to lower strong secondary and tertiary education systems growth (Fischer 1993, Engen and Skinner 1999). (Eichengreen, Park, and Shin 2014); and investment in R&D Third, investment in education and human capital devel- and advanced infrastructure to accelerate innovation while opment are crucial to growth. As the returns to physical enforcing property rights and removing labor market rigidities capital accumulation diminish, the rate of productivity (Agénor and Canuto 2015). Other studies prescribe control- improvement and technological innovations depend largely ling inflation and debt, reducing income inequality, investing on the presence of highly skilled human capital (Lucas 1988, in human capital development, promoting entrepreneurship Aghion and Howitt 1998). and knowledge diffusion, or supporting the growth of the Fourth, open and competitive markets support economic middle class. growth by promoting increased specialization, efficient No matter what policy options a country selects, however, resource allocation based on comparative advantage, it still faces the challenge of implementing them—and the improved productivity, and diffusion of knowledge and kinds of implementation challenges confronting middle- technology. Most economists agree that there is a virtuous 3 The Middle-Income Trap: Myth or Reality? Box 2: A brief case study of Malaysia (Yusuf and Nabeshima 2009). Others advise that it should Are concerns that Malaysia is (or may soon find itself) stuck in promote entrepreneurship, rapidly expand secondary and the trap warranted? Despite having higher income than Singa- tertiary education, and grow the country’s tech-based, pore or the Republic of Korea a few decades ago, Malaysia has globally-traded services sector by attracting highly productive struggled to maintain comparable growth rates, especially in foreign firms to locate production in Malaysia (Flaaen, Ghani, the aftermath of East Asia’s late-1990s financial crisis and the and Mishra 2013). Yet other researchers recommend that 2008 global recession. Compared to most other countries, Malaysia could achieve productivity gains by encouraging however, Malaysia has been gaining in relative status, with local firms to innovate through technology adoption, respect to both developed and developing economies. diffusion, and eventual creation—similar, in many ways, to the Malaysia is not stuck in a trap. This does not imply, growth strategies of the Republic of Korea or Taiwan, China however, that it can afford to disregard renewed sources of (Cherie and Hasanov 2015). This often contrasting advice growth. Several recent papers have considered Malaysia’s must be taken with caution: removing obstacles to productiv- experience and offered specific policy recommendations. ity growth is often a better policy than intervening directly in Researchers suggest that Malaysia should deepen its industrial favor of particular sectors in the economy. and innovation capabilities through localization economies cycle where trade leads to productivity enhancement, which perhaps only growing more acute amid the prevailing notion leads to further increased trade (Dollar 1992, Frankel and of a global growth slowdown. This includes even China, the Romer 1999). growth star in recent decades. Of course, achieving and maintaining the fundamentals of Historical experience and empirical evidence show that economic growth is easier said than done, and many coun- the transition from middle-income to high-income levels tries are making sincere efforts. External conditions and takes time, and requires countries to pursue consistently cyclical fluctuations in international trade and capital flows sound but evolving policies to maintain the fundamental can weaken the impact of countries’ growth efforts and policy drivers of economic growth. Different stages of growth call for reforms. The considerable debate around the middle-income different strategies and policies, and the right reforms often trap underscores that countries should tailor these funda- take time to impact economic growth. mental ingredients to fit their economic and political realities Ultimately, each country’s growth story is unique but the and constraints (see box 2). general prescription remains the same. Policymakers should critically examine their growth strategies to find the most Conclusion effective ways to boost productivity improvement, which is The middle-income trap is a narrative of growth stagnation the key to supporting, nourishing, and preserving long-run that reflects (and exacerbates) current and long-standing economic growth. anxieties about slow economic growth. This anxiety is References Middle-income trap literature Barro, Robert (1996). “Democracy and Growth.” Journal of Economic Growth Agénor, Pierre-Richard and Octaviano Canuto (2015). “Middle-Income Growth 1(1): 1-27. Traps.” Research in Economics 69(4): 641–660. Barro, Robert and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (2004). Economic Growth. Cambridge, Aiyar, Shekhar, Romain Duval, Damien Puy D, Yiqun Wu and Longmei Zhang Massachusetts: MIT Press. (2013). “Growth Slowdowns and the Middle Income Trap.” IMF Working Paper Dollar, David (1992). "Outward-Oriented Developing Economies Really Do Grow 13/71. 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