SOCIAL PROTECTION & JOBS DISCUSSION PAPER No. 1935 | SEPTEMBER 2019 Unbundled: A framework for connecting safety nets and humanitarian assistance in refugee settings Karin Seyfert, Valentina Barca, Ugo Gentilini, Manjula Luthria, and Shereen Abbady © 2019 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: +1 (202) 473 1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. 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Abstract retro geometric background: © iStock.com/marigold_88 Project 41595 Unbundled: A framework for connecting safety nets and humanitarian assistance in refugee settings Karin Seyfert*, Valentina Barca**, Ugo Gentilini***, Manjula Luthria***, and Shereen Abbady** Abstract. The debate on if and how to connect humanitarian assistance for refugees with national social protection systems can elicit polarizing views. Hence, it is not unusual to observe country-level approaches getting somewhat ‘stuck’ – especially where refugees represent a sizable share of the population: from a donor perspective, the question is how can governments be persuaded to be more inclusive; from a government standpoint, it faces disproportionate political and economic risks from “being left with the bill”; and from the international humanitarian agencies viewpoint, there might be quandaries on how to reconcile commitments to neutrality and independence with those to respecting the primary responsibility of governments. These stylized views are legitimate, but their combined effect may generate competing narratives and little negotiating space among the multiple actors involved. The net result might be the endurance of a sub-optimal dual systems operating in parallel – one for refugees, one for citizens. The framework laid out in this paper attempts to facilitate the identification of workable pathways for progress among actors. Instead of framing the humanitarian-social protection links as an ‘either-or’ choice, the framework includes a more granular analysis of how collaborations may emerge around select programmatic ‘functions’, as well as the ‘degrees’ of possible connection between national and international support within a given function. While work in progress, such analytical approach is already emerging from country practices and withholds the potential to help ‘unstuck’ the debate. Keywords: social protection, social assistance, cash transfers, humanitarian assistance, refugees, displacement, fragility. JEL codes: P33, P36, I38, H84, J61 * Oxford Policy Management ** Independent consultant *** World Bank Group Comments are welcome and could be sent to Karin.Seyfert@opml.co.uk and ugentilini@worldbank.org Acknowledgements This paper was generously funded by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID). Special thanks go to Chris Reilly, Will Helyar, Tamara Silver with DFID’s team for their precious comments and support. Hana Brixi, Tania Meyer, Lynne Sherburne- Benz, Khalid Ahmed Ali Moheyddeen, and Cristobal Ridao-Cano provided invaluable strategic guidance. The authors are grateful to participants at a workshop in Amman (May 2019) and seminar in Washington DC (June 2019) for their precious feedback, as well as to Paul Harvey and Mirey Ovadiya for their review and comments. Thanks also go to Helena Makarenko for her administrative support, and Raiden Dillard and Renata Mello for publication assistance. Outline 1. Introduction 4 2. A continuum of options 6 3. Unbundling 9 3.1 Financing 10 3.2 Legal and policy framework 11 3.3 Setting eligibility criteria 12 3.4 Setting transfer type, level, frequency, duration 13 3.5 Governance and coordination 14 3.6 Outreach 15 3.7 Registration 16 3.8 Enrolment 16 3.9 Payments 17 3.10 Case Management 18 3.11 Complaints and appeals 19 3.12 Protection 20 3.13 Information Management 21 3.14 Monitoring and Evaluation 22 4. Implications 23 4.1 Parallel systems 23 4.2 Alignment 24 4.3 Piggybacking 25 4.4 National systems-led 26 5. Conclusions 27 References 29 1. Introduction The links between humanitarian assistance and social protection elicit deep philosophical, policy and programmatic quandaries (Gentilini 2016). This paper lays out a pragmatic framework that would help, at least in part, to “take the heat out of the debate”. In doing so, the paper expands on work on social protection and humanitarian assistance by Gentilini et al (2018), O’Brien et al (2018) and World Bank (2016), and integrates it with recent research on cash assistance in refugee settings (EC 2019; UNHCR 2019a; 2019b; Maunder et al. 2018). Interestingly, humanitarian-social protection interactions are characterized by growing convergence on some issues, and a soaring divide on others. For instance, about 10 percent of global humanitarian assistance is now delivered in cash, hence offering an opportunity to connect with national cash-based programs (CaLP 2018). Also, governments are increasingly investing in making national social protection ‘shock-responsive’, thereby opening new doors for collaborations with global partners (CaLP 2018; World Bank forthcoming). Yet, a distinctive feature of humanitarian assistance revolves around the degree of involvement with and engagement of national authorities (Konyndyk 2018). While governments have the primary responsibility to assist and protect their citizens in times of crisis (UN46/182) – an obligation reiterated in the 2016 Grand Bargain – only 2.5 percent of humanitarian aid is channeled through host governments (Development Initiatives 2018; WHS 2016). Why is there such disconnect? UNCHR (2019b) and Gentilini et al (2018) point to a number of constraints that limit the ability of humanitarian cash assistance to integrate with government provisions. These may include a risky operating environment; the need for timely assistance in life-threatening situations; possible lack of government sovereignty over a territory in full or part; legislation preventing some types of domestic assistance to non- citizens; concerns about the impartiality of governments in conflicts; low government capacity; and ensuring transparency and accountability of resources. The literature discussing factors inhibiting closer connections between social protection and humanitarian assistance is flourishing. The EC has recently completed a major study on shock responsive social protection (Cherrier et al. 2019); O’Brien et al. (2018) describe in which way national systems can be expanded to accommodate people affected by humanitarian disaster; and the World Bank is in the process of finalizing an overview of such debates within an ‘adaptive’ framework (World Bank forthcoming). Moreover, Mitchell (2018) discusses how national systems could flex to accommodate displaced people. Specifically, the paper calls for a progressive transition from a parallel humanitarian delivery system, to one including features that are compatible with the national system until they are completely with the national system, if institutionally separate. Once both systems are harmonized, displaced people are progressively included in the national system. A growing number of them tend to focus on displacement contexts. Recent papers by both the European Commission and UNHCR spearhead calls for further integration of refugees in -4- national systems (UNHCR 2019b; EC 2019a). The recent Refugee Compact initiative explores strategies to move from UNHCR’s traditional ‘care and maintenance’ model to out of camp strategies promoting resilience and inclusiveness of host and displaced communities alike (ILO 2018). Under the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) compact principles are currently piloted by UNHCR in 15 countries. Recent country experiences with large refugees inflows vividly underscore the political economy considerations at play (Maunder et al. 2018). Governments may be unwilling to accept non-nationals into their delivery systems for several reasons. For instance, states might be reluctant to take on financial responsibility to delivery humanitarian assistance given budget constraints and the open-ended nature of the crisis. This can also generate high political risks in contexts of pre-existing societal tensions and weak social contracts. Political economy considerations are important when considering, for example, transfer amounts and programme sustainability. Humanitarian objectives are focused on saving lives and meeting basic needs. This may lead to larger transfer amounts than those received by the host communities, hence providing a potentially explosive situation in overcrowded urban areas with hosts and refugees living side-by-side (Gentilini 2015). It is at this stage that the debate gets somewhat ‘stuck’ – i.e., from a donor perspective, the question is how can governments be persuaded to be more inclusive; from a government standpoint, it faces disproportionate political and economic risks from “being left with the bill”; and from the international humanitarian agencies viewpoint, there might be quandaries on how to reconcile commitments to neutrality and independence with those to respecting the primary responsibility of governments. Also, concerns around the technical, humanitarian and budgetary implications from transitions between national and international systems. All these stylized views are legitimate, but their combined effect may generate competing narratives and little negotiating space among the multiple actors involved. The net result might be the persistence of a sub-optimal dual system operating completely in parallel for an indefinite amount of time. Against such backdrop, the framework laid out in this paper attempts to facilitate the identification of workable pathways for progress among actors. Instead of framing the humanitarian-social protection links as an ‘either-or’, the framework unbundles the variety of ways and options that actors can consider for better connecting humanitarian and social protection approaches. This includes a more granular understanding of how collaborations may emerge around select programmatic functions, as well as the degrees of possible connection between national and international support within a given function. These are not just analytical propositions, but practices already emerging from countries like Turkey and Lebanon. The reminder of the paper is structured as follows: the next section lays out a continuum of four engagement options for humanitarian assistance, from parallel to integrated systems. Section 3 applies such continuum to a variety of programmatic function, including a -5- disaggregated discussion for fourteen individual functions. Section 4 discusses emerging implications for each four model, including in terms if sustainability, accountability, coverage, and other parameters, while section 5 concludes. 2. A continuum of options Humanitarian social assistance systems for refugees can be placed on a continuum ranging from completely parallel systems to being fully led by national systems (see Figure 1). The options listed below, define arbitrary boundaries along what is actually a continuum. Following O’Brien et al. (2018) we define the following four: 1. Parallel or stand-alone humanitarian response: under this option, the delivery of social assistance to refugees is stand-alone from national systems 2. Shadow Alignment, which is a stand-alone response, but one that aligns with existing or future social assistance programmes 3. Piggybacking, which represents a response that combines stand-alone response with working through national systems to deliver assistance. 4. National system-led, or entirely run through national systems, where refugees are part of the national caseload. In this case, approaches such as horizontal or vertical expansion as well as technical fixes, apply. 1 Figure 1: A continuum of delivery approaches for social assistance to refugees Source: adapted from O’Brien et al. (2018). In order to illustrate the typology more in detail, we briefly outline funding and reporting lines of these different scenarios using simplified organisational charts to illustrate how these four 'Vertical expansion' refers to temporarily increasing the value or duration of benefits for existing beneficiaries. 1 Horizontal expansion refers to temporarily increasing the number of recipients in an existing social protection programme. Technical fixes refer to making small adjustments to the design of routine social protection programmes. -6- options might look like. In the case of stand-alone humanitarian response, for instance, international agencies and NGOs set up a parallel and independent social protection system for a target population within a country (i.e. in a set district) – as a standalone humanitarian response (figure 2). The org chart below is an illustration of one potential set up of parallel systems, it captures the flow of funding to refugees in the parallel systems approach. There may be coordination between actors, but key governance and delivery decisions are taken independently, with governments playing a relatively minimal role. Figure 2: Funding flows in the Parallel Systems approach Alignment is also a stand-alone response run by a humanitarian relief partner. It is one that has been designed to align with or mirror existing or future national social assistance programmes. This means that while donors, the UN and NGOs deliver humanitarian assistance, government counterparts offer strong input during design stages to ensure the humanitarian assistance mimics the national one (figure 3). Figure 3: Funding flows in the Alignment delivery systems approach -7- Humanitarian assistance that is piggy-backing in national systems is no longer a stand-alone response (figure 4). Donors and international humanitarian implementing agencies rely on existing national social assistance structures to deliver assistance. That being said, humanitarian assistance delivery will not entirely depend on national structures, but rely on both the humanitarian and the national system. Figure 4: Funding flows in the Piggy Backing delivery systems approach In this scenario, donors would typically work through a UN agency and with the Social Protection ministry to deliver a humanitarian cash transfer through the national delivery system. An NGO may be engaged to support with M&E or protection referrals. In the scenario below, the government could provide man power and access to existing institutions. In a different scenario, NGO and national delivery systems might work in parallel. Finally, humanitarian assistance that is nationally led relies entirely on the national delivery system (figure 5). Nationally led social assistance to refugees is akin to giving budget support to a government for a national policy. Refugees would be considered as part of the ‘standard’ pool of social protection cases and no distinction would be made between them and nationals. In this case, refugees can be treated like a surge in needs and all ‘usual’ adaptive social protection strategies apply (World Bank, forthcoming; O’Brien et al. 2018). Yet, few examples exist of this approach. For instance, the EU gave small budget support to Greece and Spain as countries of first arrival (EC 2018). -8- Figure 5: Contractual and reporting flows for a Nationally-Led approach 3. Unbundling This continuum can be applied across every element of the social protection delivery chain (Lindert et al forthcoming). For example, there might be cases when it could make sense to manage payment mechanisms for both the humanitarian transfer as well as the national social assistance through one common financial service provider. The humanitarian transfer could piggyback on existing payment mechanisms. In a similar vein, other elements of the humanitarian and national social assistance delivery chain could be aligned to each other. For example, targeting methods for the humanitarian and social assistance transfer could use the same targeting method but be run by two different agencies. One could be implemented by a humanitarian agency for the refugee caseload and the other by a social protection authority for citizens. Some elements of that same illustrative system could run completely in parallel. For instance, refugees may enrol into the transfer by registering with UNHCR, which could include an assessment for the transfer, while citizens might have to apply at social assistance offices. In the case of humanitarian cash assistance led by national provision systems, the host government leads on programme design and refugees are entirely part of the national social assistance system. Humanitarian agencies may offer financial support or technical assistance. In practice, to date most systems of support for refugees are largely parallel to national systems. This paper considers whether and how they could move along the continuum (see 6). It is worth adding that different adaptation approaches can be combined with each other. Figure below may well represent the final and best way to link national and humanitarian cash assistance systems. -9- Figure 6: ‘Pick’n’mix’ of delivery approaches Aid agencies choosing along the continuum should also assess national social protection capacities to determine where opportunities for alignment and integration lie. The degree to which a country is affected by crisis is commonly used basis for an assessment 2. We would concur with UNHCR (2019b) to argue that delivery capacity, along with political economy considerations discussed above, are likely more important. Annex 2 in UNHCR (2019b) includes a helpful decision tree that outlines how to assess host government capacity and humanitarian regulation in place. The Yemeni case shows, that even in severe crisis, existing social assistance systems can deliver, provided they are in place form the onset (Al-Ahmadi and da Silva 2018). 3.1 Financing Funding for cash assistance when part of national social protection systems, comes from national budgets and is financed from government revenue. Donors, through international appeals, most commonly finance humanitarian cash transfers. Table 1 below describe in more detail how various financing options could look like along the continuum. 2 i.e. A Typology of Humanitarian Contexts and Social Protection Provision Towards the development of a common ECHO-DEVCO guidance package, Phase 1 Report - 10 - Table 1: Financing What are implications along Who is responsible? How is it delivered? the delivery chain? No effect on host government’s budgets. Even though humanitarian Mostly, funding is channelled funding horizons are Donors from donors, to UN agencies, to increasing in length, they are NGOs, to beneficiaries. still shorter compared to national budgets and humanitarian funding flows can be unpredictable. Funding is channelled from donors, to UN, to NGOs, to Same as for parallel systems Donors beneficiaries. Government above: No effect on host counterparts may participate in government’s budgets. cash working groups. Donors remain the chief Donors will transfer funds either financiers of the transfer, to a UN agency, a trust fund or a with in kind contribution selected financial provider. The government will likely from governments in Regulation governing make in kind contributions in form of staff and humanitarian funding will be the form of staff or PFM infrastructure and a important. Most humanitarian systems. here is no effect on potential role of funding has to run through host government’s budgets. government financial specialized humanitarian systems. funding mechanisms. Donors will offer budget support to national governments, through a variety of Refugees will impact Governments or donors instruments. Governments may national social protection increase budget allocations budgets. under their own DRM financing processes. 3.2 Legal and policy framework The legal and policy frameworks of cash assistance set out what the goals of the transfer are, as well as define core procedures and assign implementation responsibilities. Table 2 below describes in more detail how various options could look like along the continuum. - 11 - Table 2: Legal and policy frameworks What are implications Who is responsible? How is it delivered? along the delivery chain? Delivery agencies follow NGOs and donors, humanitarian principles and polices abiding by national set by coordination mechanisms legislation, but not (often the cluster system). National None. bound by national governments set the legal framework social protection but are little involved in planning or policies. design. Delivery agencies follow humanitarian principles and polices NGOs and donors, set by national governments using abiding by national coordination mechanisms such as legislation, and Same as for parallel working groups or steering following national systems: None. committees. Policies governing the social protection humanitarian systems should be policies. aligned with national social protection policies. Changes in national A humanitarian transfer may ‘borrow’ legislation or policy are Line ministries and the national legislation, for instance on likely. For instance, to UN. Depending on the IDs. Or setting up legislation that expand national social degree of piggy- allows refugees to formally enter protection to refugees, backing. social registries. create national IDs for refugees etc. Refugees enter national systems and Changes in national Line ministries are classified as social protection legislation or policy are recipients in line with citizens. likely. 3.3 Setting eligibility criteria Eligibility criteria and qualifying conditions set out who can benefit from a cash transfer. They can include characteristics such as age, family status, disabilities or household income. Table 3 below describes in more detail how eligibility criteria could be set and look like along the continuum. - 12 - Table 3: Setting eligibility criteria What are implications Who is How is it delivered? along the delivery responsible? chain? Eligibility criteria and approaches will Often proxy means likely be different between humanitarian Determined by testing using assets as and national social assistance. Eligibility NGOs, in proxy but also criteria among various humanitarian coordination with vulnerability criteria (i.e. programmes may also differ. Such donors. dependency ratio, difference between nationals and disabilities, age). refugees may lead to perceptions of unfairness among beneficiaries. Set by NGOs, in Implementing agencies coordination with mirror government Humanitarian assistance will be strongly donors, Aligned to practice. Eligibility criteria shaped by existing national practice. This existing do not need to be exactly may be in conflict with humanitarian government the same but use similar principles. processes and conceptual approaches. criteria. Eligibility is determined by the national system, Line ministries and though special conditions implementers. may apply to refugees. Depending on the Full piggy-backing would None. degree of piggy- mean using the same backing. eligibility processes and criteria as is used for nationals Eligibility is determined Capacity increases may be required as by the national system. Line ministries well as technical support in how to best New eligibility criteria determine eligibility. may be developed. 3.4 Setting transfer type, level, frequency, duration Table 4 below describes in more detail various options of setting type, level, frequency and duration of a cash transfer. Table 4: Setting transfer type, level, frequency, duration What are implications along Who is responsible? How is it delivered? the delivery chain? Mostly monthly cash transfers, Determined by Refugees may receive higher occasionally vouchers. Levels implementing benefits compared to host are commonly set to help agencies such as populations. Benefit levels households meet a minimum NGOs, sometimes UN among humanitarian and expenditure basket. The overall and donors. national programmes will likely duration is determined by - 13 - What are implications along Who is responsible? How is it delivered? the delivery chain? funding availability and may cut differ. Perceptions of unfairness or be reduced. among beneficiaries are likely. Humanitarian assistance will be Type and frequency of transfer Determined by strongly shaped by existing can often be easily aligned. The implementers. Aligned national practice. This may lead transfer amount will have to be to existing to lower transfers and might be negotiated to be coherent with government guidelines in conflict with humanitarian national levels of support. principles. Line ministries and the The transfer amount will have National transfer amounts will implementers. to be negotiated to, if not align, likely set the benchmark. These Depending on the at least be coherent with may be below humanitarian degree of piggy- national policy. basic needs requirements. backing. As for piggy-backing: National The transfer amount for transfer amounts will likely set Line ministries. refugees will be the same as the benchmark. These may be existing national transfers. below humanitarian basic needs requirements. 3.5 Governance and coordination Governance of a cash transfer is about ‘who makes strategic decisions about the transfer?’ and ‘who coordinates all the various partners? Ministries of social affairs or social development are often in charge of national social assistance. Humanitarian coordination procedures, the cluster or working group system, are in place for transfers to refugees. Table 5 below describes in more detail various governance options. Table 5: Governance and coordination What are implications along the Who is responsible? How is it delivered? delivery chain? Coordination, mostly through Steering committee the Cash Working Group in the involving UN and cluster system. The government NGOs, sometimes is sometimes involved in an donors advisory capacity in steering committees. Coordination will move in The government has greater Steering committee emphasis from the Cash input in design decisions. involving UN, NGOs Working Group to a steering Attempts to align delivery may and government line committee where the also lead to the alignment of ministries government plays a stronger various humanitarian cash role. assistance with each other - 14 - What are implications along the Who is responsible? How is it delivered? delivery chain? NGO level cash coordination Steering committee Coordination will be led by might to disappear. NGOs role in involving UN, NGOs government and donor shaping and delivering and government line agencies. humanitarian assistance will ministries reduce. Line ministries, Coordination among UN and NGO role in shaping and potential government agencies only. delivering humanitarian involvement of Donors may have inputs via a assistance will reduce. senior cabinet. steering committee. 3.6 Outreach Outreach is about bringing the cash assistance to people who need it and to ensure that services and information necessary reaches people targeted by the transfer. Outreach may include communication campaigns and home visits. Table 6 below describes in more detail various options for outreach along the continuum. Table 6: Outreach What are implications along the Who is responsible? How is it delivered? delivery chain? Often, there are no large-scale Often NGO staff working with outreach campaigns (not to social workers or community- raise expectations). Outreach based volunteers. NGOs can NGOs efforts to target refugees will commonly only afford a small also reach and inform potential caseload and outreach may be non-beneficiary host kept deliberately limited. communities. As above. Due to the alignment there is scope for cross- Outreach likely led programme outreach being by NGOs supported by government offices. Implementing agencies may support national providers with Either the resources and capabilities to government or design outreach campaigns. If humanitarian actors assistance is national and large could lead outreach. in scale, nationwide outreach is feasible. Assistance is likely focussed on reaching host communities. Line ministries and Awareness raising campaigns are Making outreach accessible in their regional social unlikely. There may be some different languages and protection offices. outreach at the local level. platforms used by refugees may require technical assistance. - 15 - 3.7 Registration Registration refers to the process when potential beneficiaries formally express their desire to be enrolled into the cash assistance programme. Table 7 below describes in more detail various options for registration along the continuum. Table 7: Registration What are implications along Who is responsible? How is it delivered? the delivery chain? NGOs will often carry out home- visits to register applicants. NGOs or UNHCR, NGOs UNHCR holds a central database may be appointed by of refugees and may refer certain UNHCR cases to NGOS for registration for the cash assistance programme. The humanitarian and national NGOs or UNHCR, NGOs SP programmes use similar may be appointed by The registration process is registration processes, but UNHCR. Aligned to likely different from the registration may be with existing government usual humanitarian different organisations for processes and variables assistance protocol. nationals and refugees. Similar collected. types of variables are collected. An unusually large caseload If registration into the Registration is done by may enter national humanitarian transfer piggy national staff, but may registration offices, backs on the national system, be financed by a donor requiring short term surge registration is likely to happen via and supported by capacity in key locations, application at a social protection technical assistance. such as increased social office and not via home visits. workers, translators etc. Refugees will likely make applications via a social protection office, the same Regional social location as nationals. They may As for piggy-backing in cell protection offices. also be registered via health visits above. or screenings at schools, depending on the national referral system. 3.8 Enrolment Enrolment refers to the process when registered candidates for the programme are enrolled in it and become beneficiaries. Enrolment will likely overlap with registration. Those responsible for registration will likely also manage enrolment. Table 8 below describes in more detail various options for enrolment along the continuum. - 16 - Table 8: Enrolment What are Who is implications How is it delivered? responsible? along the delivery chain? Social workers may collect enrolment information during a home visit, likely at the same time as registration. Once the data is entered, eligibility may NGOs be assessed automatically (i.e. using a PMT formula). None. Beneficiaries may be notified via text message or receive a letter or call about the status of their application. Enrolment of nationals and refugees is carried out None. NGOs, separately, but using a similar process. Enrolment sometimes UN would be into a system run be the NGO or UN agency. Enrolment will happen using a government system or process. This is likely an automated process after Government registration once key information has been agencies. processed. Beneficiaries are likely to receive notification via sms, phone or mail. Enrolment will likely happen in an automated way on Government the national social registry once key information has agencies. been processed. 3.9 Payments A financial service provider makes payments to beneficiaries. This can be a public or a private provider. Table 9 below describes in more detail various options for payments along the continuum. Table 9: Payments What are implications along the Who is responsible? How is it delivered? delivery chain? A payment provider is usually selected following a Two visibly different payment Various third-party competitive process. A variety process will be in operation, one financial providers of providers and disbursement for refugees one for nationals. mechanisms are possible. - 17 - What are implications along the Who is responsible? How is it delivered? delivery chain? As long as the use of the payment mechanism and the payment frequency align, the Various third-party provider may be a different Alignment of practices across financial providers, one. NGOs might use the payment providers might have to or the same as used same financial provider as be negotiated. by the government. used by the government and pay the same charge so as to not distort the market UN agencies and NGOs may be Payment is likely going to bound by procurement rules to happen using the same Same payment competitively procure a financial payment provider as used by provider as the provider. If working with the the national transfer. The government, with government provider of choice is relevant agency would NGO/UN support to desired, a competitive process may negotiate an agreement with deal with the not be feasible. The financial the provider or could use the increased caseload. provider might see the additional same contract as the case load as damaging or government. overwhelming. If a large number of individuals is enrolled in a short time frame, Payment mechanisms are the Government surge support may be required. same for both nationals and financial provider. The financial provider might see refugees. the additional case load as damaging or overwhelming. 3.10 Case Management Case management refers to how a beneficiary’s needs are followed up on. It combines a number of activities namely registration, enrolment, appeals and advocacy for additional support options and services should they be needed. For instance, if data is missing during registration, good case management would involve having a protocol in place specifying how to follow up to get this additional information. The protocol would also nominate a responsible person as well as timeframes for follow-up. See Table 10 below for options. Table 10: Case Management What are implications along Who is responsible? How is it delivered? the delivery chain? Case management activities would involve repeated home-visits, validation exercises etc. These are The staff intensive nature of staff-intensive. NGO case NGOs, UNHCR or this form of follow up means management might be run on an another UN agency that it usually only covers a interoperable database, where small number of beneficiaries. cash partners make part of their beneficiary databases accessible to avoid duplication. - 18 - What are implications along Who is responsible? How is it delivered? the delivery chain? It is likely that NGOs will want to run closer case NGOs, sometimes NGO staff are mirroring management if the UN. Mimicking and government designed case government approach is quite building on management protocols (i.e. similar hands-off. Poor case government frequency of home visits or management has larger systems validation processes). reputational consequences for NGOs compared to governments. This may require expanding Case management led by national National statutory duties of existing social workers and national mechanism, with case workers to include systems, with reporting NGO/UN support to refugees. The UN/NGO partner mechanisms to the UN agency and deal with the may have limited access to close supervision by the M&E increased caseload case files and limited oversight team. over case management. This may require expanding statutory duties of existing Case management led by national case workers to include National social workers and national refugees. Increased staffing mechanisms. systems, and training to deal with the increased caseload may be required. 3.11 Complaints and appeals Complaints mechanisms are avenues for beneficiaries to raise concerns about issues such as late payments or clarity on eligibility criteria. Appeals mechanisms allow beneficiaries to appeal the decision that has been made on their benefit entitlements. Table 11 below describes in more detail various options for complaints and appeals along the continuum. Table 11: Complaints and appeals Who is What are implications along the How is it delivered? responsible? delivery chain? Complaints mechanisms can be in form of a hotline or NGOs None. dedicated email. Appeal mechanisms very rarely exist. NGOs will implement similar complaints and appeals NGOs None. procedures as run by governments. - 19 - Who is What are implications along the How is it delivered? responsible? delivery chain? Monitoring complaints and appeals The humanitarian transfer will be more limited and is one of the would use the available few insights non-government National national complaints and partners can gain into the mechanism, with appeals tools, or borrow functioning of the system. An NGO/UN support to some structures and unusually large caseload may enter deal with the capacity, such as a call national systems, requiring short increased caseload centre, but hire non- term surge capacity in key locations, government staff to man it. such as increased social workers, translators etc. Monitoring complaints and appeals will be one of the few insights non- government partners can gain into the functioning of the system. These The complaints and appeals National insights will be limited. An unusually used by refugees and mechanism. large caseload may enter national nationals are the same. systems, requiring short term surge capacity in key locations, such as increased social workers, translators etc. 3.12 Protection Protection is included here since refugees are especially vulnerable to abuse and do not have the same rights and legal protections as citizens. Social and humanitarian assistance to refugees should include activities such as screenings to assess if a refugee is particularly vulnerable and may need additional protection (such as an unaccompanied minor, or a person with disabilities). People found in need of additional protection activities should be referred to the relevant service (such and mentorship and adult support for unaccompanied minors). Table 12 below describes in more detail various options. Table 12: Protection Who is What are implications along the How is it delivered? responsible? delivery chain? Outreach and registration often include a protection assessment. Registration with UNHCR always NGOs, mostly a protection screening. Protection is dependent on the sometimes UN The efficiency of referrals implementing agency’s connections agencies depends on the availability of to protection service providers. service providers and the capacity in the protection and social care sector. - 20 - Who is What are implications along the How is it delivered? responsible? delivery chain? NGOs may not choose to align to national protection/social care Protection referrals are often services if they are weak, but will weak in national systems. NGOs continue using their own processes. NGOS, could align to them but may The effort of aligning national and sometimes UN reproduce a weak system in humanitarian protection activities doing so. may strengthen the national system and lead to systematising cross- agency protection referrals. Protection cases might be referred to social care services at registration, depending on the If the national system is weak, this is connections that exist in the likely reproduced in the humanitarian National social national system between social assistance. Considering that refugees care services assistance and social care are vulnerable, it may be worth services. Other options are considering providing extra support referrals by schools or the health and surge capacity in this area. service. NGOs may beef up the national system. National social As above. As above. care services 3.13 Information Management Information management refers to how beneficiary data is managed and shared between agencies. It includes social registries and other beneficiary databases. Table 13 below describes in more detail various options. Table 13: Information Management Who is What are implications along How is it delivered? responsible? the delivery chain? UNHCR’s registration database is often used as a de facto social registry of Each NGO will have its own NGOs, refugees. It functions as a basic case database, these will rarely be sometimes UN management tool. UNHCR often will shared entirely with other (e.g. especially register refugees and pass a redacted organisations. Though UNHCR and version of the data on to NGOs. NGOs redacted versions are used WFP) may add beneficiary information to the for coordination. database. Refugees are vulnerable and A case management system is built with in need of rigorous data NGOs, longer term objective of integration protection. Sharing full sometimes UN with government systems, as well as beneficiary profiles across handover and capacity building for agencies is likely impossible. government. - 21 - Who is What are implications along How is it delivered? responsible? the delivery chain? The government will lead on case For data protection reasons, Use of management. This will likely require it is unlikely that government SP changes to the national social humanitarian partners will data systems protection databases. Humanitarian get full insight into this and capacity agencies will see small excerpts of the database. full database. Changes in national databases may be required Use of to accommodate refugees. government The government will lead on case Humanitarian agencies will data, systems management. not have access to this data and capacity without government approval. 3.14 Monitoring and Evaluation Monitoring and evaluation examines if the cash assistance is delivered as intended, is reaching the people it intended and has the desired welfare impacts. M&E activities include the running of focus groups, household surveys and regular monitoring visits. Table 14 below describes the various options. Table 14: Monitoring and Evaluation What are implications Who is responsible? How is it delivered? along the delivery chain? If there are several programmes running in parallel this might lead NGOs will carry out monitoring and to duplication of M&E NGOs impact assessments systems and reporting against a variety of not necessarily comparable indicators. Aligning of Governments rarely carry out programming may lead impact assessments of their social to joint M&E protection policies. NGOs will carry approaches. Even if out monitoring and impact NGOs, sometimes UN monitoring efforts assessments, beyond what the cannot be aligned, government is doing, likely to evaluations can be satisfy accountability to their more easily donors. coordinated. If an international donor M&E partners will likely monitor Strong support is contributes to the government implementation on required to insist on programme, it is likely that the ground and feed back to rigorous and the donor will hire an NGO donors. They may work with independent M&E to carry out third party national statistical offices to data. monitoring and impact implement the M&E effort. - 22 - What are implications Who is responsible? How is it delivered? along the delivery chain? assessments on the government provider. If the government leads on If the humanitarian relief is implementation it will be national entirely funded from audit offices or statistical offices national budgets, the who will design and implement government will lead on monitoring and evaluation the monitoring effort. As above. approaches. Third party M&E Otherwise the same case as partners may monitor government piggy-backing applies. implementation on the ground and Media outlets may play an feed back to donors if donors ad hoc monitoring role. contributed to the cash transfer. 4. Implications Each of the chosen approaches has advantages and disadvantages. Below we briefly summarise key implications of each approach along the continuum.3 Negative implications are in italics. 4.1 Parallel systems Sustainability • Humanitarian financial flows to international agencies may create a parallel system with little incentives for governments to engage. Lack of government involvement may make further regulatory change in other areas favouring refugees unlikely. Accountability and political economy • Strong accountability along the individual funding chain to donors. • Refugees might prefer to interact with the UN, not with government. • Potential conflicts with the host community if refugees are perceived to receive ‘unfair’ benefits. Addressing needs and protection • Lack of clarity from beneficiary perspective about various transfers available. Enrolment into the NGO led system can be haphazard and arbitrary. • Once in the system, there are likely strong protection mechanisms for the most vulnerable. • Refugees may have different needs from nationals due to their social networks, ability to work, asset ownership etc., and a stand-alone system may tailor assistance and serve them better than a routine system. 3 Building on framework within O’Brien et al 2018 - 23 - Coverage of population • Targeting and coverage in the NGO catchment area often strong. But overall national targeting and coverage may be limited/patchy. Cost and duplicated systems • Expensive due to multiple overheads, parallel systems and caseload overlaps (which are often impossible to monitor because of lack of data sharing). Timeliness and predictability • Quickly to mobilise since part of standard delivery package in humanitarian operations. 4.2 Alignment Sustainability • Involvement of government may create a venue to discuss refugee regulation and may lead to reforms in other social protection regulation. • If multiple providers are involved, it is very time consuming to set up an aligned platform and to get NGOs to work together on a joint platform. • NGOS will often tailor their aligned programme – even if it creates unsustainable systems i.e. they will likely have much more hands-on case management than many governments, they will likely have stronger VAM and protection mechanisms (to abide by humanitarian principles). Accountability and political economy • Full alignment entails an accountability problem – NGOs have to implement a programme that they would not themselves design and are held accountable by donors for reaching targets. • If alignment is complete, this is a very attractive option for governments. Refugees would be looked after in a way that does not alienate host communities and host governments have few fiscal responsibilities. Addressing needs and protection • The transfer value is likely below the Minimum Expenditure Basket as considerations linked to host community perceptions will guide the setting of the amount. • Once in the system there are likely strong protection mechanisms for the most vulnerable (stronger than if government implementing alone). Coverage of population • Coordinated case management across NGOs will lead to better coverage nationally. • Overall national targeting and coverage may be still be limited since NGOs have smaller capacity. - 24 - Cost and duplicated systems • Expensive due to multiple overheads of different organisations parallel systems. Timeliness and predictability • Process of alignment is likely time consuming. 4.3 Piggybacking Sustainability • More likely to be a sustainable solution if humanitarian actors convince governments to take on the refugee caseload. • Possible in FCAS where some institutions and systems exist; can help to maintain some of these systems during a crisis. • NGOs will often tailor their piggybacked programmes – even if it creates unsustainable systems i.e. they will likely have much more hands-on case management than many governments, they will likely have stronger VAM and protection mechanisms (to abide by humanitarian principles). Accountability and political economy • Can be an option for working with and supporting existing national systems where donors cannot fund state actors due to the crisis. • Requires very strong cooperation and coordination between the UN and donors to manage coherent relationships with the relevant government ministry. • May require changes in SP legal frameworks since new entrants will register in the national SP database and will be served by national SP centres. • Governments may be reluctant to take on the refugee caseload. Addressing needs and protection • Refugees unlikely to be well represented in any existing social protection registries and information systems – will require ad-hoc approach to registration, etc. • Staff, institutions and processes of the social protection system need to be accessible to and able to communicate with refugees/IDPs – language, cultural, distance barriers etc. likely require additional support via NGOs/UN. • Working through administrative staff of state programmes could support access in insecure areas, or create barriers if government does not have access there. • The transfer value is likely below the MEB as considerations linked to host community perceptions will guide the setting of the amount. • Once in the system there are likely strong protection mechanisms for the most vulnerable (stronger than if government implementing alone – with implications for sustainability). Coverage of population • Coverage of government systems is likely going to be reproduced. - 25 - • Weaknesses of the underlying system may be transferred onto the emergency programme. Cost and duplicated systems • Massively reduced overheads. • Depending on the humanitarian financial instrument used, there may be scope to pay government for implementation. • Can make use of some existing systems and institutions for time and cost savings – but only those that are strong enough and relevant for an emergency response. • Systems being piggybacked on, risk being overwhelmed, impacting on the long-term social protection system. Timeliness and predictability • Likely to take a long time to set up, since is requires legal and policy change. • Slow-downs linked to coordination with government, government decision-making and existing legal/implementation/capacity constraints. 4.4 National systems-led Sustainability • As for piggy-backing: more likely to be a sustainable solution if humanitarian actors convince governments to take on the refugee caseload. • As for piggy-backing: Possible in FCAS where some institutions and systems exist; can help to maintain some of these systems during a crisis. • Protection mechanisms may be weak in national systems. Accountability and political economy • Governments may be reluctant to take on the refugee caseload: refugees will become part of the national case load and may require funding from national budgets. • May require changes in SP legal frameworks since new entrants will be registered into the national social protection database and will be served by national referral centers. Addressing needs and protection • As for piggy-backing: staff, institutions and processes of the social protection system need to be accessible to and able to communicate with refugees/IDPs – language, cultural, distance barriers etc. likely require additional support via NGOs/UN. • The transfer value is likely below the MEB as considerations linked to host community perceptions will guide the setting of the amount. • Protection mechanisms are likely to last beyond humanitarian funding horizons and offer long term protection in protracted settings. Coverage of population • People would be covered based on standard parameters independently of nationality. . - 26 - • Weaknesses of the underlying system may be reflected into the emergency programme. Cost and duplicated systems • Can make use of some existing systems and institutions for time and cost savings – but only those that are strong enough and relevant for an emergency response. • Systems risk being overwhelmed, impacting on the long-term social protection system. Timeliness and predictability • This may be swift or slow, depending on government capacity and legal changes required. 5. Conclusions This paper presented a framework to help reconcile incentives of the many actors involved in connecting social protection and refugee-based humanitarian assistance. The analysis identifies several strategic options with comparative advantages and limitations. Piggy backing and nationally-led delivery of humanitarian assistance are mechanisms preferred by donors since they offer a path towards integrating the humanitarian caseload into host country systems. 4 However, the NGO community and national governments are likely to be more sceptical towards these approaches. National governments may be wary about embarking on a large financial and political commitments, often in a context of budget constraints and societal tensions. They may be afraid that, once on their books, refugees will remain part of the national social protection caseload permanently. National governments may be reluctant to extend benefits to refugees when they struggle to extend benefits to their own citizens. NGOs and international agencies, in turn, may be concerned of piggy- backing and nationally led approaches since they reduce their ability to shape programs and to ensure humanitarian principles are adhered to. Realistically, in the absence of ‘durable solutions’ there isn’t a sustainable route to supporting refugees. One way or another, international aid will fund relief and donors may be unlikely to persuade host countries to use their negligible tax base to support refugees. Shadow alignment is a compromise whereby national governments have a true voice in the design of programs and can, to some degree, ensure it is coherent with national systems. This may occur without taking up management responsibilities and while keeping the refugee caseload separate from government accountability. From a donor perspective, shadow alignment may be seen as a way-station toward piggy-backing or nationally-led approaches. Shadow alignment is time consuming to set up since it requires substantial negotiation between government and humanitarian partners. If there is no prospect towards piggy backing on at least some government systems, the strategy may not be a viable option to 4 See the HIP in Turkey (ECHO 2016), which stipulated this as an aim of the ESSN. It was omitted in later versions of the HIP. - 27 - pursue. Shadow alignment comes with many of the costs of piggy-backing and nationally-led provisions, without their benefits. Shadow aligned assistance likely compromises humanitarian principles by offering transfers below a basic-needs threshold. Since shadow alignment depends on a separate system for the delivery of the transfer, it does not benefit from overhead cost savings which accrue to piggy-backing or nationally led approaches. Parallel systems are costly to deliver and rely entirely on humanitarian funding, making them unsustainable in protracted settings. They are easier to design in a way that meets humanitarian principles and allow host governments to stay in an ‘observer mode’ in providing humanitarian assistance to refugees. It is important to note that actors do not need to choose one approach over another, and can pick and combine different options. Delivery partners may select, for example, parallel funding sources, combine them with piggy backing on the national system for registration, and align in payment delivery. Each context will lend itself to a different approach and it is useful to consider each element of the delivery chain separately rather than the delivery system in its entirety. Importantly, rolling out these combinations of engagement modalities will likely take time. But the patience required to undergo those delicate transitions will most probably pay out in long term in terms of assisting refugees in the most cost-effective way possible. - 28 - References Alawi Al-Ahmadi, Afrah and da Silva, Samantha. 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Progress Report. ILO. Geneva. Maunder, Nick, Karin Seyfert, Meltem Aran, Gökçe Baykal, and Marta Marzi. 2018. ‘Evaluation of the ECHO Funded Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) in Turkey November 2016–February 2018 Volume 1: Evaluation Report’. Oxford. - 29 - Mitchell, Andrew. 2018. ‘Harnessing Social Protection for Forcibly Displaced People – Conceptual Overview’. Geneva. O’Brien, Clare, Zoë Scott, Gabrielle Smith, Valentina Barca, Andrew Kardan, Rebecca Holmes, Carol Watson, and Jenny Congrave. 2018. ‘Shock-Responsive Social Protection Systems Research: Synthesis Report’. Oxford Policy Management. Oxford. WHS (World Humanitarian Summit). 2016. The Grand Bargain – A Shared Commitment to Better Serve People in Need. Istanbul. World Bank. 2016. Cash Transfers in Humanitarian Contexts: A Strategic Note. Report produced for the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee. Washington, DC. ———. (forthcoming) Adaptive Social Protection: Building Resilience to Shocks. Washington, DC. 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Geneva. - 30 - Social Protection & Jobs Discussion Paper Series Titles 2017-2019 No. Title 1935 Unbundled: A framework for connecting safety nets and humanitarian assistance in refugee settings by Karin Seyfert, Valentina Barca, Ugo Gentilini, Manjula Luthria, and Shereen Abbady September 2019 1934 Decentralization’s effects on education and health: Evidence from Ethiopia by Jean-Paul Faguet, Qaiser Khan, and Devarakonda Priyanka Kanth September 2019 1933 Extending Pension Coverage to the Informal Sector in Africa by Melis Guven July 2019 1932 What Employers Actually Want - Skills in demand in online job vacancies in Ukraine by Noël Muller and Abla Safir May 2019 1931 Can Local Participatory Programs Enhance Public Confidence: Insights from the Local Initiatives Support Program in Russia by Ivan Shulga, Lev Shilov, Anna Sukhova, and Peter Pojarski May 2019 1930 Social Protection in an Era of Increasing Uncertainty and Disruption: Social Risk Management 2.0 by Steen Lau Jorgensen and Paul B. Siegel May 2019 1929 Developing Coherent Pension Systems: Design Issues for Private Pension Supplements to NDC Schemes by William Price April 2019 1928 Pensions in a Globalizing World: How Do (N)DC and (N)DB Schemes Fare and Compare on Portability and Taxation? by Bernd Genser and Robert Holzmann April 2019 1927 The Politics of NDC Pension Scheme Diffusion: Constraints and Drivers by Igor Guardiancich, R. Kent Weaver, Gustavo Demarco, and Mark C. Dorfman April 2019 1926 Setting Up a Communication Package for the Italian NDC by Tito Boeri, Maria Cozzolino, and Edoardo Di Porto April 2019 1925 Sweden’s Fifteen Years of Communication Efforts by María del Carmen Boado-Penas, Ole Settergren, Erland Ekheden, and Poontavika Naka April 2019 1924 Information and Financial Literacy for Socially Sustainable NDC Pension Schemes by Elsa Fornero, Noemi Oggero, and Riccardo Puglisi April 2019 1923 Communicating NEST Pensions for “New” DC Savers in the United Kingdom by Will Sandbrook and Ranila Ravi-Burslem April 2019 1922 Harnessing a Young Nation's Demographic Dividends through a Universal NDC Pension Scheme: A Case Study of Tanzania by Bo Larsson, Vincent Leyaro, and Edward Palmer April 2019 1921 The Notional and the Real in China’s Pension Reforms by Bei Lu, John Piggott, and Bingwen Zheng April 2019 1920 Administrative Requirements and Prospects for Universal NDCs in Emerging Economies by Robert Palacios April 2019 1919 Bridging Partner Lifecycle Earnings and Pension Gaps by Sharing NDC Accounts by Anna Klerby, Bo Larsson, and Edward Palmer April 2019 1918 The Impact of Lifetime Events on Pensions: NDC Schemes in Poland, Italy, and Sweden and the Point Scheme in Germany by Agnieszka Chłoń-Domińczak, Marek Góra, Irena E. Kotowska, Iga Magda, Anna Ruzik-Sierdzińska, and Paweł Strzelecki April 2019 1917 Drivers of the Gender Gap in Pensions: Evidence from EU-SILC and the OECD Pension Model by Maciej Lis and Boele Bonthuis April 2019 1916 Gender and Family: Conceptual Overview by Nicholas Barr April 2019 1915 Labor Market Participation and Postponed Retirement in Central and Eastern Europe by Robert I. Gal and Márta Radó April 2019 1914 NDC Schemes and the Labor Market: Issues and Options by Robert Holzmann, David Robalino, and Hernan Winkler April 2019 1913 NDC Schemes and Heterogeneity in Longevity: Proposals for Redesign by Robert Holzmann, Jennifer Alonso-García, Heloise Labit-Hardy, and Andrés M. Villegas April 2019 1912 Annuities in (N)DC Pension Schemes: Design, Heterogeneity, and Estimation Issues by Edward Palmer and Yuwei Zhao de Gosson de Varennes April 2019 1911 Overview on Heterogeneity in Longevity and Pension Schemes by Ron Lee and Miguel Sanchez-Romero April 2019 1910 Chile's Solidarity Pillar: A Benchmark for Adjoining Zero Pillar with DC Schemes by Eduardo Fajnzylber April 2019 1909 Sweden: Adjoining the Guarantee Pension with NDC by Kenneth Nelson, Rense Nieuwenhuis, and Susanne Alm April 2019 1908 The ABCs of NDCs by Robert Holzmann April 2019 1907 NDC: The Generic Old-Age Pension Scheme by Marek Góra and Edward Palmer April 2019 1906 The Greek Pension Reforms: Crises and NDC Attempts Awaiting Completion by Milton Nektarios and Platon Tinios April 2019 1905 The Norwegian NDC Scheme: Balancing Risk Sharing and Redistribution by Nils Martin Stølen, Dennis Fredriksen, Erik Hernæs, and Erling Holmøy April 2019 1904 The Polish NDC Scheme: Success in the Face of Adversity by Sonia Buchholtz, Agnieszka Chłoń-Domińczak, and Marek Góra April 2019 1903 The Italian NDC Scheme: Evolution and Remaining Potholes by Sandro Gronchi, Sergio Nisticò, and Mirko Bevilacqua April 2019 1902 The Latvian NDC Scheme: Success Under a Decreasing Labor Force by Edward Palmer and Sandra Stabina April 2019 1901 The Swedish NDC Scheme: Success on Track with Room for Reflection by Edward Palmer and Bo Könberg April 2019 1803 Rapid Social Registry Assessment: Malawi’s Unified Beneficiary Registry (UBR) by Kathy Lindert, Colin Andrews, Chipo Msowoya, Boban Varghese Paul, Elijah Chirwa, and Anita Mittal November 2018 1802 Human(itarian) Capital? Lessons on Better Connecting Humanitarian Assistance and Social Protection by Ugo Gentilini, Sarah Laughton and Clare O’Brien November 2018 1801 Delivering Social Protection in the Midst of Conflict and Crisis: The Case of Yemen by Afrah Alawi Al-Ahmadi and Samantha de Silva July 2018 1705 Aging and Long-Term Care Systems: A Review of Finance and Governance Arrangements in Europe, North America and Asia-Pacific by Laurie Joshua November 2017 1704 Social Registries for Social Assistance and Beyond: A Guidance Note & Assessment Tool by Phillippe Leite, Tina George, Changqing Sun, Theresa Jones and Kathy Lindert July 1027 1703 Social Citizenship for Older Persons? Measuring the Social Quality of Social Pensions in the Global South and Explaining Their Spread by Tobias Böger and Lutz Leisering July 2017 1702 The Impacts of Cash Transfers on Women’s Empowerment: Learning from Pakistan’s BISP Program by Kate Ambler and Alan de Brauw February 2017 1701 Social Protection and Humanitarian Assistance Nexus for Disaster Response: Lessons Learnt from Fiji’s Tropical Cyclone Winston by Aisha Mansur, Jesse Doyle, and Oleksiy Ivaschenko February 2017 To view Social Protection & Jobs Discussion Papers published prior to 2017, please visit www.worldbank.org/sp. ABSTRACT The debate on if and how to connect humanitarian assistance for refugees with national social protection systems can elicit polarizing views. Hence, it is not unusual to observe country-level approaches getting somewhat ‘stuck’ – especially where refugees represent a sizable share of the population: from a donor perspective, the question is how can governments be persuaded to be more inclusive; from a government standpoint, it faces disproportionate political and economic risks from “being left with the bill”; and from the international humanitarian agencies viewpoint, there might be quandaries on how to reconcile commitments to neutrality and independence with those to respecting the primary responsibility of governments. These stylized views are legitimate, but their combined effect may generate competing narratives and little negotiating space among the multiple actors involved. The net result might be the endurance of a sub-optimal dual systems operating in parallel – one for refugees, one for citizens. The framework laid out in this paper attempts to facilitate the identification of workable pathways for progress among actors. Instead of framing the humanitarian-social protection links as an ‘either-or’ choice, the framework includes a more granular analysis of how collaborations may emerge around select programmatic ‘functions’, as well as the ‘degrees’ of possible connection between national and international support within a given function. While work in progress, such analytical approach is already emerging from country practices and withholds the potential to help ‘unstuck’ the debate. ABOUT THIS SERIES Social Protection & Jobs Discussion Papers are published to communicate the results of The World Bank’s work to the development community with the least possible delay. This paper therefore has not been prepared in accordance with the procedures appropriate for formally edited texts. For more information, please contact the Social Protection Advisory Service, the World Bank, 1818 H Street, N.W., Room G7‑803, Washington, DC 20433, USA. Telephone: +1 (202) 458 5267, Fax: +1 (202) 614 0471, E-mail: socialprotection@worldbank.org or visit us on-line at www.worldbank.org/sp.