68030 THE WORLD BANK GROUP 2011 Annual Meetings of the Boards of Governors Summary Proceedings Washington D.C. September 9–11, 2011 THE WORLD BANK GROUP 2011 ANNUAL MEETINGS OF THE BOARDS OF GOVERNORS SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS Washington D.C. September 22–24, 2011 THE WORLD BANK GROUP Headquarters 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A. Telephone: (202) 477-1234 Telex Nos: FTCC 82987 RCA248423 WUI64145 TRT197688 Facsimile: (202) 477-6391 Internet: http://www.worldbank.org Cable Address World Bank: INTBAFRAD IFC: CORINTFIN IDA: INDEVAS MIGA: MIGAVEST INTRODUCTORY NOTE The 2011 Annual Meetings of the Boards of Governors of the World Bank Group, which consists of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Finance Corporation (IFC), International Development Association (IDA), Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), held jointly with that of the Interna- tional Monetary Fund, took place on September 23, 2011 in Washington D.C. The Honorable Hubert A. Ingraham, Governor of the Bank and the Fund for The Commonwealth of the Bahamas served as the Chairman. The Summary Proceedings record, in alphabetical order by member countries, the texts of statements by Governors and the resolutions and reports adopted by the Boards of Governors of the World Bank Group. The texts of statements concerning the IMF are published separately by the Fund. Jorge Familiar Vice President and Corporate Secretary THE WORLD BANK GROUP Washington, D.C. March, 2012 iii CONTENTS Page Opening Address by the Chairman Hubert A. Ingraham Governor of the Bank and the Fund for the Bahamas . . . . . 1 Annual Address and PowerPoint Presentation by Robert Zoellick President of the World Bank Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Report by Ahmed Bin Mohammed Al Khalifa Chairman of the Development Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Statements by Governors and Alternate Governors . . . . . . . . . 26 Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Malta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Bangladesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Myanmar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Nepal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 New Zealand . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 *Congo, Democratic *Oman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 Republic of . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Papua New Guinea . . . . . . . 102 *Dominica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Fiji . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 France. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Sri Lanka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 *Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Thailand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 Iran, Islamic Republic of . . 69 Timor-Leste . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Tonga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 *Tuvalu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 Lao, PDR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 United States . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 *Latvia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 Malaysia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 * Speaking on behalf of a group of countries. iv Page Documents of the Boards of Governors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Schedule of Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Provisions Relating to the Conduct of the Meetings . . . . . . . 136 Agendas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Joint Procedures Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 Report I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 Report III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 MIGA Procedures Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 Report I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 Resolutions Adopted by the Board of Governors of the Bank between the 2010 and 2011 Annual Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 No. 612 2010 Selective Increase in Authorized Capital Stock to Enhance Voice and Participation of Developing and Transition Countries . . . . . . . . . . . 146 No. 613 2010 General Capital Increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 No. 614 2010 Additional Increase in Authorized Capital Stock for Subscription of New Members . . . . . . . . 157 No. 615 Transfer from Surplus to Replenish the Trust Fund for Gaza and West Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 No. 616 Transfer of IBRD Surplus to the South Sudan Transition Trust Fund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 No. 617 Forthcoming Annual Meetings of the Boards of Governors Proposed dates and Venues for the 2013 and 2014 Annual Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 Resolutions Adopted by the Board of Governors of the Bank at the 2011 Annual Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160 No. 618 Financial Statements, Accountants’ Report and Administrative Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160 No. 619 Allocation of FY11 Net Income. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160 No. 620 Direct Remuneration of Executive Directors and Their Alternates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 Resolution Adopted by the Board of Governors of IDA between the 2010 and 2011 Annual Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 No. 227 Additions to Resources: Sixteenth Replenishment . . 162 v Page Resolution Adopted by the Board of Governors of IDA at the 2011 Annual Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 No. 228 Financial Statements, Accountants’ Report and Administrative Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 Resolution Adopted by the Board of Governors of IFC between the 2010 and 2011 Annual Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 No. 253 Membership of Suriname . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Resolution Adopted by the Board of Governors of IFC at the 2011 Annual Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 No. 254 Financial Statements, Accountants’ Report, Administrative Budget and Designations of Retained Earnings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Resolution Adopted by the Council of Governors of MIGA at the 2011 Annual Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 No. 89 Financial Statements and the Report of the Independent Accountants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 Reports of the Executive Directors of the Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 Enhancing Voice and Participation of Developing and Transition Countries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 2010 General Capital Increase. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Transfer from Surplus to Replenish the Trust Fund for Gaza and West Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 Transfer of IBRD Surplus to the South Sudan Transition Trust Fund. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196 Forthcoming Annual Meetings of the Boards of Governors Proposed Dates and Venues for the 2013 and 2014 Annual Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197 Allocation of FY11 Net Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198 Report to the Boards of Governors of the IMF and the World Bank by the Joint Committee on the Remuneration of Executive Directors and Their Alternates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 Report of the Board of Directors of IDA Addition to IDA Resources: Sixteenth Replenishment . . . . 205 vi Page Report of the Board of Directors of IFC Membership of Suriname . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275 Accredited Members of Delegations at the 2011 Annual Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276 Accredited Members of Delegations (MIGA) at the 2011 Annual Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311 Observers at the 2011 Annual Meetings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331 Executive Directors and Alternates, IBRD, IFC, IDA . . . . . . . 338 Directors and Alternates, MIGA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340 Officers of the Board of Governors and Joint Procedures Committee for 2011–12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342 Officers of the MIGA Council of Governors and Procedures Committee for 2011–12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343 vii OPENING ADDRESS BY THE CHAIRMAN THE HONORABLE HUBERT A. INGRAHAM GOVERNOR OF THE BANK AND THE FUND FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE BAHAMAS Welcome to the 65th plenary of the Boards of Governors of the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund. I warmly welcome Ms. Christine Lagarde in her new role as Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund. I am confident that her extensive experience will provide the leadership required at this time. My fellow Governors, we find ourselves in an economic landscape characterized by weak global prospects, rising financial volatility and considerable uncertainty fueled by a cycle of sovereign risks and financial system fragility. These economic challenges have been compounded over the past year by social and political upheavals, natural and man-made disasters, and the instability of commodity prices. Notwithstanding, we must remain focused on continuing concerns of conflict, persistent high levels of unemploy- ment, weakened consumer confidence and the fallout of climate change. This past year, the World Bank Group committed substantial resources to its members. Support to the world’s 79 poorest countries amounted to over $16 billion. The IFC and MIGA committed over $12 billion and $2 billion respectively. And the Fund committed over $222 billion in finan- cial assistance to member countries. In view of the intense uncertainties in the global economy, the Fund proposes to activate a New Arrangements to Borrow, which would give it access to a 300 billion dollar line of financing, that has been committed by its large shareholders. Concerns over sovereign debt in a number of advanced econo- mies, specifically in the euro zone, have been a major cause of global financial market volatility. The challenge is to find the appropriate pace of fiscal adjustment for each country, recognizing that the path of fiscal consolidation will differ across countries. In addition, market confidence in the global financial system needs to be restored. Toward this end, the Fund, in close collaboration with EU institutions, has been actively involved in providing financing to those countries most affected by the sovereign debt crisis, and will continue to be involved in finding solutions. In addition to its lending operations, the Fund has sought to strengthen the effectiveness of its policy advice over the past 12 months. Focus has been on financial sector reform and regulation. Unemployment has remained stubbornly high in both advanced and developing economies. High youth unemployment, in particular, is con- tributing to social tension in many places. The Bank Group and the Fund 1 will discuss means of fostering employment and nurturing economic recovery in the coming days. As the 2012 World Development Report maintains, gender equality is core to development and smart economics, for addressing poverty, raising productivity and improving other development outcomes. I urge you to read the Report and encourage the Bank Group to scale up those programs that are known to close gender gaps. Continued focus is needed on the challenges facing the Arab world. An effective response must target our client countries, with the support of strong international partners. Earlier this year, the Bank announced $6 billion of support to Egypt and Tunisia over the next two years, while the IFC, jointly with the Islamic Development Bank, will mobilize up to $2 billion over the next five years through its Education for Employment initiative. The Fund could allocate about $35 billion to the region’s oil importers, if requested, to help secure sustainable and inclusive growth, job creation and improved living standards. Amid resurgent global economic uncertainties, we have become even more aware of the danger of commodity price volatility. High food and commodity prices threaten poor households, adding to social and eco- nomic tensions. The Bank will spend over $6 billion in the agricultural sector, an increase of over $2 billion from a few years ago, while the IFC launched a new agricultural price-risk management tool that will provide up to $4 billion to protect farmers and consumers in developing countries. The Fund has undertaken substantial work on the impact of commodity price volatility on policy-making, particularly in countries where food constitutes a major portion of the consumer basket. The tragedy in the Horn of Africa reflects the terrible confluence of state fragility, climate effects, and high food prices. Financing from the IDA Crisis Response Window, on top of the $440 million from the Bank Group, is a good beginning. I call on all of us to come together in response to the needs of the poorest in the sub-region. Like much of the Caribbean, the Bahamas is a small open economy that is highly tourist dependent. In common with the region, we are among the most susceptible to economic shocks, the effects of climate change and natural disasters. Our economic fortunes are tied very closely to that of the U.S. With a jobless low-growth recovery anticipated for the next few years, the region will need to redouble efforts to contain debt burden while making prudent public sector investments. To attract scarce global foreign direct investment, we will also need to further enhance the busi- ness environment, increase our productivity and aggressively exploit more diversified trading opportunities. We therefore foresee a heightened, multifaceted engagement by the Bank Group and the Fund within the Caribbean and other similarly placed small island states. 2 This past year the Bank supported its small island state members with the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility, and is developing a new Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative. Additionally, the Fund has continued to deliver financial assistance to Caribbean countries, including those hit by natural disasters, and to pro- vide technical assistance via the Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Center. I believe that envisaged enhancements to the Fund’s financing instruments will enable greater response to the pointed needs of our small and vulnerable middle-income countries; and that we become even more efficient at the delivery of technical assistance given the resources- constrained environment. We should recognize the continued efforts of the Bank and the Fund to reform institutional governance. There is, however, still more to be done. The Bank has made progress since the last Annual Meetings, and I am pleased to welcome the third African chair, who officially joined the Boards in November 2010. I also note the strong 16th IDA replenishment that resulted in donor pledges of $49.3 billion. Emerging market donors played an important role in this achievement, reflecting their growing importance as shareholders in the Bank Group. As you know, at the end of 2010, the Fund’s Board of Governors approved governance and quota reforms that encompass a doubling of the Fund’s quotas and a radical overhaul of the Executive Board—all Directors are to be elected and emerging markets stand to gain two chairs. These are landmark reforms. Once implemented, they will constitute a significant step toward a stronger global safety net and a better represen- tation of our membership in the Fund’s Executive Board. Time is of the essence, however. We should spare no effort so that these reforms come into force by the target date of the 2012 Annual Meetings. Fellow Governors, the environment as we now find ourselves in at this year’s Annual Meetings, dictates that we continue to make our institu- tions more flexible, more responsive and results driven. The proof of our efforts will not only be in the statements we make, but in the meaning- ful and positive changes made in the lives of our people over the next several years. I look forward to our discussions over the next few days to advance actions needed to chart a successful path to recovery. 3 OPENING REMARKS AND PRESENTATION BY ROBERT B. ZOELLICK THE PRESIDENT OF THE WORLD BANK “My sister gave birth when she was 14, and died.� “I was married at 10 and had a child at 15. I was too young. A woman should not have a child until she is old enough to know the difference between right and wrong.� “The man’s family decides how many children a woman will have. If a woman’s first child is a girl, the in-laws will ask the woman to continue to have children until a son is born.� “When I was a girl, I didn’t go to school, because there was no school in my village. Not a single girl was educated in our area. It was believed that educating a girl is a shameful thing.� “By the time they found the vehicle to go to the hospital, by the time the mid- wife was called and finished eating, by the time the husband went and bought gloves for the midwife, by the time the midwife examined the woman.� “We want our daughters to go to school and know more than we do. We want them to be happier than we are. We don’t want our daughters to be cut. We want them to have good jobs, and to live better lives than we have.� “Educated women do not sit around and wait for men to provide for them. They do not need a man to buy things for them.� “I have seven children, three girls and four boys. All of my daughters started school, but only one has passed the 4th grade and continues to study.� “By the time the doctor was called, by the time the husband went out to buy drugs, by the time the husband went round to look for blood bags around town, by the time the husband begged the pharmacist to reduce the prices.� “These days, for a woman to be rated as a good wife, one has to be a super woman, working very hard, both at home and in the office, fulfilling every demand of your family members, as if we didn’t have any rights to enjoy.� “Some working women don’t even know how much they get paid for their job, because their husband’s cash their salary for them.� 4 “When divorced women return to their parents’ home, they’re not paid alimony, or any share of their former husband’s property. They also don’t have any rights to their parents’ property. In some cases, divorced women are forced to marry an older man to support themselves.� “By the time the day and night nurses changed duty, by the time the doctor came, by the time the husband had signed a consent form, the woman had died. Today, the husband wanted to sell the drugs and all the other things they never used to be able to carry the body of his wife back to their village. But he could never find the body in the hospital.� “There is no such thing as equality between men and women in this com- munity. Maybe in town, and over an area, but not here. A man is always above the woman.� “Now, it is an obligation to have women among the candidates on the ballot. Women can be part of the local counsel, not like before when they couldn’t. We even have a female judge, and that gives me more trust in justice. And, she also provides better advice.� “Child marriages have stopped, and even the poorest of us send our daugh- ters to school.� “We know about labor laws, about the protection of pregnancy, about hiring. Women are better today because of such laws.� What you just heard are stories from the some 4,000 voices that we col- lected from around the world on the challenge of gender equality. What are the implications? Four million women are missing in the developing world compared to their counterparts in the developed countries. Never born, dying as children, or in the reproductive years. That is like missing a Los Angeles or Johannesburg or Yokohama. According to UNDP, women own only 1 percent of the world’s wealth. Eliminating discrimination could increase worker productivity by 25 percent. No country can afford to overlook 50 percent of its talent. So gender equality is key to democratizing development. We can reduce deaths of girls and women through clean water, better sanitation, and maternal care. We can shrink educational gaps through incentives like those in the conditional cash transfer programs. We can close earnings and productivity gaps with access to credit, property, jobs, and basic infrastructure to help with time constraints. We should diminish gender differences in voice. And, we need to col- lect data on gender so we can assess the policies and the results. 5 Democratizing development is about openness, too. Not just a pro- gram, but a way of doing business, interconnect transparency, effective- ness, support governance, information and learning from experience, and innovation. Consider our Open Data Knowledge and Solutions Initiative. We have started by opening up over 7,000 data sets with multilingual access, and using technology for easy access, for example through IPhones. We have moved on to start to open up our Independent Evaluation Group’s project ratings database, to make information on trade barriers and aid easily accessible. And, we now have a pilot to improve transparency and accountability in construction projects. “Publish What You Fund� ranks the World Bank No. 1 among 30 international and aid agencies. We want to open up information to become a way of life in work at the Bank, not just an add on. Democratizing development is about new approaches to research and knowledge. Sharing research tools to empower researchers from around the world; building knowledge platforms so we can engage outside the World Bank on topics such as urbanization and jobs, food security, fer- tility and green growth, and others; open source publications and a new knowledge report to take stock and eventually measure the impact of our work. Democratizing development is about new approaches to results. We now have a scorecard to assess performance with enhanced results mea- sures. We have instituted geomapping which offers a deep dive into individual projects and we want to look to interface with beneficiaries in real time. And we have new instruments such as the program for results which will have disbursements based on achievements while also building institutions and governance. Democratizing development is about engaging civil society groups. Communications technology is transforming how we interact. And, CSOs can contribute in many ways. They provide information and feedback. Some of them provide services. They help us with accountability. And importantly, they build local ownership. So we’re developing a CSO facility to assist, and all this will contribute to social accountability. Now, to succeed we need these seeds to grow outside the World Bank Group, and they are. Kenya’s Open Data Initiative was launched on July 8th. The eTransform project has started in Africa and Moldova, which can help governments modernize their provision of public services. And we had a community Mapathon in South Sudan that used crowd sources to map locations and infrastructure, and this involved Astra, Google and our UN partners. Let us turn to our financials and capital because that is the foundation of our work ahead. 6 This next slide shows our group commitments since July of ’07. This involves the IBRD, IDA, IFC, as well as MIGA. You can see that we reached a high of 73 billion dollars of commitments in FY 10, and we had 57 to 58 billion or so in the prior year 09, and in the most recent year 11. Now, if you treat July of ’08, which was the start of our FY 09, as the real beginning of the financial crisis, you can see that our total commit- ments have reached 196 billion dollars. And of that, the total disburse- ments were at about 126 billion dollars, faster during the most heated period of the downturn. Now, we need a strong IBRD capital base to perform these roles. I can report to you today that we’re making significant progress on the financial package to strengthen IBRD capital that all of you recently approved. We have the 86 billion dollar general and special capital increase for IBRD approved, and I want to thank Japan and Australia who not only have done the approval, but started the subscriptions. We still have a few others to authorize but we’re well on our way. Our loan maturity reform is implemented. We have reached consen- sus on income allocation and pricing principles, and we have been able to release over 1.2 billion dollars of national currency paid-in capital that has been agreed with almost all the significant developing country shareholders. And, we have been able to maintain a flat real budget now for seven years through tighter budget discipline, even though we have had a much more demanding work program and a much higher loan volume, by trying to increase our productivity. Now, the financial strength has given us an important resilience over past years. We have a AAA rating. At the Executive Board of the June fiscal year, the IBRD equity-to-loan ratio stood at 29 percent, although we will expect this to come down because we want to make the most efficient use of that capital. Our net income from IBRD was nearly a billion dollars, and most of this was plowed right back to the IDA Fund. Our IFC FY 11 net income was 1.6 billion dollars, also an impressive number. And again, a good portion of that has been transferred back to IDA. On top of this, very importantly, IFC has been able to mobilize 6.5 billion more dollars of investment, and that was 1 billion dollars over the prior year. Our new IFC asset management corporation attracted another 4.1 billion dollars to invest in developing countries. And thanks to all of you, as the Chairman mentioned, as well as through a healthy World Bank Group contribution, we have raised a record IDA 16 of 49.3 billion dollars for fiscal years 12 to 14 for the 79 poorest countries. And we know we have to keep improving and testing our risk management. We have appointed a new chief risk officer to try to make sure we better understand 7 the interactions among risks, try to ask additional questions as we learn more, and of course consider the uncertainties of the environment in which we’re now operating. So let me now highlight some of the priority issues we have been focusing. We have been urging the world and the G-20 to put food first. And I’m very glad we’ve done so because as you can see in this chart, the prices remain near their peak of 2008. Unfortunately, the stocks of the basic grains remain very tight. Even over the past month or so rice, which had actually not risen as much, jumped 5 percent in the course of one month. Now, we have a range of actions to support this. The World Bank Group itself is investing about 6 to 8 billion dollars a year to build productiv- ity and production. So developing countries can take advantage of the higher prices. Our global food crisis response program is reaching some 40 million people in 44 different countries. The GAFSP, the special food security program that came out of the L’Aquila Summit has had almost a billion dollars pledged, about 600 million dollars received. That is the good news. But, the unfortunate news is some 11 other countries have responded to this call, they prepared requests. We still don’t have the funds to meet them, because we have to make sure that countries fulfill their commitments. We’re also starting to get the very first proposals for the private sector window where Canada has helped us develop that opportunity. The Consultative Group For Internal Agricultural Research has been restructured, moving ahead. This is going to be extremely important for this effort over time. As all of you know, research and seeds and varieties have huge payoffs particularly in an environment of climate change, so I urge all of you as you consider your agricultural resources to look to see how we can interconnect and support these 15 centers, most of which are in developing countries. The private sector is going to be very important for us to succeed, and IFC has a program to invest all across the value chain, from property rights to seeds, irrigation, fertilizers and the critical storage facilities. We have been developing risk management tools, from crop insurance for individual farmers, to IFC’s Agricultural Risk Management Program, to help farmers and businesses lock in costs and prices like you can do in developed countries. I’m pleased that France, as the G-20 chair, and the other G-20 countries have agreed to highlight these topics. Now, we have learned a lot since the crisis of the 1990s, and how effec- tive economic safety nets can cushion the most vulnerable when a crisis comes, and critically prevent the loss of a generation. One of the best models, the conditional cash transfer program, came out of Mexico and Brazil. And the World Bank Group has now helped to make this a global program, expanded to over 40 other countries. Now, some low-income 8 countries don’t yet have the capacity to run one of these CCG programs. But, they do have school feeding programs and other basic safety nets that helped a lot during this downturn. I would like to see the World Bank Group as one of its key priorities help every country have some type of effective safety net that doesn’t bust their budget. But to do so, we have got to focus more intensively on helping the low-income countries prepare, and make the safety net systematic as opposed to ad hoc, and focus those most in need. In the area of climate change and biodiversity, we have continued the active efforts. We have been supporting South Africa as we did with Mexico as the host of the conference of parties on climate change. And, working with South Africa at these meetings in particular we’re trying to highlight a potential triple win involving soil carbons. Soil carbons could be the next avoided deforestation in terms of effect on mitigation, but also having the benefit of higher yields, greater resilience for farm- ers, and the mitigation through absorbing the soil carbon. This could be a huge boost to both African agriculture and carbon mitigation. Our climate investment funds have been the best financial innovation in this area. We have leveraged some 6.4 billion dollars, almost 9 to 1. About 30 percent of that money comes from the private sector. We brought these projects together with some 45 developing countries. But, all the money we have is already committed. We have many, many more proposals, good proposals that are brought to us. For those of you looking at investments in climate funds, I hope you take a close look at this one. IFC has been innovating through the climate business group, its clean tech venture, a carbon facility. And, we have been innovating with the idea of green and natural wealth accounting to go beyond the GDP mea- sure and include biodiversity. We would like to try to boost the effective financing of hydropower pro- grams, with care for safeguards, because we think they offer big low-carbon opportunities while providing electricity to people who need it. And, we’re doing some innovation on the idea of combining wildlife premiums with the avoided deforestation program of REDD. Our fragile and conflict states World Development Report has had global resonance. We have now opened our new center of excellence on conflict security and development in Nairobi. We have, with your support, a new IDA crisis facility that has given us a valuable new tool which we’re already using in the Horn of Africa, and we’re trying to put this work to good use in Afghanistan, Cote d’Ivoire, Libya, South Sudan and others. And here I want to thank in particular the U.K. and DFID and Andrew Mitchell, who really played a leadership role in helping us move this forward. Our governance and anticorruption push is now moving to a second phase. We have had some very good high-level successes, working with 9 governments to prosecute fraud and corruption, put some people behind bars. At the same time, we know we have a lot to do to build state capa- bilities. We need to strengthen governance sector by sector. We have put a particular road review together to help countries because this is an area particularly susceptible to cartel behavior. And we’re trying to focus on the health and education areas. This is an area where we can get some great help from civil society groups and the private sector if we combine this with strengthening transparency, accountability, and voice. To be successful we have to be able to catalyze global action on cor- ruption. We now have more effective debarments for those that try to cheat the World Bank. And with our regional development bank partners, we have had a good program of cross debarment, so you steal from one, you get caught, you are thrown out from all. We also have developed a corruption hunters’ alliance, because in many countries the people who investigate these crimes and prosecute them, put them at risk so we’re trying to provide support. Infrastructure in developing countries can also be a key element of global growth. Infrastructure can provide jobs today, it can provide pro- ductivity in the future, and it is a big user of developed country exports of equipment and services. I am hopeful the new infrastructure finance center of excellence we created in Singapore will help us unlock in par- ticular the public/private partnership agenda, while generating projects, experience. And, we’re working to see if we can also create some new investment funds. In particular, we need to focus on Africa’s infrastructure needs, because this can be a device that can do all those points, but on top of it can help with regional integration, particularly in the areas of energy and transportation. The biggest bottleneck we’ve discovered in sub-Saharan Africa is the high upfront costs to develop projects, sometimes up to 10 percent or more of the overall capital costs. So we’re working with the G-20 to see how we can create the support to try to break through that bottleneck. Events across the Middle East and North Africa continue to neces- sitate flexible, multidimensional responses. Policies will matter as much as money. The progress has varied, understandably, because these are linked to critical political transitions. Our colleagues in Tunisia have offered some particularly encouraging experience. But also the Arab World Initiative that we launched in 2007 has posi- tioned us quite well to work with Arab funds and institutions on a series of cross-border interests. Some are micro and small and medium-sized enterprises, some are water, some are solar, infrastructure, trade, educa- tion, and social accountability. The role of middle income countries in a new multipolar economy, as well as their own special development needs, has been a particular interest 10 of mine since I began at the Bank. We can see the benefits now of these countries as new engines of growth, but we also have to help them avoid the particular problem of middle income traps. One major example of our effort is a project we’ve been working on with China over the past year, the China 2030 project, looking at the challenge of structural trans- formation. Moving China to a different growth model to help achieve the goals that China has set for itself in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan. We aim to complete this report in December. I was just in Beijing and we think that we will have lessons from this report that will be of great interest and applicability to many other countries. We also see that middle income countries can assist others, so they can combine their development with international voice, roles, and responsibilities. Now, let me close with a few of the issues we see on the horizon. Of course, first and foremost we have to start at home. We’re going to have to continue this modernization agenda to make the Bank Group more flexible, focused on clients, open, accountable, and always driven with attention to results. The uncertainties of financial markets pose real risks to the recovery we’re facing. We’re looking very closely at the effects of this, particularly on developing countries. We have already started to work with the Euro- pean Bank of Reconstruction Development and others on the particular dangers that we can see in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkan countries. I think we’re going to need, more generally, to recognize that we’re at a stage that will pose new challenges in the nature of the multi-speed recovery. Up to July or August most of the developing countries were focused on the challenges of overheating inflation, because they have grown quite well. And as you can see, food prices still pose a serious risk. But now we may encounter new risks on the demand side. So, we’re going to have to watch closely the implications for the World Bank Group’s financial support, and look at how we can leverage our resources most effectively. The new World Development Report 2013 will be on jobs. This is a central issue for all our shareholders. And it moves beyond the traditional discussions of labor economics and markets. We’re taking a perspective that views issues of productivity, living standards, how jobs relate to social change and social cohesion; part of the discussion we hope to get early input on through these meetings and beyond. And then there is the blue economy: Supporting the world’s oceans. It is hard to be the World Bank if we don’t focus enough attention on 70 percent of the world’s surface. Not surprisingly, our country-based model tends to overlook this area. So in 2012 we’ll be working with many 11 other groups to try to highlight the biodiversity and development issues related to the world’s oceans. Finally, I would like to give some thanks to the World Bank Group staff that has put in a tremendous effort over the past year for all of you. They’re committed, they’re expert, they’re hard working, and if we create the proper enabling environment, they’re also innovative and problem solvers. I want to thank our strong management team that reflects the very best of diverse cultures and experience, brought together with a common purpose. I want to thank our Board of Executive Directors who are working to modernize multilateralism beyond old north-south patterns. And, I want to thank all of you for your interest and support. 12 The Gender Challenge 4 MILLION women missing Women OWN ONLY 1% of the world’s wealth Eliminating discrimination could increase worker productivity by 25% No country can afford to overlook 50% While DEMOCRATIZING DEVELOPMENT Actions REDUCE DEATHS of girls and women SHRINK educational gaps CLOSE earnings and productivity gaps DIMINISH gender difference in voice COLLECT data on gender O A Z N DEVE O ME DEMOCRATIZING DEV LOPMENT 13 Democratizing Development is about: Openness TRANSPARENCY EFFECTIVENESS & Accountability Participation & SUPPORT Better GOVERNANCE INFORMATION and learning from experience: pragmatic & open-minded INNOVATION & competition of ideas Open: Data, Knowledge, Solutions Aid Flows Open Data Data Finder 2.0 Initiative iPhone App O A Z N DEVE O ME DEMOCRATIZING DEV LOPMENT 14 Democratizing Development is about: New Approaches to Research & Knowledge Sharing RESEARCH tools KNOWLEDGE Platforms OPEN SOURCE publications NEW Knowledge Report Democratizing Development is about: New Approaches to Results Scorecard Results R l Results Geo-Mapping: New Measurement Results in real time Instruments 15 Democratizing Development is about: Engaging CSOs COMMUNICATI NS Technology S ech ol y COMMUNICATIONS Technology log CSO contributions CSO facility Social Accountability Setting a Trend... Launched July 8th T eTransform eTransform h Mapathon Mapathon O A Z N DEVE O ME DEMOCRATIZING DEV LOPMENT 16 BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE FINANCIALS CAPITAL Commitments 80.00 60.00 40.00 20.00 FY08 FY09 FY10 0 FY11 IBRD IDA IFC MIGA LDING E T E BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE 17 Commitments 200 $196.3 bn 150 Total Since FY09 100 50 0 IBRD IDA IFC MIGA BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE LDING BUILDI G O E T E Capital SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS on �nancial package $86.2 bn GCI and SCI approved LOAN MATURITY reform implemented CONSENSUS on income allocation & pricing principles Release of over $1.2 bn existing NCPIC agreed FLAT real budget continued for 7 years LDING E T E BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE 18 Financially Strong AAA Rating 29% Equity-to-loan ratio IBRD net income nearly $1 bn IFC FY11 net income $1.6 bn IFC mobilized $6.5 bn in FY11 IFC AMC attracted $4.1 bn IDA 16 of $49.3 bn for FY 12-14 CHIEF RISK OFFICER & Stress Testing LDING E T E BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE PRIORITY ISSUES 19 Putting Food First Prices remain near peak of 2008 400 300 200 100 Food Fats and Oil Grains Other 0 08 Jan 08Apr 08 Jul 08 Oct 09 Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 10 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 11 Jan 11 Apr p 11 Jul 11 Aug PRIORITY ISSUES RIORITY S E O I PRIORITY ISSUES Putting Food First $6-8 bn in agriculture per annum GFRP $1.5 bn reaching 40 mn in 44 countries GF P $1.5 GFRP $1 5 reaching hing tr o tries m in 4 countries GAFSP $972 mn pledged $581 mn received - demand rising GIAR CGIAR for agricultural productivity CGIAR for agricultural productivity ral a r cu tura uctiv y IFC investing across value chain F nv t n across a IFC investing a ross value chain n hain Risk Management TOOLS R Management TOOL Risk nage L TOOLS G20 and partnerships PRIORITY SSUES IORI PRIORITY ISSUE 20 Safety nets support resilience MILLIONS pushed into poverty AVOID loss of a generation $11.5 bn to 83 countries FY’00 - FY’10 South-South learning PREPAREDNESS FOCUS on low-income SYSTEMS PRIORITY S E PRIORIT ISSUES Climate Change & Biodiversity Potential for TRIPLE win Higher yields + greater resilience + more soil carbon Climate Investment Funds Climate Business Group, Clean Tech Venture, Carbon Facility Green & Natural Wealth Accounting Effective �nancing of HYDROPOWER programs Wildlife Premiums for REDD PRIORITY ISSUES PRIORITY SSUES PRIORI 21 Fragile and Conflict States: Building on WDR 2011 Global RESONANCE CENTER OF EXCELLENCE on Conflict Security and Development NAIROBI Strengthening PARTNERSHIPS JOBS and private sector IDA Crisis Facility Afghanistan, Cote d’Ivoire, Libya, South Sudan, Horn of Africa PRIORIT ISSUES PRIORITY S E Governance and Anti-Corruption: Phase 11 PROSECUTING fraud and corruption BUILDING state capability STRENGTHENING governance in sectors SUPPORTING CSOs & the private sector CATALYZING global action on corruption PRIORITY S E PRIORIT ISSUES 22 Building Infrastructure for the Future JOBS today, PRODUCTIVITY tomorrow 30000 World Bank Group Approach: Bank, IFC, MIGA 22500 Infrastructure Finance Center 15000 of Excellence in SINGAPORE 7500 Unlocking the PPP agenda FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 0 FY09 FY10 FY11 AFRICA’s infrastructure needs World Bank (IBRD IDA Others) IFC MIGA R OR T SS S PRIORITY ISSUES Middle East & North Africa POLICIES matter as much as money TRANSPARENCY JOBS Effective SAFETY NETS PRIVATE SECTOR TRADE & Investment Social ACCOUNTABILITY PROGRESS has varied ARAB World Initiative PRIORIT ISSUES PRI PRIORITY S E 23 MICs & a New Multipolar Economy ENGINES OF GROWTH, but middle-income traps CHALLENGE of structural transformation: China 2030 LEADERS of South-South knowledge exchange COMBINING development with international voice, roles & responsibilities PRIORITY S E PRIORIT ISSUES Issues on the horizon... MAINTAINING momentum on modernization UNCERTAINTIES of �nancial markets CHALLENGES of a Multispeed Recovery WDR 2013: Jobs The BLUE ECONOMY: Supporting the World Oceans PR ORITY SSUE PRIORITY ISSUES 24 REPORT BY AHMED BIN MOHAMMED AL KHALIFA CHAIRMAN OF THE DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE I am pleased to transmit to you the final text of the DC communiqué reporting on the outcome of the 84th meeting of the Development Com- mittee held on Saturday, September 24, 2011, in Washington, D.C. I would like to thank Governors for our excellent discussion during the Development Committee meeting on the challenges and risks to the global economy and the impact on developing economies, especially the impact on the poor, who are disproportionately affected by the conse- quences of events such as the volatility in food prices. It is clear that promoting growth and meeting the targets for the MDGs remain the core goals, even as member countries deal with the immediate challenges and risks of the prevailing crisis. As this was my last meeting as chairman, I would like to thank the Development Committee members, who have supported me so construc- tively during my chairmanship, and to all the staff members who have made our meetings possible. I look forward to continued and close cooperation among the mem- bers of the Development Committee. 25 STATEMENTS BY GOVERNORS AND ALTERNATE GOVERNORS AUSTRALIA: WAYNE SWAN Governor of the Bank and the Fund These meetings come at a critical time for the global economy. The recovery from the financial crisis is under threat from a lack of confidence in the capacity of political institutions in some parts of the world to deal with fiscal and financial vulnerabilities and the poor growth prospects confronting many economies. The international community must urgently and decisively deal with these risks, in order to restore confidence and growth. We need political courage. And we need effective global cooperation, harnessing the kind of resolve the international community showed in 2009. For advanced economies, credible fiscal consolidation plans are vital, as is strengthening financial institutions’ balance sheets. For emerging economies, there is a need to increase domestic demand, requiring a range of structural reforms and a firm commitment toward more mar- ket-determined exchange rate systems. Importantly, all countries must commit to reforms that will grow their economies and create jobs. We must also ensure the resilience of our financial systems. Macroeconomic policy space is clearly limited in some countries, but even these countries can implement reforms to stimulate competition, promote productivity and lift employment. While such measures are often challenging and their benefits may not be seen for some time, the boost to confidence from decisive policy action to promote growth will be immediate. While Australia is not immune from global economic turbulence, the Australian economy and our people have shown themselves to be resilient. Our resilience is built on strong fundamentals and a willingness to meet our challenges head on. We have solid economic growth, low unemployment, a strong public sector balance sheet and well-regulated and well-capitalised financial institutions. Robust growth in our region is contributing to Australia’s strong commodity exports growth and a major pipeline of business investment. Australia is continuing to build its defences against current and future shocks. In delivering fiscal stimulus to support the economy in response to the global financial crisis, the Australian Government also commit- ted to a clear strategy to return the budget to surplus as the economy strengthened. The Government is also strengthening the country’s pro- ductive capacity by making major investments in skills and infrastructure, 26 boosting retirement savings, reforming the tax system and dealing with the challenges of climate change. Such reforms are never easy, but they are essential to future growth and prosperity. Australia welcomes the World Bank’s recent work on jobs and looks forward to the 2013 World Development Report on this topic. This issue is relevant to all countries, both developed and developing, and we must all work to deliver sustainable jobs growth. Jobs are central to improv- ing people’s lives and achieving development progress. A job can lift a person out of poverty, provide him or her with an income, and link that person into society. IMF The experience of the past few years demonstrates beyond doubt that we need an IMF that is efficient, well resourced and effective. We have made progress in achieving some of these goals, but more can and should be done. We must ensure that the Fund has the resources and facilities to meet the potential needs of all its members. A key priority is to complete the 2010 package of quota and governance reforms as soon as possible, which will double the Fund’s quota resources and enhance its legitimacy. Australia welcomes the significant reforms that increase the flexibility and resourcing of IMF programs and lending instruments for low-income countries. The Fund has taken a number of steps to strengthen its surveillance, particularly in the areas of real and financial sector linkages, cross-country linkages and spillovers. However, the Fund must do more to improve the relevance and effectiveness of its surveillance, with a particular focus on helping governments to deal with current challenges. The Fund’s policy messages and analytical work must be sufficiently targeted, flexible and visible and assist members to gain domestic support for implementing necessary policy measures. The challenge for the international community is to commit to cred- ible, specific actions in response to the Fund’s advice, which will vary across countries depending on their circumstances. We must recognize that surveillance is only effective when it leads to the right policies being implemented. World Bank The changing economic landscape underscores the need for a stronger, more effective and more representative World Bank. Australia was a strong supporter of the reforms to increase the voice and participation of developing countries at the World Bank. A Bank that possesses greater 27 legitimacy and relevance is of benefit to all members. However, the Bank should maintain this momentum by implementing outstanding reforms and fulfilling its development mandate more effectively. The Bank has highlighted the importance of developing economies in the global economy given their contributions to global growth and trade. Policies and reforms to support economic growth and develop- ment in those countries will also strengthen the global economy more generally. However, the current economic environment presents many chal- lenges to achieving development outcomes. Slower global growth, increased uncertainty and high food prices threaten recent gains in pov- erty reduction. The IMF and World Bank are in a unique position to work collaboratively with each other and with member countries to address these issues. Looking Forward International cooperation through the IMF and the World Bank is essential to secure growth, create jobs and improve living standards. Australia is firmly committed to such cooperation and looks forward to working with the Fund and the Bank to achieve these objectives. BANGLADESH: ABUL MAAL A. MUHITH Governor of the Bank and the Fund Fund-Bank Annual Meeting 2011 Last year as I cogitated on my return to the Fund-Bank Annual Meet- ing after more than a quarter century I noticed the diminutive form of the meeting. I regretted the absence of the financial fair that went along with the Annual Meeting in the past. Now after having reviewed the matter more carefully I feel more strongly that the old format should be restored and the opportunity for contacts and interactions over a five day period be reinstituted. This is more urgent because multilateral action has become more crucial in these days of uncertain financial turmoil. The assembly of the financial wizards from countries and continents and the warmth that the events generated from engaging interactions and opportunities for settlement of many bilateral issues between countries should not be lightly brushed aside. One may regret that what used to be speeches expressing the views of Governors before the Plenary are now reduced, thanks to technological advance, to statements that float in the web. I hope to move fellow Governors for a reconsideration of the format of the Fund-Bank annual gathering as it looks to me that a return to grand 28 gathering affording more interactions, more exchange of ideas, more coordination of policies, more concerted actions and more contact build- ing is very important in these days of a more integrated global economy facing too many uncertainties. Global Recovery and Uncertainties The financial crisis of the recent past led to a very healthy demonstra- tion of global action and it not only inspired hopes but also led the process of an early recovery. In fact, recovery began with Asia playing a vital role in the process. The maintenance and enhancement of domestic demand not only in China and India but equally so in Korea, Singapore, Indo- nesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Bangladesh and Vietnam halted the slide in economic growth and spearheaded the global recovery. But it seems that the crisis is not really over and difficulties in USA and Europe are of the greatest concern now. It should not be forgotten that it is still the export market of the developed countries that has the capacity to sustain the growth momentum over time. With high unemployment levels and unsustainable fiscal deficits in some developed countries the health of the global economy is direly threatened and we apprehend that the develop- ing countries will be the worst victims of the current uncertainties. Price rise with pick-up in recovery is not unexpected but the level of price hike in food grains as well as fuel is of a different nature and inflationary pres- sure as a result is really threatening the recovery. It is our urgent appeal that economic and financial housekeeping in USA and Europe should be properly coordinated to avoid destabilization of the world economy and prevent a halt in the process of recovery. Gender Equality and Women Empowerment The World Development Report this year has focused attention on gender equality which is a core development objective of the Millennium Development Goals. Identified as smart economics, it enhances produc- tivity, improves prospects of future generation and make institutions more representative by mainstreaming the less involved other half in the service, agricultural and industrial sectors. We are glad to see the cover- age Bangladesh received in the Gender WDR and the acknowledgement of the tremendous progress made in my country in improving gender norms and outcomes. It is true that the country is led by female leaders for nearly a decade and a half but the greater truth is the over-all status of women in society and their climb in the economic ladder over a period of forty years since the emergence of Bangladesh. The gender parity in educational outcomes mirrored by the rapid entry of females in the labor force as well as sharp improvements in female health indicators and social 29 norms are results of our serious emphasis on gender. It involves strong commitment of the Government to gender parity and is reflected in the budget allocation of 26.4 percent in specifically gender-related expendi- ture. For the third consecutive year we have provided gender break-down of major budget allocations and it accounts for 4.8 percent of GDP. This is a significant allocation as public expenditure in the country has only been increased to about 17 percent of GDP this year. For Bangladesh, investment in women welfare is particularly impor- tant because in our country poverty has a female face. Women are vul- nerable to economic discrimination, they bear the burden of feeding the family and themselves go hungry most of the time, many of them as abandoned wives have the responsibility of bringing up the children, they are discriminated in salaries and positions and the veil prevents them substantially from earning opportunities. In a country with high poverty incidence female poverty needs to be specially handled and that is done in Bangladesh. We have enacted a new legislation called Family Violence (Preven- tion and Protection) Act 2010 in order to give women some protection. Again in March this year, we have introduced National Women Devel- opment Policy. This legislation and more enabling policy guidelines for women development would offer further protection to women and advance women mainstreaming in the national development process. Our programmes on stipend for women education, employment preference for women in education, micro-credit policy in which women borrowers are preferred, women focus in pre and post disaster management are designed to promote women development. In addition, we have a strong affirmative action plan for advancement of women in public services and representation in elective positions. Job Creation—the Big Challenge We welcome the selection of the all-important topic of job creation as the focus of the WDR of the next year. This topic has come to the centre stage for what is termed jobless recovery of the global economy and hence the inherent fragility of the recovery process. The massive job losses the industrial and emerging countries suffered following the financial crisis is a matter of serious concern for policy-makers. For Ban- gladesh this is a matter of the greatest importance as it is directly related to the main target of our economic development programme; i.e, pov- erty alleviation. We are required to deal with the challenge of absorbing 1.8 million new entrants into the labor force each year and provide them with meaningful earning opportunities. Our task is made more difficult as we have a backlog of over 2.5 million of unemployed and under-employed labour in our hands. We are doing quite well in employment creation 30 with our programmes of rural works and micro-credit but we are lag- ging behind in systematic full time job creation meaning increasing wage employment in the formal sectors. We absorb new labourers in agriculture and services by sub-dividing the work of one into those of many. We view the employment creation strategy as both an intermediate input towards poverty reduction but also as a goal in itself as it promotes social stability. As such the Government of Bangladesh has a multi-pronged employment creation strategy which covers developing a conducive environment for the private sector, strengthening basic education followed by vocational training and skills development, promoting manpower export as well as direct employment generation programmes. Poverty elimination is the biggest challenge in Bangladesh. About a third of the population is still below poverty line and extreme pov- erty haunts nearly half of the poor. We devote up to 53.12 percent of our budget for poverty reducing expenditure which is 9.66 percent of GDP. Such a thrust was necessary to reduce poverty from 59 percent in 1992 to 31 percent in 2010. In the South Asia region Bangladesh has been doing quite well in human development but income poverty is still very high in the country. Poverty alleviation demands large-scale employment generation in Bangladesh and that can be best provided by wage employment in the manufacturing sector. It is a growing market of 160 million people and open transit policy recently adopted by the coun- try augurs well for development of the country as an economic hub of the region encompassing Northeast India, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar and Southwest China. Climate Change and the Need for Binding Commitments Climate change adaptation remains a central policy priority in our strategy to protect the environment in Bangladesh and thus the envi- ronment for all mankind. For no fault of its own Bangladesh is one of the worst victims of the climate change syndrome. As a frontline coun- try exposed to frequent natural disasters, Bangladesh has on its own developed an efficient disaster risk reduction strategy in significantly containing the loss of lives and property. It developed a much acclaimed Bangladesh Climate Change Adaptation Plan and National Action Plan for Adaptation. To implement this Strategy and Action Plan as expedi- tiously as possible, the Government for the last three years has been allocating annually from its own resources US$ 100 million for adaptation programmes to a Trust Fund that is undertaking serious programmes on a regular basis. It is, indeed, ironical that the poor Bangladesh has to pay so dearly to adapt itself to adverse climatic changes caused by reckless consumerism of the industrialized world. I notice that there is a tendency to support programmes of studies and research on climate 31 change but hold back when it is actually a project for adaptation or miti- gation. Perhaps this is a cautionary approach but it looks to us that there is a reluctance to commit substantial funds in climate change projects. Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund established with donor participation has so far attracted only $223 million in grant and soft loan from its development partners. The promises of Copenhagen are yet to materialize. Cancun promised us a Green Climate Fund but we have not heard firm commitments flowing into the kitty. The whole world, particularly the afflicted and the vulnerable countries, look towards what we resolve here now and what message we take to Durban. Kyoto targets beyond 2012 must be definitively fixed. We have an obligation to report to Rio +20 next year that human kind is determined to save mother earth and protect the specie from the ravages of climate change. Bangladesh is acutely aware of the fact of rising sea level or marching desertification. Even though we drain the waters of a basin that has only about 6 percent in our territory we have an extended period of draught in our country. And the threat of submersion into the sea is very real for a population of about 30 million of our countrymen. IDA 16th Replenishment and Relief for the Poor In my statement for the Bank Fund meeting last year I stressed the need for scaling up the contribution of richer countries to the IDA. This is because the soft credit is mainly used for development activities in agriculture and water resources, education, healthcare, transport and energy sectors of the low income countries (LIC). It is heartening to learn that this time in Brussels belying all pessimistic predictions the IDA 16th Replenishment received a generous commitment of US$ 49.4 billion recording a growth of 18 percent (which came pretty close to my demand of US$ 52 billion). This, indeed, is an excellent measure of commitment to development of the less fortunate countries by the better off brethren. I must convey my appreciation to the Bank for committing US$ 2.2 billion of IDA resources for programmes in Bangladesh in the year just concluded, which happens to be the largest annual IDA allocation in our history. I am also grateful for the indicative allocation for my country of SDR 3,189 million for three fiscal years covering IDA-16 Replenishment, making Bangladesh the largest potential beneficiary of IDA credit. In passing I would like to comment that the correction that we have witnessed recently in terms of voice and participation in decision making in the Bank and the Fund in favor of some emerging countries has not, to our disappointment, been matched by their participation in the IDA Replenishment exercise. Rights should be matched by responsibilities, particularly when we see clearly a rebalancing of global resources tak- ing place. 32 I welcome the decision of the Bank for the innovation of a new financ- ing instrument called P4R (Program for Results). As opposed to project financing, the fund against a program will be released on the evidence of IDA satisfactory to a series of pre-set, mutually agreed Disbursement Linked Indicators (DLIs). The disbursement would be made once or twice a year as mutually agreed upon. The need for such an instrument of financing was felt for years by the LICs, particularly because the tradi- tional project financing entail IDA-imposed conditions which significantly delays project execution. I must warn, however, that implementation of the new modality must be made with considerable flexibility because initially you have a lot of teething problems with a new modality. We experienced a great deal of delay and even problems with programme design as we moved to sector lending from project lending in my country in health and nutrition and primary education sectors. Bangladesh, like other low income countries, would like to see the criteria of IDA allocation retained following the present guidelines on Poverty, Population and Performance and any effort to change the allo- cation principle will defeat the very purpose for which IDA was created. Food Price Hike and Intensification of Poverty The food price hike seems to have become a recurrent phenomenon in recent times. The incidence of food riots seen in several countries since 2007 sent an alarm bell across the globe. But yet we have a 26 percent rise in food prices this year. The L’quila Summit saw President Obama declare setting up a US$ 20 billion Global Agriculture and Food Security (GAFS) Fund underscoring that in global context there was little invest- ment in agriculture in the last 30 years. This intervention was timely and Bangladesh immediately benefited by securing a grant financing from a trust fund administered by the Bank. Rice, the staple food of the people of Bangladesh, is a thinly traded item. The rice producing countries consume most of the rice they produce with only 4 percent of global rice produc- tion traded internationally. The few rice-surplus countries like Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam, on the slightest signal of an impending drought or other natural calamities, first stop exporting rice. This makes the rice importing countries like Bangladesh extremely vulnerable and nervous. We trust that food production will receive regular and consistent attention and food marketing should follow some internationally accepted norms. The vulnerability on account of food price hike in Bangladesh is ampli- fied in terms of inflation because food items receive 65 percent weight- age in our Consumer Price Index (CPI) basket. A rise in food prices for Bangladesh carry huge impact in general price index. It is also noticeable that international food price determines national prices in the integrated global economy of today and a food surplus country even cannot insulate 33 itself from international price movements. The Bank and the Fund, I trust, must have a broad appreciation of this constraint faced by the policy makers of my country. They should do some hand holding during these trying times. A regional and global initiative for a globalized world is necessary for price stability especially for food items. Let us not forget that Lord Keynes thought of the Bretton Woods set-up in the context of instability of wheat price in pre-War period. Power and Energy—Another Area for International Action Power and energy remain crucial for development. My country con- tinues to reel from power and energy shortages caused by neglect of long term planning coupled with high level corruption in the sector. In order to scale up power supply, under the direct initiative of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina we resorted to some quick fixes by installing power plants under rental power plants and independent power producers’ contracts to tide over the acute crisis and have the breathing time for longer term solution of the problem. While there is, indeed, perceptible improvement in terms of production and lesser frequency of power outages, but this has been achieved at a price. These quick fixes have a disquieting impact on both the budget and the balance of payment. The Government by way of subsidy had to provide in its budget for this fiscal US$ 1.2 billion to plug in the price and tariff differentials of Bangladesh Petroleum Cor- poration and Power Development Board. With no immediate prospect of increase in natural gas production and high oil price, Bangladesh is in a precarious situation. To rein in the subsidy within tolerable limits the Government is actively considering price and tariff adjustment of petroleum and power to shore up the difference. The Government is also borrowing short from the international market to foot the huge import bill at high price of oil. Energy resource development is not very easy except when you are endowed with fossil fuel deposits. Although research for alternative energy resource received a strong push in the 1970s, it has not moved forward with any significant inventions or discoveries. The harnessing of radiant solar energy has not become less expensive; other renewable resources are also not available except at high expense. The dream of hydrogen economy is still in the science fiction area. But energy is the capacity for work by human beings and energy use is at the root of better living standards and economic growth. The volatility in the fuel market is extremely unfavourable for the economic and financial health of the world. This market demands some kind of planned regulation and this should not be avoided at any cost. In the new architecture for the global public sector regulation of energy market is as important as regulation of the financial market. Indeed, we have to move forward with regulation 34 of food market and the fuel market as starting points for restructuring of the global financial and monetary system. Budget Support by the Bank and Credit Facility of the Fund Budget support by the Bank is a programme of recent origin although local currency financing by project credits can be treated as its predeces- sor. This is usually based on evaluation of good programmes of national budgets with creditable targets for poverty programmes or growth objec- tives. IMF received strong resource injection in the wake of the recent financial crisis to help countries to tide over balance of payment crisis or threats of such crisis. The beneficiaries of such support programmes have been the better off developing countries. As IMF had little to do with problems of less developed countries except in respect of the HIPC initiative, it thought of helping LLDCs with the ECF programme. The budget support and ECF programmes of the Bank and the Fund are meaningful only if they can be acted upon quickly and they are not clut- tered with what is fearfully termed conditionality. Bangladesh seeks budget support from the Bank under PRSC frame- work and balance of payment support from IMF under ECF to tide over the difficult situation of lack of fiscal space for the country. In order to contain budget deficit within 5 percent of GDP and tackle the looming balance of payment difficulty, the country is in need of such help. It has managed its economy with credit in the last two years and has good plans for the current year as well. It has maintained export growth, expanded domestic demand, provided reasonably for labour absorption, performed strongly in the rural and agriculture sectors, met the inherited crisis of power supply and recorded over all growth rate near 6 percent per annum. (In fiscal 2011 the growth rate has been 6.7 percent and the outlook for 2012 is over 7 percent.) For other reasons as well some kind of budget support is the rightful claim of my country. We have managed our debt situation very creditably despite the high incidence of poverty and lack of domestic savings. We have been very prudent in balancing our international payments despite the need for large imports for both investment and requirement of basic supplies. There must be some reward for such good performance and careful husbanding of scarce resources. Such reward can be in terms of programme support that is basically dedicated to poverty alleviation. It is poverty alleviation that moves Bangladesh to emphasize rural and agricultural development. It is poverty alleviation that drives Bangladesh to innovate micro-credit and other employment generation programmes. It is poverty alleviation that is at the root of all human development efforts in Bangladesh such as in basic education, non-formal education, skills training, water supply and sanitation, women empowerment and 35 gender equality. It is welfare of the deprived and the powerless that led Bangladesh to devise various food and social security programmes. It is again poverty alleviation that is the driving force behind policies for public revenue raising and public investment acceleration that call for tax reforms and spending planning. All these efforts deserve programmes like budget support or ECF accommodation. Support for Transformational Project The current Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank for Ban- gladesh and the policy directives of the Bank underscore the need for World Bank engaging in large projects that would bring in transforma- tional impact in terms of growth and poverty reduction. The Padma Bridge which would connect the country with the south-west part of the country is one such project. The construction of the bridge has a social dimension and the connectivity would go a long way in bolstering national integration in the minds of the people of the region as well as in economic integration of the country. The Padma Bridge would reduce poverty in the south-west region by 1 percentage point and raise GDP of the region by 1.7 percent. In the national context poverty would be reduced by 0.8 percent and GDP would get a boost by 0.56 percent. The Bangbandhu Bridge over Jamuna, presently the longest bridge commissioned in Bangladesh showed that the real benefit far exceeded the initial estimates. Power rental and small independent power producers’ plants are not expected to bring in transformational change in power sector that Ban- gladesh is looking for. Its accretion of wattage is offset by countervailing load of energy import bills of unbearable magnitude. What is required is going for bigger units. A mega-size coal-fired power plant producing 1000–2000 megawatt electricity using coal from the northern part of the country is technically feasible. We are aware of World Bank’s aversion to financing fossil-fuel power projects in the light of environmental consid- erations but the World Bank is known to have financed large coal-fired projects in South Africa and Botswana. An energy-starved country such as Bangladesh can legitimately request the Bank to finance power plants using coal and help the country in securing the least polluting option for coal-based power plants. The country is also in need of large projects for transport development, especially in roads and railways. The demand in this sector has escalated as a result of the choice of the country to be a transit territory in South and South-west Asia and thus transform itself into an economic hub in bustling Asia of the twenty-first century. Thus for transformational impact in the quality of life of the people of Bangladesh I would urge upon the international public sector in money, finance and trade to play a pioneering role. 36 Restructuring of the Global Financial, Monetary and Trade Regime The traumatic events that led to the Global Financial Crisis have once again concentrated attention on restructuring of the international public sector initially designed by the Bretton Woods conference. We should now take up simultaneous and complementary restructuring of the three organizations namely World Bank, IMF and WTO—the original three legs of the Bretton Woods system. • We have found the G20 informal mechanism highly effective. This should be given some legal clout. • We thought of pumping liquidity by issuing SDRs but refrained from ushering in a new and universal medium of exchange. We should think about liquidity management by the global public sector. • Although the recent crisis has not suffered from exchange rate vola- tility but the nebulous situation in this market should be considered in devising the new architecture of the global monetary and financial system. Let us begin with taxation of currency transactions and thus begin recording of transactions. • We are convinced that IMF must improve its monitoring and surveil- lance responsibility, especially by exercising symmetric jurisdiction over all countries, big or small and rich or poor. That should be its main function and early warning system should be its main concern. • We have felt that the banking sector should be better regulated and public intervention should have a role in it. Possibly the Basel mecha- nism must be coordinated with IMF watchdog responsibility. • We observed that the World Bank is functioning very well in mediat- ing surplus resources for investment in deficit countries at least cost. Should it not be its main function now? • We also have observed that the requirements of a small group of coun- tries (the so-called least developed, land-locked, small island develop- ing and climatically vulnerable countries) is qualitatively different and cannot be solved by the usual economic demand and supply equation. What kind of institutional mechanism should evolve for both relief and development work? • IDA window of the World Bank has done very well, indeed. But the development of the “fragile and vulnerable� least developed countries defies solution; the number of LLDCs is increasing while graduation out of it is rare. How do we overcome the ignominy of poverty and hunger in a world of affluence? • We have not found ways for trade financing to keep up global demand even when we have plenty of liquid resources of big savers. IMF, IFC and WTO have a duty to devise trade financing system for the future. 37 • We are at a loss in managing the volatility of commodity prices, espe- cially of food grains and petroleum crude. Management of the two markets has to be internationally coordinated and regulated. All the three institutions have to be involved in the action. The restructuring exercise should be based on the experience summed up here. In the past I have put forward some suggestions and can easily offer some more. But they will be meaningful only when the G20 or the Board of Governors inscribes restructuring as an agenda item. I propose that such a step be taken now. BELGIUM: DIDIER REYNDERS Governor of the Bank I thank Dominique Strauss-Kahn for his inspired leadership of the IMF during a challenging period in the world economy and I congratulate Ms. Christine Lagarde with her selection as the new Managing Director and I ensure her of my full support. The IMF has responded decisively to the problems posed by a tur- bulent world economy. But we need to reflect on ways to improve the Fund’s capability to address the challenges posed by today’s international monetary and financial system. How can we improve the Fund’s surveil- lance? Are the lending instruments of the Fund up to their task? What is the best response to systemic liquidity crises? What should be the future role and composition of the SDR? Are the current resources of the Fund sufficient? These are but some of the important questions that require our attention during the coming months. I cannot elaborate on all of these issues. Let me just pick out one: surveillance. Surveillance remains our first line of defence against crises. Therefore, the Fund must continuously strive to improve its surveillance performance, in dialogue and collaboration with its members. Bilateral, regional and multilateral surveillance must feed into each other: policy recommendations at different levels of surveillance must be consistent and mutually reinforcing. We, as shareholders, must ensure that the legal framework is adapted to the evolving nature of surveillance. The intro- duction of a unified surveillance decision could be a first step to clarify and formalise an enlarged surveillance mandate. Recently, we have taken important steps to increase the legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness of the IMF. These steps are part of a process, aimed at adapting the Fund to the continuously changing economic envi- ronment. Rebalancing quota and voting rights is one way of keeping the Fund up to date and fit to execute its mandate. Another aspect is respect for the Fund’s policy making bodies. Major decisions concerning the gov- ernance and mandate of the Fund should be taken within the Fund, not 38 in other forums. At the same time we must ensure that the Fund’s policy making bodies are up to their task, ready and able to take swift and force- ful decisions and accountable for their implementation. This implies that we should strengthen the IMFC and enhance its decision-making powers. In line with what I just said, the discussion on the review of the quota formula should take place in a transparent and inclusive manner within the Fund’s institutions. The quota formula should be based on economic criteria reflecting the Fund’s mandate. This mandate concerns the inter- connectedness between national economies. Therefore, a variable reflect- ing openness, including financial openness, should have a prominent role. Also, the quota formula should ensure a fair distribution of quotas between large and smaller economies. The World Bank Group has also responded timely and decisively by helping developing countries address the consequences of the global and regional crises. It needs to continue to be vigilant to the economic risks and imbalances affecting some client countries and to assist them in obtaining inclusive growth and development. An important challenge is how to create more and better jobs in these countries, especially in countries with a large and young population. So, I welcome the Bank’s intention to look in more detail into this issue. I particularly support IDA’s efforts in responding to the present drought emergency in the Horn of Africa, which was caused by a com- bination of factors such as adverse climatic conditions, a weak agricultural sector, governance problems and conflict. I urge all development partners to strengthen cooperation and coordination in order to cope with this and other emergency situations. IDA has been gradually directing more of its financial resources to the poorest countries, particularly in Sub Saharan Africa. In order to free up more resources for these countries, IDA should look into some options to enhance its long term financial sustainability. The World Bank is in the process of preparing and implementing some important internal reforms. It has clearly demonstrated that it became a more flexible and responsive institution, responding to the diverse needs of its client countries. In particular, I welcome the suggested corporate scorecard. While serving as a system for measuring and monitoring devel- opment results, it should also be used as an accountability mechanism in a strategic discussion with shareholders on the Bank’s performance. I also urge the Bank to speed up work on some of the other ongoing internal reforms, such as the issue of decentralization and the need to move more qualified staff to the field. I support the conclusions of the 2012 World Development Report on Gender Equality and Development, which clearly demonstrates that gen- der equality is a key component of economic growth and poverty reduc- tion. The Bank should engage in an ambitious campaign of communicating 39 the findings of this report. In addition, gender equality should be scaled up by further strengthening the World Bank Group policies. Finally, I urge the Management to come forward with an appropriate strategic response to the 2012 World Development Report. CHINA: XIE XUREN Governor of the Bank I. Current Global Economic Situation The world economy is now slowly recovering, but the uncertainties and destabilizing factors are increasing. The property and labor market in the US remains sloppy, the European sovereign debt crisis continues to simmer, inflation pressure in emerging market economies is increasing, and the world economy is faced with severe challenges. In face of the complicated situation and challenges, countries in the world should help each other by strengthening macro-economic policy coordination and working together to ensure stability and promote growth as they are all in the same boat. Mid- and long-term fiscal sustainability can only be achieved with accelerated restructuring which in turn depends on economic recovery and financial market stability. Due to the impact of economic crisis, the poverty reduction and development undertakings in developing countries have become more arduous. The international community should pay more attention to development issues and adopt active and effective measures to reduce the North-South gap for common development and prosperity of the world as a whole. II. Direction for Future Development and Reform of the World Bank and IMF As an important part of the international financial system reform, the World Bank has taken the lead to complete its second phase of Voice Reform, its governance structure has been further improved to better reflect the changes in the global economic landscape, and the voice and representativeness of developing countries has been increased. The successful conclusion of general capital increase for IBRD and IDA 16 replenishment has strengthened the capability of the World Bank to promote poverty reduction and development and scale up funding to developing countries, in particular, the low-income countries. The World Bank has also helped the crisis-affected countries implement counter-cyclical economic policies and establish social safety nets, and promoted global economic recovery through innovative instruments like trade finance, thus played an active role in tackling the international financial crisis. 40 As the core organization of the international monetary system, the IMF, since the start of the crisis, has carried out reforms in key areas like quota and governance, crisis rescue and monitoring, and played an important role in helping the member countries weather the crisis and maintaining global economic and financial stability. In particular, the Board of Governors of IMF adopted the resolution on the reform of quota and Board of Executive Directors in December 2010, doubling the total quotas and shifting over 6 percent of quotas to dynamic emerging market and developing countries and underrepresented countries, thus effectively increased the voice and representatives of emerging market and developing countries. As the World Bank and IMF are two important multilateral devel- opment and financial institutions in the world, I would like to make the following proposals on the future direction and reform process of the two institutions: First, the World Bank should remain unswerving on its mandate of poverty reduction and development. Development imbalance is still the primary challenge facing the world economy. The World Bank should stick to its mandate of poverty reduction and development, effectively promote the transfer of funding and technology to developing coun- tries through innovations in instruments and establishment of platforms, facilitate exchanges of development experiences, constantly enhance the capacity for development of developing countries, and promote common development of the world. Second, the World Bank should effectively promote international cooperation on development. As the world economy has entered a new development stage, the development experience of developing countries as a result of constant exploration and accumulation in line with the chang- ing situation is useful enrichment to the world development theories. The World Bank, as a multilateral development institution with strengths in funding, knowledge and cooperation platform, should work together with developing countries to jointly improve development theories, make innovations in development philosophy, exploit new territory for develop- ment cooperation, explore diverse ways of South-South cooperation and promote the global poverty reduction and development agenda. Third, the World Bank should further promote its own reform. China appreciates the efforts by the Bank in voice, internal governance and management model reforms in recent years. We are willing to work with relevant parties to be deeply involved in the reform of the Bank, further increase the voice and representativeness of developing countries in the World Bank, reinforce development effectiveness of the Bank, and help the Bank better fulfill its mandate of poverty reduction and development. Fourth, the reform of IMF should be further promoted to increase its effectiveness in performing its function. Firstly, IMF should seek the root 41 cause of the crisis and adjust the monitoring framework and transform monitoring priorities accordingly. Secondly, IMF should continue to improve its quota and governance structure. As an international insti- tution based on quota, IMF must put the 2010 quota reform package into effect as soon as possible so as to effectively guarantee the source of funding in the long run and meet the needs of member countries to address crisis. The quota formula of IMF should be simpler and more transparent and better reflect the changes in the relative economic power of member countries. In addition, IMF should further study the inherent defects of the international monetary system, promote diversification of the international reserve currency system and build the international reserve currency system into one with stable value, rule-based issuance and manageable supply. III. Economic Development Update of China Since the second half of 2008, the Chinese government has taken active policies and measures to tackle the international financial crisis, implemented the package plan in response to the crisis, constantly strengthened and improved macro-regulation, and effectively curbed the marked slowdown trend of economic growth. It is among the first to achieve economic recovery. In 2009 and 2010, our GDP grew by 9.1 percent and 10.3 percent respectively. This year, the government continued to implement the proactive fiscal policy and prudent mon- etary policy and put significant efforts in stabilizing the price, adjust- ing structure, ensuring people’s livelihood and promoting harmony. GDP in the first half of the year grew by 9.6 percent over the same period of last year and income of urban and rural residents increased by 7.6 percent and 13.7 percent respectively. For the first 7 months of the year, retail of consumer goods grew by 16.8 percent, fixed-asset investment 25.4 percent and foreign trade 25.1 percent. The macro- regulation is producing positive and steady effect and economic and social development has maintained sound momentum. The economic development of China is in good shape in general albeit challenges of imbalance and lack of coordination and sustainability of development. The Chinese government will continue to strengthen and improve macro-regulation, maintain the continuity and stability of macro- economic policies, strike a proper balance between maintaining steady yet rapid economic development, restructuring the economy and man- aging inflation expectations, and work hard to maintain the sustained and steady growth of the economy. The sound and stable development of China’s economy will serve as positive contributions to the global economic recovery. 42 COLOMBIA: JUAN CARLOS ECHEVERRY Governor of the Bank It is a great honor as Minister of Finance to represent the President of Colombia, Mr. Juan Manual Santos, on the occasion of the 2011 IMF and World Bank Annual Meetings. In this first year in office we have achieved most of our goals in terms of economic policy and of steering the economy towards a path of growth. The job done so far strengthens our economy’s perspectives and its resilience for confronting the uncertainties stemming from international economy. The Santos Administration has set up a world class macro fiscal frame- work, based on: • A Fiscal Sustainability Constitutional Reform (approved on June 2011)— introducing Fiscal Sustainability as a criterion for guiding all public sector institutions. • A Royalties’ Reform (approved on June 2011)— that redistributes revenues generated by the oil and mining boom amongst all Colombian provinces, providing important resources for investment, infrastructure and innovation. • A Fiscal Rule (approved on June 2011)—that imposes fiscal discipline to the Central Government with the objective of obtaining a primary fiscal surplus by 2012. • A Tax Reform (approved on December 2010)—that is expected to raise revenue in more than 1 percent of GDP. This framework puts Colombia on a Medium Term Fiscal Path that: • Provides predictability, sustainability and will support investor confidence. • Avoids accumulating imbalances. • Allows social expenditure for poverty reduction and compensating victims of violence; as well as winning the war on narcotrafficking, investing in infrastructure, and confronting fiscal liabilities like pen- sions or healthcare. The most recent economic performance indicators are: • Colombia avoided recession during 2007–2010 period. • GDP growth was 5.1 percent in IQ 2011 and is expected to be around 6 percent by year-end. Inflation is 3.2 percent. Our economy is solid: • Families have access to more employment and purchasing capacity. • Domestic and foreign investments are booming. 43 • The Financial System is under world class regulation and supervision. • Colombia was ranked 4th in inflation control, according to OECD ranking. • Credit is booming. • Full investment grade recovered during 2011. • Sound public finances abide to a fiscal rule and medium term targets. • Strong political governability. Colombia is well prepared to face international volatility: • Tax revenues are over performing, growing more than 20 percent in real terms in 2011. • Our budget deficit for 2011 and 2012 will be lower than expected. • At 23 percent of GDP, the public sector net debt/GDP is sustainable. • We are prepared for shocks: Enough International Reserves (US$ 33 billion), and an IMF Flexible Credit Line (US$ 6 billion). However, emerging economies’ performance will depend on the com- mitment of rich economies to clean their balance sheets, increase invest- ment, and approve fiscal and economic reforms. This commitment begins with the conviction that policymakers of those rich countries convened at this Annual Meeting, to implement all the necessary and responsible decisions in order to guarantee a stable worldwide economy. During the past years, emerging economies have done their share to achieve fiscal sustainability, avoid financial bubbles, promote growth and contribute to international financial stability. It is now the turn of developed economies to lead by example. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: MAPON MATATA PONYO Governor of the Bank and the Fund (on behalf of the African Governors) Africa Is Coping, Moving Forward and Transforming Itself Africa Is Coping Until the global economic crisis in 2008, economic growth on the Afri- can continent had been averaging 5 percent over the course of a decade. Some 22 non-oil exporting countries had posted growth of 4 percent or more during the period 1998–2008. Those efforts were slowed by the crisis. Yet, despite a slow global economic recovery and an increasingly difficult international environment, African countries continue to show solid growth, projected at more than 5 percent in 2012 and 2013. Nearly 44 40 percent of African countries are likely to record growth rates of 6 per- cent or more. This growth in Africa, however, remains closely linked to the trend of international prices for commodities, such as oil, metals and nonfood agricultural products, which are generally volatile. Consequently, investment projects are needed in sectors susceptible to stimulate rapid and sustained growth, such as energy and agriculture, which have a strong potential for transformation and regional integration that are critical to the development of the continent. While Africa was affected by the global crisis, it was able to withstand it. Africa succeeded in avoiding an even deeper recession in 2009, thanks to prudent macroeconomic policies and financial support from its part- ners. In 2010, it began a recovery. Civil society is making its voice heard more effectively and in many countries nongovernmental stakehold- ers are demanding accountability on the part of leaders as to the way national resources are being used. Countries are asserting ownership over development efforts, with more emphasis on results, on building capacities and national systems, on the choice of policies, on reforms, on aid coordination and effectiveness. In other words, Africa is not just coping, it is moving forward. Africa Is Moving Forward Indeed the majority of African countries are still far from achiev- ing most of the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. Yet, progress toward the MDGs has been such that many countries—including Cape Verde, Malawi, Ghana and Ethiopia—are now well-placed to achieve the majority of the MDGs, if not by 2015, then shortly afterwards. Moreover, development indicators reveal steady improvements. Some indices show that child mortality is beginning to fall in Ethiopia, in The Gambia, in Malawi and in Rwanda; and primary school enrollment rates are rising in most cases, faster in Africa than anywhere else. Our continent has enjoyed significant support from the International Monetary Fund and from the World Bank. With technical assistance and advice from the IMF, many African countries have achieved macroeco- nomic stability essential to development efforts. Inflation is generally under control despite pressures from abroad; budget deficits are better contained than in the past; indebtedness levels are lower, in part because of debt relief but also because of the efforts that our countries have made to manage their debt; and the external current accounts have seen an appre- ciable strengthening, helped by an improvement in the terms of trade. Financing from the World Bank made it possible, during 2010, for example, to expand agricultural yields and output in Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia and Tanzania. Tens of thousands of people in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have gained access to 45 drinking water, as have one and a half million city dwellers in Senegal, while Ghana and Rwanda have been able to boost rural people’s access to clean water considerably. Meanwhile, more than 16,000 Kenyan school- children and 15,000 vulnerable people in Liberia have received social protection. Thousands of lives have been saved from malaria in Nigeria and the DRC, from the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Malawi, in Chad and Lesotho. Africa also welcomes the fact that the World Bank has rein- forced its presence in its Africa offices, in the context of internal reforms designed to increase the impact of the development projects it finances. In other words, Africa is more than ever determined not just to cope and move forward, but also to transform itself. Africa Is Transforming Itself The business climate in Africa is improving. The private sector is attracting more and more investments, with much of the funding com- ing from national banks and investors. Private capital flows outweigh the amounts of official development assistance. According to the Doing Business 2010 report, an African country—Rwanda—ranks as the top reformer in the world. A middle-class is emerging, with hundreds of millions of consumers. Returns on investment in Africa are among the highest in the world. The success of information and communication tech- nologies, in particular the penetration rate of mobile telephone service, illustrates the speed with which the sector can develop. It also shows how the public sector can lay the conditions for exponential growth of a vital industry that could transform the continent. We ask for a much more solid support in implementing the Accra Agenda for Action adopted at the high-level forum in September 2008 following the evaluation of the 2005 Paris Declaration. These texts rec- ognize that it is up to governments to design and carry out their own development programs. But at the same time, they call on development partners to provide additional financing at the least cost and put more emphasis on results. They remind us that aid levels should correspond to at least 0.7 percent of GDP, the target set at the Monterrey Summit. The Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action also demand closer collaboration among donors to reduce competition and to ensure aid effectiveness, while avoiding wastage and overlap. The Drought in the Horn of Africa Lastly, I cannot end this statement without speaking of the human tragedy that is unfolding in the Horn of Africa. The drought is affecting more than 11 million people in the arid and semi-arid zones of Soma- lia, Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, Uganda, 46 Eritrea, Rwanda and Djibouti. Even more people, crops and livestock will be affected in the months to come because of cumulative delays in harvests. The situation reminds us that the continent, despite the progress made, remains highly vulnerable to exogenous shocks. We are grateful for all the contributions received and we are expecting more. However, while we are devoting our energies—appropriately—to emergency responses to the famine in the Horn of Africa, we must also adopt the same sense of urgency in seeking longer-term solutions, espe- cially if droughts are going to become more frequent with climate change. We therefore call for a proactive approach to risk disaster management, in addition to emergency responses. We urge multilateral institutions, like the IMF and World Bank, to maintain significant concessional resources to efficiently respond to the needs of our countries. DOMINICA: ROSAMUND EDWARDS Governor of the Bank and the Fund (on behalf of the Joint Caribbean Group) As Governor of the IMF and the World Bank for Dominica, I have the honour to speak on behalf of the countries of the Caribbean Com- munity (CARICOM), that is Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Bar- bados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. Caribbean economies continue to be heavily impacted by the vul- nerabilities in advanced countries and spillovers from the persistent uncertainty in global financial markets. We therefore support concerted multilateral efforts to nurture the recovery, though policies that bolster private sector confidence and enhance financial sector resilience. The Economic Outlook and Policy Challenges While there are a few bright spots where the recovery in the Carib- bean is starting to take hold, it is expected that medium-term growth will remain subdued and at levels inferior to those projected before the global recession. Moderate prospects for tourism and remittances inflows, owing to weaknesses in the United States and our European trading partners explain largely this cautious optimism. Additionally, foreign direct invest- ments are projected to increase only timidly. A good development for some countries is that commodities exports are expected to register a strong uplift due to recovering prices and global demand, yet this poses mounting inflation and external payments pressures for others in the region. On the whole, downside risks are persistent and rising, given the soft patch in global recovery. 47 Echoing a theme that is common to global policy makers, medium- term challenges in the Caribbean evolve around achieving more sustain- able fiscal policy frameworks and more resilient financial sectors. A well defined strategy to boost economic growth and stimulate employment is also vital. As we renew our efforts to rebuild policy buffers and reduce debt, we are therefore seeking out space within our budgetary envelopes to sustain growth promoting investments. Further, we are committed to pursuing and strengthening initiatives to diversify our export markets, increase workforce productivity and enhance external competiveness. Indeed, in the absence of strong firming in growth prospects, our fiscal consolidation will only come at the cost of significant social dislocation and contraction in domestic demand. In the financial sector, our task is still to ensure an orderly rehabilita- tion of banking sector balance sheets and to lay the foundation for more comprehensive oversight of both banking and non-banking activities. The Caribbean is building on the lessons from the regional cross-border crisis which originated in the insurance sector, and which illustrated the need to strengthen the cooperative regulatory mechanisms. For many of our countries the redress of the financial sector will impose costs. We are determined to keep the fiscal impact to a minimum, and to ensure that the resolution frameworks which emerge minimize future fiscal risks. Technical Assistance and External Financing As we confront these challenges, Caribbean governments expect the technical and financial engagement of the Bretton Woods institutions to become heightened. Outside of the formal policy consultations, the Carib- bean Regional Technical Assistance Centre (CARTAC) has become the most important delivery channel for the IMF’s services. At the moment though, we are deeply concerned that the scope for TA delivery through CARTAC is being constrained by the Fund’s policy to impose charges on the centre for administrative and quality control services. Although we appreciate that the IMF incurs costs for these services, we encourage the institution to consider boosting the internal budgetary resources devoted to TA. Moreover, we urge the Fund to take more steps to strengthen CARTAC’s own capacity to exercise quality controls. As to the World Bank Group, we welcome the IFC’s renewed interest in tourism, and urge that the regional focus of the initiatives promote the development of linkages. In this regard, we also exhort the World Bank Group to scale up support for our policies to promote micro, small and medium-size enterprises. In the meantime, we are counting on the recently formed inter-agency growth commission of the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank and Caribbean Development Bank to help us formulate pragmatic policy mea- sures which the multilateral financial institutions will also support. 48 Access to concessional financing is critical for many of our regional countries, particularly those with high debt burdens. We are therefore pleased by the enhancements made to the IMF’s lending facilities, both concessional and non-concessional, in recent years. Indeed, there has been a noteworthy effort to reform the concessional facilities for low- income countries. Nonetheless, a gap persists, as the needs of small highly vulnerable middle-income states are not adequately addressed. This an issue of importance for the Caribbean, where the limited quotas of our smallest states translate into insignificant access limits in nominal terms and in comparison with the amounts that would be necessary to make a difference in signaling and outcomes. We urge the membership to give immediate attention to this need. International Policy Coordination and Cooperation We remain supportive of the gains that the IMF is making to strengthen multilateral surveillance and the multilateral frameworks to promote global financial stability. Along these lines we endorse efforts to improve the traction in policy advice through the Fund’s technical assistance to G20 Mutual Assessment Process (G20-MAP). Both the Fund and the World Bank are encouraged to maintain close relationship with the FSB and international standards setting bodies, developing more robust and cooperative approaches to regulating the global financial sector. We note though that these initiatives do impose added demands on the Fund’s resources and justify greater prioritization of bilateral surveillance and TA activities. Even with this heightened focus on systemic issues, we urge that adequate attention and resources remain devoted to the needs of capacity constrained small states such as those in the Caribbean. As regards, the international standards setting bodies, CARICOM believes that the Fund and Bank adopted the right stance in choosing not to endorse coercive approaches to regulatory cooperation and informa- tion sharing. In our view, positive incentives and appropriate technical assistance are the right methods to ensuring that the operating legal frameworks in the Fund’s member countries evolve in tandem with best international practices. IMF Surveillance The findings in the IMF’s Triennial Surveillance Review indicate that there is no room for complacency, as important gaps in the Fund’s surveillance remain to be addressed. We urge that the excessive rotation of mission chiefs and teams working on our countries be more effec- tively managed and that macro-social issues be adequately reflected in Article IV consultations. We also join other like-minded countries in 49 urging Management and the Executive Board to accelerate the move towards increased diversity among the staff. It is only through improved governance and diversity in human resources that the Fund will be able to benefit from novel and good inputs which may complement the main- stream orthodox thinking. We also support the call for more tailored advice to countries’ peculiar circumstances and increase utilization of cross-country analysis. IMF Reforms Since the 2010 Annual Meetings the IMF has reached two impor- tant milestones in governance reform and the CARICOM countries are pleased to have supported these processes. The 2008 reform transferred increased voting shares to developing countries, including the Carib- bean. The 2008 proposal also paved the way for implementation of a new income model, financed by profits from gold sales, which entrusts the Fund with greater independence to sustain its surveillance and non- lending operations over the longer-term. As the IMF turns its attention to how best to utilize the windfall profits from the gold sales we welcome recommendations that would increase support for concessional lend- ing facilities of the Poverty and Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) fund. We also see this as an opportunity to boost resources for techni- cal assistance to low-income countries as well as the highly vulnerable middle-income states. As to the second milestone, we are pleased that agreement was reached on the latest package of proposals to double the quota base of the IMF and undertake reforms to the executive board, both with the intention of further enhancing the voice of the emerging market countries. While we are grateful that the voting shares of the two lowest income states in our region (Haiti and Guyana) were protected, we regret that this ben- efit was not extended to more of our vulnerable states. Quotas continue to frame both the cost and access to IMF resources at a juncture when the external financing needs of many Caribbean States, particularly in the OECS are heightened. With this in mind, we encourage the IMF to explore more flexible approaches to accommodating these needs, even as the new round of the quota formula review has started. The World Bank We commend the Board of Directors and Management of the World Bank Group for their hard work. We are pleased to acknowledge the positive changes that are occurring and the dynamism with which the Bank has responded to global challenges. The adoption of a corporate score card will help keep the Bank focused on its objectives and goals 50 without losing sight of its mandate. At the same time it will enhance the institution’s efforts to promote transparency. We also acknowledge the tremendous efforts of the Bank to tackle climate change. Our countries are particularly vulnerable to the adverse fallouts from these trends. We have a long way to go however, before the initiatives can be considered mainstreamed in the Bank’s work. Pro- gress will only be achieved when mitigating actions are more multiplied throughout the globe. We call on the Bank to accelerate the implementa- tion of operations in the countries of the Caribbean, particularly those pending in Dominica and Guyana. The 2012 World Development Report is remarkable in underscor- ing the importance of government leadership and the interventions of development partners to ensure that economic growth contributes to greater gender equality. Furthermore, the report highlights that gender equality is vital to both economic development and achieving the Millen- nium Development Goals—making households more resilient to shocks and to the mounting challenges of climate change and food security. The promotion of gender equality is to be prioritized and strengthened and, as the Bank stresses, uplift both sexes. The World Bank Group also continues to deliver on its mandate of development and poverty alleviation. We are pleased that the Interna- tional Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector arm of the group, has increased its presence to become largest sponsor of private foreign investment in the Caribbean. This stepped up presence is welcomed and will be further exploited by regional governments given our limited space for public sector investments. Continuing the Work in Haiti Finally, we would like to call your attention to Haiti. Progress in the reconstruction has been beneath expectations since the earthquake over one and a half years ago. More sizable and effective interventions are needed to achieve visible near-term improvements in the population’s living conditions and set off sustained medium-term growth in per capita incomes. Despite the challenging domestic and external environment the Haitian authorities have managed to maintain macroeconomic stability. There is an urgent need though for job creation through investments in economic and social infrastructure as well as through productive private sector initiatives. We call on the international donor community to speed up the delivery of their pledges so that reconstruction and poverty reduc- tion progress at a faster pace. In this regard, we continue to place high value on the multi-faceted contribution of the Bretton Woods institutions and other multilateral institutions. 51 Conclusion In conclusion, the Caribbean countries continue to believe that the challenges facing the global economy justify a heightened multilateral approach to surveillance; and coordinated policy responses to reignite private sector confidence and shore up the stability of the international financial system. Indeed, the fragile conditions in our major trading part- ners underscore the subdued medium-term outlook for the region. While our regional commitment to fiscal discipline is undeterred, achieving faster growth is critical to our debt consolidation objectives. As we face these challenges and work to enhance regional financial stability, we expect to maintain a heightened policy dialogue and engagement with the Bretton Woods institutions and our development partners over the medium-term. FIJI: BARRY WHITESIDE Governor of the Fund It is indeed an honor for me to deliver this address on behalf of the delegation of the Republic of Fiji, on the occasion of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Annual Meeting. I congratulate you on your appointment to Chair this joint annual discussion. I also warmly congratulate Ms Christine Lagarde for her appointment to the post of Managing Director and Madame Chairman of the Executive Board of the IMF. Over the past 12 months, Mr. Chairman, the global economy has shown signs of slowing and downside risks have heightened, while the expansion remains unbalanced. In most advanced countries, growth has been weak as pressures from persisting fiscal and financial sector imbalances continue to overshadow the economic outlook. Growth in many emerging and developing economies remains strong although signs of overheating have emerged. As a result, global growth prospects have slightly deteriorated to a growth of 4.0 percent for the world economy this year. Although the global economy has bounced back strongly from the depression in 2009, this path to recovery remains uncertain. As such Mr. Chairman, countries need to focus their efforts towards placing the global economy on a strong, even and sustainable growth path. This is by no means an easy task. Fiscal adjustment for some countries that need to restore fiscal sustainability, for instance, will need to be weighed against the risk of not hurting the recovery by implementing consolidation poli- cies too early. As such, policy cooperation amongst countries as was done, follow- ing the global financial crisis, is more critical now, given the constraints on monetary policy, continuing banking sector problems and mounting 52 public sector debt. Policy actions will need to be stepped up to help coun- tries secure a trajectory of positive and sustainable growth. Growing inter-linkages among economies of the world have made the global economy more complex and as a result made policy making more challenging. The varying weights of countries in terms of their contribu- tions to growth, trade and financial assets and liabilities, all underscore the huge differences and complexity of the world economy. These com- plexities, while they have provided explanations on policy failures before the crisis, have also, through the greater inter-linkages, been a cause for success in the periods both before and following the crisis. Increased global inter-connectedness Mr. Chairman, through finance and trade, had led to the longest sustained period of growth in world history prior to 2009 and also brought about remarkable achievement through greater global cooperation in the face of the recent global finan- cial crisis. The joint efforts by countries to tackle the crisis saw the eco- nomic downturn lasting only three calendar quarters, not for a prolonged period. Among current policy challenges is the need to reestablish strong, sustained and balanced growth for the world economy. While global growth both for this year and next year is around 4 percent, this masks the uneven recovery across the globe. Another major challenge facing many advanced economies is the huge public debt, with the debt-to-GDP ratios for many countries, increasing by 25 to 30 percentage points. Many of these countries face the need to stabilize their debt levels and return them to pre-crisis levels through substantial fiscal adjustment. The challenge for emerging economies is rapid growth amidst expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. Rising commodity prices in these economies are rais- ing inflationary expectations and placing upward pressure on inflation. Amidst the huge challenges facing the global economy, it is positive to note Mr. Chairman, that the Fund recognizes its need to better under- stand the interconnectedness between countries and as such provide policy advice to its member countries. In respect of the Fund’s mandate on surveillance, innovations made since the crisis are noteworthy. The introduction of the “early warning exercise,� which has strengthened the monitoring of tail risks faced by the global economy is positive. As well, the mandatory imposition of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) on members with systematically important financial systems and the first ever FSAP for the US and China and the FSAP update for Germany are positive achievements. In addition, the increased focus by the Fund on inter-linkages among economies and the spillover effects of policies from one country on to others, should greatly improve the analysis of the Institution. Having said this Mr. Chairman, we are hopeful that the release of the Spillover Report by the Fund will be a timely one. Associated with this is the greater attention now paid to understanding 53 macro-financial linkages as well as the quality of growth and its impact on macroeconomic stability. The enhancements made by the Fund to financial instruments are a welcome development. Streamlining financing programs to focus on core policies needed to reestablish growth and stability is vital. In this light, the introduction of the Flexible Credit Line and the Precautionary Credit Line should provide the insurance-like protection needed by countries in crisis. Enhancing its cooperation with regional financing arrangements is another commendable move by the Fund. It is important that the Fund continues to explore the need to further strengthen the global financial safety net. On Fund resources, whilst we support the higher quota subscriptions by members which will allow the Fund to draw additional funds from members at short notice for borrowing and financing purposes, we would like to see better balance than currently is the case, in the use of these funds. We note that the $330 billion fund allocation to needy countries since the crisis has greatly helped countries from succumbing to financial pressures. We applaud the Fund on the progress on governance reforms. The greater voice now provided to emerging market economies based on their weight in the global economy, is a historic happening. This will ensure the protection of the voices of some of the poorest in countries which are now included because of their significant weight in the global economy. We also recognize and support the Bank’s initiative on creating jobs, renewably energy sector strategy and the development of a corporate scorecard. I also commend the World Bank for the World Development Report 2012 on Gender Equality and Development. The key messages in the Report clearly underscore the importance of gender mainstreaming in economic development and nation building. The Report also makes an important and timely contribution to the global economic development agenda, ahead of the timeline for achieving the Millennium Develop- ment Goals. I applaud the work done so far by the Bank to improve gender equal- ity; however, I fully agree that more can be done in order to enhance the development impact of the Bank’s programs and assistance on this front. While low and middle income countries share similar experiences and constraints in terms of gender disparities, a “one-size fits-all� solution will not work. For developing countries like Fiji, addressing gender gaps can make a greater impact in terms of productivity gains and improving standards of living, particularly for those in rural areas. In recognition of this, the Fijian Government has developed a national Women’s Plan of Action 2010—2019 to guide resource allocation towards 54 addressing priority areas which range from formal sector employment opportunities to elimination of violence against women and children. The Plan also ensures that Fiji meets its commitments to various inter- national conventions on women, such as the Convention on Elimination on All Forms of Violence. Women in Fiji are also the major and more successful participants of micro finance and Small to Medium Enterprise (SME) schemes funded by Government, civil society and financial insti- tutions. In this regard, Government and key stakeholders are working together to increase awareness and financial support for micro and SME schemes. Therefore, the World Bank’s plans to increase and mainstream gender equality in operations (including financial lending and technical assis- tance) and policy dialogue will go a long way to guide and complement national programs. Such complementarities will ensure that development outcomes are realized much earlier. In this regard Mr. Chairman, I welcome the Bank’s focus on improv- ing country level gender diagnostics and gender based data as a means for scaling up its lending, research and technical assistance on gender equality. Not only does this approach promote country level ownership and participation, it ensures that development solutions are tailored to country and regional contexts to enhance its impact. To this end, I lend my support to the four focal areas identified by Management to leverage gender interests in the Bank’s work and I look forward to the corporate strategic document by Management that will steer the Bank’s work in promoting gender equality going forward. I also take this opportunity to call on Management to ensure that the plight of low and middle income countries is featured prominently in the plan and design of this strategic direction. The Fiji economy continues to face many challenges. The actual growth for 2010 was a marginal 0.3 percent, lower than the forecast 0.6 percent. The slow pick up in global demand and high oil and food prices remain a major drag on the economy despite the strong growth in tourism and in major export commodities such as sugar, timber, gold, mineral water and fish. Sector performances have been mixed with strong growth in the services sector especially tourism, outweighing the weaker performances in the agriculture and other resource based sectors. The modest level of economic activity has seen continuing weakness in import growth, particularly in mineral fuels. This year’s growth is targeted at 2.7 percent, expected to come from improved performances across most sectors. Foreign reserves continue to grow on the back of better than expected tourism receipts, stable remittance inflows and domestic export earnings. The outlook for the end of year level remains adequate at around 5 months of import cover. Excess capacity in the economy has kept underlying inflation around 3 percent or below. However, headline 55 inflation continues to be driven by high food and oil prices. The outlook for end of year inflation is around 7 percent with an upward bias resulting mainly from recent unexpected increases in domestic food prices. On bilateral relations, Mr. Chairman, we thank the Fund for the continuous consultations and discussions during the annual Article IV Missions, which provide valuable insight for our assessment of the mac- roeconomic situation, and more importantly advice on policy issues. The authorities continue to examine issues raised by the Fund during these missions as well as make progress on recommendations on the recent Safeguards Assessment report on compliance and independence issues for the Bank. The Reserve Bank of Fiji continues to focus monetary policy towards supporting growth in priority sectors of the economy while ensuring external and financial stability. As such, the accommodative monetary policy stance by the Reserve Bank has seen the cost of borrowing in the market generally decline since the beginning of the year, auguring well for investment intentions in the country and the cost of financing for the Government. The Reserve Bank continues to review its existing prudential policies, formulating new ones to ensure that the financial system remains sound. Moreover, the Reserve Bank in partnership with financial institutions and donors continue to review national strategies to promote greater financial inclusion in Fiji. Countries in the region recently met in Fiji to discuss concepts and tools for the supervision and regulation of non-bank microfinance institutions, which currently do not fall under the ambit of supervision by the Reserve Bank. On other developments in our country, the authorities continue to reaffirm their commitment to the People’s Charter for Change, Peace and Progress and the Roadmap to Democracy—the guiding principle for policy formulation by the Fijian Government and the new Fiji Con- stitution. Following the endorsement by Pacific leaders of Fiji’s Charter and the Roadmap recently, the Fijian Government has reiterated its commitment towards hosting elections in September 2014, with voter registration targeted to begin in early 2012. This new system of voting will ensure fairness to all and elimination of voter and political party fraud. Under its civil service reform, the Government aims to improve the efficiency, effectiveness and quality of service delivered by the civil ser- vice, particularly focusing on creating a leaner and more efficient civil service, which will bring about cost savings and efficiency gains. The Fijian Government continues to implement its strategies for reforming public enterprises. Reforms and restructurings to date have been undertaken in areas including government residences and supplies, utilities, maritime, meteorological, telecommunications and agriculture-livestock. Future plans include the development of plans for outsourcing service delivery and formulating a corporate governance code. 56 Reform initiatives aimed at improving the accessibility to and utili- zation of land, have progressed well with more land now available for production and social purposes. Under the Land Use Decree 2010, the i-taukei landowners, potential investors, farmers and the state, are able to benefit through certainty of tenure and improved rental return. Fur- thermore, Mr Chairman, to promote rural and outer island development, the Fijian Government had set up an “Integrated Rural Development Framework� and facility to provide additional resources for upgrading rural infrastructure. The declaration of tax free regions in these areas supported by tax and non-tax concessions, are expected to boost devel- opment in the nation. While the country is beginning to see tangible benefits of reforms, the Fijian Government remains adamant on its course towards addressing systematic corruption in the country. This year, Fiji has gained recognition by the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) for its efforts in combating corruption and white collar crime in the country. This was supported by the closure of 30 convicted court cases by the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (FICAC). The Fijian Government is committed to developing and implement- ing the best political, social and economic policies in order to advance the goals of good governance, prosperity and peace and national unity. The authorities continue to consult widely with the private sector and non-governmental organizations, to identify policies appropriate to the country’s current social and economic situation. In this light, we call upon the international community and our devel- opment partners, including the Fund and the World Bank, to bear witness to the progress that Fiji has made. Our Government will continue to push for greater engagement and dialogue with the region, as evident in the recent meetings on “Strengthening Partnership Agreement Amongst Pacific Small Island Developing States� and “Economic Partnership Agreement Negotiations.� We reiterate our call to the Fund and World Bank for greater engage- ment with Fiji, to boost the support it needs to move the country forward quickly. Joint research programs between the Bretton Woods institutions and country officials will greatly enhance understanding of our country situation and challenges and help with capacity building. This will lead to the better design of appropriate policies to achieve our development agenda. At this juncture, I would like to sincerely thank the Fund for the Tech- nical Assistance Fiji continues to receive, and the work done by the IMF Pacific Technical Assistance Centre in Suva. The Reserve Bank and the Finance Ministry have specifically gained from the training provided by the new IMF Macroeconomic Adviser, and regular discussions between the IMF Resident Rep Office and the Reserve Bank have been very 57 useful. I also thank the World Bank for its assistance to Fiji and our island neighbours through its Regional Office in Sydney, Australia. Finally, my best wishes to the Fund and the Bank in their future efforts and we look forward to closely working with both institutions. FRANCE: FRANÇOIS BAROIN Governor of the Bank and the Fund We are meeting at a time of new challenges to global economic recov- ery. From development, growth to budget deficits or sovereign debt, serious issues are at stake. We have to face the facts. In most countries, and to varying degrees, it will take time for households, businesses and public administrations to pay down their debt. Growth rates will be affected. This means that the global recovery is inherently fragile and particularly vulnerable to shocks. We have just been through a particularly trying summer, marked by new economic and financial tension. The outlook remains uncertain for a more buoyant economy in the second half of 2011 and in 2012. We therefore need to restore confidence, support growth, dispel uncertainty and protect a convalescent world economy from new shocks. In the months ahead, it is vital to that purpose that we manage to achieve a balance between the fiscal consolidation required and the need to sustain growth. We should give priority to measures that hurt demand least, while ensuring that governments are on a credible and sustainable medium-term path to reducing their deficits. In countries where it is possible, we should use the room of manoeuvre available to us in the short term. To enhance our ability to respond to crises, foster a return to inclu- sive, sustainable, and balanced global growth and prevent future crises, we must renew our will to take action. The advanced economies need to strengthen the resilience of their financial sectors. Medium-term fis- cal consolidation plans must be implemented—or in some countries designed—with the aim of moving towards a balanced budget while, where possible, supporting growth in the short term. The major emerg- ing economies also have to help reduce global imbalances, notably by an increase in domestic demand. In developing countries, ensuring sustain- able growth and poverty reduction will require sustained effort, both to tackle structural vulnerabilities and to rebuild the buffers that enabled them to overcome the global crisis. This means achieving a delicate bal- ance. As the cornerstone of world economic and financial governance and development, the Bretton Woods institutions have a vital role to play in emphasising this urgent need for coordination. Chairing the G20, the G7 and the G8 has given France special respon- sibilities this year. We are committed to continuing our efforts in this regard. The international context requires more than ever a determined, 58 concrete and concerted action. This is the ambition of the G20 French presidency: to come up at the Leaders’ Summit, in Cannes the 4th of November, with political decisions accompanied as far as possible by concrete actions. In our view, the legitimacy of the G20 is at stake here. It is essential today to bolster the status of the Bretton Woods institu- tions as the linchpin of the crisis response. These institutions have dealt effectively and swiftly with the deepest economic and financial crisis since World War II. This is basically because our collective mobilisation since 2008 has been exemplary, and we have provided those institutions with the expanded resources they needed to take action. Since the onset of the crisis, the World Bank has committed more than $150 billion to secure eco- nomic recovery in the developing countries, and the IMF’s commitments have increased fivefold since January 2009, from roughly $60 billion to $330 billion. Following a decade of diminishing intervention, the response to the crisis has given fresh impetus to the Bretton Woods institutions. Collectively, we have succeeded in taking a pragmatic approach and demonstrated our ability to adjust to new economic realities by endowing the international financial institutions with more appropriate tools. As a result, they have been able to take action in a troubled environment and respond in innovative ways to the needs of all their members, from developed nations to the emerging and low-income countries. I am par- ticularly encouraged by the new precautionary instruments introduced by the IMF, a significant boost to the Fund’s scope of intervention. I am also encouraged by the targeted, timely moves by the Bretton Woods institutions to assist their poorest and most vulnerable members. Over the last few years, the IMF has considerably increased—almost doubled— its commitments to low-income countries, and took an important step forward by revamping its lending facilities for those countries. At the World Bank, we have created a Crisis Response Window within IDA so that adequate resources and an appropriate mechanism will be readily available for us to confront economic crises and natural disasters. The current famine in the Horn of Africa cruelly highlights how urgently such an instrument is needed. Our ability to respond collectively is also in evidence in our approach to the Arab Spring. The international financial institutions can and must provide effective, coordinated support to the economic and democratic progress under way in the countries on the southern rim of the Medi- terranean. Multilateral action is a key component of the response pro- posed by the Deauville Partnership, so I am particularly pleased with the involvement of the Bretton Woods institutions. The Joint Statement of commitment by the multilateral institutions to coordinating their work on the ground attests to their determination to act together, effectively and in new ways. Substantial funding, close to 38 billion of euros, has been mobilised at the Marseille meeting the 10th of September to support 59 exemplary transition plans. The path taken by the Deauville Partnership is a model of effective, coordinated, country-focused development policy. To be ready to respond to future crises, we need to learn from our recent experience and achievements. The primary conclusion I have drawn is that crisis response must be collective. We must continuously strive to refine our tools. What is lacking is a structured approach that can ensure our collective ability to meet short- term liquidity needs in the event of a systemic crisis. This situation must be corrected. I maintain that the IMF has to play a more important role—a pivotal role—with respect to global financial safety nets. We also need to strengthen our ability to work together. I believe that collaboration between the Bretton Woods institutions and regional orga- nisations will be beneficial, because I have witnessed the IMF’s exemplary collaboration with the European institutions, creating collaborative rather than competitive synergies. Increased coordination with the existing regional mechanisms and organisations will also be crucial to making global financial safety nets more effective. This is another area in which I would like to see the World Bank step up its efforts. Today, we have the institution’s own scorecard. It is a highly valuable tool for institutional monitoring and dialogue. Let’s make it a guidance tool that development banks can use in a uniform manner. Last of all, we need resources that match our ambition. By way of example, establishing a mechanism for responding to liquidity crises triggered by systemic shocks implies that we also consider the issue of adequate available resources for the Fund. We must act responsibly by giving the Fund the means to fully assume its role and refine its tools as needed. Should we so decide, we are also in a position today to ensure that the IMF will have a lasting ability to support its poorest members. For that reason, France is in favour of using the windfall profits from gold sales to boost the concessional lending capacity of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust. We must prepare for the future by giving the IFIs the means to prevent crises and foster sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth. It’s by improv- ing surveillance that we will be able to act more effectively and to reduce macroeconomic vulnerabilities. We need stronger, more effective, and more consistent IMF surveil- lance. Progress has been achieved, and the Triennial Surveillance Review helps us identify possible avenues for making surveillance as intercon- nected as today’s economy and financial world. But we mustn’t stop half- way. We must make sure there is adequate follow-through. That requires setting ambitious goals for ourselves. By adapting the legal surveillance framework, we can come together around a shared vision of international stability and prosperity; by strengthening the role of the IMFC, we can improve the traction of the IMF. 60 Heightened surveillance is complementary to the Mutual Assessment Process carried out under the G20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth, to which the IMF contributes essential technical expertise. With the help of the IMF, the upcoming G20 Summit can adopt an action plan specifying the domestic policies that countries can pursue to foster growth and tackle global imbalances. By factoring a changing economy into our thinking, we will like- wise be better equipped to prevent future crises and promote balanced development. The Bretton Woods institutions must adjust to a changing global econ- omy. I encourage the IMF to continue with its work on major developments in the international monetary system and support the increasing interna- tionalisation of emerging markets currencies by its advice. The IMF should also go forward with its work on such growing challenges as managing capital flows, measuring global liquidity and assessing reserves adequacy. Finally, by resolutely addressing structural vulnerabilities, the Bretton Woods institutions will be in a better position to prevent future crises and promote inclusive, sustainable growth. Just three years after food riots erupted in the most vulnerable coun- tries, we are confronted with another large-scale food crisis, this time in the Horn of Africa. A swift response was required, and I wish to commend the World Bank for intervening so effectively in the hardest-hit coun- tries. We must also prevent any recurrence of the same scenario. In that respect, the response by the World Bank, which has worked to strengthen the resilience of the countries affected, deserves our full approval. Food security is built from the shorter to the longer term, and this is the approach adopted by the G20. I wish to thank the World Bank for taking part in our efforts, which led last June to a far-reaching Action Plan on Food Price Volatility and Agriculture. The expertise of the World Bank, alongside other international organizations, is essential for implementation of this action plan in order to reach concrete decisions and implement instru- ments that facilitate mitigation of the risks associated with excessive agricultural commodity price volatility. Infrastructure deficits are likewise a significant obstacle to growth in developing countries and a source of structural fragility. They reduce annual GDP by nearly 2 points in Africa, the continent that has made the slowest progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. Working alongside the other multilateral development banks and in close coor- dination with the High-Level Panel (HLP) on infrastructure created to provide private sector expertise in this area, the World Bank has con- tributed heavily to the G20’s work. A joint action plan prepared by the multilateral development banks is being finalized. Once implemented, it should lead to major progress in enhancing the transparency and quality 61 of information. Ahead of the Cannes Summit, a number of recommen- dations are eagerly awaited in areas on which the multilateral develop- ment banks have already made a commitment: creating an environment conducive to investment in infrastructure through the harmonization of procurement rules among the MDBs and making the debt sustainability framework more flexible to facilitate the financing of large-scale infra- structure projects. Financing development and the fight against climate change is one of the biggest challenges facing the international community in the com- ing years. We must deliver not only on the global development goals we have set ourselves, but also on the financial commitment we made in Copenhagen and reaffirmed in Cancún to mobilise $100 billion a year between now and 2020 in public and private sector funding to help the developing countries combat climate change. France put this theme on the G20 Development agenda in order to underscore the need to come up with tangible, sustainable ways of meeting our commitments and create lasting momentum in the area of climate and development financing. I would like to thank the World Bank and the IMF for their preliminary report, and encourage them to carry on with their efforts. France, jointly with Germany, is in favour of a financial transactions tax and a market instrument (a levy or market for emissions permits) as a means of reduc- ing carbon emissions produced by international shipping and aviation. Such innovative tools would generate substantial revenue that could be mobilized to deal with climate change. * The challenges we are facing are considerable. Once they have been reformed and strengthened, the Bretton Woods institutions will make all the difference. I would like to underscore how committed I am to the existence of strong, sustainable and legitimate financial institutions. In the case of the World Bank, this calls for an allocation of income that ensures significant transfers to the poorest countries; for appropriate loan pricing in order to ensure the institution’s sustainability; and for adequate control over the administrative budget. We must also give further thought to adjusting the IMF’s resources to its new commitments. With respect to internal functioning, the IMF should also stay on course with the new income model approved in 2008 and promote the organisational changes that will make it a stronger, more efficient institution. Governance reform and the 14th General Review of Quotas have represented a major step towards increasing the representative character of the IMF. It is now necessary to implement it. 62 GERMANY: JENS WEIDMANN Governor of the Fund I would like to thank the authorities for their outstanding hospitality and excellent organization of these Annual Meetings. Unlike the last two years no new member has joined the Fund since our previous Annual Meetings. However, as the membership process for South Sudan has already been started, we are looking forward to welcome this young country as a new IMF member in the near future. The Annual Meetings take place amidst signs that the recovery of the world economy is ongoing, albeit at a somewhat slower pace and against the background of significant risks. Solid growth in important emerging market economies has been a key driver of global activity, while expansion- ary fiscal and monetary policies in advanced economies have supported economic activities. However, downside risks for the world economy have increased for a wide spectrum of countries and pose challenges for policy makers at the national level, but also in international cooperation. When looking for ways to address these challenges due regard should be given to the underlying weaknesses, especially in the financial sector and public finances, as well as the limits of the yet quite stretched fiscal and monetary policies under current circumstances. Confidence and trust in the ability of policy makers to deliver proper solutions has become a key factor for the effectiveness of policy measures. This requires the pursuit of a clear and medium-term strategy based on sound principles as well as a demonstrated ability to deliver on commitments. Credibility also hinges on respecting the mandates and the division of responsibilities of the vari- ous players in the national and international policy area. The German economic recovery has slowed down in the second quarter 2011 after a strong start in the first quarter. This slowdown was expected and largely due to temporary factors. The perspectives for the German economy remain intact. However, there are major challenges to economic policy, such as achieving the constitutional goal of a bal- anced budget as early as 2016. Against this background, suggestions for additional fiscal stimuli and postponing budget consolidation might not strengthen confidence. What is rather needed are deficit neutral struc- tural reforms to enhance growth potentials. We should remember that Germany has to remain an anchor of fiscal stability in EMU. Developments since the last Annual Meetings and the still ongoing economic and financial crisis and the efforts to overcome this crisis remind us on a daily basis of the overwhelming importance of crisis prevention. Here, the IMF as the principal institution of global economic governance has to play a major role. Surveillance in its various forms remains the pri- mary tool for the IMF to fulfill its important crisis-prevention function and thus should be top priority at the Fund. Efforts underway to strengthen 63 the tools and effectiveness of bilateral and multilateral surveillance are therefore very welcome and Germany supports these initiatives. However, it will be critical that efforts to strengthen the multilateral dimension of surveillance are not pursued at the expense of bilateral surveillance. Since stability begins at home, Germany strongly cautions against a view that for the pursuit of global stability it might be necessary to ask for compromises with respect to domestic stability. National authorities are—and should remain to be held—responsible for the economic and financial stability in their respective countries. Germany sees domestic stability as a neces- sary condition for international stability and thus fully supports efforts to strengthen bilateral surveillance, e.g. by enhancing the analytical capacities of the Fund and thus the traction of its recommendations. The financial crisis has also brought to the fore the discussion about instruments for financial support to distressed countries. The Fund’s mandate and institutional setup gives a clear orientation for what the Fund can and should do in this respect. Many countries have benefited in the past of the Fund’s programs, which provide liquidity support against conditionality in order to allow for an orderly adjustment process to repair the temporary economic difficulties. External financial assistance can only buy time for necessary domestic adjustments, but can never replace them. More recently introduced and modified facilities like the FCL and PCL which provide a kind of liquidity insurance for countries that pre-qualify on the basis of sound fundamentals and policies were only rarely requested. Germany welcomes a thorough review of those instru- ments in order to evaluate their effectiveness and the justification of the Fund’s commitment of extraordinary large scale financing. This review is a precondition before considering to expanding the Fund’s financing role towards short-term liquidity provision even further. Germany does not support any unconditional financial support since such a move would not only bear the risk of setting inappropriate incentives and increasing moral hazard but would also risk to overstretching the Fund’s financial possibilities and mandate. Germany continues to be a reliable partner for the Fund in providing necessary financial resources, as demonstrated through her participation in the NAB and her provision of a bilateral loan, in order to ensure that the Fund has sufficient resources available to fulfill its mandate according to the Articles of Agreement. Germany has started the necessary legisla- tive process to ratify the seventh amendment of the Articles of Agreement and prepares in this context her consent to the sizeable quota increase under the 14th General Review of Quotas, which will be completed in spring 2012. Germany supports the view that the Fund should remain a quota based institution. A fair representation of all members is crucial for the legitimacy of the Fund. In our view the 2008 quota and voice reform as well as the quota 64 adjustments under the 14th General Review of Quotas have achieved a fair balance of the quota and voting shares of the various member countries in the IMF. Largely due to strong pre-crisis macroeconomic policy buffers, LICs were more resilient during the global crisis than in the past and have been recovering well. However, many LICs remain vulnerable. Against this background, the IMF should continue to provide policy support and financing, in close cooperation with the World Bank. The comprehensive reform of the Fund’s lending facilities and financing framework for LICs brought in a new architecture that is more flexible and tailored to the specific circumstances of LICs. The new framework should help LICs—if used in a responsible manner—to overcome their protracted balance of payments problems within a reasonable timeframe. INDIA: PRANAB MUKHERJEE Governor of the Bank and the Fund Recent global developments have considerably undermined the pros- pects of a self-sustaining recovery. Political inflexibility and an apparent lack of will in responding to these problems have severely weakened business and consumer confidence. Against this backdrop, a renewed commitment towards coordination of policy actions and re-calibration of policy instruments to the changed global environment assumes critical importance. Policy makers in crisis-hit economies must accelerate repair and reform of the financial sector and take steps to repair market confi- dence in sovereign debt sustainability. In these countries there may be an immediate need for banks and other fragile financial institutions to raise private capital and for adequate public backstops. Wherever fiscal space exists in the advanced economies, growth supportive fiscal measures to create jobs need to be taken in conjunction with a credible medium term fiscal consolidation plan. Recent assessment of the Fund’s surveillance shows that effective- ness and evenhandedness are crucial for timely and specific early warn- ings of crises. Candid and relevant policy advice, in an environment of trust, should be able to create the needed traction for being adopted by countries. During the last crisis, the Fund reformed its lending toolkits. We also ensured substantial resources for the Fund. Effectiveness of this resource pool will depend on the ability to identify triggers of systemic crises well before their onset, and quickly assuring needed backstops. Support should be specific to genuine bystanders with strong fundamentals and prudent macroeconomic policies, or to ones who can demonstrate strong commitment to these policies. 65 While focus should remain on the emerging crisis, we should also con- tinue to pay attention to implementing the 2010 quota reforms quickly, appropriately rolling NAB into quota and making progress on the review of the quota formula. I will now speak on the World Bank The response of the World Bank Group to the last crisis was exem- plary. A record lending made a crucial difference. In the unfolding global scenario, developing countries see the World Bank Group as an important partner. They should help them meet any foreseen and unforeseen chal- lenges. However, we are worried over the lack of financial capacity in the Bank and the IFC. We also need to put IDA on a more sustainable footing. In the light of the above, we would like the World Bank to focus on a few priorities: • The first and foremost is to address the lack of financial capacity of the Bank and the IFC. They should work towards a strong capital base through a capital increase, and finding other creative ways to expand lending to and investment in developing countries. • IDA needs to be put on a more sustainable footing with donors giving priority to IDA over Trust Funds, and also without weakening the resources of the IBRD and IFC. • Priority needs to be given to the upliftment of the poor, wherever the poor may be, without getting diverted by peripheral goals. In this context, we would like to reiterate that efforts should be made to also address the needs of MICs particularly through enhanced financing, more knowl- edge products and a focus on the poor in MICs. • Food price inflation needs to be tackled on a priority basis. This would require investments in both short-term measures focusing on immedi- ate food supply and safety nets, and long-term measures to enhance agricultural productivity and output. • Generating additional and new finance for climate change along with measures to encourage transfer of technology to developing countries. • Meeting the energy access needs of the poor. While climate concerns are legitimate, providing access to energy for the poor is a priority far more important than sustaining energy intensive lifestyles. I am happy that the Bank has taken up the agenda of gender equal- ity and jobs. The only meaningful way to tackle poverty is through a development process which emphasizes swift job creation, while at the same time ensuring women’s participation in good jobs. We endorse the Bank’s efforts to promote gender equality and women’s development. From a developing country perspective, jobs require a massive shift in employment from agriculture to manufacturing, and skill development 66 of a high order. The Global Development Report on Jobs must come up with concrete ideas on the demand and the supply side of the jobs chal- lenge and also on how the transition can be managed. By adapting their mandates and functions, the WBG and the IMF must remain the anchors of the evolving international financial architecture. We must all support the Fund and the Bank to play this role. INDONESIA: AGUS D.W. MARTOWARDOJO Governor of the Bank It is my honor to deliver this statement on behalf of Indonesia on the occasion of the World Bank/IMF 2011 Annual Meeting. This meeting comes at a critical juncture for the global economy with financial dis- tress and stagnant growth in the advanced economies threatening global growth prospects. High levels of sovereign debt, large fiscal deficits, and global imbalances are among the factors posing significant uncertainties for the global economic outlook. The nascent global recovery has proved vulnerable despite significant growth in the emerging economies. It is thus patently clear that this meeting must develop a credible plan to address these concerns and communicate the strong message that there is a clear path forward to prevent another economic downturn. The World Bank and IMF have been responsive and innovative with their financial facilities over the crisis period. On behalf of the Indone- sian government, I express my appreciation to the managements of the Bank and the Fund for their efforts. We welcome especially those actions targeted to curbing the detrimental impact of the financial crisis on the developing economies. The increasingly challenging global economic environment requires the Bank and the Fund to develop initiatives and flexible financial facilities that will meet member countries’ needs in these difficult times. The need for sufficient official financing both for crisis prevention and mitigation is a lesson from the experience of the crisis in late 2008. Not- withstanding the availability of the IMF FCL and PCL facilities, the Fund should enhance its cooperation with regional financing arrangements to ensure that crisis prevention and resolution become more effective. We encourage the Fund to design a collaborative framework for this coopera- tion and enhance the flexibility of its lending facilities. High commodity prices have jeopardized development in low- income countries. We are concerned about the impact of high and volatile food prices on the poor. In this regard, we wish to underscore the impact of climate change on global food supply and urge the Bank to collaborate with other international organizations to support the provision of new technology to be used in the agricultural sectors of 67 developing and low-income countries; in particular, technology related to climate resilient seeds. With regard to the Bank’s strategy in the palm oil sector, we support the proposal to lift the Bank moratorium. We have reached the agreement that the palm oil sector has higher income potential, higher employment opportunities, and scope for greater involvement of small farmers that can combine to contribute to poverty reduction objectives. We urge the Bank to immediately proceed with the implementation of the framework for re-engagement in the palm oil sector. Development in low-income countries is also jeopardized by the finan- cial distress and weak demand in the advanced economies. This setback to private sector development and employment is a particular concern. We urge the Bank and the IFC to seek mechanisms to promote private sector development to further expand its capacity to provide employment. We urge the Bank to expand its lending capacity through more resources for private sector and IFC to ensure that its strategic focus supports employ- ment intensive private sector growth. We appreciate the Bank’s strategy in developing human capacity through investment in education. Labor markets are becoming global with technological change and increased labor mobility. As a consequence, labor competitiveness is becoming more critical. This underscores the importance of developing skilled labor as an integral part of the develop- ment process in low-income countries. We are of the view that the approach to the job issues should include: (i) a proper way to link growth and employment; (ii) the nexus between growth and reduction of inequality; (iii) measures that would enhance partnership between the public and private sectors; (iv) policy tools for tackling issues relevant to self-employment and sectors with high wage employment potential; (v) means for employability; (vi) the demand- supply matching issue; and (vii) remedies for issues relating to labor mobility across countries including “brain drain� issues. Labor skill development must be inclusive. Every citizen, both men and women, should have opportunity to benefit from skill upgrading so that they can contribute toward national development and benefit from economic growth. We welcome IFC’s $86 million in loans for 2,500 women entrepreneurs. We also support the Bank’s agenda to promote gender equality in economic opportunity. We encourage the Bank and the Fund to seize the momentum of South-South trade to help support global economic activity. This takes on added importance in the face of weakening demand for low-income country exports from the advanced economies. We applaud the Bank’s work on Aid for Trade and trade facilitation that has helped remove bottlenecks in trade. We look forward to further measures from the Bank 68 and the Fund to help emerging and developing economies boost global output through trade. Indonesia welcomes the Bank and the Fund as important partners in achieving prosperity and quality growth and is committed to working with fellow members to ensure the effectiveness of these institutions. Both institutions face pressing challenges in helping the membership resolve economic and development challenges in the current very difficult envi- ronment. We are committed to extend our cooperation in these efforts. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN: SEYED SHAMSEDDIN HOSSEINI Governor of the Bank Necessity to Rethink the World Bank Behavior In the Name of Allah These meetings are held at a juncture that we still see the negative consequences of the global crisis on the economic and financial environ- ment. The debt of the United States Government has exceeded 14 trillion dollars and the impacts of downgrading US credit rating, as well as low economic growth and its negative prospect, has resulted in severe fluctua- tions in the money, commodities and capital markets. The Euro Zone, too, faces three contradictory policy challenges, namely implementation of austerity economic measures, low growth rate, and incapability in repaying its debts and honoring financial obligations. These problems root from the following : • The current architecture of the world’s economy, due to inconsistency between the financial and the real sectors, creates unavoidable peri- odical instabilities. Settling this issue requires amending the current financial and monetary models, and shifting toward new models, such as Islamic finance, which are based on the balance between the financial and real sectors of the economy. • Political instability influences the economic performance. What is now happening in the MENA region, though appears to be political, doubt- lessly deepens the global economic crisis, if the political and military interventions are not avoided. • The management of the international monetary and financial institu- tions has been deviated from its original functions and pursues the political will of some certain shareholders. 69 Unfair sanctions imposed on countries, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, and following the will of some certain countries by the World Bank in drawing up its relations with Iran, is a proof to this point. That the World Bank management, contrary to its Articles of Agree- ments, avoids approving the Country Assistance Strategy for Iran, and refrains from offering technical assistance to Iran, is another evidence of its deviation. As the representative of a country which is a founding member of the World Bank, I would like to emphasize on the loyalty of the manage- ment of the World Bank to its Articles of Agreement as well as good and corporate governance, instead of biased governance. Let me briefly inform you of our economic structural and institutional reforms and achievements in recent years: Revising one of the Articles of Constitution improved the role of the private sector, the situation for non-governmental sector and doing business environment. Implementing the economic transforma- tion plan, including targeting subsidies, amending customs, taxation and banking systems, goods and services distribution system as well as currency denomination reform and enhancing productivity are in our agenda. The achievements of these plans are as per following: • The Targeting Subsidy Plan, focusing on amending the energy car- rier prices resulted in a 6 percent reduction in energy consumption. This policy reduced electricity consumption by 2 percent, while prior to implementation of the plan, there was an annual rate of growth of 8 percent. • Amending the flour price, reduced its consumption by 30 percent and prevented smuggling to neighboring countries. The savings strengthened the food security and also listed Iran among the exporters of wheat. • The revenues of targeting subsidies are redistributed. A cash payment of one and a half dollars a day to 73 million plus Iranian, who have applied for it, led to a sharp fall of Gini Coefficient in Iran. • The capital market is developed, and privatizing state-owned firms and issuing Sukuk Bond are done through the stock exchange and OTC. These efforts led to 146 percent growth of stock exchange index and 100 percent growth in market value of Tehran Stock Exchange in December 2010, comparing to the end of 2007. • Foreign direct investment to the country during 2009 and 2010 expe- rienced 120 percent growth. • The growth of non-oil exports in 2009 and 2010 was 24 and 31 percent respectively. 70 IRELAND: MICHAEL NOONAN Governor of the Bank and the Fund I welcome the opportunity to make this statement to the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings on behalf of the Government of Ireland. We meet here at a time when both developed and developing coun- tries alike face great challenges. Recent events show that there is ongoing turbulence in the global economy. In many ways the past year has again demonstrated just how globally interconnected developments are. We are therefore encouraged by the proactive and adaptive responses being adopted by the IMF, the World Bank and other international financial institutions to respond to shocks including major market fluctuations. Our meetings here in Washington and the exchange of views regarding critical issues for the global economy are very important in advancing understanding and collaboration on policies to promote recovery and renewed economic growth. Irish Economic Developments Firstly, I would like to provide an update on developments in the Irish economy. After a number of very difficult years, economic stabi- lization is becoming evident, as seen by the most recent economic data for Ireland. However, recovery to date has been uneven. On the one hand, the substantial improvements in both price and cost competitive- ness that have taken place in recent years are standing to us, with solid export growth in recent quarters. On the other hand, the unwinding of previously accumulated imbalances is weighing on domestic demand, and will probably continue to do so for some time. On balance, however, the level of activity is increasing this year for the first time since 2007 and tax revenues are once again growing. After a sharp deterioration in market sentiment, Ireland entered a joint EU/IMF programme of financial assistance last December. The third quarterly review of the Programme has been successfully completed and it is generally acknowledged—by both the official sector and by markets alike—that programme implementation has been strong. As a result of the budgetary adjustments ongoing since 2008, the public finances continue to stabilise. Details of the medium term fiscal consoli- dation path are to be published soon providing further greater certainty and direction for householders and businesses alike. Augmenting these developments are significant reforms designed to enhance the credibility and sustainability of the domestic budgetary architecture. The Irish Fiscal Council was recently established and a Fiscal Responsibility Bill will be published before the end of the year. 71 Indeed, financial market sentiment towards Ireland has improved noticeably of late, as evidenced by the sharp decline in yields on Irish government paper. So while there is clearly much more to be done, we are on the right path and our key objective is to build on the positive momentum. The recent agreement by the EU to lower the interest rate for Ireland and extend maturities on EU loans is positive news. The resulting improved debt sustainability will assist Ireland in its attempts to regain market access. Irish Banking Developments A key part of the process of regaining investor confidence has been the major steps taken in stabilising the Irish banking sector. Significant progress has been made in recent months with the merger of various institutions to form pillar banks competing in the market with other domestic and foreign-owned banking and finance operations, and the strengthening and renewal of management structures in these banks with clearer roles and lines of responsibility. In July this year, a €24 billion recapitalisation of the banking sector took place. The State’s net direct investment was some €16.4 billion with the remaining capital amount provided by Liability Management Exer- cises with subordinated bondholders in the various banks, anticipated asset sales and the injection of private capital into one major bank. The banks have also had success in securing term wholesale funding from international banks with some €4.5 billion funded to-date. This is ahead of the second quarter 2013 schedule. At the same time, the programme of asset deleveraging is underway, with significant progress expected to be made this year. It should be noted that more than 80 percent of the assets, to be disposed of by the end of 2013, are located outside Ireland. All of these measures are helping to rebuild international investor confidence in the Irish banking sector and we are confident in and com- mitted to the bank restructuring plans. IMF Issues Turing to matters related specifically to these meetings. The IMF has played a central role in coordinating a global policy response to the financial crisis. In the current climate, the Fund’s role as guardian of the International Monetary System, global policy coordinator, and trusted policy advisor and lender to members will be even more crucial. We welcome the important work being done by the Fund on the reform of the IMS, on the reform of the lending toolkit, and on surveillance. In light of the important role the Fund has to play in the global economy and for its membership, we consider it important that the Governance 72 and Quota Reform reforms agreed upon in 2010 are ratified as quickly as possible to ensure the Fund continues to have the capacity required to take meaningful action while also being more representative of the global economy. For its part, Ireland is taking the steps necessary to ensure these reforms are delivered as early as possible. Development Challenges Finally, turning to development issues, despite the challenges currently facing the economy, Ireland continues to recognise our international development obligations. In particular, combating hunger is a central pil- lar of Irish foreign policy and of our development assistance programme. Our priorities are focused on boosting the agricultural productivity of poor smallholder farmers, particularly female farmers; supporting pro- grams focused on maternal and infant undernutrition and ensuring politi- cal commitment to address food insecurity generally. Ireland welcomes the World Bank’s continued efforts in this regard through various initiatives, such as the Agriculture Action Plan, and its investments in safety nets and other nutrition sensitive social protection programmes. Ireland is a strong supporter of the ‘Scaling-Up Nutrition’ (SUN) movement and we have increased our support for interventions that reduce maternal, infant and child undernutrition. Despite progress in some areas of food security the world faces another famine, this time in Somalia and the Horn of Africa. The crisis has once again shown us that the world needs to put “food first� and effectively address the problems facing fragile and conflict affected states. As is so often the case, either in emergencies or persistent poverty, it is women, and children, who suffer the most. World Bank Issues Specifically in relation to the work of the Bank, Ireland welcomes the recommendations contained in the World Development Report (WDR) on Gender. The WDR provides an excellent background for future work on Gender Equality and Ireland in particular welcomes the Bank’s commitment to developing a corporate strategic framework for Gender Equality, complete with indicators. We note that the next World Development Report will focus on Jobs which will be a particularly important issue for both middle-income and low-income countries alike. The World Bank has an ambitious program of operational and internal reforms. We support activities which will enhance development effective- ness and consider accountability to be a key component in this regard. We welcome the corporate scorecard and the World Bank for Results report which are being published for the first time during these annual meetings. 73 Conclusion The challenges facing the global economy underline more than ever the need for collective global action through institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. Ireland will continue to work to ensure that both institutions are enabled to respond to ongoing and emerging challenges in the most effective way. JAPAN: JUN AZUMI Governor of the Bank and the Fund I. The Japanese Economy and the Global Economy Six months have passed since the unprecedented earthquake and tsunami hit Japan. With the world’s support, Japan is working to recover and rebuild. My home town is Ishinomaki City, in Miyagi Prefecture; it was one of the cities most severely damaged by the earthquake and tsu- nami. The home where I was born was totally destroyed, and my parents both had to stay in a refuge center for about six weeks. This way I have personally experienced this terrible disaster, and thus, I would like to express my deepest gratitude for all your support. Immediately after the earthquake, the Japanese economy faced three uncertainties: electrical power shortages, supply chain disruptions, and the response to the nuclear power plant accident. As a result of working on both supply and demand, we were able to overcome our electrical power problems in August, a month in which the tightest supply-demand condition was expected. Supply chain disruptions temporarily affected not only Japan but the global economy, but they recovered faster than was foreseen, and production activities are steadily returning to pre- earthquake levels. For the nuclear power plant, work has been proceed- ing steadily toward a cold shutdown of nuclear reactors in accordance with our roadmap for controlling the accident. Thus, these concerns have steadily been eliminated, which also contributes to improving consumer and business sentiment in Japan. With demand generated by reconstruc- tion work, the Japanese economy is expected to start picking up in the second half of 2011. In our fiscal management that has been a challenge faced by Japan for a long time, we will stick to the targets of the Fiscal Management Strat- egy we developed before the earthquake. We will endeavor to recover fiscal soundness through eliminating unnecessary expenditures, securing resources for earthquake reconstruction, and promoting a comprehensive reform of social security and tax. In terms of recovery/reconstruction, we will take all possible measures, with three supplementary budgets, to ensure the necessary expenditures. 74 While continuing efforts to cut down other expenditures, we will fill the gap in the fiscal resources for recovery/reconstruction which would still remain, by income tax and corporate tax measures mainly, so that we will not push the burden toward the future. On the other hand, to cope with the longer-term challenge of securing stable fiscal resources to match increasing/accumulating social security spending due to the aging, we will raise the consumption tax rate from 5 percent (which is currently the lowest among advanced economies) to 10 percent by the middle of the 2010s. We will move forward, with concrete discussions on the con- sumption tax, aiming to submit related bills within this fiscal year. If we fail to recover fiscal soundness, we will see the private sector’s confidence deteriorate, and fail to achieve solid economic growth. Recent disruption in financial markets, including the foreign exchange market and the stock market sparked by the global economic downturn and sovereign debt problems in Europe and the US, is creating new challenges to the entire world, including Japan which is working hard toward reconstruction. Concerns about growing sovereign debt problems in Europe and the resulting financial system vulnerability are the biggest source of the current global financial instability. Euro- pean countries should come together and take action responsibly. It is important that the IMF encourage efforts by European countries, while also cooperating with these countries appropriately. We expect the US to steadily implement their fiscal consolidation plans and employment measures. II. Expectations for the IMF and the World Bank Group Amidst increasing uncertainty about the global economy, it is impor- tant that the Fund and the World Bank Group provide appropriate eco- nomic analysis, financial safety nets, and development funds, and that they both contribute to international coordination. Trust by member countries is necessary for both institutions to more effectively perform these functions. Reforms are progressing to have each country’s voice match their economic weight, but there remains much room for improve- ment in their staff composition. Japan quickly completed its procedures to approve quota/capital increases for the IMF and the World Bank Group, as agreed in 2010, but in addition to the funding aspects of our contribu- tion, we would like to contribute to their human resources. We ask that the Fund continue its work on improvements in the inter- national monetary system. To this end, first of all, enhanced quality and traction of surveillance are important. Emerging market economies need appropriate advice from the Fund on how to handle capital inflows, which generate concerns about exchange rate appreciation and inflation. Advanced economies also need the Fund’s advice on how to formulate 75 policies that will lead to sustainable development, while paying attention to their effect on the global economy. Also, the IMF has enhanced its capacity for crisis prevention and reso- lution, but its lending facilities must be strengthened further. As global trade and finance become more interconnected, mechanisms to effectively prevent the contagion of crises should be institutionalized quickly. Next, I will address our expectations for the World Bank. As shown by Japan’s earthquake, one can say that a country’s response to natural disasters is an essential element of sustainable development. The disas- ter prevention knowledge and lessons learned from this earthquake, and the corresponding recovery process, will be shared by Japan as an international public resource. In this regard, we would like to work with the World Bank to actively contribute to raising awareness of the impor- tance of developing disaster prevention policies, and promoting stronger initiatives. We would also like to actively contribute to actions taken in response to both global environmental and climate changes, in cooperation with the World Bank and the international community. Regarding the “Green Fund� for climate change funding, which is currently being dis- cussed, it is important to design a system that can efficiently mobilize private capital. Countries vulnerable to climate change must also be supported. While utilizing tools such as the Global Environment Facil- ity (GEF), we also intend to actively strengthen support systems and capacity building. III. The Annual Meetings 2012 in Tokyo Finally, we are grateful for the opportunity to host the Fund/Bank Annual Meetings next year in Tokyo. Taking this opportunity, we will organize an international conference on disaster prevention together with the World Bank, in Sendai, a city that was struck by the recent great earthquake. We look forward to showing you the shape of Japan’s post- earthquake recovery. Next year will be the 60th anniversary of Japan’s membership in the IMF and World Bank, and 48 years will have passed since the previ- ous Annual Meetings held in Tokyo. During this period, the global econ- omy has achieved tremendous growth and advancement, with dramatic increases in trade and capital flows, the growth of developing countries and the expansion of market economies, as well as a shift toward float- ing exchange rate system and the birth of the euro. On the other hand, poverty reduction and climate change remain to be big challenges and prevention and resolution of repeated international financial crises needs to be provided appropriately. At the Annual Meetings in Tokyo, we intend to set up fora to discuss the future of the global economy and the 76 international monetary system. We would appreciate your cooperation toward success in the Annual Meetings in Tokyo, and we will put forth our best efforts. KOREA: JAEWAN BAHK Governor of the Bank and the Fund First of all, I’d like to give my special thanks to the IMF and the World Bank for this excellent arrangement. The Recent State of the Global Economy As you all remember, three years ago, we were here at this same place, to do all that was possible to weather the financial and economic crisis, and such concerted efforts kept a second Great Depression at bay. At the last year’s G20 Seoul Summit, we made our historical achieve- ments as well. Agreement was reached on IMF/WB governance and quota reforms, and the Seoul Action Plan was also launched to contribute to the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth. Yet today, we are here again with another huge challenge and respon- sibility on our shoulders. Economic recovery showed signs of slowdown from this year, and financial markets are again in turmoil with the fiscal deterioration and lin- gering concerns about a credit rating downgrade in advanced economies. A big worry now is that the current situation would not be just limited to a fiscal crisis in a couple of countries, but likely lead to a systemic risk to the overall global economy. That’s because what we’re seeing in the market reflects very different challenges from the 2008 financial crisis. First, the current crisis stems from the fiscal side. Back in 2008, the crisis originated in the private and financial sectors and led to sluggish global demand. Therefore, the fiscal and monetary stimulus enabled us to get out of the crisis. However, the challenges this time are mainly due to concerns about public finances. There is a growing call for fiscal adjustment now, but fiscal tightening all over the world could cause growth to falter again. Moreover, the already abundant liquidity makes the effect of additional monetary loosening very limited. Second, unlike back then when all the countries experienced and suf- fered the economic downturn, the situation today is all different from country to country. Advanced economies are experiencing fiscal deterioration and sluggish growth whereas emerging economies are concerned about overheating. 77 Furthermore, some underdeveloped countries suffer a food crisis due to price spikes in agricultural products. Given such distinctive country-specific circumstances, international coordination that was possible back then won’t be easy this time, and the risk of negative spill-over through capital flows should be getting only large. Third, the current situation is “a crisis of confidence� regarding col- lective will and governments’ capacity to deal with ongoing problems. The market right now desperately calls for strong political commit- ment to push through fiscal austerity, policy capability to facilitate fiscal consolidation coupled with economic recovery, and the very right system to prevent the crisis contagion. Though we face such challenges, it doesn’t necessarily mean there is no key to resolve the current situation. I believe finding out answers to tackle this crisis, no matter how difficult they may be, should be our job today. During this year’s Annual Meetings, our first and foremost task should be to present a clear vision and strategy and take bold and swift action in an effort to rebuild market confidence. Suggestions to Stabilize the Global Economy In this respect, I’d like to offer three policy suggestions to tackle the challenges facing the global economy. First, more aggressive, systematic and balanced approach is needed to ensure fiscal sustainability. Countries facing fiscal challenges need to come up with more concrete, substantive and implementable mid- and long-term fiscal consolidation plans. Countries whose primary worry is solvency risk need to give prior- ity to reassuring markets through more fundamental structural reforms based on determined political leadership. For countries whose fiscal position is relatively sound, potential factors like aging should be taken into consideration to design credible and sustainable strategies. I believe what is required now is to gain market confidence in our capability to restore fiscal sustainability. Rather than short-term fiscal consolidation plans, we need credible mid- and long-term ones that can balance short-term risks to growth and fiscal sustainability. Besides, in terms of how to do the fiscal tightening, we must find various measures that can also shore up economic growth. As part of this, we must remain focused on reducing spending that has limited direct impact on short- term demand while maintaining and even expanding growth promoting expenditure such as investment in infrastructure, R&D and education. Much of our emphasis should be also on accelerating structural reforms fast enough in a wide range of areas, such as labor and product market reforms, to increase growth potential. 78 Second, we must prevent the spread of the debt crisis from advanced economies to emerging economies that could otherwise pose a systemic risk to the global economy. In that sense, countries with the large size of the economy should take into account how their fiscal and monetary policy would affect stability in other countries. As regards this issue, it is very timely and meaning- ful that the IMF attempts to strengthen its surveillance through spill- over reports considering the interconnectedness between countries, and between sectors. Emerging economies, for their part, need to step up efforts to mitigate excessive capital flows with strengthened monitoring on capital move- ments, and the introduction of various macro-prudential measures. Financial safety nets should be also established in parallel at the global level to absorb potential external shocks sufficiently. The IMF’s crisis response capacity has much increased in the wake of the financial crisis as well evidenced by capital increase and improved lending facilities. Yet the Fund should further strengthen its capacity to better cope with a crisis in large advanced economies, and to address a systemic risk that could lead to widespread crises. For these reasons, we must expedite the approval process on the Fund’s quota increase that was agreed last year, and discussion must begin now on the expansion of the Fund’s available resources. It is also important that agreement should be reached as early as possible to intro- duce new credit lines and to enhance collaboration between the Fund and regional financial safety nets like CMIM. Last, but not least, the international community must provide continu- ing support to low-income countries which are especially vulnerable to economic crisis. The recent deteriorating fiscal situation in advanced coun- tries makes us worry about a potential decline in Official Development Assistance (ODA). However, we have to remember that ODA holds the key to sustainable growth that can allow creation of new global demand. To this end, we need to explore a variety of ways to ensure that there shouldn’t be a reduction in the volume of ODA. These include emerging economies’ larger contributions, facilitating Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects, and securing new resources to fuel further development. In the meantime, efforts should be also made to enhance the aid effectiveness within the limited resources available to us. We have to first reduce overlaps or duplications, and consolidate similar projects if possible, between individual countries and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), as well as between MDBs. Furthermore, the assessment of development projects should be strengthened to give a priority to those with high effectiveness from the perspective of recipient countries. 79 In this respect, I believe that the Bank has a larger role to play. On top of that, I’d like to ask for your participation in the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) to deliver tangible outcomes, which is scheduled this November in Korea. Korea’s Policy Response Facing the recent market turmoil and the subsequent economic slow- down, Korea will do its utmost to preemptively mitigate lingering risks, and also continue to play its part as a responsible member of the inter- national community. First, while we will continue to pursue stable macroeconomic policy, Korea has been putting in place policy tools to curb capital flow volatility such as Macro-prudential Stability Levy. Efforts are also being made to improve fiscal health as well. Korea maintains a relatively solid fiscal position, but considering potential risk factors, for example, aging and unification, we have already implemented mid- and long-term credible consolidation plans. In an attempt to secure fiscal sustainability, we aim to achieve bal- anced budget by 2013 through such as diversifying the tax base, increas- ing the effectiveness of expenditure, and improving fiscal management system. Meanwhile, under the stance of fiscal soundness, we will strengthen strategic resource allocation to expand our economic foundation of growth, including job creation, green growth, and human resources development. Building on that, we will try our best to strike a balance between ensuring fiscal consolidation and promoting economic growth. Lastly, what’s all the more important is Korea’s efforts will remain focused on supporting low-income and underdeveloped countries even with the stance of fiscal soundness in place. As an example of having successfully transformed from a recipient to a donor country, Korea has been keen to share our development experience with developing countries through Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP), and continued to expand its support to those countries in need of KSP. Furthermore, we’ll facilitate our cooperation with MDBs like the World Bank in line with such bilateral ODA. Our newly established Trust Fund worth 40 million dollars at the Bank to support green growth in developing countries will be an excellent example for such cooperation. Notably, a variety of cooperative projects with the Bank to be financed by the Trust Fund, are in the pipeline. One of these will be jointly operating the Financial Advisory Center to prevent another financial crisis in East Asia. 80 Conclusion Challenges facing the world economy now will be a critical test for all of us. Just like we pulled together three years ago, we need to rekindle a spirit of global coordination, and take this crisis as another stepping stone to leap forward in the global economy. John Maynard Keynes, the greatest economist who made a great contribution to the establishment of the Fund and the Bank, once stated, “Be confident that we are suffering from the growing pains of youth, not from the rheumatics of old age,� and underlined the need for confidence in overcoming the crisis amid the Great Depression. He also suggested that “activity and boldness and enterprise, both individually and nationally, must be the cure,� as one of the strategies to weather the crisis. Finally, make no mistake we must address today’s challenges boldly and swiftly with our greater political resolve of a spirit of union. We must make our greater commitment to demonstrate our firm leadership and vision for tomorrow. Let’s get reminded that time and tide wait for no man. LAO: PHOUPHET KHAMPHOUNVONG Governor of the Bank It’s my honor to represent the Government of Lao People’s Demo- cratic Republic at the 2011 Annual Meetings of the Board of Governors of the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund. Let me join my fellow Governors in congratulating Mr. Chairman, the President of the World Bank, the Managing Director of the IMF, and the Gov- ernment and people of the United States of America for the excellent arrangements made for this important meeting. I would also like to take this opportunity to express my congratulations to President Zoellick for keeping fruitful works in enhancing the World Bank’s role in supporting poverty reduction for the least developed countries despite the recent global financial crisis. The global economy has encountered various challenges—an increase in food and fuel price, impacts of natural disaster combined with the impacts of the global economic crisis on job markets and the post-crisis difficulties in high-income countries, and prolonged debt and economic crisis in Europe—have impeded the economic recovery and social stabil- ity across the world. In order to respond to the global financial crisis as well as to restructure the post-crisis world, the World Bank has played a significant role in providing multidimensional support to the crisis-hit countries. 81 In Lao PDR, Fiscal Year 2010–2011 marks the beginning of the 7th five-year National Social and Economic Development Plan 2011–2015 (NSEDP), which continues to further the outcomes of the 6th five-year NSEDP 2006–2010. During the previous five-year plan, Lao economy has grown with an average growth rate of 7.9 percent. The overall mac- roeconomic situation has remained robust and stable, the year-to-year inflation increased but has remained under single digit at 5.76 percent as of December 2010. The nominal exchange rate of kip has remained strong against US dollar. The balance of payments has improved as for- eign direct investment has continued to expand. In 2011, Lao PDR’s real GDP growth will remain robust with pro- jected growth of 8.6 percent compared to 8.4 percent in 2010. This growth has outstandingly derived from natural resources and manufacturing sectors. Agriculture is expected to benefit from the recent increase in regional demand and high food prices. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) has risen in recent months due to high commodity prices. The capital account surplus is projected to increase from 9.9 percent of GDP in 2010 to 12.1 percent in 2011 with a corresponding surge of new investment, espe- cially in the hydropower sector. The credit growth decelerated about 46 percent in December 2010 due to significant slowdown in lending to State-Owned Enterprises. While the pressure from the food and fuel prices increases, the Government recognizes the importance of diver- sifying the sources of growth and in enhancing prudent public financial management to ensure sufficient funding for priority health and educa- tion services. Despite uncertainty of the external environment, the economy is pro- jected to continue to grow over the 7th five-year NSEDP, with real GDP growth targeted at 8 percent. To achieve the socio-economic development targets and Millennium Development Goals by 2015, the Government will continue its reform agendas, by focusing on improvement of business environment, enhancement of investment efficiency, strengthening public financial management, particularly centralization of revenue adminis- tration and treasury as well as redesigning the inter-government fiscal relationship, accelerating the banking sector reform. On the economic integration into the world, the government has continued to reduce the tariff under AFTA’s commitments and push up the preparation for WTO accession. During 2010–2011, the Government has continuously reformed in various areas. On fiscal front, the Government has implemented a com- prehensive medium-term Public Financial Management Strengthening Programs (PFMSP) that aims to strengthening the capacity of the Min- istry of Finance and Provincial Finance Departments to improve the effectiveness, transparency and accountability in managing the budget. We are working on enhancing the fiscal planning, budget allocation, 82 implementation of the treasury single accounts, budget execution and reporting. Key achievements are the completion of the treasury, customs and tax administration centralization, developing new fiscal transfer sys- tem and aligning budget to the policies, as well as the implementation of the VAT since 1 January 2010. In order to fully implement the PFMSP, the Government will require sufficient capacity enhancement and tech- nical assistance. For financial sector, the Government will need to develop the sound and robust financial and capital markets in the wake of international financial integration, enable to provide financial resource for long-term economic development. In 2011, the aim of the monetary policy is to continue maintaining a sound monetary stability, stable exchange rate, ensure international reserve to cover more than 6 months of imports, extend amount of credits to economy equal to 27.2 percent of GDP, and deposit mobilization is set to achieve 28.4 percent of GDP. Subject to targets set above, the Bank of the Lao PDR (BOL) will wisely conduct its monetary policy in the tight direction to control money supply as set out. In the meantime, BOL will continue to conduct the exchange rate policy based on market-oriented force. In addition, in early 2011 the Lao PDR officially launched the Lao Stock Market aims to open more invest- ment’s channel for investors and to start developing a capital market in the country. The Government of Lao PDR appreciates the support of the World Bank to many sectors that has contributed to achieving significant devel- opment outcomes. Lao PDR also supports IDA16’s overarching theme on “Development Results� which focuses on crisis response, fragile and conflict-affected countries, gender, and climate change. Recently, the country has also taken advantage of the IDA’s Crisis Response Window (CRW) to address impacts of global financial crisis and the devastating damages caused by tropical storm Haima struck central and northern Laos in June and Nock-Ten hit central and southern areas in July of this year. Lao PDR aims to lift the country out of the ranks of the least devel- oped country by 2020. To achieve this, economy needs to grow by 8 percent annually over the next decade. This is an ambitious undertaking, and we are committed to achieving it by further reforming our policies and institutions to strengthen governance, expanding private sector’s role in the economy, improving people’s social welfare by better targeting of programs in education, health and poverty reduction, and protecting the environment. The Government of Lao PDR looks forward to the continuing sup- port of IDA and role of World Bank in achieving the 2020 vision through policy advice, investment support and technical assistance. Despite the challenging times for many developed economies, we urge development partners to contribute to the ongoing replenishment of IDA led by the 83 World Bank so that Lao PDR and other least developing countries could fulfill the aspirations of their people for better lives. In conclusion, on behalf of Government of Lao PDR, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the World Bank’s member staff and our colleagues from line agencies of the United States of America for their enthusiastic contribution to the organization of the annual meetings, and the fellow member countries for supporting the Lao PDR. May I also express my deepest gratitude to President Zoellick for his excellent leadership to lead World Bank to continue its active and successful role in supporting the development of all regions. I wish the meetings a great success. LATVIA: ANDRIS VILKS Governor of the Bank (on behalf of the Nordic and Baltic Countries) It is my great honour to address the 2011 Annual Meetings on behalf of the eight Nordic and Baltic countries—Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden and Latvia. The outlook for the global economy is subject to high uncertainty. Projections indicate that global economic growth has been slowing in recent months. The earthquake in Japan, the political turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa, the Euro area’s financial turbulence, the troubled handover from public to private demand in the US as well as overheating pressures in a number of emerging markets have contributed to the increase of the downside risks. The international community—including the advanced and emerg- ing economies—needs to do its utmost to strengthen policies to hedge against these risks. Strong multilateral institutions, like the World Bank Group, have a decisive role to play to provide stability and the means to navigate in troubled waters. We need both new and old tools in order to adapt, and be able to move beyond aid, into strong partnerships of solidarity, openness and interdependence. At the forefront of the many challenges facing us today should be the protection of the most vulner- able and poorest and the promotion of employment. My own country has just gone through a period of deep economic crisis and recovery. A very decisive policy response was required when the economic hardships in Latvia had to be addressed. When the crisis hit Latvia, one of the first issues to address was to establish a social safety net. This was necessary in order to diminish the adverse social effects resulting from the financial and economic crisis and from the structural reforms required to fulfill rigorous fiscal policy. In order to maintain social stability and meet the needs of the poor and those in need, we decided to increase financing to maintain social programmes in the fields of health, 84 welfare and social inclusion. It was done with the help of highly profes- sional policy advice and funding from the World Bank. Targeting the poor and vulnerable is the core mandate of the World Bank. The high and volatile food prices are a great concern especially for the poorest—and we appreciate the efforts made by President Zoellick to get the world’s attention to this problem. IDA is a powerful vehicle in support of the poorest. We welcome that the new crisis-response win- dow has been put to use to react rapidly to economic crises or natural disasters, most recently in supporting refugees severely affected by the drought in the Horn of Africa. The Nordic-Baltic Constituency would like to express our firm commitment to IDA and to its 16th replenishment, and we strongly encourage existing donors to do the same. A prerequisite for sustainable growth and development is the creation of jobs. Jobs should be considered as a lever that raises the living standards and aggregates the overall productivity gain of the economy. Jobs can lead to positive social changes through the empowerment of women, by easing social tensions and creating social cohesion. Employment and education are strongly interlinked; we praise the IFC launching the Education for Employment initiative in the Middle East and North Africa. The Nordic-Baltic Constituency has been paying great attention towards gender issues for a long time. Obviously, we are delighted that this year’s Annual Meeting has Gender Equality as the main theme. We welcome the World Development Report 2012 on Gender Equality and Development—and the Bank’s implications paper—with enthusiasm. For us, gender equality is a human right in itself. And it will continue to be a priority for us until the “Fifty Percent Solution,� as articulated by Presi- dent Zoellick, has materialized all over the world. Gender equality must be a strategic priority for the World Bank Group. It must be integrated in all of the World Bank’s operational and analytical work. The World Bank is in a strong position to take the agenda forward—and to become a global leader and champion for gender equality. We note the results achieved so far in countries assisted by the World Bank, but we have to make absolutely sure that this World Development Report is transformed into action. This means that gender equality becomes a strategic priority also in internal goal setting, staff capacities, results reporting and incen- tives structures. This means allocation of more resources through the administrative budget and it means clearly formulated goals, targets and indicators on gender equality. It also means stronger partnerships with the UN system and UN Women in particular, as well as with local actors. As the world is changing, so does the World Bank Group. Growing responsibilities involve higher demands and standards for the institution. As shareholders, we want to continue to make the Bank stronger. In this regard, we want to commend the Bank for its modernization efforts, for the major steps regarding the results agenda, i.e. the Corporate Scorecard 85 and the new Program for Results instrument, and the important efforts to increase transparency and openness. We are confident of the World Bank Group as a powerful steward of our common development legacy, and we strongly support the Bank’s efforts to move us into a World Beyond Aid. MALAYSIA: AHMAD HUSNI MOHAMAD HANADZLAH Governor of the Bank It is my privilege and pleasure to address the 2011 Annual Fall Meet- ings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. We are now at a critical junction. Our present actions may very well define the course of global economic growth for many years to come. Since its founding, the scope of the International Monetary Fund’s responsibilities has evolved to accommodate the changing world. The Fund’s role in ensuring the stability and proper functioning of the world’s financial system is now more critical than ever. We are looking to the Fund to provide a guiding hand and resolute advice to ease the prevailing situations. In the context of the current situation, multilateral institutions can play a supportive role. With its cross-country experience, multilateral institu- tions can offer independent analysis and external perspective which may be necessary in approaching situations which would have global impact. While resolute action is required to overcome a crisis, it is infinitely preferable that financial and economic risks be preempted or mitigated in a timely manner. One of the most important tasks of the Fund is to monitor, forecast and provide policy advice to its member nations. It is especially important that the Fund engages with systemically important economies in the carrying out of this task. There are also other multilateral mechanisms which can play comple- mentary yet equally instrumental roles in ensuring regional, hence global, financial stability. In 2008, the Group of Eight (G8) and the Group of Twenty (G20) demonstrated its decisiveness in meeting the challenges of the then financial crisis. Multilateral groupings and associations worldwide would be wise to adopt a more diversified role in addition to the traditional developmental mandate of diplomatic and cultural exchanges. Additional responsibilities would include the establishment of mechanisms that would be able to provide localised policy solutions which can take into account of a region’s particular socio-economic and cultural context. The concept of regional empowerment is not new. However, it requires a strong injection of revi- talization; in order to meet the inevitable challenges of this new century. The Member States of ASEAN, The People’s Republic of China, Japan and The Republic of Korea (ASEAN+3), have established the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM), a multilateral currency swap arrangement worth US$120 billion, in the event that the Member 86 States would require external liquidity assistance. This and other formal and informal intra-ASEAN financial and economic linkages are part of a concerted effort to strengthen a multi-pronged strategy of regionalism. The concept of regionalism is only valid when there are appropri- ate structures to support it. In this regard, ASEAN+3 has also estab- lished other support institutions such as the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO). The establishment of AMRO as the surveil- lance unit of CMIM, plays an important role to monitor and analyse regional economies, and to contribute to early detection of risks, swift implementation of remedial actions, and effective decision-making of CMIM. We are indeed proud to demonstrate that with collective political will and a determined sense of joint-responsibility, regional institutions can indeed serve as effective mechanisms to deter and resolve complex and multi-layered challenges. Due to the structural nature of the underlying causes for the prevail- ing situation in the United States and Europe, we are not expecting full recovery to pre-crisis levels soon. Nevertheless, in the immediate term, we would like to see confident demonstrations of effort being made towards the provision of effective solutions in regard to the situation in the developed West. We also have to recognise that, in these fragile times, the strictest of austerity measures may not be the most applicable of solu- tions. The IMF is ideally positioned to play the role of an institutional statesman—an independent mediator. Any momentum to tip the devel- oped economies into the realm of negative growth must be discouraged. I take this opportunity to extend my country’s best wishes as well as my own personal welcome to Madame Christine Lagarde on her recent appointment as the Managing Director of the Fund. Her leadership of this most important multilateral institution at this critical of times receives all of our support and encouragement. MALTA: JOSEF BONNICI Governor of the Fund It is a pleasure for me to address the Annual Meetings of the Inter- national Monetary Fund and the World Bank. I take this opportunity to thank the United States Government and the Authorities of Wash- ington D.C. for their hospitality and excellent arrangements for these meetings. Let me join other Governors in congratulating Ms. Christine Lagarde on her appointment as Managing Director of the Fund, while extending a warm welcome to Mr. David Lipton as the Fund’s First Deputy Managing Director and to Ms. Nemat Shafik and Mr. Min Zhu as IMF’s Deputy Managing Directors. This year’s meetings are overshadowed by deep concerns about the global economy and the volatile conditions which continue to persist in 87 financial markets partly in response to the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. Furthermore, while inflation appears to have abated in the advanced economies inflationary pressures among emerging and devel- oping countries are intensifying and becoming more broad based. These overheating pressures posit risks to the inflation outlook and growth. There is no doubt that the IMF’s role in addressing macroeconomic balances becomes all the more essential in this hostile environment. We are thus pleased to note that since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, the IMF has successfully strengthened its resources and overhauled its lending toolkit, putting its ability to pre-empt financial crisis on a sounder basis. The Fund has been successful in mobilising both quota and non- quota resources in response to balance of payments problems in member countries, including Low Income Countries (LICs). Here we would like to emphasise our support for the Fund’s strategy of using resources linked to gold sales profits for concessional lending to LICs. Within its limited means, Malta too continues to contribute to Fund resources by honour- ing its commitments under a bilateral loan agreement with the IMF and through its participation in SDR voluntary arrangements. We also con- tinue to provide a modest share of assistance to the Fund’s development agenda, in partnership with other countries. The IMF’s credibility and effectiveness hinges to a very large extent on the availability of resources, that need to be commensurate with the long term needs of its members, and on a governance framework that is perceived to be fair and inclusive. In this regard, we welcome the effort by IMF members in bringing into effect the 2008 quota and voice reform. While not among the countries benefiting from the ad hoc quota increase, Malta has completed its ratification process so that the amendments of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement and those related to the Fund’s enhanced investment authority are brought into effect as soon as possible. In this regard, we also note with satisfaction the considerable progress made in terms of the 2010 Quota and Governance reforms. As to the Fourteenth Quota Review, we are pleased to observe that this will lead to a realignment in the ranking of quota shares to better reflect global economic realities. At the same time the reforms ensure protection of the quota shares and voting power of the poorest members. I now turn to an issue which ranks high on the Group of 20’s agenda and which is also a medium term objective of the Fund. I refer to the reform of the International Monetary System (IMS). Although, the IMS has underpinned strong GDP growth and hastened the process of glo- balisation, the financial crisis has exposed a number of vulnerabilities in the system. It is therefore encouraging to see that the Fund is directing its efforts to enhance the IMS, and achieving progress on a number of fronts. In this regard we strongly support the Fund’s work on capital flows, specifically its effort to develop coherent conclusions for the management 88 of such flows. We must, however, also reiterate that there are no substi- tutes to sound macroeconomic and financial policies, and that capital flow measures should be transparent, temporary, and only used as a last resort with clear exit strategies. Moreover, we believe that the Fund should play a central monitoring role in this regard. As part of the broader debate on reforming the IMS, we are open to consider a greater role for the SDR in the global economy. In this regard, we recognise that the SDR would need to be enhanced considerably from its current insignificant level, and that substantial practical, political, and legal hurdles must be overcome in this process. We also strongly believe that a decision to broaden the SDR requires clear and transparent criteria to ensure the stability of the basket, and only freely usable currencies can support the functions of the SDR. Surveillance will play a key role in the reform of the IMS and in sup- porting global macroeconomic and financial stability. It is encouraging to see that the IMF-FSB Early Warning Exercise has become firmly established and, at the same time, financial sector issues are now being given greater coverage under Fund surveillance and in Article IV reports. However, we are of the view that some elements of surveillance need to be further explored. Political traction, in fact, needs to be improved to strengthen the Fund’s crises prevention role. We also believe that, surveillance needs to be more focussed and recommend that the assess- ment of spill-over effects is strengthened by enhancing a more integrated approach between multilateral and bilateral surveillance. In conclusion, I would like to emphasise Malta’s support for the efforts that are being undertaken by the Fund and the Bank to respond in an effective and coherent manner to the very challenging economic and financial problems that continue to characterise the global environment. MYANMAR: HLA TUN Governor of the Bank It is an honor and a great pleasure for me to represent the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar at the 2011 Annual Meetings of the Boards of Governors of the World Bank and International Mon- etary Fund. At the outset, I would like to congratulate you Mr. Chairman for your appointment to chair the joint Annual Meetings. It is also my privilege to congratulate and welcome Ms. Christine Lagarde to your new post as Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund. We are certain that the Fund will benefit from your experiences working with developing countries and we look forward to our association with you. We meet here today at a time of heightened uncertainty about outlook for the global economy. Since the second quarter of this year we have 89 seen a slowdown in economic activities in developed countries which led to a downward revision in the projection of the global economic growth due to the European debt crisis and planned spending cuts in the United States. The near-term outlook for the world economy is not promising and risks are still on the downside. In this context, promoting sustainable growth not only in advanced countries but also in emerging countries is of singular importance for such a common strategy. With these concerns in mind let me briefly outline to you the position of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar is in at present. The multiparty democracy general election was held in November 2010 and the new government was formed in March 2011. The government aims at achiev- ing sustainable developments on all fronts through a number of reform measures. The major thrust of these measures is to establish transparency and accountability at all levels of Government. The policy focus of the elected government is based on the twin objectives of economic manage- ment and poverty alleviation. Regarding the developments of the Myanmar economy, Myanmar has implemented the Fifth Short Term Five-Year Plan spanning from 2011/12 to 2015/16 with aims to have further development based on favorable existing economic conditions. Myanmar expects an economic growth rate of 8.8 percent in the first year of the fifth short term five-year plan 2011/12. This growth will be attributed mainly by the growths of agricul- tural sector and services sector. With regard to the fiscal front, Myanmar has taken measures both in terms of revenue and expenditure consistent with the fiscal consolidation plans. On the revenue side, while measures have been taken to strengthen tax administration, reduce tax evasion and tax avoidance and improving tax compliance, the government reduced tax rate on exports from 8 per- cent to 5 percent and granted tax exemption from exported agricultural produce so as to encourage for boosting export. On the expenditure side, prioritization has been emphasized and unproductive expenditures discouraged. On the external front, during the first quarter of 2011/2012 fiscal year, the current account is in surplus, due mainly to surplus in the trade account. The surplus can be attributable to increase gas exports and remittances from abroad. As such our foreign exchange reserves have also risen considerably. Regarding the banking sector, efforts are being made towards further banking and financial sector modernization by implementing of Elec- tronic Banking Network and Payment System. Moreover, measures have been taken to strengthen the Central Bank’s supervisory and regulatory power. Necessary instructions and guidelines have been issued in order to maintain the stability of the banking sector. At present our banking sector is strong and stable. 90 With respect to monetary policy, the Central Bank of Myanmar imple- ments measures to absorb excess liquidity into the banking system and to curb inflation by using interest rate and limiting credits to unproductive sectors. We are grateful for the technical assistance that we have received from the Fund especially in the area of exchange rate management. This assistance will provide us with valuable policy advice and training for uni- fying our multiple exchange rate capability to address immediate needs for redesigning the prevailing exchange rate system. We consider that the availability of technical and financial cooperation from the Bretton Woods institutions will support our economic develop- ment programmes and we believe that they can provide a parallel role in our future prosperity. In conclusion, I wish to express our deep appreciation and best wishes to the Boards of Directors, the managements, and the staffs for their valuable contribution to the Annual Meetings. Let us move forward to shape a better future of peace and prosperity in the next millennium. NEPAL: BARSHAMAN PUN Governor of the Bank It is a great honor for me and my delegation to participate in 2011 Annual Meetings of the Board of Governors of the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund. I express my sincere apprecia- tion for the hospitality extended to us. I would also like to commend the management of the World Bank Group and Fund for the excellent arrangement made for this meeting. The entire world has been confronted with a crisis of one sort or another in the recent years. It has not been long time when the World recovered from the aftermaths of global financial meltdown, it is being plagued by soaring food prices, global warming, natural calamities and other problems and conflicts. Financial meltdown which created a major economic crisis was caused mainly by the weaknesses in regulations and supervision and failure in spotting and correcting banking crisis. So I urge all my fellow del- egates to draw the attention of the World Institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, with which we are all associated, to explore ways of correcting the defects of existing mechanism. Nepal is still struggling hard in bringing the peace process to a logical end, drafting the new constitution, and institutionalizing political stabil- ity in the country. Accomplishment of all these tasks require political consensus among the major political parties. And, it is encouraging that there are indications of forging a consensus very soon. Recently, a new coalition Government led by the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) has been formed. The new Government has 91 committed to complete the drafting of the new constitution and estab- lish lasting peace in the country within the stipulated time. On the very day, that is August 29, 2011, the new Prime Minister was elected, the Constituent Assembly unanimously extended the time for drafting the new constitution to 30 November 2011. The Maoist Party, even before the new Prime Minister was elected, had publicly announced to finalize the integration and rehabilitation of its army combatants, which fought for bringing the great historical political change in the country, within 45 days. As first and key step towards fulfilling this commitment, the UCPN (Maoist) had already handed over its weapons stored in various cantonments to the Special Committee on 1 September 2011. Nepali people have seen the returning back of the UCPN (Maoist) to the helm of the Government with great hope and expectations. Even the international community has viewed this development as a right event to expedite the peace process and maintain political stability in the country. I take this opportunity to reassure the international communities our commitment to meet their expectations as well as aspirations of the Nepalese people for peace, stability, and progress through a democratic and inclusive constitution to pave the way for economic development and improvement of the living standard of the people. On the economic front, the growth performance of the Nepalese econ- omy in the recent years has not been encouraging. Frequent changes in the Government, energy problem, low efficiency in the use of resources, absence of conducive industrial environment have been some of the major causes for this. The present Government is committed to address all these problems and to this effect various programs have already been initiated. On the social front, many of the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) indicators have improved. And, poverty levels are declining. Inclusion and representation have received increased policy attention, but capacity building of marginalized communities still remains far from satisfactory. Despite the pressure on Government expenditure to meet emerging needs of the people, we have maintained macro-economic stability in the country. We are encouraged by the World Bank Group’s focus on strengthen- ing governance to increase transparency and accountability of the member governments and the Bank itself. We highly appreciate the World Bank’s support for Nepal’s partici- pation in regional and multilateral global initiatives including Climate Investment Fund Pilot Programs and other projects with the joint support of Asian Development Bank, International Development Association and the International Finance Corporation. We welcome the successful IDA 16 which has been the hope and aspirations of the poor countries to meet MDGs. We have realized from our long experience that aid effectiveness has not been directly visible where aid is scattered. We would, therefore, like 92 to draw World Bank Group’s attention to concentrate on large and mega projects like large hydro-power projects, roads and river water manage- ment projects, which will have multiple development impact in the low income countries like Nepal, and would also help create employment. Finally, on behalf of the Government of Nepal, and on my own, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund for their continued support to Nepal and expect that this support will be enhanced further in the days to come. I wish the Annual Meeting a grand success and thank you all for your kind attention. NETHERLANDS: JAN KEES DE JAGER Governor of the Bank International Financial and Economic Situation The global economic recovery has recently suffered a setback. After relatively strong growth in 2010, the combination of slowing growth pros- pects and concerns about fiscal sustainability in parts of the advanced world have sparked adverse reactions in markets and the financial sec- tor. This threatens to cause a negative feedback loop between sovereign, financial sector and the real economy that has to be controlled. Uncertain- ties around the public finances of some euro area countries—but also of the United States and Japan—have become key risks for global financial stability. As such, we believe that credible consolidation strategies with- out delay, combined with structural reforms, are now a critical priority in order to secure fiscal sustainability and long-term growth. Given the strong differences in the speed and progress of the recovery between countries and regions, the high level of global liquidity, and the fact that many distortions underlying pre-crisis global imbalances are still in place, global coordination on policy priorities is as critical as ever. In Europe, we are taking bold steps to address the problems of dis- tressed sovereigns, including through EU/IMF programs for Greece, Ire- land and Portugal and adjustments to internal economic governance. The recent EU-wide stress test has focused on vulnerabilities in the banking sector, which are being addressed through European Banking Authority and as part of EU/IMF programs. Overall, the IMF has acted as a key contributor in crisis management in the euro area, bringing invaluable third-party expertise and conditionality. We welcome the Fund’s contin- ued involvement throughout the process of repair, reform and rebalancing in the euro area and beyond. In several key emerging economies, growth has been very rapid in recent quarters. Such rapid growth can bring strong welfare benefits, 93 particularly for the poorest in society. Yet it also could pose challenges to authorities. While emerging countries generally have a stronger outlook for fiscal sustainability than in the past and then some advanced countries, fiscal stances are often still accommodative, and interest rates potentially too low. Hence, in countries facing strong credit and asset price growth, financial inflows and overheating, we encourage the use of more coun- tercyclical policies, including macro-prudential instruments and fiscal tightening, so as to ensure stability and enhance resilience. IMF’s Role in a More Stable and Resilient International Monetary and Financial System To support macroeconomic and financial stability, the IMF has a crisis prevention and crisis resolution role. The IMF’s surveillance and lending framework has already undergone a remarkable overhaul since the onset of the crisis, but more needs to be done to create a more stable and resil- ient international monetary and financial system. Although we are open to reforms and instruments that strengthen the crisis resolution role of the IMF, we believe the focus should lie on how to address the buildup of imbalances and vulnerabilities as this is key to prevent (systemic) crisis situations from emerging. To address underlying imbalances, it is of utmost importance that risks and vulnerabilities are identified and communicated in a clear, consistent and timely manner. We welcome the significant progress over the past three years to address the shortcomings of IMF surveillance, including the spillover reports and the consolidated multilateral surveillance report as the most recent products. We look forward to an extensive discussion of these reports in the IMFC, and suggest building further on the expe- rience and capacity gained with these reports by repeating the exercise next year. However, we should continue with the process of strength- ening and improving the IMF surveillance framework building on the recommendations of the 2011 Triennial Surveillance Review (TSR) and the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO). We especially encourage the Fund and the membership to focus more on interconnections, spillovers, financial stability and capital flows. World Bank The World Bank Group has worked hard since the outbreak of the financial crisis on an effective and immediate response to cushion the impact of the crisis on the most vulnerable. At the same time, however, some challenges remain unaddressed or have re-emerged and new ones have arisen. In Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, the dire consequences of years of conflict, poverty and drought are glaringly evident. The current 94 humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa is painful proof that achieving food security continues to be a major challenge. The Netherlands is actively engaged in finding a solution to the global problem of food security. Achiev- ing the Millennium Development Goals remains a top priority and the posi- tion of women requires special attention now and in the future. The unrest in the Middle East and North Africa underlines the need to have a better understanding of the role jobs should play in the development process. The World Development Report on Gender Equality makes a com- pelling case to further strengthen World Bank policies. The Netherlands agrees with the conclusion from the World Development Report that gender equality is a condition for economic growth and requires leader- ship by governments and commitment by development partners. We also agree with the Bank’s proposed strategy to capitalize on the recom- mendations of the report. We put particular emphasis on expansion of country-level diagnostic work for a clearer understanding of the nature of possible inequalities and to enable utilization of the most effective program and policy interventions. These interventions need to be results- oriented, well-prioritized and to take account of the financial and human resources necessary to implement the agenda. Strengthening field-based and other partnerships with the United Nations, regional organizations, donors and recipient countries should also be a priority. In this context, we urge the Bank to engage the Ministries of Finance or Planning in the policy dialogue on gender in order to obtain broad commitment. For us it is evident that attracting the right expertise at all levels of the World Bank Group is a precondition for successful implementation of the rec- ommendations of the World Development Report. The Netherlands welcomes employment as the intended topic for the 2013 World Development Report. Employment is not only a key factor in making growth inclusive, but also contributes to social integration, social protection and a sustainably peaceful society. The Netherlands believes that the private sector needs to play a central role in the employment strategies of countries, since it is vital to securing sustainable employment opportunities and economic growth. The Netherlands fully endorses the Bank’s Corporate Scorecard which will report on operational and organizational effectiveness and the implementation of internal reforms. The Corporate Scorecard is an important accountability mechanism, supporting a strategic discussion with shareholders on Bank performance. The Scorecard should serve both the Governors and the Board to track progress on development results and organizational performance. 95 NEW ZEALAND: BILL ENGLISH Governor of the Bank At this year’s Annual Meetings the role of the IMF in promoting global policy cooperation is more important than ever. Recent months have seen sentiment become more negative, reflecting greater recogni- tion of the full extent and severity of problems facing the world economy. Recovery is intrinsically linked to reductions of deficits and surpluses across countries: the process we call global rebalancing. This process will involve deleveraging in some advanced economies, and increased con- sumption and investment in some emerging markets. Generally speaking, by reorienting the composition of growth more towards consumption in emerging markets, and more towards exports in advanced economies, both sets of economies will benefit. However, the pace at which rebalancing can occur remains uncertain. Policy actions to facilitate rebalancing in one country have implications for the pace of rebalancing in others, and countries may take different views on the right speed at which to implement such policy change. More- over, structural changes are needed—for example, to shift production to new or different industries, and supply side reforms to lift growth more generally. Such change will take time to implement and to yield results. Although some progress is being made and faster adjustment would have advantages, our outlook is that the pace of global rebalancing will be slow. EU leaders have made commitments which, once implemented, are sure to be of great assistance to the most fragile countries and to broader European stability. However concerns have continued to grow about debt sustainability in the region. Euro zone countries in IMF programs are benefitting from program finance and advice on comprehensive and ambitious reform agendas. The agendas cover measures to facilitate fiscal consolidation and deleveraging, peel back inefficiencies, improve policy and regulatory frameworks and country competitiveness. While progress has been made we must be realistic about prospects, and careful to ensure that resource is used as effectively as possible. In the present circumstances, market uncertainty on whether the program targets will be successfully met is causing volatility and exacerbating risks. More generally, heightened risk aversion and volatility is damaging to growth. Ensuing capital flows can be difficult to absorb, with unwelcome risks of instability or bubbles. In New Zealand we also have a rebalanc- ing process that needs to take place. Our ability to rebalance is being constrained by a persistently high exchange rate, which is creating excep- tionally difficult conditions for exporters. Alongside this, high household debt is contributing to subdued retail spending. And we continue to deal with the aftermath of devastating earthquakes. 96 However, we are working towards a continued orderly reduction of the ratio of our debt to GDP. Growth has been supported by high commodity prices, and the Rugby World Cup has provided a boost to the tourism industry. Part of our effort to tackle deleveraging is to raise national sav- ings, through fiscal consolidation and a continual drive to improve public sector efficiency. Throughout this process monetary policy has provided support, while keeping a close eye on inflation pressures. New Zealand’s open economy and financial system provides important opportunities for growth, but also poses risks that need to be managed. Moving back to the global context, credible convincing and cooperative policies are called for. The Fund assists governments to identify policy solutions in the bilateral context, while multilateral discussion of policy is typically high-level. In these unusual times, an increase in the level of policy detail given in multilateral discussion may be called for. This would add visibility to potential policy solutions and trade-offs. Financial market volatility is a symptom of underlying problems and imbalances, but also evidence of uncertainty as to whether policymak- ers will succeed in working together to fundamentally resolve existing problems. This year’s meetings are an opportunity to push back on that source of uncertainty, and to clarify that our shared national interests lie in policy cooperation. While immediate challenges to growth and recovery are at the fore- front of the policy effort, regulators must also press ahead with financial sector reform. Substantial reforms have been agreed, and need to be implemented. New Zealand has implemented a new liquidity policy for banks, and expects to adopt Basel III standards, with some adaptation to suit local conditions. New Zealand has established a new Council of Financial Regulators to foster cooperation between financial and pruden- tial regulators. However significant aspects of global regulatory concern remain, including risks associated with systemically important financial institutions and the shadow banking system. We encourage the Fund to continue to work closely with the BIS and the FSB on these matters. In order for the Fund to maintain the high levels of authority and relevance that it needs to be effective, it must be adequately resourced and representative. We are working towards ratifying the 14th General Review of Quotas, and we are using this as an opportunity to look at streamlining our ratification process. The Fund is currently working on a revised quota formula, which we hope will go further in ensuring quota better reflects the mix of the Fund’s membership. The selection of Managing Director/President has a key impact on how representative the IMF and World Bank are perceived to be. Not- withstanding our full support for both incumbents, we believe that any link to nationality in selection of these roles needs to be removed. 97 I would like to briefly mention three upcoming reviews that cut to the heart of the Fund’s operations: those on surveillance, lending instruments, and conditionality. We think the drive for more focus on surveillance of systemically-important countries is appropriate, and we are also pleased to observe the increased weight put on spillovers across countries and regions. The new Flexible and Precautionary Credit Line (FCL and PCL) instruments ensure that assistance can be delivered in a timely fashion, though we look forward to what the review can tell us about any chal- lenges associated with these instruments. On conditionality, the Fund must strike the right balance between supporting countries through crises and facilitating necessary change. As a knowledge-based institution it is necessary for the Fund to con- tinually review its thinking and approach. Therefore we support the efforts of the Independent Evaluation Office to ensure that the Fund’s experiences are captured and learned from. We look forward to hearing more about how insights gained from these efforts are being put to use. Alongside our support for increased systemic focus to surveillance, I would like to caution that the Fund must also retain focus on the small island states: the IMF and the World Bank have huge scope to positively affect these countries. We think this can be best accomplished through having teams that have developed long term specialized understanding of both the similarities and points of uniqueness in challenges faced by Pacific countries. Improved outcomes in the Pacific are a key focus for New Zealand, and we appreciate the work that the Fund has done in the Pacific through the regional technical assistance centre, and Fund programs in response to some of the PIC’s specific adjustment plans. Similarly, we welcome the World Bank’s increased presence in the Pacific region over recent years, including through joint Asian Develop- ment Bank/World Bank country offices. We encourage this commitment to continue and build in momentum. We support progress towards devel- opment co-ordination initiatives and an enhanced development dialogue. For New Zealand, results are about actively improving develop- ment outcomes. Like other donors, New Zealand is looking carefully at value for money and tangible outcomes for our taxpayer investment. We need to be sure that multilateral instruments are playing to their comparative advantage, and achieving stronger outcomes than we could achieve bilaterally. A practical focus on development results can help us achieve this. We welcome the World Bank’s proposed new Programme for Results lending instrument and look forward to seeing it deployed effectively in the Pacific. We welcome the Bank’s revision of the Corporate Scorecard and the provision of more information on results. However there is still work to be done to see more tangible results on the ground, and to ensure that results data is used effectively. The Pacific is a region of profound 98 potential, where innovation and nimbleness are key to unlock improved economic performance and sustainable development. We look forward to working collaboratively with the World Bank, Pacific partners and other development partners in the coming year to make a real difference in the lives of the peoples of the Pacific and beyond. OMAN: DARWISH BIN ISMAIL AL BALUSHI Governor of the Bank (on behalf of the Arab Governors) I am honored to speak on behalf of my colleagues from the Arab World—a region that continues to be in the limelight of global attention, especially given the various reform initiatives currently being imple- mented. While this attention has focused on the importance of acceler- ating the pace of adjustment and reforms, we want to underscore today the relatively impressive macroeconomic performance and development progress achieved thus far. To date, our region has witnessed significant improvement in key economic and social indicators. Sound macroeconomic policies, sustained implementation of structural reforms, and generally favorable external developments have underpinned notable growth performance across the region and allowed for a rapid recovery from the global crisis. Arab oil producers continue to support regional and global macroeconomic stabil- ity and development, whether through stabilizing oil markets, external development and humanitarian assistance or through remittances from their expatriate workers. Notable progress has also been made on key development indicators including an increase in average life expectancy to 70 years, a primary education completion rate of 90 percent and an under-5 mortality rate of 38 per 1,000. Most significantly, substantial progress has been made in reducing poverty. That said, the recent political events in some countries in the Arab World are a key reminder that much remains to be done. In the near term, these events and associated uncertainties are likely to lower economic prospects in the affected countries. At the same time, they present a valu- able opportunity to accelerate the pace of implementation of wide-ranging reforms, including promoting further economic diversification and private sector development, and strengthening the financial systems, to support sustainable and inclusive economic growth and secure employment for our people, particularly, the youth. In short, our immediate priority is to respond to peoples’ expectations while preserving macroeconomic stability. And, while many of our countries and financial institutions have received pledges of economic and financial support to assist them dur- ing this transitional period, these have yet to be translated to actual commitments. 99 While the Bretton Woods Institutions have played an important role in supporting our region, we hope that this role can be strengthened to align it with the global and regional changes, while taking into account the current challenges being faced, and the need for prompt response, particularly in strengthening the human and financial resources. In this regard, we value the increase in the World Bank support to the region and for strengthening cooperation, and its prompt response to the emerging needs of Egypt and Tunisia. We also appreciate that IDA support has been maintained for some Arab countries, and that the IMF has indicated that it could potentially make available up to $35 billion in financial assistance to the region as part of a broad international effort. In this context, we value the close engagement of the IMF through surveillance, technical assistance and lending relationships with our mem- ber countries. In this connection, we consider important the strengthening of effec- tive IMF surveillance—the pillar upon which the institution rests. The Tri- ennial Surveillance Review provides an opportunity to strengthen current practices. We support the intention to gain traction in the surveillance of advanced and large economies, and explore avenues for enhanced candor, relevance in terms of coverage of macro-social issues, and collaboration with country authorities. We also support the ongoing deepening of the institution’s work on financial stability, interconnectedness, and analysis of spillovers. We do not support applying reserve adequacy metrics as part of surveillance. We encourage efforts to strengthen the integration of bilateral and multilateral surveillance. In this regard, we reiterate our concern for the weakness in the eco- nomic growth prospects of the industrialized countries, and look forward to prompt and decisive response that would ensure global economic stability, and avert contagion. Across IBRD, IDA and IFC, high-value knowledge and advisory services have increased—including several influential reports on poverty, private and financial sector development, migration and regional inte- gration. We greatly value these analytical knowledge products whether bundled with lending programs, programmatically in a CAS as in the case of Algeria, within the Reimbursable Technical Assistance Program, or within the Advisory Programs, as we recognize the importance of their best practice recommendations for the proper design and effective implementation of reform programs. We also welcome the intensified focus on regional programs and projects, in collaboration with the regional development Banks, Arab and Islamic financial institutions, other multilateral and emerging coun- try donors. The five-country Concentrated Solar Power program under the Bank’s Arab World Initiative and the IFC’s e4e initiative are two notable cases in point. 100 We look to further strengthening of such collaboration of the Bret- ton Woods Institutions with each other, and with the regional develop- ment banks and financial institutions on an integrated approach to the development agenda in the region and leverage the limited development resources for greater effectiveness. At this juncture, the Governors of the Bretton Woods Institutions representing Arab countries would like to underscore the importance of broader and stronger coordination between our countries and the Bretton Woods Institutions, on the selectivity and prioritization in the regional strategies and approaches of the Institutions. In this regard, we believe, there are three key objectives we should work towards. First, critical to strengthening economic progress across the region is the urgency of creating sustainable jobs, particularly for the youth, and enhancing the skills of our people more broadly. The Bretton Woods Institutions can support this objective through a two-pronged approach. a. We need to include capacity building as an integral part of the ‘on- the-job’ implementation of the BWI programmes and projects in our region, whether in the field, or at the Institutions themselves. This would also include intensifying efforts to enhance recruitment, par- ticularly of under-represented nationalities; and career development of existing Arab staff. b. We need to prioritize the objective of generation of sustainable employ- ment through a vibrant private sector, operating in an enabling, com- petitive and diversified environment. To this end, we must maintain the macroeconomic stability achieved thus far, inter alia, by ensuring that measures introduced to support the recovery, consumer subsidies in the face of higher food and commodity prices, and social transfers are designed with due regard to the available fiscal space and long- term fiscal sustainability. We also need to utilize more intensively IFC’s regional expertise and innovative approach, and thus urge fur- ther scaling up of their work across a broader range of sectors. A more proactive approach by MIGA particularly during this critical time would boost confidence and foreign direct investment. Our second priority is the challenge of low and depleting water resources, and for some, the associated food insecurity, given that the Arab World imports most of its food, and most of this is heavily subsi- dized. Designing integrated rural development strategies that not only address the challenge of food security and scarce water resources, but also contribute towards creating good productive employment opportunities in agriculture and related sectors, would be welcome. At the same time, targeted and cost-effective social safety nets are needed to mitigate the impact of higher food and commodity prices on the poorer segments of the populations. 101 Third, we need to recognize the unique circumstances of Sudan. The cession of the South poses significant risks, not only in terms of the loss of large oil revenues, but also because Sudan’s debt situation is already unsustainable. We call on the Bank and the Fund to lead the necessary multilateral effort to urgently define a clear, time-bound, debt relief strat- egy to secure access to resources, thereby ensuring that the development agenda of Sudan is not compromised. Fourth, the Palestinian Authority continues to work with the World Bank Group in implementing strategic interventions. The World Bank Group’s support is instrumental and critical in encouraging the interna- tional community to continue their generous support to the Palestinian people by setting an example of excellence and partnership. We urge the World Bank Group to expand its programs and financial support to help the Palestinian Authority in the state building and developing a viable economy. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to welcome the process for selection of the new Managing Director of the IMF, and the incoming MD herself, Ms. Christine Lagarde. We are confident that the combination of financial and legal knowledge that Ms. Lagarde brings will be critical for the effective management of this important Institution going forward. PAPUA NEW GUINEA: LOI M. BAKANI Governor of the Bank and the Fund It is my pleasure to release this Statement on the occasion of the 2011 Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Mon- etary Fund and World Bank Group. On behalf of the Papua New Guinea Government, I would like to express our gratitude and appreciation to the Bank and the Fund for their ongoing technical, financial and inter- vention programs aimed at improving the living standards of societies and strengthening of the financial systems. Governors and colleagues, the slower than anticipated global economic recovery in the first half of 2011 and the present sluggish growth and/or the possibility of a recession in some advanced economies is indeed worrying and calls for a greater coordinated effort and complementary actions of our two organizations and individual countries in addressing these concerns. I echo the IMF’s downward revision of anticipated growth of 4.3 percent for 2011 (in its June World Economic Outlook Update) from its earlier projection of 4.5 percent. Downside risks still persist as sovereign debt crisis and fiscal imbalances linger in Europe, which potentially could trigger another global recession. 102 Turning to my country, Papua New Guinea is currently enjoying the longest streak of economic growth in its history as an independent nation. With little exposure to the troubled financial institutions abroad, the Papua New Guinea economy was able to escape the onslaught of the recent global financial crisis. Real gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 5.5 percent in 2009 and 7.1 percent in 2010. Revised projections indicate that economic growth could reach low double digit in 2011, making it the ninth year in succession of economic growth. Starting in 2003, high export commodity prices, strong macroeconomic funda- mentals of relatively stable prices including domestic exchange rate, interest rates and inflation, strong balance of payments position, and prudent macroeconomic management—including fiscal management (except for a lapse in 2008), gave rise to increased business confidence and growth in investment and employment in the economy. Starting in 2010, in addition to the above factors, the construction phase of the multi-billion Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) project has triggered posi- tive spin-off effects to the other sectors of the economy such as trans- portation, manufacturing, building and construction, and wholesale & retail. Also, Government spending has increased with the windfall tax revenue from exports and business activity. All these have led to an increase in aggregate domestic demand and consequently, increased inflationary pressures. With the high commodity prices and increased investment inflows associated with the LNG project, the country’s balance of payments posi- tion is strong—having recorded an overall surplus of K471 million in the first half of 2011. The level of gross international reserves at the end of June 2011 was K8,485.90 (US$3,738.6) million, sufficient for 10.5 months of total and 14.6 months of non-mineral import covers. The Government, in its Mid Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook (MYEFO) Report, projects a budget surplus of K606.8 million for 2011. This surplus has now been appropriated through a supplementary budget of around K800 million that includes other revenue expected from non-taxation sources. While the new Government has publicly announced its intention to seriously tackle corruption by instigating investigation into cases of misappropria- tion of public funds, the pace of its commitment and spending is a concern for prudent macroeconomic management. The economy is further supported by a sound and strong financial system. The financial system is well capitalized with adequate levels of liquidity, low level of non-performing loans, and are highly profitable. The major strategic project to provide a cost effective and efficient pay- ment system (both domestic and international transactions) that started in 2009 is continuing, with the procurement of a system expected to be completed this year. The reform to the payment system will enhance our efforts to promote financial inclusion and financial literacy in the country 103 through the promotion of micro banks, savings and loan societies, and mobile phone banking. While the PNG economy is growing and is flushed with liquidity, there are some key issues and challenges. First, the economy needs to steer a course between high economic growth and high inflation as there is a trade-off between the two. This will require a closer coordination between fiscal and monetary policy in supporting macroeconomic stabil- ity. Second, Government spending should be directed at needy areas that include health, education, infrastructure and law and order to improve delivery of social services and help improve micro level development. Third, good governance is required not only in the political sphere but also in the bureaucratic administration and processes. With the rise in annual headline inflation to 9.0 percent in the March quarter and 9.6 percent in the June quarter 2011, the Central Bank has tightened monetary policy by increasing the policy signaling rate—the Kina Facility Rate (KFR) progressively by 25 basis points in June, July and September 2011 to 7.75 percent and by increasing the Cash Reserve Requirement by 100 basis points each in July and August to 6.0 percent. It will require a joint effort by the Departments of Treasury, Finance and National Planning, and the Central Bank to ensure quality and produc- tive Government spending on essential areas—not excessive wasteful spending especially ahead of the upcoming National Elections in 2012, and appropriate monetary policy conduct to contain inflation at a reason- able level in this period of high economic growth. In this regard, first the Government can assist by concentrating its efforts on areas that do not compete with the LNG developer, which are the social sectors of education, including the up-skilling of the workforce through vocational and on the job training, health and law and order. Engaging in new projects will only add to demand pressures and exert upward pressure on inflation. The second strategy is for the Government to invest seriously in the agriculture sector to ensure the export sector remains competitive and food production is increased for local consumption and import replace- ment. This will assist in mitigating the effects of Dutch Disease. Above all, good governance in political leadership and the bureaucracy is required to weed out corruption and minimize law and order problems for the country to prosper. The agenda on Sovereign Wealth Fund has been advanced by rel- evant Government authorities following the decision by the Govern- ment in 2010 to establish the Fund. The underlying rationale to have the Fund is for the country to better manage the windfall revenue that will result from the LNG projects and other mineral projects. The con- tinuing involvement and advice of the IMF in the macro sphere and the World Bank in development of programs and initiatives to reduce poverty and improve the country’s social development indicators are 104 welcomed. We are grateful for the continued assistance provided by the Fund and the Bank and our other development partners in terms of technical assistance, funding and advice. Working together, we can ensure that our efforts can complement each other for the benefit of our people. PHILIPPINES: CESAR V. PURISIMA Governor of the Bank Countries around the world are faced with significant challenges. The turbulence in the financial markets and its repercussions on con- fidence, jobs, output and prices are hampering global recovery and growth. While countries seek to address vulnerabilities and accelerate growth, uncertainty continues to persist. Thus, it is the opportune time to ask how the World Bank Group and we as policymakers of our respective countries can play more relevant roles and be stronger forces to attain sustainable and inclusive growth and development. The answers cannot be commonplace but out-of-the-box, efforts cannot be free-standing but concerted and more importantly, solutions cannot be postponed or long in coming but urgent. Amidst a weak global economic outlook, we see the role of the Bank to be ever-increasing on the broad scale and we challenge it to live up to the expectations of the global community especially the most vulnerable. As the Bank plays out its development mandate, we strongly encourage broader dimensions to its country-driven strategies. We would like to see more enhanced country partnerships addressing specific challenges faced by IDA countries, and the low and upper middle income countries. As the financial crisis besetting select countries risks contagion within the region with adverse repercussions for the global economy, the Bank should step up its efforts with both tried and tested measures as well as novel approaches. In these extraordinary times, special debt facilities can allow the Bank to more effectively tap and channel additional resources to aid debt-strapped sovereigns attain temporary financing until their situation normalizes. This would have the intended effect of reassuring markets and creditors as well as providing headroom to struggling econo- mies while continuing vital funding to assure a sustainable way out of the crisis. With respect to environmental and other possible external shocks, we encourage the use of innovative tools like catastrophe financing instru- ments to address climate change vulnerabilities faced by many nations as well as aid in post-crisis financing should the need arise. This seems to be a pretty tall order but I am confident of the Bank’s capabilities, and we expect the Bank’s effective leadership and pro-active response to avert any further impending crises. 105 Furthermore, the Bank needs to be closer to client-countries and we cannot but fully agree with Bank President Zoellick’s vision of democra- tized development. We strongly encourage initiatives to establish regional hubs for knowledge and financial activities, and to facilitate the sharing of knowledge and best practices among regions as well as pursuing more development policy dialogues. We are enthusiastic about the expansion of the World Bank Group—Singapore Hub as a center for development innovation particularly focused on infrastructure financing, ICT, urban development and services, among others, and its potential in driving investments in developing countries in East Asia and other regions. Because the pursuit of the Bank’s development agenda is a long-term engagement, it is important that it maintains its relevance and respon- siveness given the rapid changes in the global economy. Only genuine and broader consultations and dialogue with member states will ensure this. Processes and decisions of the Bank, as well as of the International Monetary Fund, must continue to be open and inclusive. Participation must be deepened. Leadership structures must be democratized. The Government of the Philippines shares a common vision for devel- opment with the World Bank Group. Governance and accountability are cross-cutting themes of our reform programs. We are committed to pursu- ing inclusive growth and are consciously setting the bar higher for ourselves to achieve this goal. We are expanding the social safety net program, pursuing universal health coverage and enhancing basic and secondary education because we believe that strengthening our human capital and best resource would be instrumental to achieving growth and alleviating poverty. Attainment of the MDGs, job creation and reaching out to the conflict-affected areas are high on our agenda. We are also re-invigorating our infrastructure program through PPPs to address severe infrastructure gaps that have hampered our competitiveness. We are putting our fiscal house in order through a robust public financial management program and by strengthening our balance sheet to raise resources to finance our needs. We acknowledge the Bank’s support in our initiatives through the Country Assistance Strategy, the reinstatement of the Development Policy Loan facility and of late, the CAT-DDO operation that offers contingent financing in the event of a high-level disaster while pursuing disaster risk reduction and management programs. And we look forward to a continued and richer partnership through financing and advisory services, and knowledge sharing. Because the development vision is universal, we would like to con- tribute to the agenda by sharing our experiences and lessons learned in program implementation with other countries. We are keen at pursu- ing the growth strategy within ASEAN and intra-Asia, and are open to engaging with the Bank and other development partners on how to nurture this idea. 106 POLAND: JAN VINCENT-ROSTOWSKI Governor of the Fund The recovery of the world economy from the unprecedented crisis has, over the past few months been facing serious and increasing prob- lems. The outlook points to a protracted and difficult recovery rather than a rapid adjustment which returns the process back to a sustainable path. What were, at the outset of the crisis, local financial difficulties on sub-prime markets have spread across sectors and countries, channeling risks from private to public sectors and are now the main source of global uncertainty and of the significant reduction of market confidence. The advanced economies are still struggling with the legacy of exces- sive leverage and high debt which adversely affects growth, while a num- ber of emerging economies are showing signs of overheating. The two projects aimed at rebalancing demand, domestic demand from the public to the private sector and global demand from external deficit countries to external surplus countries remain to be completed. Several of the European economies are facing a huge problem of sovereign debt which in some cases seems to be difficult to sustain. These developments bring considerable consequences for global finan- cial stability. After the risks to financial stability declined somewhat this spring, they are now again on the rise. An increase of individual financial risk is reflected by a clear reduction of the appetite for risk. Over recent decades global and innovative financial markets have been increasingly driving the growth of the world economy. These markets, while bringing strong growth-enhancing effects, may also fuel, amplify and channel risks to economic growth and financial stability. Despite some failures inherent to financial markets, it is, however, policy which has turned out to be a major factor responsible for the recent global crisis. The crisis has affected, although to varying degrees, a vast number of economies putting the concept of decoupling in seri- ous doubt. Simultaneously, the crisis has turned out to be a country- and region-specific process with some economies hit hard, whereas others remain relatively resilient and able to weather the impact of the crisis. In principle, it is the build-up of systemic risk due to inadequate, pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies and to regulatory and supervisory failure which can be considered as the root causes of the global financial crisis. Strong and determined policy action is instrumental for overcom- ing the current unbalanced, weak global recovery and associated risks. In particular, at this moment in time, the severity of the crisis in public finances poses an extremely difficult challenge for policy makers: to strike an appropriate balance between the strength and speed of fiscal consolidation and economic growth. A possible contraction in growth increases the risk of negative and punishing assessments by the markets. 107 Widespread international financial contagion throughout global financial markets makes a case for an internationally coordinated policy response. While in difficult times more policy coordination is warranted, markets should be reassured that the policy makers are working together. Nearly all stakeholders have an interest in maintaining the stability of the international financial system as it helps to provide a more efficient distribution of financial resources across countries. However, develop- ment of global financial governance seems to have lagged behind the robust development of financial markets. A difficult environment and increasing risks call for coordinated action aimed at achieving common goals, for financial solidarity and responsibil- ity, including support for those hardest hit, especially by external shocks, for a fair burden-sharing of costs and non-abuse of financial support. International financial institutions are naturally predestined to actively participate in a policy response to the global crisis. It is worth appreciating that the G20 has initiated and is overseeing the overall process of eco- nomic and financial reforms. It is the G20 economies which should lead by example in making adjustments and introducing reforms. It should also be emphasized that owing to its financial, human and institutional resources, its mandate, its comparative advantage as well as its global membership, the IMF is uniquely equipped to address crisis legacies and current risks to financial stability and global recovery. The Fund indeed remains instrumental in shaping policy response in the areas both of crisis prevention and crisis resolution. Surveillance plays a critical role in crisis prevention and the recent eco- nomic downturn has highlighted the need to improve surveillance. More detailed assessment is necessary to pinpoint why the build-up of systemic risks was not adequately addressed in the run-up to the crisis. Several IMF surveillance products, including WEO and GFSR, had warned the global community of these risks. However, despite manifold warnings, policy makers were not determined enough to adjust their policies. The impact of the IMF policy advice turned out to be the sensitive, weak spot of the surveillance framework. This reluctance to implement prompt adjustments mainly occurred in some advanced countries which are nor- mally subjected to less intensive surveillance than other groups of Fund members and it highlights the need for a more evenhanded approach to surveillance as well as for the development of a uniform and balanced approach across both countries and issues. We think that the preliminary 2011 Triennial Surveillance Review adequately signals current surveillance priorities. In particular, greater attention is merited by topics such as risk assessment, traction of sur- veillance, increasing financial interconnectedness between countries which implies an increasing vulnerability to international spillover effects. 108 Additionally, in view of the growing number of valuable multilateral surveillance reports, a move towards some streamlining, consistency and coherence of reports would be reasonable. In this context, a stand-alone consolidated surveillance report for the IMFC helps increase the effec- tiveness of surveillance. The clear and positive role of the IMF in crisis resolution deserves to be recognized. The Fund’s emergency response to the crisis, as well as further actions designed to resolve the crisis, are essentially adequate and timely. The IMF has substantially increased its financial resources, including through expansion of the NAB program, additional SDR allo- cation and speeding up the implementation of the 2008 quota increases and, therefore, exerting a calming effect on markets. The Fund has also adjusted its lending toolkit by introducing and augmenting new instru- ments, such as the FCL, for countries with strong fundamentals and appropriate policies. For three years Poland has benefited from the FCL on a precautionary basis which has served the country well and even better now, during the sovereign debt crisis. Risks to sovereign debt sustain- ability call for greater attention to be paid to orderly debt restructuring procedures. Work in this area may well have benefited from the Fund’s past discussions on the SDRM. The IMF has a critical role to play in strengthening global financial safety nets. This process includes cooperation between the Fund and regional financial arrangements. Inside the EU, “the six-pack� approach provides a useful example of badly needed enhancements to regional economic governance designed to address a number of institutional and structural shortcomings of the Eurozone. Regional actions in both crisis resolution and its prevention are well aligned with, and complemented by the involvement of the IMF, not only in financial terms but also by having access to the Fund’s vast technical expertise. We see great merit in the Fund participating in activities under the G20 framework on reforming the international monetary system. These activi- ties involve a number of financial institutions at the national, regional and global level. A spirit of collective responsibility, as well as an appropriate division of labor between participating institutions will allow for better synergy between the partners. LIC’s are especially vulnerable to external shocks and deserve particu- lar attention and support from the IMF. We welcome the Fund’s focus on enhancing its engagement in those situations where LIC’s face unique chal- lenges. The IMF’s involvement should be consistent with its core respon- sibilities and should take into account the security of its financial position. We also believe that the quota reform agreed in 2010 will further bring the quota system to better reflect the world’s economy and finances, and will be helpful in improving the representation, credibility and efficiency of the Fund. 109 SPAIN: ELENA SALGADO Governor of the Bank and the Fund During the summer, prospects for global growth and financial stability have deteriorated and downside risks have increased. International Financial Institutions, national and regional authori- ties need to react quickly and forcefully to address these challenges, to strengthen the recovery and advance on two key objectives: reducing unemployment and fighting poverty. We need to look beyond short term financial market volatility, and base our assessments on underlying economic fundamentals and policy decisions. So let me provide some examples of key recent advancements in Europe and in Spain. In the Euro Area, July 21st agreement of the Heads of State and Gov- ernment contains a set of comprehensive measures to address the root causes of the sovereign debt crisis. First, it improves the debt sustainability outlook for Greece. Second, it gives the EFSF new and more effective tools to ensure financial stability and prevent contagion. The European Financial sector has also undergone a process of repair and recapitalization. The EBA stress test has shown that the bulk of the banking system is sound enough to withstand an adverse scenario. Spain has participated for two consecutive years in the stress tests exercise with full transparency, including our entire banking sector. As the Fiscal Monitor highlights, the Euro Area has continued to make progress on fiscal consolidation, long term fiscal sustainability and fiscal rules. Since 2010, Spain has accelerated its public deficit reduction and we have passed a pension reform that improves long term fiscal sustainability. Furthermore, Parliament has just approved a reform of Spain´s constitution introducing a commitment to struc- turally balanced budgets and moderate debt. We have also addressed flaws in the labour market, raised bank capital standards and acceler- ated the savings banks´ restructuring. Further efforts are needed, but with these policies, and with the economy growing, although modestly, thanks to strong export performance, we are laying the ground for higher growth, and lower unemployment, under a more sustainable economic model. We all need to react in order to protect the global recovery, and ensure that the tough measures that we have implemented, start yielding income and job gains. We should stick to our medium term fiscal targets, taking into account national circumstances. In the financial sector, we need to continue strengthening our banks, keeping a close eye on financial market stability, to avoid costly dislocations. In short, policymakers should continue to address the unresolved struc- tural problems from the crisis, while preserving the role of Government, 110 as insurer of last resort against the threat of uncertainty. The contribution of the IMF to this endeavour is crucial. In the first place, the Fund is uniquely placed to provide the funda- mentals based assessment. Surveillance has improved substantially but there are still important lessons to be learned. In my view, the Fund should continue to act mainly as a policy advisor, promoting countercyclical policies, and basing its guidance on careful analysis of country-specific fundamentals, and their interaction in the complex global economy. Secondly, the IMF can make a very important contribution through its lending role. Recent events have highlighted the importance of solid liquidity provision arrangements, as insurance against systemic shocks. Expanding the IMF’s lending toolkit, to include a short-term liquidity provision facility, could strengthen the global financial safety net, by building on the much needed flexibility introduced by Fund instruments, such as the FCL and PCL. Thirdly, the IMF should continue to provide excellent analytical sup- port to help us advance in the International Monetary System reform. I am glad to announce that the Spanish Parliament has just ratified the 2010 Quota and Governance reform. Finally, in the area of development, a slowdown in advanced econo- mies, and further financial turbulence may have an impact on the progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. This could add to the dif- ficult issues posed by rising food prices and volatility in commodity prices. Spain has always supported a strong countercyclical role in the Mul- tilateral Development Banks that needs to be strengthened. We have already approved our country’s participation in the general and selective capital increases of the IBRD, as well as the disbursement of the first tranche of paid-in capital. We welcome the focus of this year’s World Development Report 2012 on Gender Equality and Development. Spain views the issue of gender as a major political priority, as evidenced by the approval of a compre- hensive gender equality law in 2007. I hope that during these Annual Meetings we will be able to address these issues and to find coordinated approaches for all of them. SRI LANKA: DR. SARATH AMUNUGAMA Governor of the Bank and the Fund At the last Annual Meeting, we expressed our concern about too slow global recovery, particularly in advanced economies. Unfortunately, after one year there is more uncertainty and recovery is slower than expected in advanced countries in addition to growing turbulence in the euro area and the US. Sovereign debt crises are emerging in the euro area and its contagion effects could spill over to other regions as well. Sovereign risks 111 have already spilled over to banks in the euro area and as a result some have lost access to private funding markets. This has raised risks of severe credit contraction with further negative consequences on recovery. The political impasse over fiscal consolidation in the US has increased the uncertainty of the pace of recovery, investor and consumer confidence without any positive signs such as reducing high level of unemployment and improvements in housing markets and household debt overhang. We are more concerned about the emerging crises than in the past as there is hardly any space for fiscal policy in advanced countries to sup- port recovery in view of looming debt vulnerabilities. Monetary policy has limited space with interest rates already at historical low levels in advanced countries and quantitative easing has failed to deliver desired results. In this environment, emerging market countries have a very lim- ited role in rebalancing acts—shifting from public to private demand and from external to domestic demand—unless advanced countries resort to coherent policy actions to reduce sovereign risks and prevent contagion while strengthening the resilience of their financial systems. Let me now turn to my country, Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka continues to reap peace dividends after ending the three decade long war against terrorism. The economy grew by 8 percent in 2010 which is the first full financial year after conclusion of the war. There is strong evidence of continuation of the growth momentum in 2011 and beyond as the first half of 2011 also grew by 8 percent. International investor confidence on Sri Lanka has been improving steadily. International rating agencies upgraded Sri Lanka’s sovereign ratings and revised outlook in a positive direction in the second consecutive year. Despite some turbulence in international capital markets due to concerns on sovereign debt vulner- abilities in advanced countries, the Sri Lankan government was able to raise capital from international capital markets at historically low rates, reflecting renowned investor confidence on Sri Lanka due to improving macroeconomic fundamentals and political stability. Relatively high fiscal deficits and double-digit inflation were the main macroeconomic issues resulting in high levels of public debt, high interest rates and unstable currency was experienced by Sri Lanka in the past particularly during the period of the conflict. Prudent monetary and credible fiscal policies that were implemented by my government have helped bring down inflation to a manageable level and maintain single digit inflation since 2009. The fiscal consolidation process has steadily brought down fiscal deficits from 10 percent of GDP in 2010 to below 7 percent in 2011. Our medium term macroeconomic programme targets further fiscal consolidation aiming at bringing down debt to GDP ratio below 60 percent by 2016 as com- pared to above 100 percent of GDP in 2004. Improved macroeconomic management has helped stabilize both the interest rate and exchange rate which are conducive for higher investments. The healthy external 112 sector performance was reflected in a less volatile exchange rate, while post conflict productivity gains helped maintain competitiveness. The private sector is responding positively to emerging economic opportuni- ties arising from permanent peace and greater integration of the Northern and Eastern provinces with the main stream economy of the country. Private sector credit is currently expanding at around 30 percent reflecting renewed investor confidence compared to negative growth experienced in the recent past. Such a rapid credit growth is not likely to create excessive demand in the near future as the country now has enhanced capacity to absorp excess demand supported by major infrastructure development programmes commenced under the leadership of His Excellency the President Mahinda Rajapaksa. Completion of major infrastructure proj- ects such as ports, airports, major road and railway networks integrating the lagging regions, building new power plants providing electricity to reach 100 percent coverage supplement the role of the private sector for enhanced investments in new opportunities such as tourism, internal and external trade, port and airport related services, banking services, BPO and educational services. These are key elements of positioning Sri Lanka as a maritime, aviation, energy, knowledge and commercial hub in the region as envisaged in the vision of my government. Let me now explain briefly the progress we have made in the post war resettlement, reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation pro- cess. During the last phase of the war, our armed forces rescued 290,000 civilians used by the terrorists as a human shield. More than 95 percent of these internally displaced people have been resettled by now and the remainder will be resettled once the demining process is completed. In addition, 11,644 ex-LTTE combatants surrendered or were arrested at the end of the conflict. Of these detainees, around 6,500 have already been rehabilitated. My government is implementing a comprehensive infrastructure development programme specially targeting the Eastern and Northern provinces where infrastructure facilities were lagging due to the war. In the process of political reconcillation, the government has already conducted local government elections in both conflict affected provinces and provincial elections in the Eastern province. Provincial elections for the Northern province will be held in the near future in order to establish an elected provincial administration. In the meantime, the government has commenced a dialogue with Tamil political parties with a view to forming long-term constitutional, legal and democratic reforms for sustainable peace. In the process of reconciliation, the Les- sons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) commenced its work in August 2010 and is making a good progress. Some interim measures recommended by the LLRC have already been implemented and the full report is expected within next 6 months. For example, some of the remedial measures include the reduction of high security 113 zones, release of a large number of ex-combatants, resolution of land disputes, disarming paramilitary groups. In addition, the government has lifted emergency regulations which were in effect during the last three decades. We continue to benefit substantially from assistance extended by multilateral and bilateral development partners and renewed confidence placed by international investment community in Sri Lanka. We look forward to strengthening these partnerships further. SWEDEN: STEFAN INGVES Governor of the Fund (on behalf of the Nordic and Baltic Countries) I am honored to make this Statement on behalf of the Nordic-Baltic constituency consisting of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway and Sweden. Before the world economy fully recovered from the financial crisis and the following downturn, financial market unease has risen again. This time, the uncertainty mainly stems from concerns about the outlook for public finances, and consequently the effects this may have on the integrated banking system. The international community and domestic policymakers once again need to handle risks and hinder contagion. Public sector debt is currently high, particularly in the advanced economies. Many advanced countries are planning considerable fiscal consolidation. This is welcome but it will also be important to appropri- ately balance short term considerations with credible medium term plans. Improved public finances will be necessary to create stability and reduce vulnerability in the future. But to consolidate public finances will take time, and until this is achieved there is always a risk that markets will judge the measures as insufficient, which in turn risks leading to wors- ened or renewed turbulence. Because sovereign debt problems and bank problems are often closely intertwined, via banks’ holdings of sovereign debt but also the public sector’s ability to support banks in distress, this is of concern also to the banking system. The Fund, with its almost universal membership and unique surveil- lance capacity, is the organization best suited, and most legitimate, to coordinate and formulate policy options to meet the challenges at the global level. However, the Fund’s comparative advantages—good surveillance and legitimate governance structure—will never be enough without two other crucial ingredients. These are frankness and traction. The IMF must always be prepared to speak truth to power. All countries—no matter small or large—need independent evaluation to be able to make the best policy choices. The increasingly interdependent global economy makes 114 this a common interest, as we are affected not only by our own but also by our neighbors’ policy choices! But frank surveillance also needs to be accompanied by frank discussion and policy action. The Triennial Surveillance Review just considered by the Executive Board must result in more effective IMF surveillance, bilateral and mul- tilateral as well as of financial sectors. It will build on the improvements and innovations introduced so far, including spillover reports and the increased focus on interconnectedness. The globalization of the financial system means that systemic risks can spread quickly across countries. Reducing the build-up or impact of such risks will require coordinated international actions. The joint IMF-FSB Early Warning Exercise is very important to this end, including the involvement of the IMFC. We would also favor that IMF surveillance focus more on the structure of capital flows to be able to better assess their impact. However, the greatest chal- lenge remains to increase the traction of IMF advice. We suggest among other things that the member countries should be expected to comply or explain. Significant changes in IMF governance were agreed last year but they need to be followed up. We have for example repeatedly emphasized the importance of strengthening the IMFC, making it the principal forum on matters of global economics and finance. We therefore welcome the IMFC Chairman’s emphasis on the importance of the IMFC becoming a more effective forum for open and active discussions. We have made proposals to this end, relating among other things to preparations for meetings, the setting of the agenda and the meeting format in addition to giving it a spe- cific role in the surveillance of systemic countries. A stronger IMFC entails increased accountability since it represents the IMF’s global membership. Important discussions are ahead on the review of the quota formula. It is crucial that the revised quota formula will be consistent with the mandate of the IMF and the purpose of quotas. The current formula has several weaknesses and there is significant room for improvement, such as including financial openness, measure GDP at market exchange rates rather than purchasing power parity and making the compression element a strong feature. We are prepared to enter into constructive discussions, fully anchored in the Executive Board and the IMFC, in order to achieve a result that will ensure that the IMF quota distribution remains trans- parent and formula-based and that the revised formula will be the sole basis for future quota alignments. Nevertheless, at this important time for the world economy, we have to use most of our energy on finding solutions to the current economic and financial challenges, and less on internal Fund matters. To sum up, the first line of defense that needs to be strengthened to prevent systemic risks materializing in the first place is prudent domestic policies—including financial regulation—guided by good surveillance 115 and followed by policy actions. However, when risks do materialize, the overall challenge is to create multilateral responses that are sufficiently fast, predictable and well-coordinated to avoid risks evolving into a full- fledged crisis. The IMF is well placed to act as a whistleblower when systemic risks arise and coordinate national, bilateral and multilateral action to stem contagion. In the long-run, we may be destined to repeat the past, but we can put structures in place that make this repetition less frequent and less costly. Institutions have a longer memory than individuals, so an important element of the current reforms to the global financial system is to create frameworks to ensure that the mistakes made in the run-up to this crisis are not forgot- ten and repeated once the key actors in this crisis are gone. It is difficult to predict the cause of the next crisis and this is why we actively support strong international institutions, where the IMF is of course a key player. THAILAND: THIRACHAI PHUVANATNARANUBALA Governor of the Bank I. The World Economy The President of the World Bank Group recently said that the world economy is entering a dangerous phase. The world economy has been growing at multi-speeds, driven by a few key emerging market countries but at the same time shackled by the problems in Europe and the weak growth of the United States. But now some of these emerging markets are also starting to face the risk of a slowdown. It will be a challenge as to how these countries can be guided towards a soft landing, in the face of the potential disruption that they may face with regard to capital flows and softened export demand. The world economy therefore needs immediate attention. And at no time is the role of Multilateral Development Institutions as important as now. II. Thai Economy Amidst these global challenges, I am glad to report that the Thai economy is still doing well. Growth this year will be around our potential at around 4.0 to 5.0 percent. The overall economic stability continues to be robust with inflation remaining mild, unemployment low, public debt level manageable, current account surplus adequate, and international reserves that is more than ample. The World Bank recognized these economic achievements. It has recently upgraded Thailand from a lower-middle-income economy to an upper-middle-income economy. Yet, we realize that to further pro- pel the Thai economy forward, we need to address the issue of national 116 competitiveness. That is, we must overcome the middle income trap by fostering private sector’s productivity and innovation as well as ensuring social inclusion. In this regard, the Royal Thai Government will give priority to provid- ing sound physical and non-physical infrastructure, support private sec- tors to attain more advanced technologies and equipments, and endorse higher minimum labor remuneration. With these policies in place, Thailand will rely more on domestic demand, with more emphasis on internal growth than the external. This, in fact, should be the path to be taken by other emerging countries. Under this silhouette, we appreciate the World Bank’s technical assis- tance, particularly on the topics of Specialized Financial Institution, Tax Reform, and Micro-finance, which will be hugely beneficial to the success of our mission. We are looking forward to further cooperation under our new Country Partnership Strategy for the next five years. III. Regional Economic and Financial Cooperation At the regional level, Thailand has developed many partnership pro- grams with ASEAN, ASEAN+3, and Greater Mekong Sub-region countries. You may be aware that ASEAN aims to more closely integrate our economies under the goal of ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2015. With the AEC, ASEAN will become more open, more outward-looking, more inclusive, and more market-driven, consistent with multilateral rules while adhering to rule-based systems for effective compliance and imple- mentation of economic commitments. AEC will position ASEAN as a single market and production base, with attraction comparable to China and India. The ASEAN+3 Chiang Mai Initiative which provides a self-man- aged Reserved Pooling Arrangement in order to address short-term liquidity problems of members is going well. Also, we have launched 700 million US Dollars Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility to support the issuance of local currency-denominated bonds in ASEAN+3 region. At the Greater Mekong Sub-region level, work is advancing to channel finances to our neighboring countries in the form of loans and grants for infrastructure development projects. This module should fit in well with the ASEAN Infrastructure Fund that is being launched with the Asian Development Bank concurrently with this meeting. IMF I shall now turn to the International Monetary Fund. We welcome the change in the management, and the new Managing Director’s vision to reform and improve the operation of the Fund. 117 Many years ago, the countries that demanded the Fund’s time and attention the most were the small emerging markets with their frequent crises. Nowadays, the Fund needs instead to more closely guide and monitor the advanced markets as well as the very large emerging markets. Crises of global proportion are rare. The only economies capable of starting crises of global proportion are the very large economies that pur- sue wrong policies. And the only institution that can effectively monitor, identify and put an early stop to these wrong policies is the Fund. World Bank Group As for the World Bank, we welcome the Bank’s New Trade Strategy, focusing on how to assist developing member countries to provide more opportunities for the poor through market means. We appreciate the leading role of the bank on Food Crisis through the establishment of the Global Food Crisis Response program. We also recognize that for countries to derive demographic dividend benefits, they have to provide better education, healthcare and job oppor- tunity for their women. We therefore encourage the Bank to expedite the implementation of the Gender Action Plan. Finally, we commend the Bank’s achievement of a historic IDA16 replenishment. As Thailand has voluntarily prepaid the outstanding IDA credit, we also believe that this amount of fund will be used promptly in the Bank’s operation. Let me end by expressing our most sincere appreciation to the Boards of Governors, Management, and staff of the Bank and the Fund. The only way to tackle the difficult agenda ahead is to all work hand in hand. TIMOR-LESTE: EMILIA PIRES Governor of the Bank and the Fund I am honored to be here at the World Bank and International Monetary Fund Annual Meeting to update both my colleagues from around the globe and my colleagues from these two pivotal institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, that bring us together each year. This year has been a year of historical context, when I believe the developing and the developed, while from vastly different contexts, are merging to meet many of the same challenges. The G20 agricultural Min- isters were brought together for the first time to discuss food insecurity, land rights and use and increased productivity, a common theme in the developing world. Much of the Euro zone is in debt crisis with budget deficits set to worsen not unlike many fragile and post conflict nations. People around the world are insecure about their livelihoods given the pressure from economic forecasts and looming financial conditions. There 118 is no disparity between People’s will for a secure livelihood in any part of the world. Last year, I broached the topic of the necessity of collectivism in facing these challenges as a global community. Even though Timor- Leste is one of the smallest nations in the world, I believe we were able to contribute to the value of collectivism in 2011. In August, Timor- Leste hosted the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative Confer- ence; Beyond the EITI, bringing together 28 countries. This marked the launch of the Timor-Leste Transparency Model, five pillars which extend the principles of EITI for better, more inclusive, resource management. Timor-Leste was able to begin the global dialogue on how the EITI principles can be expanded to a 360-degree value chain of fiscal accountability, promoting good governance and better results for the People of resource rich countries. Timor-Leste was only the third country in the world to become EITI compliant. For a nation like Timor-Leste, that is highly dependent on natural resources to fund future economic growth and human develop- ment, these initiatives were considered vital. Today, the nations reaching compliance has grown ten–fold, both developing and developed, standing collectively on the issue of transparent regulations, and strong, open and accountable governance in resource management. If we can reach this milestone in resource management, there is no doubt we can reach a level of consensus on transparent global fiscal and economic policies which affect us all as interconnected borders, regions and continents. 2011 marked the launch of Timor-Leste’s Strategic Development Plan (SDP) 2011–2030, outlining the policies to transform Timor-Leste into an upper middle income country with a healthy, educated and secure population by 2030. However; if the IMF sees the euro zone debt crisis as a trigger for overheating emerging market economies, Timor-Leste’s experience tells us, yes, this is a valid concern. While Timor-Leste is not an emerging economy, it is an economy that is growing exponentially due to its life span, oil wealth and strategic plans. As we invest into our own economy, importing both materials and labor for infrastructure works while also investing into our own human capacity to reduce the reliance on foreign experts and exports, we are feeling the fiscal pressure of domestic inflation. Add drivers like increases in international food prices, depreciation of the US dollar and increases in recurrent expenditure and we faced a dramatic increase in domestic infla- tion to 12.4 percent by June 2011. This compels us to continually review fiscal policy and monitor closely our accelerated growth and planning. Given these factors and others, Timor-Leste has taken the necessary steps to diversify the Petroleum Fund with an investment policy better aligned to the fiscal policy and Timor-Leste’s nation building program. The amended legislation passed by National Parliament on August 23, 2011 119 strengthens the already internationally acclaimed governance framework embedded in the architecture of the original 2005 law. A key change in the amended law was to apply the fundamental financial market principle of diversification. The Petroleum Fund Law now allows for investment instruments other than US Government bonds and hopefully, increasing the share of equities will increase the expected long-term return. The law now allows 50 percent of the fund to be invested in equities and other asset classes rather than the conservative 10 percent as per the former mandate in the law. Having successfully reformed much of the public finance manage- ment system, confidence in capacity has increased with positive results; increased budget execution, increased tax collection and compliance, increased decentralization and increased automation with transpar- ency and accountability at the forefront of the reforms. This year, the Timor-Leste Transparency Portal was launched which made the State Budget on-line for all to analyze, study and explore as well as the e-Procurement Portal. By January 2012, the e-Procurement Portal will be on-line for equality, fairness and anti-graft assurances. In all, four on-line portals will be available to the public in 2012 including the aid portal and the results portal which will show the outcomes of State expenditure. Although Timor-Leste’s challenges remain vast, last year at the 2010 Annual Meeting, we reported the Petroleum Fund was US$6,592 billion, averaging a return of US$138 million per month from oil and gas revenues with a forecast of US$150 million per month for 2011 or $8.7 billion by year’s end. The Petroleum Fund balance as of 2 September, 2011 reached $8.8 billion with an actual average of $176.4 million per month. Prudently managed, the Petroleum Fund will be an enabling tool to transform the nation’s non-oil economy, build the necessary basic and core infrastructure for private sector growth and also begin the arduous task of educating our People so they may take their chosen path in the course of Statebuilding. With these measures, Timor-Leste has proudly been able to go into the second year leading the g7+, seventeen fragile and post conflict countries including Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, Solo- mon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, and Timor-Leste. Together, these nations have consolidated a united voice, with a focus in 2011 on identify- ing Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSG’s) as a prerequisite to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Timor-Leste continues to co-chair the International Dialogue with the Netherlands, promoting the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding agenda with global organizations, development partners and partner countries to ensure the voice of the 120 post conflict and fragile nations gets heard with one message and a future vision for the betterment of our People. In closing, Timor-Leste, as one of the world’s newest nations, still only a decade long in its nation-building cycle continues on an upward trajectory. The United Nations is now preparing for withdrawal following consecutive years of calm and stability since 2007. With elections slated for 2012, we are confident in the strengthened abilities and reforms to the State and its Institutions that democratic principles will prevail, the nation will stay on course and Timor-Leste will maintain its strategic plan for a future of peace and prosperity for its citizens. TONGA: SUNIA MANU FILI Governor of the Bank and the Fund I am honored to have the opportunity to address the 2011 Interna- tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank Group (WB) Board of Governors’ Annual Meetings. I would like to congratulate and welcome Ms Christine Lagarde on her first Annual Meetings in her capacity as the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund. On behalf of the Tongan delegation, I would like to express my appre- ciation to the Fund and Bank for the excellent arrangements of this important meeting. This is an opportunity for us to collectively reflect on what we have accomplished to date since the onset of the global economic crisis and chart our future direction in a changing world. The impact of the global economic crisis which engulfed economies three years ago continues to echo today. While the international com- munity and the international financial institutions have responded to the plight of the developing countries with remarkable unity of effort, the economic recovery remains fragile and uncertain. One year ago we had looked forward to a gradual return to economic growth, but recent events suggest that this may be some time further away as the larger and more advanced economies seek to address their own domestic economic challenges. Tongan Economy For the past three years, Tonga’s economy went through a period of economic contraction associated initially with the rapid increase of international food and fuel prices, followed by the onset of the global economic crisis, and exacerbated by a succession of natural disasters including a tsunami and a drought. 121 The path towards economic recovery is not easy. Tonga is highly dependent on foreign remittances which are adversely affected by the impact of the global economic crisis. The decline of remittances, par- ticularly from the United States, has reduced household incomes signifi- cantly affecting domestic aggregate demand and government tax revenue collections. The main outcome of this has been an increase in the fiscal deficit and an associated impact on government’s service delivery as well as increased hardship within the community. Fortunately the development partners, including the Fund and the Bank, have responded positively to the government’s request for support. The economy has still not returned to the state that it was in prior to the global economic crisis, but the government anticipates that posi- tive growth can be achieved through its policies of fiscal consolidation and structural reform with additional support from its development partners. In the recently announced budget for 2011/2012, the government plans to regain sustainable fiscal stability while enhancing service delivery and thereby contributing to economic growth. Following Tonga’s first democratic election in November 2010, the government, which took office in January 2011, announced a new medium-term national development plan, the Tonga Strategic Develop- ment Framework, to provide the platform for its economic policies over the period until 2014. The government continues to make significant improvement to its public financial management system. One of the key commitments by the government is the proposed implementation of a Medium Term Budget Framework (MTBF) in the next financial year. At the same time, the government, with the support of its development partners including the Bank, has made significant progress with energy and infrastructure development, particularly the planned installation of a submarine fiber optic cable. This infrastructure improvement should enhance the transmittal speed of digital communication, a critical factor to the development of the private sector. While Tonga has maintained its commitment to achieving substan- tial progress of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), par- ticularly in the basic areas of human development, there is continuing hardship facing households and communities in the rural areas and outer islands. The government plans to introduce a social protection scheme to mitigate increased hardships amongst the more vulnerable members of society. The government is committed to maintaining the momentum of the ongoing economic reforms and despite recent challenges, it is optimistic about future developments. 122 The World Bank Group The global economy is still facing urgent and pressing issues, which calls for continued engagement by the international financial com- munity with low income countries to take appropriate measures to address them. The post-crisis strategy developed a year ago identified five priority actions for the World Bank Group, one of which is targeting the “poor and vulnerable.� This underscores the importance of coordination with relevant parties, particularly the private sector, and appropriately putting jobs and gender at the center of policy development. This comes with determination in using collective capacity to implement what had been mapped out as key lessons in the 2011 World Development Report (WDR). The global economic crisis has taken a heavy toll across many coun- tries with negative impact on employment and incomes undoing the accumulated economic gains of the past decade, undermining progress towards achieving MDGs, and creating serious risks for social sustain- ability and cohesion. In this regard, the effort by the Bank to develop a framework to address the concerns over jobless recovery is welcomed. The Bank has rightly avoided applying universal solutions by searching for strategies that suit individual countries. At the same time, the Bank’s work could take a more integrated approach across sectors and also across countries given global interdependencies. With the ability of the Bank to mobilize resources, it can take a com- prehensive analysis by looking into jobs as the key of development that connects the need to lift the living standard of people, productivity gains across sectors, and social change and cohesion. In this connection, the launching of the crisis response window under IDA16 is welcomed as it should help strengthen the IDA’s capacity to support its member countries in their quest for economic growth and jobs creation. Furthermore, the Bank’s review of its strategic approach to address gender parities is also welcomed. Indeed, this is a core development objective and it cannot be overemphasized enough given that it would enhance productivity, improve the life of the next generation, and make institutions and societies more representative. While it is recognized that substantial resources have been allocated through different developmental instruments to address gender parity, it is considered that more can be done through greater engagement in country-level gender diagnostic, so that needed interventions are clearly understood for the Bank to provide effective and meaningful support. The importance of more effective coordination cannot be over emphasized. The Tongan government wishes to formally express its gratitude to the Bank for its support during these difficult economic and financial times. 123 The support has been provided by way of budgetary support, project grants and policy advice. For a small country with limited resources, such support has been most welcomed and appreciated. In this regard, the Bank’s regional office based in Sydney has been most effective and the Bank’s staffs have been very proactive in engaging with the government to address its policy challenges, and the govern- ment looks forward to this close working relationship continuing into the foreseeable future. The International Monetary Fund The continuing efforts by the Fund to support member countries to maintain financial and economic stability in the aftermath of the global economic crisis is welcomed. The initiatives by the Fund to broaden the surveillance mandate to ensure a more balanced focus on various risks such as fiscal, monetary and financial sector risks is especially welcomed in the aftermath of the global economic crisis. Furthermore the Fund’s on-going discussion with the Bank on strengthening global financial safety nets is also timely. There is a need to review the Fund’s lending toolkit for low income countries, including fragile states so that country-specific circumstances are more effectively incorporated into staff assessments, and also to ensure that there are adequate resources devoted to the engagement with such states, as this is of particular importance for the smaller members of the Fund. The Fund’s on-going reviews of the Debt Sustainability Analysis framework together with the studies on the spillover effects of events in the advanced member countries are welcomed. These are significant contributions which will be very useful for Tonga in light of her experi- ences of the impact of the recent global economic crisis. The government of Tonga is grateful to the Fund for the close coop- eration and engagement over the past year during a time of significant fiscal pressure as a consequence of the global economic crisis. The policy advice received from the Fund and its staff, as well as the support pro- vided by the Pacific Financial Technical Assistance Center based in Suva, Fiji Islands, has been a significant contribution to enhancing the limited capacity of the government. The recent establishment of the office of the Resident Representative for the Pacific has contributed positively to a closer working relationship between the government and the Fund staff. This has resulted in enhancing the government’s economic manage- ment capability which has supported the maintenance of the country’s macroeconomic stability. May I conclude by wishing the Bank and the Fund continued success in resolving the many difficult challenges that lie ahead. 124 TURKEY: ALI BABACAN Governor of the Fund We are living in interesting times. Each day we are witnessing swift mood shifts, abnormal market developments and substantial volatility. Glimmers of strength in the global economy are steadily fading away and outlook is becoming bleak. Once striving to recover from one of the deepest downturns in history, global economy is now facing several risks. Debt sustainability concerns and weak growth prospects of the advanced economies stand out as the most urgent problems. Sovereign debt crisis is spreading and becoming a major threat as the concerns on the Euro-zone economies intensify. We need to recognize that political squabbles, lack of coordinated and decisive action lie at the core of these problems. Weak growth prospects undermine the market confidence and make it harder to achieve significant fiscal consolidation. We have, at all times, urged that policymakers should develop a medium-term approach and announce credible targets. By this way the markets can be reassured and confidence can be restored. At the same time, we need to deal with surging and volatile com- modity prices. Higher and fluctuating prices carry the risk of further destabilizing our economies through supply shocks. We should improve the regulation of commodity markets and increase the transparency of price setting mechanisms. High structural unemployment is another challenge that prevents a healthy and stable global growth. As many economies are struggling with fiscal concerns, there is little room to implement further stimulus measures. Long-lasting and structural unemployment also restricts the effectiveness of these stimulus measures. We need to prepare the work- force for the requirements of the new economy through active labor market programs. International policy coordination and coordinated efforts are the keys to all these challenges. International financial institutions, especially the IMF, have a pivotal role to play while implementing coordinated policies. We should make a comprehensive review and restructuring of the Fund’s surveillance function so as to increase its effectiveness. Also, we should pay attention to solving the long-lasting representation problem. This is a critical issue for the Fund’s legitimacy. Therefore, we call for the timely completion of the 14th quota review in IMF and implementation of the envisaged restructuring at the Board of Executive Directors. We have achieved a significant success by approving these reforms. We should not undermine them by delaying their imple- mentation. All the members should undertake their part to conclude much needed reforms. 125 Let me touch upon the recent developments in the Turkish economy. We have been witnessing very strong growth performance during the last six quarters. In 2010 Turkish economy grew by 9.0 percent while the growth rate jumped to 10.2 percent in the first half of 2011. There is a similar growth pattern in the labor market. Over the last 12 months period, nearly 1.4 million new jobs were created, bringing down the unem- ployment rate from 10.5 percent to 9.2 percent. Despite this robust performance, we are not losing sight of the risks threatening the global economy. Our government units, Central Bank, Treasury, Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency have taken sev- eral measures in close coordination. With these steps we try to avert the overheating concerns, curb excessive rise in the indebtedness ratios and solidify the financial stability. Structural reforms implemented in the last decade are one of the main factors behind the favorable economic performance. We are committed to enhance the effectiveness of all these reforms and consolidate the successes we have achieved so far. We are hammering out policies and structural reforms that our economy needs. Our agenda comprises of labor market reforms, judicial reforms, product market reforms, reforms aimed at improving the investment environment and transforming Istan- bul into a global financial centre. We will also continue to firmly support research and development investments in Turkey. We have been going through critical times for the global economic and financial stability. Our decisions and efforts have the power to affect many years to come. Therefore, I suggest that all policymakers handle the issues with decisiveness and a forward looking approach. We should not hesitate to bite the bullet when necessary. TUVALU: LOTOALA METIA Governor of the Bank and the Fund (on behalf of Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu) Last year was our first as a member to both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group (WBG). This year, I have been given the opportunity to deliver this statement on behalf of the Pacific States comprising of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Palau, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. As the smallest mem- ber country in both institutions, it is indeed an honor and a privilege to address this forum on issues and challenges that are particular to Pacific Island Countries (PICs). 126 Pacific Island Economies Pacific economies are still recovering from the effects of the Global Economic Crisis. The current uncertainty surrounding the global recovery and the second-round effects of food and oil prices present immediate macroeconomic challenges to our fiscal and external sustainability. As a group of small vulnerable countries, with narrow export and produc- tion bases, and geographical remoteness, we face broadly similar chal- lenges resulting largely from diseconomies of scale. However, each Pacific economy has distinct needs and requires tailored solutions. Well targeted efforts are necessary to overcome current macroeconomic challenges, and create jobs to progress our national and international development goals. We remain committed to national and regional actions to generate growth aimed to improve the well-being of our people. To this end, we will persevere with reform and implement policies and capital projects that promote private sector development and strengthen sectors of com- parative advantage such as agriculture, tourism, and fisheries. Given our limited technical capacities, the achievement of these priorities will require ongoing coordinated support provided by partners such as the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund. Climate Change Climate change is now the most serious threat to our regional eco- nomic growth prospects and more fundamentally the security of people’s livelihood in our region. We need urgent tailor-made solutions for the implementation of critical and urgent adaptation priorities. Implementation of mitigation and adaptation initiatives is a matter of national survival, not only for Pacific states but also for other developing member countries. We are hopeful therefore that the Bank and the Fund can assist by providing necessary support including simplifying the access criteria for the various climate change financing and fast tracking their drawdown through our national systems to support the implementation of national pri- orities. While some progress is being made, we believe more needs to be done. World Bank Group Country Assistance Strategy and IDA Resources In this regard, we welcome the first joint World Bank and IFC Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Kiribati, approved by the Board early this year. This is a positive development for the World Bank Group, delivering on its commitment to develop individual strategies for the Pacific Island countries. In welcoming this, we would like the Bank to set out a clear timeframe for the development of the remaining Country Assistance Strategies for other countries in our region. 127 We also commend the World Bank Group for its long standing support which is sustained through IDA resources. IDA Resources have been a key complementary force in assisting us to address our pressing priorities and in particular infrastructure development, telecommunication reform, agriculture development and food security, institutional reform, energy and climate change adaptation, as well as budget support. Governance Reform We support the implementation of the quota and governance reforms in both the Bank and the Fund to make the two Institutions more rel- evant and representative of emerging markets and developing countries. In this context, while we agree with the Boards of both Institutions that the quota and governance reform would need to enhance the representation of dynamic economies, we would like to underscore that such increase should not come at the expense of other developing countries, such as our own. Surveillance, Technical Assistance and Representation We consider effective and regular surveillance as critical in strength- ening macroeconomic frameworks and driving the structural changes needed to improve our resilience to regional and global challenges. In that context, we note the Fund’s commitment to look into the spillover effects from Australia and New Zealand, as well as the United States and Europe on our region. We also encourage the Fund to update Pacific countries’ Financial Sector Assessment Programs, to support sound poli- cies in this sector. In this connection, we consider the provision of well coordinated and timely technical assistance (TA), relative to our absorptive capacities remains essential for ensuring sound policy development and analysis. The ongoing work of PFTAC and IFC is critical in this regard. We will support the World Bank Group and the Fund to increase their presence in the Pacific, including through co-location with the PFTAC and other multilateral institutions. Donor Coordination We believe coordination amongst donors and developmental partners is needed for improved efficiency and cost effectiveness and we believe both the Bank and the Fund have important roles to play in donor coor- dination. The Pacific Principles on Aid effectiveness and the Forum Com- pact on Strengthening Development Coordination provide a framework for continuous improvement, and we look forward to working with the Bank and Fund to improve performance in this regard. 128 We are encouraged by the commitment of the World Bank and the IMF to the Pacific by working together in partnership to ensure efforts are complementary to those of other development partners. Conclusion We trust our engagements at this year’s Annual Meeting once again demonstrate the importance of our partnership with the IMF and the World Bank Group. I would like to convey the gratitude of our Govern- ments to the Management of the World Bank Group and the IMF for all their support over the year. We look forward to working closely again over the coming year to address the issues that have been highlighted. In this regard, let me formally welcome Ms Christine Lagarde, the new Managing Director of the Fund. We look forward to working with you, and invite you and the President of the World Bank Group to our region to witness firsthand the development challenges we face, and to help address our needs. Let me finally take this opportunity to convey our collective grat- itude to the outgoing Vice President for East Asia and the Pacific Region of the World Bank Group, Mr. Jim Adams. Mr. Adam’s vision and leadership ensured that Pacific issues were prioritized within the World Bank Group. We wish Mr. Adams the very best in his future endeavors and, we look forward to working closely with the incoming Vice President. UNITED STATES: TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER Governor of the Bank and the Fund On behalf of President Obama, welcome to Washington. Decisive action is needed in the face of renewed challenges. Economic growth has slowed, especially in the advanced economies, and financial stress has intensified. Slow growth threatens to cause a negative spiral, under- mining our ability to create good jobs that contribute to demand and exacerbating fiscal strains. In order to spur economic growth in the short term, President Obama recently proposed a $447 billion package of public investments, tax incen- tives, and targeted jobs measures. The President’s proposal includes: payroll tax cuts for both workers and small businesses; targeted hiring incentives; immediate investments in infrastructure and schools and the creation of a National Infrastructure Bank; and extension and reform of unemploy- ment insurance to help facilitate workforce re-entry for the unemployed. Private economists estimate that these proposed measures could increase 129 real economic growth next year by around one and a half percentage points and create more than one million jobs at a critical moment in the recovery. Alongside near-term support for the economic recovery, we remain committed to credible steps to restore fiscal sustainability in the medium term. This week the President put forward a plan to reduce deficits by more than $3 trillion over the next 10 years, more than offsetting the cost of any additional near-term accommodation. This deficit reduction would be on top of the $1 trillion in spending cuts enacted this summer. The President’s proposal for $4 trillion in deficit reduction would bring the U.S. into primary surplus by the middle of the decade, resulting in a decrease in the debt-to-GDP ratio from 2015 to 2021. In order to meet these fiscal targets, the President proposed specific reforms to spending programs and called for comprehensive reform of the tax code, including reducing spending through the tax code. For its part, Europe’s most important contribution is to take action to resolve its sovereign debt and financial crisis. European governments and the European Central Bank must work together to demonstrate an unequivocal commitment to support Europe’s financial system and ensure that European banks have recourse to adequate capital and funding. Fur- ther action to create effective firewalls against contagion is still necessary. Restarting strong global growth will also require more effective action to rebalance global demand. Broader and faster appreciation of the ren- minbi and other polices necessary to boost domestic consumption in China and other emerging economies with large external surpluses will help to achieve much-needed rebalancing of global demand. The imperative remains to strengthen economic growth through con- tinued global coordination. Now we must all deliver on the G20 com- mitments made in Seoul to address key imbalances that threaten strong, sustainable, and balanced growth. Fiscal policy everywhere has to be guided by the imperatives of growth. As for monetary policy, inflation risks are on average, though not everywhere, less acute. This means some central banks will continue to ease policy, while some will keep rates lower longer and slow the pace of expected tightening. In addition to individual countries’ actions, the International Mon- etary Fund (IMF) has a vital role to play in the international monetary system. We have made significant progress in strengthening the func- tioning of the IMF, including through agreements to reform the Fund’s governance structure and to increase its resources. The IMF’s increased lending in the wake of the crisis and since then has been crucial to the global recovery. The Fund is closely collaborating with the G20 in its Mutual Assessment Process and analyzing necessary adjustments to tackle large and persistent external imbalances. 130 In addition to the growth challenges facing the global economy, there are new and unique development challenges. The Middle East and North Africa is undergoing one of the most important transitions of our time. We are committed to working with our partners to support transitions in Egypt and Tunisia. The success of these emerging democracies will hinge on build- ing strong and inclusive economies that improve people’s lives, especially the lives of young people. International financial institutions will be central to this effort. We welcome the efforts of the multilateral institutions to sup- port near-term financial needs of transition countries, along with supporting home grown reforms that improve governance, enhance growth, and expand opportunities for citizens. As endorsed in the latest U.N. Security Council Resolution, we welcome the role of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in helping Libyan authorities to develop transparent and accountable mechanisms for managing the country’s public finances. In Africa, several countries face one of the worst famines in decades. At this very time, we welcome the vital response of the World Bank and other multilateral agencies to this acute crisis. This crisis, coupled with two food price spikes in the past three years, calls for concerted global action to strengthen food security and agriculture. To this end, we continue to sup- port the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP), which has proven to be a key source of transparent and competitive financing for country-led, evidence-based agricultural development strategies in the world’s poorest countries, encouraging countries to take a comprehensive and inclusive approach to agricultural investment and reform. The fund has allocated nearly half a billion in grants to 12 countries. These invest- ments are expected to increase the incomes and improve food security for 7.5 million people. It is clear that, while much has been achieved, there remains an acute need for the Bank’s continued efforts to combat poverty and promote broad-based, sustainable economic growth, includ- ing by strengthening the private sector and developing infrastructure and through climate change adaptation and prevention. From global poverty to historic transitions to climate change, the World Bank and the regional development banks are on the front lines of the globe’s most pressing economic and national security challenges. In an environment of tight national budgets in advanced economies, no other institutions can so effectively leverage our limited resources or more strongly reflect our shared priorities of reducing poverty and hunger. We will work closely with our Congress to meet our capital increase commit- ments and replenishment of the International Development Association. 131 VIETNAM: NGUYEN VAN BINH Governor of the Fund First of all, on behalf of the Government of Vietnam, I would like to express our privilege and happiness to be here with you, in Washington D.C, to have our annual discussion on issues of common interest. And this is especially a great pleasure for me for the first time in the position of Governor of the Fund and the Bank for Vietnam to address you all. In the first eight months of 2011, the world economy showed sign of recovery mainly supported by strong economic growth of developing countries. However, the recovery was slow, unstable and uneven across regions. Major challenges and vulnerabilities remained ahead including rising global commodity prices, political unrest in the Middle-East and North Africa, the natural disaster and nuclear catastrophe in Japan, pro- longed public debt and budget deficit in Europe, freezing of global credit, dysfunction of financial markets and the resulting blows to confidence. We are all aware of the extraordinarily dire economic consequences that such these facts could have. In this context, the Fund and Bank have played well their roles to sup- port the member countries to address those vulnerabilities and challenges individually and globally and to this end, to help their members achieve sustainable growth and the Millennium Development Goals as a whole. We are all aware of recent increase in food and energy prices, pro- found and prolonged public debt and financial distress that posed serious threats to us all. We therefore appreciate the Fund’s and the Bank’s role in responding to those challenges, especially in helping member countries to mitigate the effects of the food and energy hiked prices. However, the rising concern of a repetition of economic crisis due to recent movements in the global economy including deadly natural disasters, looming public debt and financial distress, higher inflation trend across the regions etc., requires a stronger role of the Bank in continuing to support its clients. We also support the Bank’s creation of a crisis response window, an effort to enhance the Bank’s ability to help its low-income member countries in dealing with certain but unpredictable disasters and achieving sustain- able development. We highly appreciate the significant success of IDA16 Replenishment of approximately US$50 billion. It clearly showed a greater global coali- tion of the donors and our commitment to meet the MDGs by 2015. We also endorse the overarching theme for IDA16 period to secure “Devel- opment Results,� focusing on crisis response, fragile and conflict-affected countries, gender, and climate change. 132 As I have mentioned earlier, the recent food and energy hiked prices posed serious threats to global food security, we thus welcome the Bank’s hosting of the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program and establishing of the Global Food Crisis Response Program to pro- vide immediate relief to countries hard hit by high food price. We urge the Bank to work out with other international development partners including G20 and Multilateral Development Banks to help people in the Horn of Africa overcome the current drought and famine. In this context, the Bank also needs to pay more attention to agriculture production of the East Asia and Pacific as it plays dominant role in ensuring global food security. We highly appreciate the WB’s call for pushing sustainable develop- ment by literately responding to the Climate Change. The recent earth- quake and tsunami in Japan, US and others require us to jointly act now on climate change. Developing countries will bear most of the costs of the damage from climate change. Many people in developing countries live in physically exposed locations and economically precarious conditions, and their financial and institutional capacity to adapt is limited. Thus, support from the Bank and other development partners needs to be stronger and wider to help them mitigate the impacts of those challenges. In the context of current great challenges in the global economy, especially regarding sovereign debt in advanced countries, unbalanced growth and social instability, it is encouraging that the IMF’s role has grown tremendously, reflecting in its calling for global coordinated policy during the crisis, reforming lending instruments, and providing policy advice and technical assistance support. After giving sharp recommendations for policy actions globally during the global economic crisis, helping the world to recover, the IMF is further appreciated for its assistance provided for the Group of 20 industrialized and emerging economies in reshaping the international regulation and governance. In order to support member countries to recover from the crisis, the IMF has increased its lending capacity and tailored instruments to countries’ particular needs. The Fund’s support in giving policy advices and technical assistance is also highly appreciated. With its unique expertise, the Fund’s policy advices have help countries, including Vietnam to build up stronger econ- omies. Besides the traditional technical assistance programs, we welcome the IMF’s creation of 3 topical trust funds, to expand the externally funded assistance to meet member countries’ large demands for practical and on- the-ground support, from which Vietnam also benefits much, particularly for our anti-money laundering efforts. 133 Looking forward, we expect to see the IMF, under the new leadership of Madame Christine Lagarde, continue its important reforms, especially in quota and voice issues, including the protection of quotas shares of poorest countries, as well as strengthened voices of dynamic and devel- oping countries at the Fund. We also support the IMF’s willingness to adapt itself to focus more on serving member countries with the same extent as focusing on the international monetary system; to have more comprehensive surveillance, not only looking at the traditional macro- economic measures, but also other factors including social and political issues; to keep track of the global interconnectedness and improve the Fund’s credibility. Now let me turn to the recent developments of our country. Since the last Annual Meeting, there were several important political and social events in Vietnam, including the National Assembly election and the 11th Party Congress. The success of these events has created a solid confidence of the people in the country development pathway and served as a strong base for Vietnam to initiate its new five year socio-economic develop- ment plan for 2011–2015 and to implement the 10 year socio-economic development strategy for 2011–2020. The Government continues to decisively pursue reforms and policies to ensure the macroeconomic stability as well as the rationally high and sustainable economic growth. With regard to the current external shocks, we fully recognized the challenges and difficulties posed to our economy including macroeco- nomic uncertainty, inflation risks and major global economic distur- bances. Therefore, on the February 24, 2011 the Government has issued the Resolution 11 containing a wide range of bold actions to address challenges and to restore macroeconomic stability. The measures adopted under the Resolution 11 have started to show positive results toward regaining Vietnam’s macroeconomic stability. Despite these initial achievements, challenges that we face in stabiliz- ing economic and financial conditions conductive to healthy growth are still remained ahead. Inflationary pressure, macroeconomic imbalances, climate change and the like continue to threaten our efforts in stabilizing the economy and ensuring our social targets. Apart from our consistent efforts, the support and assistance from our development partners, includ- ing the Bank and the Fund, play a critical role in this regard and we hope you can continue to assist us in our endeavor. To conclude, allow me to reveal our high appreciation to dear col- leagues at the Fund and the Bank for their excellent arrangements for this important opportunity. I wish the meetings a great success. 134 DOCUMENTS OF THE BOARDS OF GOVERNORS SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS1,2,3 Tuesday September 23 10:00 a.m. Opening Ceremonies Address from the Chair Annual Address by President, World Bank Group4 Annual Address by Managing Director, International Monetary Fund Procedures Committees Reports Chairman, ICSID Administrative Council Adjournment 2:00 p.m. ICSID (continued) Report by Secretary-General, ICSID Recommended Guidelines for ICSID Annulments (requested by The Republic of the Philippines) 1 The Meetings were held at DAR Constitution Hall (Friday a.m. session). The ICSID session continued at 2:00 p.m. in the IFC Auditorium, 2121 Pennsylvania Ave., NW. 2 The Development Committee met on Saturday, September 24, 2011 at 3:00 p.m. in the Preston Auditorium, World Bank HQ. 3 The reports of the Joint Procedures Committee (JPC) and MIGA Procedures Committee (MPC) were approved on September 22, 2011 on an absence of objec- tion basis and the Committees’ conclusion to the Boards of Governors were deliv- ered by the Chair at the plenary session on September 23, 2011. 4 The World Bank Group consists of the following: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) International Finance Corporation (IFC) International Development Association (IDA) International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) 135 PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF THE MEETINGS1 ADMISSION 1. Session of the Boards of Governors of the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund will be joint and shall open to accredited press, guests and staff. 2. Meetings of the Joint Procedures Committee shall be open only to Governors who are members of the Committee and their advisers, Executive Directors, and such staff as may be necessary. PROCEDURES AND RECORDS 3. The Chairman of the Boards of Governors will establish the order of speaking at each session. Governors signifying a desire to speak will generally be recognized in the order in which they ask to speak. 4. With the consent of the Chairman, a Governor may extend his state- ment in the record following advance submission of the text to the Secretaries. 5. The Secretaries will have verbatim transcripts prepared of the proceed- ings of the Boards of Governors and the Joint Procedures Committee. The transcripts of proceedings of the Joint Procedures Committee will be confidential and available only to the Chairman, the President of the World Bank Group, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, and the Secretaries. 6. Reports of the Joint Procedures Committee shall be signed by the Committee Chairman and the Reporting Members. PUBLIC INFORMATION 7. The Chairman of the Boards of Governors, the President of the World Bank Group and the Managing Director of the International Mon- etary Fund will communicate to the press such information concerning the proceedings of the Annual Meetings as they may deem suitable. 1 Approved on May 2, 2011, pursuant to the By-laws, IBRD Section 5(d), IFC Sec- tion 4(d), and IDA Section 1(a). 136 AGENDAS BANK1 Annual Report Financial Statements and Annual Audit Allocation of FY11 Net Income Administrative Budget for FY12 Annual Report of the Development Committee Selection of the Members of the Joint Procedures Committee and its Officers for 2011–2012 IFC1 Annual Report Financial Statements and Annual Audit Use of IFC’s FY11 Net Income: Retained Earnings and Designated Retained Earnings Administrative Budget for FY12 IDA1 IBRD/IDA Annual Report Financial Statements and Annual Audit Administrative Budget for FY12 MIGA2 Annual Report Financial Statements and Annual Audit Selection of the Members of the MIGA Procedures Committee and its Officers for 2011–2012 1 Approved on August 10, 2011 pursuant to the By-laws, IBRD Section 5(d), IFC Section 4(d), and IDA Section 1(a). 2 Approved on August 10, 2011 pursuant to Section 4(a) of the MIGA By-laws. 137 JOINT PROCEDURES COMMITTEE Chairman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Bahamas Vice Chairmen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Georgia Pakistan Reporting Member . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Philippines Members Australia Japan Bangladesh Kenya Belgium Malaysia Burkina Faso Norway Egypt Paraguay France Saudi Arabia Gambia Trinidad and Tobago Germany United Kingdom Guatemala United States Italy 138 REPORTS OF THE JOINT PROCEDURES COMMITTEE REPORT I September 21, 2011 The Joint Procedures Committee approved on September 21, 2011, submission of the following report and recommendations on Bank and IDA business to the Boards of Governors: 1. 2011 Annual Report The Committee noted that the 2011 Annual Report and the activi- ties of the Bank and IDA would be discussed at these Annual Meet- ings. The Annual Report is available on the Bank’s website after September 19 (www.worldbank.org/annualreport). 2. Financial Statements, Annual Audits, and Administrative Budgets The Committee considered the Financial Statements, Accountants’ Reports, and Administrative Budgets contained in the 2011 Bank and IDA Annual Report, together with the Report dated June 20, 2011 (Bank/IDA Document No. 2). The Committee recommends that the Boards of Governors of the Bank and IDA adopt the draft Resolutions. . . .1 3. Allocation of FY11 Net Income The Committee considered the Report of the Executive Directors, dated August 4, 2011 on the Allocation of FY11 Net Income. . . .2 The Committee recommends that the Board of Governors of the Bank adopt the draft resolution. . . .3 1 These resolutions were subsequently approved. See pages 160 and 176. 2 This resolution was subsequently approved. See page 198. 3 This resolution was subsequently approved. See page 160. 139 The Committee further approved submission of the follow- ing report and recommendations on IFC business to the Board of Governors: 1. 2011 Annual Report The Committee noted that the 2011 Annual Report and the activi- ties of the IFC would be discussed at these Annual Meetings. The Annual Report is available on the Corporation’s website after Sep- tember 19 (http://www.ifc.org/annualreport). 2. Financial Statements, Annual Audit, Administrative Budget and Designation of Retained Earnings The Committee considered the Financial Statements and Accoun- tants’ Report, the Administrative Budget and the Designation of Retained Earnings based on IFC’s FY10 Net Income contained in the 2010 Annual Report, dated June 20, 2011. The Committee recommends that the Board of Governors of IFC adopt the draft resolution. . . .1 Approved: /s/ Hubert A. Ingraham The Bahamas – Chairman /s/ Dimitri Gvindadze Georgia – Vice Chairman /s/ Yaseen Anwar Abdul Hafeez Shaikh Pakistan – Vice Chairman Report I was approved by the Joint Procedures Committee (JPC) at noon on September 21, 2011. Reports signed by the Chairman and Vice Chair- man will be maintained by the Bank and Fund Secretaries. (This report was approved and its recommendations were adopted by the Board of Governors on September 23, 2011.) 1 This resolution was subsequently approved. See page 179. 140 JOINT PROCEDURES COMMITTEE REPORT III1 September 21, 2011 The Joint Procedures Committee approved on September 21, 2011 submission of the following report and recommendations to the Boards of Governors: 1. Development Committee The Committee noted that the Report of the Chairman of the Joint Ministerial Committee of the Boards of Governors of the Bank and the Fund on the Transfer of Real Resources to Develop- ing Countries (Development Committee) would be circulated to the Boards of Governors of the Fund and the Bank pursuant to paragraph 5 of Resolutions Nos. 294 and 29-9 of the Bank and the Fund, respectively . . . 2 and subsequently entered into the record. The Committee recommends that the Boards of Governors of the Bank and the Fund note the report and thanks the Development Committee for its work. 2. Officers and Joint Procedures Committee for 2011/2012 The Committee recommends that the Governor for Lebanon be Chairman, and that the Governors for El Salvador and Netherlands be Vice Chairmen, of the Boards of Governors of the World Bank Group and the Fund, to hold office until the close of the next Annual Meet- ings. It is further recommended that a Joint Procedures Committee be established to be available, after the termination of these meetings and until the close of the next Annual Meetings, for consultation at the discretion of the Chairman, normally by correspondence and, if the occasion requires, by convening; and that this Committee shall consist of the Governors for the following members: Algeria, Austria, Chile, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, St Lucia, Timor-Leste, United Kingdom, and the United States. 1 Report II related to business of the Fund. 2 See page 25. 141 It is recommended that the Chairman of the Joint Procedures Committee shall be the Governor for Lebanon and the Vice Chairmen shall be the Governors for El Salvador and Netherlands and that the Governor for Mali shall serve as Reporting Member. Approved: /s/ Hubert A. Ingraham The Bahamas – Chairman /s/ Dimitri Gvindadze Georgia – Vice Chairman /s/ Yaseen Anwar Abdul Hafeez Shaikh Pakistan – Vice Chairman Report III was approved by the Joint Procedures Committee (JPC) at noon on September 21, 2011. Reports signed by the Chairman and Vice Chairman will be maintained by the Bank and Fund Secretaries. (This report was approved and its recommendations were adopted by the Board of Governors on September 23, 2011.) 142 MIGA PROCEDURES COMMITTEE Chairman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Bahamas Vice Chairmen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Georgia Pakistan Reporting Member . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Philippines Members Australia Japan Bangladesh Kenya Belgium Malaysia Burkina Faso Norway Egypt Paraguay France Saudi Arabia Gambia Trinidad and Tobago Germany United Kingdom Guatemala United States Italy 143 REPORT OF THE MIGA PROCEDURES COMMITTEE REPORT 1 September 21, 2011 On September 21, 2011 the MIGA Procedures Committee approved submission of the following report and recommendations on business on the agenda of the Council of Governors of MIGA: 1. 2011 Annual Report The Committee noted that the 2011 Annual Report and the activ- ities of MIGA would be considered at this Annual Meeting. The Annual Report is available on MIGA’s website (http://www.miga.org). 2. Financial Statements and Annual Audit The Committee considered the Financial Statements and Accoun- tants’ Report contained in the 2011 Annual Report. The Committee recommends that the Council of Governors adopt the draft Resolution. . . .1 3. Officers and Procedures Committee for 2011/2012 The Committee recommends that the Governor for Lebanon be Chairman and the Governors for El Salvador and The Netherlands be Vice Chairmen of the Council of Governors of MIGA to hold office until the close of the next Annual Meeting. It is further recommended that a Procedures Committee be estab- lished to be available, after the termination of this Annual Meeting and until the close of the next Annual Meeting, for consultation at the discretion of the Chairman, normally by correspondence and, if the occasion requires, by convening; and that this committee shall consist of the Governors for the following members: Algeria, Austria, Chile, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, France, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, St. Lucia, Timor-Leste, United Kingdom, and the United States. 1 This resolution was subsequently approved. See page 180. 144 It is recommended that the Chairman of the Procedures Com- mittee shall be the Governor for Lebanon and the Vice Chairmen shall be Governors for El Salvador and The Netherlands and that the Governor for Mali shall serve as Reporting Member. Approved: /s/ Hubert A. Ingraham The Bahamas – Chairman /s/ Dimitri Gvindadze Georgia – Vice Chairman /s/ Yaseen Anwar Abdul Hafeez Shaikh Pakistan – Vice Chairman Report I was approved by the MIGA Procedures Committee (MPC) at noon on September 21, 2011. Reports signed by the Chairman and Vice Chairman will be maintained by the Bank and Fund Secretaries. (This report was approved and its recommendations were adopted by the Council of Governors on September 23, 2011.) 145 RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE BANK BETWEEN THE 2010 AND 2011 ANNUAL MEETINGS Resolution No. 612 2010 Selective Increase in Authorized Capital Stock to Enhance Voice and Participation of Developing and Transition Countries WHEREAS at its April 2010 meeting, the Joint Ministerial Commit- tee of the Boards of Governors of the Bank and the Fund on the Transfer of Real Resources to Developing Countries endorsed proposals for the second phase of reforms to enhance the voice and participation of devel- oping and transition countries in the World Bank Group; WHEREAS in their Report approved on July 20, 2010, the Executive Directors recommend that the Board of Governors approves: (a) an increase in the authorized capital stock of the Bank and alloca- tion of shares to members as set forth in Part (A) of this Resolu- tion; and (b) a review of the Bank’s shareholding every five years, starting in 2015, as set forth in Part (B) of this Resolution; and WHEREAS in order to achieve the purpose of the special increases in subscription of members, the Executive Directors have noted that it is necessary for all members to waive their rights under Article II, Section 3(c) of the Articles of Agreement of the Bank (hereinafter referred to as the “Articles�) to subscribe to a proportionate share of the increase in authorized capital stock under this Resolution; NOW THEREFORE the Board of Governors hereby resolves as follows: (A) Increase in Authorized Capital Stock and Allocation of Shares 1. The authorized capital stock of the Bank is increased by 230,374 shares of capital stock, each having a par value of $100,000 in terms of United States dollars of the weight and fineness in effect on July 1, 1944, as interpreted by the Executive Directors; 146 2. Each member of the Bank is authorized to subscribe up to the total number of shares set forth opposite its name in the table below, subject to the conditions set forth in paragraph 3 below: NUMBER OF SHARES ALLOCATED NUMBER OF SHARES ALLOCATED Member 6% PAID-IN; FULLY Member 6% PAID-IN; FULLY 94% CALLABLE CALLABLE 94% CALLABLE CALLABLE Column (1) Column (2) Column (1) Column (2) AFGHANISTAN 99 - COSTA RICA 653 - ALBANIA - 107 COTE D'IVOIRE - 250 ANGOLA - 250 DENMARK 593 - ARGENTINA 2,643 - DJIBOUTI - 73 ARMENIA - 160 ECUADOR - 250 AUSTRALIA 467 - EGYPT, ARAB REPUBLIC OF 1,322 - AUSTRIA 467 - EL SALVADOR 568 - AZERBAIJAN - 225 ERITREA - 77 BANGLADESH - 250 ETHIOPIA 182 - BELGIUM 541 - FINLAND 467 - BELIZE - 84 FRANCE 1,945 - BENIN - 126 GAMBIA, THE - 70 BHUTAN - 58 GEORGIA - 211 BOLIVIA - 239 GERMANY 3,812 - BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 104 - GHANA - 213 BRAZIL 8,314 - GREECE 4,142 - BURKINA FASO - 126 GUATEMALA - 250 BURUNDI - 107 GUINEA - 179 CAMBODIA 175 - GUINEA-BISSAU - 73 CAMEROON - 211 GUYANA - 146 CANADA 1,255 - HAITI - 156 CAPE VERDE - 67 HONDURAS - 86 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC - 113 HUNGARY 467 - CHAD - 113 ICELAND 117 - CHILE 971 - INDIA 9,348 - CHINA 38,283 - INDONESIA 3,009 - COLOMBIA 1,326 - IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF 3,474 - COMOROS - 45 IRAQ - 250 CONGO, DEM. REP. OF - 250 IRELAND 874 - CONGO, REPUBLIC OF - 124 ITALY 5,215 - 147 NUMBER OF SHARES ALLOCATED NUMBER OF SHARES ALLOCATED Member 6% PAID-IN; FULLY Member 6% PAID-IN; FULLY 94% CALLABLE CALLABLE 94% CALLABLE CALLABLE Column (1) Column (2) Column (1) Column (2) JAPAN 3,559 - ROMANIA 1,407 - JORDAN - 197 RUSSIAN FEDERATION 6,651 - KAZAKHSTAN 624 - RWANDA - 139 KENYA - 250 SAMOA - 82 KIRIBATI - 72 SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE - 61 KOREA, REPUBLIC OF 13,586 - SAUDI ARABIA 6,651 - KOSOVO - 143 SENEGAL - 250 KUWAIT 1,919 - SIERRA LEONE - 105 KYRGYZ REPUBLIC - 154 SINGAPORE 4,498 - LAO PEOPLE'S DEM. REP. 37 - SLOVENIA 88 - LEBANON 498 - SOLOMON ISLANDS - 62 LESOTHO - 83 SOMALIA - 80 LIBERIA - 74 SOUTH AFRICA 467 - LUXEMBOURG 154 - SPAIN 6,851 - MADAGASCAR - 201 SRI LANKA - 250 MALAWI - 148 SUDAN 720 - MALDIVES - 68 SWAZILAND - 59 MALI - 156 SWEDEN 677 - MARSHALL ISLANDS - 68 SWITZERLAND 746 - MAURITANIA - 132 SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC - 250 MEXICO 12,562 - TAJIKISTAN - 144 MICRONESIA, FED. STATES OF - 58 TANZANIA - 176 MOLDOVA - 198 THAILAND 2,417 - MONGOLIA - 71 TIMOR-LESTE - 77 MOROCCO - 250 TOGO - 156 MOZAMBIQUE - 121 TONGA - 62 MYANMAR - 250 TUNISIA 617 - NEPAL - 141 TURKEY 11,908 - NETHERLANDS 663 - TURKMENISTAN 101 - NEW ZEALAND 467 - UGANDA 115 - NICARAGUA - 81 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 1,831 - NIGER - 123 UNITED KINGDOM 1,945 - NORWAY 607 - UNITED STATES 38,459 - PANAMA 318 - UZBEKISTAN - 250 PAPUA NEW GUINEA - 177 VANUATU - 84 PARAGUAY - 165 VIETNAM 2,325 - PERU 738 - YEMEN, REPUBLIC OF - 250 PHILIPPINES 971 - ZAMBIA - 250 POLAND 2,540 - ZIMBABWE - 250 PORTUGAL 467 - TOTAL 219,017 11,357 148 3. Each subscription authorized under paragraph 2 above shall be on the following terms and conditions: (a) the subscription price per share shall be par; (b) each member may subscribe to shares up to the total number set forth opposite its name in the table in paragraph 2 above from time to time prior to the fourth (4th) anniversary of the date that this Resolution is adopted, or such later date as may be decided upon consideration of a request by a member for an extension of the subscription period containing a schedule of the steps the member will take to subscribe the shares, provided, however, that: (i) extension of the subscription period with respect to a member to the fifth (5th) anniversary of the date that this Resolution is adopted or earlier shall be decided under the authority of the President, and such an extension to a date later than the fifth (5th) anniversary of the date that this Resolution is adopted shall be decided by the Executive Directors; and (ii) in any event, the subscription period shall not be extended beyond the sixth (6th) anniversary of the date that this Reso- lution is adopted; (c) with respect to each subscription listed in paragraph 2, column 1 above, the subscribing member shall pay to the Bank under Arti- cle II, Section 7(i) of the Articles: (i) gold or United States dollars equal to 0.6% (six-tenths of one percent) of the subscription price of the shares sub- scribed, and (ii) an amount in its own currency or any other currency equal to 5.4% (five and four-tenths percent) of such subscription price, provided in each case that such currency: (A) is paid in cash or, in the case of amounts under sub-paragraph (c)(ii) above, in accordance with paragraph (d) below; and (B) is freely convert- ible for use in the Bank’s operations, except that any member that is eligible to borrow only from the International Development Association (hereinafter referred to as the “Association�) and not from the Bank as of July 1, 2010 shall be exempt from the requirement in clause (B) if that member’s currency is not freely convertible; (d) payment of amounts under paragraph 3(c)(ii) above may be made by way of deposit of non-interest-bearing demand notes in a form acceptable to the Bank which the Bank will promptly encash, provided that, if the note is denominated in a currency other than United States dollars and if the amount of the notes falls short of the amount due in United States dollars on the date 149 of encashment, the member will make a supplemental payment to the Bank within a period of seven days of presentation of the note for encashment to ensure that the Bank receives the full purchase price of the shares subscribed; (e) with respect to each subscription listed in paragraph 2, columns 1 and 2 above, the Bank shall call the 2% and 18% portions of the subscriptions payable under Article II, Section 7(i) of the Articles which are not required to be paid under paragraph 3(c) above only when required to meet obligations of the Bank for funds borrowed or on loans guaranteed by it and not for use by the Bank in its lending activities or for administrative expenses; (f) before each subscription shall be accepted by the Bank, the mem- ber shall have: (i) taken all action necessary to authorize such subscription and shall furnish to the Bank such information thereon as the Bank may request; (ii) made the payments provided for in paragraph 3(c) and (d) above; and (iii) taken all action necessary to ensure the unrestricted and immediate usability by the Bank in its operations of the por- tion of the subscription price of shares paid in the member’s currency under Article II, Section 7(i) of the Articles; and (iv) for the shares allocated under paragraph 2 above on the basis of the member’s commitment to provide agreed con- tributions to the Sixteenth Replenishment of the resources of the Association, the member shall have first deposited with the Association its instrument of commitment under the Sixteenth Replenishment in the amount agreed between the member and the Bank; and (g) by subscribing to such shares, the member shall be deemed to have: (i) provided its irrevocable consent to the unrestricted and imme- diate use of its paid-in capital, notwithstanding the member’s rights of approval under Article IV, Sections 2(a) and (b) of the Articles, its right under Article V, Section 12 of the Articles to substitute notes or similar obligations, or any other rights or restrictions; and (ii) acknowledged that the paid-in portion of its subscription is needed in the Bank’s operations and that notes or similar obligations may not be substituted in place of any member’s currency. 4. In the absence of notice to the Bank from any member within twenty one (21) days of the date of transmission of this Resolution to the 150 Governors for voting that it intends to exercise its rights under Article II, Section 3(c) of the Articles to subscribe to its proportionate share of the increase in the authorized capital stock provided under this Resolution, such member will be deemed to have waived such a right. 5. All rights, including voting rights, acquired in respect of shares for which payment is made by note pursuant to paragraph 3(d) above shall be suspended: (a) if payment is not made within a period of seven days of its pre- sentation for encashment; and (b) if, for any note that is denominated in a currency other than United States dollars, encashment yields a shortfall in the pur- chase price of the shares and the supplemental payment is not made within a period of seven days of the relevant payment date, in each case only with regard to shares for which payment has not been received and until full payment in cash is received by the Bank. 6. After the end of the subscription period set forth in paragraph 3(b) above: (a) the subscription for any shares in respect of which rights have been suspended pursuant to paragraph 5 above shall become void; and (b) the allocated capital stock of the Bank that has not been sub- scribed, including any shares in respect of which the subscription has become void pursuant to paragraph 6(a) above, shall become part of the Bank’s unallocated capital stock. (B) Regular Shareholding Review The Bank’s shareholding shall be reviewed every five years, starting in 2015. Parts (A) and (B) of this Resolution shall not become effective unless all members have waived their rights under Article II, Section 3(c) of the Articles to subscribe their proportionate share of the increase in the authorized capital stock of the Bank provided under this Resolution. (Adopted March 16, 2011) 151 Resolution No. 613 2010 General Capital Increase WHEREAS the Executive Directors, having considered the question of enlarging the resources of the Bank through an increase in its autho- rized capital, have concluded that such an increase would be desirable and, in their Report approved on July 20, 2010, have submitted a proposal for such an increase to the Board of Governors; WHEREAS the Executive Directors have proposed that each member be authorized, subject to certain conditions, to subscribe shares of the newly-authorized capital in proportion to the aggregate number of shares such member has subscribed and is authorized to subscribe, including shares certain members are to be authorized to subscribe in accordance with the proposed Resolution entitled “2010 Selective Increase in Autho- rized Capital Stock to Enhance Voice and Participation of Developing and Transition Countries� (hereinafter referred to as the “Selective Capi- tal Increase Resolution�); NOW THEREFORE the Board of Governors hereby resolves as follows: 1. The authorized capital stock of the Bank shall be increased by 484,102 shares of capital stock, each having a par value of $100,000 in terms of United States dollars of the weight and fineness in effect on July 1, 1944, as interpreted by the Executive Directors. 2. Each member of the Bank is authorized to subscribe up to the total number of shares set forth opposite its name in the table below, subject to the conditions set forth in paragraph 3 below: 152 Number of Shares Number of Shares Member Member Allocated Allocated AFGHANISTAN 107 ETHIOPIA 310 ALBANIA 250 FIJI 264 ALGERIA 2,472 FINLAND 2,412 ANGOLA 782 FRANCE 19,062 ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 139 GABON 264 ARGENTINA 5,564 GAMBIA, THE 164 ARMENIA 347 GEORGIA 480 AUSTRALIA 6,661 GERMANY 20,363 AUSTRIA 3,081 GHANA 464 AZERBAIJAN 500 GREECE 1,557 BAHAMAS, THE 286 GRENADA 142 BAHRAIN 295 GUATEMALA 601 BANGLADESH 1,364 GUINEA 393 BARBADOS 253 GUINEA-BISSAU 164 BELARUS 888 GUYANA 322 BELGIUM 7,889 HAITI 327 BELIZE 179 HONDURAS 194 BENIN 266 HUNGARY 2,276 BHUTAN 143 ICELAND 367 BOLIVIA 541 INDIA 14,744 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 174 INDONESIA 4,856 BOTSWANA 164 IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF 7,373 BRAZIL 11,305 IRAQ 817 BRUNEI DARUSSALAM 634 IRELAND 1,642 BULGARIA 1,393 ISRAEL 1,269 BURKINA FASO 266 ITALY 13,362 BURUNDI 220 JAMAICA 689 CAMBODIA 104 JAPAN 34,885 CAMEROON 464 JORDAN 424 CANADA 12,304 KAZAKHSTAN 964 CAPE VERDE 154 KENYA 724 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC 261 KIRIBATI 143 CHAD 261 KOREA, REPUBLIC OF 7,912 CHILE 2,111 KOSOVO 296 CHINA 22,476 KUWAIT 4,097 COLOMBIA 2,052 KYRGYZ REPUBLIC 337 COMOROS 87 LAO PEOPLE'S DEM. REP. 57 CONGO, DEM. REP. OF 773 LATVIA 370 CONGO, REPUBLIC OF 281 LEBANON 224 COSTA RICA 237 LESOTHO 199 COTE D'IVOIRE 739 LIBERIA 143 CROATIA 613 LIBYA 2,095 CYPRUS 390 LITHUANIA 403 CZECH REPUBLIC 1,685 LUXEMBOURG 483 DENMARK 3,752 MACEDONIA, FYR OF 114 DJIBOUTI 169 MADAGASCAR 434 DOMINICA 135 MALAWI 332 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 559 MALAYSIA 2,203 ECUADOR 807 MALDIVES 143 EGYPT, ARAB REPUBLIC OF 2,252 MALI 352 EL SALVADOR 189 MALTA 287 EQUATORIAL GUINEA 191 MARSHALL ISLANDS 143 ERITREA 179 MAURITANIA 276 ESTONIA 247 MAURITIUS 332 153 Number of Shares Number of Shares Member Member Allocated Allocated MEXICO 8,459 SLOVENIA 360 MICRONESIA, FED. STATES OF 143 SOLOMON ISLANDS 154 MOLDOVA 418 SOMALIA 169 MONGOLIA 143 SOUTH AFRICA 3,760 MONTENEGRO 184 SPAIN 9,311 MOROCCO 1,396 SRI LANKA 1,087 MOZAMBIQUE 281 ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 73 MYANMAR 731 ST. LUCIA 147 NAMIBIA 407 ST. VINCENT & THE GRENADINES 74 NEPAL 296 SUDAN 419 NETHERLANDS 9,663 SURINAME 110 NEW ZEALAND 2,058 SWAZILAND 133 NICARAGUA 184 SWEDEN 4,182 NIGER 261 SWITZERLAND 7,308 NIGERIA 3,413 SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 655 NORWAY 2,829 TAJIKISTAN 322 OMAN 417 TANZANIA 393 PAKISTAN 2,495 THAILAND 2,342 PALAU 4 TIMOR-LESTE 159 PANAMA 188 TOGO 337 PAPUA NEW GUINEA 393 TONGA 149 PARAGUAY 372 TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 712 PERU 1,622 TUNISIA 357 PHILIPPINES 2,088 TURKEY 5,407 POLAND 3,612 TURKMENISTAN 168 PORTUGAL 1,584 UGANDA 196 QATAR 293 UKRAINE 2,933 ROMANIA 1,448 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 1,126 RUSSIAN FEDERATION 14,023 UNITED KINGDOM 19,062 RWANDA 317 UNITED STATES 81,074 SAMOA 164 URUGUAY 751 SAN MARINO 159 UZBEKISTAN 733 SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE 149 VANUATU 179 SAUDI ARABIA 14,023 VENEZUELA, REP. BOLIVARIANA DE 5,531 SENEGAL 620 VIETNAM 880 SERBIA 760 YEMEN, REPUBLIC OF 658 SEYCHELLES 70 ZAMBIA 818 SIERRA LEONE 220 ZIMBABWE 955 SINGAPORE 1,287 SLOVAK REPUBLIC 859 TOTAL 484,102 3. Each subscription authorized under paragraph 2 above shall be on the following terms and conditions: (a) the subscription price shall be par; (b) each member may subscribe up to the total number of shares set forth opposite its name in the table in paragraph 2 above from time to time prior to the fifth (5th) anniversary of the date that this Resolution is adopted, or such later date as may be decided upon consideration of a request by a member for an extension of the subscription period containing a schedule of the steps the member will take to subscribe the shares; provided, however, that: (i) extension of the subscription period with respect to a member to the sixth (6th) anniversary of the date that this Resolution is adopted or earlier shall be decided under the authority of 154 the President, and such an extension to a date later than the sixth (6th) anniversary of the date that this Resolution is adopted shall be decided by the Executive Directors; and (ii) in any event, the subscription period shall not be extended beyond the seventh (7th) anniversary of the date that this Resolution is adopted; (c) the subscribing member shall pay to the Bank under Article II, Section 7(i) of the Bank’s Articles of Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “Articles�): (i) gold or United States dollars equal to 0.6% (six-tenths of one percent) of the subscription price of the shares subscribed; and (ii) an amount in its own currency or any other currency equal to 5.4% (five and four-tenths percent) of such subscription price, provided in each case that such currency: (A) is paid in cash or, in the case of amounts under sub-paragraph (c)(ii) above, in accordance with paragraph (d) below; and (B) is freely convert- ible for use in the Bank’s operations, except that any member that is eligible to borrow only from the International Develop- ment Association and not from the Bank as of July 1, 2010 shall be exempt from the requirement in clause (B) if that member’s currency is not freely convertible; (d) payment of amounts under paragraph (c)(ii) above may be made by way of deposit of non-interest-bearing demand notes in a form acceptable to the Bank which the Bank will promptly encash, provided that, if the note is denominated in a currency other than United States dollars and if the amount of the notes falls short of the amount due in United States dollars on the date of encashment, the member will make a supplemental payment to the Bank within a period of seven days of presentation of the note for encashment to ensure that the Bank receives the full purchase price of the shares subscribed; (e) the Bank shall call the 2% and 18% portions of the subscriptions payable under Article II, Section 7(i) of the Articles which are not required to be paid under paragraph 3(c) above only when required to meet obligations of the Bank for funds borrowed or on loans guaranteed by it and not for use by the Bank in its lending activities or for administrative expenses; (f) before each subscription shall be accepted by the Bank, the mem- ber shall have: (i) taken all action necessary to authorize such subscription and shall furnish to the Bank such information thereon as the Bank may request; (ii) made the payments provided for in paragraph 3(c) and (d) above; and 155 (iii) taken all action necessary to ensure the unrestricted and immediate usability by the Bank in its operations of the por- tion of the subscription price of shares paid in the member’s currency under Article II, Section 7(i) of the Articles; and (g) by subscribing to such shares, the member shall be deemed to have: (i) provided its irrevocable consent to the unrestricted and imme- diate use of its paid-in capital, notwithstanding the member’s rights of approval under Article IV, Sections 2(a) and (b) of the Articles, its right under Article V, Section 12 of the Articles to substitute notes or similar obligations, or any other rights or restrictions; (ii) acknowledged that the paid-in portion of its subscription is needed in the Bank’s operations and that notes or similar obligations may not be substituted in place of any member’s currency; and (h) in the event that the Selective Capital Increase Resolution is not adopted on or prior to the date that this Resolution is adopted, then no subscription shall be accepted by the Bank prior to the earlier of (i) the date that the Selective Capital Increase Reso- lution is adopted by the Board of Governors and (ii) the date that the Bank notifies each member that the voting period for the Selective Capital Increase Resolution, as may be extended, is closed. If the voting period for the Selective Capital Increase Resolution closes without adoption of the Selective Capital Increase Resolution by the Board of Governors, the number of shares authorized to be subscribed by each member as set forth in paragraph 2 above shall be adjusted such that the pro rata share allocation of each member after giving effect to the increase in capital stock under this Resolution shall be equal to the pro rata share allocation of the member without giving effect to the Selec- tive Capital Increase Resolution. 4. All rights, including voting rights, acquired in respect of shares for which payment is made by note pursuant to paragraph 3(d) above shall be suspended: (a) if payment is not made within a period of seven days of its pre- sentation for encashment; and (b) if, for any note that is denominated in a currency other than United States Dollars, encashment yields a shortfall in the pur- chase price of the shares and the supplemental payment is not made within a period of seven days of the relevant payment date, in each case only with regard to shares for which payment has not been received and until full payment in cash is received by the Bank. 156 5. After the end of the subscription period set forth in paragraph 3(b) above, (a) the subscription for any shares in respect of which rights have been suspended pursuant to paragraph 4 above shall become void; and (b) the allocated capital stock of the Bank that has not been sub- scribed, including any shares in respect of which the subscription has become void pursuant to paragraph 5(a) above, shall become part of the Bank’s unallocated capital stock. (Adopted March 16, 2011) Resolution No. 614 2010 Additional Increase in Authorized Capital Stock for Subscription of New Members WHEREAS in their Report approved on July 20, 2010, the Executive Directors have recommended that the Board of Governors increase the authorized capital stock of the Bank in order to provide for the admis- sion of new members; WHEREAS in order to achieve the purpose of the special increases in subscription of members, the Executive Directors have noted that it is necessary for all members to waive their rights under Article II, Sec- tion 3(c) of the Articles of Agreement of the Bank (hereinafter referred to as the “Articles�) to subscribe to a proportionate share of the increase in authorized capital stock under this Resolution; NOW THEREFORE the Board of Governors hereby resolves as follows: 1. The authorized capital stock of the Bank shall be increased by 11,400 shares of capital stock, each having a par value of $100,000 in terms of United States dollars of the weight and fineness in effect on July 1, 1944, as interpreted by the Executive Directors. 2. In the absence of notice to the Bank from any member within twenty one (21) days of the date of transmission of this Resolution to the Gov- ernors for voting, that it intends to exercise its rights under Article II, Section 3(c) of the Articles to subscribe to its proportionate share of the increase in the authorized capital stock provided under this Resolution, such member will be deemed to have waived such rights. 157 3. This Resolution shall not become effective unless all members have waived their rights under Article II, Section 3(c) of the Articles to subscribe their proportionate share of the increase in the authorized capital stock of the Bank provided under this Resolution. (Adopted March 16, 2011) Resolution No. 615 Transfer from Surplus to Replenish the Trust Fund for Gaza and West Bank RESOLVED: THAT the Bank transfers immediately from surplus, by way of grant, US$75,000,000 to the Trust Fund for Gaza and West Bank, such transfer to be drawn down by the International Development Association as needed; provided, however, that the amount of such grant may at any time be changed by the International Development Association into an equivalent amount in other currencies. (Adopted June 8, 2011) Resolution No. 616 Transfer of IBRD Surplus to the South Sudan Transition Trust Fund RESOLVED THAT: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development imme- diately transfers from surplus, by way of grant, $75 million to the South Sudan Transition Trust Fund (the “Trust Fund�), established by the International Development Association (IDA or the “Association�), administered by the Association in accordance with the Resolution estab- lishing the Trust Fund. (Adopted July 20, 2011) 158 Resolution No. 617 Forthcoming Annual Meetings of the Boards of Governors Proposed Dates and Venues for the 2013 and 2014 Annual Meetings RESOLVED: THAT the 2013 Annual Meetings shall be convened in Washing- ton, D.C., on Friday, October 11, 2013; and THAT the 2014 Annual Meetings shall be convened in Washing- ton, D.C., on Friday, October 10, 2014. (Adopted September 13, 2011) 159 RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE BANK AT THE 2011 ANNUAL MEETINGS Resolution No. 618 Financial Statements, Accountants’ Report and Administrative Budget RESOLVED: THAT the Board of Governors of the Bank consider the Financial Statements, Accountants’ Report and Administrative Budget, included in the 2011 Annual Report, as fulfilling the requirements of Article V, Section 13, of the Articles of Agreement and of Section 18 of the By- Laws of the Bank. (Adopted September 23, 2011) Resolution No. 619 Allocation of FY11 Net Income RESOLVED: 1. THAT the Report of the Executive Directors dated August 4, 2011 on “Allocation of FY11 Net Income� is hereby noted with approval; 2. THAT the addition to the General Reserve of the IBRD of $401 million, plus or minus any rounding amount less than $1 million, is hereby noted with approval; 3. THAT the IBRD transfer to the International Development Associa- tion, by way of a grant out of the FY11 allocable net income of the IBRD, $520 million, which amount may be used by the Association to provide financing in the form of grants in addition to loans, such transfer to be drawn down by the Association immediately upon approval by the Board of Governors of the IBRD; and 4. THAT the IBRD retains $75 million as surplus. (Adopted September 23, 2011) 160 Resolution No. 620* Direct Remuneration of Executive Directors and Their Alternates RESOLVED: THAT, effective July 1, 2011, the remuneration of the Executive Directors of the Bank and their Alternates pursuant to Section 13(e) of the By-Laws shall be paid in the form of salary without a separate supplemental allowance, and such salary shall be paid at the annual rate of $244,350 for Executive Directors and $211,370 for their Alternates. (Adopted September 23, 2011) * This resolution was adopted by mail on September 23, 2011. 161 RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF IDA BETWEEN THE 2010 AND 2011 ANNUAL MEETING Resolution No. 227 Additions to Resources: Sixteenth Replenishment WHEREAS: (A) The Executive Directors of the International Development Associa- tion (the “Association�) have considered the prospective financial requirements of the Association and have concluded that it is desir- able to authorize a replenishment of the resources of the Association for new financing commitments for the period from July 1, 2011 to June 30, 2014 (the “Sixteenth Replenishment�) in the amounts and on the basis set out in the report of the IDA Deputies, “Additions to Resources: Sixteenth Replenishment,� (the “Report�), approved by the Executive Directors on February 15, 2011 (modified on March 18, 2011), and submitted to the Board of Governors; (B) The members of the Association consider that an increase in the resources of the Association is required and intend to take all neces- sary governmental and legislative action to authorize and approve the allocation of additional resources to the Association in the amounts and on the conditions set out in this Resolution; (C) Members of the Association that contribute resources to the Asso- ciation in addition to their subscriptions as part of the Sixteenth Replenishment (“Contributing Members�) are to make available their contributions pursuant to the Articles of Agreement of the Association (the “Articles�) partly in the form of subscriptions car- rying voting rights and partly as supplementary resources in the form of contributions not carrying voting rights; (D) Additional subscriptions are to be authorized for Contributing Mem- bers in this Resolution on the basis of their agreement with respect to their preemptive rights under Article III, Section 1(c) of the Articles, and provision is made for the other members of the Association (“Subscribing Members�) intending to exercise their rights pursuant to that provision to do so; 162 (E) It is desirable to provide for a portion of resources to be contributed by members to be paid to the Association as advance contributions; (F) Additional subscriptions and contributions are to be authorized for Contributing Members to provide compensation for the Association’s debt forgiveness commitments under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (“HIPC�) Debt Initiative; to provide financing for arrears clearance operations by the Association; to provide compensation for forgone principal reflows from the making of grants, and to provide financing for the Crisis Response Window; (G) It is desirable to authorize the Association to provide financing in the form of grants, guarantees and the intermediation of risk manage- ment products in addition to loans; and (H) It is desirable to administer any remaining funds from the replenish- ment authorized by Resolution No. 219 of the Board of Governors of the Association (the “Fifteenth Replenishment�) as part of the Sixteenth Replenishment. NOW THEREFORE THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS HEREBY ACCEPTS the Report as approved by the Executive Directors, ADOPTS its conclusions and recommendations AND RESOLVES THAT a general increase in subscriptions of the Association is authorized on the following terms and conditions: 1. Authorization of Subscriptions and Contributions. (a) The Association is authorized to accept additional resources from each Contributing Member in the amounts specified for each such member in Columns (2) (3) (7), and (10) of Table 1 attached to this Resolution, and each such amount will be divided into a subscription carrying voting rights and a contribution not carrying voting rights as specified in Table 2 attached to this Resolution. (i) As part of the resources described in paragraph 1(a) above, the Association is authorized to accept additional subscrip- tions and contributions from Contributing Members to com- pensate the Association for the Association’s debt forgiveness commitments under the HIPC Debt Initiative in the amounts and as specified in Column (7) of Table 1 attached to this Resolution. (ii) As part of the resources described in paragraph 1(a) above, the Association is authorized to accept additional subscriptions and contributions from Contributing Members to finance 163 arrears clearance operations in the amounts and as specified in Column (10) of Table 1 attached to this Resolution. (iii) As part of the resources described in paragraph 1(a) above, the Association is authorized to accept additional subscrip- tions and contributions from Contributing Members finance forgone principal reflows from the making of grants in the amounts and as specified in Column (12) of Table 1 attached to this Resolution. (b) The Association is authorized to accept additional resources from any member for which no contribution is specified in Table 2 and additional subscriptions and contributions from Contributing Members incremental to the amounts specified for each such member in Table 1; (c) The Association is authorized to accept additional subscriptions from each Subscribing Member in the amount specified for each such member in Table 2. (d) The rights and obligations of the Association and the Contrib- uting Members in respect of the authorized subscriptions and contributions in paragraphs (a) and (b) above will be the same (except as otherwise provided in this Resolution) as those appli- cable to the ninety per cent portion of the initial subscriptions of original members payable under Article II, Section 2(d) of the Articles of Agreement (the “Articles�) by members listed in Part I of Schedule A of the Articles. 2. Agreement to Pay. (a) When a Contributing Member agrees to pay its subscription and contribution, or a Subscribing Member agrees to pay its subscription, it will deposit with the Association an Instrument of Commitment substantially in the form set out in Attachment I to this Resolution (“Instrument of Commitment�) and, with respect to its contribution for debt forgiveness under the HIPC Debt Initiative or for arrears clearance operations, a Contributing Member will either include such contribution in an Instrument of Commitment or make a Debt Relief Transfer Contribution, as defined and specified in paragraph 9(a) of this Resolution. (b) When a Contributing Member agrees to pay a part of its subscrip- tion and contribution without qualification and the remainder is subject to enactment by its legislature of the necessary appropria- tion legislation, it will deposit a qualified Instrument of Com- mitment in a form acceptable to the Association (“Qualified Instrument of Commitment�) and such member: (i) undertakes to exercise its best efforts to obtain legisla- tive approval for the full amount of its subscription and 164 contribution by the payment dates set out in paragraph 3(b) of this Resolution; and (ii) agrees that, upon obtaining such approvals, it will notify the Association that any parts of its Qualified Instrument of Commitment have become unqualified. 3. Payment. (a) Each Subscribing Member will pay to the Association the amount of its subscription in full within 31 days after the date of deposit of its Instrument of Commitment; provided that if the Sixteenth Replenishment shall not have become effective by December 15, 2011, payment may be postponed by the member for not more than 31 days after the Effective Date as defined in paragraph 6(a) of this Resolution. (b) Each Contributing Member that deposits an Instrument of Com- mitment that is not a Qualified Instrument of Commitment will pay to the Association the amount of its subscription and contri- bution in three equal annual installments no later than 31 days after the Effective Date or as agreed with the Association, Janu- ary 15, 2013, and January 15, 2014; provided that: (i) the Association and each Contributing Member may agree to earlier payment; (ii) if the Sixteenth Replenishment shall not have become effec- tive by December 15, 2011, payment of the first such install- ment may be postponed by the member for not more than 31 days after the date on which the Sixteenth Replenishment becomes effective; (iii) the Association may agree to the postponement of any install- ment, or part thereof, if the amount paid, together with any unused balance of previous payments by the Contributing Member concerned, is at least equal to the amount estimated by the Association to be required from that member up to the due date of the next installment for purposes of disburse- ments for financing committed under the Sixteenth Replen- ishment; and (iv) if any Contributing Member deposits an Instrument of Com- mitment with the Association after the date when the first installment of the subscription and contribution is due, pay- ment of any installment, or part thereof, will be made to the Association within 31 days after the date of such deposit. (c) If a Contributing Member has deposited a Qualified Instrument of Commitment and, upon enactment of appropriation legisla- tion, notifies the Association that an installment, or part thereof, is unqualified after the date when it was due, then payment of 165 such installment, or part thereof, will be made within 31 days after the date of such notification. 4. Mode of Payment. (a) Payments pursuant to this Resolution will be made, at the option of the member: (i) in cash, on terms agreed between the member and the Association; or (ii) by the deposit of notes or similar obli- gations issued by the government of the member or the deposi- tory designated by such member, which shall be non-negotiable, non-interest bearing and payable at their par value on demand to the account of the Association. (b) The Association will encash notes or similar obligations of Con- tributing Members, on an approximately pro rata basis among donors, in accordance with the encashment schedule set out at Attachment II to this Resolution, or as agreed between a Con- tributing Member and the Association. With respect to a Con- tributing Member that is unable to comply with one or more encashment requests, the Association may agree with the member on a revised encashment schedule that yields at least an equiva- lent value to the Association. (c) The provisions of Article IV, Section 1(a) of the Articles will apply to the use of a Subscribing Member’s currency paid to the Association pursuant to this Resolution. 5. Currency of Denomination and Payment. (a) Members will denominate the resources to be made available pursuant to this Resolution in SDRs, the currency of the member if freely convertible, or, with the agreement of the Association, in a freely convertible currency of another member, except that if a Contributing Member’s economy experienced a rate of infla- tion in excess of ten percent per annum on average in the period 2007–2009, as determined by the Association, its subscription and contribution will be denominated in SDRs or in any cur- rency used for the valuation of the SDR and agreed with the Association. (b) Contributing Members will make payments pursuant to this Reso- lution in SDRs, a currency used for the valuation of the SDR, or, with the agreement of the Association, in another freely con- vertible currency, and the Association may freely exchange the amounts received as required for its operations. Subscribing Mem- bers will make payments in the currency of the member or in a freely convertible currency with the agreement of the Association. (c) Each member will maintain, in respect of its currency paid by it under this Resolution, and the currency of such member derived 166 therefrom as principal, interest or other charges, the same con- vertibility as existed on the effective date of this Resolution. (d) The provisions of Article IV, Section 2 of the Articles with respect to maintenance of value will not be applicable. 6. Effective Date. (a) The Sixteenth Replenishment will become effective and the resources to be contributed pursuant to this Resolution will become payable to the Association on the date (the “Effective Date�) when Contributing Members whose subscriptions and contributions aggregate not less than SDR 10,395 million shall have deposited with the Association Instruments of Commitment, Qualified Instruments of Commitment or Debt Relief Transfer Notifications (as defined in paragraph 9(b) of this Resolution), provided that this date shall be not later than December 15, 2011, or such later date as the Executive Directors of the Association may determine. (b) If the Association determines that the availability of additional resources pursuant to this Resolution is likely to be unduly delayed, it shall convene promptly a meeting of the Contributing Members to review the situation and to consider the steps to be taken to prevent a suspension of financing to eligible recipients by the Association. 7. Advance Contributions. (a) In order to avoid an interruption in the Association’s ability to commit financing to eligible recipients pending the effective- ness of the Sixteenth Replenishment, the Association may deem, prior to the Effective Date, one third of the total amount of each subscription and contribution for which an Instrument of Com- mitment has been deposited with the Association, or for which a Debt Relief Transfer Notification (as defined in paragraph 9(b) of this Resolution) has been received by the Association, as an “Advance Contribution,� unless the Contributing Member speci- fies otherwise in its Instrument of Commitment or Debt Relief Transfer Notification. (b) The Association shall specify when Advance Contributions pur- suant to subparagraph (a) are to be paid to the Association. (c) The terms and conditions applicable to contributions to the Sixteenth Replenishment shall apply also to Advance Con- tributions until the Effective Date, when such contributions shall be deemed to constitute payment towards the amount due from each Contributing Member for its subscription and contribution. 167 (d) In the event that the Sixteenth Replenishment shall not become effective pursuant to paragraph 6(a) of this Resolution, (i) voting rights will be allocated to each member for the Advance Con- tribution as if it had been made as a subscription and contribu- tion under this Resolution, and (ii) each member not making an Advance Contribution will have the opportunity to exercise its preemptive rights under Article III, Section 1(c) of the Articles with respect to such subscription as the Association shall specify. 8. Commitment Authority. (a) Subscriptions and contributions will become available for com- mitment by the Association for financing to eligible recipients in three equal annual installments: (i) the first installment will become available to the Association for commitment from the Effective Date, provided that advance contributions may become available earlier under paragraph 7(a) of this Resolution; (ii) the second installment will become available from July 1, 2012; and (iii) the third installment will become available from July 1, 2013. (b) Any qualified part of a subscription and contribution notified under a Qualified Instrument of Commitment will become avail- able for commitment by the Association for financing when the Association has been notified, pursuant to paragraph 2(b)(ii) of this Resolution, that such parts have become unqualified. (c) The Association may enter into financing commitments with eligible recipients conditional on such commitments becoming effective and binding on the Association when resources under the Sixteenth Replenishment become available for commitment by the Association. 9. HIPC and Arrears Clearance Contributions. (a) Contributing Members making an additional subscription and contribution to compensate the Association for forgiveness of debt under the HIPC Debt Relief Initiative or to finance arrears clearance operations, will do so either: (i) through an additional subscription and contribution to the Association’s regular resources (a “Debt Relief Additional Contribution�) or (ii) through a creditor-specific contribution for the benefit of the Association to the HIPC window of the Debt Relief Trust Fund or a contribution to the arrears clearance window of the Debt Relief Trust Fund (each a “Debt Relief Transfer Contribution�). (b) Contributing Members making a Debt Relief Transfer Contribu- tion will either (i) enter into a Contribution Agreement with the Association as administrator of the Debt Relief Trust Fund; or (ii) for Contributing Members that are already current 168 contributors to the Debt Relief Trust Fund, send to the Asso- ciation a notice of additional contribution or allocation to the appropriate window of the Debt Relief Trust Fund, (each a “Debt Relief Transfer Notification�). Such Debt Relief Trans- fer Notification will provide for a contribution to be made to the appropriate window of the Debt Relief Trust Fund in the amounts set forth in Columns (7) and (10) of Table 1 to this Resolution, each to be payable in three equal annual install- ments no later than 31 days after the Effective Date, January 15, 2013, and January 15, 2014; provided that the Association and each Contributing Member may agree to earlier payment. (c) When any amount of a Debt Relief Transfer Contribution is paid to compensate the Association for forgiveness of debt under the HIPC Debt Initiative or to finance arrears clearance operations, such amount of the Debt Relief Transfer Contribu- tion will be treated as a subscription and contribution under the Sixteenth Replenishment. 10. Compensation for Forgone Principal Reflows. (a) Contributing Members making an additional subscription and contribution to finance forgone principal reflows from the mak- ing of grants will do so through an additional subscription and contribution to the Association’s regular resources (a “Grant Compensation Additional Contribution�). 11. Authorization of Grants, Guarantees and Risk Intermediation. The Association is hereby authorized to provide financing under the Sixteenth Replenishment in the form of grants and guarantees and through the intermediation of risk management products. 12. Administration of IDA15 Funds under the Sixteenth Replenishment. (a) On the Effective Date, any funds, receipts, assets and liabilities held by the Association under the Fifteenth Replenishment will be administered under the Sixteenth Replenishment, subject, as appropriate, to the terms and conditions applicable to the Fifteenth Replenishment. (b) Pursuant to Article V, Section 2(a)(i) of the Articles of Agree- ment of the Association, the Association is authorized to use the funds referred to in paragraph 11(a) above, and funds derived therefrom as principal, interest or other charges, to provide financing in the forms of grants and guarantees under the terms, conditions and policies applicable under the Sixteenth Replenishment. 169 13. Allocation of Voting Rights under Sixteenth Replenishment. Voting rights calculated on the basis of the current voting rights system will be allocated to members for subscriptions under the Sixteenth Replenishment as follows: (a) Each Subscribing Member that has deposited with the Asso- ciation an Instrument of Commitment will be allocated the subscription votes specified for each such member in Table 2 on the effective payment date pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of this Resolution. Each Subscribing Member will be allocated the additional membership votes specified in Column c-3 of Table 2 on the date such member is allocated its subscription votes. (b) Each Contributing Member that has deposited with the Associa- tion an Instrument of Commitment will be allocated one third of the subscription votes specified for each such member in Table 2 on each effective payment date pursuant to paragraph 3(b) of this Resolution. Each Contributing Member will be allocated the additional membership votes specified in Column b-4 of Table 2 for its subscription on the date such member is allocated the first one third of its subscription votes. (c) Each Contributing Member that has made a Debt Relief Trans- fer Contribution will be allocated a proportionate share of the subscription votes specified for such member in Column b-3 of Table 2 from time to time and at least semi-annually following payment of any amount of its Debt Relief Transfer Contribution to compensate the Association for forgiveness of debt under the HIPC Debt Initiative or to finance arrears clearance operations. (d) Each member that has deposited with the Association a Quali- fied Instrument of Commitment will be allocated subscription votes at the time and to the extent of payments made in respect of its subscription and contribution. (e) Any member that deposits its Instrument of Commitment after any of these dates will be allocated, within 31 days of the date of such deposit, the subscription votes to which such member is entitled on account of such deposit. (f) If a member fails to pay any amount of its subscription or sub- scription and contribution when due, the number of subscription votes allocated from time to time to such member under this Resolution in respect of the Sixteenth Replenishment will be reduced in proportion to the shortfall in such payments, but any such votes will be reallocated when the shortfall in payments causing such adjustment is subsequently made up. (Adopted April 26, 2011) 170 Table 1: Contributions to the Sixteenth Replenishment Basic Contributions Supplemental Sub-total Contributions HIPC Costs Arrears Clearance Grant Compensation Total Donor Contributions Credit FX Rates Currency of 10/ 10/ 10/ 10/ Share SDR Million SDR Million SDR Million NC Million 10/ Share SDR Million NC Million Share SDR Million NC Million Share SDR Million NC Million Share SDR Million NC Million NC Million 10/ (NC/SDR) Denomination Hid Contributing Members (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) AR Argentina 0.20% 41.30 - 41.30 62.04 0.20% 2.78 4.18 0.20% 0.80 1.20 0.20% 0.12 0.18 0.20% 45.00 67.60 - 1.502330 USD AU Australia 1.80% 370.67 59.44 430.12 723.60 1.61% 22.34 37.58 1.61% 6.44 10.84 1.61% 0.97 1.63 2.05% 459.86 773.64 - 1.682330 AUD AT Austria 3/5/ 1.56% 321.58 10.97 332.55 376.88 0.86% 11.93 13.98 0.86% 3.44 4.03 0.86% 0.52 0.60 1.55% 348.44 395.50 12.86 1.171980 EUR BS Bahamas, The 0.01% 2.37 - 2.37 3.56 0.01% 0.16 0.24 0.01% 0.05 0.07 0.01% 0.01 0.01 0.01% 2.58 3.88 - 1.502330 USD BB Barbados 0.002% 0.41 - 0.41 1.24 0.002% 0.03 0.08 0.002% 0.01 0.02 0.002% 0.00 0.00 0.002% 0.45 1.35 - 2.999800 BBD BE Belgium 3/ 1.55% 319.51 - 319.51 374.46 1.71% 23.73 27.81 1.71% 6.84 8.02 1.71% 1.03 1.20 1.56% 351.10 411.49 - 1.171980 EUR BR Brazil 3/ 0.26% 54.19 - 54.19 144.16 0.67% 9.30 24.73 0.67% 2.68 7.13 0.67% 0.40 1.07 0.30% 66.56 177.09 - 2.660540 BRL CA Canada 3.98% 820.42 11.99 832.41 1,292.26 4.14% 57.44 89.17 4.14% 16.56 25.71 4.14% 2.48 3.86 4.05% 908.90 1,411.00 - 1.552430 CAD CL Chile 3/ 0.10% 21.08 - 21.08 31.66 0.10% 1.42 2.13 0.10% 0.41 0.61 0.10% 0.06 0.09 0.10% 22.96 34.50 - 1.502330 USD CN China 3/ 0.15% 31.43 73.74 105.17 158.00 0.10% 1.39 2.08 0.10% 0.40 0.60 0.10% 0.06 0.09 0.48% 107.02 160.78 - 1.502330 USD CY Cyprus 3/ 0.02% 4.12 - 4.12 4.83 0.02% 0.28 0.33 0.02% 0.08 0.09 0.02% 0.01 0.01 0.02% 4.49 5.26 - 1.171980 EUR CZ Czech Republic 5/ 0.05% 10.31 0.74 11.05 305.21 0.06% 0.83 24.65 0.06% 0.24 7.11 0.06% 0.04 1.07 0.05% 12.15 338.03 21.90 29.612170 CZK DK Denmark 3/ 1.08% 222.63 - 222.63 1,942.73 1.21% 16.79 146.50 1.21% 4.84 42.25 1.21% 0.73 6.34 1.09% 244.98 2,137.81 - 8.726400 DKK EG Egypt 1/3/4/ 0.007% 1.37 - 1.37 1.92 0.01% 0.14 0.21 0.01% 0.04 0.06 0.01% 0.01 0.01 0.007% 1.56 2.20 0.14 1.502330 USD EE Estonia 0.01% 2.67 - 2.67 3.13 0.01% 0.14 0.16 0.01% 0.04 0.05 0.01% 0.01 0.01 0.01% 2.85 3.35 - 1.171980 EUR FI Finland 0.94% 193.44 12.80 206.24 241.71 0.66% 9.16 10.73 0.66% 2.64 3.09 0.66% 0.40 0.46 0.97% 218.43 256.00 - 1.171980 EUR FR France 3/ 4.88% 1,006.11 - 1,006.11 1,511.51 6.62% 91.85 137.99 6.62% 26.49 39.79 6.62% 3.97 5.97 5.02% 1,128.42 1,695.26 - 1.502330 USD DE Germany 3/4/ 6.01% 1,238.61 - 1,238.61 1,215.27 11.37% 157.76 157.76 11.37% 45.49 45.49 10.30% 6.18 6.18 6.45% 1,448.04 1,424.69 23.34 1.000000 SDR GR Greece 9/ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1.171980 EUR HU Hungary 0.06% 12.37 - 12.37 4,038.74 0.06% 0.83 271.84 0.06% 0.24 78.39 0.06% 0.04 11.76 0.06% 13.48 4,400.73 - 326.543700 HUF IS Iceland 3/ 0.03% 6.18 - 6.18 6.18 0.03% 0.42 0.42 0.03% 0.12 0.12 0.03% 0.02 0.02 0.03% 6.74 6.74 - 1.000000 SDR IR Iran, Islamic Republic of 1/ 0.05% 11.24 - 11.24 16.89 0.05% 0.76 1.14 0.05% 0.22 0.33 0.05% 0.03 0.05 0.05% 12.25 18.40 - 1.502330 USD IE Ireland 9/ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1.171980 EUR IL Israel 7/ 0.07% 14.43 - 14.43 82.14 0.11% 1.53 8.69 0.11% 0.44 2.51 0.11% 0.07 0.38 0.07% 16.46 93.71 - 5.692650 ILS IT Italy 3/ 2.23% 458.81 - 458.81 537.72 3.80% 52.72 61.79 3.80% 15.20 17.82 3.80% 2.28 2.67 2.36% 529.02 620.00 - 1.171980 EUR JP Japan 10.41% 2,146.41 - 2,146.41 286,910.50 16.00% 222.00 29,674.26 16.00% 64.02 8,557.02 16.00% 9.60 1,283.23 10.87% 2,442.02 326,425.00 - 133.669960 JPY KK Kazakhstan 3/ 0.01% 1.83 - 1.83 2.75 0.01% 0.12 0.19 0.01% 0.04 0.05 0.01% 0.01 0.01 0.01% 2.00 3.00 - 1.502330 USD KR Korea 3/ 1.00% 206.14 - 206.14 363,544.69 1.00% 13.87 24,469.82 1.00% 4.00 7,056.24 1.00% 0.60 1,058.17 1.00% 224.61 396,128.93 - 1,763.618920 KRW KWKuwait 3/ 0.24% 49.01 - 49.01 21.28 0.15% 2.07 0.90 0.15% 0.60 0.26 0.15% 0.09 0.04 0.23% 51.78 22.48 - 0.434080 KWD LV Latvia 7/ 0.01% 2.06 - 2.06 2.42 0.01% 0.14 0.16 0.01% 0.04 0.05 0.01% 0.01 0.01 0.01% 2.25 2.63 - 1.171980 EUR LT Lithuania 3/6/ 0.01% 1.88 - 1.88 2.20 0.01% 0.13 0.15 0.01% 0.04 0.04 0.01% 0.01 0.01 0.01% 2.05 2.40 - 1.171980 EUR LU Luxembourg 3/ 0.19% 38.17 - 38.17 44.74 0.19% 2.64 3.09 0.21% 0.84 0.99 0.19% 0.11 0.13 0.19% 41.76 48.95 - 1.171980 EUR 171 MXMexico 3/ 0.32% 65.03 - 65.03 1,238.88 0.06% 0.83 15.86 0.06% 0.24 4.57 0.06% 0.04 0.69 0.29% 66.14 1,260.00 - 19.051300 MXN NL Netherlands 3/ 3.00% 618.41 - 618.41 724.76 2.87% 39.82 46.67 2.87% 11.48 13.46 2.87% 1.72 2.02 2.99% 671.43 786.91 - 1.171980 EUR NZ New Zealand 3/ 0.12% 24.74 - 24.74 52.40 0.13% 1.80 3.82 0.13% 0.52 1.10 0.13% 0.08 0.17 0.12% 27.14 57.49 - 2.118260 NZD NO Norway 3/4/ 1.31% 269.38 - 269.38 2,337.00 1.68% 23.31 216.94 1.68% 6.72 62.56 1.68% 1.01 9.38 1.34% 300.42 2,625.88 170.08 9.306810 NOK PE Peru 0.05% 9.47 - 9.47 14.23 0.05% 0.64 0.96 0.05% 0.18 0.28 0.05% 0.03 0.04 0.05% 10.32 15.50 - 1.502330 USD PH Philippines 3/8/ 0.03% 6.90 - 6.90 10.37 0.03% 0.46 0.70 0.03% 0.13 0.20 0.03% 0.02 0.03 0.03% 7.52 11.30 - 1.502330 USD PL Poland 3/ 0.03% 6.18 - 6.18 6.18 0.03% 0.42 0.42 0.03% 0.12 0.12 0.03% 0.02 0.02 0.03% 6.74 6.74 - 1.000000 SDR PT Portugal 3/ 0.08% 15.56 - 15.56 18.24 0.22% 3.05 3.58 0.22% 0.88 1.03 0.22% 0.13 0.15 0.09% 19.62 23.00 - 1.171980 EUR RU Russia 1/ 0.35% 72.15 36.89 109.03 109.03 0.35% 4.86 4.86 0.35% 1.40 1.40 0.35% 0.21 0.21 0.51% 115.50 115.50 - 1.000000 SDR SA Saudi Arabia 0.22% 45.35 20.29 65.63 98.61 0.43% 5.97 8.96 0.43% 1.72 2.58 0.43% 0.26 0.39 0.33% 73.58 110.54 - 1.502330 USD SG Singapore 3/ 0.15% 31.14 - 31.14 46.78 0.08% 1.11 1.67 0.08% 0.32 0.48 0.08% 0.05 0.07 0.15% 32.62 49.00 - 1.502330 USD SK Slovak Republic 0.01% 2.06 - 2.06 2.42 0.01% 0.14 0.16 0.01% 0.04 0.05 0.01% 0.01 0.01 0.01% 2.25 2.63 - 1.171980 EUR SI Slovenia 3/ 0.03% 5.42 - 5.42 6.35 0.03% 0.42 0.49 0.03% 0.12 0.14 0.03% 0.02 0.02 0.03% 5.97 7.00 - 1.171980 EUR ZA South Africa 5/ 0.09% 18.55 2.92 21.47 224.14 0.09% 1.25 13.95 0.09% 0.36 4.02 0.09% 0.05 0.60 0.10% 23.14 242.72 15.78 11.172980 ZAR ES Spain 3/4/ 3.17% 652.58 - 652.58 724.76 1.99% 27.61 32.36 1.99% 7.96 9.33 1.99% 1.19 1.40 3.07% 689.34 767.85 40.05 1.171980 EUR SE Sweden 2.96% 610.16 - 610.16 6,801.31 2.89% 40.10 446.96 2.89% 11.56 128.89 2.89% 1.73 19.33 2.95% 663.56 7,396.48 - 11.146730 SEK CH Switzerland 3/ 2.10% 432.88 - 432.88 432.88 2.10% 29.14 29.14 2.10% 8.40 8.40 2.10% 1.26 1.26 2.10% 471.68 471.68 - 1.000000 SDR TR Turkey 3/ 0.06% 13.07 - 13.07 30.00 0.00% - - 0.00% - - 0.00% - - 0.06% 13.07 30.00 - 2.294950 TRY GB United Kingdom 12.08% 2,489.34 - 2,489.34 2,459.72 11.19% 155.26 153.41 11.19% 44.77 44.24 11.19% 6.71 6.63 12.00% 2,696.08 2,664.00 - 0.988100 GBP US United States 3/ 11.36% 2,341.05 - 2,341.05 3,517.03 20.12% 279.16 419.39 20.12% 80.50 120.94 20.12% 12.07 18.14 12.08% 2,712.79 4,075.50 - 1.502330 USD ## Sub-total 74.42% 15,340.17 229.77 15,569.94 95.14% 1,320.01 95.16% 380.73 94.07% 56.44 77.14% 17,327.12 Additional financing 2/ 1.14% 233.99 233.99 1.04% 233.99 Structural financing gap 24.45% 5,039.41 4,809.63 4.86% 67.47 4.84% 19.37 5.93% 3.56 21.82% 4,900.03 Total 100.00% 20,613.56 20,613.56 100.00% 1,387.48 100.00% 400.10 100.00% 60.00 100.00% 22,461.14 1/ Contributions of countries with an average inflation rate exceeding 10% over the 2007-2009 period would be denominated in SDRs or in any currency used for the valuation of the SDR and agreed with the association. 2/ Represents the investment income generated by using a regular encashment profile of 9 years. 3/ Indicative contribution, subject to government and/or parliamentary approval. 4/ Includes an increase in basic share achieved through accelerated encashments. 5/ Supplemental contributions provided through accelerated encashments. 6/ Country is not yet a member of IDA. 7/ As proposed by Management, for government consideration. 8/ Contingent on adoption of the 2010 selective capital increase resolution by IBRD's Board of Governors. 9/ Pledge outstanding. 10/ The amounts in national currency ('NC') exclude individual acceleration credits (when applicable), which are included in the SDR amounts. The equivalent NC amount of any individual acceleration credit is shown separately in column 18. Table 2: Subscriptions, Contributions and Votes (Amounts in US$ Equivalent) 172 Table 2: Subscriptions, Contributions and Votes (Amounts in US$ Equivalent) 173 Table 2: Subscriptions, Contributions and Votes (Amounts in US$ Equivalent) 174 Table 2: Subscriptions, Contributions and Votes (Amounts in US$ Equivalent) 175 RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF IDA AT THE 2011 ANNUAL MEETINGS Resolution No. 228 Financial Statements, Accountants’ Report and Administrative Budget RESOLVED: THAT the Board of Governors of the Association consider the Financial Statements, Accountants’ Report and Administrative Budget, included in the 2011 Annual Report, as fulfilling the requirements of Article VI, Section 11, of the Articles of Agreement and of Section 8 of the By-Laws of the Association. (Adopted September 23, 2011) 176 RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF IFC BETWEEN THE 2010 AND 2011 ANNUAL MEETINGS Resolution No. 253 Membership of Suriname WHEREAS, Suriname has applied for admission to membership in the International Finance Corporation in accordance with Section 1(b) of Article II of the Articles of Agreement of the Corporation; and WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 17 of the By-Laws of the Corpo- ration, the Board of Directors, after consultation with representatives of Suriname, has made recommendations to the Board of Governors regarding this application; NOW, THEREFORE, the Board of Governors hereby RESOLVES: THAT the terms and conditions upon which Suriname shall be admit- ted to membership in the Corporation shall be as follows: 1. Definitions: As used in this Resolution: (a) “Corporation� means International Finance Corporation. (b) “Articles� means the Articles of Agreement of the Corporation. (c) “Dollars� or “$� means dollars in currency of the United States of America. 2. Subscription: By accepting membership in the Corporation, Suriname shall subscribe to 620 shares of the capital stock of the Corporation at the par value of $1,000 per share. 3. Payment of Subscription: Before accepting membership in the Corpo- ration, Suriname shall pay $620,000 to the Corporation representing payment in full for the 620 shares of the capital stock subscribed. 4. Information: Before accepting membership in the Corporation, Suri- name shall furnish to the Corporation such information relating to its application for membership as the Corporation may request. 177 5. Effective Date of Membership: Suriname shall become a member of the Corporation with a subscription as set forth in paragraph 2 of this Resolution as of the date when Suriname shall have complied with the following requirements: (a) made the payment called for by paragraph 3 of this Resolution; (b) furnished such information as may have been requested by the Corporation pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Resolution; (c) deposited with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development an instrument stating that it has accepted without reservation in accordance with its law the Articles and all the terms and conditions prescribed in this Resolution, and that it has taken all steps necessary to enable it to carry out all its obligations under the Articles and this Resolution; and (d) signed the original Articles held by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 6. Limitation on Period for Fulfillment of Requirements of Membership: Suriname may fulfill the requirements for membership in the Corpo- ration pursuant to this Resolution until December 31, 2011, or such later date as the Board of Directors may determine. (Adopted August 12, 2011) 178 RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF IFC AT THE 2011 ANNUAL MEETINGS Resolution No. 254 Financial Statements, Accountants’ Report, Administrative Budget and Designations of Retained Earnings RESOLVED: 1. THAT the Board of Governors of the Corporation consider the Con- solidated Financial Statements and Independent Auditors’ Report included in the 2011 Annual Report and the Administrative Budget contained in the Report of the Board of Governors on IFC’s FY12 Business Plan and Budget (the “Report�), as fulfilling the require- ments of Article IV, Section 11, of the Articles of Agreement and of Section 16 of the By-Laws of the Corporation; 2. THAT the Report is hereby noted with approval; 3. THAT the Corporation’s FY11 Net Income of $1,579 million shall be transferred to undesignated retained earnings; 4. THAT the Corporation’s designation of $69 million of retained earnings for IFC’s Funding Mechanism for Technical Assistance and Advisory Services in IFC’s Fiscal Year 2012 First Quarter financial statements is hereby noted with approval; 5. THAT the Corporation’s designation of $330 million of retained earn- ings in IFC’s Fiscal Year 2012 financial statements for grants to the International Development Association (the “Association�) for use by the Association in the form of grants in furtherance of the Corpo- ration’s purposes is hereby noted with approval. (Adopted September 23, 2011) 179 RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL OF GOVERNORS OF MIGA AT THE 2011 ANNUAL MEETINGS Resolution No. 89 Financial Statements and the Report of the Independent Accountants RESOLVED: THAT the Council of Governors of the Agency consider the Financial Statements, and the Report of Independent Accountants included in the 2011 Annual Report, as fulfilling the requirements of Article 29 of the MIGA Convention and of Section 16(b) of the By-Laws of the Agency. (Adopted September 23, 2011) 180 REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS OF THE BANK July 20, 2010 Enhancing Voice and Participation of Developing and Transition Countries I. Introduction 1. The 2002 Monterrey Consensus encouraged the World Bank Group (WBG) and the International Monetary Fund “to continue to enhance participation of all developing countries and countries with economies in transition (DTC) in their decision making and thereby to strengthen the international dialogue and the work of these institutions as they address the development needs and concerns of these countries.�1 2. The Executive Directors of the Bank and the Board of Directors of IFC have considered over the last two years the question of enhancing the voice and participation of the DTCs in the Bank and the Corpo- ration, following several years that saw initiatives that strengthened DTC participation in WBG decision-making.2 The first phase of voice and participation reform was agreed by the Development Committee in October 2008 and approved by the Board of Governors in January 2009. At its Fall 2009 and Spring 2010 meetings, the Development Committee discussed papers from the Executive Directors on further reforms, on the basis of which the Executive Directors of the Bank and the Board of Directors of the Corporation have prepared this report. 3. At its April 2010 meeting, the Development Committee considered the second phase of voice reforms described in “World Bank Group Voice Reform: Enhancing Voice and Participation of Developing and Transition Countries in 2010 and Beyond� (DC2010-0006/1, April 25, 2010). The Development Committee Communiqué of April 25, 2010 stated: 1 Quoted from Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development, International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mexico, March 18–22, 2002, paragraph 63. 2 Development Committee Communiqué, October 2008, and Enhancing Voice and Participation of Developing and Transition Countries in the World Bank Group: Implementation of Reforms (R2008-244/1, December 11, 2008). 181 In line with our Istanbul commitments, we endorsed voice reform to increase the voting power of developing and transition countries (DTC) in IBRD by 3.13%, bringing it to 47.19%. This represents a total shift of 4.59% to DTCs since 2008. This 2010 realignment includes a selective capital increase of $27.8 billion with paid-in capital of $1.6 billion. The approach used for the 2010 shareholding realign- ment and its elements are the basis for the current selective capital increase only. For the next shareholding review in 2015, we committed to establish a work program and a roadmap to arrive at a benchmark for a dynamic formula reflecting the principles we agreed in Istanbul, moving over time towards equitable voting power and protecting the voting power of the smallest poor countries. We reiterate the importance of an open, merit-based and transparent process for the selection of the President of the World Bank Group. We will also promote staff diversity to reflect better the global nature of the WBG. As a first step in IFC voice reform, we endorsed an increase in basic votes and a selective capital increase of $200 million, representing a total shift of 6.07%, to bring DTC voting power to 39.48% and move towards a broad and flexible alignment with IBRD shareholding. We urged the Boards and WBG management to expedite the neces- sary procedures so the appropriate resolutions to implement the voice reform and capital packages are submitted to the IBRD and IFC Boards of Governors by end-June 2010.3 4. This paper presents the necessary implementation decisions and actions that require approval by the Boards of Governors of the Bank and the Corporation. II. Bank 5. 2010 Bank Shareholding Realignment. As endorsed by the Develop- ment Committee in April 2010, the Executive Directors recommend to the Board of Governors: (a) a selective capital increase (SCI) of $27.8 billion, corresponding to 230,374 shares4, and allocation of shares to the participating 3 Development Committee Communique, April 25, 2010, paragraphs 6, 7 and 9. 4 As is the case of the present authorized capital, the increase would be denominated in terms of the United States dollars of the weight and fineness in effect on July 1, 1944, and, in accordance with Executive Directors’ decision of October 14, 1986, would be valued in terms of the 1974 SDR, i.e., on the basis of US$1.20635 per 1944 gold dollar. 182 members as set forth in the attached draft Board of Governors’ Resolution (SCI Resolution) (Annex 1); and (b) a review of the Bank’s shareholding every five years, starting in 2015. Approval of Bank capital increases requires a 75% majority of total voting power. 6. Modalities. The Executive Directors recommend modalities for the SCI as set forth in paragraphs 7 to 11 below. 7. Paid-in Percentage. The shares allocated to smallest poor members to address voting power dilution will be fully callable with no paid-in portion.5 In line with the current average paid-in ratio of Bank’s capi- tal, all other shares allocated under this SCI require paid-in capital at 6%.6 Therefore, a total of $1.6 billion of the $27.8 billion SCI will be in the form of paid-in capital. 8. Payment Arrangements. As endorsed by the Development Committee, the draft SCI Resolution provides that each subscription to shares is con- ditioned upon the free and immediate use of national currency paid-in capital (NCPIC).7 The Executive Directors recommend to the Governors that this be implemented through the following payment arrangements: (a) Of the paid-in percentage of 6%, 0.6% is payable in United States dollars and 5.4% is payable in a member’s national currency, but if the member’s national currency is not freely convertible, the 5.4% portion will be payable in any freely convertible currency.8 In order to achieve the unrestricted usability of NCPIC, the Bank will immediately convert the NCPIC portion into United States dollars for use in Bank operations.9 (b) The NCPIC portion will cease to be denominated in “national currency� for the purposes of the Bank’s Articles upon conversion 5 Shares allocated to smallest poor members are listed in paragraph 2, column 2 of the SCI Resolution (Annex 1). 6 Shares allocated are listed in paragraph 2, column 1 of the SCI Resolution (Annex 1). 7 These conditions apply only to new subscriptions under the SCI and GCI, not to existing IBRD subscriptions. 8 A “freely convertible currency� means a currency which the Bank determines is adequately convertible by the Bank into United States dollars. 9 The general practice of the Bank is to warehouse funds in United States dollars. 183 by the Bank, and the restrictions on the use of the NCPIC will no longer apply.10 (c) As the requirement for payment in freely convertible currency may impose a substantial burden on the foreign currency reserves of low-income countries, members that are recipients of IDA resources and are not eligible to borrow from the Bank (IDA- only members) as of July 1, 2010, may pay in their national cur- rencies even if not freely convertible.11 (d) The SCI Resolution reflects these payment arrangements12 and expressly provides that, by subscribing to such shares, members acknowledge that no further consents are required for use of this portion of their paid-in capital in the Bank’s operations. 9. In addition, to ensure that funds paid-in are immediately usable by the Bank in its operations, payments for subscriptions to the SCI will be made in cash.13 By subscribing to shares, members acknowledge 10 This is similar to the effect of entering into “repurchase arrangements� with the Bank. Under these arrangements, members substitute United States Dollars for their NCPIC. In addition, maintenance of value (MoV) obligations relating to subscriptions under the contemplated SCI will be extinguished upon conversion into United States dollars. (MoV obligations refers to provisions in the Bank’s Articles of Agreement that payment by the Bank or the member is required when the par value of the member’s NCPIC changes.) 11 A total of $8.7 million is expected to be subject to this exception for these IDA- only members, assuming that the SCI is fully subscribed by such members. While these members are not required to provide freely-convertible currency, the draft SCI Resolution provides that, by subscribing, the IDA-only members are deemed to provide their irrevocable consent to the use of their currencies in Bank operations. This use is expected to be limited but would include, for example, lending, re-lending, exchange (if the currency becomes freely convertible), and/or disbursing to contractors in local currency for payments due under WBG projects inside the country. Consent for use by the Bank for administrative expenses is not required under the Articles. MoV obligations would continue to apply to subscriptions of these IDA-only members under this exception to the amounts which have not been used by the Bank. 12 See paragraphs 3(c), (d) and (f) of the SCI Resolution (Annex 1). 13 In lieu of cash, the Bank may accept notes from members with legislative constraints requiring payment for such subscriptions to be made by note. Any notes must be non-interest-bearing demand notes issued by the member or its depository. In order to ensure immediate usability, such notes will be promptly encashed by the Bank. In the event of failure to pay on the notes, the voting rights attached to such shares would be subject to suspension within seven days. 184 in the SCI Resolution that the ongoing right to substitute notes for these cash payments will not apply to these subscriptions.14 10. Subscription. Members will have four years from the date of adop- tion of the SCI Resolution to subscribe to shares allocated to them. Extension for individual countries will be considered for a period of up to 24 months beyond the initial four years. Each request for extension will need to be accompanied by a specific schedule of the steps the member will take to subscribe to the shares. Any extension beyond the first 12 months will require approval by the Executive Directors. The Executive Directors expect Management to report periodically on the status of subscriptions and extensions. While early subscription is encouraged, members will be able to customize their subscription schedule within the four-year subscription period. Voting power of individual members will change at the intervals at which shares are subscribed. Members are urged to make necessary arrangements to subscribe as soon as possible. 11. Preemptive Rights. An SCI depends on the agreement of members to refrain from the exercise of their rights to subscribe to sufficient shares in the capital increase to maintain their percentage share of total capital of the Bank (preemptive rights).15 Recent SCIs have been conditioned on the waiver of preemptive rights by all sharehold- ers, so that if any member decided to exercise its preemptive rights, the Board of Governors’ Resolution would not become effective. Accordingly, the effectiveness of the SCI Resolution is conditioned on waiver of preemptive rights by all members. If a member wishes to exercise its preemptive rights, it must do so within 21 days of the date of the transmission of this Report and SCI Resolution to the Governors for voting. If a member does not wish to exercise its preemptive rights, no action is required. 12. Regular Bank Shareholding Review. Bank shareholding will be reviewed every five years starting in 2015. While it is envisioned that such reviews will take place regularly, shareholding realignment 14 The ongoing right to substitute notes applies only to subscriptions in the member’s national currency. Through conversion, the right to substitute notes for cash falls away. Even if the national currency is provided by IDA-only countries, it cannot be substituted for notes, as the Articles expressly recognize that there is no right to substitute notes if the paid-in portion is needed by the Bank in its operations. 15 Article II, Section 3(c) of IBRD’s Articles of Agreement. 185 will not necessarily be required with each review, but only when shareholders, through the Board of Governors, decide that the results warrant adjustment. This feature is introduced through the SCI Reso- lution. The approach and elements for the 2010 shareholding realign- ment are the basis for this SCI only, to achieve the agreed increase of 3.13% in DTC voting power. For the first five-year review, the Development Committee Communiqué stated that: For the next shareholding review in 2015, we committed to estab- lish a work program and a roadmap to arrive at a benchmark for a dynamic formula reflecting the principles we agreed in Istanbul, moving over time towards equitable voting power and protecting the voting power of the smallest poor countries. 13. Board Composition. In line with the first phase of voice reforms already approved by the Board of Governors in January 2009, the countries in the two current Sub-Saharan Africa constituencies will be represented by three Executive Directors to be elected at the 2010 Regular Election this Fall. Moreover, member subscriptions to the shares proposed in the SCI Resolution will eventually result in one member (China) becoming the third largest shareholder and two members (France and the United Kingdom) becoming the fifth larg- est shareholders, each having an equal number of shares. Under the Articles, the five largest shareholders have a right to appoint Execu- tive Directors. Given these circumstances, the Executive Directors approved (at the close of business on July 6, 2010) an interpretation of the Articles to permit both France and the United Kingdom to each appoint an Executive Director while they hold equal number of shares and are the fifth largest shareholders in the Bank until the first regular election of Executive Directors after 2015. 14. Voting. The terminal date for Governors to vote on the SCI Resolu- tion is by close of business on September 10, 2010, unless extended by the Executive Directors of the Bank. The Executive Directors encourage the Governors to vote as expeditiously as possible. 15. Recommendation. In consideration of the above, the Executive Directors of the Bank recommend that the Governors of the Bank adopt the attached SCI Resolution. . . .(1) (1) This resolution was subsequently approved. See page 146. 186 III. IFC 16. Historically, IFC’s main shareholding principle has been to reflect each new member’s relative weight in IBRD shareholding. However, over the years, a differentiation has developed in the relative size of IFC and IBRD share allocations among members, so that the DTC voting power today in IFC is at 33.4%, compared to post-Phase 1 DTC voting power in IBRD at 44.1%. IFC voice reform provides an opportunity for shareholders to balance voting power adjust- ments in IBRD and IFC, while achieving voting power adjust- ments and reinforcing IFC’s financial capacity. 17. Realignment Principles. The underlying principle for IFC Voice Reform is a broad and flexible alignment between IFC and IBRD shareholdings, that takes into account different levels of shareholder interest in and support for the different institutions. In that light, the IFC Voice Reform will be implemented through an increase in Basic Votes in parallel with a selective capital increase (SCI) open for subscription to those members interested in increasing their share- holding and support for IFC. 18. Increase in Basic Votes and Amendment to the Articles of Agree- ment. As at the Bank, the voting power of each IFC member is the sum of its Basic Votes, fixed at 250 votes per member in the Corpo- ration’s Articles, and its share votes, with one vote for each share of IFC stock held16. 19. At present, Basic Votes represent 1.88% of total IFC voting power, compared to 12.28% at the time of the Corporation’s founding in 1956. An increase in Basic Votes would strengthen the relative voting power of members with smaller shareholdings, many of which are classified as DTCs. The package of Voice Reforms discussed at the Development Committee meeting held on April 25, 2010 proposed increasing IFC Basic Votes to 5.55% of total votes, in line with what was done for IBRD in the Phase I Voice Reform. An amendment to the Articles that sets Basic Votes at this percentage of 5.55% would prevent future reductions in the proportion in voting power that Basic Votes represent. 20. Calculation. With this amendment, Basic Votes for any member will be determined by a two-step calculation. First, the aggregate number 16 Article IV, Section 3 of IFC’s Articles of Agreement. 187 of Basic Votes for all members will be calculated to be 5.55% of total votes. Second, this aggregate number of Basic Votes will be divided by the number of members at the time of calculation, to determine the number of Basic Votes allocated to each member.17 To avoid the complication of fractional Basic Votes, the number of Basic Votes allocated to each member will be rounded upward or downward to a whole number, using the basic rounding convention. 21. Changes in Basic Votes. The percentage of total voting power that is represented by aggregate Basic Votes would be fixed at 5.55% and would not change when the number of subscribed shares of the Corporation’s capital stock are increased or decreased, or when the number of the Corporation members increases or decreases. Increases or decreases in the number of shares held by members will change the aggregate number of Share Votes, and thus the aggregate number of Basic Votes as well as the Basic Votes allocated to each member. Similarly, the addition or departure of members will change the num- ber of Basic Votes per member, even if there were no change in the aggregate number of Basic Votes. The level of Basic Votes shall be increased to 5.55% of total votes through an amendment to Article IV, Section 3(a) of the Corporation’s Articles of Agreement, as set out below: Proposed New Text of Article IV, Section 3 Section 3. Voting (a) The voting power of each member shall be equal to the sum of its basic votes and share votes. (i) The basic votes of each member shall be the number of votes that results from the equal distribution among all members of 5.55 percent of the aggregate sum of the voting power of all members, provided that there shall be no fractional basic votes. 17 For this calculation, Total Share Votes will be the total number of shares of the Corporation’s capital subscribed by all members. Total Basic Votes will be 5.55% of Total Votes; therefore, Total Share Votes will be 94.45% of Total Votes. The associated equations are as follows: (a) Total Votes = Total Share Votes divided by 0.9445. (b) Total Basic Votes = Total Votes minus Total Share Votes. (c) Each member’s basic Votes = Total Basic Votes divided by the number of members (currently 182), rounded to zero decimal places using the basic rounding convention. 188 (ii) The share votes of each member shall be the number of votes that results from the allocation of one vote for each share of stock held. 22. The proposed amendment would require acceptance by vote of three- fifths of the Governors exercising eighty-five percent of the total voting power. The amendment would enter into force three months after the Corporation certifies that the required majority has been reached.18 23. Increase in IFC’s Authorized Capital Stock and Issuance of Shares. The package of Voice Reforms endorsed by the Development Com- mittee contemplated issuance and subscription of $200 million shares, comprising $70 million existing but unallocated shares and $130 mil- lion newly created shares. At present, IFC has an authorized capital stock of $2,450 million divided into 2,450,000 shares of $1,000 each. Of this capital stock, 2,369,396 shares are allocated, subscribed and fully paid-in, and the remaining 80,604 shares are currently unallo- cated. Management has recommended retention of 10,604 of those unallocated shares available for possible issuance to new IFC mem- bers to meet membership requirements. Thus, 70,000 currently unal- located shares could be issued pursuant to a selective capital increase. Additional capital subscriptions for an amount of $130 million would require issuance of 130,000 new shares and an increase in the autho- rized capital stock of the Corporation by $130 million. 24. Allocation of Shares and Waiver of Preemptive Rights of Subscrip- tion by Members. The allocation of shares to participating members is based on the principles of allocation endorsed by the Development Committee and the non-binding expressions of interest received by IFC Management no later than April 20, 2010. The Board of Gov- ernors’ Resolution attached to this Report as Annex 2 shows the number of shares that would be allocated and offered for subscription to each participating member, and, in the event that some members do not subscribe, authorizes the further allocation of the remaining unsubscribed shares, first to Saudi Arabia (up to 2,372 additional shares) and Kuwait (up to 400 additional shares), to correct an error in the calculation of their non-binding expressions of interest as of April 20, 2010 as a result of which they should be allocated additional shares; and the balance of remaining unsubscribed shares, pro rata among all participating members. Members who are not interested in 18 Article VII of IFC’s Articles of Agreement. 189 subscribing to all or part of the shares allocated to them are encour- aged to notify the Corporation as soon as possible; preferably no later than six months following the date of effectiveness of the increase in the authorized capital stock of the Corporation. 25. The effectiveness of the proposed allocation of shares is based on the expectation that all members will agree to waive their preemptive rights of subscription under the Articles of Agreement.19 26. Terms of Subscription and Payment. All shares would be issued at par and fully paid in cash in United States dollars or other freely con- vertible currencies. In lieu of cash, the Corporation will also accept United States dollars denominated notes payable on demand and issued by a member or its designated depository. Although partici- pating members are encouraged by Management to subscribe and pay promptly, the terms of subscription and payment set out in the draft Board of Governors’ Resolution provide wide flexibility to participating members. 27. IFC Shareholding Review. The IFC Voice Reform contemplates a periodic shareholding review for IFC every five years, starting in 2015. 28. Recommendation. In consideration of the above, the Board of Direc- tors of the Corporation recommends that the Governors of the Cor- poration adopt the attached Resolution. . . .(1) (This report was approved and its recommendation in para. 15 was adopted by the Board of Governors on March 16, 2011. The recommendation in para. 28 has not yet been adopted.) 19 Article II, Section 2(d) of IFC’s Articles of Agreement. (1) This resolution has not been adopted. 190 July 20, 2010 2010 General Capital Increase 1. Introduction. Over the past months, the Executive Directors have considered a general increase in IBRD’s capital as part of a package of measures aimed at enhancing IBRD’s financial capacity. During this period, there has been a series of formal and informal discussions to help build consensus on the general capital increase (GCI). Agree- ment on the size and modalities of the GCI has now been reached. This report presents the Executive Directors’ recommendations on the GCI to the Board of Governors, as well as recommendations for an additional increase in shares for new members. Draft Resolutions of the Board of Governors for the GCI (GCI Resolution) and the additional increase in shares for new members (Additional Increase Resolution), respectively, are presented in Annexes 3 and 4. 2. Size of GCI. As endorsed by the Development Committee in April 2010, the Executive Directors recommend to the Governors a general capital increase of $58.4 billion corresponding to 484,102 shares20 to be allocated on a pro rata basis. The pro rata allocation of shares for members is set out in the draft GCI Resolution. With this increase and the $27.8 billion Selective Capital Increase (SCI) as recommended in the Executive Directors Report entitled “Enhancing Voice and Partici- pation of Developing and Transition Countries�, the authorized capital of IBRD will be increased by $86.2 billion to reach $276.1 billion. 3. Paid-In Percentage. In line with the current average paid-in ratio of Bank’s capital, the Executive Directors recommend to the Governors that all shares allocated under this GCI require paid-in capital at 6%. Therefore, a total of $3.5 billion of the $58.4 billion GCI will be in the form of paid-in capital. 4. Payment Arrangements. As endorsed by the Development Commit- tee, the draft GCI Resolution provides that each subscription to shares is conditioned upon the free and immediate use of national currency 20 As is the case of the present authorized capital, the increase would be denominated in terms of the United States dollars of the weight and fineness in effect on July 1, 1944, and, in accordance with Executive Directors’ decision of October 14, 1986, would be valued in terms of the 1974 SDR, i.e., on the basis of US$1.20635 per 1944 gold dollar. 191 paid-in capital (NCPIC).21 The Executive Directors recommend to the Governors that this be implemented through the following pay- ment arrangements: (a) Of the paid-in percentage of 6%, 0.6% is payable in United States dollars and 5.4% is payable in a member’s national currency, but if the member’s national currency is not freely convertible, the 5.4% portion will be payable in any freely convertible currency.22 In order to achieve the unrestricted usability of NCPIC, the Bank will immediately convert the NCPIC portion into United States dollars for use in Bank operations.23 (b) The NCPIC portion will cease to be denominated in “national currency� for the purposes of the Bank’s Articles upon conver- sion by the Bank, and the restrictions on the use of the NCPIC will no longer apply.24 (c) As the requirement for payment in freely convertible currency may impose a substantial burden on the foreign currency reserves of low-income countries, members that are recipients of IDA resources and are not eligible to borrow from IBRD (IDA-only members) as of July 1, 2010, may pay in their national currencies even if not freely convertible.25 21 These conditions apply only to new subscriptions under the SCI and GCI, not to existing IBRD subscriptions. 22 A “freely convertible currency� means a currency which the Bank determines is adequately convertible by the Bank into United States dollars. 23 The general practice of the Bank is to warehouse funds in United States dollars. 24 This is similar to the effect of entering into “repurchase arrangements� with the Bank. Under these arrangements, members substitute United States dollars for their NCPIC. In addition, maintenance of value (MoV) obligations relating to subscriptions under the contemplated GCI will be extinguished upon conversion into United States dollars. (MoV obligations refers to provisions in the Bank’s Articles of Agreement that payment by the Bank or the member is required when the par value of the member’s NCPIC changes.) 25 A total of $159.5 million is expected to be subject to this exception for these IDA-only members, assuming that the GCI is fully-subscribed by such members. While these members are not required to provide freely-convertible currency, the draft GCI Resolution provides that, by subscribing, the IDA-only members are deemed to provide their irrevocable consent to the use of their currencies in Bank operations. This use is expected to be limited but would include, for example, lending, re-lending, exchange (if the currency becomes freely convertible), and/or disbursing to contractors in local currency for payments due under WBG projects inside the country. Consent for use by the Bank for administrative expenses is not required under the Articles. MoV obligations would continue to apply to subscriptions of these IDA-only members under this exception to the amounts which have not been used by the Bank. 192 (d) The GCI Resolution reflects these payment arrangements26 and expressly provides that, by subscribing to such shares, members acknowledge that no further consents are required for use of this portion of their paid-in capital in the Bank’s operations. 5. In addition, to ensure that funds paid-in are immediately usable by the Bank in its operations, payments for subscriptions to the GCI will be made in cash.27 By subscribing to shares, members acknowledge in the GCI Resolution that the ongoing right to substitute notes for these cash payments will not apply to these subscriptions.28 6. Subscription. Members will have five years from the date of adop- tion of the GCI Resolution to subscribe to shares allocated to them. Extension for individual countries will be considered for a period of up to 24 months beyond the initial five years. Each request for exten- sion will need to be accompanied by a specific schedule of legislative steps to be taken to subscribe to shares. Any extension beyond the first 12 months will require the approval by the Executive Directors. The Executive Directors expect Management to report periodically on the status of subscriptions and extensions. While early subscription is encouraged, members will be able to customize their own subscrip- tion schedule within the five-year subscription period. Voting power of individual members will change at the intervals at which shares are subscribed. It is important that members make arrangements to subscribe as soon as possible. 7. Share Allocation for New Members. The Articles of Agreement require the Bank to “reserve a sufficient portion of its capital stock for subscription� by new members. Therefore, Executive Directors 26 See paragraphs 3(c), (d) and (f) of the draft GCI Resolution (Annex 3). 27 In lieu of cash, the Bank may accept notes from members with legislative constraints requiring payment for such subscriptions to be made by note. Any notes must be non-interest-bearing demand notes issued by the member or its depository. In order to ensure immediate usability, any such notes will be promptly encashed by the Bank. In the event of failure to pay on the notes, the voting rights attached to such shares would be subject to suspension within seven days. 28 The ongoing right to substitute notes applies only to subscriptions in the member’s national currency. Through conversion, the right to substitute notes for cash falls away. Even if the national currency is provided by IDA-only countries, it cannot be substituted for notes, as the Articles expressly recognize that there is no right to substitute notes if the paid-in portion is needed by the Bank in its operations. 193 also recommend that an additional increase of 11,400 shares be autho- rized and set aside for new members. This is considered sufficient to accommodate future membership applications and corresponds to about 0.72% of total shares. 8. Voting. It is important to have early effectiveness of the proposed GCI as capital constraints have already started to limit the Bank’s lending. The terminal date for Governors to vote on the GCI Resolu- tion is by close of business on September 10, 2010, unless extended by the Executive Directors of the Bank. Executive Directors encourage the Governors to vote as expeditiously as possible. 9. Recommendation. In consideration of the above, the Executive Direc- tors of the Bank recommend that the Governors of the Bank adopt the attached Governors’ Resolutions . . . .1,2 (This report was approved and its recommendations were adopted by the Board of Governors on March 16, 2011.) 1,2 These resolutions were subsequently approved. See pages 152, 157. 194 April 26, 2011 Transfer from Surplus to Replenish the Trust Fund for Gaza and West Bank 1. On October 19, 1993, by the terms of Resolution No. 93-11 and IDA 93-7, the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Bank) and the International Development Association (Association) approved the establishment of the Trust Fund for Gaza. On November 11, 1993, by the terms of Resolution No. 483, the Board of Governors of the Bank approved the transfer from surplus, by way of grant, of US$50 million to the Trust Fund for Gaza. On August 1, 1995, by the terms of Resolution No. 95-6 and IDA 95-3, the Executive Directors of the Bank and the Associa- tion amended Resolution No. 93-11 and IDA 93-7 by (a) expanding the territorial scope of the activities to be financed out of the Trust Fund for Gaza to include such areas, sectors and activities in the West Bank which are or will be under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority pursuant to the relevant Israeli-Palestinian agreements; and (b) changing the name of the “Trust Fund for Gaza� to “Trust Fund for Gaza and West Bank.� On October 12, 1995, by the terms of Resolution No. 500, the Board of Governors approved the transfer to the Trust Fund for Gaza and West Bank, by way of grant out of the Bank’s FY95 net income, of US$90 million. On December 19, 1996, by the terms of Resolution No. 96-11 and No. IDA 96-7, the Executive Directors of the Bank and the Association further amended Resolu- tion No. 93-11 and IDA 93-7 by (a) introducing flexibility to the terms under which resources may be provided out of the Trust Fund for Gaza and West Bank; and (b) requiring that the repayment of trust fund credits made out of the Trust Fund for Gaza and West Bank accrue to the Association as part of its resources. Additional funding was provided by transfers from surplus or net income approved by the Bank’s Board of Governors on February 3, 1997 (US$90 million, Reso- lution 511), July 13, 1998 (US$90 million, Resolution No. 519), Sep- tember 30, 1999 (US$60 million, Resolution No. 529), February 4, 2004 (US$80 million, Resolution No. 556), January 31, 2007 (US$50 mil- lion, Resolution No. 584), June 4, 2008 (US$55 million, Resolution No. 589), July 10, 2009 (US$55 million, Resolution No. 599), and August 9, 2010 (US$55 million, Resolution No. 608). 2. In view of the material contribution that the Bank’s financial assis- tance makes to Palestinian economic welfare, the Executive Directors 195 consider that the Trust Fund for Gaza and West Bank should be replenished. They recommend that the Board of Governors authorize the transfer from surplus of the amount of US$75 million to the Trust Fund for Gaza and West Bank. 3. Accordingly, the Executive Directors recommend that the Board of Governors adopt the draft Resolution. . . .1 (This report was approved and its recommendation was adopted by the Board of Governors on June 8, 2011) June 14, 2011 Transfer of IBRD Surplus to the South Sudan Transition Trust Fund 1. In view of the need for quick starting development for South Sudan and in order to promote the purposes of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the “IBRD�), the Executive Direc- tors consider that a program of assistance for South Sudan should be undertaken for the benefit of the members of the IBRD, upon South Sudan attaining independence. The Executive Directors consider that a trust fund should be established by the International Development Association (IDA) and recommend that the Board of Governors authorize the immediate transfer from surplus of $75 million to the South Sudan Transition Trust Fund as a deemed advance of part of IBRD’s expected contribution to IDA from FY11 net income. 2. Accordingly, the Executive Directors recommend that the Board of Governors adopt the draft Resolution . . . 2 attached hereto as expedi- tiously as possible. (This report was approved and its recommendation was adopted on July 20, 2011.) 1 This resolution was subsequently approved. See page 158. 2 This resolution was subsequently approved. See page 158. 196 July 29, 2011 Forthcoming Annual Meetings of the Boards of Governors Proposed Dates and Venues for the 2013 and 2014 Annual Meetings 1. The Executive Directors of the World Bank Group (Bank) and the International Monetary Fund (Fund) recommend to the Boards of Governors the dates and venues for the forthcoming Annual Meetings. These recommendations are made well in advance due to the contrac- tual obligations that are required in connection with the arrangements for the Meetings. 2. Therefore, it is timely for Executive Directors to recommend, to the Boards of Governors, the dates for the 2013 and 2014 Annual Meet- ings planned to be held in Washington, D.C. 3. Accordingly, the Executive Directors of the Bank and the Fund rec- ommend that Governors adopt the Resolution . . .1 on the dates for the 2013 and 2014 Annual Meetings set out in the attachment to this Report by a vote without meeting. (This report was approved and its recommendation was adopted on Sep- tember 13, 2011.) 1 This resolution was subsequently approved. See page 159. 197 August 4, 2011 Allocation of FY11 Net Income 1. The General Reserve (including cumulative exchange rate translation adjustment) of the IBRD as of June 30, 2011 was $26,562 million. As of that date, the surplus of the IBRD was $227 million, and the Special Reserve created under Article IV, Section 6 of the IBRD’s Articles of Agreement totaled $293 million. For the fiscal year ended June 30, 2011 (FY11), the IBRD recorded net income on a reported basis of $930 million. IBRD’s Operating Income (referred to as “Income before fair value adjustment on non-trading portfolios, net and Board of Governors-approved transfers� in the Statement of Income in FY11 external financial statements) is used as the basis for annual net income allocation decisions, subject to certain standard adjustments. For FY11, Operating Income was $1,023 million, which was adjusted by a $91 million transfer from the pension reserve rep- resenting the excess of the SRP, RSBP and PEBP accounting expense over cash contributions, a $4 million transfer to the Restricted Retained Earnings Account, a $109 million transfer to the LTIP Reserve, and a $5 million transfer to the pension reserve reflecting the IBRD share of the PEBP investment income to arrive at allocable net income. 2. The Executive Directors have considered what action to take, or to recommend that the Board of Governors take, with respect to FY11 net income. The Executive Directors have concluded that the interests of the IBRD and its members would best be served by the following dispositions of the net income of the IBRD: (a) The addition of $401 million to the General Reserve, plus or minus any rounding amount less than $1 million; (b) the transfer to the International Development Association, by way of a grant of $520 million, from FY11 allocable net income, which amount would be usable to provide financing in the form of grants in addition to loans; and (c) the retention as surplus of $75 million. 3. Accordingly, the Executive Directors recommend that the Board of Governors note with approval the present Report and adopt the draft Resolutions. . . .1 (This report was approved and its recommendation was adopted on Sep- tember 23, 2011.) 1 This resolution was subsequently approved. See page 160. 198 Report to the Boards of Governors of the IMF and the World Bank by the Joint Committee on the Remuneration of Executive Directors and Their Alternates August 23, 2011 I. Introduction 1. Pursuant to Section 13(e) of the By-Laws of the Bank and Section 14(e) of the By-Laws of the Fund, the undersigned were appointed to the 2011 Joint Committee on the Remuneration of Executive Directors and their Alternates (JCR). 2. The 2011 JCR has conducted a streamlined review, in line with the process started in 2000 of undertaking a comprehensive review every four years (most recently in 2008), with a streamlined review in the intervening years. The 2011 review focused on: • Executive Directors’ remuneration in light of recent salary develop- ments in both institutions and experience with the methodology devel- oped in the context of the full-scale review conducted in 2008; and • The extension to Fund Executive Directors and Alternates of recent changes to the Fund’s Staff Retirement Plan. No other benefit changes were brought to the attention of the JCR for its consideration. 3. Consistent with the suggestions of the 2008 JCR for further streamlin- ing of the process, the 2011 Committee conducted its deliberations by means of electronic communications without a meeting. II. Remuneration 4. The 2011 JCR noted the following developments relating to the remu- neration of Bank and IMF management and staff: • The consumer price index (CPI) for the Washington Metropolitan area has risen by 3.9 percent (May 2010 to May 2011). The remu- neration of the Managing Director of the Fund and the President of the Bank are linked to the May-to-May change in the Washington Metropolitan area CPI in years between major reviews (normally carried out at the start of the appointment term) and have been increased by 3.9 percent with effect from July 1, 2011. In the Fund, this increase followed a review of management remuneration by the Executive Board, on the occasion of the selection of a new Managing Director, which concluded that no adjustment should be made to the salaries of the new Managing Director and the 199 Deputy Managing Directors, other than to reflect the May-to-May CPI increase. • Accordingly, the salaries of the Fund’s Deputy Managing Directors, which are indexed on the same basis as the remuneration of the Man- aging Director, were also adjusted by 3.9 percent effective July 1. • The increase in the salary structure of the World Bank’s staff includes an average adjustment to the salary structure of 1.9 percent for Washington-appointed staff and country-by-country structure adjustments based on the 2011 average market salary increases covering 130 countries. It was approved by the Bank’s Executive Directors on June 14, 2011.1 • Under the Fund’s new staff salary adjustment framework, Fund staff will receive a structural salary adjustment as of May 1, and a sepa- rate merit-based salary adjustment as of July 1. For 2011, the Fund’s Executive Board approved a 1.5 percent structure increase and merit increases of 1.27 percent, 2.54 percent, and 3.81 percent, depending on performance. Fund staff whose performance was deemed unsat- isfactory received no structural or merit salary increase. 5. The 2011 JCR concurs with the conclusion of the 2008 Committee that the primary internal reference for the remuneration of Bank and Fund Executive Directors should be the maintenance of a reasonable relationship to the base salaries of the Heads of the two institutions. This relationship has been broadly stable over the past twenty years, and the 2008 Committee considered the present ratio of 52.2 percent of the base salary of the Heads to be appropriate. 6. Consistent with the process for adjusting the remuneration of the President of the Bank and the Managing Director of the Fund, and barring exceptional or unexpected developments, the 2008 Committee had recommended that the 2009–2011 JCRs should propose a salary increase for Executive Directors equal to the year’s (May-to-May) percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index for the Washing- ton-Baltimore Metropolitan area. This approach was subsequently endorsed by the 2009 and 2010 JCRs. In line with this recommenda- tion, the salaries of Executive Directors were increased by 5 percent in 2008; no increase was recommended in 2009 (as the May-to-May local CPI in 2009 was negative), and increased by 1.9 percent (from the 2008 level) in 2010. 1 This does not include the staff salary ranges at Grades J and K. The market ref- erence points of salaries of Grades J and K will be raised by 3.9 percent, reflect- ing the May 2010 to May 2011 Washington-Baltimore CPI percentage change. 200 7. The Committee considers that setting the salaries of Executive Direc- tors as a proportion of the salaries of the Heads of the institutions remains a sound approach, given that it is consistent with the provi- sions of the By-Laws of the Bank and the Fund and the respective roles of Executive Directors and the Heads of the two institutions as Chairman of their respective Boards.2 This approach should also help ensure that the salaries of Executive Directors are appropriately positioned within the institutions’ overall salary hierarchy over time. The outcome of the periodic structural reviews of the remuneration of the Heads of the institutions should be taken into account by future JCRs in recommending salary adjustments for Executive Directors. 8. In this regard, the Committee notes that the review of IMF manage- ment remuneration conducted by the Fund’s Executive Board in June 2011 carefully examined the changing relationship between manage- ment remuneration and the salary structure for the most senior staff in assessing whether any changes in management remuneration were warranted. The review identified that the gap between Fund manage- ment salaries and the top of the salary range for the most senior staff (Grade B5) has narrowed in recent years, reflecting the real growth of salaries in the comparator markets for the Fund staff compensation system. However, the review also noted that the relationship between management remuneration, including the Managing Director, and average actual B5 salaries has remained relatively stable over the past decade. Accordingly, the review concluded that no adjustment should be made to the salaries of the new Managing Director and the Deputy Managing Directors, other than to reflect the annual increase in the May-to-May Washington-Baltimore CPI. 9. The Committee observed that the next major review of the remunera- tion of Executive Directors and Alternates is scheduled for 2012, and could provide an opportunity to evaluate whether the methodology adopted in and followed since 2008 remains appropriate. A com- prehensive review could also encompass an assessment of whether Executive Directors’ salaries are broadly consistent with the salaries of comparator positions in national public sectors. 2 Section 13 (e) (ii) of the By-Laws of the Bank and Section 14 (e) (ii) of the By- Laws of the Fund state that “. . . in making proposals with respect to the remu- neration of Executive Directors and their Alternates, the Committee shall bear in mind their functions under the Articles of Agreement of the [Bank] [Fund] in relation to those of the [President] [Managing Director].� 201 10. Taking all the above recommendations into account, the 2011 JCR recommends that the ratio of remuneration of Executive Directors to the base salary of the Heads of the two institutions be maintained at 52.2 percent, consistent with the methodology adopted by the JCR in 2008, and followed in 2009 and 2010. Accordingly, the JCR recom- mends an increase in the salary of Executive Directors equal to the May 2010 to May 2011 CPI increase for the Washington-Baltimore metropolitan area. This 3.9 percent increase would raise the sal- ary of Executive Directors from $235,180 to $244,350 effective on July 1, 2011. 11. The JCR considers that, at 86.5 percent, the current ratio between the salary of Alternate Executive Directors and Executive Directors remains appropriate, in line with the views of the 2008, 2009 and 2010 Committees. Accordingly, the 2011 JCR recommends the same 3.9 percent increase in the salary of Alternate Executive Directors from $203,440 to $211,370 effective on July 1, 2011. III. Benefits 12. Within the framework of the applicable resolutions of the Board of Governors, each year the JCR considers the possible extension of any new or modified benefits for Fund and Bank staff to Executive Directors and their Alternates, and whether the extension of such benefits would require the approval of the Board of Governors or may be left to the Executive Boards of the Bank and/or the Fund.3 The 2011 Committee has considered one change in IMF staff benefits that was introduced after the 2010 JCR meeting. 13. In late 2010, the eligibility criteria for the Fund Staff Retirement Plan (SRP) were amended to remove the prohibition on enrollment in the plan for staff members hired after their 62nd birthday. This change was introduced to recognize increased labor force participation by older workers, and that if the best candidate for a Fund position were 62 or older, the exclusion from SRP participation could hinder the Fund’s 3 IMF Board of Governors Resolutions No. 34-7, adopted on July 20, 1979 and No. 31-1, adopted on October 16, 1975. 202 recruitment objectives4,5. It is not anticipated that many individu- als over the age of 62 will enroll in the SRP, and thus the actuarial impact of the removal of the age limit for staff enrollment in the SRP is expected to be minimal. 14. The Committee considers that there are compelling practical reasons for maintaining consistency of pension benefits between Executive Directors and staff as different provisions would add greatly to admin- istrative complexity and costs. The Committee also noted that earlier changes to staff retirement plans, most recently to the Fund’s SRP in 2010, had consistently been made applicable to Executive Directors and Alternates. 15. With regard to whether the extension of these benefit changes to Executive Directors would require the approval of the Board of Gov- ernors or may be left to the Fund’s Executive Board, the Commit- tee carefully considered the effects that the changes would have on the benefits of Executive Directors and Alternates. The Committee determined that removing the age limit on enrollment in the SRP for Executive Directors and Alternates would not alter the basic nature or level of the Fund’s existing retirement benefits, and would have a minor effect on the overall cost of the Plan. 16. In light of the above, the Committee has concluded that the Fund’s SRP changes do not constitute major changes to the existing retire- ment benefits and that it is thus not necessary to seek the approval of the Board of Governors. The changes may be made available to Fund Executive Directors and Alternates by decision of the Fund’s Executive Board. 4 A similar prohibition on enrollment after age 62 in the Bank’s pension scheme was removed, by decision of the Bank’s Executive Board, in 2003. That change has been deemed also to apply to enrollment in the Bank’s pension plans by Bank Executive Directors and Alternates. 5 As a result, there is now no age limit for enrollment in the plan. There has never been any mandatory retirement age in the Fund’s SRP. However, for Fund staff, participation in the Plan is normally circumscribed by the Fund’s mandatory retirement at age 65, although this retirement age can be waived in exceptional circumstances with Management approval. 203 IV. Recommendations Requiring a Vote by the Governors 17. In light of the recommendations on remuneration of Bank and Fund Executive Directors and their Alternates (paragraphs 10 and 11 above), the Committee recommends that the draft resolutions . . .1 for the Bank and the Fund, included in Attachments I and II, be adopted by the respective Boards of Governors of the Bank and the Fund. 18. The Joint Committee directs the Vice President and Corporate Secre- tary of the Bank and the Secretary of the Fund to transmit this report to the Boards of Governors of the Bank and the Fund, respectively, for a vote without meeting in accordance with Sections 12 and 13(e) of the By-Laws of the Bank and Sections 13 and 14(e) of the By-Laws of the Fund. (This report was approved and its recommendation was adopted by mail on September 23, 2011.) 1 This resolution was subsequently approved. See page 161. 204 REPORT OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF IDA March 11, 2011 Addition to IDA Resources: Sixteenth Replenishment* Introduction 1. IDA is a key provider of development assistance. IDA is the largest single source of concessional financing to developing countries where people earn less than two dollars a day. IDA resources finance close to 20 percent of all development programs that help government in IDA countries develop the policies, infrastructure, institutions and human capital that are the foundation for sustained improvements in their standard of living. IDA operates with a unique set of principles and strengths that enables it to support development results effectively and efficiently and to maximize the impact of all development aid: (i) it is based on a demand driven, country-based model—countries determine the priorities for their IDA financing; (ii) it provides a vital platform to help countries coordinate and target their various bilateral and multilateral resources; (iii) it supports capacity building and the development of essential systems and institutions for more effective delivery of issue-specific aid; (iv) it promotes global priorities within national development programs; (v) it leverages aid across multiple sectors; (vi) its safeguards and accountability mechanisms promote sustainability and good governance; and (vii) it generates and shares knowledge on best practices and results across the globe. 2. IDA supports key development outcomes. Over the last ten years, IDA has transformed the lives of millions of people by improving their access to basic services. Through IDA support 105 million children have benefitted from improvements in the quality of teaching and facilities for learning; 47 million people have benefitted from basic health, nutrition, and population services; 310 million children were immunized; 26 million people gained access to an all-season road and 113 million people to an improved water source; and 5.8 million were provided with access to improved sanitation facilities. In addition, over the last five years, IDA has helped to improve public sector management and Government procurement systems in over half of IDA eligible countries as well as enhanced financial management and access to information in about a third of IDA countries. * Annexes are not included in this report. 205 3. IDA’s sources of funding. IDA is a revolving fund that relies on contri- butions from governments of donor countries for over 60 percent of its funding. The number of donors to IDA has grown considerably over time, and includes both developed and middle-income developing countries, some of which were once IDA recipients. IDA also relies on repayments on outstanding credits, including from 27 countries that have graduated from IDA. In addition, other members of the World Bank Group (WBG), i.e., the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Finance Corpora- tion (IFC), support IDA with contributions from their net income. 4. Context for the IDA16 discussions. The IDA16 replenishment discussions took place at a critical time for IDA countries and the international community. • First, as highlighted by the Replenishment’s participants, opinion leaders and representatives of civil society organizations (CSOs), there are only a few years until 2015—the target date for reach- ing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)—and IDA recipients’ longer term growth and progress towards reaching the MDGs have been negatively affected by the impact of recent food, fuel, and global economic crises. IDA responded rapidly and effectively to these crises, including by frontloading of IDA resources and providing additional funding through the pilot- Crisis Response Window (CRW). IDA countries’ recovery from these crises remains fragile and they need significant resources to regain their momentum of growth and progress towards the MDGs. They also face additional challenges related to manag- ing recurrent severe crises that threaten to reverse progress in development outcomes, as well as adapting to global warming and climate volatility, which would require additional resources. In this context, Participants highlighted the important role IDA has played in supporting the poorest and most vulnerable countries of the world make progress towards the MDGs and sustainable economic growth. They called for IDA to play an even bigger role during the IDA16 period (July 1, 2011 to June 30, 2014) in sup- porting countries in their development efforts and highlighted the urgency of scaling up IDA resources, continuing to improve IDA’s operational and organizational effectiveness, further enhancing its emphasis on achieving results and deepening the collabora- tion and coordination between IDA, MIGA and IFC and other development partners. • Second, many donors indicated that they are facing significant fiscal challenges that require adjustments in their domestic and 206 international programs, including in official development assis- tance (ODA). These circumstances challenge donors, recipient countries and IDA to make the best use of limited resources in the face of escalating and competing demands. • Third, the evolution in the overall governance of international financial institutions with an increasing role and voice for devel- oping countries1 is also reflected in the IDA16 replenishment dis- cussions. There is an emerging global compact with contributions being made by all interested parties: traditional donors, new and emerging donors, IDA graduates and IDA blend countries, and the World Bank Group. • Fourth, IDA recipient countries continue to remain central to the achievement of results. In addition to their central role in prior- ity setting through the country-based development model, they are increasingly involved in the IDA replenishment process: as borrower representatives, through the involvement of Govern- ment Representatives as keynote speakers and opinion leaders in IDA16 replenishment meetings and through working groups which will be fora for consultation and brainstorming on selected development topics during the IDA16 period. 5. IDA16’s Focus on Results. Participants selected the achievement, enhanced monitoring and communication of “development results� as the overarching theme and main focus for the IDA16 Replenish- ment discussions. They endorsed the expansion of IDA’s Results Measurement System (RMS) from a two-tier to a four-tier system for IDA16, which will also track IDA’s operational and organiza- tional effectiveness against performance standards (the “IDA Report Card�) and report on outputs and outcomes for selected core sector indicators. They welcomed the use of the IDA16 RMS as a manage- ment tool, and noted that it provides added incentives to focus on results. They encouraged Management to continue enhancing com- munications on development results, and to develop ways to capture the impact of IDA’s support for institutional development and public sector governance. 6. Special Themes for IDA16. Participants agreed on the following four special themes for IDA16: crisis response, gender, climate change 1 The World Bank (2010). “World Bank Group Voice Reform: Enhancing Voice and Participation of Developing and Transition Countries in 2010 and Beyond.� http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/22556148/ DC2010-0006-1(E)Voice.pdf 207 Box 1. Participation by Recipient Country Representatives in the IDA16 Replenishment Process Following calls from the international community for greater voice and par- ticipation by developing countries in international organizations, the IDA replenishment process now includes borrower views in several different ways. • First, twelve representatives selected by borrower governments partici- pate in all the IDA replenishment meetings. • Second, Presidents from Mali, Senegal and Liberia and a number of Ministers, including from Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, Haiti, Mongolia, Yemen and Togo have participated as keynote speakers. • Third, at the second meeting of the IDA16 replenishment round, which was held in Bamako, Mali in June of 2010, African opinion leaders participated in a consultation with the IDA Deputies and borrower representatives. • Fourth, the draft IDA16 report was posted on IDA’s external website and comments were invited from civil society of both donor and recipi- ent nations. This participation enriched the discussions with insights into development challenges (both long-term and due to the impact of the global financial crisis), IDA’s role in the aid architecture, and IDA’s strengths and areas for improve- ment. Going forward, IDA is also establishing working groups to serve as fora for discussion of select development topics, with participation from recipient countries, donors and Bank staff. and fragile and conflict affected countries. While acknowledging the significant progress achieved in the last years, Participants urged IDA to continue in its leadership role through its convening power at the global level and coordination and collaboration at the country level, to enhance its effectiveness and efficiency through its internal reforms agenda and to strengthen its results measurement system. Participants noted that the special themes are “frontier� issues and that IDA’s efforts to better understand these challenges and to trans- late research findings and lessons learned into new operational tools and policies, and ultimately results on the ground, are critical to achieve development results, including the MDGs. 7. Process for the IDA Sixteenth Replenishment Round. Representa- tives of donor governments (“the IDA Deputies�) and representa- tives of borrower countries (collectively referred to in this report as the “Participants�) negotiated the Sixteenth Replenishment of IDA’s resources over a series of four meetings during the course of 2010. 208 The meetings were chaired by Ms. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Managing Director of the WBG. The IDA16 Replenishment consultations included observers from international development institutions and management and staff of the WBG. Participants sought the views of African opinion leaders in Bamako, Mali in June 2010. In addi- tion, comments on the draft IDA Deputies’ Report were invited from civil society. The policy papers discussed at the replenishment meetings were posted on IDA’s external website, as were summaries of the discussions at each of the meetings. This report contains the Participants’ guidance on the policy and financial framework that underpins IDA’s support for economic development and poverty reduction in eligible countries during the IDA16 period. Progress on the implementation of the IDA16 replenishment arrangements will be reviewed by IDA Deputies and borrower representatives at the IDA16 Mid-Term Review, which would take place in the second quarter of fiscal year 2013. Deliverables for the IDA16 Mid-Term Review are specified in Table 5 of Annex 1. 8. Organization of the IDA16 report. The report is organized in seven sections. Section I provides the backdrop against which the IDA16 Replenishment discussions took place. Section II sets out how IDA is meeting the implementation challenge including by strengthen- ing its focus on results, enhancing its operational and organizational effectiveness and leveraging its role in the international community. Section III covers the four special themes—crisis response, gender, climate change and fragile and conflict affected countries. These two sections describe in detail the totality of the IDA16 policy package (both on the overall thematic focus of the replenishment on devel- opment results as well as specific actions in the special themes). Sec- tion IV summarizes adjustments to the volume and terms of IDA’s assistance. Section V contains a discussion on the management of IDA’s financial resources. Section VI discusses financing of debt relief, arrears clearance and forgone grant principal. Finally, Section VII sets forth the recommendation of the Executive Directors to the Board of Governors to adopt the draft IDA16 Resolution (see Annex 5). Section I: Meeting the Growth and MDG Challenges in IDA Countries A. Supporting a Pro-Poor Growth Agenda in the Context of Crisis 9. Impact of the crisis on growth. During the IDA15 period, IDA countries witnessed a rapid succession of crises—in the form of global food and fuel price shocks, and more recently the global economic 209 crisis. In addition, a number of IDA countries were severely impacted by natural disasters, including earthquakes, hurricanes and floods. The financial crisis in particular has sharply reduced growth in IDA countries—through reductions in export revenues, remittances, tour- ism, and foreign direct investment (FDI), among others. The average growth of gross domestic product (GDP) in developing countries decreased from 8.1 percent in the pre-crisis period (2006–07) to 3.4 percent during the crisis (2008–09). Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia—two of the regions with the largest concentration of poverty—similarly decelerated from 6.7 percent and 8.7 percent in the pre-crisis period to 3.1 percent and 5.1 percent during the crisis, which is below the growth rates needed to make significant reductions in poverty. 10. Impact of the crisis on MDG progress. Developing countries made considerable progress towards the MDGs in the pre-crisis period. Progress towards reaching the targets on poverty reduction was par- ticularly strong. Significant advances were also made on achieving gender parity in primary and secondary education and on reliable access to improved water, where several countries were on track to meet the targets by 2015. Yet, concerns remain about the human development goals as progress on most of them—especially child and maternal mortality, universal access to reproductive health, nutrition, sanitation and full and productive employment—was lagging in most IDA countries. Progress was also less encouraging on gender parity in tertiary education and other targets for the empowerment of women. 11. The crisis impacted two key drivers of social and economic progress: faster economic growth and service delivery. The Global Monitor- ing Report (GMR) for 20102 indicates that while the goal of halving the poverty headcount by 2015 will likely be achieved, 53 million more people globally would have been lifted out of poverty if there had been no crisis. The analysis also points towards a severe dete- rioration of human development indicators: for example, by 2015, globally 55,000 more infants would die, 350,000 more students will fail to complete primary school, and 100 million more people will lose access to safe drinking water. Evidence from past crises indi- cates that human development indicators deteriorate significantly 2 The World Bank (2010). Global Monitoring Report, 2010. http://web.worldbank .org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTGLOBALMONITOR/EXTGLOM ONREP2010/0,,contentMDK:22519784~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~the SitePK:6911226,00.html 210 during growth downturns and that such deteriorations tend to exceed improvements during booms. This, coupled with the sharp contrac- tion of the global economy, suggests that a long period of strong economic growth will be needed to undo the damage inflicted on development outcomes. 12. While the global economic recovery is underway, it remains fragile and uneven. IDA countries are particularly vulnerable to a weak and uneven global recovery as they remain heavily dependent on com- modity exports, remittances, foreign direct investment and official development assistance, and their ability to maintain or scale up development spending is uncertain as fiscal buffers have been drawn down over the last two years. A scarcity of resources to finance devel- opment programs can jeopardize years of progress in accelerating growth and combating poverty. 13. Supporting IDA countries’ recovery and long-term broad based growth represents the most effective means to help lift tens of mil- lions of people in IDA countries out of poverty. Better policies have improved growth performance and opportunities in many IDA coun- tries over the last decade, including in Sub-Saharan Africa, which experienced robust growth in the five years preceding the global crisis and significant progress towards the MDGs. Moreover, promotion of growth in IDA countries through more support for investment that removes bottlenecks is a global win-win. Promoting multiple growth poles in developing countries can make an important contribution to the structural rebalancing of growth so necessary for its sustainability. Developing countries offer abundant opportunities for high-return investments (such as in critical infrastructure to remove bottlenecks to growth) that can create new sources of sustainable and diversi- fied growth in global demand. Developing countries now contribute about half of global growth. South-South trade is also expanding, now accounting for one-third of global trade. 14. Key requirements for accelerated progress towards regaining momentum of strong growth and achievement of the MDGs. The likelihood of attaining the MDGs will depend on the capacity of developing countries to maintain good policies and provide effective service delivery. Resumption and acceleration of economic growth will play a particularly crucial role: not only will it help with income generation for the millions of poor people but the resulting increases in domestic resource mobilization will help with increased resources 211 for public service delivery. While growth and job creation will primar- ily result from the private sector, Governments will need to provide supporting macro-economic frameworks and policy reform efforts to bolster growth. Improvements in basic physical infrastructure as well as in “soft infrastructure�—in governance and institutions—in IDA countries will also be needed, as are sustained investments in human capital and safety nets. Stronger results orientation and improved strategic allocation and management of resources are essential. Development outcomes will also hinge critically on the speed at which the global economic recovery supports increases in developing countries’ financial resources through the multiple channels through which IDA countries are affected (i.e., trade, remittances, tourism, FDI and ODA). 15. ODA commitments and development effectiveness. While IDA coun- tries need to increase domestic resource mobilization, increased and more effective aid remains critical. In Monterrey in 2002, the interna- tional community pledged to support the efforts of developing coun- tries in achieving internationally agreed development goals, including the MDGs. Since that time ODA has increased significantly. Between 2004 and 2010 (projected), ODA from members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Develop- ment and Cooperation (OECD-DAC) grew by 36 percent in real terms, excluding the large increases in debt relief to IDA countries during 2005–07. The significant need for supporting the recovery and redoubling efforts on the MDGs in IDA countries calls for sustained growth in ODA, including through the IDA16 replenishment, while recognizing the fiscal pressures that many donors currently face. At the same time, increased ODA must be accompanied by increased efforts to enhance the relevance, effectiveness and accountability of aid resources. For over a decade, donors and partner countries, working together, have made progress on strengthening the efficiency and effectiveness of development assistance. Participants agreed that these efforts need to be redoubled with a clear focus on strengthening the results orientation of aid programs. B. How IDA Will Support Countries During the IDA16 Period 16. Broad strategic directions. IDA will operate within the WBG’s long-term strategy set out in the recent Post-Crisis Directions Paper (PCD) that supports an inclusive and sustainable globalization—to overcome poverty, enhance sustainable growth and create individual 212 opportunity and hope.3 This long-term vision is being implemented in a changing global landscape where progress in achieving devel- opment outcomes has stalled or reversed and millions have been pushed back into extreme poverty by the global crisis; economic power configurations have changed; and the global aid architecture has become broader and more complex. 17. The PCD strategy notes that the global development community faces five key development challenges, both old and new, in the new decade: (i) redoubling efforts to meet the MDGs before the 2015 deadline; (ii) fostering multi-polar growth in developing countries and inte- grating rising economic powers; (iii) responding effectively to com- plex global interactions in the global public goods arena, particularly in climate change; (iv) promoting an environmentally and socially sustainable development process through effective institutions and policy environments; and (v) managing risks and anticipating potential shocks and new crises. Responding to these challenges requires more agile and stronger multilateral institutions, including a stronger WBG. 18. The WBG is responding to these challenges by establishing strate- gic priority areas of engagement; reforming its business model; and improving governance, transparency, and voice and participation. In particular, the PCD strategy sets out five key priority areas for the WBG going forward: (i) Targeting the poor and vulnerable in Africa, the “bottom billion� located in fragile and post-conflict states, and the 70 percent of the world’s poor living in middle income countries (MICs); (ii) Creating opportunities for growth through promoting agricul- ture and food security, addressing pressing infrastructure needs, fostering an investment climate and private sector that encour- ages innovation and competitiveness, engaging on critical public finance issues, and offering knowledge and policy expertise to help policymakers manage choices and tradeoffs within an increasingly global economy; (iii) Providing cooperative models/promoting global collective action to deal with global challenges through helping Govern- ments to integrate regional and global interests and goals in national development strategies; participating in partnerships including with the private sector and in developing innovative 3 The World Bank (2010). “Synthesis Paper: New World, New World Bank Group.� http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/ 22555916/DC2010-0002-1_E_SynthesisPaperRevised.pdf 213 financial mechanisms; and undertaking constructive advocacy on behalf of developing countries; (iv) Strengthening governance in fragile and conflict affected states; improving results and capacity-building for effective service delivery in critical sectors; and mainstreaming the Governance and Anti-Corruption (GAC) strategy and understanding its impact; and (v) Managing risk and preparing for crises by developing global approaches to disaster and post-conflict needs assessments and helping design counter-cyclical policies, risk sharing mecha- nisms and institutions for the public and private sectors. 19. These priorities are consistent with the broad thrust of the IDA16 Replenishment discussions. In particular, the broad agreement among Participants that “development results� should be the over- arching theme for IDA16 reflects the emphasis on meeting the core challenge of poverty reduction and accelerating progress towards the MDGs. Furthermore, the special themes for the IDA Replenishment discussions—crisis response, gender, climate change and fragile and conflict affected countries—mirror these priorities. 20. Support at the country level. These overall priorities are translated into assistance for each country which is customized on the basis of a Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) in line with IDA’s country-based approach. With the complexity of the aid architecture and the risks of proliferation and fragmentation, IDA’s country-based develop- ment model helps countries align aid to their national development priorities. The CAS provides the strategic basis for IDA’s support to a country. It supports a country’s development strategy as outlined in its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The CAS also enables IDA to help countries address global and regional development chal- lenges at the country level and serves as a vehicle for other WBG activities and other donors’ assistance. IDA’s support is provided flexibly through a range of financing and knowledge services. 21. Country strategies are the basis for regional management strategies and identify opportunities for cross-border solutions to sub-regional development challenges which can be addressed through regional projects involving several countries.4 Common themes across the 4 IDA (2010). “The Demand for IDA16 Resources and the Strategy for their Effective Use.� http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/Seminar%20 PDFs/73449-1271341193277/ASK_Paper.pdf 214 regional strategies include supporting countries in their efforts to close the MDG gaps; addressing the challenges posed by climate change; strengthening regional integration; mainstreaming gender issues; and strengthening governance. As in previous replenishments, Participants urged IDA to direct more than half of its assistance to countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, if warranted by performance, to help address the exceptional development challenges confronting the region. 22. IDA’s sectoral and thematic focus. Over the last years, IDA-supported government programs have intensified investment in human and infra- structure capital, strengthened policies and institutions and have helped transform the lives of hundreds of millions of people. During the IDA16 period, IDA will continue to assist countries in key sectoral and the- matic areas while also addressing regional and global issues. While the choice of sectors is determined at the country level, the World Bank’s sector strategies help shape the sectoral focus at the country, regional and global levels, as follows:5 • Infrastructure. Many IDA recipients still have major gaps in infra- structure which plays a critical role in growth and poverty reduc- tion and achieving the MDGs. The investments needed for new infrastructure and maintenance are estimated at 7 to 9 percent of the GDP per year for developing countries, while only about half this amount is being currently financed. IDA has consistently supported basic infrastructure services, notably energy, transport, water and sanitation, and information and communication tech- nologies.6 IDA will continue to help countries implement the access agenda by supporting policy and institutional reforms and sustainable investments. In doing so, IDA will focus on: cross- sectoral approaches to address climate change mitigation and adaptation; private public partnerships; rural-urban integration; and addressing social and environmental objectives. Cross-cutting objectives will include ensuring economic/financial viability and affordability through strong governance, and leveraging addi- tional financing, particularly from the private sector. IDA will 5 Information on other sectors not included in this section can be found in the “IDA at Work� website: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,contentMDK:21205382~menuPK:83993~pagePK:5123 6175~piPK:437394~theSitePK:73154,00.html 6 The World Bank (2008). World Bank Group Sustainable Infrastructure Plan for FY09–11. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSDNETWORK/Resources/ SIAPbooklet.pdf 215 also continue to support cross-border regional infrastructure as a means to foster regional integration. • Agriculture accounts for the highest share of GDP and the largest number of people employed in many IDA countries. In the wake of the recent global food price increases, there has been a renewed attention and strategic cooperation in the international community to supporting agricultural development. IDA is one of the largest providers of resources for agriculture and supports both long-term development programs and emergency responses, e.g. through the Global Food Crisis Response Program (GFRP)7 and the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP).8 Long term investments are particularly targeted to smallholder farmers, with the aim of strengthening property rights and access to technology, to improving land and water-use efficiency and productivity and changing agricultural practices to adapt to, and mitigate the effects of climate change. IDA’s funding increased substantially following the food price crisis—the greatest beneficiaries were countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia regions. IDA will con- tinue to support countries to: increase productivity through the use of new technologies; link farmers to markets—including by supporting the Doha round of global trade negotiations; invest in rural roads; strengthen producer organizations; improve market information and access to finance; reduce risk and vulnerability including safety nets; enhance non-farm income by improving rural investment climates; upgrade skills and expand rural infra- structure; and enhance environmental services and sustainability including better management of livestock, rangeland, ecosystems and overcoming barriers to entry in carbon markets.9 IDA will also continue to play an important role in coordination and investing in key international public goods, including cross-border infrastruc- ture development and systems and shared resources such as rivers 7 The GFRP was initiated in 2008 to provide rapid financing to countries with the greatest needs arising from the food crisis. In addition to IDA resources, the GFRP was supported by IBRD net income, Australia, Russia, Spain and the European Union. 8 GAFSP is a multilateral trust fund managed by the World Bank that aims to provide additional funding to public and private entities to support national and regional strategic plans for agriculture and food security in poor countries. 9 The World Bank (2008). World Development Report: Agriculture for Develop- ment. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2008/Resources/WDR_00_ book.pdf 216 and lakes. IDA will further strengthen the gender mainstreaming and women’s economic empowerment in the agricultural sector. • Private Sector Development (PSD) is central to sustained economic growth and poverty reduction in IDA countries. IDA promotes improvements in the investment climate through diagnostic work that allows IDA recipients to better address barriers to business formation and to healthy competition in their economies. Through policy dialogue and provision of lending and advisory services, IDA helps governments implement regulatory and structural reforms that reduce the costs associated with building and run- ning a business, as well as better measuring the results of reform programs.10 IDA also helps to assess constraints to employment creation and earnings growth and supports related policy priori- ties aimed at fostering more and better jobs. In fragile and conflict affected countries, IDA is supporting efforts to stabilize income generation and employment creation, notably for the unemployed youth, and link short-term job creation with longer term actions that lay the foundations for sustainable jobs and development. IFC complements IDA’s support and Management has continued efforts to improve coordination between the two organizations. In particular, efforts have been made to develop more effective ways to leverage the WBG’s instruments, resources and skills in sup- port of private sector development in IDA recipients by increas- ing joint advisory activities and jointly financed projects.11 For example, a joint program delivers integrated packages including reforms of secured lending and financial information infrastruc- ture frameworks to broaden micro, small and medium enterprise (MSME) access to finance. Other efforts include coordination at the strategy level through preparation of joint CASs with IFC and other specific strategies, and harmonization of guidelines12 and coordinated field level presence.13 A new WBG PSD strategy is 10 The World Bank (2002). Private Sector Development Strategy. Directions for the World Bank Group. http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/PapersLinks/699.pdf 11 IDA-IFC Secretariat (2010). “World Bank–International Finance Corporation Collaboration in IDA Recipients: Second Progress Report.� http://intresources .worldbank.org/IDAIFCSEC/Resources/CompleteReportfinal.pdf 12 These includes investment processing procedures, procurement policy and Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) procurement guidelines, increasing alignment of Bank and IFC trust fund policies, and social and environment guidelines for jointly financed projects. 13 Country offices are now co-located in 71 percent of locations where both organi- zations are present. 217 expected to be prepared in 2012, by which time recovery from the crises will be clearer and further progress made in defining global approaches to new challenges. IFC Management will make every effort to ensure that IDA Deputies are kept informed of the out- comes of IFC’s work in IDA countries, as an integral component of WBG support. • Education. IDA is one of the largest sources of assistance for education sector investments in IDA countries. About half its education funds supports primary education, thereby helping countries work towards achieving universal primary education, reaching under-served populations, and eliminating gender dis- parities. IDA support has focused on laying a foundation through training teachers, updating curricula, building schools, delivering textbooks and improving education governance and school man- agement. The World Bank also hosts the Education for All Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI) and manages the US$ 1.72 billion FTI Catalytic Fund and the US$ 115 million Education Program Fund which supports 35 countries.14 The FTI is a results-based partnership focused on delivering basic and primary education to children in developing countries based on country commitment, increased aid, improved aid effectiveness and donor coordina- tion. As primary access, enrollment and completion increase and the labor market demands a better skilled workforce, IDA will increase its efforts to help countries meet the growing demand for secondary and tertiary education. Increasingly, IDA will support countries’ efforts to strengthen their education systems and, as a global development partner, help build a high-quality knowledge base in education to underpin sound policy, promising innovations and effective instruments. Financing will therefore increasingly be based on the achievements of improvement in the education systems that will lead to higher student retention and improved learning outcomes. Some countries will also need support to reach gender parity at secondary and tertiary levels. An updated edu- cation sector strategy for the World Bank is under preparation. • Health. IDA financing in the health sector is focused on provid- ing strategic funding for health system strengthening to enable countries make effective use of aid from other sources, as well as funding critical areas of health programs not covered by other 14 Fourteen of the countries have either achieved or are on track to meet the universal primary completion goal, while 21 countries—mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa—face major obstacles and require increased and sustained donor support to speed up progress towards the MDG goal. 218 donors.15 IDA will support country-driven programs that dem- onstrate results on the ground with a focus on IDA’s areas of comparative advantage which include: health system strengthening and governance; health finance reform (including with respect to user fees); and targeted assistance and insurance mechanisms to protect the poor from health risks and economic shocks such as the recent global economic crisis.16 As part of this effort, IDA will support countries in establishing and/or expanding results based financing (RBF) mechanisms to explicitly link investments to achieving desired health outcomes. IDA will also provide selective support to major disease programs with the aim of complement- ing the funding from governments and donors for HIV/AIDS and malaria through the World Bank’s Malaria Booster Program. It will also support countries’ efforts to address two key areas critical for health related MDGs: nutrition, and reproductive health with a focus on high priority countries, as outlined in the World Bank’s Reproductive Health Action Plan.17 IDA will also continue to use its convening role, knowledge and lending to provide leadership in international health partnerships, as well as work to strengthen partnerships at the regional and country level.18 • Social Protection. IDA activities aim to improve earning oppor- tunities and the quality of jobs; improve security for households 15 The World Bank (2007). The World Bank Strategy for Health, Nutrition, and Population Results. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/HEALTH NUTRITIONANDPOPULATION/Resources/281627-1154048816360/ HNPStrategyFINALApril302007.pdf. IEG (2009), Improving Effectiveness and Outcomes for the Poor in Health, Nutrition, and Population. An Evalu- ation of World Bank Group Support Since 1997. http://web.worldbank.org/ WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTOED/EXTWBASSHEANUTPOP/0,,contentMD K:22153992~menuPK:6080533~pagePK:64829573~piPK:64829550~theSitePK: 4422776~isCURL:Y,00.html 16 IDA at Work. Health: Supporting Country Health Systems in a New Global Context. p. 2. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/ Resources/73153-1285271432420/IDA_AT_WORK_Health_2010.pdf 17 The World Bank (2010). The World Bank’s Reproductive Health Action Plan 2010–2014. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRH/ Resources/376374-1261312056980/RHActionPlanFinalMay112010.pdf 18 These partnerships include UNAIDS where the Bank is a co-sponsoring agency; the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) where the Bank is a board member and trustee; the International Health Partnership; the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization; Roll Back Malaria; the Part- nership for Maternal and Newborn Child Health; the Advanced Market Com- mitments; and the Affordable Medicines Facility for Malaria. 219 and communities through better management of risks; and provide assistance for vulnerable groups to improve equity and reduce extreme poverty. In support of these objectives, IDA focuses on labor markets (including eliminating harmful child labor, promot- ing gender equity, and advancing other internationally agreed workers’ rights) and job creation; expanding pensions and old- age income support; strengthening social safety nets; using social funds as community-based mechanisms to improve access to social services for the poor and other vulnerable groups; and encourag- ing governments to integrate disabled people into their poverty alleviation efforts. In response to the financial crisis, IDA support for social protection programs expanded, particularly for pub- lic works and cash-for-work programs that generate temporary jobs and income for low-skilled workers through labor-intensive infrastructure projects. Other activities that IDA supports include cash transfers or food stamps; conditional cash transfers; in-kind transfers (e.g. school feeding programs); and temporary price sub- sidies. The recent food and economic crises have underscored the need to have well functioning safety nets in place to mitigate the impact of crises on the poor and vulnerable. Effective targeting, payment systems, monitoring and evaluation, and program gover- nance are key ingredients to the success or failure of a safety net system. During the IDA16 period, IDA will continue to provide instruments and financing that enable the poor to minimize the impact of exposure to risk and help them exit poverty and lower their vulnerability. The World Bank is also preparing a new social protection strategy which is scheduled for completion in 2012. 23. Cross-cutting themes and issues. IDA will continue its focus on cross-cutting themes that complement its sectoral strategies. These include the IDA16 special themes of gender, climate change and fragile and conflict affected countries (which are covered in detail in Sections III.B, III.C and III.D) as well as governance and debt sustainability. All of them are critical for IDA recipients’ potential to achieve the MDGs. • Gender. Addressing gender issues, especially empowering women, is critical for making progress on all the MDGs. Through the World Bank’s Gender Policy and Gender Action Plan (GAP) IDA is on the forefront of supporting the efforts that IDA countries are mak- ing to address gender issues. IDA has worked to ensure that gen- der concerns are mainstreamed in country strategies, sector work and IDA-financed operations. Building on the work of the GAP, IDA will continue to promote women’s economic empowerment in 220 line with its comparative advantage. Further efforts to strengthen gender mainstreaming and to make progress on gender-related MDGs are described in Section III.B. • Climate change presents an urgent challenge to the well-being of all countries and particularly to the poorest countries as it adds to the cost of achieving the MDGs. Deputies took note of the outcome of the Cancun Conference of Parties at which a number of relevant and important agreements were made under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that will likely influence the ability of IDA countries to eventually access additional resources to address climate risks and shift towards low carbon growth. Of particular relevance to IDA are (i) financing, where formalized, including provisions of fast track financing, with priority given to adaptation funding for the most vulnerable coun- tries; and (ii) a process was agreed to establish a Green Climate Fund with the World Bank as the interim trustee. The Cancun Agreement recognizes that the most effective way to assist IDA countries is to support them in their efforts to build resilience to climate change in their social and economic development pro- grams through mainstreaming climate change in country strategies and by analyzing the impacts of climate change on its projects. IDA’s support is guided by the World Bank Group’s Strategic Framework for Development and Climate Change (SFDCC). The SFDCC and the various regional and sectoral strategies tied to it stress the role of IDA as the main platform for funding and mainstreaming climate change into development, through sector operations. While IDA cannot provide all the necessary funding for adaptation, it is well suited to be at the center of a coherent and integrated system for supporting adaptation and mitigation efforts, consistent with global agreements on climate change financing that are expected to emerge. IDA also plays a growing role as a conduit for climate financing such as Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) and the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR). Additional areas of emphasis on climate change are outlined in Section III.C. • Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries (FCCs) pose a special challenge for IDA as they have higher levels of poverty and lag behind other IDA countries in their progress towards the MDGs. The poor development outcomes in fragile states result from weak institutions, poor governance, unstable political environments, and in some cases, ongoing violence or lingering effects of past severe conflicts. While these factors undermine the effectiveness of aid, IDA has in recent replenishments significantly strengthened its capacity to support state-building and peace-building in FCCs. Recent reforms include both enhancements of IDA’s financial 221 capacity to support FCCs, as well as operational reforms aimed at increasing IDA’s effectiveness in FCCs and as a partner with other agencies involved in these countries. IDA’s work in FCCs is evolving in line with the latest findings regarding operational effec- tiveness; the forthcoming World Development Report (WDR) for 2011 on Conflict, Security and Development will further add to IDA’s and the development community’s understanding of the complex set of issues that need to be addressed in FCCs. Addi- tional areas of emphasis in FCCs are outlined in Section III.D. • Governance. Strengthening governance and fighting corruption are critical for poverty reduction, better management of risks, and effectiveness of development interventions. The World Bank Group’s Governance and Anti-Corruption (GAC) Strategy sup- ports these goals by strengthening GAC elements across country and sector programs and projects and at the global level, including through support to the implementation of international conven- tions and initiatives.19 The WBG is currently preparing a strategic plan for the second phase of the implementation of the GAC Strategy. During the IDA16 period, IDA will continue to support recipients to improve their governance environments and reduce corruption for better service delivery and development outcomes. At the country level, IDA will help strengthen state capacity and accountability (through improving public financial management, procurement, auditing, judicial and legal systems and civil service and transparency reforms); public management and governance in sectors (infrastructure, extractive industries, education and health, among others); transparency in decision making; private sector reforms; and involvement of beneficiaries and other stakeholders in policy-making and oversight (including Parliamentarians, civil society and local government bodies). IDA will also ensure the highest fiduciary standards in its operations by preventing oppor- tunities for corruption through improved project design, greater disclosure, enhanced participation and strengthened monitoring and supervision. Lastly, to enhance accountability and ownership, IDA will strengthen its contacts in recipient countries with parlia- ments and Civil Society Organizations as well as continue to work 19 For example, the OECD Anti-bribery convention, the United Nations Conven- tion against Corruption (UNCAC), the Extractive Industry Transparency Initia- tive (EITI) and the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR). 222 through international organizations such as the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank.20 • Debt Sustainability. IDA has been a leader in supporting low income countries’ (LICs) efforts to achieve debt sustainability. IDA has delivered support in the form of debt relief under the HIPC and MDRI initiatives with commitments for financial sup- port from its donors, which has reduced substantially the debt vulnerabilities of many HIPCs. Achieving debt sustainability, how- ever, remains a challenge for many IDA recipients, in particular in light of the global economic crisis. In this regard, IDA has taken steps to help countries in their efforts to preserve the gains from debt relief and better manage their debt profile and associated financial risks. These include: developing the joint World Bank- International Monetary Fund (IMF) Low-Income Countries Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF); operationalizing the DSF by linking it to IDA’s grant allocation framework; formulating a Non- Concessional Borrowing Policy (NCBP) to help countries avoid a rapid re-accumulation of debt; and developing tools designed to help countries strengthen their debt management capacity and institutions. In this context, Participants noted their strong support for the joint World Bank and IMF outreach activities to encourage other creditors—both multilateral and bilateral—to harmonize their lending practices broadly along the lines suggested by the risk assessments contained in joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Analyses (DSAs). During the IDA16 period, IDA will continue to assist countries in these areas. This would be supported by an active outreach program, as the effectiveness of these policies and tools hinges on their broader understanding by both creditors and borrowers alike. 24. IDA’s role at the regional level. IDA helps countries jointly address regional challenges—including the provision of regional public goods—through regional projects. Participants noted that IDA’s regional projects have, since IDA13, supported three critical areas: management of shared natural resources, integrated or harmonized treatment of trans-boundary issues, and achievement of common national objectives such as regional integration. They underscored that IDA regional projects have played a critical role in intercon- necting the electricity grids of neighboring countries and develop- ing regional power pools and energy markets; facilitating transport 20 The importance of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in the development pro- cess was recognized in the Accra Agenda for Action. 223 connectivity and trade corridors for land-locked countries and creat- ing conditions for improved trade between countries; preventing the spread of communicable diseases (e.g. HIV/AIDS) across borders; and supporting regional payment systems and capital market devel- opment. Participants recognized that IDA’s pipeline of regional proj- ects has grown rapidly, reflecting an increase in demand, particularly in Africa as well as in the other regions, with a total commitment of about SDR 400 million per year during the IDA15 period. They urged Management to strengthen efforts to implement the ongoing regional IDA portfolio. In view of the growing demand for regional solutions, Participants recognized that a further scale up of regional projects funds during the IDA16 period (including the grant-based support for regional organizations) is needed to enable IDA to con- tinue supporting the goal of regional integration and collaboration, which is an important element in the overall IDA mandate of growth and poverty reduction. In pursuing this goal, Participants noted the importance of working closely with regional entities, including the regional development banks (RDBs). In this regard, they noted the continuation of the pilot program for grants-based support for regional organizations and requested that Management report on progress under this pilot at the IDA16 Mid-Term Review. 25. IDA’s role at the global level. IDA will continue to play an impor- tant role at the global level, drawing upon the entire World Bank Group analytical capacity and operational experience to find solu- tions to global and regional development challenges. IDA partici- pates in ongoing global and regional partnerships working closely with agencies of the United Nations (UN) and regional multi-lateral development banks, and also coordinates closely with the IMF. IDA supports countries with integrating and mainstreaming global and regional public goods into national development strategies in many areas including addressing communicable diseases such as HIV/ AIDS and malaria; international trade systems; and climate change. 26. IDA working groups. In keeping with IDA’s leadership role in gener- ating knowledge on development, Participants supported the creation of four informal working groups to facilitate in-depth discussions of selected topics of interest: (i) development results; (ii) IDA’s long- term financial sustainability; (iii) inclusive growth; and (iv) fragile and conflict-affected countries. Participants endorsed broad prin- ciples to guide the operation of the working groups, notably that they should be consultative rather than decision making, transparent, cost- efficient, and membership should be voluntary and inclusive (with participation from donors, recipient countries, and Bank staff). They 224 also agreed that the working groups could schedule events to share ideas and feedback on their work on the margins of the Spring or Annual World Bank-IMF meetings. In addition, IDA Management has offered to organize periodic IDA fora at the margins of the Spring and Annual Meetings that would provide a further opportunity to debate development issues. Section II: Delivering Development Results 27. IDA has a strong track record in delivering results, including by playing a platform role for other donors, and is an effective part- ner to help poor countries achieve their long term development objectives. IDA has also been at the forefront of developing results concepts and frameworks for monitoring and assessing the impact of its efforts and continues to strive to strengthen its results focus to increase efficiency and accountability. Participants noted that the accountability for results is part of a robust World Bank Group evaluation and accountability mechanism which includes: the Board of Executive Directors, an Independent Evaluation Group and an Inspection Panel. Within the WBG, there is also a comprehensive internal accountability framework which includes self evaluation of every activity, development results monitoring systems (including IDA’s Results Measurement System) and other fiduciary account- ability mechanisms (including the Institutional Integrity and Internal Audit Departments). 28. Participants emphasized the importance of improving communica- tion of IDA’s results to donors, clients and other external audiences, particularly from the perspective of strengthening social accountabil- ity in recipient and donor countries and demonstrating the difference IDA makes on the ground. Participants welcomed the IDA at Work stories and briefs, and noted Management’s efforts to enhance ways of providing web-based access to quantitative and qualitative data on IDA results at the country level. They welcomed Management’s ongoing efforts to build a “Results Mapping Platform� based on the Open Data Initiative and Management’s commitment to geo-code 100 percent of IDA supported operations during the IDA16 period.21 This is expected to provide country-specific visualization of IDA projects and the capability to overlay them with MDG and other indicators and conduct associated analysis. It should also increase 21 Operations will be geo-coded at least to the sub-national level. 225 transparency and social accountability and strengthen country dia- logue and civic engagement. 29. Given the focus of the IDA16 replenishment on development results, Participants agreed on an ambitious package of policy measures and performance targets that underpin the financing framework for the IDA16 replenishment. This package includes several important elements: (i) it quantifies as far as feasible IDA-supported devel- opment results in recipient countries; (ii) introduces measures of IDA’s operational and organizational effectiveness; and (iii) focuses on important policy and implementation actions which would be undertaken by IDA management during the IDA16 period. It is note- worthy that, for the first time, specific indicators that track progress on the IDA16 special themes have been integrated into the overall results framework. 30. Participants reiterated the importance of the IDA Results Mea- surement System which has been a central pillar of IDA and has built a strong results culture in the institution. The RMS has been continually refined since its launch in IDA13, to strengthen IDA’s focus on results monitoring and measurement at the country, pro- gram and project levels and ensure that managing for development results remains the driving force behind all IDA work. Participants recognized that during IDA15, IDA ramped up its ability to monitor and measure development results and improved the quality of its operational work, and Management has continued to track results performance through the RMS. They looked at recently collected data on development results as measured by the IDA15 RMS and noted that the strengthened results frameworks of the programs and projects funded by IDA have supported consistently high levels of satisfactory development outcomes. 31. Participants urged Management to further strengthen the RMS for the IDA16 period, building on the extensive effort over the last decade to foster a results orientation in IDA. In particular, they endorsed the expansion of the RMS from a two-tier system in IDA15, to a four tier system in IDA16. They noted that this expan- sion will provide IDA with a more complete framework to support the achievement of development results with client countries, and should help to strengthen IDA’s effectiveness and efficiency. They also noted that the expansion and restructuring of the RMS will allow for a clearer distinction between development results achieved by IDA countries, including sectoral outputs and outcomes (in the enhanced Tiers 1 and 2) and the operational and organizational 226 effectiveness of IDA (in the new “IDA Report Card�—Tiers 3 and 4). The new RMS will allow for greater consistency with the approaches that other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) are adopt- ing. Details of each tier of the RMS are provided in sub-sections B through E below, and the revised RMS tables are presented in Annex 1. Participants also welcomed IDA’s efforts to capture the impact of IDA’s support to long-term development outcomes and actions designed to strengthen IDA’s capacity to deliver results, including with respect to the role IDA plays in the international community, and the corporate internal reforms agenda. Participants also welcomed several actions associated with developing and refin- ing monitoring indicators (included in the Matrix of Monitorable Actions, Table 5 of Annex 1) that would constitute the building blocks for the further strengthening of the RMS over the course of IDA16 and beyond. A. Review of Results 32. Progress on IDA country outcomes (Tier 1 of the IDA15 RMS). Participants noted that while progress in country outcomes cannot be attributed to IDA alone, IDA has been at the forefront of supporting these results through financing, policy dialogue, and knowledge and analytical work. They welcomed the progress made, including on: • Poverty: IDA countries have achieved significant progress in reducing poverty. The proportion of people in IDA countries liv- ing on less than US$ 1.25/day22 declined to 42.4 percent in 2005, the last year for which aggregate estimates of poverty rates are available (compared to 51.4 percent in 1990 and 46.4 percent in 2002). Poverty reduction has been underpinned by faster growth: between 2005 and 2008, the average annual GDP per capita in IDA countries grew by 5.8 percent, more than double the aver- age rate of growth of the same countries between 1990 and 2005. • Regulatory reform: Improvements have also been solid with respect to the reduction of regulatory obstacles to private sector development and access to basic infrastructure. The cost required to register a start-up has dropped by about one-quarter between 2006 and 2009, and the time required has dropped by about 22 The extreme poverty line was updated following the availability of the 2005 benchmark Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) estimates in 2005, as were the pov- erty headcount estimates at country and global level. 227 one-fifth, making it cheaper and faster to register a new business in IDA countries. • Access to services: In 2007, almost 62 percent of IDA households had electricity, up from 55 percent in 2004. In 2006, 77 percent of the population in IDA countries had access to an improved water source, nearly 14 percentage points higher than in 1990. Most IDA countries have seen progress in the number of phone subscribers per 100 people, and four-fifths have experienced an annual growth rate of greater than 25 percent. • Human development: Progress has been slower on human devel- opment goals, particularly maternal and child mortality, and universal access to reproductive health. There have been some encouraging gains in halting and beginning to reverse the spread of major communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS and malaria, but progress must be accelerated if the MDG targets are to be met. Even though maternal mortality has dropped by 34 percent, the annual rate of decline is less than half of what is needed to achieve the MDG5 a target. And target 5b, achieving universal access to reproductive health, is widely acknowledged as the fur- thest off-track of all MDGs. Still, the primary school completion rate increased by 4 percentage points and 80.4 percent of children of graduation age were able to complete their primary education. The ratio of girls’ primary and secondary enrollment to boys’ increased from 88.6 percent to 90.7 percent. 33. IDA’s contribution to country outcomes (Tier 2 of the IDA15 RMS). Participants also reviewed the impact of the assistance that IDA is providing and noted steady improvements in IDA’s contribu- tions to development outcomes.23 They also noted that the results of both Tier 1 and Tier 2 of the RMS are underpinned by IDA’s financing, policy advice, analytical work, and its unique capacity for cross-sectoral knowledge and integration. They welcomed progress made, including: • Progress at the project level. Over three quarters of IDA-financed projects achieve their development objectives. IEG evaluations 23 IEG (2008). Annual Review of Development Effectiveness, http://web.worldbank .org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTOED/EXTANNREVDEVEFFE/EXT2008A NNREVDEVEFFE/0,,contentMDK:21652456~menuPK:4683631~pagePK:648 29573~piPK:64829550~theSitePK:4683541,00.html. IEG (2009). Annual Review of Development Effectiveness 2009: Achieving Sustainable Development. http:// www.worldbank.org/ieg/arde09/ 228 indicate that satisfactory project outcomes at exit steadily improved from 64 percent during IDA11 to 74 percent currently. • In terms of IDA-financed project outputs and outcomes, sig- nificant progress has been achieved over the past 10 years. In education, IDA-funded activities helped train and/or recruit 3.2 million teachers, construct or rehabilitate 2.2 million class- rooms, and purchase and distribute 279 million textbooks, benefit- ting over 100 million children. In the health sector, IDA assistance helped provide 47 million people with access to a basic package of health, nutrition or population services. In addition, 2.5 million pregnant women received antenatal care during a visit to a health provider, and 310 million children were immunized and 98 million received targeted interventions to improve nutrition, including Vitamin A doses and deworming. In infrastructure, IDA-funded projects helped construct or rehabilitate 118,000 kilometers of roads. Furthermore, 113.5 million people were provided with access to improved water sources and 5.8 million received access to improved sanitation facilities. B. Delivering Further Progress on Development Indicators (Tier 1 of the IDA16 RMS) 34. Participants noted that Tier 1 of the RMS will continue to measure key development indicators in IDA countries, in the broad areas of growth and poverty reduction, governance, PSD and infrastructure, and gender and human development. This tier thus captures the efforts of IDA countries and the broader community of donors supporting these countries, to which IDA contributes. Participants welcomed the introduction of three new indicators on gender: (i) the ratio of female to male labor force participation; (ii) the maternal mortality ratio; and (iii) the adolescent fertility rate. They also welcomed a revised public financial management indicator that would measure the quality of pub- lic financial management on a scale from 1 (low) to 6 (high) and new indicators on the prevalence of malnutrition and on CO2 emissions. C. Supporting Development Results (Tier 2 of the IDA16 RMS) 35. Tier 2 of the RMS measures how IDA is supporting country develop- ment results. First, Tier 2 tracks indicators that measure the overall out- comes of IDA’s CASs, operations and analytical and advisory activities (AAA). Participants welcomed the introduction of ambitious IDA performance standards against which progress in these areas would be measured. Tier 2 also tracks aggregate project output and outcome indicators in sectors for which core indicators have been developed. 229 They also welcomed the introduction of estimates of projected outputs by 2015 for the seven indicators for which data is available. 36. Results-based CASs. Participants noted IDA’s continued efforts to improve CASs to ensure that IDA programs are aligned with country priorities and serve as a platform for partners at the country level. They welcomed the mainstreaming of results-based CAS so that all CASs now have results frameworks to monitor the results of all IDA resources and programs and donor mapping information. 37. Enhancing achievement of IDA products’ development outcomes. Participants noted IDA’s efforts to ensure satisfactory achievement of operations’ development outcomes and welcomed efforts to help enhance those of operations in fragile and conflict affected countries. They also noted Management’s intention to improve the impact of analytical and advisory activities. In addition, Participants welcomed Management’s plans to expand reporting on indicators from the current four sectors (education, health, infrastructure and water) to seven sectors during IDA16.24 While IDA cannot set targets for these sectoral outputs and outcomes given its country-driven approach, Participants welcomed the inclusion of indicative projections for the IDA16 period based on current sectoral trends. 38. Participants also welcomed Management’s commitment to better capture the impact of IDA’s support on long-term development outcomes such as institutional development and public sector gov- ernance. They noted Management’s plans to develop and pilot a self assessment methodology to better capture and monitor across coun- tries the quality of IDA’s country engagement. This self-assessment will complement the quantitative data on IDA’s support to outputs and outcomes and IDA results briefs, enabling IDA to present a more comprehensive view of IDA’s support to development results. D. Increasing the Operational Effectiveness of IDA Products (Tier 3 of the IDA16 RMS) 39. Participants noted the addition of a third tier to measure how IDA is increasing the operational effectiveness of its products, notably over- all quality, the results-orientation of operations (including through 24 Additional indicators would be developed for the urban, information and communication technologies (ICT) and micro, small and medium enterprise (MSME) sectors. 230 the use of impact evaluations), the strengthening and use of country systems and the performance of IDA’s portfolio. They welcomed the inclusion of “performance standards� indicators which define the norms of operational effectiveness that IDA should maintain to be considered performing in a satisfactory fashion. They also wel- comed the introduction of indicators to monitor progress on IDA16 Special Themes. 40. Participants noted the importance of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of IDA operations throughout the project cycle including the preparation, implementation, and completion phases. They welcomed Management’s continued emphasis on ensuring that: (i) IDA operations have appropriate results frameworks and moni- toring and evaluation systems as part of project design; (ii) adequate baseline information is included in the Implementation Status and Results (ISR) Report at the start of project implementation; and (iii) the information on the results achieved through the project are adequately captured in the Implementation Completion and Results (ICR) Report. 41. Impact evaluation. Participants welcomed Management’s adoption of a corporate strategic approach to the use of impact evaluations25 to enhance learning from IDA supported interventions on what worked well and what did not. A key element of this will be to increase the number of projects with appropriate evaluation frameworks, continue efforts to improve their quality, and enhance the learning stemming from the evaluation process in IDA projects to strengthen feedback loops for project design. There will be several elements to this approach. First, IDA will work to improve monitoring systems of all projects, and strengthen evaluation designs in all new IDA proj- ects. Second, Management will outline the range of monitoring and evaluation techniques and map out which approaches are appropriate for each category of IDA projects. Finally, IDA will strengthen its program of impact evaluation by deploying a more strategic approach to selecting projects for impact evaluation. Participants noted that the World Bank is already engaged in a widespread program of impact 25 Impact evaluations are defined as any quantitative assessment of the outputs, outcomes or impact of a project intervention relative to a well-specified (and measurable) counterfactual. The counterfactual could be specified in different ways, ranging from randomized assignments with a control and treatment group to propensity score matching techniques or other methods that isolate cause and effect in a credible and measurable way. 231 evaluations in IDA countries to strengthen the evidence base for IDA’s assistance. This program includes impact evaluations that are directly linked to IDA-supported operations and activities, as well as those that help to strengthen government analysis and programs. In total, the number of impact evaluations that are currently under- taken in IDA countries is about 37 per year under the Development Impact Evaluation (DIME) initiative. The annual average over the last three years for IDA operations is about 14 per year. Participants welcomed Management’s plans to increase the number of impact evaluations directly associated with IDA operations by 20 percent to at least 17 per year during the IDA16 period, and to improve the process for selecting projects for impact evaluation. 42. Participants noted that Management will convene a panel of experts to make recommendations on how to strengthen the Bank’s program of impact evaluation, including the selection framework and associ- ated issues of financing and implementation. The panel’s work will include defining the appropriate criteria and process for selecting projects and incentivizing evaluability across all projects. This work will be based on an assessment of the benefits and shortcomings of different selection methods, potentially including some combination of the random selection of projects and the use of criteria related to knowledge gaps, cost-benefit, and technical feasibility and country program buy-in. Based on the findings of the panel of experts, Man- agement will finalize the strategic selection framework and associated financing and implementation plans by April 2011, to be applied at the outset of the IDA16 period. Management will also inform the Board about the strategic selection framework and associated financing and implementation plans before the end of FY11 and update IDA Deputies at the IDA16 Mid-Term Review on progress in implementing this framework. The findings from impact evalua- tions, including data, results and lessons learned, would be used to further improve the development effectiveness of IDA operations. They would be widely disseminated outside the World Bank to allow others to benefit from IDA’s experience. 43. Aid effectiveness. IDA’s shareholders have been keen proponents of the aid effectiveness agenda, and included this as a main component of IDA15. IDA has demonstrated its support for this agenda by meeting its IDA15 commitments and by making significant progress toward meeting the Paris Declaration monitoring targets. IDA has been in the forefront among development partners in holding itself accountable for the broader aid effectiveness principles of the Accra 232 Agenda for Action, and works behind the scenes to support numer- ous initiatives related to aid effectiveness. 44. Participants underscored the importance of IDA’s collaboration and coordination with other donors, either in a leadership role or following the lead of others to help align donor programs with coun- try priorities. Participants urged IDA to continue to monitor its performance and provide guidance to staff in this area, drawing from findings of external reviews (e.g., the Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network—MOPAN) as well as internal reviews of aid coordination processes at the country-level. They also supported the strengthening and use of country systems, building on ongoing work in areas of public financial management, procurement and safeguards. As a vehicle to identify partner relationships at the country level, IDA continues to improve donor mapping informa- tion in CASs and integrate activities financed through World Bank administered trust funds into CASs. 45. To signal the importance of IDA’s aid effectiveness commitments, key aid effectiveness indicators—on the use of country financial management and procurement systems, coordinated analytical and advisory activities, and the predictability of IDA’s lending—are included in the RMS and will be refined in light of experience. 26 46. Participants also acknowledged the work since 2005 to reform the World Bank’s policy-based lending instrument (development policy lending, DPL).27 They welcomed the progress made in ensuring that DPLs support country-owned policies and institutional reforms and 26 These four indicators will be measured initially in conjunction with the Paris Declaration Survey process, using the DAC definitions and measures and the sample of countries responding to the Survey. IDA performance standards for collaborative AAA and aid predictability will remain as defined by DAC tar- gets (66 percent and 71 percent respectively). Performance standards for use of country systems (financial management and procurement) will be increased to 65 percent (financial management) and 55 percent (procurement) from the cur- rent DAC target of 50 percent, to provide an appropriate reach for IDA relative to the measure of current performance. After the 2011 Paris Declaration Survey, the definitions and measurement of these indicators will be revisited—to reflect best practice measurement—and incorporated into the RMS prior to the IDA16 Mid-Term Review. 27 If the projected share of IDA commitments for development policy operations exceeds 30 percent for any future year, it was agreed that Management would seek additional guidance from IDA’s Executive Directors. 233 development results, and in using poverty and social impact analysis to inform them. Participants strongly encouraged IDA to support the use of poverty and social impact analysis in order to help inform the development programs of IDA countries, as well as IDA-financed operations. They further asked IDA to encourage the routine use of poverty and social impact analysis in macroeconomic policies. Participants urged the continuation of efforts to improve the use of poverty and social impact analysis in DPLs, and asked Manage- ment to report on this, as well as on collaborative DPLs, in the next DPL Retrospective. Recognizing the centrality of country owner- ship and policy space, Participants underscored the importance of robust country systems and a continued focus on capacity building. In this context they welcomed and urged continued progress under the Good Practice Principles on conditionality. Participants also welcomed the forthcoming proposal for a Results-Based Lending (RBL) instrument, which will be presented to the Board for approval during 2011. 47. During the IDA15 period, IDA completed a comprehensive assess- ment of internal controls over IDA operations and has implemented a robust plan of actions to address identified gaps. Participants encouraged Management to finalize actions on IDA’s controls by year end. Following this, the process will revert to monitoring and evaluation through regular channels, including the new Integrated Risk Management Report, IDA reviews and IEG evaluations. E. Increasing Organizational Effectiveness (Tier 4 of the IDA16 RMS) 48. Participants welcomed the addition of a fourth tier to the RMS, with indicators that measure how IDA is improving its organizational effectiveness to respond better to clients. They noted that the fourth tier reflects the comprehensive internal reform effort that the World Bank is undertaking to further enhance efficiency, effectiveness, and value for money in achieving development results, notably in IDA countries: • to modernize services, Participants welcomed the overhaul of the investment lending instrument to focus on results, increase speed of delivery, improve risk management and implementation sup- port, and better align services with Government priorities and the efforts of partners in the field. Participants also noted that design of a results-based instrument is underway, building on the earlier use of result-based approaches, which would strengthen the linkages of IDA disbursements and results. At the same time, 234 knowledge services are being enhanced to create incentives for capturing, sharing, and disseminating knowledge quickly to staff and clients; revitalize knowledge products; and strengthen techni- cal teams. • to support the reforms, Participants noted the implementation of complementary reforms to foster human resource development and diversity; revamp information technology systems to support knowledge sharing and improve connectivity for country offices and staff; and reform the budget process to strengthen the focus on results, expand planning and budget discussions to trust funds, and streamline and simplify budgeting, planning, and performance systems, while continuing to focus on cost efficiency. • to enhance transparency, Participants noted that the World Bank has also pioneered numerous transparency efforts, moving from an era of publishing select information to broad institutional transpar- ency through its new Access to Information Policy and the Open Data initiative which have made valuable Bank information and data readily available to the public, as well as the ongoing geo- coding of IDA supported operations. It also works extensively to further transparency and accountability among a variety of constituencies in partner countries. • to increase the effectiveness of its internal operation, Participants welcomed recent efforts made to reduce lending costs and increase speed of delivery. They also noted that the World Bank operated in a flat real net administrative budget environment under IDA15, while scaling up its commitments and disbursements, continuing to serve as a platform for the donor community and increasingly doing analytical and advocacy work on global issues. 49. Participants urged the World Bank to accelerate the implementation of these reforms during IDA16. They welcomed the additional indica- tors included in the RMS which measure IDA’s organizational and operational effectiveness—to ensure that IDA achieves “value for money,� notably indicators on speed and cost of operational delivery and the numbers and levels of staff and responsibilities located in the field. These indicators reflect areas where Management is currently focusing attention; as such these areas will be monitored closely during the IDA16 period to review progress against performance standards. They also noted Management commitment to continue to operate the World Bank on a flat real net administrative budget during the FY11–13 planning cycle and to continue to pursue cost savings measures. 235 50. Participants supported the implementation of near-term measures to further strengthen IDA’s field presence and move decision mak- ing authority to country offices, especially in fragile states. They supported Management’s plans to review decentralization over the medium term in consultation with the Board, focusing on issues of cost effectiveness, efficiency and the incentives for moving highly skilled staff to the field and ensuring an appropriate skills mix in field offices. The goal is to combine close-to-the-client service, the ability for the client to tap top-flight global expertise quickly and easily, and strong central capabilities to guide a unified effort. 51. With the inclusion of these and other new indicators, the IDA RMS will contain robust information to monitor IDA’s performance throughout the cycle from strategy formulation, to design to comple- tion. The information from this monitoring system supports Man- agement’s efforts to monitor the overall quality of IDA products, as well as the effectiveness of the processes that are in place across the institution to maintain high quality in: (i) design (where systems are in place to ensure that good practices from research, evaluations and other analysis, and monitoring systems are incorporated into project and program design); (ii) implementation (where supervision reports are now disclosed in keeping with the Access to Information Policy and monitored regularly for outcome data); (iii) completion (where results data from ICRs are assessed, and all products are scrutinized through self- and independent evaluations); and finally (iv) ex-post in-depth evaluations (which are undertaken for a sample of products by the DIME Initiative, by IEG and by IDA project and country teams) to complete the learning and feedback loop for the next generation of new/restructured products. F. IDA’s Role in the International Community 52. Beyond the many measures which will be monitored through the RMS, Participants underscored the importance of IDA’s continuing role as a platform for the effective delivery of aid, particularly given the increasingly complex global aid architecture. This role includes: convening and collaborating with other development partners at the global, regional, and at the country level, working with devel- opment partners to support country leadership of its own develop- ment agenda. The nature of IDA’s role will vary across countries and depend on government demand for IDA services, government capacity and the comparative advantage of donors and partners. 236 53. Global leadership. Participants welcomed the leadership role that IDA has been playing among the MDBs and other multilaterals in terms of developing and disseminating policies and practices for aid effectiveness (e.g., on conditionality). Participants also noted IDA as having a unique global role, especially as a convener of develop- ment partners and a connector of South-South experience, promot- ing international initiatives (e.g. International Aid Transparency Initiative), and leading MDB Groups (COMPAS, MDB working groups on Results, Aid Effectiveness, Public Financial Management, Procurement, and Safeguards). IDA has supported efforts to bring broader perspectives to the agenda, notably by playing a key role to engage partner countries at the third High Level Forum (HLF3) in Accra in 2008, by working with emerging donors on the South-South cooperation agenda, and by supporting the preparation for HLF4 in Korea in 2011. 54. Leadership on issues. Participants acknowledged that the World Bank is called upon to lead by example, implementing cutting-edge policies to make the institution more effective. For instance, the World Bank is considered to be a front-runner in its Access to Infor- mation Policy, Open Data Initiative, its good practices on condition- ality, its results frameworks, and its standards setting on fiduciary policies and debarment. Participants noted the World Bank’s leading efforts in the area of aid predictability and aid on budget are particu- larly important for IDA countries, which are more heavily dependent on relatively fragmented and unpredictable aid. As Co-Chair of the Task Team on Predictability and Transparency under the auspices of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and Donor Practices (WP- EFF), the Bank is leading the work to examine ways to improve aid predictability for all development partners. Participants welcomed this work as well as work on IDA’s own practices with “putting aid on budget� to further improve its good performance in these areas. 55. Strengthening country ownership and institutional capacity over development strategies. IDA’s work to spearhead and mainstream PRSPs, and monitor their implementation by clients, has benefited all development partners. In addition, IDA is continuing to develop standards for country systems and diagnostic tools to assess the ade- quacy of these systems, and is working with other donors to agree on common frameworks for analysis and capacity building to move countries toward greater reliance on their own systems. Also, IDA has increasingly used and will continue to use the analytical tools available, together with other donors where possible. IDA has also 237 increasingly worked and will continue to strengthen its dialogue and engagement with Parliaments, civil society and local government bodies to foster broader ownership of the development process. Section III: Special Themes 56. At the first IDA16 replenishment meeting held in March 2010, Par- ticipants agreed that development results should be the overarch- ing theme for IDA16. Within this overarching theme Participants selected crises response, gender, climate change, and fragile and conflict affected countries as the “special themes� for IDA16. Partici- pants discussed these themes during the second and third IDA meet- ings and their findings and recommendations on each special theme are summarized below. These special themes recommendations are an integral part of the IDA16 results package and complement the specific improvements to the RMS described in the preceding section. A. Special Theme 1: Enhancing IDA’s Capacity to Respond to Crises 57. IDA countries and crises. IDA countries are subject to a variety of crises and emergencies that can undermine their social and economic development efforts. These include natural disasters—such as earth- quakes, floods, droughts, tsunamis and storms—and economic shocks such as the recent global food, fuel, and financial crises. Participants noted that IDA countries have limited capacity to address the impact of such crises given their limited resources, environmental vulner- abilities, infrastructure limitations, lack of economic diversification, and often poorly developed formal safety nets. The long-term effects of severe crises often include lower growth, destruction of public and private assets, and declines in government revenues. Furthermore, revenue decline can reduce resources for core development spend- ing, including resources to mitigate the poverty, social and economic impact of the crisis. 58. IDA’s role. Participants noted IDA’s long-standing involvement in various aspects of crises response, including the provision of excep- tional financial support. Such support has been provided in the after- math of both major natural disasters and when countries are hit by severe exogenous economic shocks such as in the recent global economic crisis. IDA’s comparative advantages in crisis response have included its ability to work closely and collaboratively with other organizations (including the UN and IMF), to build on pre- vious analytical work and operational portfolio, its flexibility and 238 global reach, and its ability to link short-term crisis mitigation and long-term development objectives. Participants also noted that in the absence of a dedicated funding mechanism, this assistance has been provided through an ad hoc approach, generally by restructuring existing projects or reallocating resources within country portfolios, thus diverting resources from long-term development activities, or through trust funds which may be slow to set up, or, in the case of natural disasters, exceptional IDA allocations. 59. Establishment of the Crisis Response Window. Participants sup- ported the establishment of a dedicated Crisis Response Window (CRW) within IDA. They noted that the primary purpose of IDA resources is to support long term development in low income coun- tries, which includes building resilience so that they are less prone to being affected by crises and are better able to handle the impact of those that do occur. The CRW, and its resources deployed for severe economic crises and natural disasters, are a necessary complement to this primary mission that will help countries return to their long- term development paths. Increasing globalization, the threats arising from climate change and environmental degradation, and population pressures that force people to live in areas exposed to natural disas- ters are all contributing to the need for IDA to be able to support and reinforce a strong international response when emergencies do occur. The creation of the CRW will provide an important additional tool for the international community to respond to severe natural disasters, or the re-occurrence of severe economic crises. 60. As in all of IDA’s work in responding to crises, coordination both with the affected countries’ governments and with other agencies is critical. IDA will continue to work closely with all its partners and focus its interventions on areas where it has an existing role and key comparative advantages. This means that in the case of severe natural disasters, IDA would aim to complement the primary mandate of the UN for providing emergency relief, with IDA’s efforts aimed at supporting safety nets for affected groups and restoring basic physical assets destroyed by the disaster. In the case of severe economic crises, IDA’s role would be to help mitigate the impact on vulnerable groups and protect core development spending at risk in health, education and infrastructure. The CRW would thus complement IMF’s role as the first responder to the macro-economic effects of severe economic shocks with balance of payments implications. 61. Objectives of the CRW. Participants noted that establishing a dedi- cated crisis response mechanism, as opposed to ad hoc funding 239 arrangements, would not only address the issues of timeliness and additionality, but would also give IDA added flexibility with which to respond to crises and emergencies, and to do so in a manner that is both transparent and predictable. They asked that the new mecha- nism should strengthen IDA’s capacity to participate in global efforts to rapidly respond to severe crises, in partnership with UN agencies, the IMF, other MDBs and bilateral donors. Furthermore, the CRW would provide resources that are additional to the regular IDA allo- cations of countries severely impacted by crises. 62. Design of the CRW. Participants agreed that, to meet these objec- tives, CRW resources should only be accessed after an exogenous shock such as a major natural disaster or a severe economic shock. Financing from the CRW would form part of a concerted interna- tional response and would only be accessed as a last resort.28 Partici- pants noted that while all IDA countries could potentially be eligible for CRW support, actual access to CRW resources would be linked to country-specific circumstances (e.g., magnitude of crisis impact, access to alternative sources of financing, etc.). 63. Responding to natural disasters. In the case of natural disasters, the CRW would target events that are exceptionally severe. The pro- posed procedures for responding to such events build on the authority already provided under IDA replenishments to allocate resources on an exceptional basis but would also add guidance regarding the amount of resources that would be made available. However, this guidance would not rely on a simple formula, due to large differences between IDA recipients and how they can be affected by crises. Man- agement would consult with the IDA Board shortly after the disaster occurs, and indicate to the Board that access to CRW resources would form an appropriate part of the response from the World Bank Group. Participants urged coordination and complementarity with the UN, in particular with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Management would subsequently seek Board approval for the crisis response operations and funding levels (see Annex 3 for additional details on CRW processes). 64. Responding to economic crises. In the case of economic crises, the CRW would target severe economic crises caused by exogenous shocks that affect a significant number of countries, thus reducing 28 The terms of assistance from the CRW are identical to those under which IDA assistance is provided to a particular country. 240 the potential for moral hazard. Specifically, Participants asked that the crisis be expected to result in a widespread or a regional year- on-year projected decline of GDP growth of at least 3 percentage points in a significant number of IDA countries.29 The 3 percentage point decline in growth would be the threshold to identify countries that could be eligible for CRW support. This preliminary ring-fencing would be vetted by an analysis of available fiscal and other relevant data in line with the CRW objective to protect core spending in the short-term and avoid derailing long-term development objectives. As a result, countries where the crisis did not have a significant fis- cal impact could be excluded from access to CRW resources, even if they did experience the 3 percentage point decline in projected GDP growth. 65. Participants also agreed that in the event of a severe price shock that did not result in a GDP growth decline in line with this trigger, CRW support could be considered on an exceptional basis if: (i) the shock is broad based and deemed severe in terms of fiscal impact (i.e., additional spending for targeted interventions to protect vulner- able groups); (ii) there is consensus that a concerted international response is needed; and (iii) the existing IDA allocations of affected countries are deemed insufficient to provide an adequate response. 66. Participants requested that the Board be involved in the entire process of determining the country eligibility and all stages of resource allocation. Management would present for approval by Executive Directors its analysis of the nature of the shock and of the severity of the impact on IDA countries and its recommenda- tion to trigger access to the CRW resources. Where an economic crisis has significant balance-of-payments implications for multiple countries, Management would also reflect the views of IMF staff on the overall extent and nature of the shock in a distinct section of the Board paper and, to the extent possible, the impact on individual countries and relevant information regarding their macroeconomic policy frameworks, drawing on IMF staff analysis including existing publicly available IMF report(s). In addition, the paper would be made available to IMF Management, and IMF Management would be invited to the Board discussion of this paper so that Executive Directors could seek such clarifications from the IMF as they may need. Individual operations would be submitted for Board approval 29 The projected year-on-year GDP growth decline will be assessed using projec- tions from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO). 241 on an accelerated basis and in accordance with existing World Bank policies and procedures.30 As is current practice, the staffs of the Bank and IMF would collaborate closely on individual country cases. 67. Participants supported a robust process for triggering access to CRW resources for economic crises through an initial note submitted for approval to IDA’s Executive Directors. Specifically, this note would: • Demonstrate that responding to a specific economic crisis is in line with CRW objectives and its guiding principles. In particular, the note would demonstrate the severe impact of the crisis on a significant number of IDA countries and that this impact has been caused by exogenous factors. • Propose the overall volume of CRW resources to be allocated in response to the event and present its rationale. The proposal will need to factor in the nature and scope of the crisis as well as the resources available in the CRW. • Propose the framework and rationale for allocating the approved resources across countries. The framework will be based primarily on the fiscal analysis aimed at estimating the “core development spending at risk.� Core development spending at risk would be defined as the amount needed to maintain the pre-existing path of spending on education, health and operations and maintenance of existing infrastructure, and to maintain, or potentially increase (depending on the nature of the crisis) spending on safety nets. Countries with the greatest impact as measured by core devel- opment spending at risk would receive proportionately more resources than those with a lower impact. While designing the allocation framework, Management will also consider including: (i) a base allocation to ensure a meaningful response, particularly for small states; and (ii) a cap to the resources allocated to any one country or group of countries (in the case of the pilot-CRW the cap for any country was set at 5 percent of total CRW resources); such a cap could be particularly relevant in cases where the same event affects countries or groups of countries with different lags to avoid the risk of a first-come first-served approach that leads to depletion of finite resources. Participants noted that CRW 30 For development policy operations, a Fund Relations Note (in the form of a Public Information Notice of an Article IV review or a Chairman’s Statement after a decision on the use of Fund resources or a Policy Support Instrument, or in their absence, an IMF assessment letter of the country’s macroeconomic framework) reflecting analysis of the shock would be required. 242 resources would be allocated in two stages: in the first stage of this process the bulk (at least 75 percent) of the resources would be allocated, with those countries that have been most severely impacted receiving the highest levels of support. In the second stage, allocations would be adjusted (using the share of resources not allocated in the first round) in light of additional country spe- cific information related to crisis impact, resource requirements and capacity to mobilize an effective response through the use of additional resources. The allocation framework would calculate allocations on a per capita basis (to take account of country-size). Management would submit a separate note to the Board with details of second stage allocations in advance of the presentation of projects financed from second stage allocations. 68. Resources. Participants agreed that total CRW resources be capped at 5 percent of the total IDA16 replenishment resources. Towards this cap, donors would provide an amount of SDR 1,335 million, representing 4.1 percent of IDA16’s envelope.31 This amount would include an exceptional allocation of SDR 329 million for Haiti for the purpose of supporting reconstruction after the earthquake in 2010. Should additional resources prove necessary, up to the 5 per- cent maximum cap, additional donor contributions may be sought or credit reflows may be advanced on an exceptional basis from the subsequent replenishment period subject to approval by the Board of Executive Directors. IDA will keep the ex-post bridge financing option in reserve should IDA Deputies decide it appropriate to make use of it in the future. 69. Participants asked that the CRW be the primary channel for the World Bank’s crisis response in IDA countries. With respect to the future creation of trust funds for crisis and emergencies that are eli- gible for CRW financing, Management will encourage donors that would like to provide additional resources for such crises and emer- gencies to do so through the IDA CRW. Such contributions to the CRW would take the form of additional contributions which can be made at any time during the replenishment period. These contribu- tions can have a “soft� earmark for a specific crisis or emergency and 31 This amounts to approximately 4.2 percent of the preferred scenario for IDA16. Data will be updated pending finalization of the replenishment discussions. 243 would be additional to the allocation determined by IDA. Partici- pants agree that this is an important, powerful and flexible element of design to reduce the need for trust funds and the fragmentation of donor responses to crises. 70. Review. Participants requested that a comprehensive review, includ- ing both the pilot-CRW and the results to date of the new CRW, be prepared for discussion at the IDA16 Mid-Term Review with the expectation that the results of these reviews will be used to inform the policies and procedures that would govern its use. This review will include an assessment of the timeliness and effectiveness of the pilot-CRW, as well as of its allocation methodology (including stage 2 allocations). At that time, Management would also pro- vide an update on the implementation of the dedicated CRW so far in the IDA16 period, and indicate plans for the reallocation of any unused resources during the last year of the IDA16 period. As financing for the CRW would cover only the IDA16 period, con- tinued funding including the possibility of ex-post financing would be reviewed within the context of subsequent replenishments and be contingent upon positive reviews of both the IDA15 pilot CRW and the IDA16 CRW. B. Special Theme 2: Accelerating Progress on Gender Mainstreaming and Gender-Related MDGs 71. The Millennium Declaration endorsed by the world’s governments in 2000 identifies gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls as among the most effective ways to “combat poverty, hunger and disease and to stimulate development that is truly sustainable.�32 Participants noted that IDA, as the largest source of concessional finance for low-income countries, can play a critical role in investing in women’s health, education and access to economic opportuni- ties. They also noted that gender inequalities can best be addressed when both women and men are actively engaged in policy dialogue. During the IDA16 period, they called on IDA to strengthen gender mainstreaming in its operations and analytical work, introduce a 32 UN General Assembly. 2000. United Nations Millennium Declaration, para. 20. http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf 244 robust results framework and implement an action plan to accelerate progress on the gender-related MDGs.33 72. Role of IDA. Participants noted that IDA is uniquely suited to support gender equality outcomes at the country level which requires working across multiple sectors and sustaining efforts of long periods. They agreed that the multi-sector nature of gen- der issues requires assistance across sectors since progress on key gender indicators—such as girls’ enrollment and completion rates, universal access to reproductive health including family planning, maternal mortality, labor force participation, and asset owner- ship—also depends on investments in water, sanitation, transport, and access to financial and other economic services. While many agencies cover gender issues in education and health, few can match IDA’s effectiveness in sectors that are essential to expanding women’s economic opportunities, such as infrastructure, private sector development, agriculture, and financial service delivery. IDA’s work on women’s economic empowerment will build on that of the Gender Action Plan (GAP). IDA can also apply lessons from different cultural contexts and sustain activities through its lending instruments and analytical and advisory services. These comparative advantages are important because changing attitudes, traditions, and behaviors related to gender requires long-term engagement and supportive country leadership reflecting agreed national development goals. 73. Gender and the MDGs. Achieving gender equality matters for equity and efficiency: gender inequalities in access to public services and economic opportunities are associated with increased poverty and 33 See IDA (2010). “Special Themes for IDA16,� http://siteresources.worldbank .org/IDA/Resources/Seminar%20PDFs/73449-1271341193277/SpecialThemes IDA16.pdf. The World Bank (2010), “Applying GAP Lessons: a Three-year Road Map to Gender Mainstreaming,� http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGENDER/ Resources/336003-1241561860207/GAPtransitionplan_may25.pdf. IEG (2010), Gender and Development: An Evaluation of World Bank Support, 2002–2008, http:// www.worldbank.org/ieg/gender/. The World Bank (2010), Gender Equality as Smart Economics: World Bank Group Gender Action Plan—Third Year Progress Report (January 2007–January 2010), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGENDER/ Resources/GAP-Progress-Report_May-25-2010.pdf. The World Bank (2010), Repro- ductive Health Action Plan 2010–2015, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRH/ Resources/376374-1261312056980/RHActionPlanFinalMay112010.pdf. Education Sector Strategy for the World Bank (forthcoming 2011). 245 lower economic growth. Participant reviewed the progress of IDA countries towards MDG gender goals and found that this has been uneven and has differed significantly across countries, regions, income groups or institutional status—with FCCs lagging behind on all counts. • MDG1: Participants noted that expanding women’s economic opportunities is central to the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger. While women in IDA countries are increasingly bet- ter placed to enter the labor market, important barriers remain. Participants called for investments in support of women’s entry into the labor force and to improve women farmers’ access to land, agricultural markets, financial services and infrastructure investments. Furthermore, labor market policies should encourage entrepreneurship and employment. Reporting on IDA’s results in these areas will be done in the annual gender monitoring reports and at the IDA16 Mid-Term Review. Participants also noted the important role of women in meeting the target of halving the proportion of people who suffer from hunger. • MDG3: Participants noted that achieving MDG3, which targets the elimination of gender disparities in education and is the most explicit gender equality goal, will have a positive and speedy impact on most MDGs, including those that do not directly target gender equality. They noted that while progress had been good overall for primary education, many IDA countries are still off- track. In addition, large gender gaps in schooling persist among disadvantaged groups and at the secondary level, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. • MDG5: Achieving MDG5a on reducing the maternal mortality rate (MMR) has been especially challenging in most IDA coun- tries, and the MMR had increased in some countries. Participants noted that progress in reducing MMR is linked to factors such as lower fertility rates, rising income per-capita, greater education attainment among mothers, access to good medical care during childbirth and reducing HIV/AIDS. MDG5b, achieving universal access to reproductive health by 2015, is off-track in most IDA countries although it is a critical element in reducing the MMR, economically empowering women and curbing the spread of dis- eases such as HIV/AIDS. 74. Scaling up gender mainstreaming. Participants also reviewed pro- gress on the treatment of gender issues in IDA Country Assistance Strategies (CASs), as well as in analytical work and in IDA financed 246 projects and programs.34 They welcomed the efforts made to increase gender coverage in the economic sectors where progress was lagging through the GAP.35 They also noted a recent IEG evaluation of the World Bank’s support for gender which found that the levels of gen- der mainstreaming are lower than expected even though the trend is positive.36 They urged Management to move quickly to implement commitments made in response to the IEG report. In order to make progress visible, gender mainstreaming in CASs will be reported in Tier 3 of the IDA16 RMS. 75. Key commitments for IDA16. During IDA16, Participants urged IDA to intensify its support for the efforts IDA countries are making to promote gender equality. They welcomed the introduction of the Action Plan on Gender Mainstreaming and Gender-Related MDGs and urged Management to make rapid progress on its implementa- tion. This Action Plan includes: • A commitment that 100 percent of IDA CASs would draw on and discuss the findings of a gender assessment. Implementation of this commitment would be supported through the issuance of a guidance note on the World Bank gender policy, training for staff on how to mainstream gender issues in CASs, and more robust cor- porate review of gender analysis of CASs by the PREM network. • Increasing gender-informed investments in line with President Zoel- lick’s commitment, and monitoring progress through the addition of an indicator and a performance standard in the IDA16 RMS. • Tracking indicators to measure IDA’s support to gender-based country outcomes. • The preparation and implementation of Regional Gender Action Plans. 34 In 2003, the Bank introduced a new operational policy (OP/BP 4.20) on Gender and Development http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,contentMDK:20064559~ pagePK:64141683~piPK:64141620~theSitePK:502184,00.html 35 The GAP was developed to advance women’s empowerment in economic sectors. See IDA (2009). “World Bank Group Gender Action Plan: Imple- mentation Status Report� http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/ Seminar%20PDFs/73449- 1257448780237/IDA15MTR_Gender_Action_ Plan.pdf 36 IEG (2010). Gender and Development: An Evaluation of World Bank Support, 2002–2008; http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/gender/ 247 • Implementation of the Reproductive Health Action Plan37 with a focus on 52 priority countries with high maternal mortality and total fertility rates, including 25 countries in the Africa Region. • The completion of the forthcoming Education Sector Strategy and the subsequent implementation of a program of action targeting gender issues in high priority countries. • Progress on the Action Plan would be reviewed during the IDA16 Mid-Term Review. 76. Participants also welcomed Management’s efforts to strengthen the RMS for gender activities, including through the addition of three country-level outcome indicators and two indicators of IDA’s opera- tions effectiveness (see Annex 1 for details). They noted that, where feasible, beneficiary indicators for all IDA investment operations in the education, health, roads and social protection sectors will also be gender-disaggregated, and urged Management to disaggregate additional indicators in preparing relevant reports for the IDA16 Mid-Term Review. During the IDA16 replenishment period, IDA management will track IDA’s support to gender-based country out- comes through the Annual Gender Monitoring Report. This report will inter alia track: (i) the percentage of IDA CASs drawing on and discussing a gender assessment; (ii) the increase in gender-informed IDA investments; and (iii) three indicators to measure IDA’s sup- port to gender-based country outcomes, including the percentage of safety nets projects designed to mitigate risk and vulnerability for women and girls, the percentage of agriculture and rural development operations that target women, and the percentage of health projects that address high fertility and maternal mortality. 77. Participants requested that IDA intensify capacity building of staff and country counterparts by: (i) scaling-up innovative models of capacity building developed under the GAP; (ii) providing technical assistance to sectors for developing new indicators on gender and rolling out gender-informed results frameworks; and (iii) facilitat- ing South-South dialogue and extending capacity building efforts to civil society in client countries. As noted in the IEG evaluation, low demand for gender mainstreaming interventions in client countries has been a serious constraint, therefore Participants asked IDA to step up efforts to highlight the importance of gender for country 37 The World Bank (2010). Reproductive Health Action Plan 2010–2015 http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRH/Resources/376374-1261312056980/RH ActionPlanFinalMay112010.pdf 248 development prospects; and intensify efforts in economic sectors. They requested that the strategy outlined for the IDA16 replenish- ment be synchronized with the GAP transition plan and that it draw lessons from the IEG report. 78. Lastly, Participants welcomed Management’s decision to focus the World Development Report for 2012 on gender. The WDR will examine links and tensions that exist between development objectives and gender-related institutions, and the role of policies in resolving them. It will build on and synthesize the growing body of multi- disciplinary analysis, evidence and data on development and gender equality while identifying key knowledge gaps. Participants noted that the WDR presents a unique opportunity to identify obstacles to mainstreaming gender, and articulate and disseminate the case for gender equality and hence help generate partner country demand. It is also a vehicle to convey policy options and innovative approaches to reduce gender inequalities and increase women’s empowerment. C. Special Theme 3: Achieving Climate Resilient Development 79. Impact of climate change. Participants noted that climate change presents an urgent challenge to the well-being of all countries and particularly to the poorest. Even if efforts to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are successful, it is no longer possible to avoid the impact of climate change. The primary direct effects of climate change will be increased variability and uncertainty in weather pat- terns, including an increase in droughts and floods, more seasonal peaks in river flow, sea level rise and a higher probability of stronger tropical storms. The poorest countries and communities are likely to suffer the most because of their geographical location, low incomes, weaker infrastructure, and limited public and private institutional capacity, as well as their greater reliance on climate-sensitive sec- tors such as agriculture. IDA is working with affected countries and communities to develop and implement a growing range of activi- ties and instruments that support climate resilient development and adaptation. 80. Cost of climate change adaptation. Participants reviewed the sub- stantial effort that the World Bank made during the IDA15 period to better understand and address adaptation to climate change and its implications for development efforts. Adaptation and develop- ment are two sides of the same coin: efforts on one reinforce those on the other. Participants agreed that achieving planned develop- ment outcomes such as meeting the MDGs in the context of climate 249 change will require an effort to increase financial resources available to IDA recipients. The Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change study (EACC) estimates that the total cost for currently IDA-eligible (including blend) countries will be around US$ 24–26 billion per year over the next ten years.38 Costs will increase over time: EACC estimates that costs will rise to US$ 40 billion by 2050. The steep- est increases in cost will be in Sub-Saharan Africa (over a twofold increase). Part of the cost will fall on IDA’s development assistance, as IDA must climate proof projects in climate-sensitive sectors39 by factoring in the additional costs associated with climate change. 81. Building climate resilience. Participants stressed the importance of building climate resilience in IDA countries as part of the country- based development efforts. They requested that IDA projects in climate-sensitive sectors take climate risks into account. They noted that the share of IDA financing providing climate co-benefits should be better captured. Ensuring climate resilience will also require research and strategic planning. IDA will support climate resilience activities through financing as well as enhancing the effectiveness of investments by other development partners. Of particular importance is to ensure that potential climate impacts for all IDA projects in sensitive sectors are analyzed to ensure that they are consistent with the country’s adaptation and mitigation strategies. IDA’s financ- ing can complement the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs), most notably the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR), which supports IDA recipients in integrating adaptation and resilience into their development programs. Nine IDA recipients—Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Tajikistan, Yemen and Zambia—and two regions (Caribbean and South Pacific) have been selected to participate in the PPCR, which currently has an envelope of US$ 967 million. 82. Financing for low-carbon growth. Participants noted that building low carbon economies is also important for IDA recipients, given that much of their current development efforts include long term infrastructure. IDA has been a crucial source of finance for energy, water and transport projects and will continue to support investments 38 The World Bank (2010). Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change: Global Study. http://beta.worldbank.org/content/economics-adaptation- climate-change-study-homepage 39 Climate-sensitive sectors include inter alia agriculture, water supply, health, and infrastructure. 250 in these sectors, including renewable energy projects in the energy sector. As various other sources of climate finance channeled through the World Bank are also beginning to play an important role in miti- gation, Participants urged IDA to promote and increasingly support ambitious low carbon investments, including increased investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency, and to further leverage sources of additional climate finance for IDA countries. For example, IDA recipients are in the process of submitting expressions of interest to the Program for Scaling-Up Renewable Energy in Low Income Countries (SREP), which has a current envelope of US$ 292 million. Furthermore, Burkina Faso, Ghana and Lao PDR were selected as pilot countries for the Forest Investment Program (FIP), which has a current envelope of US$ 558 million. Finally, the Clean Technol- ogy Fund (CTF) investment plan for Vietnam proposes co-financing of US$ 250 million to support the country’s climate related goals. IDA’s ability to leverage new and additional climate finance would help ensure that actions needed to build resilience would not reduce finance available for other development efforts. 83. Key commitments for IDA16. Participants welcomed IDA’s strategy to focus its efforts to address climate change in five closely linked areas: (i) discussing in 100 percent of IDA CASs climate change vulnerabilities as part of the country’s development challenges and priorities and including activities in climate change mitigation and adaptation areas when requested by the recipient country; (ii) scal- ing up IDA Analytic and Advisory Activities on adaptation and mitigation from the IDA15 level and reporting back on progress at the IDA16 Mid-Term Review; (iii) establishing a system for the monitoring, assessment and reporting of the contribution of the IDA portfolio to climate adaptation and mitigation co-benefits and reporting on the number of projects and amount of associated IDA financing that aim at climate co-benefits in their design by the IDA16 Mid-Term Review; (iv) analyzing in all projects in climate change sensitive sectors the potential climate impact of project activities to ensure that they are consistent with the climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies of the country; and (v) providing expertise to and continuing dialogue with development partners (including OECD/DAC and MDBs) on Rio-Markers with the objective of developing and agreeing on quantitative measures of global financ- ing for climate adaptation and mitigation actions. Monitoring the climate co-benefits of IDA funds, establishing and applying out- come measures of climate support, and tracking global financing for climate change, are all necessary to measure progress in the global efforts to achieve climate resilience and low carbon growth in the 251 poorest countries. Policy advice at the country level will continue to be informed by IDA’s analytical work on the links between adapta- tion and development. D. Special Theme 4: Supporting Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries 84. Participants welcomed the progress made by IDA in assisting fragile and conflict-affected countries. IDA’s approach to the challenges of FCCs has evolved over the last decade, with successive IDA replen- ishments seeking to respond to the specific needs of these countries. Eligible post-conflict and re-engaging countries receive exceptional allocations from IDA, and some have also benefited from exceptional pre-arrears clearance grants and allocations to help clear arrears. Furthermore, FCCs have benefited from IDA’s policies on debt relief (through the HIPC and MDRI initiatives) and from grants allocated through IDA’s grant allocation framework. Lastly, IDA has enhanced its institutional capacity to provide rapid, effective and coordinated assistance to FCCs, including through increased presence, operational reforms, comprehensive analytical work on fragility, and deeper partnerships with international actors.40 85. World Development Report 2011. Participants emphasized the importance of the upcoming WDR 2011 on Conflict, Security and Development in improving the understanding of FCCs, particularly in terms of their heterogeneity. They underscored that drawing out the implications of WDR findings will be an important task during the IDA16 period and noted that this work could have implications for future support to FCCs from the international community and IDA, including with respect to the: (i) application of approaches for conflict prevention and regional action, notably by increasing support for difficult reforms, improving linkages between political, security and economic assistance, and supporting regional initiatives; (ii) timing and sequencing of reforms in fragile and conflict-affected countries; (iii) investment in under-resourced sectors, e.g., in the justice sector, promoting public-private partnerships, and reach- ing insecure areas; and (iv) monitoring success through measures of actual levels of violence and popular perceptions of progress, in 40 For further details see IDA (2009). “IDA’s Support to Fragile and Conflict- Affected Countries: Progress Report 2007–2009,� http://siteresources.worldbank .org/IDA/Resources/Seminar%20PDFs/73449-1257448780237/Fragile_States_ MTR.pdf 252 order to track progress alongside the MDGs, which do not capture the special challenges faced by FCCs. The need for gender sensitive analyses and an integrated gender perspective was emphasized. Par- ticipants also welcomed the evaluation of the World Bank’s work in FCCs, which IEG plans to undertake in 2012–2013. 86. Analytical progress. For the IDA16 Mid-Term Review, Partici- pants requested Management to undertake analytical work on the types and heterogeneity of fragility that could lead to a stronger differentiation of fragile countries and their respective needs and circumstances. In addition, Management should examine (i) if tar- geted development assistance to non-post conflict fragile countries could help support the mitigation of the risks of conflict escalation; (ii) the needs and absorptive capacity of FCCs; (iii) review IDA’s effectiveness and results in FCCs and evaluate if more differentiated approaches to fragility and risk-taking in the design of interventions and choice of partners would improve effectiveness; (iv) the multi- faceted impact of development assistance (ODA) on fragile and conflict-affected countries; (v) if volatility in IDA allocations due to small changes in governance ratings misses opportunities to maintain human and institutional capital and pursue long-term strengthen- ing; and (vi) the potential to simplify and adjust the framework for allocating IDA resources to FCCs to enhance IDA’s ability to respond to the different needs and circumstances of FCCs. IDA should draw on existing research on peace- and state-building, the WDR 2011, and also build on the results of ongoing international processes such as the OECD-DAC, the International Network for Conflict and Fragility (INCAF), and the International Dialogue on Peace-building and State-building. Based on the above-mentioned analytical work, Participants requested that proposals on IDA’s support to FCCs be developed for consideration at the IDA16 Mid- Term Review. 87. Improving partnerships and aid coordination. Participants called for IDA to deepen its collaboration with partners to improve the effec- tiveness of foreign assistance in FCCs and to enhance IDA’s coordina- tion platform role and catalytic impact. Moving forward, Participants urged IDA to focus on: (i) the importance of achieving results through coherent, coordinated and complementary approaches to develop- ment, peace-building and state-building; (ii) the need for the work of all partners to be driven by the country context and preferences while ensuring a predictable and coherent response to fragility and conflict in terms of early engagement and communication among all partners; (iii) the centrality of the partner-country government in the 253 development process; and (iv) the need to build institutional capacity and support and actively strengthen country systems to the extent possible and avoid parallel aid and service delivery mechanisms. Participants noted ongoing efforts to coordinate with the UN and other agencies including through partnership agreements. Participants welcomed efforts of the UN and the World Bank to work together to better leverage their respective strengths. Specifically, they noted the semi-annual UN-WB High Level meetings that review the UN-World Bank Partnership Framework for Crisis and Post-Conflict Situations (signed in October 2008), discuss institutional arrangements, identify emerging opportunities and constraints, and work to improve the effectiveness of the crisis and post-crisis response. Participants also called for additional collective efforts to improve effectiveness and results in FCCs and welcomed the Bank’s ongoing efforts to enhance implementation of UN/Bank partnership agreements in an initial set of pilot countries. They welcomed Management’s intention to revise the World Bank’s Operational Policy on Development Cooperation and Conflict (OP/BP 2.30) by the end of calendar year 2011, and to include partnership agreements. 88. Increasing the effectiveness of Multi-Donor Trust Funds. Partic- ipants called for a deeper collaboration with partners on Multi- Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs) administered by the World Bank. They pointed out that several challenges need to be addressed to enhance the strategic effectiveness of MDTFs in FCCs, including ensuring that (i) the mandates of MDTFs are conflict-sensitive and are adapted to the complex environments found in FCCs; (ii) MDTFs are managed inclusively, with knowledge shared among all participants; (iii) MDTFs are mainstreamed into the regular work of IDA, with administrative budgets that take account of the higher costs of delivering programs in FCCs; (iv) demands on reporting and measurement are adequately balanced against the goal of improving the flexibility and effectiveness of MDTFs in FCCs; and (v) adequate human and financial resources are provided for fund management. Actions addressing some of these challenges are already underway. Participants requested Management to report on progress at the IDA16 Mid-Term Review. 89. Enhancing IDA’s effectiveness through staffing and decentraliza- tion initiatives. Participants welcomed progress on the decentral- ization of experienced staff to FCCs and noted that IDA now has country offices in virtually all FCCs. They welcomed the increase from 11 to 15 country departments in the Africa Region, and noted that this would help to sharpen the focus on the many FCCs in that 254 region. They also welcomed the establishment of a Hub for FCCs in the Africa Region, and the continued efforts of the Global Expert Team (GET) for Fragility and Conflict to provide operational and policy advice to FCC country teams. Management should continue to enhance the skills mix in FCCs including through adequate incen- tives to encourage staff to work in these countries. 90. Compliance with fiduciary principles: balance of risks and speed in implementation. Participants called for enhanced effectiveness in FCCs, including the ability to respond rapidly to emergency situa- tions. They noted that the Framework for Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies has resulted in faster preparation of emergency operations, but not yet in faster implementation.41 They welcomed Management’s commitment to reduce the number of projects (pre- pared under OP 8.00) with disbursement delays from 35 percent at the end of FY09 to 25 percent by the end of FY11. 91. Participants noted that while a robust procurement policy is impor- tant in order to mitigate fiduciary risks, it can result in longer pro- cesses if firms in FCCs do not have access to information, capacity, and security. They welcomed Management’s efforts to simplify procurement guidelines for FCCs, including through the use of simplified technical proposals for low-risk and low-value contracts, simplified short-listing processes, and increasing thresholds for prior review. They urged quick dissemination of the Procurement and Consultant Guidelines for the World Bank, once approved, which seek to harmonize procurement policies across MDBs and include the “Framework Agreements� procurement method to facilitate speedier implementation. Lastly, they welcomed the plans to: (i) establish integrated task teams that include seasoned procure- ment staff; (ii) address high staff turnover through better succession planning; (iii) seek early assessments of market conditions; (iv) use of UN agencies where appropriate; and (v) establish and maintain a database of best practices and templates. They looked forward to a review of procurement, fiduciary and legal inputs in FCCs by the time of the IDA16 Mid-Term Review. 92. Measurement of progress in FCCs. Participants welcomed IDA’s efforts to refine its approach to performance measurement in coun- tries currently receiving exceptional allocations. For these countries, 41 The World Bank (2010). “Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies (OP 8.00): Progress Report� (SecM2009-0200). 255 IDA uses Post-Conflict Performance Indicators (PCPI) tailored to the specifics of countries emerging from conflict. They noted that an external panel had recommended streamlining the criteria and strengthening the review process used to determine the PCPI country scores. They urged Management to complete the revision and test- ing of the PCPI criteria, and to publicly disclose the country scores in June 2011 before the start of IDA16. Participants also called for specific mechanisms to monitor efforts in the broader set of FCCs, and welcomed ongoing joint efforts with other agencies and bilateral partners to develop one harmonized approach to measuring progress in these countries. Section IV: Adjustments to the Volumes and Terms of IDA Assistance 93. Participants reviewed IDA’s Performance Based Allocation (PBA) system and agreed that it has generally worked well; they noted however that exceptions should be limited going forward. 94. Strengthening financial support for fragile and conflict affected countries. Participants welcomed Management’s proposals for strengthening financing for FCCs during IDA16 and endorsed the following changes to the PBA: (i) introduction of a flexible and case- by-case approach to extending the phase-out for post-conflict and re-engaging countries for the IDA16 period;42 and (ii) modifying the requirements for IDA’s regional program to allow projects with only two countries when at least one is an FCC. Furthermore, Participants endorsed Management’s proposal to continue to support, including through arrears clearance operations and special allocations as war- ranted, countries that are likely to re-engage with IDA during the IDA16 period. These measures will strengthen financing for post- conflict and re-engaging countries during IDA16. 95. Strengthening financing for small states. Participants noted that small states, particularly those with populations of less than 1.5 mil- lion, face a number of challenges owing to their higher vulnerability to economic shocks and natural disasters. In light of these challenges, they endorsed Management’s proposals to strengthen financing for small states during IDA16 by: (i) eliminating the maximum per capita 42 The eligibility criteria for the case by case extension are: (i) GNI per capita and country financing options; (ii) the presence of exogenous factors slowing down transitions; and (iii) portfolio performance. This approach may be modified in the context of subsequent discussions on financing for FCCs. 256 allocation ceiling, which has constrained the allocations of several small states; and (ii) raising the base allocation from the current SDR 1.5 million per year to SDR 3 million per year. 96. MDRI netting out. Participants discussed the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) netting out mechanism, whereby the debt relief that eligible countries receive under the MDRI is deducted from their gross PBA allocation. They noted that the “netting out� system ensures more resources are allocated on performance, rather than on the basis of historic debt levels. However, the mechanism has led to significant reductions in new allocations to a few countries, which has implications for IDA’s operational engagement in these countries. Participants emphasized the importance of maintaining the underlying principles of MDRI and considered several options for ensuring that IDA can work effectively in these countries. Partici- pants endorsed a change to the MDRI netting out mechanism with effect from FY11, whereby the amount deducted as foregone debt service from an eligible country’s gross annual PBA allocation is capped at 30 percent of such gross PBA allocation. This mechanism will reduce the impact on those countries most affected by the MDRI netting out while at the same time limiting the adverse impact on IDA’s equity-of-treatment principle for eligible countries. Finally, Management agreed to provide a review of implementation experi- ence at the time of the IDA16 Mid-Term Review. 97. Review of IDA’s financial instruments. Participants welcomed a review of the terms of IDA’s financial instruments and noted that adjusting these terms could strengthen IDA’s finances and long- term financial capacity. They noted that IDA currently has rela- tively undifferentiated financing terms between IDA-only and blend countries despite very different borrower circumstances in terms of income levels, economic prospects and levels of external debt. They supported aligning the terms for IDA blend countries with those of other institutions while allowing for an exceptional treatment for small island countries. Participants further agreed that this would recognize the stronger financial capacity of blend countries while still ensuring sufficient concessionality and also result in a smoother transition from IDA to IBRD financing terms. 98. Participants endorsed adjustments to the lending terms of IDA’s blend, gap and small island exception countries. This included adjust- ing the terms of IDA’s blend, hardened and hard term credits. Start- ing in IDA16, IDA’s blend credits and hardened term credits would be harmonized into one instrument with a final credit maturity of 257 25 years with a 5-year grace period, and instituting a 1.25 percent per annum interest rate.43 Hard term credits would also be harmonized with a maturity of 25 years and a 5-year grace period and continue to feature an interest rate based on the IBRD fixed rate equivalent minus 200 basis points. In addition, the terms for the small island country exception would be changed from blend credit terms to regular credit terms. Access to hard term credits would be expanded to all blend countries in proportion to their performance-based allocation. 99. Accelerated repayments. The terms of IDA credits provide for accelerated repayments of credits for countries that have a per capita GNI level that exceeds a specific threshold and are IBRD creditworthy. IDA has included an accelerated repayment clause in legal agreements of regular and blend credits approved since 1987 that allows it to double the principal repayments of the credit or increase the interest rate, subject to the approval of IDA’s Executive Directors after considering the borrower’s economic development. The GNI per capita threshold was originally set as exceeding the historic cut-off for 5 consecutive years, but for agreements after 1996 it was lowered to exceed the operational cut-off for 3 consecutive years. Deputies noted that a few IDA borrowers with outstanding IDA credits that include the acceleration clause have met these criteria. Deputies indicated that these countries changed circum- stances should be reflected in their repayment obligations to IDA. They endorsed the exercising of the acceleration clause for these borrowers that are IDA graduates, after considering the borrower’s economic development, and noted that this would have a positive impact on IDA’s financial capacity for the IDA16 period. 100. IDA’s long-term financial sustainability. Participants welcomed Management’s review of IDA’s long-term financial capacity, and looked forward to further discussions of IDA’s long-term financial sustainability in the context of the working group established for this purpose. Participants reviewed the growth of IDA over its history. They noted that donor contributions have been the main source of funding of IDA replenishment. Participants welcomed the increase in the number of donors to the IDA replenishments. While recog- nizing the value of debt relief in freeing up fiscal space in IDA coun- tries’ budgets, Participants noted that without the compensation 43 All other terms and charges would remain consistent with the current General Conditions for IDA credits and grants. 258 mechanisms agreed by donors, debt relief under the HIPC Initia- tive and MDRI would have altered IDA’s long-term financing by lowering credit reflows that would have become available to sup- port future replenishments. Participants also noted that country graduations could free up resources for other IDA recipients over time and that future graduations should be encouraged. Partici- pants recommended that future analysis be explored for innovative ideas to increase IDA’s financial sustainability and requested that in cooperation with IBRD a review of IDA’s graduation policy be presented for discussion at the IDA16 Mid-Term Review. Section V: Managing IDA’s Financial Resources 101. Deputies recognized that the IDA16 replenishment period (FY12–14) is the last full replenishment before the MDGs 2015 target and will be a critical time for the donor community to pro- vide assistance to IDA countries to help them in their efforts to reach the MDGs by 2015. Towards this end, they endorsed a total replenishment of SDR 32.8 billion (equivalent to US$ 49.3 bil- lion)44 during the IDA16 period, which would constitute the IDA16 commitment authority envelope. A. Commitment Authority 102. Sources of commitment authority. IDA’s commitment authority is backed by donor contributions, internal resources of IDA, trans- fers45 from IBRD and IFC, and by other resources, as available. Donor contributions supporting IDA16 commitment authority are provided as part of the IDA16 replenishment itself as well as under the MDRI replenishment. Deputies noted that Management will review IDA’s commitment authority and report to the Board on an annual basis, as per current practice. This review will take into account the status of donor financing commitments to the IDA16 replenishment and the MDRI replenishment. In the event of a shortfall of donor commitments, the level of IDA16 commit- ment authority could be adjusted over the course of the IDA16 period. Deputies reiterated the commitment made under MDRI to fully finance the costs to IDA of providing MDRI debt relief, 44 At the IDA16 foreign exchange reference rate of US$/SDR1.50233. 45 IBRD transfers are made out of its net income. IFC designates grants to IDA out of its retained earnings. 259 and that financing of these costs would be additional to regular IDA contributions. 103. Sources. The volume for each source of funding is as follows: • Deputies endorsed SDR 17.6 billion (equivalent to US$ 26.4 bil- lion) of total donor contributions for the IDA16 replenishment. IDA16 donor contributions comprise: (i) regular contributions of SDR 15.8 billion (equivalent to US$ 23.7 billion), net of the structural financing gap; (ii) contributions to cover IDA’s debt relief costs under the HIPC Initiative during the IDA16 com- mitment period (FY12–14) of SDR 1.3 billion (equivalent to US$ 2.0 billion); (iii) contributions to finance arrears clearance operations of SDR 0.4 billion46 (equivalent to US$ 0.6 billion); and (iv) contribution to cover the forgone principal on grants provided of SDR 0.1 billion (equivalent to US$ 0.1 billion). • Deputies reaffirmed the need to provide additional donor contri- butions for the MDRI replenishment of SDR 3.5 billion (equiva- lent to US$ 5.3 billion), so as to cover IDA’s debt relief costs due to the MDRI during the IDA16 disbursement period (FY12–22) as agreed under MDRI. • Deputies acknowledged proposed commitments against IDA’s internal resources in the amount of SDR 6.6 billion (equivalent to US$ 9.9 billion), subject to approval by IDA’s Executive Direc- tors. Internal resources include credit repayments received from both current and past IDA borrowers, as well as resources from IDA’s liquid assets including investment income. • Deputies noted the approval by IDA’s Executive Directors of Management’s proposal to exercise the contractual acceleration clause in qualifying IDA credits and acknowledged that this would increase the internal resources available in IDA16 by SDR 1.2 billion (equivalent to US$ 1.8 billion).47 They recognized the significant efforts of seven IDA graduates whose repayments of qualifying outstanding IDA credits would be accelerated under this proposal: Albania, China, Arab Republic of Egypt, Equato- rial Guinea, Indonesia, FYR Macedonia and St. Kitts and Nevis. 46 Total estimated arrears clearance costs during IDA16 are SDR400 million, of which donors pledged to cover SDR381 million. 47 IDA (2010). “Acceleration of Credit Repayments to IDA and New Policy Framework for Voluntary Prepayments.� IDA R02010-0351. The new policy was approved on December 7, 2010. 260 • Deputies welcomed the additional voluntary prepayment of outstanding IDA credits by China of US$ 1.0 billion. In accor- dance with the new policy framework for voluntary prepayments China received a discount of US$ 110.78 million on these credit repayments. China is passing the entire discount on to IDA as a donor contribution to IDA16. The remaining US$ 889 million (SDR 592 million) will increase the internal resources available in IDA16. • Deputies acknowledged that the proposed adjustments to the lending terms of IDA’s blend and gap borrowers would increase the internal resources available in IDA16 by SDR 1.3 billion (equivalent to US$ 2.0 billion). They noted that IDA blend and gap borrowers would be making an important contribution to IDA’s long term financial sustainability and, although the lend- ing terms remain concessional, the shortened maturity and grace period would allow IDA to recycle resources more quickly and the interest paid would increase IDA’s internal resources avail- able for commitment authority. • Replenishment funding would also comprise expected transfers from IBRD net income in the amount of SDR 1.3 billion and grants from IFC in the amount of SDR 0.7 billion, in each case based upon evaluations of the institutions’ financial capacities and subject to availability of net income and annual approvals by the IBRD and IFC (equivalent to an aggregate World Bank Group contribution of US$ 3.0 billion). 104. Donor contributions of SDR 21.1 billion continue to be the pri- mary source of IDA’s commitment authority, accounting for some 64 percent of the total resources supporting IDA16. Donor commit- ments for the IDA16 replenishment (subscriptions and contribu- tions) of SDR 17.6 billion as shown in Table 1 of Annex 5 reflect the agreement reached among donors. Donor contributions for the MDRI replenishment of SDR 3.5 billion are governed by the MDRI Resolution.48 Under the terms of the MDRI Resolution, IDA has undertaken to reflect changes in actual and estimated costs of MDRI debt forgiveness by making adjustments to donor con- tributions to the MDRI every three years normally in conjunction with regular replenishments.49 A revised Compensation Schedule 48 IDA (2006). Additions to IDA’s Resources: Financing the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative: IDA Resolution No. 211 adopted by IDA’s Board of Governors on April 21, 2006 (the “MDRI Resolution�). 49 Paragraphs 1(f), 2(c) and 2(d) of the MDRI Resolution. 261 and revised Donor Contribution tables to the MDRI Resolution will be provided to members reflecting the updated cost estimates for the MDRI as of June 30, 2010. Corresponding adjustments to reflect these updated amounts are also required in the payment schedule attached to each member’s Instrument of Commitment for its MDRI subscription and contribution.50 Section VI provides further information regarding donors’ contributions to finance debt relief costs under the HIPC Initiative, the MDRI, arrears clearance operations and compensation for forgone principal on grants. • New and prospective donors. Argentina, The Bahamas, Chile, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan, Peru, and the Philippines have pledged to become IDA donors. Participants noted that, in their view, there are still a number of countries that have the economic capability to contribute to IDA but have not yet done so. Participants acknowledged Management’s efforts to reach out to these countries and agreed that efforts should continue to encourage them to become IDA donors. • Burden Shares. Participants acknowledged the dual challenge of securing an adequate replenishment size while achieving an acceptable burden sharing framework. They acknowledged the large structural gap of 20.2 percent in donors’ basic contributions during the fifteenth replenishment of IDA and that this gap has continued to grow in recent IDA replenishments. Participants noted that the increasing structural gap leads to underfunding relative to the donor consensus regarding the financial needs of IDA countries in the coming replenishment period and that it leads to under-reporting of each donor’s “effective or real burden share� of total contributions. They also noted that rescaling basic burden shares could have unintended consequences and that fur- ther discussion was needed during the IDA16 Mid-Term Review. • Additional contributions. Donors may, at any time, make addi- tional contributions to the amounts shown in Table 1 of Annex 5. Such contributions would reduce the financing gap and result in a corresponding increase in IDA’s available commitment authority. • Voting rights. Participants agreed that the existing IDA voting rights system continue for the IDA16 period. 50 Members will be notified of the necessary amendments to their MDRI Instru- ments of Commitment and the payment schedule following adoption of the IDA16 Resolution by the Board of Governors. 262 105. Internal resources. Participants welcomed the record internal resource mobilization efforts for IDA16, particularly given that many donors face serious fiscal constraints. They recognized the significant efforts of IDA graduates whose repayment of qualifying IDA credits would be accelerated and blend countries that would receive new credits based on the adjusted terms. In both cases, these efforts increase the internal resources available for commit- ment authority during IDA16. Participants endorsed IDA’s existing practice of using internal resources to complement donor resources. They supported the analysis presented during the replenishment discussions demonstrating that IDA would have an adequate level of internal resources to continue to support future replenishments. Participants noted that credit repayments constitute an important component of internal resources and recognized the impact of the MDRI, HIPC Initiative and IDA grants on credit reflows. Deputies confirmed their commitment to compensate IDA for these forgone reflows on a “dollar-for-dollar� basis. Participants reviewed the structure of IDA’s liquid resources and discussed Management’s projections regarding IDA’s long-term financial capacity. 106. IBRD and IFC contributions. Participants welcomed the under- taking for a planned contribution of US$ 2.8 billion51 from World Bank Group resources in support of the IDA16 replenishment con- sistent with the approach discussed at the 2010 Spring Meetings.52 Participants noted that the ability of IDA to assist low-income countries over the next three years depends heavily on the agreed IDA16 funding package and that a critical component of this fund- ing package was the continued ability of IBRD and IFC to con- tribute financial resources to IDA. They noted that IDA would use IFC-provided resources in furtherance of IFC’s purposes, with emphasis on sectors such as finance, industry and trade, informa- tion and communication, energy and mining and transportation. Such transfers are approved annually by IBRD’s Board of Gover- nors and IFC’s Board of Directors based upon evaluations of the 51 This amount is expected to generate additional investment income of US$ 222 mil- lion and provide total financing for IDA16 of US$3.0 billion, equivalent to SDR 2.0 billion. 52 The World Bank (2010). “Synthesis Paper: New World, New World Bank Group,� DC2010-002/1. Annex 1. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/ Documentation/22555916/DC2010-0002-1_E_SynthesisPaperRevised.pdf 263 institutions’ annual results and financial capacities.53 Participants emphasized the importance they attach to continued and substantial transfers from IBRD and IFC to IDA. They urged IBRD and IFC to maintain their financial support to IDA, consistent with IBRD’s and IFC’s financial priorities. B. Replenishment Effectiveness 107. Deputies recommended that financing for IDA16 be made subject to an effectiveness condition similar to that used under previous IDA replenishments. The purpose of such a condition is to ensure that most donor financing, including contributions by major donors, is in place on time. Deputies recommended that IDA16 become effective when Instruments or Qualified Instruments of Commit- ment accounting for 60 percent of the total donor contributions have been received by IDA. They recommended a target effectiveness date for the replenishment of December 15, 2011. 108. Deputies noted the expected limited availability of commitment authority for making grants at the start of the IDA16 period, before the replenishment becomes effective. Principal reflows derived from credits extended in replenishments prior to IDA11 cannot be used for the financing of grants as the associated replenishment resolutions did not authorize the making of grants. IDA would, therefore, need to rely on donor contributions to back new grant commitments during IDA16. Since many IDA recipients receive their entire assistance in the form of grants, the timely availability of donor contributions to support commitment authority for grants is of particular concern. 109. In response to this concern, Deputies noted the importance of pro- viding their Instruments of Commitment as early as possible, so as to advance the date of reaching the threshold for replenishment effectiveness.54 Deputies also noted two options to address the con- straint associated with the provision of grants, both of which were used with success in IDA15: (i) the continued use of the Advance 53 IFC’s Board of Governors notes with approval the designation of retained earn- ings by IFC’s Board of Directors. 54 Some donors’ budgetary and legislative timetables permit them to make their contributions at an early stage in the fiscal year. 264 Contribution Scheme; and (ii) the use of conditional grants and convertible credits. • Advance Contribution Scheme. In past IDA replenishments, some donors agreed that a share of their contributions could be used before the replenishment becomes effective. Under this Advance Contribution Scheme, one-third of the amount specified in a contributing member’s Instrument of Commitment would be released for commitment authority purposes, provided that at least a defined minimum threshold volume of total donor Instruments of Commitment has been received. In view of the limited availability of commitment authority for grants during the first six months of IDA16, Deputies agreed to eliminate the threshold for the Advance Contribution Scheme, following the same procedure as in IDA15. Consequently, unless stated otherwise by the donor, one-third of that donor’s contributions will be released for commitment immediately upon receipt of the donor’s Instrument of Commitment by IDA. The second and third tranches of donor contributions will be released at the beginning of each fiscal year, on July 1, 2012 and July 1, 2013, respectively. • Conditional grants and convertible credits. Deputies noted two other options to address constraints on commitment authority: (a) using conditional grants; and (b) converting credits to grants. Grants during the first six months of IDA16 could be made con- ditional upon availability of sufficient commitment authority from donor contributions. Alternatively, IDA16 grant operations could be approved as credits in the first six months of IDA16 with an automatic conversion to grant terms as and when sufficient donor resources become available. Upon conversion, any IDA service and commitment charges paid under the credit would be refunded to the borrower. To the extent required, Management would adopt a combination of conditional grants and conversion of credits into grants, as described above, following the same procedures that were used successfully in IDA15. C. Contribution Procedures 110. Payments. Deputies recommended that the contribution and pay- ment arrangements for donors continue as in previous replenish- ments. Donors will provide their contributions in the form of cash or notes in three equal annual installments. The first installment will be due 31 days after the replenishment becomes effective, which is expected by December 15, 2011, except for advance contributions 265 which will be paid as specified by IDA. The second installment will be paid no later than January 15, 2013, and the third installment no later than January 15, 2014. IDA may agree to postpone any payment under the terms of the IDA16 Resolution. 111. Deputies recommended that subscription and payment arrange- ments for non-donors continue as in previous replenishments. Sub- scription payments of non-contributing members will be fully paid in one installment and in national currency, either in cash or notes. 112. Encashment. Donor contributions will be encashed on an approxi- mately pro rata basis among donors following the agreed regular encashment schedule (Attachment II of the IDA16 Resolution). Donors may, with the agreement of Management, adjust their encashments to reflect their legal and budgetary requirements. Deputies agreed to indicate any special preferences in this regard to Management when donors deposit their Instruments of Commit- ment. Deputies recognized that the timing of encashments affects IDA’s resource base. They agreed that in exceptional cases, should unavoidable delays occur, IDA’s encashment requests to the affected donor be expected to be adjusted to take into account any past pay- ment delays by that donor and any related lost income to IDA. IDA may also agree with any member on a revised encashment schedule that yields at least an equivalent value to IDA. Deputies agreed that the present value of donors’ encashment schedules will be based on a 2.5 percent per annum discount rate.55 Donors that accelerate their encashments can use the additional resources as a credit item, either to increase their own regular burden share, to cover a share of their costs under the MDRI replenishment, or to lower the overall structural gap in the replenishment. In each case, donors would receive additional subscription votes on account of the additional resources provided to IDA from accelerated encashment. Donors that use accelerated encashment can also benefit from a discount on the amounts encashed. 113. Valuation of contributions. Deputies agreed to denominate their contributions in their respective national currencies if freely con- vertible, in SDRs, or, with the approval of IDA, in any convertible currency of another member country. They also agreed to determine 55 IDA (2010).�Updated IDA16 Financing Framework and Key Financial Variables.� http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/Seminar%20 PDFs/73449-1271341193277/FinancingFramework_October2010.pdf 266 the currency of denomination for each donor contribution as of the date of conclusion of the IDA16 replenishment discussions. For the purpose of establishing the equivalence of value among different currencies and the SDR, donors agreed to use the average daily exchange rate for the period April 1, 2010, through September 30, 2010. To help maintain the value of contributions from donors with high inflation rates, contributions from donors with domestic annual inflation of 10 percent or higher in 2007–2009 will be denominated in SDRs or in any currency used for valuation of the SDR and agreed with IDA.56 114. IDA15 funds carried into the IDA16 replenishment. Deputies agreed that the IDA15 funds carried over into the IDA16 period will be administered under the terms of the IDA15 replenishment with respect to financial management matters such as payment, encashment and allocation of voting rights. For ongoing operational matters, such as commitment authority, IDA16 terms, conditions and procedures will apply. 115. Reporting of contributions. Participants requested Management to report regularly to the Executive Directors on the status of each donor’s commitment and actual contributions to IDA and to include this information in the Annual Report of the World Bank and other publications as appropriate. Section VI: Financing Debt Relief, Arrears Clearance and Foregone Principal on Grants 116. Participants reiterated their strong support for the HIPC Initiative and MDRI, which provide debt relief to the world’s poorest and most indebted countries. They reviewed updated cost estimates for IDA’s lost credit reflows and the status of donor financing for the MDRI. In addition, Deputies discussed the financing arrangements for exceptional IDA allocations for arrears clearance in IDA16 and supported the continued use of the Debt Relief Trust Fund to accept resources from donors and IBRD net income transfers for this pur- pose. Participants noted that IDA16 will be the first replenishment for donors to compensate IDA for forgone principal repayments on grants. Participants recognized that further discussions were 56 Inflation is measured by the rate of change of the national Consumer Price Index (CPI), or the GDP deflator in case of donor countries for which the CPI is not available. 267 needed on the question of financing gaps in donors’ contribution for compensatory items. A. The HIPC Initiative 117. Impact on IDA finances. Participants reviewed the impact of HIPC debt relief on IDA’s finances. They reaffirmed the basic HIPC prin- ciple that debt relief should not reduce IDA’s capacity to support poverty reduction and development and should be additional to other IDA assistance. They noted that current resources available to finance IDA’s HIPC debt relief costs will be fully utilized by the beginning of the IDA16 period. IDA will, therefore, need additional financing of about SDR 1.4 billion during the IDA16 period to finance forgone credit reflows due to the HIPC Initiative. 118. Two mechanisms. Deputies supported the continued use of the two mechanisms used in IDA15 for donors’ HIPC-related contributions: (a) contributing to IDA directly; or (b) channeling contributions through the Debt Relief Trust Fund.57 The HIPC-related contribu- tions will be recorded separately from regular IDA contributions in order to ensure that HIPC debt relief is additional to other IDA assistance. As in IDA15, each donor’s share will be determined based on the agreed burden-sharing and shown as a separate column in Table 1 of the IDA16 Resolution. 119. Donor funds provided directly to IDA will be treated in the same manner as regular contributions, becoming part of IDA’s gen- eral resources. Donors can choose to submit one Instrument of Commitment that would include the amount of the HIPC-related contribution, or separate Instruments of Commitment for regular IDA contributions and HIPC-related contributions. Donors can pay their HIPC contributions in cash or promissory notes. Since these additional contributions will reimburse IDA for its forgone reflows during FY12–14, they will be drawn down over this three- year period. Donors will receive voting rights for contributions upon payment to IDA16. 120. Donors can also make HIPC contributions directly to the Debt Relief Trust Fund. Donors would sign contribution agreements with IDA, as administrator of the Debt Relief Trust Fund, specify- ing the contribution amount and payment modalities—in cash or 57 As amended by donors and the Executive Directors. 268 in promissory notes to be drawn down over a three-year period. Donors will deposit their contributions in the World Bank com- ponent of the Debt Relief Trust Fund, and contributions will be transferred to IDA to reimburse IDA for its forgone credit reflows. Since these funds become part of IDA’s general resources at the time of transfer from the Debt Relief Trust Fund to IDA’s cash accounts, donors will receive additional voting rights in IDA following such transfers. Management will report periodically to donors on the status of their contributions to the Debt Relief Trust Fund. B. The MDRI 121. Replacement of lost credit reflows. In the spring of 2006, donors and shareholders approved IDA’s participation in the MDRI, which provides 100 percent cancellation of eligible debt owed to IDA by countries reaching the HIPC completion point. Starting on July 1, 2006 and over the next four decades of MDRI implementation, IDA is projected to cancel an estimated total amount of SDR 23.7 bil- lion (equivalent to US$ 35.5 billion) of credit reflows from eligible HIPC countries. Under the MDRI replenishment arrangements, donors have committed to compensate IDA’s MDRI costs on a ‘dollar-for-dollar’ basis, over the duration of the cancelled credits. Participants reiterated the need for full replacement of the lost credit reflows due to the MDRI so as to ensure that the debt relief granted by IDA will be additional for recipient countries, providing further resources for their development efforts. 122. MDRI replenishment. Donor contributions for IDA’s MDRI costs are recorded under a separate replenishment and added to IDA’s general resources, following established IDA procedures. Deputies reaffirmed the need for full replacement of lost credit reflows due to debt relief and their commitment “to fully finance the costs to IDA of providing MDRI debt relief over the 40-year time span of the MDRI.�58 To preserve IDA’s advance commitment capacity—under which IDA uses its stream of available future credit reflows to back future disbursements on approved credits and grants—Deputies acknowledged the need to provide unqualified, firm MDRI financ- ing commitments over the disbursement period of each future IDA replenishment. However, Participants also recognized that the abil- ity to provide binding financial commitments for the entire duration 58 IDA (2006). Additions to IDA Resources: Financing the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, approved by IDA’s Executive Directors on March 28, 2006. Paragraph 5. 269 of MDRI varies from donor to donor and committed themselves to make every effort possible to translate their full political commit- ment for outer as well as earlier years into as firm and far reach- ing financial pledges as allowed for by their legislative processes. Specifically, in the context of the MDRI replenishment, donors recognized that: “It will be critical to provide an Unqualified Com- mitment for subscriptions and contributions in FY07 and FY08.�59 For the remainder of the first decade of MDRI implementation (FY09–16), donors recognized that: “Firm, Unqualified Commit- ments are also needed over this period. Participants recognized that some donors would require periodic approval of their contri- butions over this period, resulting in the provision of some portion of Qualified Commitments. Participants encouraged IDA’s donors to take all necessary steps in successive replenishments to provide firm financing on a rolling basis.�60 In order to avoid a financ- ing shortfall, the MDRI replenishment resolution was amended in 201061 to allow a portion of qualified commitments to be counted towards IDA’s commitment authority. This portion was set by IDA’s Executive Directors at 85 percent of qualified commitments during IDA15, and the Executive Directors will set the level for IDA16 under the IDA16 commitment authority framework. Nevertheless, Participants stressed the need for donors to make every effort to provide firm, unqualified commitments up to FY22. 123. To back IDA16 commitment authority, Deputies reaffirmed the urgent need to provide additional donor contributions for the MDRI replenishment of SDR 3.5 billion, so as to cover IDA’s debt relief costs due to the MDRI during the IDA16 disburse- ment period (FY12–22) as agreed under the MDRI. In that context, Participants noted with appreciation that a number of donors have already provided unqualified MDRI financing commitments over 40 years, including Ireland, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Portugal, Russia and South Africa. 124. Participants noted that the value of IDA’s lost credit reflows under the MDRI will continue to fluctuate over the 40-year period, and that the MDRI financing arrangements include a mechanism to 59 Paragraph 19 (a), ibid. 60 Paragraph 19 (b), ibid. 61 IDA (2010) “Amendment to Resolution No. 211—Additions to Resources: Financing the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative,� Resolution 224, IDA/ R2010-0054. 270 adjust the compensatory amounts payable by donors in conjunction with every regular IDA replenishment. Participants reviewed the updated cost estimates for the MDRI, as of June 30, 2010, which provide the basis for updates to the MDRI cost tables and donor payment schedule. Revised tables to the MDRI Resolution reflect- ing the updated cost estimates will be provided to members. Cor- responding adjustments to reflect these updated amounts are also required in the payment schedule attached to each member’s Instru- ment of Commitment for its MDRI subscription and contribution. Donors noted that, in the Instrument of Commitment, each member had agreed to amend its Instrument of Commitment to reflect any such adjustment. 125. Monitoring donor contributions. Participants reaffirmed that there should be continued monitoring of donor contributions to the MDRI. For transparency, donor contributions to the MDRI will continue to be recorded separately from regular IDA replenishment contributions, as additional to donors’ regular financial support to IDA. They noted that donor contributions to the MDRI have been reported in the annual report to IDA Deputies and IDA’s Execu- tive Directors and will continue to be reported annually during the IDA16 period. Such reporting will contain information on the volume of debt relief delivered by IDA under the MDRI and the amount of compensatory donor resources received. C. Financing of Arrears Clearance Operations 126. Burden shares. During IDA15, donors agreed to establish a sys- tematic approach to arrears clearance.62 The cost of providing exceptional support for arrears clearance to countries eligible per the established criteria and which could be expected to clear arrears before the end of the IDA16 period is estimated to be SDR 0.4 billion.63 Donors agreed that this amount be included as part of IDA’s overall financing commitments during IDA16 based on fair burden shares. In general, therefore, donors supported the use of their HIPC burden shares to finance arrears clearance operations in IDA15. 62 IDA (2008). Additions to IDA Resources: Fifteenth Replenishment—IDA: The Platform for Achieving Results at the Country Level, See section IV.C, page 31. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/Seminar%20PDFs/73449- 1172525976405/FinalreportMarch2008.pdf 63 See also footnote 47. 271 127. Set aside of resources. Participants agreed that the resources pro- vided to finance arrears clearance operations would be released for commitment only when such arrears clearance actually takes place. They also agreed that if the resources requested for IDA16 would be insufficient to cover the full cost of the exceptional support, the shortfall would be made up in IDA17, in the same manner that HIPC costs are updated at each replenishment based on use and availability of resources. Participants requested Management to provide an update on the utilization of resources for arrears clear- ance operations at the IDA16 Mid-Term Review and to indicate plans for the reallocation of any unused resources during the last year of the IDA16 period. 128. Redeployment of unused resources from IDA15. Deputies agreed during the IDA15 Mid-term Review to the redeployment of SDR 243 million (US$ 370 million) from the unused set-aside for arrears clearance operations to provide resources for the pilot-Crisis Response Window (pilot-CRW).64 However, the IDA15 Depu- ties’ Report and Board of Governors’ resolution limited the use of these funds to arrears clearance operations. Therefore, pending the approval for the repurposing of these funds, the Executive Directors approved—in November 2009—the use of an equivalent amount of IDA16 internal resources to bridge the immediate financing need. This additional amount of internal resources was included in the internal resources used for IDA15 and was deducted from the internal resources available in IDA16. Given the above Depu- ties’ agreement, the funds can be carried forward into IDA16 to reimburse the use of internal resources. 129. Debt Relief Trust Fund. Participants noted that the continued use of the Debt Relief Trust Fund to allow it to receive donor contri- butions for arrears clearance provided an additional avenue for donors to finance the cost associated with arrears clearance. They also noted that any donor making bilateral contributions towards coverage of arrears clearance costs into the arrears clearance win- dow of the Debt Relief Trust Fund, ahead of IDA16, will have the option of having these contributions credited against the donor’s burden-shared contributions for arrears clearance financing during IDA16. Similarly, in IDA16, donors have the option of contribut- ing directly to IDA or channeling their contribution for arrears 64 IDA (2009). “Proposal for a Pilot IDA Crisis Response Window,� IDA/ R2009-0293. 272 clearance through the Debt Relief Trust Fund. In addition, in the event that IBRD has additional income, the Debt Relief Trust Fund could be able to receive contributions from IBRD net income, which could be used to address any remaining structural gap in the financing of IDA’s debt relief costs, including HIPC and MDRI. 130. IBRD debt. In IDA countries with debt to IBRD, Participants also agreed that IDA provide debt relief grants or credits where these would be necessary in order for the World Bank to deliver its share of debt relief under the HIPC Initiative. Such debt relief grants from IDA (for interim HIPC relief on IBRD debt service pay- ments) and prepayment by IDA of remaining IBRD claims at the HIPC completion point are part of the implementation modalities for IDA’s delivery of debt relief under the HIPC process.65 These debt relief grants and prepayments are to be funded by resources other than IBRD net income transfers. 131. Participants noted that the IDA-financed clearance of arrears to IBRD would lead to an increase in IBRD’s allocable income in the fiscal year in which the arrears clearance took place and expressed a desire for dollar-for-dollar compensation from IBRD, while acknowledging that any such compensation could be made only after meeting IBRD’s general reserve allocation requirements and in line with IBRD’s policies and practices. Participants also expressed the desire that any such additional contributions would be used to close the structural gap in the MDRI financing framework. D. Financing of Forgone Principal from Grants 132. Grant making began in earnest in IDA13. In IDA14, donors com- mitted to replace forgone principal reflows due to the making of grants, on a pay-as-you-go basis. Given the 10-year grace period on regular IDA credits, IDA16 will be the first replenishment for the financing of forgone principal reflows due the grants extended in IDA13. 133. Impact on IDA finances. Participants reviewed the impact of pro- viding grants on IDA’s finances. They reaffirmed the basic principle that grants provided should not reduce IDA’s future capacity to 65 IDA (2000). “Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative: Note on Modalities for Implementing HIPC Debt Relief under the Enhanced Frame- work,� IDA/R 2000-4, approved by the Executive Directors on January 25, 2000. 273 support poverty reduction and development. They noted that IDA will need additional financing of about SDR 60 million during the IDA16 period to finance forgone credit reflows due to grants. 134. Burden shares. Donors agreed that this amount is included as part of IDA’s overall financing commitments during IDA16 based on fair burden shares. Section VII: Recommendation 135. The Executive Directors recommend to the Board of Governors the adoption of the draft IDA16 Resolution. . . .(1) (This report was approved and its recommendation was adopted by the Board of Governors On April 26, 2011) (1) This resolution was subsequently approved. See page 162. 274 REPORT OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF IFC July 1, 2011 Membership of Suriname 1. In accordance with Section 17 of the By-Laws of the International Finance Corporation, the application of Suriname for membership in IFC is hereby submitted to the Board of Governors. 2. Representatives of Suriname have been consulted informally regard- ing the terms and conditions recommended in the attached draft Reso- lution and they have raised no objection thereto. 3. Accordingly, the Board of Directors recommends that the Board of Governors adopt the draft Resolution. . . .1 (This report was approved and its recommendation was adopted by the Board of Governors on August 12, 2011) (1) This resolution was subsequently approved. See page 177. 275 ACCREDITED MEMBERS OF DELEGATIONS AT THE 2011 ANNUAL MEETINGS Afghanistan Angola Governor Governor Omar Zakhilwal Manuel Neto da Costa Adviser Alternate Governor Eklil Ahmad Hakimi Gualberto Lima Campos Samiullah Ibrahimi Ahmad Jalali Adviser Dallas Newby Maria Luisa Abrantes Abdul Qadier Nur Martinho Bachi Codo Khalid Payenda Manuel da Silva Adris Walli Ana Beatriz G. De Ceita Da Costa Ismael Filipe Albania Mauro Fonseca Lucombo Joaquim Luveia Governor Mario Miguel Ridvan Bode Amadeu Leitao Nunes Domingos Pedro Alternate Governor Celson J. Ndombe Pongolola Fatos Ibrahimi Alberto Bento Ribeiro Adviser Antigua and Barbuda# Elvi Fundo Toni Gogu Governor Gramoz Kolasi Whitfield Harris, Jr. Endrit Lami Genci Mamani Alternate Governor Erald Themeli Reuben Meade Algeria Adviser Deborah-Mae Lovell Governor Rafael Molina Karim Djoudi Argentina Alternate Governor Abdelhak Bedjaoui Governor Amado Boudou Adviser Hadia Amrane Alternate Governor Noureddine Bardad-Daidj Roberto Jose Feletti Omar Bougara Sid Ahmed Dib Soraya Mellali * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 276 Adviser Alternate Governor Mauro Alem Roger Brake Martin Bes Kevin Rudd* Carlos Bolo Bolano Diego Luis Bossio Adviser Felix Alberto Camarasa Ranya Alkadamani Jorge Carrera Ric Battellino Alfredo Vicente Chiaradia Peter Baxter Marcelo Cinto Courtaux Kim Beazley Maia Colodenco Robert Bolitho Adrian Consentino Matthew Coghlan Gabriela Costa Patrick Colmer Juan Pablo De Jesus Robin Davies Guadalupe del Valle Beth Delaney Eduardo de Simone Anna Engwerda-Smith Eugenio Diaz Bonilla Chay Fisher Gisela Andrea Ferrari Peter Grant Cesar Forcieri Philip Green Victor Fuentes-Castillo Joanne Greenfield Hugo Gobbi Penelope Howarth Anibal Lopez Evanor Palac-McMiken Gustavo Lunazzi David Pearl Romina Machello Tracy Reid Hilda Raquel Melgin Susan Richards Adrian Nador Skye Rogers Norberto Pagani Amanda Sayegh Pablo Andres Pereira Andrew Thomas German Plessen Justin Whyatt Sergio Poggi Michael Willcock Hector Romano Paul Wojciechowski Lucio Simpson Analia Tello Austria Ruben Eduardo Tempone Cecilia Todesca Bocco Governor Ignacio Torterola Andreas Schieder Fabiola Vela Velazquez Nicolas Viggiolo Alternate Governor Edith Frauwallner Armenia Adviser Governor Elisabeth Gruber Tigran Davtyan Gerhard Gunz Andrea Hagmann Alternate Governor Konstantin Huber Vardan Aramyan Stefan Imhof Alice Irvin Adviser Eva-Maria Liebmann Grigor Sargsyan Seena Moongananiyil Georg Ortner Australia Guenther Schoenleitner Juergen Schwarz Governor Michael Wancata Wayne Swan Thomas Wieser * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 277 Azerbaijan Barbados Alternate Governor Governor Khagani Abdullayev Christopher P. Sinckler Ali Gara* Alternate Governor Bahamas, The Grantley W. Smith Governor Adviser Hubert A. Ingraham John Beale Jane Elizabeth Brathwaite Alternate Governor Carson Browne Zhivargo Laing Ricardo Kellman Ehurd Cunningham* Nicolla Rudder Adviser Belarus# Andrea Adderley Maria-Teresa Butler Governor Robert Henry Andrei M. Kharkovets Khyle Quincy Parker Cornelius A. Smith Alternate Governor Freddie Tucker Gennady Medvedev* Nicola Virgill Simon D. Wilson Adviser Siarhei Chuhai Bahrain# Georgy Egorov Ihar Klimashevich Governor Dmitry Kolkin Ahmed Bin Mohammed Al-Khalifa Oleg Kravchenko Vadim Sergeevich Misyukovets Alternate Governor Uladzimir Novik Yousif Abdulla Humood Ruslan Varankov Adviser Belgium Salman Al Khalifa Zakaria Ahmed Hejres Governor Houda Ezra Nonoo Didier Reynders Bangladesh Alternate Governor Guillaume Pierre Wunsch Governor Abul Maal A. Muhith Adviser Gino Alzetta Alternate Governor Marlene Beco M. Musharraf Hossain Bhuiyan Laurent Burton Qader Akramul* Marianne Collin Kazi M. Aminul Islam* Hubert Cooreman A.K.M. Masihur Rahman* Lieven De la Marche Anthony De Lannoy Adviser Ronald De Swert Zahiduzzaman Faruque Florence Fauconnier Mohammad Wahid Hossain Emile Goffin Sabia Muhith Olivier Henin * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 278 Anne Leclercq Adviser David Marechal Gabriel Baldivieso Peter Moors Freddy Bersatti Tudela Bernadette Prignon Varinia Cecilia Daza Foronda Bernard Quintin Hernando Larrazabal Cordova Marc Riflet Pablo Menacho Diederich Johan Rosseel Dirk Slaats Bosnia and Herzegovina Peter Van Acker Peter Van der Stoelen Governor Nikola Spiric Belize Adviser Governor Biljana Bogicevic Yvonne Sharman Hyde Samir Corovic Mitar Kujundzic Alternate Governor Joseph D. Waight Botswana Adviser Governor Yvette Carole Alvarez Ontefetse Kenneth Matambo Nestor Mendez Alternate Governor Benin Solomon M. Sekwakwa Governor Adviser Marcel A. de Souza Kabo Phillip Kote Puna Keineetse Lepekoane Adviser Keganele Ontametse Malikongwa Aristide Djidjoho Maria Mmasolo Nthebolan Babatunde Mohamed Gado Michael Moleleke Martin Nani Gbedey Oduetse Andr Motshidisi Cyrille Oguin Tebelelo Mazile Seretse Hector Posset Brazil Bhutan Governor Governor Alexandre Antonio Tombini Lyonpo Wangdi Norbu Alternate Governor Alternate Governor Carlos Cozendey Nim Dorji Aldo Luis Mendes* Dendup Norbu* Paulo Nogueira Batista, Jr.* Fernando Pimentel* Bolivia Rogerio Studart* Governor Adviser Elba Viviana Caro Hinojosa Ernesto Araujo Paulo Roberto Araujo Alternate Governor Fernanda Arraes Myragliha Jenny Giles Castillo* Marcio Ayrosa Moreira * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 279 Luis Antonio Balduino Bulgaria# Gilberto Borca Junior Andre Carvalhal da Silva Alternate Governor Ana Costa Kalin Hristov Henrique Costa Pinto Luciano Galvao Coutinho Adviser Otavio Damaso Jenya Ivanova Dinkova Patricia Fernandes Ana Mihaylova Joao Carlos Ferraz Burkina Faso Fabio Frederico Eduardo Frighetto Alternate Governor Admilson Garcia Lene Sebgo Wagner Guerra Junior Karim Traore* Sergio Foldes Guimaraes Gustavo Kurrle Adviser Bruno Soares Leite Issa Benjamin Baguian Eduardo Lessa Seydou Bouda Giselle Meirelles Issaka Kargougou Luiz Melin de Carvalho e Silva Frank Tapsoba Ricardo Monteiro Fabio Jose Nunes Burundi Helena Oshiro Viviane Pretti Governor Fernando Puga Clotilde Nizigama Pedro Saldanha Bruno Walter Coelho Saraiva Alternate Governor Jose Gilberto Scandiucci Leon Nimbona Jose Pedro R. Fachada Martins Da Silva Adviser Ramiro Alves da Silva Jean Ciza Luis Gustavo Mansur Siqueira Beatrice Hamenyayo Natalia B.S. Speer Pamphile Muderega Julia Tundidor Angele Niyuhire Mauro Vieira Joel Nkurabagaya Bonaventure Sota Brunei Darussalam<># Cambodia Governor Abd Rahman Ibrahim Governor Sothy Chan Alternate Governor Mohd Roselan Mohd Daud Alternate Governor Se Ly Adviser Hasnan Ali Hasan Adviser Irwan Rashid Sopheap Chan Azam Roselan Heng Meas Kim Hamzah Sulaiman Tayi Ngy Rina Hayane Sumardi * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 280 Kresna Tauch Chan Diane Jacovella Rithipol Tith Alayna Johnson Sy Yong Carine Khawam Steven Kuhn Cameroon Robert Lavigne Rick Leblanc Governor Nicholas Leswick Louis Paul Motaze Donald Mackay Marie Josephine Nsengiyumva Alternate Governor Sabrina Ramzi Dieudonne Evou Mekou Vincent Rigby Hossein Rostami Adviser Paul Samson Lucas Abaga Jeea Saraswati Mahamat Sarwal Adoum Rob Stewart Aminou Bassoro Karen Welch Naomie Begala Mikel Eric Roland Belibi Cape Verde Dieudonne Bondoma Yokono Dontsi Dontsi Alternate Governor Didier Edoa Sandro De Brito Blaise Essomba Ngoula Joseph Bienvenu Foe Atangana Adviser Nazaire Fotso Ndefo Abraao Andrade Lopes Bela Lazare Rui Maia Mandeng Mandeng Daniel Oliveira Oumarou Nchare Maria Semedo Francois Ngoubene Maria De Fatima Veiga Michelin Njoh Pierre Emmanuel Nkoa Ayissi Central African Republic Eugene Nyambal Chinmoun Oumarou Governor Dieudonne Takouo Sylvain Maliko Jean Tchoffo Canada Alternate Governor Bendert Bokia Governor James Michael Flaherty Chad Alternate Governor Governor Margaret Biggs Mahamat Ali Hassan Beverley J. Oda* Adviser Adviser Mourcha Abakar Mallah Marc Banzet Barh Bachar Abdoulaye Pablo Berlanga Bachar Brahim Adoum Heather Cameron Nourain N. Bashir Wendy K. Dobson Zara Itno Pascale Dugre Sasseville Mustapha Mahamat Orest Dykyj Mbaiguedem Mbairo Jonathan Finkelstein Ngabo Mbogo Michael Horgan Mahamat Djibrine Souleyman Idee Inyangudor * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 281 Chile Shu Zhan Shaogang Zhang Governor Tianwei Zhang Felipe Larrain Bascunan Colombia Alternate Governor Alfie Ulloa* Alternate Governor Hernando Jose Gomez Restrepo Adviser Lucy Bennett Adviser Andres Cristian Perez Morales Ingrid Carolina Abaunza Gloria Alonso China Maria Angelica Arbelaez Restrepo German Arce Zapata Governor Sergio Clavijo Xie Xuren Maria Catalina Escobar Francisco Lloreda Alternate Governor Carolina Renteria Zhu Guangyao Carolina Rojas Yang Shaolin* Rodrigo Suescun Zhang Wencai* Fernando Tenjo Xiaosong Zheng* Hernando Vargas Ciyong Zou* Juan Pablo Zarate Zou Jiayi* Comoros Adviser Xueping Bian Governor Li Ding S. Sofiat Tadjiddine Alfeine Ziying Fu Yuanyuan Gao Alternate Governor Yi Han Djohar Boinariziki Hui Hua Rui Li Congo, Democratic Republic of the Xudong Li Weihua Liu Governor Weijie Liu Mapon Matata Ponyo Feng Lu Jin Lu Adviser Shi Pan Joachim Batomene Matukondolo Kai Qi Ntahwakuderwa Batumike Jiangnan Qian Chiriji Celestin Chiza Chiva Yuanjiang Sun Kalala Kabuya Guanzhu Wang Kayembe Kayembe Wa Wei Wang Nsanzadi Gustave Kingoma Zhen Wang Patrice Kitebi Guoqi Wu Firmin Ey Olanga Koto Sheng Xie Jean Claude Lapole Kanga Yan Xiong Corneille Lumbu Mukoko Dongning Xu Roger Kabulo Massangu Zhiyu Xu Bertin Mawaka Lubembo Jianmin Yang Faida Mitifu Ruijin Yang Tambo A. Kabila Mukendi Fazhen Zang Nkwara Mwana * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 282 Pfuti Raymond Ndudi Croatia Matobo Placide Nzazi Mawakani Samba Governor Jerome Sekana Pene Papa Martina Dalic Serge Tshamala Feliciem Luamuela Tshibangu Alternate Governor Zdravko Maric Congo, Republic of the Adviser Governor Silvija Belajec Pierre Moussa Branimir Berkovic Ivana Bilan Alternate Governor Vladimira Ivandic Leon Raphael Mokoko Anton Kovacev Hrvoje Radovanic Adviser Jean Jacques Bouya Cyprus Serge Mombouli Eric Magloire Ndinga Governor Antoine Ngakegni Andreas Trokkos Michel Niama Jocelyne Yama Alternate Governor Kyriacos Kakouris Costa Rica Czech Republic Governor Fernando Herrero Acosta Governor Miroslav Kalousek Alternate Governor Rodrigo Bolanos Zamora Alternate Governor Eva Anderova* Adviser Carmen Maria Madriz Contreras Adviser Josef Dvoracek Côte d’Ivoire Sarka Dybczakova Jan Gregor Governor Jakub Haas Charles Koffi Diby Ondrej Jakob Patricie Klimesova Vlachova Alternate Governor Miroslav Kubicek Moussa Dosso Zuzana Kudelova Petr Pavelek Adviser Petr Polacek Lancine Diaby Petr Prochazka Adama Kone Petr Sedlacek Jil Alexandre N’Dia Petr Vozobule Yao Sylvain Oka Abou Toure Madeleine Yao * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 283 Denmark Magdalena Lizardo Felipe Peña Vasquez Alternate Governor Luis Reyes Ib Petersen Ana Beatriz Rodriguez Alberti Ramon S. Tarrago Adviser Nelson Toca Albert Birnbaum Edgar Victoria Thomas Djurhuus Jens Haarlov Ecuador Soren Jensen Mimi Lytje Governor Camilla Reimer Penn Maria Dolores Almeida Sanchez Peter Taksoe-Jensen Alternate Governor Djibouti Andres Chiriboga Governor Adviser Ilyas Moussa Dawaleh Ramon Leonardo Espinel Martinez Pablo Proano Alternate Governor Simon Mibrathu Arab Republic of Egypt Adviser Governor Issa Bouraleh Fayza Aboulnaga Malik Mohamed Garad Mahdi Aden Guirreh Adviser Roble Olhaye Ahmed Abuzeid Ismael Hassan Said Mahmoud El Ashmawy Alaa Elbially Dominica Mohamed El Khatib Yasser Elnaggar Governor Ashraf Ezzeldin Rosamund Edwards Yehia Halim Mohamed Hammam Adviser Sameh Shoukry Kennedy W. Byron Hubert Charles El Salvador Dominican Republic Governor Rene Guardado Governor Juan Temistocles Montas Alternate Governor Carlos Acevedo Alternate Governor Daniel Toribio Adviser Oscar Anaya Adviser Rafael Hernandez Jaime Alvarez Mauricio Silva Maria Felisa Gutierrez * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 284 Eritrea Alternate Governor Heidi Hautala Governor Martti Hetemaki* Daniel Tesfaldet Anne Sipilainen* Alternate Governor Adviser Martha Woldegiorghis Pasi Hellman Lehmusvaara Jussi Estonia Tuuli Juurikkala Paivi Kannisto Alternate Governor Olli K. Kantanen Tanel Ross Markku Kauppinen Martin Poder* Ville Kopra Ritva Koukku-Ronde Adviser Marja Kuosmanen Aare Jarvan Timo Laitinen Mart Kivine Laura Nordstrom Terje Raadik Satu-Leena Santala Markus Juhani Sovala Ethiopia Susanna Virtanen Governor France Sufian Ahmed Governor Alternate Governor Francois Baroin Demissie Dejene Bedanie* Alternate Governor Adviser Ramon Fernandez Tsegab Kebebew Daka Henri De Raincourt* Newaye-Christos Gebre-ab Delphine de Sahaguet d’Amarzit* Girma Birru Geda Ambroise Fayolle* E. Getachew Gizaw Terefe Mezgebu Amha Adviser Laurence Arnould Fiji Christophe Audurand-Clement Paul-Bertrand Barets Governor Jerome Bertrand-Hardy Filimone Waqabaca Nicolas Bienvenu Thomas Boglino Alternate Governor Jean-Francois Boittin David Kolitangane Christophe Bonnard Guillaume Chabert Adviser Philippe Chedanne Ray Baleikasavu Benoit Coeure Veretariki Lomalagi Emmanuel Comolet Winston Thompson Jean-Sebastien Conty Paul Coustere Finland Herve Cronel Alain Damais Governor Pia Decarsin Jutta Urpilainen Agnes De Fressenel * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 285 Sylvain De Gelder Alice Terracol Francois Delattre Serge Tomasi Virginie Delaury Anne Touret-Blondy Fabien Dell Luis Vassy Irene De Sesmaisons Anne Vidal de la Blache Herve De Villeroche Cosimo Winckler Etienne Diot Roxane Wuattier Sophie d’Oliveira Dov Zerah Charlotte Dollot Frederic Dore Gabon Henri Marie Etienne Dufey Pierre Duquesne Alternate Governor Anne Epaulard Roger Owono Mba Thomas Esposito Nathalie Estival-Broadhurst Adviser Viard Etienne Alba Biffot Celine Franco Pilar Garcia Martinez Gambia, The Remi Genevey Louis Giscard d’Estaing Governor Jean-Yves Grosclaude Mambury Njie Patrick Guillaumont Thibault Guyon Alternate Governor Frederick Jeske-Schonhoven Mod A.K. Secka Jean Paul Arokiasamy Julia Amelie July Adviser Thibault Lacarriere Mod Ceesay Emilie Larese Sonko Fofana Cecilia Lemonnier Baboucarr H.M. Jallow Gabriel Leost Ebrima Mboob Marie Helene Loison Alieu M. Ngum Veronique Massenet Christian Masset Georgia Virginie Mevel-Bleitrach Emmanuel Moulin Governor Aurore Mouysset-Nozerand Dimitri Gvindadze Benjamin Nefussi Gabriel Normand Adviser Emmanuelle Pavillon Konstantine Kintsurashvili Vincent Perrotin Akaki Lomidze Matthieu Peyraud Datuna Raqviashvili Jean-Guillaume Poulain Temur Yakobashvili Dana Purcarescu Julien Pierre Marie Reynaud Germany Luc Rigouzzo Remy Rioux Governor Romaric Roignan Dirk Niebel Nicolas Rossin Daniel Schlosser Alternate Governor Sujiro Seam Friedel Eggelmeyer* Mohamed Taguine Kerstin Faehrmann* Charles E. Tellier * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 286 Ingrid G. Hoven* Alternate Governor Steffen Meyer* Alex Tetteh* Hubert Temmeyer* Juergen Zattler* Adviser Regina Ohene-Darko Adutwum Adviser Elikplim Agbemava Lothar Wilhelm Binding Daniel Agyekum Michael Brendle Felix Amoakoh Georg Fahrenschon Albert Asamoa-Baah Thomas Feidieker James Avedzi Klaus Flosbach Mahama Ayariga Maike Friedrichsen Michael Ayesu Markus Gallander Peter Boateng Uwe Gehlen Magnus Duncan Joern Graevingholt Mahama Duwiejua Claus Happe Gladys Ghartey Barbara Hendricks Edith Hazel Matthias Hoeninger John Kwabena Kwakye Holger Illi Kwabena Gyan Kwakye Florian Kern Fifi Fiavi Kwetey Volkmar Klein Joseph Onyinah Benjamin Knoedler Matilda Osei-Agyeman Harald Koch Kenneth Owusu Manfred Kolbe Fauziatu Salifu Daniel Krestel Carsten Kuehl Greece Sebastian Lesch Martin Mauthe Alternate Governor Michael Meister Ioannis Drymoussis Andreas Mitschke Petros Kontos* Rolf Martin Moormann Erika Renneke Adviser Wilhelm Rissmann Anthony Bartzokas Christoph Sauer Petros Christodoulou Gerhard Schick Joanna Kriebardi Bettina Schmidt Sophia Philippidou Klaus-Werner Schmitter George Politakis Carsten Schneider Panagiotis Roumeliotis Thorsten Scholz George S. Tavlas Gerhard Sennlaub Maria Theofili Joachim Steffens Ilias Vergitsis Mario Stumm Eftychia Xydia Marcus von Essen George Zanias Nils Weith Dagmar Woehrl Grenada Sebastian Ziaja Governor Ghana Timothy Antoine Governor Alternate Governor Kwabena Duffuor Christopher Jules De Riggs * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 287 Adviser Haiti Gillian Bristol Governor Guatemala Alfred Fils Metellus Governor Alternate Governor Edgar Baltazar Barquín Durán Yves Jean Jean Edner Nelson* Adviser Juan Carlos Castaneda Adviser Henry Robert Dubois Guinea Jean Edwige Marie Neltha Fetiere Thibaud Governor Ketleen Florestal Kerfalla Yansane Ronald Gabriel Alternate Governor Honduras Souleymane Cisse Governor Adviser William Chong Wong Blaise Cherif Bintou Conde Alternate Governor Michel Dore Maria Elena Mondragon Ordonez Idrissa Thiam Sekou Traore Adviser Evelyn Bautista Guinea-Bissau Hugo Alejandro Castillo Maria Antonieta de Bogran Governor Jose Guillen Helena Nosolini Embalo Oscar A. Nunez-Sandoval Elizabeth Rivera Adviser Marlon Tabora Moussa Barry Danielle Benoist Hungary Vasco Da Silva Paulo F. Gomes Alternate Governor Hussein Bruno Jamil Jauad Andras Karman Laszlo Orlos* Guyana Adviser Governor Sandor Karacsony Bharrat Jagdeo Gyorgy Szapary Akos Veisz Alternate Governor Ashni Singh Iceland Adviser Alternate Governor Asgar Ally Steingrimur J. Sigfusson Louise Brown * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 288 Adviser Benyamin Carnadi Jonas Haraldsson Fnu Dalyono Fridrik Jonsson Dino Patti Djalal Anna Katrin Vilhjalmsdottir Salman Al Farisi Abdul Gafur India Andin Hadiyanto Tormarbulang Lumbantobing Governor Rizal Edwin Manansang Pranab Mukherjee Made Mastra Andie Megantara Alternate Governor Vahd Nabyl Mulachela R. Gopalan Herfan Brilianto Mursabdo Montek Singh Ahluwalia* Mulia P. Nasution Kaushik Basu* Fnu Parjiono Pulok Chatterji* Dewo Broto Joko Putranto Subir Vithal Gokarn* Ratmoko Ratmansunu Namo Narain Meena* Rionald Silaban Venu Rajamony* Wismana Adi Suryabrata Alok Sheel* Fnu Syurkani Loretta Maryann Vas* Umiyatun Hayati Triastuti Vincentius K. Wicaksono Adviser Dara Yusilawati Subrahmanyam Bhamidipati Mukhmeet Bhatia Iran, Islamic Republic of Pratip Chaudhuri Pradeep Gupta Governor Sukriti Likhi Seyyed Shams Al-din Hosseini Devinder Singh Malik Nilaya Mitash Alternate Governor Deepak Mohanty Behrouz Alishiri Maddirala Nagaraju Manoj Pant Adviser Nirupama Rao Jamshid Ansari Davinder P.S. Sandhu Mohammad Azizi Vediappa Senthil Mohammad Reza Farzin Parthasarathi Shome Farid Ghaderi Arun Singh Akbar Ghahremani Susobhan Sinha Hassan Khastehband Anuradha Thakur Khorrami Majid Usha Titus Seyed Hossein Mirjalili Masoud Mozayani Indonesia Iraq Governor Agus D.W. Martowardojo Governor Rafe H. Al-Eissawi Alternate Governor Armida S. Alisjahbana Adviser Mudher Al-Alwani Adviser Jaber Al Jaber Nugraha Adi Tarik Al-Jubori Fnu Adriyanto Fadel Jawad Khadhum Al-Mukh Adi Cahyadi Alaa Hassan Alobeidi * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 289 Atheer Al-Saedy Amanda Carmignani Al-Khayoun Dhia Piero Cipollone Adners Christian Digemose Gian Lorenzo Cornado Abdulsattar Hammad Abed Giannandrea Falchi Mowafak Maroki Lorenzo Galanti Sama Salim Poules Filippo Giansante Simon Maxwell Ziff Benedetto Giuntini Giorgio Gomel Ireland Vittorio Grilli Luigi Laraia Governor Costantino Moretti Michael Noonan Tindaro Paganini Giuseppe Parigi Alternate Governor Franco Passacantando Michael Joseph McGrath* Edoardo Pucci Marco Ricci Adviser Guido Rivolta Michael Collins Gian Paolo Ruggiero Laurence Simms Ludovica Soderini Ralph Victory Giulio Terzi Basilio Antonio Toth Israel Francesca Utili Carlo Villanacci Governor Ignazio Visco Stanley Fischer Umberto Viviani Alternate Governor Jamaica# Michal Boiangiu-Abadi Alternate Governor Adviser Wesley George Hughes Shani Bar-Or Amit Friedman Adviser Zvi Herman Richard Bernal Gideon Maor Shavit Franz Hall David Sharan Gayon Hosin Sigalit Siag Gladstone Hutchinson Audrey Marks Italy Darlene Marie Morrison John Robinson Governor Mario Draghi Japan Alternate Governor Governor Carlo Monticelli Jun Azumi Adviser Alternate Governor Mattia Adani Masaaki Shirakawa Paola Ansuini Masatsugu Asakawa* Carlo Baldocci Nobumitsu Hayashi* Stefania Bazzoni Naoko Ishii* Emilia Bonaccorsi di Patti Mikio Kajikawa* Maria Cannata Takehiko Nakao* * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 290 Hiroshi Nakaso* Kenko Sone Ryuji Yamane* Akiko Suzuki Tatsuo Yamasaki* Hideharu Tachibana Yoshiyuki Tahara Adviser Keiko Takahashi Yasushi Akahoshi Hiromi Takase Hiroto Arakawa Masao Takekida Yasuhiro Atsumi Kazuyuki Takimi Hiroaki Baba Hirofumi Takinami Atsuyuki Fujinuma Fumie Tokunaga Ichiro Fujisaki Haruyuki Toyama Masao Fujiwara Akihiro Tsuji Masaya Fujiwara Koji Uemura Takashi Hamano Masayuki Ueno Hidenori Hashimoto Hiroshi Ugai Tadashi Horiuchi Satoshi Yamaguchi Toru Hotta Takahisa Yamaguchi Shinji Ihara Yuji Yamamoto Hideaki Imamura Keiichi Yokota Keiichiro Inui Yasuaki Yoneyama Kazuhide Ishikawa Kyoko Yoshikawa Koji Jitsukawa Kazushige Kamiyama Jordan Shigeo Kawauchi Daisaku Kihara Governor Takaya Kishi Jafar Hassan Jiro Kodera Yoshiyuki Komiya Alternate Governor Chiharu Kudo Zeina Toukan* Chishiro Matsumoto Shuichi Matsuta Adviser Kenichi Miyabata Hazar Ibrahim Badran Takashi Miyahara Fawaz Bilbeisi Katsuhito Miyake Mahmoud Hmoud Takeo Mori Sufyan Qudah Kei Muraki Osamu Nakamura Kazakhstan Yoshinori Nakata Keiichiro Nakazawa Alternate Governor Yoshihiro Nakazawa Timur Suleimenov Keiko Namba Masaki Noke Adviser Takuya Nomura Askar Baltagulov Akihiro Oda Dauren Kabiyev Yukisato Ohta Anuar Kurzhikayev Eiichiro Omata Daulet Orynbayev Toshio Oya Ernar Serikov Takashi Sadakane Toshitaka Sakoda Kenya Tomoya Sato Keiji Shibata Governor Hiroshi Shigemoto Joseph Kanja Kinyua Shigeo Shimizu * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 291 Alternate Governor Jeong Wook Lee Geoffrey Ngungi Mwau Jin Yue Lee Mi Suk Lee Adviser Semna Lee Christopher Wachira Gacicio Dong Jun Park Moses Kanagi Eon Young Park James Mwangi Kiiru Il Young Park Jackson Kinyanjui Yoonae Park Lucy Kiruthu Jae Hun Ryu Justus Nyamunga Song Seung Ik Absalom Elkanah Odembo Lee Seung Jae Henry Kiplagat Rotich Byung-Doo Sohn Cheol Min Yeom Kiribati Jae Hyun Yoo Kwangyeol Yoo Governor SooHoon Yoon Atanteora Beiatau Hyun Chul Yun Alternate Governor Kosovo Timi Kaiekieki Governor Korea, Republic of Bedri Hamza Governor Alternate Governor Jaewan Bahk Bashkim Isufi Alternate Governor Adviser Choongsoo Kim Lulzim Ismajli Agim Krasniqi Adviser Valon Novosella Sang Don Bu Valmira Rexhebeqaj Kwang Ouck Byun Hyeon Jin Cha Kuwait Eun Jong Chang Hye-Jeong Chang Governor In-Kang Cho Mustafa Al-Shamali Ji Young Choi Sujin Heo Alternate Governor Dongsoo Hong Abdulwahab Ahmed Al-Bader Seung Je Hong Mijoo Hyun Adviser Kwang Chul Ji Sami Husain Al Anbaee Hoan Uk Joo Osama Alattal Ho Sung Jung Abdulla Almusaibeeh Kyung Doo Jung Eid Al-Rasheedi Hyunjung Kim Yousef B.Y.H. Al-Roumi Jae Chun Kim Khalid Sulaiman Al-Ruwaih Jun Il Kim Saleh Y. Al-Sagoubi Ki Won Kim Ahmed Al Tahous Seong-Wook Kim Hesham Ibrahim Al-Waqayan Sungmin Kim Fahad Khaled Al Zamami Wook Joong Kim Ahmad Mohammed Abdulrehman Jae-Sun Lee Bastaki * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 292 Farouk A. Bastaki Adviser Abdulrahman Hashim Hana Anouti Daniel Katz Wafaa Charafeddine Antoine Constantine Kyrgyz Republic Samir El Daher Fouad El Khouri Governor Michel Fouad Ferneini Melis Tulendievich Mambetjanov Toufic K. Gaspard Joe Issa El Khoury Alternate Governor Anwar Ali Jammal Meder Temirbekov* Adnan Kassar Violette Khairallah Adviser Roger Melki Rakhman Adanov Zeina Mroueh Ruslan Bekbolotov Lama Oueijan Muktar Djumaliev Chorobek Imashev Lesotho Lao People’s Democratic Republic Governor Timothy T. Thahane Governor Phouphet Khamphounvong Alternate Governor Mosito Khethisa Alternate Governor Thipphakone Chanthavongsa* Adviser Masilo Philemon Makhetha Adviser Motseoa Masheane Alad Chanthavong Sebongile Nkholise Boualith Khounsy Christopher Molefi Nyaka Bounhom Phommauixay Matoka C. Phori Rithikone Phoummasack Mai Sayavongs Liberia Thongdy Soulichack Holady Volarath Governor Augustine Kpehe Ngafuan Latvia Alternate Governor Governor Sebastian Tagbe Muah Andris Vilks Adviser Adviser Theophilus Bettie Andzs Ubelis Boima Kamara M. Tarnue Mawolo Lebanon Boimah Taylor Ernest M. Vafee Governor Ciara Walker Mohammad Safadi Libya Alternate Governor Nicolas Nahas Governor Alain A. Bifani* Ahmed Jehani * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 293 Adviser Alternate Governor Mohammad Wefati Abi Marambika Shawa Lithuania Adviser Singano Dalitso Kabambe Governor Grant Kabango Ingrida Simonyte Jane Kambalame Chimwemwe Magalasi Alternate Governor Winford Masanjala Rolandas Krisciunas Stephen Matenje Henry Mathanga Adviser Rhino Mchenga Giedre Balcytyte Nations Msowoya Dovile Jasaitiene Jayne Nankwenya Ted Sitima-wina Luxembourg Malaysia Governor Luc Frieden Governor Ahmad Husni Mohamad Hanadzlah Alternate Governor Arsene Joseph Jacoby Alternate Governor Kuppammal Ramasamy Adviser Jamaludin Jarjis* Etienne De lhoneux Georges Heinrich Adviser Amela Hubic Shahril Effendi Abd Ghany Sarah Khabirpour Zulkifly Abdul Malek Serge Kolb Shahabudeen Adam Shah Miguel Marques-Gomes Ramlee Amat Dirk Mevis Saiful Bahari Baharom Juergen Schaaf Nazifah Jusoh Astar Mohammad Macedonia, former Yugoslav Republic of Noorsyafiq Nazri Nurwaheeda Omar Governor Zoran Stavreski Maldives Alternate Governor Governor Suzana Peneva Ahmad Inaz Adviser Alternate Governor Katerina Matikj Aminath Manik* Malawi Mali Governor Governor Ken Lipenga Sidiki Traore * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 294 Alternate Governor Mexico Bangaly N’Ko Traore* Governor Adviser Jose Antonio Meade-Kuribrena Babaly Ba Mohamed Ouzouna Maiga Alternate Governor Mamadou Traore Gerardo Rodriguez Regordosa Alejandro Diaz de Leon* Malta# Jose Antonio Gonzalez Anaya* Claudia Grayeb Bayata* Governor Hector Rangel* Tonio Fenech Adviser Adviser Juan Alonso Pasquale Briguglio Gerardo Bracho David Pulis Antonio Castano Leal Francisco J.J. Castro y Ortiz Marshall Islands Erika Contreras Raul Delgado Governor Irene Espinosa Alfred Alfred, Jr. Jose Martin Garcia Mario Govea Alternate Governor Rogelio Granguillhome Jimmy Kemem Roberto Marino Antonio Ortiz Mena Mauritania Jose Luis Stein Governor Micronesia, Federated States of Sidi Ould Tah Governor Alternate Governor Lorin Robert Mohamed Lemine Ould Ahmed Moldova Adviser Ahmed Ould Moulaye Ahmed Alternate Governor Dhehbi Alarbi Veaceslav Mamaliga Boumedienne Ould Taya Eugeniu Cozmulici* Mauritius Adviser Maia Sandu Governor Ali Michael Mansoor Mongolia Alternate Governor Governor Vishnu Bassant Purevdorj Lkhanaasuren Adviser Alternate Governor Jitendra Nathsingh Bissessur Boldbaatar Dagva Gilbert Gnany Joyker Nayeck Adviser Salomon Samen Ariunaa Adiya Somduth Soborun Khasbazar Bekhbat * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 295 Davaasuren Damdinsuren Adviser Enkhbayar Namjildorj Than Tun Aung Ye Lwin Montenegro Soe Paing Kyaw Tin Shein Governor Milorad Katnic Namibia# Adviser Governor Goran Jovetic Saara Kuugongelwa-Amadhila Veljko Milonjic Marija Radenovic Alternate Governor Ipumbu Shiimi Morocco Adviser Alternate Governor Thomas K. Alweendo Faouzia Zaaboul Julia Imene-Chanduru Monkid Mestassi* Ms. Antonia Kapia Anna Nengenge Adviser Angelina Nandjila Sinvula Mustapha Bakkoury Sabah Benchekroun Nepal Driss El Azami El Idrissi Ahmed Hajoub Governor Othmane Lahlou Barshaman Pun Ali Lamrani Dayae Oudghiri Alternate Governor Ghizlane Ratbi Krishnahari Baskota Younes Shaimi Abdeslam Zefri Adviser Jaouad Zhar Arjun Kanta Mainali Shankar Prasad Sharma Mozambique Netherlands Governor Aiuba Cuereneia Governor Jan Kees de Jager Alternate Governor Ernesto Gouveia Gove Alternate Governor Ben Knapen Adviser Waldemar de Sousa Adviser Maria Isaltina De Sales Lucas Joost Yvo Baeten Piedade Macamo Matavela Marcel Beukeboom Maria Sambo Johanna Brandt Amelia Matos Sumbana Femmy De Jong-Bakker Luis Tobela Martin de la Beij Adriano Isaias Ubisse Marian Dijken Johannet Gaemers Myanmar Gijs Gerlag Alexander J.B. Gerts Governor Renee Jones-Bos U Hla Tun Christophe Kamp * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 296 Macha Kemperman Niger Alexander Kofman Pieter Mollema Governor Robert Mosch Amadou Boubacar Cisse Stephan Raes Helene Rekkers Alternate Governor Mark Timmermans Boubacar Sanda Rudolf Treffers Adviser New Zealand Boubacar Moussa Rila Dante Ousamane Governor Yakoubou Maman Sani Bill English Abdoulaye Soumana Alternate Governor Nigeria Andrew Kibblewhite* Governor Adviser Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala Michael Appleton Danie Beukman Alternate Governor Mark Blackmore Danladi Kifasi Philip Combes Ade Adefuye* Jane Coombs M. Abiodun Alao* Paul Dyer Nwanze Okidegbe* Joanna Gordon Craig Hawke Adviser Matthew Hawkins Adetokumbo Abiru Ben King Aliyu Ahmed Susan Lancaster Clement Buari Rebekah Mawson Xavier Ekpo H.E. Michael K. Moore Folakemi Fatogbe Sian Roguski Alvan Ikoku Cushla Margaret Thompson Haruna Mohammed John Whitehead Mansur Muhtar Baba Y. Musa Nicaragua Chiedu Ndubisi Paul C. Nwabuikwu Governor Fidel Ogar Odey Alberto Jose Guevara Obregon Vivian N. Okeke Patience Uwayeme Oniha Alternate Governor Arthur Onyeachu Antenor Rosales Bolanos Lawal Pedro Larai Hajara Shuaibu Adviser Manuel Coronel Norway Nadiesca Garcia Edward Jackson Alternate Governor Francisco J. Mayorga Ingrid Fiskaa Francisco Mena Aragon Christian Syse* Alvaro Peralta Ovidio Reyes * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 297 Adviser Adviser Julie Bjork Antonio De Roux Tom Eriksen Alfredo Nicolas Macia Almeida Rasmus Gedde-Dahl Bjorn Brede Hansen Papua New Guinea Harald Lund Kjetil Lund Governor Ola Nafstad Loi M. Bakani Kjell Roland Mari Saether Alternate Governor Bjorg Skotnes Gae Kauzi Harriet Solheim Ola Storberg Adviser Harald Tollan Manu Momo Oman Paraguay Governor Governor Darwish bin Ismail Al Balushi Dionisio Borda Alternate Governor Alternate Governor Tahir Salim Abdullah Al-Amry Manuel Vidal Caballero Gimenez Adviser Adviser Najeeb Al-Busaidi Emilio Camacho Nasser Suleiman Al Harthy Pedro R. Espinola Warith Al-Kharusi Ali Hamdan Al-Raisi Peru Pakistan Governor Luis Miguel Castilla Rubio Governor Abdul Hafeez Shaikh Alternate Governor Carlos Augusto Oliva Neyra Alternate Governor Abdul Wajid Rana Adviser Carlos Adrian Linares Penaloza Adviser Miguel Angel Ostos Rios Sultan Ali Allana Naveed Bokhari Philippines Zahid Hafeez Chaudhri Fozia Fayyaz Governor Husain Haqqani Cesar V. Purisima Nadeem Haque Salman Sharif Alternate Governor Javed Talat Florencio Abad Arshad Aziz Zuberi Rosalia de Leon* Cayetano W. Paderanga, Jr.* Panama Roberto Tan* Alternate Governor Mahesh Khemlani * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 298 Adviser Qatar# Gregg Angeles Tomas Apacible Governor Sergio Apostol Yousef Hussain Kamal Anselmo Cadiz Jose L. Cuisia, Jr. Adviser Emilio Fenandez Ismail Omar Aldafa Corazon Victoria Juliano-Soliman Ali Shareef Al Emadi Judy Lardizabal Essa Al Mannai Hermilando Mandanas Ahmed Abdullah Al Sulaiti Angelito Nayan Mejeb Turki Al-Turki Antonio H. Ozaeta Abdurahman Dashti Malou Recente Mohamed Kabir Alberto S. Villarosa Fayssal Lkorchy Jane Yu Romania# Poland, Republic of Governor Governor Bogdan Alexandru Dragoi Marek Belka Alternate Governor Alternate Governor Cristian Popa Andrzej Raczko* Adviser Adviser Stefan Nanu Slawomir Cytrycki Pawel Jerzy Gasiorowski Russian Federation Jacek Kocerka Katarzyna Kukier Governor Perl Rafal Aleksei Kudrin Pawel Samecki Sebastian Stolorz Alternate Governor Vadim Grishin* Portugal Sergey Storchak* Governor Adviser Vitor Gaspar Elena Beskurnikova Andrei Bokarev Alternate Governor Andrei Bugrov Maria Luis Albuquerque Vladimir Dmitriev Denis Esaulov Adviser Timur Eyvazov Paulo Ernesto Carvalho Amorim Aleksander Gorban Diogo Araujo Nadezda Ivanova Alberto Manuel S. Azevedo Soares Stanislav Katash Nuno Brito Sergey Kislyak Jose Pedro Viegas Cardoso Mikhail Korobkin Rui Manuel Carvalho Andrei Kostin Nuno Faria Pavel Kuznetsov Pedro Machado Alexey G. Kvasov Bernardo Ribeiro da Cunha Boris M. Lvin Sofia Teixeira F. Torres Roman Marshavin * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 299 Eugene Miagkov St. Vincent and the Grenadines<> Denis Morozov Dmitry Nikolaev Alternate Governor Dmitry Pankin Len Ishmael Konstantin Panov Andrey Shinaev Adviser Margarita Smoroda La Celia Prince Ekaterina Sycheva Vladimir Tamozhnikov Samoa Anna Uspenskaya Anna Valkova Governor Konstantin Vyshkovskiy Faumuina Tiatia Liuga Oleg Zasov Alternate Governor Rwanda Iulai Lavea Sealiimalletoa Isara* Governor John Rwangombwa Adviser Iosefo Bourne Adviser Thomas Rusuhuzwa Kigabo San Marino<># James Kimonyo Bonny Musefano Governor Fredrick Amoo Quarshire Marco Arzilli Amina Rwakunda Venkatesh Saha Alternate Governor Pietro Giacomini* St. Kitts and Nevis Adviser Daniele Bernardi Governor Daniele Bodini Denzil Douglas Mario Giannini Alternate Governor Sao Tome and Principe Joseph Parry Governor Adviser Americo d’Oliveira Dos Ramos Hilary Hazel Jacinth Henry-Martin Alternate Governor Laurie Lawrence Ana Maria da Conceicao Silveira St. Lucia Saudi Arabia Governor Governor Isaac Anthony Ibrahim A. Al-Assaf Alternate Governor Alternate Governor Bernard La Corbiniere Muhammad S. Al-Jasser Abdulrahman Mohammed Adviser Almofadhi* Randolph Cato Michael Louis * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 300 Adviser Aftab Qureshi Ahmed Al-Balawie Sadok Rouai Yousef I. Al-Bassam Bernd van Linder Abdulmohsen A. Al-Fares Gebreen Al-Gebreen Senegal Ahmed M. Al-Ghannam Suliman Al-Gwaiz Governor Nabil bin Dawood Al Hoshan Abdoulaye Diop Abdulrhman bin Ibrahim Al-Humaid Alternate Governor Khalid Al-Jasser Mamadou Faye* Abdulrahman Al-Kalaf Mubarak Al-Khafra Adviser Khalid S. Al Khudairy Babacar Cisse Abdulrahman M. Al-Kudsi Ibrahima Dia Taha A. Al Kuwaiz Baidy Dieng Musaed Al-Mineefi Marema Lo Abdullah Hussein Almounsor Evelyne Tall Fahad Al Mubarak Ahmed A. Al Nassar Serbia Saad Mohammed A. Al Nefaee Mohamad Alomran Governor Mousa Omran Alomran Bozidar Djelic Abdulaziz Al Onaizan Abdulrahman Aloraini Alternate Governor Saeed Al-Qahtani Vuk Djokovic Khaled AbdulRahman Al-Rajhi Rashed Abdulaziz Al-Rashed Adviser Salah Al-Rashed Biljana Chroneos-Krasavac Mansour Al-Saawi Nebojsa Ciric Nayef Alsadoun Jelena Danilovic Mohammed Abdulrahman Momcilo Gajic Al Samhan Tatjana Isakovic Fahad Ibrahim A. Alshathri Mirjana Jovasevic Ibrahim M. Alturki Djerdj Matkovic Sulaiman M. Al-Turki Milomir Ognjanovic Mohammed Maziad AlTuwaijri Vladimir Petrovic Sami Al-Yousef Dragijana Radonjic Petrovic Mohammed Alzaben Branislav Zec Abdulaziz Al-Zamil Fuad Abdul Wahab Bahrawi Seychelles# Zarir Cama Simon Cooper Governor Hugues de Parcevaux Pierre Frank Laporte David Dew Robert Eid Alternate Governor Adnan Hassan Ahmed Afif* Subodh Kumar Keshava Abdulaziz A. O’Hali Adviser Hutham S. Olayan Brynmwr Battersby Khaled Olayan Elizabeth Charles Rita Pasi David Nagoski * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 301 Sierra Leone Slovenia Governor Governor Samura Mathew Wilson Kamara Franc Krizanic Alternate Governor Alternate Governor Matthew Dingie Mitja Mavko Adviser Adviser Abu Bangura Taja Cehovin James Comyn Marko Golob Sahr Lahai Jusu Borut Jamnik James Sanpha Koroma Andrej Kavcic Ibrahim Khalil Lamin Bostjan Plesec Mohamed Mansaray Metka Prevc Grahame J. Nathan Peter Nuyaba Sam-Kpakra Solomon Islands Singapore Governor Rick Nelson Houenipwela Governor Tharman Shanmugaratnam Alternate Governor McKinnie Dentana Alternate Governor Peter Ong Boon Kwee South Africa Adviser Governor Heng Chee Chan Pravin Jamnadas Gordhan Kevin Chi Ning Foo Dominic Goh Alternate Governor Jerome Lee Lungisa Fuzile Daryl Tek Yean Sng Trevor Andrew Manuel* Weiming Tan Nozipho Mxakato-Diseko* Melwyn Teo Nhlanhla Nene* Pi-Hsien Yu Mafie Emily Nkoana-Mashabane* Slovak Republic Adviser Nadira Bayat Governor Fuad Cassim Ivan Miklos Johanna Gertruida Susanna De Wet Siphiwe Dube Alternate Governor Laura Eady Mario Vircik Reginald Dumisa Jele Sagaria Daniel Jonker Adviser Lesetja Kganyago Norbert Brada Trevor Kola Peter Burian Shoahlane Andries Lentsoane Marek Jakoby Christopher Leowald Katarina Kovacova Elias Masilela Vit Koziak Pumulo Masualle Jan Toth Phumzile Pride Mazibuko Natalia Urbanova Zanele Mbatha * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 302 Jason Milton Alternate Governor Frans Thapelo Moeng K.G.D.D. Dheerasinghe Dondo Andrew Mogajane P. Nandalal Weerasinghe* Setepane Malehu Mohale Jaliya Wickremasuriya* Renosi Mokate Patricia Lesego Mokhine Adviser Johny Moloto Dammika Juwan Mandalage Tumuga Clayson Monyela M.P. Deshapriya Mapa Pathirana Kurt Joseph Morais Wasantha Perera Unati Ngamntwini K.D. Ranasinghe Shahkira Parker Priyantha Ratnayake Mmakgoshi Phetla-Lekhethe Chandrasiri J.P. Siriwardana Ebrahim Rasool Bandula Somasiri Cleo Rose-Innes Esala Weerakoon Thuto Shomang Samantha Springfield Sudan Vuyelwa Vumendlini-Schalk Governor Spain Mohamed Kheir Ahmed Elzubier Governor Alternate Governor Elena Salgado Mustafa Yousif Holi Alternate Governor Adviser Jose Manuel Campa Fernandez Elsham Abdalla ElAmin Adam Abuelgasim Adviser Muna Elsayed Abuharaz Alejandra Del Rio Novo Bukhari Afandi Jorge Dezcallar Hazim Algadir Ahmed Alice Faibishenko Emad Altohamy Jose Maria Fernandez Yousif Bashir Mariano Fernandez Prieto Nasreldin Abdalla Mohamed Isabel Garayo Orbe Ahmed Gonzalo Garcia Andres Marta Garcia Jauregui Suriname# Enrique Gimenez de Cordoba Ramon Guzman Zapater Governor Miguel A. Martinez Rolland Gillmore Hoefdraad Emma Navarro Soledad Nunez Alternate Governor Cristina Perez Canto Adelien Wijnerman Leonardo Rodriguez Glenn H. Gersie* Soraya Rodriguez Ramos Rocio Sanchez Adviser Eva Valle Maestro Bernhard Fritz-Krochow Sairagatoen Jahangir-Abdvelrahman Sri Lanka Echhorst Karel Monica Kramawitana-Tamrin Governor Shobha Malhoe-Chothan Sarath Leelananda Bandara Georgetine Tjalim Amunugama Cornelis van Dijk * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 303 Swaziland Adviser Melanie Buehler Governor Daniel Hunkeler Khabonina Mabuza Vay-Luy Jetzer Giancarlo Kessler Adviser Marco Mosca Bheki Sibonangaye Bhembe Salome Ramseier Lindiwe Kunene Josef Renggli Bhadala T. Mamba Manuel Sager Dumisani E. Masilela Francoise Salame Guex Abednego Ntshangase Philippe Sas Lukas Schneller Sweden Gabriella Spirli Rebekka Straessle Governor Holger Tausch Anders Borg Tajikistan Alternate Governor Gunilla Carlsson Governor Safarali Najmudinov Adviser Susanne Ackum Adviser Lund Ann-Kristin Farhod Salim Bjorn Blomberg Abdujabbor Shirinov Johan Borgstam Anna M. Brandt Tanzania Anna Ferry Bjorn Fritjofsson Governor Eva Haghanipour Mustafa Haidi Mkulo Pereric Hogberg Torgny E.O. Holmgren Alternate Governor Anna Holmryd Servacius Likwelile* Stefan Isaksson Anneli Nilsson Adviser Ann-Sofie Nilsson Jerome J. Buretta Emma Nilsson Omary Juma Ingrid Nilsson Omary Khama Magnus Nordstrom Harry Msamire Kitilya Per Orneus Erasto Kivuyo Annika Tornqvist Ngosha Said Magonya Line Vikstrom Veronica Maina Anna Westerholm Joseph Leina Masawe Torsten Wetterblad Haika Sabuni Mmbaga Philip Isdor N. Mpango Switzerland Sauda Msemo Anna Mathias Msutze Governor Mwanaid Athumani Mtanda Johann N. Schneider-Ammann Paul Mwafongo Monica Mwamunyange Alternate Governor Omar Yussuf Mzee Jorg Frieden* Johnson Jossia Nyella Beatrice Maser Mallor* Said Nyenge Michel Mordasini* Khamis Mussa Omar * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 304 Morrice Yattega Oyuke Jose Oliveira Mlozi Patricia Francis Ramon G. Oliveros Patrick Wilbert Pima Constancio Pinto Saada Salum Joao Mariano Saldanha Amina K. Shaaban Balbina Soares Bedason Antony Shallanda Nicholaus Shombe Togo Governor Thailand Dede Ahoefa Ekoue Governor Alternate Governor Thirachai Phuvanatnaranubala Aheba Johnson Alternate Governor Adviser Areepong Bhoocha-Oom Novinyo Serge Amega Naris Chaiyasoot* Zakari Darou-Salim Adviser Tonga Pichit Akrathit Acksiri Buranasiri Governor Chaksuda Chakkaphak Sunia Manu Fili Rapibhat Chandarasrivongs Nadhavudh Dhamasiri Alternate Governor Sutira Hirunwiboon Tiofilusi Tiueti Tada Phutthitada Sansucha Ratanadirek Trinidad and Tobago Suwit Rojanavanich Sukuma Sarahong Governor Siribha Satayanon Winston Dookeran Nantana Sivakua Teeranun Srihong Alternate Governor Kanit Sukonthaman Enid Agatha Zephyrine Chularat Suteethorn Vishnu Dhanpaul* Benjarat Tanongsakmontri Yongyuth Tariyo Adviser Chanya Thanasridahpat Nicole Leslie-Ann Des Vignes Soraphol Tulayasathien Kevin Finch Ruecha Varatorn Kurt Kisto Porametee Vimolsiri Neil Parsan Philaslak Yukkasemwong Avinash D. Persaud Suzette Taylor-Lee Chee Timor-Leste Tunisia Governor Emilia Pires Governor Abdelhamid Triki Adviser Felicia Carvalho Alternate Governor Olgario Vidigal De Castro Lamia Zribi Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao Adelina Martins * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 305 Adviser Turkmenistan# Ferid Abbas Tarek Amri Alternate Governor Jaloul Ayed Gochmyrat A. Myradov Samir Chebil Azzouz Ennifar Adviser Safia Hachicha Nurgeldi Meredov Bouzekri Rmili H.E. Mohammed Salah Takaya Tuvalu<> Paul Theunissen Abdallah Zekri Governor Lotoala Metia Turkey Alternate Governor Governor Minute Alapati Taupo Ibrahim H. Canakci Uganda Alternate Governor Governor Evren Dilekli Maria Kiwanuka Adviser Alternate Governor Abdullah Agaoglu Chris. M. Kassami Murat Akkas Ahmet Mufit Arberk Adviser Seyit Ahmet Bas Asaba Amooti-Winyi Feridun Bilgin Adam Mugume Gulsun Bor Guner Fred Muhumuza Burcu Canakci George Ndyamuba Tahir Canatan Omer Cihan Ukraine Cavit Dagdas Yusuf Demet Governor Huseyin Dogan Sergiy Tigipko Nursel Hatun Durucakoglu Unal Turgay Gerlesli Adviser Zeki Guler Volodymyr Bandurov K. Cagatay Imirgi Serhii Kamyshev Burak Kararti Olena Kucherenko S. Elvan Ongun Anatoliy Maksyuta Asli Ozar Volodymyr Makukha Mehmet Sefa Pamuksuz Victor Mayko Sedife Sarp Pavlo Moiseichenko Erdeniz Sen Olexander Motsyk Ekrem Soyler Denys Mykhailiuk Unal Tayyan Oleksandr Pakhil Mahmut Salih Unlu Andrii Pravednyk Erhan Usta Serhii Rybak Omer Yalvac Tamara Solyanyk Cevdet Yilmaz Vitalii Tarasiuk Tulay Yilmaz Mykola Udovychenko Hasan Yurtoglu Yuriy G. Yakusha * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 306 United Arab Emirates United States Governor Governor Obaid Humaid Al Tayer Timothy F. Geithner Alternate Governor Alternate Governor Younis Haji AlKhoori Robert D. Hormats Andrew Baukol* Adviser Lael Brainard* Hamed Naser Abdulkhader Charles V.A. Collyns* Ali Hamdan Ahmed Robert Dohner* Abdullah Mohammed Al Awar Marisa Lago* Khalifa Al Faheem Scott Morris* Abdulrahman Aljaber Bradley Wayne Setser* Alya Al Mulla Christopher Smart* Omar M. Al-Qaizi Mark Sobel* Ahmed Al Qamzi Ian Solomon* Juma Rashid Al Tayer Hamad Essa Al Zaabi Adviser Robert Clarke Mark Abdoo Abdullah Naser Lootah Mimi Alemayehou Mark John McGinness Anne Alikonis Majed Ali Omran Chuka Asike Tarek Shayya Brian Bacon J. Andrew Spindler Jeffrey Baker Susan Baker United Kingdom Daniel Balke Annamaria Ballard Governor Rachel Bayly Andrew Mitchell Mary Allen Beasley Debra Anne Benavidez Alternate Governor Lilly Marie Bertz George Osborne Laura Lynn Black Hans Anand Beck* William Block Julia Bunting* Jonathan Bloom Siobhan Clifford* Ken Borghese Nick Dyer* Francois Boye Ellen Bronte Flecker* Virginia Brandon Loga Gnansambanthan* Jessica Brinkmann Stewart James* Luke Bronin Suzy Kantor* Alice Brooks Mark Lowcock* Marie Brown Susanna Moorehead* Deborah K. Burand Richard Teuten* Andrea M. Cameron Sharon White* Karja Carr Carol Cohen Adviser David S. Cohen Philippa Buckley Deborah M. Crane Michelle Edwards Benjamin Jared Cushman Claire Moran Brian Darin * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 307 Himamauli Das Matthew Kaczmarek Roland de Marcellus Michael Kaplan Benjamin Dennis Francis Michael Kelleher Dora Douglass Carol Kelley Patrick Douglass Leyla Kester Jaroslav I. Dutkewych Nasir Khilji John B. Emery Mark Kissel Thomas Engle Basil Kiwan Becky Erkul Dennis Knecht Sameera Fazili Christina Knowles Mark Feierestein Keith Kozloff Jose Fernandez Rachel Leatham Patrick C. Fine Jeanny Lee Molly Flores Paul Leonovich William Foster Elizabeth Lien Jamie Samantha Franco Kingsan Lien Michael B.G. Froman Nancy Lindborg David Fulton Elizabeth Littlefield Lawrence A. Garber David P. Loevinger Joel R. Garverick Mark Lopes Fonta Gilliam Jonathan Loritz Daniel Glaser Anthony Marcus Stephen Gooch Alejandro Mares Gregory Gottlieb Justin Marsico Christopher Grewe Leonardo Martinez Deborah Grieser Karen Mathiasen Mathew P. Haarsager Robin H. Matthewman Barbara Hammerle Birgitta Mattingley Omid Harraf Andrew Mayock Halliday Hart John Anthony McAdams Amy Wilcox Hawthorne Deborah McCarthy Sheila Herrling Brian McCauley Jeffery Hill Christopher P. McCoy Alejandro Hinojosa W. Larry McDonald Michael Hirson Carrie McKellogg Fred Philip Hochberg Tjada McKenna Amos Hochstein Gilbert Metcalf Amy Holman Ricardo Michel Julie A. Howard Lailee Moghtader Thomas Howell Matthew Mohlenkamp Michelle Hoyt Richard L. Morningstar James Hudson Liza Morris Leslie D. Hull William C. Murden John Hurley Neil Murphy Anthony Ieronimo Adrian A. Ngasi Elizabeth Jaff Ariel Pablos-Mendez Rajakumari Jandhyala James F. Parks Linda Jeng Carlos Pascual Robert Stuart Jones Emily-Anne Patt Sandra Jordan Bill Pelton * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 308 Daniel Walter Peters April Wells Steven Pierce James M. Wilson Anthony F. Pipa Stephen Winn Michael Pisa, III Christopher Winship Asa Piyaka David Wright Patricia S. Pollard Tsung-Tao Yang Christopher Pratt Daniel Yohannes Judith Pryor David Young Steven Radelet Sharon Yuan Scott Radloff Andrew Zilm Silvia L. Ramirez William Remington Uruguay# Catherine Reynolds Robin Ruth Ritterhoff Governor William Roebuck Fernando Lorenzo Lawrence Rubey Michael Ruffner Alternate Governor Andrew Rushing Mariella Maglia* Gary Sampliner Miriam Elizabeth Sapiro Adviser Chloe Schwenke Azucena Arbeleche Rajiv Shah Marianela Bruno Linda Shin Adrian Fernandez William Shively Juan Luis Siutto Elizabeth Shortino Marguerite Siemer Uzbekistan Thomas D. Simpson Gayle Smith Governor Donald Steinberg Shukhrat Vafaev Samantha Stephens Elizabeth K. Stewart Adviser Meredith Street Laziz Kudratov Patrick Stuart Sardor Sagdullayev Margaret Sullivan Adam Szubin Vanuatu William Taylor Laura Taylor-Kale Governor William Thomas Moana Kalosil Carcasses Bella Tonkonogy Thomas Torgerson Alternate Governor Luyen Doan Tran George Maniuri Carmen Tull Marie Louise Milne* Matthew Turner Beth Urbanas Adviser Roya Vakil Betty Zinner-Toa Kevin Patrick Varney Rachel B. Vogelstein Venezuela, República Bolivariana de# Debra von Koch Lisa Michelle Walker Adviser John Weeks Daniela M. Malaspina Jason Weiss Atticus Weller * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 309 Vietnam Tarek Alsharafi Khaled Hussein Alyemany Governor Omar Salim Bazara Trung Truong Ahmed Ghaleb Jalal Omar Yaqoub Alternate Governor Phuong Van Pham Zambia Adviser Governor Luc V. Can Danies Kawama Chisenda Hanh Thi Phuong Hoang Tuyen Trong Kieu Alternate Governor Anh Tuan Le Felix Nkulukusa Hung Minh Le Van Hoai Ly Adviser Dang Huu Nguyen Richard Kumendo Chembe Hong Yen Thi Nguyen Mukuli Sibbuku Chikuba Huong Duc Nguyen Alfred Chioza Trung Huu Nguyen Francis Chipimo Tuan Anh Nguyen Ben Kangwa Dung Quang Pham Lazarous Kapambwe Hong Van Thi Pham Inonge Limbambala Hung Huy Pham Mike Masiye Tu Duc Phan Musiwa Muyatwa Van Anh Thi Tran Willie Ndembela Phuoc Van Truong Emmanuel Pamu Trung Khac Vo H.E. Sheila Siwela Irene B.M Tembo Yemen, Republic of Peter Zgambo Ivan Zyuulu Governor Abubaker Al Qirbi Zimbabwe Alternate Governor Governor Mutahar Abdulaziz Al-Abbasi Willard L. Manungo Adviser Alternate Governor Fatima Abo Alasrar Pfungwa Kunaka Mohammed A. Al-Basha Abdulwahab Al-Hajjri Adviser Fouad Al-Kohlany Kudakwashe Mudereri Ibrahim Alnahari E. Mushayakarara Waleed Mohammed AlShahari * Temporary <> Not a member of IFC # Not a member of IDA 310 ACCREDITED MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATIONS (MIGA) AT THE 2011 ANNUAL MEETINGS Afghanistan Adviser Carlos Bolo Bolano Governor Diego Luis Bossio Omar Zakhilwal Felix Alberto Camarasa Jorge Carrera Adviser Alfredo Vicente Chiaradia Samiullah Ibrahimi Marcelo Cinto Courtaux Maia Colodenco Albania Adrian Consentino Gabriela Costa Governor Juan Pablo De Jesus Ardian Fullani Guadalupe del Valle Eduardo de Simone Alternate Governor Gisela Andrea Ferrari Fatos Ibrahimi Cesar Forcieri Victor Fuentes-Castillo Adviser Hugo Gobbi Elvi Fundo Anibal Lopez Toni Gogu Romina Machello Gramoz Kolasi Adrian Nador Endrit Lami Norberto Pagani Genci Mamani Pablo Andres Pereira Erald Themeli German Plessen Hector Romano Algeria Lucio Simpson Analia Tello Adviser Ruben Eduardo Tempone Sid Ahmed Dib Cecilia Todesca Bocco Soraya Mellali Fabiola Vela Velazquez Nicolas Viggiolo Angola Alternate Governor Armenia Manuel Neto da Costa Governor Adviser Tigran Davtyan Celson J. Ndombe Pongolola Adviser Antigua and Barbuda Grigor Sargsyan Alternate Governor Australia Harold E. Lovell Governor Argentina Wayne Swan Governor Adviser Amado Boudou Ranya Alkadamani Ric Battellino Alternate Governor Peter Baxter Roberto Jose Feletti Kim Beazley * Temporary 311 Matthew Coghlan Alternate Governor Patrick Colmer Grantley W. Smith Anna Engwerda-Smith Chay Fisher Belarus Philip Green Joanne Greenfield Alternate Governor Penelope Howarth Andrei M. Kharkovets Evanor Palac-McMiken Tracy Reid Belgium Susan Richards Amanda Sayegh Governor Andrew Thomas Didier Reynders Paul Wojciechowski Alternate Governor Austria Franciscus Godts Governor Adviser Andreas Schieder Gino Alzetta Marianne Collin Alternate Governor Anthony De Lannoy Edith Frauwallner Dirk Slaats Bahamas, The Belize Governor Governor Hubert A. Ingraham Yvonne Sharman Hyde Adviser Alternate Governor Faith Lightbourne Joseph D. Waight Khyle Quincy Parker Cornelius A. Smith Benin Freddie Tucker Nicola Virgill Governor Marcel A. de Souza Bahrain Alternate Governor Governor Adidjatou A. Mathys Ahmed Bin Mohammed Al-Khalifa Adviser Alternate Governor Babatunde Mohamed Gado Yousif Abdulla Humood Hector Posset Bolivia Bangladesh Governor Governor Elba Viviana Caro Hinojosa Abul Maal A. Muhith Alternate Governor Alternate Governor Myragliha Jenny Giles Castillo* Arastoo Khan Adviser Barbados Freddy Bersatti Tudela Varinia Cecilia Daza Foronda Governor Hernando Larrazabal Cordova Christopher P. Sinckler Pablo Menacho Diederich * Temporary 312 Bosnia and Herzegovina Eduardo Lessa Giselle Meirelles Governor Luiz Melin de Carvalho e Silva Nikola Spiric Ricardo Monteiro Fabio Jose Nunes Botswana Helena Oshiro Viviane Pretti Governor Fernando Puga Ontefetse Kenneth Matambo Pedro Saldanha Bruno Walter Coelho Saraiva Alternate Governor Jose Gilberto Scandiucci Solomon M. Sekwakwa Jose Pedro R. Fachada Martins Da Silva Adviser Ramiro Alves da Silva Puna Keineetse Lepekoane Luis Gustavo Mansur Siqueira Keganele Ontametse Malikongwa Natalia B.S. Speer Maria Mmasolo Nthebolan Julia Tundidor Michael Moleleke Mauro Vieira Oduetse Andr Motshidisi Tebelelo Mazile Seretse Burkina Faso Brazil Governor Lucien Marie Noel Bembamba Governor Guido Mantega Alternate Governor Lene Sebgo Alternate Governor Alexandre Antonio Tombini Adviser Aldo Luis Mendes* Issa Benjamin Baguian Paulo Nogueira Batista, Jr.* Seydou Bouda Fernando Pimentel* Frank Tapsoba Rogerio Studart* Burundi Adviser Ernesto Araujo Governor Paulo Roberto Araujo Clotilde Nizigama Fernanda Arraes Marcio Ayrosa Moreira Adviser Luis Antonio Balduino Beatrice Hamenyayo Gilberto Borca Junior Bonaventure Sota Andre Carvalhal da Silva Ana Costa Cameroon Henrique Costa Pinto Luciano Galvao Coutinho Governor Otavio Damaso Louis Paul Motaze Patricia Fernandes Joao Carlos Ferraz Alternate Governor Fabio Frederico Dieudonne Evou Mekou Eduardo Frighetto Admilson Garcia Adviser Wagner Guerra Junior Lucas Abaga Sergio Foldes Guimaraes Mahamat Sarwal Adoum Gustavo Kurrle Naomie Begala Mikel Bruno Soares Leite Dontsi Dontsi * Temporary 313 Didier Edoa Adviser Blaise Essomba Ngoula Mourcha Abakar Mallah Joseph Bienvenu Foe Atangana Barh Bachar Abdoulaye Nazaire Fotso Ndefo Bachar Brahim Adoum Bela Lazare Nourain N. Bashir Mandeng Mandeng Zara Itno Oumarou Nchare Mustapha Mahamat Francois Ngoubene Mbaiguedem Mbairo Michelin Njoh Ngabo Mbogo Pierre Emmanuel Nkoa Ayissi Mahamat Djibrine Souleyman Eugene Nyambal Chinmoun Oumarou Chile Dieudonne Takouo Jean Tchoffo Governor Felipe Larrain Bascunan Canada Alternate Governor Governor Alfie Ulloa* James Michael Flaherty Adviser Alternate Governor Lucy Bennett Margaret Biggs Andres Cristian Perez Morales Adviser China Wendy K. Dobson Jeea Saraswati Governor Xie Xuren Cape Verde Alternate Governor Governor Zhu Guangyao Cristina Duarte Yang Shaolin* Zhang Wencai* Alternate Governor Xiaosong Zheng* Sandro De Brito Ciyong Zou* Zou Jiayi* Adviser Abraao Andrade Lopes Adviser Rui Maia Xueping Bian Daniel Oliveira Li Ding Maria Semedo Ziying Fu Maria De Fatima Veiga Yuanyuan Gao Yi Han Central African Republic Hui Hua Rui Li Governor Xudong Li Sylvain Maliko Weihua Liu Weijie Liu Alternate Governor Feng Lu Bendert Bokia Jin Lu Shi Pan Chad Kai Qi Jiangnan Qian Governor Yuanjiang Sun Mahamat Ali Hassan Guanzhu Wang * Temporary 314 Wei Wang Corneille Lumbu Mukoko Zhen Wang Roger Kabulo Massangu Guoqi Wu Bertin Mawaka Lubembo Sheng Xie Faida Mitifu Yan Xiong Tambo A. Kabila Mukendi Dongning Xu Nkwara Mwana Zhiyu Xu Pfuti Raymond Ndudi Jianmin Yang Matobo Placide Nzazi Ruijin Yang Mawakani Samba Fazhen Zang Jerome Sekana Pene Papa Shu Zhan Serge Tshamala Shaogang Zhang Feliciem Luamuela Tshibangu Tianwei Zhang Congo, Republic of Colombia Governor Governor Pierre Moussa Juan Carlos Echeverry Garzon Alternate Governor Alternate Governor Leon Raphael Mokoko Hernando Jose Gomez Restrepo Adviser Adviser Jean Jacques Bouya Ingrid Carolina Abaunza Serge Mombouli Gloria Alonso Eric Magloire Ndinga Maria Angelica Arbelaez Restrepo Antoine Ngakegni German Arce Zapata Michel Niama Sergio Clavijo Jocelyne Yama Maria Catalina Escobar Francisco Lloreda Côte d’Ivoire Carolina Renteria Carolina Rojas Governor Rodrigo Suescun Charles Koffi Diby Fernando Tenjo Hernando Vargas Adviser Juan Pablo Zarate Lancine Diaby Adama Kone Congo, Democratic Republic of the Jil Alexandre N’Dia Yao Sylvain Oka Governor Abou Toure Mapon Matata Ponyo Madeleine Yao Alternate Governor Croatia Jean-Claude Masangu Mulongo Governor Adviser Martina Dalic Joachim Batomene Matukondolo Ntahwakuderwa Batumike Alternate Governor Chiriji Celestin Chiza Chiva Zdravko Maric Kalala Kabuya Kayembe Kayembe Wa Cyprus Nsanzadi Gustave Kingoma Patrice Kitebi Governor Firmin Ey Olanga Koto Andreas Trokkos Jean Claude Lapole Kanga * Temporary 315 Alternate Governor Ecuador Kyriacos Kakouris Adviser Czech Republic Ramon Leonardo Espinel Martinez Governor Arab Republic of Egypt Miroslav Kalousek Governor Denmark Fayza Aboulnaga Alternate Governor Eritrea Ib Petersen Governor Adviser Daniel Tesfaldet Albert Birnbaum Thomas Djurhuus Alternate Governor Jens Haarlov Martha Woldegiorghis Soren Jensen Mimi Lytje Estonia Djibouti Alternate Governor Tanel Ross Governor Ilyas Moussa Dawaleh Adviser Aare Jarvan Alternate Governor Mart Kivine Simon Mibrathu Terje Raadik Adviser Ethiopia Issa Bouraleh Malik Mohamed Garad Governor Mahdi Aden Guirreh Sufian Ahmed Roble Olhaye Ismael Hassan Said Adviser Abi Woldemeskel Bayou Dominica Fiji Alternate Governor Alternate Governor Rosamund Edwards Filimone Waqabaca Adviser Finland Hubert Charles Governor Dominican Republic Jutta Urpilainen Governor Alternate Governor Juan Temistocles Montas Pentti Pikkarainen Martti Hetemaki* Alternate Governor Anne Sipilainen* Daniel Toribio Adviser Adviser Pasi Hellman Ana Beatriz Rodriguez Alberti Lehmusvaara Jussi * Temporary 316 Tuuli Juurikkala Remi Genevey Olli K. Kantanen Louis Giscard d’Estaing Markku Kauppinen Jean-Yves Grosclaude Ville Kopra Patrick Guillaumont Satu-Leena Santala Thibault Guyon Markus Juhani Sovala Frederick Jeske-Schonhoven Jean Paul Arokiasamy Julia France Amelie July Thibault Lacarriere Governor Emilie Larese Francois Baroin Cecilia Lemonnier Gabriel Leost Alternate Governor Marie Helene Loison Ramon Fernandez Veronique Massenet Henri De Raincourt* Christian Masset Delphine de Sahaguet d’Amarzit* Virginie Mevel-Bleitrach Ambroise Fayolle* Emmanuel Moulin Aurore Mouysset-Nozerand Adviser Benjamin Nefussi Christophe Audurand-Clement Gabriel Normand Paul-Bertrand Barets Emmanuelle Pavillon Jerome Bertrand-Hardy Vincent Perrotin Nicolas Bienvenu Matthieu Peyraud Thomas Boglino Jean-Guillaume Poulain Jean-Francois Boittin Dana Purcarescu Christophe Bonnard Julien Pierre Marie Reynaud Guillaume Chabert Luc Rigouzzo Philippe Chedanne Remy Rioux Benoit Coeure Romaric Roignan Emmanuel Comolet Nicolas Rossin Jean-Sebastien Conty Daniel Schlosser Paul Coustere Sujiro Seam Alain Damais Mohamed Taguine Pia Decarsin Charles E. Tellier Agnes De Fressenel Alice Terracol Sylvain De Gelder Serge Tomasi Francois Delattre Anne Touret-Blondy Virginie Delaury Luis Vassy Fabien Dell Anne Vidal de la Blache Irene De Sesmaisons Cosimo Winckler Herve De Villeroche Roxane Wuattier Etienne Diot Dov Zerah Helene Djoufelkit Sophie d’Oliveira Gabon Charlotte Dollot Frederic Dore Governor Henri Marie Etienne Dufey Magloire Ngambia Pierre Duquesne Anne Epaulard Alternate Governor Thomas Esposito Roger Owono Mba Nathalie Estival-Broadhurst Viard Etienne Adviser Celine Franco Alba Biffot Pilar Garcia Martinez * Temporary 317 Gambia, The George S. Tavlas Maria Theofili Governor Ilias Vergitsis Mambury Njie Eftychia Xydia George Zanias Alternate Governor Mod A.K. Secka Grenada Adviser Governor Mod Ceesay V. Nazim Burke Georgia Alternate Governor Timothy Antoine Governor Dimitri Gvindadze Guinea Adviser Governor Datuna Raqviashvili Kerfalla Yansane Temur Yakobashvili Alternate Governor Germany Souleymane Cisse Governor Adviser Dirk Niebel Blaise Cherif Bintou Conde Alternate Governor Michel Dore Friedel Eggelmeyer* Idrissa Thiam Kerstin Faehrmann* Sekou Traore Ingrid G. Hoven* Steffen Meyer* Guinea-Bissau Hubert Temmeyer* Juergen Zattler* Governor Helena Nosolini Embalo Ghana Alternate Governor Governor Jose Carlos Varela Casimiro Kwabena Duffuor Adviser Adviser Danielle Benoist Michael Ayesu Vasco Da Silva Paulo F. Gomes Greece Hussein Bruno Jamil Jauad Alternate Governor Guyana Ioannis Drymoussis Petros Kontos* Governor Bharrat Jagdeo Adviser Anthony Bartzokas Alternate Governor Petros Christodoulou Ashni Singh Joanna Kriebardi Sophia Philippidou Adviser George Politakis Asgar Ally Panagiotis Roumeliotis Louise Brown * Temporary 318 Haiti Adviser Subrahmanyam Bhamidipati Alternate Governor Mukhmeet Bhatia Charles Castel Pradeep Gupta Devinder Singh Malik Adviser Nilaya Mitash Jean Edwige Deepak Mohanty Maddirala Nagaraju Honduras Manoj Pant Davinder P.S. Sandhu Governor Vediappa Senthil William Chong Wong Arun Singh Susobhan Sinha Alternate Governor Anuradha Thakur Maria Elena Mondragon Ordonez Usha Titus Adviser Indonesia Hugo Alejandro Castillo Carlos E. Espinoza Tejeda Governor Agus D.W. Martowardojo Hungary Alternate Governor Governor Darmin Nasution Roland Natran Iran, Islamic Republic of Alternate Governor Laszlo Orlos Governor Seyyed Shams Al-din Hosseini Iceland Alternate Governor Alternate Governor Behrouz Alishiri Steingrimur J. Sigfusson Adviser Adviser Seyed Hossein Mirjalili Jonas Haraldsson Masoud Mozayani Fridrik Jonsson Anna Katrin Vilhjalmsdottir Iraq India Governor Rafe H. Al-Eissawi Governor Pranab Mukherjee Ireland Alternate Governor Governor R. Gopalan Michael Noonan Montek Singh Ahluwalia* Kaushik Basu* Israel Pulok Chatterji* Subir Vithal Gokarn* Governor Namo Narain Meena* Stanley Fischer Venu Rajamony* Alok Sheel* Alternate Governor Loretta Maryann Vas* Eran Heimer * Temporary 319 Adviser Masaya Fujiwara Amit Friedman Takashi Hamano Hidenori Hashimoto Italy Tadashi Horiuchi Toru Hotta Governor Shinji Ihara Mario Draghi Hideaki Imamura Keiichiro Inui Alternate Governor Kazuhide Ishikawa Carlo Monticelli Koji Jitsukawa Kazushige Kamiyama Adviser Shigeo Kawauchi Mattia Adani Daisaku Kihara Stefania Bazzoni Takaya Kishi Emilia Bonaccorsi di Patti Jiro Kodera Amanda Carmignani Yoshiyuki Komiya Piero Cipollone Chiharu Kudo Gian Lorenzo Cornado Chishiro Matsumoto Luigi Laraia Shuichi Matsuta Costantino Moretti Kenichi Miyabata Tindaro Paganini Takashi Miyahara Giuseppe Parigi Katsuhito Miyake Marco Ricci Takeo Mori Gian Paolo Ruggiero Kei Muraki Ludovica Soderini Osamu Nakamura Francesca Utili Yoshinori Nakata Ignazio Visco Keiichiro Nakazawa Yoshihiro Nakazawa Jamaica Keiko Namba Masaki Noke Alternate Governor Takuya Nomura Wesley George Hughes Akihiro Oda Yukisato Ohta Japan Eiichiro Omata Toshio Oya Governor Takashi Sadakane Jun Azumi Toshitaka Sakoda Tomoya Sato Alternate Governor Keiji Shibata Masatsugu Asakawa* Hiroshi Shigemoto Nobumitsu Hayashi* Shigeo Shimizu Naoko Ishii* Kenko Sone Takehiko Nakao* Akiko Suzuki Ryuji Yamane* Hideharu Tachibana Tatsuo Yamasaki* Yoshiyuki Tahara Keiko Takahashi Adviser Hiromi Takase Yasushi Akahoshi Masao Takekida Hiroto Arakawa Kazuyuki Takimi Yasuhiro Atsumi Hirofumi Takinami Hiroaki Baba Fumie Tokunaga Atsuyuki Fujinuma Haruyuki Toyama Ichiro Fujisaki Akihiro Tsuji Masao Fujiwara Koji Uemura * Temporary 320 Masayuki Ueno Kuwait Hiroshi Ugai Satoshi Yamaguchi Governor Takahisa Yamaguchi Mustafa Al-Shamali Yuji Yamamoto Keiichi Yokota Alternate Governor Yasuaki Yoneyama Bader Mohamed Al-Saad Kyoko Yoshikawa Kyrgyz Republic Jordan Governor Governor Melis Tulendievich Mambetjanov Jafar Hassan Adviser Kazakhstan Rakhman Adanov Ruslan Bekbolotov Alternate Governor Muktar Djumaliev Timur Suleimenov Chorobek Imashev Adviser Lao People’s Democratic Republic Askar Baltagulov Dauren Kabiyev Governor Anuar Kurzhikayev Phouphet Khamphounvong Ernar Serikov Latvia Kenya Governor Governor Andris Vilks Joseph Kanja Kinyua Adviser Alternate Governor Andzs Ubelis Geoffrey Ngungi Mwau Lebanon Adviser Christopher Wachira Gacicio Governor Moses Kanagi Nicolas Nahas James Mwangi Kiiru Jackson Kinyanjui Alternate Governor Justus Nyamunga Mohammad Safadi Absalom Elkanah Odembo Henry Kiplagat Rotich Lesotho Korea, Republic of Governor Timothy T. Thahane Governor Jaewan Bahk Alternate Governor Mosito Khethisa Alternate Governor Choongsoo Kim Adviser Masilo Philemon Makhetha Kosovo Motseoa Masheane Sebongile Nkholise Governor Christopher Molefi Nyaka Bedri Hamza Matoka C. Phori * Temporary 321 Liberia Adviser Katerina Matikj Governor Augustine Kpehe Ngafuan Malawi Alternate Governor Governor Sebastian Tagbe Muah Ken Lipenga Adviser Alternate Governor Theophilus Bettie Abi Marambika Shawa Boima Kamara Boimah Taylor Adviser Ernest M. Vafee Grant Kabango Ciara Walker Jane Kambalame Winford Masanjala Libya Stephen Matenje Rhino Mchenga Governor Nations Msowoya Ahmed Jehani Jayne Nankwenya Ted Sitima-wina Lithuania Maldives Governor Governor Ingrida Simonyte Ahmad Inaz Alternate Governor Mali Rolandas Krisciunas Adviser Adviser Babaly Ba Giedre Balcytyte Mohamed Ouzouna Maiga Dovile Jasaitiene Mamadou Traore Luxembourg Malta Governor Governor Luc Frieden Tonio Fenech Alternate Governor Adviser Arsene Joseph Jacoby Pasquale Briguglio David Pulis Adviser Etienne De Ihoneux Mauritania Georges Heinrich Amela Hubic Governor Sarah Khabirpour Sidi Ould Tah Serge Kolb Miguel Marques-Gomes Alternate Governor Dirk Mevis Mohamed Lemine Ould Ahmed Juergen Schaaf Adviser Macedonia, former Yugoslav Republic of Ahmed Ould Moulaye Ahmed Dhehbi Alarbi Governor Aminetou Mint Deihi Zoran Stavreski Boumedienne Ould Taya * Temporary 322 Mauritius Mozambique Governor Governor Charles Gaetan Xavier Luc Duval Aiuba Cuereneia Alternate Governor Alternate Governor Ali Michael Mansoor Ernesto Gouveia Gove Adviser Adviser Jitendra Nathsingh Bissessur Waldemar de Sousa Gilbert Gnany Maria Isaltina De Sales Lucas Joyker Nayeck Piedade Macamo Matavela Salomon Samen Luis Tobela Somduth Soborun Adriano Isaias Ubisse Mexico Namibia Governor Governor Jose Antonio Meade-Kuribrena Saara Kuugongelwa-Amadhila Alternate Governor Alternate Governor Gerardo Rodriguez Regordosa Ipumbu Shiimi Micronesia, Federated States of Adviser Antonia Kapia Governor Lorin Robert Nepal Mongolia Governor Barshaman Pun Governor Purevdorj Lkhanaasuren Alternate Governor Krishnahari Baskota Alternate Governor Boldbaatar Dagva Netherlands Adviser Governor H.E. Khasbazar Bekhbat Jan Kees de Jager Davaasuren Damdinsuren Enkhbayar Namjildorj Alternate Governor Ben Knapen Montenegro Adviser Governor Robert Mosch Milorad Katnic New Zealand Adviser Marija Radenovic Governor Bill English Morocco Alternate Governor Adviser Andrew Kibblewhite* Ali Lamrani * Temporary 323 Adviser Panama Mark Blackmore Paul Dyer Governor Craig Hawke Alberto Vallarino Clement Susan Lancaster Sian Roguski Adviser Cushla Margaret Thompson Antonio De Roux John Whitehead Alfredo Nicolas Macia Almeida Nicaragua Paraguay Governor Governor Alberto Jose Guevara Obregon Dionisio Borda Alternate Governor Alternate Governor Antenor Rosales Bolanos Manuel Vidal Caballero Gimenez Nigeria Adviser Emilio Camacho Governor Pedro R. Espinola Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala Peru Alternate Governor Danladi Kifasi Governor Luis Miguel Castilla Rubio Adviser Clement Buari Alternate Governor Fidel Ogar Odey Carlos Augusto Oliva Neyra Norway Adviser Carlos Adrian Linares Penaloza Alternate Governor Miguel Angel Ostos Rios Ingrid Fiskaa Christian Syse* Philippines Adviser Governor Tom Eriksen Cesar V. Purisima Bjorn Brede Hansen Ola Storberg Alternate Governor Amando M. Tetangco, Jr. Oman Rosalia de Leon* Cayetano W. Paderanga, Jr.* Governor Roberto Tan* Darwish bin Ismail Al Balushi Adviser Alternate Governor Gregg Angeles Rashid Salim Al Rashdi Jose L. Cuisia, Jr. Emilio Fenandez Pakistan Hermilando Mandanas Angelito Nayan Governor Salman Siddique Poland Adviser Governor Javed Talat Michal Baj * Temporary 324 Adviser Nadezda Ivanova Jacek Kocerka Stanislav Katash Perl Rafal Sergey Kislyak Mikhail Korobkin Portugal Andrei Kostin Pavel Kuznetsov Governor Alexey G. Kvasov Vitor Gaspar Boris M. Lvin Roman Marshavin Alternate Governor Eugene Miagkov Maria Luis Albuquerque Denis Morozov Dmitry Nikolaev Adviser Dmitry Pankin Paulo Ernesto Carvalho Amorim Konstantin Panov Diogo Araujo Andrey Shinaev Alberto Manuel S. Azevedo Soares Margarita Smoroda Nuno Brito Ekaterina Sycheva Jose Pedro Viegas Cardoso Vladimir Tamozhnikov Rui Manuel Carvalho Anna Uspenskaya Nuno Faria Anna Valkova Pedro Machado Konstantin Vyshkovskiy Bernardo Ribeiro da Cunha Oleg Zasov Sofia Teixeira F. Torres Rwanda Qatar Governor Governor John Rwangombwa Yousef Hussain Kamal St. Kitts and Nevis Alternate Governor Abdullah Bin Saoud Al-Thani Governor Denzil Douglas Romania Alternate Governor Alternate Governor Janet Harris Cristian Popa Adviser Russian Federation Jacinth Henry-Martin Governor St. Lucia Aleksei Kudrin Governor Alternate Governor Isaac Anthony Vadim Grishin* Sergey Storchak* Alternate Governor Bernard La Corbiniere Adviser Elena Beskurnikova St. Vincent and the Grenadines Andrei Bokarev Andrei Bugrov Alternate Governor Vladimir Dmitriev Len Ishmael Denis Esaulov Timur Eyvazov Adviser Aleksander Gorban La Celia Prince * Temporary 325 Samoa Mohammed Maziad Al Tuwaijri Mohammed Alzaben Governor Abdulaziz Al-Zamil Faumuina Tiatia Liuga Fuad Abdul Wahab Bahrawi Zarir Cama Alternate Governor Simon Cooper Iulai Lavea Hugues de Parcevaux David Dew Saudi Arabia Robert Eid Adnan Hassan Governor Subodh Kumar Keshava Ibrahim A. Al-Assaf Abdulaziz A. O’Hali Hutham S. Olayan Alternate Governor Khaled Olayan Muhammad S. Al-Jasser Rita Pasi Abdulrahman Mohammed Aftab Qureshi Almofadhi* Sadok Rouai Bernd van Linder Adviser Ahmed Al-Balawie Senegal Yousef I. Al-Bassam Abdulmohsen A. Al-Fares Governor Gebreen Al-Gebreen Abdoulaye Diop Ahmed M. Al-Ghannam Suliman Al-Gwaiz Adviser Nabil bin Dawood Al Hoshan Babacar Cisse Abdulrhman bin Ibrahim Ibrahima Dia Al-Humaid Baidy Dieng Khalid Al-Jasser Marema Lo Abdulrahman Al-Kalaf Evelyne Tall Mubarak Al-Khafra Khalid S. Al Khudairy Serbia Abdulrahman M. Al-Kudsi Taha A. Al Kuwaiz Governor Musaed Al-Mineefi Bozidar Djelic Abdullah Hussein Almounsor Fahad Al Mubarak Adviser Ahmed A. Al Nassar Djerdj Matkovic Saad Mohammed A. Al Nefaee Milomir Ognjanovic Mohamad Alomran Vladimir Petrovic Mousa Omran Alomran Abdulaziz Al Onaizan Seychelles Abdulrahman Aloraini Saeed Al-Qahtani Adviser Khaled Abdul Rahman Al-Rajhi Brynmwr Battersby Rashed Abdulaziz Al-Rashed David Nagoski Salah Al-Rashed Mansour Al-Saawi Sierra Leone Nayef Alsadoun Mohammed Abdulrahman Governor Al Samhan Samura Mathew Wilson Kamara Fahad Ibrahim A. Alshathri Ibrahim M. Alturki Alternate Governor Sulaiman M. Al-Turki Matthew Dingie * Temporary 326 Singapore Sudan Governor Governor Tharman Shanmugaratnam Ali Mahmoud Mohamed Abdelrasoul Alternate Governor Peter Ong Boon Kwee Adviser Elsham Abdalla Slovak Republic ElAmin Adam Abuelgasim Muna Elsayed Abuharaz Governor Hazim Algadir Ahmed Ivan Miklos Yousif Bashir Adviser Suriname Norbert Brada Peter Burian Governor Marek Jakoby Gillmore Hoefdraad Katarina Kovacova Vit Koziak Alternate Governor Jan Toth Adelien Wijnerman Natalia Urbanova Glenn H. Gersie* Slovenia Adviser Bernhard Fritz-Krochow Governor Sairagatoen Jahangir-Abdvelrahman Franc Krizanic Echhorst Karel Monica Kramawitana-Tamrin Alternate Governor Shobha Malhoe-Chothan Mitja Mavko Georgetine Tjalim Cornelis van Dijk South Africa Swaziland Governor Pravin Jamnadas Gordhan Adviser Lindiwe Kunene Alternate Governor Bhadala T. Mamba Lungisa Fuzile Abednego Ntshangase Adviser Sweden Siphiwe Dube Lesetja Kganyago Governor Pumulo Masualle Anders Borg Zanele Mbatha Jason Milton Alternate Governor Dondo Andrew Mogajane Gunilla Carlsson Cleo Rose-Innes Samantha Springfield Adviser Lund Ann-Kristin Spain Johan Borgstam Anna M. Brandt Governor Anna Ferry Elena Salgado Bjorn Fritjofsson Pereric Hogberg Alternate Governor Torgny E.O. Holmgren Jose Manuel Campa Fernandez Stefan Isaksson * Temporary 327 Ann-Sofie Nilsson Adviser Emma Nilsson Felicia Carvalho Ingrid Nilsson Olgario Vidigal De Castro Magnus Nordstrom Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao Per Orneus Adelina Martins Annika Tornqvist Jose Oliveira Anna Westerholm Ramon G. Oliveros Torsten Wetterblad Constancio Pinto Joao Mariano Saldanha Switzerland Balbina Soares Governor Togo Beatrice Maser Mallor Governor Alternate Governor Dede Ahoefa Ekoue Michel Mordasini* Alternate Governor Adviser Aheba Johnson Melanie Buehler Daniel Hunkeler Adviser Vay-Luy Jetzer Novinyo Serge Amega Marco Mosca Zakari Darou-Salim Salome Ramseier Josef Renggli Trinidad and Tobago Manuel Sager Francoise Salame Guex Governor Lukas Schneller Winston Dookeran Holger Tausch Alternate Governor Tajikistan Vishnu Dhanpaul* Adviser Adviser Farhod Salim Nicole Leslie-Ann Des Vignes Abdujabbor Shirinov Kurt Kisto Neil Parsan Tanzania Suzette Taylor-Lee Chee Governor Tunisia Mustafa Haidi Mkulo Governor Thailand Abdelhamid Triki Governor Alternate Governor Thirachai Phuvanatnaranubala Lamia Zribi Alternate Governor Turkey Areepong Bhoocha-Oom Governor Timor-Leste Ibrahim H. Canakci Governor Alternate Governor Emilia Pires Evren Dilekli * Temporary 328 Turkmenistan Ellen Bronte Flecker* Loga Gnansambanthan* Alternate Governor Stewart James* Gochmyrat A. Myradov Suzy Kantor* Mark Lowcock* Adviser Susanna Moorehead* Nurgeldi Meredov Richard Teuten* Uganda Adviser Philippa Buckley Governor Michelle Edwards Maria Kiwanuka United States Alternate Governor Chris. M. Kassami Governor Timothy F. Geithner Adviser Adam Mugume Alternate Governor Fred Muhumuza Robert D. Hormats Andrew Baukol* Ukraine Lael Brainard* Charles V.A. Collyns* Governor Robert Dohner* Sergiy Tigipko Marisa Lago* Scott Morris* Adviser Bradley Wayne Setser* Serhii Kamyshev Christopher Smart* Olena Kucherenko Mark Sobel* Anatoliy Maksyuta Ian Solomon* Victor Mayko Pavlo Moiseichenko Adviser Olexander Motsyk Chuka Asike Denys Mykhailiuk Virginia Brandon Oleksandr Pakhil Marie Brown Andrii Pravednyk David Fulton Mykola Udovychenko Stephen Gooch Yuriy G. Yakusha Francis Michael Kelleher Christopher Pratt United Arab Emirates Andrew Rushing Governor Uruguay Khalid Ali Al-Bustani Governor United Kingdom Fernando Lorenzo Governor Alternate Governor Andrew Mitchell Mariella Maglia* Alternate Governor Adviser George Osborne Azucena Arbeleche Hans Anand Beck* Marianela Bruno Julia Bunting* Adrian Fernandez Siobhan Clifford* Juan Luis Siutto Nick Dyer* * Temporary 329 Uzbekistan Zambia Alternate Governor Adviser Shukhrat Vafaev Alfred Chioza Francis Chipimo Adviser Ben Kangwa Laziz Kudratov Inonge Limbambala Sardor Sagdullayev Musiwa Muyatwa Willie Ndembela Vanuatu Emmanuel Pamu H.E. Sheila Siwela Governor Ivan Zyuulu Moana Kalosil Carcasses Zimbabwe Alternate Governor George Maniuri Governor Marie Louise Milne* Tendai Biti Yemen, Republic of Adviser Kudakwashe Mudereri Governor Abubaker Al Qirbi Alternate Governor Mutahar Abdulaziz Al-Abbasi * Temporary 330 OBSERVERS AT THE 2011 ANNUAL MEETINGS Abu Dhabi Fund for Development Richard M. Uku Mohammed Saif G.S. Al Suwaidi Pierre Nicolas van Peteghem Adel Alhosani James Gituro Wahome African Capacity Building Foundation African Export-Import Bank Frannie A. Leautier Jean-Louis Ekra Mercy Bruce-Amanquah Denys Denya Shupikayi Chimhini Khushhal Chand Khushiram Franklin Mutahakana Frederic Mao Aubrey Phiri Samuel Mugoya Benedict O. Oramah African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States African Trade Insurance Agency Mohammed Ibn Chambas George O. Otieno Paulo Salesi Kautoke Cyprien Sakubu Obadiah Mailafia African Union African Development Bank Group Jean Ping Donald Kaberuka Simone Abela Aly Abou-Sabaa Paul Chimenya Cecilia Akintomide Maxwell M. Mkwezalamba Mahamat Issein Bardi John Shinkaiye Abdelakim Ben Hammouda Rhoda Tumusiime Charles Boamah Sheritha Brace Hela Cheikhrouhou Erik Churchill Andean Development Corporation Medjomo Coulibaly Enrique Garcia Oumama El Kettani Jennifer Arencibia Olivier Eweck Carolina Espana Alessandro Girola Gabriel Felpeto Michael Grossmann Anahiz Figueroa Kazumi Ikeda-Larhed Andres Oneto Shirley Jean Michael Penfold Faith Kamau Andres Rugeles Steve Kayizzi-Mugerwa Hugo Sarmiento Jacob Kolster Leonardo G. Villar Janvier K. Litse Peter Vonk Isaac Lobe Ndoumbe Delenia McIver Arab Bank for Economic Development Moono Mupotola in Africa Subha Nagarajan Abdelaziz Khelef Stefan Nalletamby Kamal Mahmoud Abdellatif Mthuli Ncube Mohamed Elhafed Ould Beddy Gabriel Negatu Mouhamadou Niang Arab Fund for Economic and Onike Nicol-Houra Social Development Hassatou N’Sele Abdulatif Y. Al-Hamad Andre W. Nzapayeke Khalil Omar Hossam Aloysius Uche Ordu Godfred Penn Arab Monetary Fund Mike Salawou Jassim Abdulla Al-Mannai Emmanuel Samah Yisr Burnieh Timothy Turner 331 Asian Development Bank Caribbean Community Haruhiko Kuroda Evelyn Wayne Lourdes Adriano Fay Ingrid Housty Thierry de Longuemar Lorne McDonnough Gregori Enzo Philip C. Erquiaga Caribbean Development Bank Kazuki Fukunaga Wm Warren Smith Arjun Goswami Christine Dawson Laurel Gutenberg Adrian Debique Bindu N. Lohani Dorla Humes Maria Aurora Gregoria Lomotan Denny Lewis-Bynoe Alessandro Pio Tessa Williams-Robertson Changyong Rhee Tomoyuki Saisu Center for Latin American Monetary Kazu Sakai Studies Ursula Schaefer-Preuss Adriana Alverde Kunio Senga Javier Granguillhome Morfin Chaiyuth Sudthitanakorn Maria Luisa Gutierrez Melendez Lea Sumulong Javier Guzman-Calafell Samuel Tumiwa Dalmir Sergio Louzada Constantijn Jelle Vandersyp Cecilia Bendeck Lakshmi Venkatachalam Maricela Cruz Natsuki Tyler Central African Economic and Association of African Development Monetary Community Finance Institutions Bakhit Haggar Hassan Adoum Joseph Alfred Amihere Benoit Ketchekmen Mupani Ilunga Eugene Kassi N’da Central African States Katuala Ndekenya Development Bank Peter Noni Michael Adande Jean Lambert Sama Ngbokoli Mohammed Santuraki Central American Bank for Economic Admassu Yilma Tadesse Integration Constantin Thamuk Nick Rischbieth Gloe Eduardo Gutierrez Association of Southeast Asian Nations Juan Carlos Javier Antonina B. Espiritu Jose Felix Magana Aladdin Rillo Carlos Watson Bank for International Settlements Central American Monetary Council Jaime Felix Caruana Lacorte William Calvo-Villegas Stephen G. Cecchetti Benjamin H. Cohen Common Fund for Commodities Guenter Anton Pleines Ali Mchumo Bruno Tissot Javed Akhtar Bank of Central African States Common Market for Eastern and Mahamat Allamine Bourma Treye Southern Africa Sindiso Ngwenya Black Sea Trade and Alexius Gitari Development Bank Michael Gondwe Andrey Kondakov Stephen Lester Lande Orsalia Kalantzopoulos Tasara Muzorori Marin Marinov Chungu Mwila Anatoly Sementsov 332 Walter C. Talma Jonathan Charles Mutombo Kalonji Thierry Christoph Ludwig Denk Olivier Descamps Commonwealth Secretariat Varel D. Freeman Kamalesh Sharma Heike Harmgart David K.S. Ashiagbor John Howell Samantha Attridge Tina Hoy Cheryl Bruce Lorenz Jorgensen Simon John Timothy Gimson Olena Koval Jose Maurel Johann Peter Art Lankes Lorna McLaren Isabelle Laurent Julius Mucunguzi Irakli Managadze Elaine Ogilvie-Ricketts Piroska M. Nagy Cyrus Rustomjee Djoomart Otorbaev Ransford Smith Jean Marc Peterschmitt Janet Strachan Manfred J. Schepers Alexander Burr Artem Shevalev Annie Kahenya Brimas Sisay Amita Patel Josue Tanaka Nick Tesseyman Council of Europe Development Bank Hiroshi Tsubota Raphael Alomar Axel Van Nederveen Matthias Bauer Marian Dalton Frederic de Dinechin Julie Green Jacques Mirante Pere Thierry Poirel European Central Bank Michael Georg Roeskau Jean-Claude Trichet Apolonio Ruiz Ligero Elisabeth Ardaillon-Poirier Imre Tarafas Lorenzo Bini Smaghi Wouter Coussens East African Community Ettore Dorrucci Richard Sezibera Marcel Fratzscher Enos Steven Bukuku Jose Manuel Gonzalez-Paramo Rusatira Desire Michele Kirstetter Steve Machage Christophe Madaschi Frank Moss East African Development Bank Georges Pineau Mahesh K. Kotecha Regina Karoline Schueller Juergen Stark Economic Community of West African Zsuzsanna Tozser Milam States Regine Wolfinger James Victor Gbeho Ousmane Bocoum European Commission Tagbo Ejikeme Andris Piebalgs Bashir Mamman Ifo Olli Rehn Stephane Kohl Amadeu Altafaj-Tardio Nelson O. Magbagbeola Peter Bekx Abdelfatau Musah Moreno Bertoldi Bamba Lambert Ngaladjo Marco Buti Kadjo Jean N’Guessan Nadia Calvino Celestin Talaki Peter Craig-McQuaide Thierno Bocar Tall Antonio de Lecea Tessy Winkelman Servaas Deroose Marica Ganelli European Bank for Reconstruction Daniel Giorev and Development Mariella Huber Thomas Mirow Karin Hundeboll Erik Berglof Nina Hyvarinen 333 Peter Kerstens Laura Fan Silvia Kofler Kurt Focke Philippe Patrick Legrain Claudia Franco Despina Manos Alejandro Gamboa Amy Medearis Luis Alberto Giorgio Stefan Pflueger Sebastian Gonzalez Isabelle Poupaert Takashi Hanajiri Anna Prisco Werner Kiene Catherine Ray Isabel G. Lavadenz Paccieri Ichard Razaaly Santiago Levy Luis Riera Caballero Luz Francois Rivasseau Cheryle Morris-Skeete Heinz Scherrer Cristina Pailhe David Sharrock Roberto Prieto Steffen Stenberg Steven Puig Gerassimos Thomas German Quintana Vlassia Vassikeri Melecio Rivera Luc Veron Joaquin Tres Viladomat Maarten Verwey Veronica E. Zavala Lombardi Vesa Vihriala Kasper Zeuthen IADB-Inter-American Investment Corporation European Investment Bank Group Jacques Rogozinski Philippe Maystadt Jacques Antebi Tamsyn Barton Sarah Fandell Dominique de Crayencour Orlando Ferreira Caballero Philippe de Fontaine Vive Juan Antonio Ketterer Bertrand de Mazieres Lisa Krochmal Constance Kann Steven Reed Eila Kreivi Rebeca White Sanchez de Tagle Vanessa Paul Plutarchos Sakellaris International Fund for Agricultural Francoise Thunis Development Patrick Walsh Kanayo F. Nwanze Sirpa Jarvenpaa Financial Stability Board Henock Kifle Svein Andresen Cheryl Morden Juan Antonio Sole Lopez Pinto Thomas Pesek Rupert Thackray Thorne International Labour Organization Food and Agriculture Organization of Juan Somavia the United Nations Romina Bandura Jacques Diouf Janine Berg Hafez M.H. Ghanem Nancy Donaldson Daniel J. Gustafson Stephen Kennett Pursey Gabriel T. Laizer Raymond Torres Inter-American Development Bank Islamic Development Bank Luis Alberto Moreno Mejia Ahmad Mohamed Ali Al Madani Clara Alemann Walid Abdelwahab Pablo Alonso Rami Mahmoud Ahmad Edward Bartholomew Khaled M. Al-Aboodi Ian Brodie Mohammed Alami Ignacio Corlazzoli Karim Allaoui Andre Delgado Mohammad Al Saati Estanislao Echebarria Waleed Abdulmohsin Mohammed Soren Elbech Alwohaib Antoni Estevadeordal Muhammad Iqbal Azad 334 Abdullateef Bello Jennifer Carolin Ann Bisping Julio Estrada Federico Bonaglia Siddiqui Haseeb Ullah Jonathan Coppel Salah Amer Jelassi Ebba Dohlman Majid S. Kermani Carolyn Ervin Abdulnasser Minkara Susan Fridy Khaled Nazer Sara Fyson Abdel Rahman Eltayeb Ali Taha Brenda Killen Ghada Attieh Jean-Marie Le Grand Ilan Bouchard-Gordon Jon Lomoy Randa Hudome Divya Mathew Jan Corfee Morlot Islamic Financial Services Board Helen Mountford Abdelilah Belatik Gabriela Ramos Luiz Reis de Mello Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Holly Richards Development Matthias Rumpf Yousef Al-Bader Jill Schuker Ernesto Soria Morales Latin American Association of Elodie Turchi Development Financing Institutions Sandra Wilson Ricardo Palma-Valderrama OECD-Development Assistance Latin American Reserve Fund Committee Ana Maria Carrasquilla J. Brian Atwood Juan Carlos Alfaro Talat Abdel-Malek Diana Briceno Donata Garrasi Carlos Giraldo Bert Koenders Patricia O’Neill Nordic Development Fund Jens Sedemund Helge Semb Linda Lundqvist Organization of American States Emeli Moller Jose Miguel Insulza Carmen de la Soledad Moreno Nordic Investment Bank Toscano Johnny Akerholm Marta Martinez Angela Brusas Belkys Mones Lars Eibeholm Sherry M. Stephenson Jens Hellerup Eva Villarreal Pascual Soren Kjaer Mortensen Harro Pitkaenen Organization of the Petroleum Heidi Susanne Syrjanen Exporting Countries Hasan M. Qabazard OPEC Fund for International Development Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat Suleiman Jasir Al-Herbish Sanjesh Naidu Helen Abu Jurji Said Aissi P. L. O. Fuad Albassam Jihad Al Wazir Tareq Alnassar Durgham Maraee Malcolm Bricknell Joseph Nesnas Ranya Nehmeh Hashim Shawa Najib Yaser Organization for Economic Eyad Zeitawi Co-operation and Development Angel Gurria South Sudan Stephen Paul Groff Kosti Manibe Pier Carlo Padoan Abraham Akoi 335 Moses Mabior Deu Awuol United Nations Development Ben French Programme Kornelio Koriom Mayik Koriom Helen Clark Dier Tong Ngor-Chol Yannick Glemarec Deng Deng Nhial Marissa Ayento Charles Chol Nyok Paul F. Clayman Tisa Aggrey Sabuni Paolo Galli Albino Chol Thiik Madol Anna Hjartardottir Ezekeil Thon Sarah Jackson-Han Marial Yol Sigrid Kaag Samuel Tabani Youziel Kamal Kishore Enoch Awejok Heather Simpson Jehan Mechak Deng Frederick S. Tipson United Nations United Nations Economic Commission Josette Sheeran for Africa Amat Al-Alim Alsoswa Abdoulie Janneh Valerie Amos Adeyemi Dipeolu Michelle Bachelete Suzanne Bishopric United Nations Economic Commission Ella Brown for Latin America and the Caribbean Christiana Figueres Ines Bustillo Mads Frandsen Helvia Velloso Kul Chandra Gautam Ali Goldstein United Nations Educational, Scientific, Ameerah Haq and Cultural Organization John Hendra Carol Bellamy Paula Hunker Allan Jury United Nations Industrial Development Rene McGuffin Organization Chris Moore H. Stephen Halloway Carlos Perrone Jordon Ramacciato West African Development Bank Nicholas Reader Christian N. Adovelande Rebecca Richards Karamath Djivede Adamon Stanlake Samkange Christian Agossa Frank Schroeder Gnekele Gnassingbe Chad Shipmaker Jomo Kwame Sundaram West African Economic and Monetary Utku Teksoz Union Henrietta Thompson Soumaila Cisse Alexander Trepelkov Alhassane Ag Mohamed Richard Tyner Eloge Houessou Daniele Violetti Laurent Mathieu Robert Peter Vos Emedetemin Nonfodji Katherine Walters Calvin El Hadji Abdou Sakho United Nations Children’s Fund West African Monetary Institute Tony Lake Temitope Oshikoya Bjorn Gillsater Abu-Bakarr Tarawalie Geeta Rao Gupta Isabel Ortiz World Health Organization Claudia Pescetto United Nations Conference on Trade Jean Luc Poncelet and Development Ciro Ugarte Heiner Flassbeck Yuefen Li 336 World Trade Organization Yuri Murata Pascal Lamy Yasuto Muto Emmanuelle Ganne Yoshikatsu Nagano Kazunori Nakagawa Japan Planning Team 2012 Annual Shinobu Nakagawa Meetings Kazusuke Nakamichi Hiroshi Naka Yoshitsugu Nakamura Yasuhiko Amano Gota Nakazawa Tatsunobu Aoki Kyo Nishida Masashi Azuma Makiko Nishihata Toshimitsu Bamba Shinichiro Nishioka Masaki Bessho Kayo Nomura Yoshiyuki Chiba Shohji Oguri Takufumi Fuchiwaki Kazuhiko Saito Yasuhiro Fujie Gen Sano Tomoyuki Fukumoto Masaki Sato Tom Haapanen Naomi Sato Masahiko Hagiwara Nobuki Sato Kazuhiro Hattori Yoshinori Sawa Seiji Hiroishi Atsushi Shimada Toru Hiroya Yasuhiro Sobashima Kyoko Hoshino Daisuke Sogabe Yumeko Hyugaji Naoyuki Suzuka Yuko Ihara Takao Suzuki Mitsuru Ishima Tomomi Takahashi Masakazu Kadowaki Yoshiya Takayanagi Kotaro Kai Ayumi Tanaka Keiichi Kajiwara Tomohiro Tanaka Futoshi Kawanishi Yasuori Tanaka Yasuhito Kimura Kazuko Toda Shinobu Kodama Yoshiki Togiya Mika Kosaka Ryosuke Torii Izumi Koyama Katsuo Tsuruta Reiko Kubota Katsutaro Watabe Masatsugu Kunieda Nobuyasu Yamada Hideto Kuranari Toshiki Yamakawa Margaret Hanna Kuroyanagi Hirohito Yamamoto Eugene Limb Kaori Yamazaki Atsushi Maeda Masahiro Yano Shinichi Makimura Hitomi Yasue Kensuke Matsuhashi Tokimasa Yokoi Jun Mifune Ikuko Yoshihara Noriko Minai Toshihiro Yoshihara Satoshi Mizugaki Mai Yoshinari Yusuke Moriya Naoko Yoshioka 337 EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND ALTERNATES IBRD, IFC, IDA SEPTEMBER 21, 2011 Directors Alternate Directors Abdulrahman Mohammed Almofadhi Ibrahim Alturki (Saudi Arabia) (Saudi Arabia) Anna Brandt Jens Haarlov (Sweden) (Denmark) Felix Alberto Camarasa Varinia Cecilia Daza Foronda (Argentina) (Bolivia) Pulok Chatterji Kazi M. Aminul Islam (India) (Bangladesh) Piero Cipollone Nuno Mota Pinto (Italy) (Portugal) Ambroise Fayolle Anne Touret-Blondy (France) (France) Jorg Frieden (Vacant) (Switzerland) Marta Garcia Juan Jose Bravo (Spain) (Mexico) Vadim Grishin Eugene Miagkov (Russian Federation) (Russian Federation) Merza H. Hasan Ayman Alkaffas (Kuwait) (Arab Republic of Egypt) Nobumitsu Hayashi Yasuo Takamura (Japan) (Japan) Ingrid G. Hoven Wilhelm Rissman (Germany) (Germany) Konstantin Huber Gino Alzetta (Austria) (Belgium) Hekinus Manao Dyg Sadiah Bt. Abg Bohan (Indonesia) (Malaysia) Agapito Mendes Dias Mohamed Sikieh Kayad (Mauritius) (Djibouti) Renosi Mokate Mansur Muhtar (South Africa) (Nigeria) 338 Directors Alternate Directors Susanna Moorehead Stewart James (United Kingdom) (United Kingdom) Marie-Lucie Morin Kelvin Dalrymple (Canada) (Barbados) Ian Solomon (Vacant) (United States) (United States) Rogerio Studart Vishnu Dhanpaul (Brazil) (Trinidad and Tobago) Hassan Ahmed Taha Denny H. Kalyalya (Sudan) (Zambia) Javed Talat Sid Ahmed Dib (Pakistan) (Algeria) Rudolf Treffers Stefan Nanu (Netherlands) (Romania) John Whitehead In-Chang Cho (New Zealand) (Republic of Korea) Shaolin Yang Ciyong Zou (China) (China) 339 DIRECTORS AND ALTERNATES MIGA SEPTEMBER 21, 2011 Directors Alternate Directors Abdulrahman Mohammed Almofadhi Ibrahim Alturki (Saudi Arabia) (Saudi Arabia) Gino Alzetta Konstantin Huber (Belgium) (Austria) Anna Brandt Jens Haarlov (Sweden) (Denmark) Felix Alberto Camarasa Varinia Cecilia Daza Foronda (Argentina) (Bolivia) Pulok Chatterji Kazi M. Aminul Islam (India) (Bangladesh) Piero Cipollone Nuno Mota Pinto (Italy) (Portugal) Ambroise Fayolle Anne Touret-Blondy (France) (France) Jorg Frieden (Vacant) (Switzerland) Marta Garcia Juan Jose Bravo (Spain) (Mexico) Vadim Grishin Eugene Miagkov (Russian Federation) (Russian Federation) Merza H. Hasan Ayman Alkaffas (Kuwait) (Arab Republic of Egypt) Nobumitsu Hayashi Takaya Kishi (Japan) (Japan) Ingrid G. Hoven Wilhelm Rissman (Germany) (Germany) Hekinus Manao Dyg Sadiah Bt. Abg Bohan (Indonesia) (Malaysia) Agapito Mendes Dias Mohamed Sikieh Kayad (Mauritius) (Djibouti) Renosi Mokate Mansur Muhtar (South Africa) (Nigeria) 340 Directors Alternate Directors Susanna Moorehead Stewart James (United Kingdom) (United Kingdom) Marie-Lucie Morin Kelvin Dalrymple (Canada) (Barbados) Ian Solomon (Vacant) (United States) (United States) Rogerio Studart Vishnu Dhanpaul (Brazil) (Trinidad and Tobago) Hassan Ahmed Taha Denny H. Kalyalya (Sudan) (Zambia) Javed Talat Sid Ahmed Dib (Pakistan) (Algeria) Rudolf Treffers Stefan Nanu (Netherlands) (Romania) John Whitehead In-Chang Cho (New Zealand) (Republic of Korea) Shaolin Yang Ciyong Zou (People’s Republic of China) (China) 341 OFFICERS OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS IBRD, IFC AND IDA AND JOINT PROCEDURES COMMITTEE FOR 2011/2012 Chairman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lebanon Vice Chairmen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . El Salvador Netherlands Reporting Member . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mali Members Algeria Lebanon Austria Mali Chile Netherlands Ecuador Russia El Salvador Saudi Arabia Equatorial Guinea Sierra Leone France South Africa Germany St. Lucia Indonesia Timor-Leste Japan United Kingdom Kazakhstan United States Korea 342 OFFICERS OF THE MIGA COUNCIL OF GOVERNORS AND MIGA PROCEDURES COMMITTEE FOR 2011/2012 Chairman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lebanon Vice Chairmen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . El Salvador Netherlands Reporting Member . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mali Members Algeria Lebanon Austria Mali Chile Netherlands Ecuador Russia El Salvador Saudi Arabia Equatorial Guinea Sierra Leone France South Africa Germany St. Lucia Indonesia Timor-Leste Japan United Kingdom Kazakhstan United States Korea 343 THE WORLD BANK GROUP Headquarters 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A. Telephone: (202) 473-1000 Facsimile: (202) 477-6391 Website: www.worldbank.org