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Cartels, Antitrust Enforcement, and Industry Performance : Evidence from Mexico (English)

Forty percent of economic activities in Mexico weighed by sales have been investigated for illegal monopolistic practices since the Federal Competition Commission was established in 1993. By exploiting some unique features of the Mexican investigative system, and using a synthetic control approach, this paper examines the causal impact of antitrust sanctions on industry performance and aggregate outcomes. Sanctions cause sales and wages to increase...
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Reed,Tristan; Pereira Lopez,Mariana De La Paz; Urrutia Arrieta,Ana Francisca; Iacovone,Leonardo.

Cartels, Antitrust Enforcement, and Industry Performance : Evidence from Mexico (English). Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 10269; Impact Evaluation series; Paper is funded by the Knowledge for Change Program (KCP) Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099455012222225128

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