Skip to Main Navigation

The microeconomics of a corrupt tax bureaucracy (English)

This paper is the first of a series of papers exploring the problems of tax evasion and corruption and how these influence the effectiveness of government policies. It develops a simple model of the corrupt tax bureaucracy based on institutional structure which characterizes many developing countries. The objective is to understand the complex interaction between the tax evader, the bureaucrat dealing with him and receiving a bribe, and the government...
See More

DOWNLOADS

COMPLETE REPORT

Official version of document (may contain signatures, etc)


Citation

Virmani,Arvind.

The microeconomics of a corrupt tax bureaucracy (English). Development Research Department discussion paper ; no. DRD 54 Washington, DC: World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/132321467988916247

This document is being processed or is not available.