Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements (English)

The authors analyze whether financial compensation is preferable to the current system of dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization that permits member countries to impose retaliatory tariffs in response to trade violations committed by other members. They show that monetary fines are more efficient than tariffs in terms of granting compensation to injured parties when there are violations in equilibrium. However, fines suffer from an enforcement...

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Author

Limao,Nuno;

Saggi,Kamal;
Document Date
2006/04/01
Document Type
Policy Research Working Paper
Report Number
WPS3873
Volume No
1
Total Volume(s)
1
Country
World,
Region
Other,
Disclosure Date
2006/03/24
Disclosure Status
Disclosed
Doc Name
Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements
Keywords
bond

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Citation

Limao,Nuno; Saggi,Kamal.

Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements (English). Policy, Research working paper series ; no. WPS 3873 Washington, DC: World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/153561468315288712

Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements (English)

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