Skip to Main Navigation

Uninsured risk and asset protection: can conditional cash transfer programs serve as safety nets (English)

Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have proved to be effective in inducing chronic poor households to invest in the human capital of their children while helping reduce poverty. They have also protected child human capital from the shocks that affect these households. In this paper, we argue that many non-poor households exposed to uninsured shocks have to use children as risk coping instruments, creating long term irreversibilities in child human capital development. We explore how CCT programs can be designed to serve as safety nets for the vulnerable non-poor when hit by a shock This would help them not use children as risk coping instruments, thus avoiding long term irreversibilities in child human capital development and creation of a source of new poor.

Details

  • Author

    Sadoulet,Elisabeth Marie L., Solomon,Pantelis, Vakis,Renos, De Janvry,Alain F.

  • Document Date

    2006/06/01

  • Document Type

    Working Paper (Numbered Series)

  • Report Number

    36637

  • Volume No

    1

  • Total Volume(s)

    1

  • Country

    World,

  • Region

    The World Region,

  • Disclosure Date

    2010/07/01

  • Disclosure Status

    Disclosed

  • Doc Name

    Uninsured risk and asset protection: can conditional cash transfer programs serve as safety nets?

  • Keywords

    chronic poor;dropping out of school;conditional cash transfer program;human capital;reduction of transaction costs;short period of time;social protection program;response to shock;uninsured risk;impact of shock;exposure to risk;risk coping;poor household;social fund programs;children attending schools;school enrollment rate;national poverty line;vulnerability to shock;education and health;human capital development;household total expenditure;demand for school;ante risk management;impact on child;risk management capacity;types of instrument;data on poverty;capital market failures;incidence of poverty;small scale farmer;safety net program;risk management instrument;poor rural community;labor allocation decision;human capital asset;protection of child;children at risk;investment in children;child in school;consumption per capita;high poverty rate;dimensions of poverty;moral hazard behavior;fight against poverty;social assistance program;determination of eligibility;small herd size;duration of unemployment;expanding employment opportunity;enrollment for child;capitalization of asset;verification of eligibility;high yielding variety;Civil Service Employment;maternal health care;private sector activity;enrollment of child;number of workers;food price subsidy;secondary school enrollment;shock poverty;net social gain;Demand For Education;school feeding program;cost risk;per capita expenditure;long run cost;people with disability;reducing child labor;vulnerable household;school attendance;natural disaster;income effect;welfare level;risk exposure;price effect;weather insurance;educational achievement;data management;household affect;insurance function;child schooling;school decision;poverty trap;child education;protecting children;empirical evidence;household head;extreme poverty;program effectiveness;asset accumulation;good health;risk taking;adverse consequence;Higher Education;inducing investment;household welfare;beneficiary household;middle class;eligible child;school participation;education outcome;household income;asset protection;buffer stock;income shock;vulnerability indicator;supply side;eligibility criterion;insurance companies;eligible individual;commitment device;productive activity;food ration;insufficient information;asset poverty;development of literature;transfer cash;food transfer;food stamp;insurance product;weather shock;hospital staff;verification process;vulnerable group;Conflict Resolution;program review;internal mechanism;daily income;complaint process;village council;public hearing;Child Health;health practice;financial sustainability;clear rules;children's schooling;income generation;physical asset;institutional innovation;rainfall data;public good;Public Goods;health objectives;livestock loss;redistributive program;asset creation;medical bill;school scholarship;financial crisis;utility subsidies;enforcement mechanism;excessive risk;rainfall intensity;livestock mortality;induced demand;energy bill;short-term shocks;exclusion error;accountability mechanism;unemployment insurance;local expenditure;formal sector;utility service;payment scheme;fee waiver;school cost;insurance value;interaction effect;evaluation study;positive impact;health outcome;coffee sector;activity choice;livestock holding;downward mobility;risk aversion;scarce capital;innovative way;infant nutrition;income shortfall;physical development;labor productivity;health maintenance;aggregate poverty;coffee crisis;health improvement;coffee farmer;idiosyncratic shock;coffee farming;recipient household;household survey;economic crisis;investment program;program efficiency;tuition waiver;state control;welfare program;asset portfolio;family allowance;emergency response;social housing;employment opportunities;childcare center;refugee camp;precautionary saving;raising income;risk prevention;traditional technology;income gain;workfare program;capital accumulation;insurance program;stable equilibrium;credit program;small fraction;rental market

Downloads

COMPLETE REPORT

Official version of document (may contain signatures, etc)

  • Official PDF
  • TXT*
  • Total Downloads** :
  • Download Stats
  • *The text version is uncorrected OCR text and is included solely to benefit users with slow connectivity.

Citation

Sadoulet,Elisabeth Marie L. Solomon,Pantelis Vakis,Renos De Janvry,Alain F.

Uninsured risk and asset protection: can conditional cash transfer programs serve as safety nets (English). SP discussion paper ; no. 604 Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/231231468314079566/Uninsured-risk-and-asset-protection-can-conditional-cash-transfer-programs-serve-as-safety-nets