Externalities and bailouts : hard and soft budget constraints in intergovernmental fiscal relations (English)

Subnational governments are assuming greater fiscal responsibility in many developing and transition countries. There is concern, however, that fiscal decentralization may weaken fiscal discipline -that local authorities may undertake commitments or incur debt obligations that subsequently result in massive central government support, in the form of extraordinary transfers, or bailouts. (Recent experience in major U.S. cities shows that these problems...

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Author

Wildasin,David E.;
Document Date
1997/11/30
Document Type
Policy Research Working Paper
Report Number
WPS1843
Volume No
1
Total Volume(s)
1
Disclosure Date
2010/07/01
Doc Name
Externalities and bailouts : hard and soft budget constraints in intergovernmental fiscal relations
Keywords
local public good provision

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Wildasin,David E..

Externalities and bailouts : hard and soft budget constraints in intergovernmental fiscal relations (English). Policy, Research working paper ; no. WPS 1843 Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/239501468765618550

Externalities and bailouts : hard and soft budget constraints in intergovernmental fiscal relations (English)

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