International lending, long-term credit relationships, and dynamic contract theory (English)

This paper surveys recent work on long-term credit relationships from a game-theoretic perspective. The purpose is to provide an explanation for observed behavior based on rationality in a specific context of long-term strategic contracting as opposed to instantaneous, complete, perfectly competitive and enforceable markets. This helps explain the existence of credit rationing, of reschedulings, of predominantly short-term international credits and...

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Author

Carrie Crawford,Sabrina V;
Document Date
1984/09/30
Document Type
Departmental Working Paper
Report Number
CPD8423
Volume No
1
Total Volume(s)
1
Country
World,
Region
Other,
Disclosure Date
2017/11/15
Disclosure Status
Disclosed
Doc Name
International lending, long-term credit relationships, and dynamic contract theory
Keywords
credit limit

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Citation

Carrie Crawford,Sabrina V.

International lending, long-term credit relationships, and dynamic contract theory (English). Country Policy Department discussion paper|no. CPD 8423 Washington, DC: World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/408971492001726296

International lending, long-term credit relationships, and dynamic contract theory (English)

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