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Conditionality and debt relief (English)

Six years into the debt crisis, questions about the relevance of policy measures to alleviate the crisis still abound. Conditionality by international financial institutions and rescheduling by commercial creditors have been dismissed in favor of debt reduction as strategies for restoring the creditworthiness of heavily indebted countries. This paper argues that the combination of conditionality and new private money - if properly interpreted and correctly implemented - should not be dismissed too lightly. The paper contends that liquidity (the availability of current resources) in the debtor country is probably as important an incentive for a country to invest and adjust as having a small enough debt stock outstanding. Debt reduction alone, is not as efficient as simultaneously providing liquidity and debt reduction if liquidity were available. The combination of new money and conditionality will work if the debt stock is small enough and enough new money is available.

Details

  • Author

    Claessens,Constantijn A. Diwan, Ishac

  • Document Date

    1989/06/30

  • Document Type

    Policy Research Working Paper

  • Report Number

    WPS213

  • Volume No

    1

  • Total Volume(s)

    1

  • Disclosure Date

    2010/07/01

  • Doc Name

    Conditionality and debt relief

  • Keywords

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Citation

Claessens,Constantijn A. Diwan, Ishac

Conditionality and debt relief (English). Policy, Planning and Research Department working papers ; no. WPS 213 Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/424491468765277877/Conditionality-and-debt-relief