Electoral rules and political selection : theory and evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan (English)

Voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own. This paper explores how electoral rules, such as district magnitude, mediate this trade-off and affect the composition of representative bodies and policy outcomes. The paper shows formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple single-member districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy...

DETAILS

Author

Beath,Andrew;

Christia,Fotini;

Egorov,Georgy;

Enikolopov,Ruben;
Document Date
2015/07/13
Document Type
Policy Research Working Paper
Report Number
WPS7361
Volume No
1
Total Volume(s)
1
Country
Afghanistan,
Region
South Asia,
Disclosure Date
2015/07/13
Disclosure Status
Disclosed
Doc Name
Electoral rules and political selection : theory and evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan
Keywords
food and agriculture organisation

DOWNLOADS

COMPLETE REPORT

Official version of document (may contain signatures, etc)

Official PDF
TXT*
Total Downloads** : 1238
Download Stats
*The text version is uncorrected OCR text and is included solely to benefit users with slow connectivity.

Citation

Beath,Andrew; Christia,Fotini; Egorov,Georgy; Enikolopov,Ruben.

Electoral rules and political selection : theory and evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan (English). Impact Evaluation series|Policy Research working paper|no. WPS 7361 Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/434051467998236461

Electoral rules and political selection : theory and evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan (English)

DETAILS

DOWNLOADS

COMPLETE REPORT

Citation

SUBSCRIBE TO EMAIL ALERTS