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Sovereign debt buybacks as a signal of creditworthiness (English)

To solve the puzzle of attitudes toward debt buybacks, the authors use a model that combines considerations of debt overhang with the possibility of asymmetrical information between debtor countries and their creditors. In this environment, a debt overhang may create disincentives for a country to undertake a worthwile investment, and debt relief may induce the country to invest and to increase its output, raising future debt repayments. The authors...
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Citation

Acharya, Sankarshan; Diwan,Ishac.

Sovereign debt buybacks as a signal of creditworthiness (English). Policy, Planning and Research Department working papers ; no. WPS 318 Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/532951468765019626

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