The political economy of deposit insurance (English)

The author uses a political economy framework to analyze cross-country differences in deposit insurance coverage. He finds supporting evidence of the significance of private interest theories in explaining coverage of deposit insurance. Deposit insurance coverage is significantly higher in countries where poorly capitalized banks dominate the market and in countries where depositors are poorly educated. The author does not find that coverage is significantly...
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Citation

Laeven,Luc A..

The political economy of deposit insurance (English). Policy, Research working paper ; no. WPS 3247 Washington, DC: World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/611291468780338024

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