Nash on a rotary : two theorems with implications for electoral politics (English)

The paper provides a complete characterization of Nash equilibria for games in which n candidates choose a strategy in the form of a platform, each from a circle of feasible platforms, with the aim of maximizing the stretch of the circle from where the candidate’s platform will receive support from the voters. Using this characterization, it is shown that if the sum of all players’ payoffs is 1, the Nash equilibrium payoff of each player in an arbitrary...

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Author

Basu,Kaushik Chandra;

Mitra,Tapan;
Document Date
2016/06/08
Document Type
Policy Research Working Paper
Report Number
WPS7701
Volume No
1
Total Volume(s)
1
Country
World,
Region
Other,
Disclosure Date
2016/06/08
Disclosure Status
Disclosed
Doc Name
Nash on a rotary : two theorems with implications for electoral politics
Keywords
Canadian Journal of Economics

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Citation

Basu,Kaushik Chandra; Mitra,Tapan.

Nash on a rotary : two theorems with implications for electoral politics (English). Policy Research working paper|no. WPS 7701 Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/641401467995054018

Nash on a rotary : two theorems with implications for electoral politics (English)

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