This volume consists of two comments on Shleifer's "Establishing Property Rights" and a summary of the floor discussion on the paper. All of them were proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics 1994. The first comment applied the logic of Shleifer's article to privatization in Poland. It also looked at control rights within firms. It argued that a frontal assault on politicians is only one of several reforms to change control rights. As an example, the comment explored the interactions of the safety net, the inflation tax, and control rights in Russia. The second comment elaborated on Shleifer's view that governments in most transition economies are too weak to protect property rights. It also pointed out that Shleifer's article focuses almost exclusively on preprivatization politics as a key determinant of the political feasibility of privatization, and does not really deal with the politics created by the allocation of control rights following privatization.
Details
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Author
Blanchard, Olivier Jean Frydman, Roman
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Document Date
1995/03/31
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Document Type
Publication
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Report Number
14423
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Volume No
1
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Total Volume(s)
1
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Disclosure Date
2010/07/01
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Doc Name
Comment on "Establishing Property Rights"
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Keywords
property right;reallocation of control right;reliable enforcement of contract;allocation of property rights;protection property right;mass privatization program;hard budget constraint;private property right;efficient resource allocation;forms of protection;effective contract enforcement;concentration of ownership;structure of incentive;method of privatization;loose monetary policy;ownership of corporation;Oil and Gas;Oil & Gas;concentration of asset;allocation of resource;managers of state;resource allocation decision;transition economy;Transition economies;political control;market economy;equity stake;decentralized structure;oil industry;state intervention;political feasibility;inflation tax;security law;Cash flow;legal protection;cash constraint;unemployment benefit;privatization plan;bureaucratic control;industrial enterprise;economic reform;commercial bank;private actor;efficiency gain;industrial asset;enforcement mechanism;enforcement strategy;financial interest;residual control;industrial units;smaller enterprise;insider control;advanced economy;commercial policy;textile mill;political pressure;state bureaucracy;democratic institution;bureaucratic intervention;privatization process;empirical study;managerial control;initial distribution;political influence;reform strategy;Corporate Law;market system;minority ownership;dividend income;central authority;capital need;political decision;political objective;liquidation route;positive outcome;monetary stabilization;enterprise restructuring;State Treasury;bank ownership;political process;adequate resources;large expenditures;simple contract;privatization option;market economics;greater access;
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Citation
Blanchard, Olivier Jean Frydman, Roman
Comment on "Establishing Property Rights" (English). Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/647951468764736513/Comment-on-Establishing-Property-Rights