Enforcement of labor regulation and informality (English)

Enforcement of labor regulations in the formal sector may drive workers to informality because they increase the costs of formal labor. But better compliance with mandated benefits makes it attractive to be a formal employee. The authors show that, in locations with frequent inspections, workers pay for mandated benefits by receiving lower wages. Wage rigidity prevents downward adjustment at the bottom of the wage distribution. As a result, lower...

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Author

Almeida,Rita Kullberg;

Amaro Da Costa Luz Carneiro,Pedro Manuel;
Document Date
2012/07/01
Document Type
Journal Article
Report Number
92922
Volume No
1
Total Volume(s)
1
Country
World,
Region
Other,
Disclosure Date
2014/12/05
Disclosure Status
Disclosed
Doc Name
Enforcement of labor regulation and informality
Keywords
labor inspector

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Citation

Almeida,Rita Kullberg; Amaro Da Costa Luz Carneiro,Pedro Manuel.

Enforcement of labor regulation and informality (English). Author accepted manuscript Washington, DC ; World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/697221468320935976

Enforcement of labor regulation and informality (English)

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