The design of incentives for health care providers in developing countries : contracts, competition, and cost control (English)

The authors examine the design and limitations of incentives for health care providers to serve in rural areas in developing countries. Governments face two problems: it is costly to compensate well-trained urban physicians enough to relocate to rural areas, and it is difficult to ensure quality care when monitoring performance is costly or impossible. The goal of providing universal primary health care has been hard to meet, in part because of the...

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Author

Hammer,Jeffrey S.;

Jack, William G.;
Document Date
2001/02/28
Document Type
Policy Research Working Paper
Report Number
WPS2547
Volume No
1
Total Volume(s)
1
Disclosure Date
2010/07/01
Disclosure Status
Disclosed
Doc Name
The design of incentives for health care providers in developing countries : contracts, competition, and cost control
Keywords
rural area

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Citation

Hammer,Jeffrey S.; Jack, William G..

The design of incentives for health care providers in developing countries : contracts, competition, and cost control (English). Policy, Research working paper ; no. WPS 2547 Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/771291468764352419

The design of incentives for health care providers in developing countries : contracts, competition, and cost control (English)

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