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Information, Loss Framing, and Spillovers in Pay-for-Performance Contracts (English)

Do incentives matter beyond the information conveyed by pay-for-performance contracts? Does loss framing matter? And do incomplete contracts generate spillovers on unincentivized tasks? This study reports on a framed field experiment with 1,363 maternity care workers in 691 primary health facilities in Nigeria to answer these questions. Participants were randomized into three study arms—(1) information with a flat participation fee, (2) performance-based...
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Bauhoff,Sebastian Peter Alexander; Kandpal,Eeshani.

Information, Loss Framing, and Spillovers in Pay-for-Performance Contracts (English). Policy Research working paper|no. WPS 9687 Washington, D.C. : World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/918691622646942703

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