Tax evasion, corruption, and administration : monitoring the people's agents under symmetric dishonesty (English)

Previous work on income tax evasion has assumed that taxpayers are dishonest, while tax collectors are honest. Such a clear 'moral' asymmetry is seldom observed in developing countries. The present paper shows how corruption depends on the type of (corruption detection mechanisms in) society, and the incentives which can be designed to ensure honesty or increase net revenue. It also sheds light on the puzzle of why governments ignore the implications...

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Author

Virmani,Arvind;
Document Date
1987/05/01
Document Type
Departmental Working Paper
Report Number
DRD271
Volume No
1
Total Volume(s)
1
Country
World,
Region
Other,
Disclosure Date
2010/07/01
Disclosure Status
Disclosed
Doc Name
Tax evasion, corruption, and administration : monitoring the people's agents under symmetric dishonesty
Keywords
effective tax rate

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Citation

Virmani,Arvind.

Tax evasion, corruption, and administration : monitoring the people's agents under symmetric dishonesty (English). Development Research Department discussion paper ; no. DRD 271 Washington, DC: World Bank. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/938061468337846905

Tax evasion, corruption, and administration : monitoring the people's agents under symmetric dishonesty (English)

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