Skip to Main Navigation

Banking on governance? conflicts of interest facing bank owners and supervisors (Inglês)

Banks fail with alarming frequency, resulting in large losses of taxpayer money. A key factor in the high failure rate is the flawed governance mechanism, which exacerbates the risks inherent in banking. Bankers control a lot of other people's money and have much discretion over the information they disclose. The temptation to engage in excessive risk taking is strong. Tightening banking supervision is seldom the solution. For their part, banking supervisors often face incentives at odds with those of taxpayers. At times they may prefer not to act to minimize taxpayer losses. These twin governance problems are further compounded by the common practice of disclosing banking information only to supervisors, not to markets. This Note explains the conflicts and proposes some solutions.


  • Autor


  • Data do documento


  • TIpo de documento

    Ponto de vista

  • No. do relatório


  • Nº do volume


  • Total Volume(s)


  • País


  • Região

    Regiões Mundiais,

  • Data de divulgação


  • Disclosure Status


  • Nome do documento

    Banking on governance? conflicts of interest facing bank owners and supervisors

  • Palavras-chave

    Banking Supervisors;public deposit guarantee;wave of bank failure;restrictions on bank branching;protecting minority shareholder;public guarantee fund;risk exposure;excessive risk taking;conflicts of interest;peak exposure concentration;real estate price;regulation of bank;high failure rate;quality of bank;runs on bank;public deposit insurance;duty of loyalty;historical cost accounting;related party lending;sanctions for breach;valuation of asset;cash on hand;good governance;banking business;financial statement;banking information;private surety;bank management;advanced country;connected lending;expected value;bank director;criminal sanction;corrective action;banking crisis;market participant;open bank;excessive lending;public accountant;banking rule;bank owner;fiscal cost;infrastructure network;judicial remedies;regulatory opinion;taxpayer loss;disclosure rule;taxpayer money;government ethics;governing body;official misconduct;public fund;commodity price;supervisory agency;widespread failure;governance problem;credit guarantee;commercial basis;copper price;clear accountability;modern banking;valuing asset;controlling shareholder;banking distress;reserve requirement;business risk;international standard;portfolio quality;credit withdrawal;loan institution;good information;cocoa price;bank limits;public money;foreign ownership;risky business;individual asset;price fluctuation;debt-equity ratio;public official;inefficient risk;bank governance;state fund;incentive contract;independent director;adequate sanction;Market Risk;investment merit;business partner;speculative investment;accounting standard;accounting standards;commercial interests;insider abuse;flawed governance;Banking Supervision;equity stake;regulatory action;unlimited liability;long-term interest;



Versão oficial do documento (pode conter assinaturas, etc.)

  • PDF oficial
  • TXT*
  • Total Downloads** :
  • Download Stats
  • *A versão do texto é um OCR incorreto e está incluído unicamente em benefício de usuários com conectividade lenta.