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Problem-driven political economy analysis : the World Bank's experience (Inglês)

Why does development progress in some places but not others? Very often, the distinguishing factor is not a lack of financial resources or of knowledge about the right technical solution. Governments may decide to allocate agricultural services to their core supporters or to key swing voters and to deny them to others, thereby reducing the incentive for farmers to seek increases in productivity. Social health insurance benefits may be extended ahead of elections, but removed once elections have taken place. At the same time, political incentives play a powerful role not only in frustrating development efforts, but also in shaping opportunities for change. Often, there are various stakeholders-within government, in the private sector, and in civil society-who want to change what government does for the better. However, in many situations, advice based on technically optimal solutions is not that helpful for potential reformers because such solutions may not be politically feasible nor may even backfire and have unintended negative consequences. The general problem that political incentives are frequently at odds with a technocratic approach to development has long been recognized. Politicians prefer policies and seek institutional changes that support their current needs, including exigencies such as horse trading when negotiating over policies with other powerful stakeholders or designing intergovernmental relations with a view to maintaining some form of centralized control, rather than optimizing service delivery. At the same time, the interests of politicians can also broadly converge with development objectives, such as seeking to deliver growth, jobs, or social protection benefits as a way to secure legitimacy or reelection. This book is a result from a systematic effort at taking stock of what the World Bank has learned from its efforts to mainstream Political Economy Analysis (PEA). The effort included an open invitation to staff members active in the area to submit their work for presentation and discussion at a 2012 review conference. The goal was to identify work that was strong analytically and that provided practical recommendations that resulted in action. The book is thus intended to illustrate (and reflect on) what the Bank has been able to achieve in this area so far and to help others learn more about how PEA perspectives can be effectively integrated into development approaches.


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    Fritz,Verena Maria, Levy,Brian David, Ort,Rachel Lemay

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    Problem-driven political economy analysis : the World Bank's experience

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    Political Economy;incentive problem;Political Economy Analysis;misuse of public funds;large tracts of land;political incentive;household survey data;national government agency;political economy considerations;structural adjustment program;national health insurance;analysis of utility;incentive for farmer;public opinion survey;de facto use;provision of advice;privileges and immunity;continuity and change;political economy dynamic;Early Childhood Development;access to fund;political economy environment;foreign policy considerations;allocation of fund;natural resource rent;political support;stakeholder interest;fiscal pressure;donor agencies;national parliament;energy subsidies;commercial agriculture;commodity price;subnational levels;Health Service;ownership pattern;infrastructure reform;electricity provision;public resource;civil society;good policy;telecommunications reform;institutional change;resource-rich country;Social Welfare;intergovernmental relation;secondary sources;contract opportunity;political actor;political capital;incentive structure;subsidy system;survey questions;social transfer;political views;fiscal deficit;public source;specific issue;Government Performance;Social Protection;opportunistic behavior;Fuel Subsidies;agency staff;policy position;informal interview;geographic area;rural area;property right;fiscal allocation;utility pricing;foreign mining;sustainable fiscal;quantitative information;community for use;historical trajectory;participatory approach;historical analysis;national politics;community characteristic;investment fund;fiscal space;intergovernmental transfer;aid allocation;spoils system;discretionary authority;power tariff;target resources;similar way;ethnic dimension;institutional rule;diagnostic approach;smallholder farmer;election result;electoral system;empirical underpinning;unintended consequence;non-governmental organization;economic institution;resource endowments;demographic dynamic;institutional strength;social cleavage;regulatory body;Regulatory Bodies;road map;agricultural service;good governance;regulatory rule;political constraint;learning process;explanatory variable;teacher absenteeism;independent regulation;private benefit;electoral campaigns;technocratic approach;mineral rent;vested interests;neoclassical economics;institutional dysfunction;horse trading;social security;local council;financial resource;local elite;administrative support;electricity distribution;international aid;ward levels;local infrastructure;allocation decision;political commitment;Economic Policy;governance cluster;large-scale investment;formal property;veto power;contract farming;governmental actors;distribution capacity;power company;binding constraint;budget process;descriptive statistic;operational decisions;tariff rate;electoral competition;health outcome;subnational governance;engagement strategies;preferential access;commercial purpose;Cash Transfer;citizen voice;sectoral strategy;infrastructure sector;study including;small-scale infrastructure;state policy;democratic country;private investor;regression analysis;government effort;economic rent;geographic distribution;decentralized level;historical perspective;credible commitment;primary purpose;sectoral development;current investment;electoral rules;telecommunications sector;political influence;political elite;government plan;



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