This paper examines the effects of rationing import quotas by licenses-on-demand. We analyze the Nash equilibrium for a game where prizes are allocated on a prorated basis and bidding is costless. Factors affecting the degree of inefficiency and rent shares among firms are assessed. With licenses-on-demand, a reduction of in-quota tariffs may result in decreased quota fill, and an increase in the quota may result in a 100 percent quota fill rate...
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2003/01/01
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Documento de Trabalho
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31908
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1
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1
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2010/07/01
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The economics of administering import quotas with licenses-on-demand
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impact of trade liberalization
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