It is now widely accepted that if markets for specific goods and services fail or are inefficient, some form of imperfect information or assymetry is often the primary cause of such failure. The present paper identifies a deficiency in the concept of rationing by random selection contained in the widely quoted paper of Stiglitz and Weiss. It then presents an alternative analysis in which information can produce market failure, and shows how government...
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DETALHES
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1986/01/01
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Documento de trabalho departamental
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DRD143
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1
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1
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2013/03/11
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Disclosed
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Adverse selection, competitive rationing and government policy in credit markets
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Credit effectiveness
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