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Making the poor creditworthy : a case study of the integrated rural development program in India (Inglês)

India's Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP) is among the most ambitious efforts at credit-based poverty alleviation. The program has reached 27 million households through commercial banks which provide finance for investment in income generating assets. This paper examines the impact of the IRDP and the long-term viability of credit-led approaches to poverty alleviation. Success is assessed against the program's objectives including productivity of investments, real income gain by households, and credit repayment. The paper also examines the extent to which the IRDP's structural objective of assuring that the poor have continuing access to institutional credit and banking services is being achieved. It shows that providing some poor with capital to invest can be an effective means of raising their incomes. The paper also points out that gains in productivity of investment and credit recovery can be made by altering delivery features of IRDP, but argues that the existing structure of incentives facing banks and borrowers are responsible for critical shortcomings. Finally, the paper argues that future access to credit is essential not only to finance new investment, but also to provide working capital to offset declining yields that occur on most existing IRDP assets.

Detalhes

  • Autor

    Pulley, Robert V.

  • Data do documento

    1989/07/31

  • TIpo de documento

    Publicação

  • No. do relatório

    WDP58

  • Nº do volume

    1

  • Total Volume(s)

    1

  • País

    Índia,

  • Região

    Sul da Ásia,

  • Data de divulgação

    2010/07/01

  • Nome do documento

    Making the poor creditworthy : a case study of the integrated rural development program in India

  • Palavras-chave

    commercial bank;access to banking service;institutional credit;capital subsidy;reserve bank of india;demand for credit;poor household;poverty alleviation;market rate of interest;increase in interest rate;higher incidence of poverty;State Bank of India;lending to the poor;high rates of interest;short period of time;Rural Poor;market interest rate;share of debt;income generating asset;supply of credit;repayment of credit;access to capital;Type of Investment;rural branch;flow of investment;steady state level;regional rural bank;income for household;international financial flows;lack of asset;long term investment;speed of adjustment;return to investment;structural adjustment policies;quality of textbook;lines of credit;system of subsidy;identification of beneficiary;amount of fund;types of beneficiaries;finance for investment;market clearing level;structure of incentive;lack of security;income generating activity;families with income;average interest rate;average investment level;safe motherhood initiative;rural household income;households with income;redistribution of wealth;official poverty line;rural household debt;public sector bank;standard of living;lack of collateral;private commercial bank;poverty alleviation effort;fixed interest rate;economies of scale;informal money lenders;banking system;Rural Credit;small farmer;transaction cost;Macroeconomic Policy;rural area;institutional source;poverty threshold;productive investment;marginal farmer;agricultural laborer;long-term viability;rural lending;financial service;income estimate;small loan;productive use;beneficiary household;outstanding advance;eligible beneficiary;labor contract;loan application;social justice;policy option;paid credit;financial discipline;incremental income;term credit;real expenditure;household characteristic;eligibility criterion;sustained access;long-term interest;Bank Credit;efficiency gain;exclusive domain;negative incentive;community participation;government ownership;profitable operation;road transport;credit institution;banking institution;resource base;subsidized credit;long-term finance;relative poverty;productive asset;poverty eradication;program selection;social security;rural artisan;delivery mechanism;cost structure;random sample;primary cause;market failure;individual household;modern business;personal service;industrial area;explicit subsidy;asset finance;interim findings;panel data;rural cooperative;coercive action;lending institution;cooperative bank;demographic trend;working condition;criminal penalty;criminal sanction;credit scheme;credit delivery;bank activity;self-employment program;urban poor;welfare gains;housing loan;security requirement;bank official;bargaining position;default risk;economic shock;lending decision;household demand;absorptive capacity;public expenditure;counterfactual simulations;multivariate analysis;income gain;investment increase;private enterprise;longer period;longitudinal analysis;recipient household;explanatory power;maximum likelihood;selection criterion;public revenue;explanatory variable;logit analysis;correlation coefficient;unanticipated shock;occupational group;administrative cost;program monitoring;government fund;transparent selection;guaranteed access;future credit;future bank;government administrator;financial targets;milk cooperative;large subsidy;government capital;loan approval;debt obligation;minimum financing;repayment period;village assembly;food import;informal markets;bonded labor;informal credit;regression results;financial indiscipline;discussion papers;institutional purchaser;Credit policies;direct credit;credit policy;household investment;government spent;landless laborer;classroom use;noncommercial purposes;copyright notice;real income;dairy development;Industrial Policies;administrative expense;market imperfection;government budget;equal share;skill base;future consumption;asset position;sales opportunity;bank transaction;institutional dimension;investment opportunities

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