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An empirical analysis of Mexican merger policy (Inglês)

A newly created dataset including 239 decisions made by the Mexican Federal Competition Commission on horizontal mergers between 1997 and 2001 is used to estimate the different factors affecting the Commission's resolution. The paper approximates the decision making process using two different discrete choice models. The results indicate that, contrary to the Commission's objective, the presence of efficiency gains increases the probability of a case being issued. The findings also show that factors different from the ones explicitly mentioned by the Commission have a significant effect on the Commission's final decision. In particular, the presence of a foreign company among the would-be merger firms significantly increases the likelihood of observing an allowed merger.

Detalhes

  • Autor

    Avalos, Marcos, De Hoyos Navarro,Rafael E.

  • Data do documento

    2008/02/01

  • TIpo de documento

    Documento de trabalho sobre pesquisa de políticas

  • No. do relatório

    WPS4527

  • Nº do volume

    1

  • Total Volume(s)

    1

  • País

    México,

  • Região

    América Latina e Caribe,

  • Data de divulgação

    2010/07/01

  • Disclosure Status

    Disclosed

  • Nome do documento

    An empirical analysis of Mexican merger policy

  • Palavras-chave

    marginal effect;efficiency gain;economies of scale and scope;european commission;level of market concentration;relevant market;law and economics;barrier to entry;independent variable;cumulative distribution function;qualitative response model;competition policy implementation;limited dependent variable;determinants of outcome;degree of concentration;market entry barrier;high entry barrier;price and quality;equity share;antitrust authorities;econometric analysis;horizontal merger;import competition;choice model;merger policy;merger case;merger guideline;high probability;economic efficiency;ceteris paribus;market structure;qualitative variable;cut-off point;model specification;explanatory power;antitrust enforcement;merger review;merger firms;safe harbor;statistical significance;marginal impact;positive coefficient;explanatory variable;indicator variable;regulation policy;empirical analysis;market power;concentration index;industrial economics;empirical evidence;contractual condition;media coverage;infinitesimal change;selection criterion;discrete change;political variable;logistic distribution;process use;increased export;economic model;foreign company;linear function;antitrust regulation;statistical relationship;econometric model;market efficiency;quantitative measure;Competition Law;expected value;positive correlation;upper right;high share;efficiency claims;section show;ancillary agreements;Antitrust Law;negative effect;indirect utility;standard error;negative sign;regression model;free access;productive capacity;case file;competitive effect;determining outcome;distribution network;economic integration;production technology;judicial review;extensive use;accurate assessment;future research;administrative cost;research design;law applicable;merger control;litigation process;quantitative techniques;Social Sciences;descriptive statistic;foreign trade;majority vote;regulatory control;factual information;urban travel;public economics;financial cost;accurate information;imperfect information;probit analysis;quality improvement;legal process;

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