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Di Bao : a guaranteed minimum income in urban China (Inglês)

Concerns about incentives and targeting naturally arise when cash transfers are used to fight poverty. The authors address these concerns in the context of China's Di Bao program, which uses means-tested transfers to try to assure that no registered urban resident has an income below a stipulated poverty line. There is little sign in the data of poverty traps due to high benefit withdrawal rates. Targeting performance is excellent by various measures. Di Bao appears to be better targeted than any other program in the developing world. However, all but one measure of targeting performance is found to be uninformative, or even deceptive, about impacts on poverty. The authors find that the majority of the poor are not receiving help, even with a generous allowance for measurement errors. While on paper, Di Bao would eliminate urban poverty, it falls well short of that ideal in practice.

Detalhes

  • Autor

    Chen,Shaohua, Ravallion,Martin, Wang,Youjuan

  • Data do documento

    2006/01/01

  • TIpo de documento

    Documento de trabalho sobre pesquisa de políticas

  • No. do relatório

    WPS3805

  • Nº do volume

    1

  • Total Volume(s)

    1

  • País

    China,

  • Região

    Leste Asiático e Pacífico,

  • Data de divulgação

    2010/07/01

  • Disclosure Status

    Disclosed

  • Nome do documento

    Di Bao : a guaranteed minimum income in urban China?

  • Palavras-chave

    impact on poverty;targeting performance;annual per capita income;poverty in developing country;high marginal tax rate;positive marginal tax rate;household income per person;female head of household;behavioral response;poverty gap index;measurement error;square poverty gap;years of schooling;propensity score matching;guaranteed minimum income;cash transfer program;net income gain;headcount index;targeted transfer program;concept of income;work at home;adverse incentive effect;cumulative distribution function;local fiscal capacity;share of transfer;type 1 error;type 2 error;assessments of impacts;sum of money;household survey data;extent of coverage;share of children;poverty gap measure;redistribution of income;predictor participation;national tax journal;decomposable poverty measure;liquefied petroleum gas;development research group;difference in income;indicators of costs;cash transfer scheme;lack of skill;bureau of statistic;method of estimation;standard normal distribution;poverty impact;withdrawal rate;Poverty measures;financial asset;urban resident;transfer payment;program impact;labor supply;participation rate;concentration index;frequency distribution;correlation coefficient;selection bias;estimate impact;household characteristic;sample mean;eligible population;targeted program;coverage rate;standard error;current income;poverty trap;field work;geographic area;measure of use;urban population;income measurement;increasing function;expected value;wage ratio;social security;social assistance;financial wealth;chronically poor;gross income;national policy;economic welfare;positive correlation;program coverage;predictive power;transfer income;behavioral effect;work requirement;instrumental variable;aggregate poverty;urban household;summary statistic;administrative capability;reduced inequality;household size;fighting poverty;survey instrument;urban sample;fiscal contraction;metropolitan area;Public Spending;Transient Poverty;negative effect;earned income;anecdotal evidence;positive coefficient;household labor;Political Economy;income loss;causal effect;observational study;treatment group;heating equipment;formal regulation;mathematical analysis;behavioral impact;income inequality;evaluation method;longitudinal data;Real estate;employer subsidy;private enterprise;regression coefficient;unobserved variable;share holding;common problems;welfare indicator;income variable;migration decision;economic reform;fiscal incidence;subjective perceptions;total sample;standard definition;respondents felt;program participation;eliminating poverty;income concepts;questionable assumption;housing condition;high share;high concentration;empirical work;incentive problem;local administrator;income question;consumer durable;neighborhood committee;income elasticity;urban residence;living standard;panel data;personal communication;income rise;informal interview;future research;future prospect;upper bind;qualitative research;field study;Community Services;reduced work;sample household;state council;international standard;city population;poor community;perfect targeting;public place;individual poverty;workfare program;rural area;technological research;Social Sciences;commercial service;targeting transfer;work disincentives;program assignment;objective criterion;aggregate income;

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