Skip to Main Navigation

Does participation improve project performance : establishing causality with subjective data (Inglês)

Development practitioners are coming to a consensus that participation by the intended beneficiaries improves project performance. But is there convincing evidence that this is true? Skeptics have three objections: 1) "Participation is not objective -- project rankings are subjective; 2) this subjectivity leads to "halo effects"; 3) better project performance may have increased beneficiary participation rather than the other way around -- a statistical association is not proof of cause and effect. The authors show methodologically how to answer each of these objections. Subjectivity does not preclude reliable cardinal measurement. Halo effects do not appear to induce a strong upward bias in estimating the effect of participation. Finally, instrumental variables estimation can help establish a structural cause and effect relationship between participation and project performance -- at least in the rural water supply projects they studied.


  • Autor

    Isham, Jonathan, Narayan, Deepa, Pritchett, Lant

  • Data do documento


  • TIpo de documento

    Documento de trabalho sobre pesquisa de políticas

  • No. do relatório


  • Nº do volume


  • Total Volume(s)


  • País


  • Região

    Regiões Mundiais,

  • Data de divulgação


  • Disclosure Status


  • Nome do documento

    Does participation improve project performance : establishing causality with subjective data

  • Palavras-chave

    halo effect;degree of measurement error;instrumental variable estimation;project performance indicator;degrees of freedom;operations and maintenance;linear probability model;beneficiary participation;impact on performance;central bank independence;public sector agency;effect of aid;linear regression analysis;consistent standard error;participation of beneficiary;random measurement error;case study method;human resource management;performance determinant;project effectiveness;independent variable;statistical association;correlation coefficient;water system;subjective nature;participation effect;functional form;consistent estimate;causal impact;intended beneficiary;statistical technique;regression results;linear model;linear relationship;estimate impact;exclusion restriction;subjective judgement;performance assessment;empirical evidence;exogenous changes;subjective indicators;utility index;informal sector;panel data;payment system;convergence hypothesis;household size;Public Services;cultural context;endogenous growth;labor regulation;university press;critical consciousness;futures clearinghouse;opportunity cost;Labor Market;exogenous variable;export incentive;community participation;fiscal consolidation;payment method;water right;exogenous shift;rural community;private information;free riding;creating incentives;Emerging economies;bore hole;community group;building material;Water Services;uruguay round;industrial structure;commodity export;emerging economy;real numbers;environmental context;downward bias;investment cost;causal effect;average values;multivariate model;random noise;random error;statistical relationship;downward movement;population target;econometric issue;performance factor;project datum;standard deviation;indirect impact;participatory development;explanatory variable;finance agency;institutional evaluation;empirical exercise;dissenting view;social scientist;performance categories;multivariate regression;grassroots organization;integer range;systematic measurement;project participation;aid agency;endogenous variable;clean water;empirical analysis;statistical procedure;statistical results;subjective evaluation;econometric problem;subjective data;relative price;success indicator;subjective assessment;point estimate;infrastructure policy;institutional incentive;national irrigation;basic model;education organization;research facility;qualitative analysis;statistical data;summary statistic;quantitative evaluation;high correlation;regression coefficient;Higher Education;qualitative evaluation;rural water;gas trade;participatory approach;direct beneficiaries;effective participation;



Versão oficial do documento (pode conter assinaturas, etc.)

  • PDF oficial
  • TXT*
  • Total Downloads** :
  • Download Stats
  • *A versão do texto é um OCR incorreto e está incluído unicamente em benefício de usuários com conectividade lenta.