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The allocation of textile and apparel export quotas among companies (Inglês)

Optimal allocation of textile and apparel export quotas among various companies in an exporting country necessitates appropriate policies to maximize efficiency and increase output of a particular commodity. This situation in the textile and apparel industry is a result of relatively recent protectionist measures such as the Multifiber Arrangements. Under these arrangements, importing countries consult with exporting countries on the terms of export restraint arrangements which usually yield bilateral agreements. These agreements in turn specify a quota limit on the quantities of commodity categories that each country might export to a relevant importing country in each time period. Once a country's export quota is fixed, quotas must be distributed either to exporting companies or to importing companies, depending on the form of administration of the restraint system. This paper will, in Part II, discuss the principles of optimal allocation of quotas among exporting firms, where the exporting country is empowered to allocate and the expected effects of different allocational arrangements. In Part III, it will discuss the rules for allocation of quota among firms that actually prevail and the expected consequences of those rules and practices.

Detalhes

  • Autor

    Rottenberg, Simon

  • Data do documento

    1985/06/30

  • TIpo de documento

    Documento de trabalho departamental

  • No. do relatório

    CPD8524

  • Nº do volume

    1

  • Total Volume(s)

    1

  • País

    Mundo,

  • Região

    Regiões Mundiais,

  • Data de divulgação

    2017/11/14

  • Disclosure Status

    Disclosed

  • Nome do documento

    The allocation of textile and apparel export quotas among companies

  • Palavras-chave

    general agreement on tariffs and trade;international trade in textiles;efficiency of resource use;european common market;marginal cost of production;export quota;allocation of quota;barrier to entry;distribution of rent;quota holder;price of export;allocation of right;transfer of quota;quantity of exports;return on investment;free trade zone;restrictions on export;gross national product;competitive market price;production of commodity;factor of production;market equilibrium price;discounted present value;average production cost;hong kong dollar;ex ante estimates;export of apparel;efficiency of firms;production and export;governments of country;average variable cost;sale of commodities;claim to resources;trading companies;export performance;real resource;export market;deadweight loss;export tax;commodity price;export license;export commodity;public policy;commodity export;supply schedule;exporting firms;quantitative restriction;private monopoly;Permanent Transfer;public authority;exporting country;customary practice;export orders;base period;quota holding;commodity production;economic efficiency;world economy;transfer payment;discount value;relative magnitude;demand schedule;domestic consumption;transfer market;allocation system;private monopolist;market circumstances;apparel export;trade constraints;optimal allocation;competitive world;apparel industry;import companies;bilateral agreement;scarcity rent;capital value;export company;normal return;quota allocations;arbitrage operation;selling price;Research Support;cottage industry;tax rate;information cost;resource cost;material quality;preferential access;import good;political pressure;foreign investor;right holder;firm size;productive efficiency;depressed area;inefficient firms;quota limits;Learning and Innovation Credit;hold rights;marginal product;cost production;capital asset;marginal revenue;implicit tax;apparel producers;exportable goods;apparel trade;textile quotas;future time;public revenue;ration quota;private payment;rank order;production conditions;regulatory rule;entry barrier;alternative use;cost condition;initial distribution;elastic demand;government revenue;commercial market;production activity;binding constraint;net earning;private decisions;social interest;input market;social cost;export trade;small fraction;permit flexibility;licensing arrangement;high reward;asian countries;trading system;efficient production;auction market;auction sale;quota assignments;full quota;minimum price;low-cost exporters;import market;market disruption;ethical neutrality;import quota;quota rent;large transaction;export transaction;exportable commodity;fixed supply;international market;average cost;product price;export quantity;

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