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Lessons from international experience with electricity market monitoring (Inglês)

The author first describes those features of the electricity supply industry that make a prospective market monitoring process essential to a well-functioning wholesale market. Some of these features are shared with the securities industry, although the technology of electricity production and delivery make a reliable transmission network a necessary condition for an efficient wholesale market. These features of the electricity supply industry also make antitrust or competition law alone an inadequate foundation for an electricity market monitoring process. The author provides examples of both the successes and failures of market monitoring from several international markets. More than 10 years of experience with the electricity industry restructuring process has shown that market failures are more likely and substantially more harmful to consumers than other market failures because of how electricity is produced and delivered and the crucial role it plays in the modern economy. Wholesale market meltdowns of varying magnitudes and durations have occurred in electricity markets around the world, and many of them could have been prevented if a prospective market monitoring process backed by the prevailing regulatory authority had been in place at the start of the market.

Detalhes

  • Autor

    Wolak,Frank Anthony

  • Data do documento

    2005/09/01

  • TIpo de documento

    Documento de trabalho sobre pesquisa de políticas

  • No. do relatório

    WPS3692

  • Nº do volume

    1

  • Total Volume(s)

    1

  • País

    Mundo,

  • Região

    Regiões Mundiais,

  • Data de divulgação

    2010/07/01

  • Disclosure Status

    Disclosed

  • Nome do documento

    Lessons from international experience with electricity market monitoring

  • Palavras-chave

    monitoring process;market participant;abuse of market power;exercise of market power;System and Market Operator;Abuse of Dominant Position;retail price of electricity;short period of time;open lines of communication;electricity market monitoring;wholesale market;wholesale electricity market;electricity supply industry;market design;sequence of events;success and failure;lack of competition;average spot price;resistance to change;consumers of electricity;independent system operator;producer of electricity;electricity industry restructuring;process of reform;centers of activity;liquid spot market;cost of participation;investment in technology;gas and electricity;lack of incentive;natural gas regulator;wholesale electricity price;quality of supply;standards of integrity;excessively high price;information on market;market performance;market rule;market outcome;transmission network;regulatory process;wholesale price;wealth transfer;significant harm;market manipulation;regulatory intervention;market failure;political process;market condition;Competition Law;monitoring protocols;system operation;bidding behavior;market price;market efficiency;regulatory oversight;price cap;output level;change process;Contractual obligations;governance process;regulatory authority;security market;energy purchase;modern economy;data confidentiality;internal market;regulatory risk;energy trader;regulatory commission;electricity crisis;market oversight;financial market;illegal activities;average price;price movement;legal process;international market;trade day;electricity production;unilateral action;electricity pool;security industry;market operation;important component;commitment device;potential abuse;collected information;monitoring function;license agreement;price spike;separate entity;market change;vital signs;public statement;financial service;confidential data;electricity producer;regulatory mechanism;maximum amount;peak demand;generation capacity;academic study;political decision;coordinated action;competition authority;collusive behavior;trade sector;Antitrust Law;electricity network;price decline;retail market;generation entry;effective monitoring;market inefficiency;wholesale energy;potential danger;apparent success;long-term contract;qualified candidates;consumer representation;government regulator;Regulatory Bodies;hydroelectric capacity;regulatory body;daily demand;governance function;financial interest;distribution company;future demand;effective strategy;supply condition;transmission investment;research program;ownership share;common perception;grid reliability;system failure;large transaction;production process;geographic area;future market;market opening;regulatory action;interagency coordination;Energy Sector;inefficient market;energy delivery;fossil-fuel generation;political pressure;criminal authority;energy supplier;capacity payment;demand growth;regional market;reform process;market analysis;full disclosure;result data;water conditions;relevant market;illegal behavior;trading strategy;adverse conditions;market reform;telephone conversation;efficiency loss;opportunity cost;financial contract;regulatory structure;capacity constraint;primary reason;empirical analysis;fair deal;

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